Military History: Reconstruction - Philippine Insurrection (1865-1901) (about 5 weeks)
Military History: Reconstruction - Philippine Insurrection (1865-1901) (about 5 weeks) History 4394
Popular in American Military History after 1865
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This 53 page Bundle was uploaded by Sophie Walker on Monday February 15, 2016. The Bundle belongs to History 4394 at Baylor University taught by Dr. David Smith in Winter 2016. Since its upload, it has received 68 views. For similar materials see American Military History after 1865 in History at Baylor University.
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Date Created: 02/15/16
Partial List of Terms Friday, January 15, 2016 8:04 AM Center of Gravity: -Clausewitz: Prussian -Jomini: French; during Napoleon -ideas reached West Point around 1730s -basically wrote a How To manual on war -how effective campaigns are managed -interior lines: fight on your own soil/let enemy come to you; can create an efficient way to fight the diff fronts Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) The Levels of War: Tactical, Operational, Strategic, Grand Strategic Maneuver Warfare Envelopment: -holy grail of tactical combat -goes back to Roman Era -battle of Cane (Can-Ey):Carthinians defeat Romans -Battle of Cowpen: Amers kind did to Brits -begin of WWI: closest way that mimicked Battle of Kane -Schleifen: wants to envelope France; try 6 weeks -had trouble getting through Belgium; try double envelop -transfer some troops to the south -Right Hook of Germans is weakened --> Brit/Fr could be stopped -want to replicate Battle of K; will be really awesome if you can Cannae (216 b.c.) Turning Movement: -Want to negate advantages of being on the defensive side st 1 Manassas (1861) Unit sizes: Company, Regiment, Division, Corps Branches (increase in side): Infantry Cavalry: very mobile; light/heavy -Plains Indians: light calv; no armor, quick, etc -Knight: heavy (armor, lance, huge horse); Abrahm's tank; very slow Armor: heavily armored mobile (but less than calvary) forces Friction: Clausewitz -"no plan survives the initial contact with the enemy" -murphy's law -things happen/can't predict -one thing goes wrong --> everything falls apart -Civ War: -someone loses Lee's orders --> messes all kind of shit up Fog: Clausewitz -always going to be unknown that can't anticipate (gaps in intel, etc) -Civ War: -Lee loses contact w Stewart's contact -Amer Rev: -the literal fog on the river that allowed Washington/troops to move unseen -Lifting the Fog of War: with advancement of tech --> no reason for there to be fog anymore/will always know everything -good if opponent is fighting way you are -our enemies want to create fog -personally don't really believe in this; Linear tactics: worked before rifle muskets -Brit soldier standing in field, in a line, walking to drum -whole rank of soldiers with muskets, point same direction/fire --> someone going to get hit -exchange volleys/slowly inch up by switching ranks until close enough to charge with bayonets -much discipline needed to hold the ranks (bc bullets are fucking flying at you and someone's going to get hit) Culminating Point of Victory: -Korean War -S Korea force falls short of CPoV; driven all the way down to the bottom of the peninsula -S Korea gets better defense position bc territory so contracted; can use interior lines; -N Korea more venerable to air strikes -air power plays a big factor/shows how important air power is (supplies/cut off communication) -passed S Korea's CVoP once pass 38 parallel --> mission creep -kind of messes things up when pass CVoP -Kuwait: doesn't want to go too far --> pulls out too early/kind of messes things up -every war has to attend to; both strategic/operation way -operation: Pearl Harbor; called off before finished --> wasn't as decisive as could've been -didn't know where US carriers were/they may know where JP is -didn't want to risk his fleet --> calls it off; shouldn't have called it off -JP: army/navy didn't get along well; kind of messed things up Limited war Insurrection Irregular warfare: a lot during/after Cold War -counter insurgency vs guerilla war -plains inds fight unconventionally against US Guerilla warfare: -can't fight with g war; have to fight with a counter -Philippines vs US after being annexed The “spectrum” of war Clausewitz’s “trinity”: complicated but important; will always be there -war: very complex interplay btwn 3 nonmaterial forces 1 Reason: human capacity for reason/rational decisions 2 Chance: fog of war, friction; can't be foreseen/just happen 3 Passion: anger, boredom; feelings -how going to work with these three nonmaterial things --> war 1 Government: rational item that keeps everything in balance 2 People: the population involved in the war 3 Military: responsibility to deal with fog, friction, chance, etc -out of balance --> military's success goes down -Bismark: plans a war with neighbors; limited wars with very precise objectives -Austria: Prussia won a few --> let's talk --> Austria accepted Bismark/surrendered -heads down to Balkins (lol WWI later on) -France: wants surrender southern German states -invades Fr --> wins --> Fr doesn't surrender --> go deeper into Fr/cont fighting --> more issues/Bismark loses control -army wants to invade Paris, Bis doesn't want too --> disrupts the inequality of the triangle; should've fired the generals --> completely changes the world (Fr hates Germany after that) -US-Mexican War: -Scoot takes Mexico but Mex doesn't surrender; US just waited until did --> worked out very well in the end -WWI: -German/Fr high command: make things out of balance -Vietnam: -Tet Offensive: N/Vietcong against US/S (early '68) -well planned; gets every big S Viet city; totally shocks US bc didn't think they'd do that (said we were winning but totally weren't) -becomes catastrophe for N--> come out into open/slaughtered -operational disaster for N but strategic disaster for US --> lose ppl's support --> collapses the triangle -people hate the military (spit on, etc) “Indirect approach” Prepared Position Tactical Integrity -______________ Way of War: -China: has specific way to fight -kind of moving away from the way they fight -every mil institution should have a model of how/why to fight -friction: always there; keeps from fighting way to fight -find the way your enemy fights --> attack their strategy, not their troops -Doctrine of the Offensive -win a battle by pushing enemy onto defensiveness; charge/break the lines -WW1: foundation of trench war far French: the spirit of the troops (elan vital) -will win bc they have the greater spirit/can take the offensive --> caused more casualties than needed -truth in it until there are counters to the idea -Prussians had the smallest but most trained army --> allowed them to win a lot -JP decide to embrace W technology/do away with old feudal ways -go to Brit to help build Navy (builds relationship for WWI) -Prussians/Germans to help build Army (for WW2) Reconstruction/Post Civ War Wednesday, January 20, 2016 8:46 AM Jan 20: -very political -military gets involved in Rec very early (even before it starts) -provosts martials (MP's): secure the peace/promote domestic stability beyond where armies are; keeping the peace in S during the war -radical repubs: want to completely remake the south -army (in general) want that too -army: -Oliver O Howard (Howard Uni): Maj Gen; in command of Freedman's Bearu (redist of land); want blacks to had their rights -doesn't want S to go back bc paid too big of a price -occurs all the time: they fought/don't want things to go back bc they suffered for that change (from Grant to present day) -Andrew Johnson: -doesn’t want S to change --> doesn't agree with the army/radical repubs -he's Command in Chief -gets him impeached -Cong/Johnson fight over control of army over South -Grant: -new position: Commanding General (not used really since Washington) -complete operational control of Army Jan 22: -US military professionalism changes after Civ War: -focus more on professional aspects vs how thought of before -idea of Amer solider: -adopts from British: -citizen soldiers: efficient, effective, backbone of democracy thinks soldier should be -suspicion of standing solider (fear of oppression) -downplays professionalism bc have such strong view of cit solider -elitism v galiantism -pre Civ War: -engineering degree when go to W Pnt -18030: start studying mil history -very formulatize: win a battle --> do this; etc -after Civ War: -"postwar hangover:" war was so taxing -6 hr long parade: April, 1865 (over 1 mil ppl in the army) -Oct, 1865: below 250,000 -volunteers pushed back into society --> pro army shrinks drastically -cong makes max size: 27,000 ppl -active duty soldiers: policing missions -200ish forts around US; most small/out W (2-3 companies) -boring AF workkkk vs how the idea of professionalism grows -no one wants to do this work -after industrial/reconstruction: the pro army become self-consciously isolated -lingering effects of triumph of war/how quick army shrank/society moved on -focus more inward: what makes up diff -think about idea of war, way of war, etc -Uptom: first US guy to think of war like this -Sherman: likes idea of continuation of education (after W Pnt); school of higher professionalism -each branch should have their own school (infantry school, cav school, etc) -Army War College: highest pnt of ed; study more strategy, ideas of war, etc -society: 1870s: more specialized -factory system: job specialization; professionalization ethic absorbed in society -hard to get promoted: -had to do s'thing heroic--> didn't happen -stick with it/slowly go up rank -know someone in Cong -Custard: -promoted to high gen rank during -after war: everyone go back to pre war rank: LTC (Sec of Def/Cong decide) -didn't need that high of an officer -post Vietnam: -promotions changed --> Snr Officers in Command at the time didn’t really know much --> want officers to be more educated -proficient civ and mil education Reconstruction: -Johnson: -signing tons of pardons for Confed sols/anybody -army: didn't want lots of Confed soldiers pardoned/reinstated w political power -army has huge difficulty there -constantly harassed by S -Johnson doesn't really care how they're being treated -Stanton/Grant being more protective of Army against Johnson -have clashing views of how want to use the army -tenure of office act: -Johnson violates --> impeached -pres can't fire an official who has his position with senate approval w/o firing being sanctioned by senate -senate says you have job, senate has to approve for pres to fire you --> protects Stanton; Johnsons wants him goneeeeee -also Command of the Army Act: -expressed attempt to take Pres out of Chain of Command -all orders to armies in the field have to go through Sec of Def (Stanton has to make all the orders) --> reflects ambiguity of C of C in Const -not worked really worked out until 1980s -Lincoln/McLennan: L fired Mc/hires Polk; keeps going through diff ppl -what does is mean to be Com in Chief (operational? Lin ran the war) -2 army structures: -army loses on both ends: where do your loyalties lay -Frontier army had no connection with Reconst Army -affects promotions; S get more promoted/noticed by Cong -Johnson: comman those in the W -Johnson --> Field Cmmds (didn't really care/take advantage of this) -Army of Reconst: Stanton --> Grant --> Field Cmmds -Johnson/Grant: -J talks to Grant; seems like a good solider/yes man; wants to replace Stanton w Grant -Grant doesn't want to be Sec of Defense -army gets wrapped up in politics even if doesn't want to -Reconst damages army --> tempts officer into pol action -after Johnson: -Grant becomes pres -Belkanp: very political; Sherman hatesssss bc gets in the way of his stuff -almost impeached for corruptly awarding supply contracts to Natives Inds/shady ppl -suttlers: give supplies to forts/inds --> Belkanp helps them out (I think) -Cong calls back officers to testify -Custard called up for testimony: wants to get back to frontier -Sherman leave DC/moves HQ to St Louis: -Sheridan works w -creates strategy of how Army should approach the Inds -campaigns: destroy everything; total war -totally war = decisive victory over Inds -once army pulled out of S: -either went back to civ life or moved to frontier -more solds in frontier had Reconst experience Savage/Amer Way of War Monday, January 25, 2016 8:02 AM American Way of War: -national strategy v military strategy -don’t think about after effects of what consequences will be -Sherman or Lee??: burn the S --> affects S later but at the time didn't matter bc just want to win -Civ War diff than other wars; Civ War is going to have greater effect on ppl -annihilation v attrition -US tends to like annihilation more -did Sherman's way of war (annihilation) set the trend or did they already think that -US mil is the last resort when diplomacy can't be reached? -or just the only option we want --> we want action -WW2: stronger nation --> changes war -increasing influence/strength --> changes how Amers think of Mil strategy -stronger/greater reach --> changes how think fight -wage war bc we have to v wage war bc of want to -we now have the means to annihilate --> prefer -used to be more attrition based bc our means were smaller -Claseuvitz (total wars are unusual) vs Greek/US likes to annihilate -not always good to have total war -how media changes ppl's views of mil -means to change public's perception -media: show bomb stuff -ppl know mil's strength/capabilities -journalism has changed more than media technology has changed -want to destroy enemy but want to do it nicely -ISIS -hard to do annihilation against them -don't want annihilation or attrition -Amer views on war: -being misinterpreted Plains Indians/US Wednesday, January 27, 2016 8:00 AM Look up West Point Atlas -mobile warfare: army didn't really use before -maneuver warfare: fight on horseback -transition: develop weapons that can be used in mobile war -Colt revolver -_______ rifle -Plains Inds: -excellent light calvary -fight while moving -light but effective weapons: short bows/arrows -horseback -tactic: raids, hit/run, ambush: strike hard/withdraw fast -warfare: doesn't involve strategy -no idea of campaigning -just simple attacks/fights--> over; not really annihilation POV -similar to attrition but don't plan on battles building on each other -tribes don't really work/communicate together -almost never concentrate btwn tribes in large number -exception: Sioux War --> Custard gets slaughtered -largest concentration -warriors v soldiers: different -warriors: fought for personal pride, honor, glory, etc w/in tribe -after battle: sing songs/praise warriors who could "touch"/be close range with enemy -soldiers: their job -helps Amers win: -Amers do campaigns that are strung together --> Inds don't do that; don't think strategically -treaties: -difficult to do; each tribe wants their own terms -each tribe doesn't have just one big spokesperson -want an opponent who can make diplomacy with -tribes: very ind -each branch of the tribe had their own ind as well -like to project on enemy their (US's) image -ie: take away their dictator --> democracy will come -take out Bin Laden --> all finish (lol) -know your enemy --> don't assume (Clausewitz doesn't mention/think like this) -TX panhandle, MO, West Dakota, Wyoming -use river to move troops/supplies in North -expanding railroads: -bringing supplies is easier -Cheyenne/Comanche: -moved to reservation: -small groups who resist --> army has to go get them Bozeman Trail: 1863-68 -forged during Civ War -gold discovered: -passes through ancestral Sioux grounds -build forts: Fort Smith/Fort Kearny -come under lots of attacks -hostile forces attack foraging parties, scouts, patrols, not actual fort Fetterman Massacre: Dec 21, 1866 -CPT: hears reports of attacks --> leads 80 soldiers to relieve this woodcutting party -whole unit massacred by Inds Red Cloud's War: 1866-68 -most prominent chief in the region (N Wyoming/S MT) -want whites out of this area -war made up of raids, ambushes, etc -US super frustrated -Reconstruction: most of soldiers are busy in the S -Johnson has control of W but doesn't care --> fighting Congress about the S -US solds don't have support to defend themselves -parallel: -Korea W/Europe occupation -afraid to pull solds out of Europe to go fight Korea -don't want to be distracted by Korea: Europe is the main focus Treaty of Ft Laramie: April 29, 1868 -big victory for Sioux/Red Cloud --> ends Red Coulds War -closes those forts (burned down)/Bozeman Trail -absence of Ft Smith: crucial when go to war in 1875/76 -shift armies focus to S (TX panhandle) -has a railroad down there --> effects stuff -same line cattle/army uses -more success there bc tighter communication/supply Phil Sheridan: -under Sherman -Head of Depart of MO: everything on left of Missouri -unconventional/total war -campaigning: -in the winter against the infrastructure (buffalo, pony heard, hit the society) Battle of Washita: Nov 27 1868 (very W Oklahoma/close to TX) -Custer: attack Black Kettle's tribes -placate the S if do this -attempt at pacification through focused pretty small uses of force --> get Inds back to reservation -captures village, kills/capts lots of ppl (prob woman/children) or abandons his company as they chase Inds -against civs operation -sends w/children back to reservation; rumors that most killed were w/kids -heads back N without his troops who followed the Inds --> later found dead/mutilated --> C is blame -wants big victory so can get attn/lead to promotion G.A. Custer: -lots of beef with about 1/2 of officer -has political/military ambitions -wouldn't mind being president eventually -victim of the way the army is at the point: -very politicized (like Brit army was during US Revolution): -lots of officers are mebs of Parliament of have patrons who are high in the Gov -Clinton, Howe, Cornwallis, some other ppl -subordinates will go over their com in chief/get Parliament approval for other operations -thinking about operations that will give him better opportunity for his future -driven by things mil officers shouldn't be driven by -Reno/Bintine: don't like him Red River War: 1874-75 (S plains W part 2) -ppl feeling reservations -June 27, 1874: -group of Inds attack groups of buffalo hunters (Adobe Vaults) -triggers army to come in to panhandle again -series of forts surrounding the area: converging columns -put pressure on Inds to go certain direction --> towards major block force that will defeat them (Hunt for Red October) -success: try to do this in N against Sioux Sioux War: 1875-76: Battle of Little Big Horn: June 25, 1876 -Custard didn't have good intel; didn't really know what was going on -Ft Abraham Lincoln right on the river; lots of other forces -Inds need to be brought back to reservation -assume Inds are in certain area/can find with these converging columns -scouts: always find where were but never where are; think know where going -columns become more concentrated -don't know how many Inds there are --> assumer there aren't going to be that many bc Inds never had group together -Custer is under Terry -today's army: -not really political today even though think it is -officers have done good of remaining unpol Custer's Campaign Red: US Green: Inds Friday, January 29, 2016 8:05 AM Little Big Horn (about 3, 4 weeks) -operationally: makes sense; Custer just kinda fucks things up later -comes from concept of converging columns; this worked in TX panhandle -campaign conts after battle -based on assumptions: -Inds do hit/run; are in small numbers -find sings of Ind camps but moving west -Gibon: sets up supply near river; then sets up new LBH -little ferry: supply/movement -biggest problem: -Crook's camp is attacked by sizable force of Inds -not hit/fun; more hit/push method --> Crook falls back --> takes away S convergence/removes one of the columns -Crook finds out there are lot of Inds/not fighting way usually are -Terry/Gibbon: don't find out what happened --> clearly a lack of communication btwn columns -Terry: -sent Custer down river--> was supposed to meet Crook -Terry/Gibbon meet/maneuver together -Custer/Crook were supposed to push Inds up to T/G -Custer: -sees smoke--> thinks Inds --> takes his troops -support is lagging; doesn't wait for them to catch up; sends Reno to Inds -Inds meet Reno in field (don't bolt like thought would)/try to flank -Custer tries to envelop camp from both sides -Reno retreats --> Inds meet Custer --> wiped out at Last Stand Hill -T/G are waiting for Inds -Custer/Inds don't show up -T/G go down/see what happens -Inds: -interior lines -this isn't their way of strategy -thought this was the end/the big battle -afterwards: army just chases Inds/wait for them to surrender -last big win for the Inds -fog: where were the Inds/how many -Washington: -attack at Germantown w 5 converging columns --> collapses bc lack of communication -much smaller area than LBH area --> diff to keep communication up with these kinds of operations -Custer: everything he does makes sense to him -may make bad decisions based on Inds will/wont (wrong about both) -rash/impetuous bc of army's situation --> wants that promotion to General -Reconstruct ends 77; LBH is 66 -Cong done with the Army --> less political afterwards/Army not as needed --> "turns" inward -good timing: after 77/78: Inds mostly go quiet/Army isn't faced with much pressure 1880-mid 90s (can reasses themselves) -after Vietnam: -lot of soul searching for Army --> can reflect on themselves; did had to deal with public's bad opinion -technology: both sides must adapt US Navy/Army Monday, February 1, 2016 8:10 AM -not much strategic thought w Naval power until 1880s/90s -needed clearer strategic vision w N than Army --> use them differently -US: protected by two oceans/isolation --> tend to have more reactive than proactive way to use N -don't have to use N very much bc of the oceans -N always a tug/war btwn the gov: Feds created navy -Jeffosinians don't like: expensive/like isolation -N can lead to trouble if go abroad -isolation country: just need a navy to defend coastal defense -Revolution War, War 1812: some good N guys but no one really cared -N Academy starts 1840 -tech advances: steel, steam --> different kind of N with diff kind of missions -read: -think of strategy -under what situations should US undertake to project pwrs abroad vs staying here/fulfilling more defensive positions -what kind of pwr to project: air strike, boots on the ground, naval pwr -what's the process look like to make those decisions -after Reconstruct: -Army turns inward/looks at its professionalism -was mad that gov used for this -Sherman: -upper schools of division are created -try to make Army less political/tied with gov -modernizing the army --> military science/thought 1870s: more democratic gov -don't deal with army as much -republican take better care of -about 15 yrs to pull self back from politics -turns more to professionalism -vietnam/Reconstruction with the army -very similar things happen -introspection: doesn't happen after WW2 -after V: -service academies look more at what they do strategically than ever before -navy: institutes more higher lvl courses --> look at history/reflect on it/what went wrong Navy (cont) Wednesday, February 3, 2016 8:05 AM -read Clausewitz -tactical prescription: here's what you do to win a battle -not individual prescriptions; more of the idea of the formula/steps on how to win a battle -Stephen Luce/Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History -Industrialization/Reconst: -shift away from armed forces --> no one really cares about them (Cong kept cutting budget) --> changes the way army think about self --> marginalized in society -business passivism: -more interested in economics -military is in opposition to the positive growth of economy -spending money on big army/navy --> take away "stable world" in which economics/commerce can thrive --> military isolated from society -fortress mentality: we know what we're about; screw you guys/who cares what you think about us -growth interest in higher education --> professionalism (Sherman est schools) -reflects -schools: -sent soldiers to fort to learn these skills -more currently military is not isolated due to how active military has been (WW2- after) -air force helped change the view also once became its own branch -Stephen Luce: -est Naval War College (1880s) -Cpts/upper ranking officers will study war as war: what influences, how it is, how to use navies strategically -study how to use fleets (if had fleets) in ambitious ways: strategic thought v tactic thought -these officers already know everything there is to know about a ship (all the tactical stuff); so work on strategy -moving from age of sailing to steam power -most ships weren't good at blue water action (away from coast; brown water = close to coast -Monitors: have a fleet of these but these are useless for away from coast -Alfred Thayer Mahan: -teachers at the War College; main naval history guy -1890: publishes book The Influences of Sea Power Upon History (history book) -focuses on 1660-1783: 2nd part Dutch War - Revolutionary War -how navies used against each other; all come from his lectures -preface: talked about the idea of sea power throughout history of the world --> all the beef is in here -goes back to Greeks/Romans: key element -Rome finally defeated Carthaginians -Rome had command of Mediterranean; through sea power could put troops anywhere/no rivals in that area for control of the sea -command of the sea: every great pwr had command of the sea --> makes a nation powerful -nations neglect this: 2nd places (Prussia; had great army but no navy so couldn't spread out) -great nation --> great navy -1880s: US is 13th best navy -1885: start from scratch -1900: US has 3rd largest navy -sink one of the navies above us -advancements: build ships quickly -all of the fleet is modern/new --> even gives us advantage to Brit -how to use the fleet/what to use it for: strategic questions -becomes a big deal -debate btwn Mahan and Julian Corbett (Brit guy)--> influences navy history after that -2 navy theorists that compete in 20th century; what do you do with your navy -Mahan: concentrate your fleet/use it to defeat other battle fleets (other navies); -to do: concentrate your fleet (don't spread it out); have command of the sea bc defeated opponent/no one else to challenge you -opponent doesn’t concentrate: can easily wipe out o -later thinks about Napolean: lost fleet --> couldn't invade England anymore (2nd vol) -Amers win Revolutionary War --> French Sea power defeated Brit navy -command of sea at crucial moment --> makes nation great -civilians also study this book: want to turn US into world power -competitive implications of Darwinism (survival of the fittest bitchesssss) --> only way for US to move forward -fleet of monitors/old sailing ships --> that's weak yo -business passivism: US becomes a weak economic competition --> ppl want it to be more -Theodore Roosevelt: -read this --> this book transformed way Amers think about navy -Congress: -start being concerned of size of navy -these ideas will most likely lead to desire to want to have a bigger navy -Chester Harvard: -first president to be interested in modernizing navy -known for: -being VP when Garfield killed -poster boy of political corruption -radical change of heart after becoming president/signing 1st civil reform act -starts signing off on increased naval appropriations; OK's construction of 1st all steam/steel ship for the navy -taking known naval technology/adapt them to steel -take model of frigit, friget (wooden ship?), and build it with steal instead of oak -Brit/US first to really do this -but don't copy the Brit; going to go in the same evolutionary paths (bc same culture) -if Brit doing it, prob best thing to do (they have best navy at the time) -Brit wins first world war (7 yr war) bc of their use of the navy; strongest power during Mahan's book -Brits: will later build armor for bigger battleships --> we'll use that stuff later -more of an evolution instead of revolution in tech -not really copying anyone -deep hull (deeper in the water), sharper keel (bottom of the ship): keep from flipping over -monitors: had flatter bottom -steam vs wind: -only downside: have to carry fuel -The Monitor (the Union used): -first ship with revolving turret -98% of the stuff to operate the ship is below the water -very think iron plated walls -two cannons mounted in it but can still turn 360 -navy likes this: builds more w/ 1 or 2 cannon -doesn't do well in blue water; rolls over Larger the bulb: Water will compress the sides to make it stronger Mahan v Corbett Friday, February 5, 2016 8:01 AM -Mahan: writes first; popular first -Corbett: not popular until 1911, 12 -doesn't matter that their books are 20 yrs apart; the ides they talk about are timeless so that's why there's competition btwn 2 views -19th cent: -last quarter: precipitance globalization of military thought (military thought grows on a global scale) -had global wars before: 7 yrs war -but moving toward: more sustainable of projected pwr --> steel hull/steam pwrered ships -Mahan: modern day navies -one of most important elements (of being world pwr): to have places were fleet can take on coal -need coal to fuel these steel ships -rule of thumb: never let your coal bunkers go below 50% 1 Never know when going to fill up next 2 Coal bunkers empty out --> open up at the top -coal dust collects: that shit is explosiveeeeeee so you don't want that space -safer have coal bunker filled --> need ind bases where can coal ship --> don't need alliances to do this stuff --> US looking at Pearl Harbor/W Pacific for a coal place -the one who emphasizes the most: Central American Canal -Suez Canal: opens 1869 -cuts distance Brit/India in 1/2 -transforms the strategic importance of Mediterranean -Brit plays bigger role in Eastern Mediterranean --> leads to protectorate of Egypt -bases: Cyprus; places that are near the exit of Red Sea that leads into Indian Ocean -Central Amer Canal: will transform the Caribbean -US will have a huge interest in the canal; US should start thinking of bases in Car -cover more of the Panama area than the Pacific Ocean side -how to use the navy/its purpose: -big picture: secure the sea as a means of communication/supplies -make sure shipping/communication lanes stay ocean -how do that?: take "command of the sea" -build a batter fleet; concentrate it; use it to defeat rivals with: ppl like this; this is exciting/not just sitting around and patrolling (Mahanian big battle concept) -concentration/offensive action: "buzzwords" for military thought during 2nd half of 19 cent -creating a "doctrine of the offensive" for the navy -strategic military boards: early 1900s -draw up peace-time war plans for the first time -increasing fleet/want to use it more --> necessitate prior planning -not perfected until 1910-15 -from where, how, when do you want to concentrate your fleet -build battleship as the center of your navy: "big gun battleship" is what's going to win the war -lesser ships: find diff kinds of uses -eventually idea: big heavy fleet, smaller fleet to fix enemy fleet -until WW1: -cruiser fleet outruns anything can't outfight -battle fleets: actually attack the feet -destroyers: don't come around until later; meant to cruis/protect battleships -battleships: can fight individually -Cong likes the idea of battleships -these are the high profile glamor weapons of the day -single most expensive thing any nation will build -event when Mahan doesn't apply: -Commodore Dewey over Spanish fleet: May, 1898 -Dewey goes against Spanish fleet/destroys it --> Spanish position in Philippines collapses -Cuba: Sp fleet destroyed by US -when Mahan is validated: -Tsushima: 1905 (Russia v JP) -everyone is watching the Russia-JP war: will validate/invalidate how building force -Russia Baltic fleet sails around the world to fight JP fleet -meets at straight btwn JP/Korean peninsula -one day/battle: huge fleet vs huge fleet: JP destroys Russia's fleet (almost completely defeats it) -this is Mahanian warfare!! --> Corbett starts coming in -Corbett: -purpose of the navy: help with wars -wars won: force your enemy to do your will (Clausewitz) -JP/Russia fought on land mostly on Korea; fought all the way up into Manchuria -all the flashiness aside: navy just needs to help in the war -wars: decided on land -navy: brings about victory by supporting forces on land --> navy not as supportive of him -JP able to move soldiers back/forth -can win a war without defeating fleet --> need to secure positions -get the army where it needs to be/supply it -downplays big battleship mentality -not given much credence until after WW1: -see that not much big war stuff happened with the navy -afraid to send fleet out bc spent money on it/don't want to lose it -almost anti-Mahanian concept --> "fleet in being" -becomes more of strategic fleet against another fleet -command of the sea: to get troops where want them -if can di without big fleet battle that's better -1909: US plan war against JP -US fleet wants to bring JP fleet to battle in advantageous circumstances (both sides are thinking like this) -WW2: -not much big battleship battles -only one encounter that almost looks like Mahanian style (Oct 1944): didn't work out very well; the last of its kind -more Corbettian-joint doctrine strategy US uses -Mahan still super loved but today's navy more Corbett -navy: Mahan :: army: Napoleon -keep C/M in mind when thinking about navy -Pearl Harbor (1941): destruction of its battle fleet --> what do we do now? -trasition into the air craft carriers but still want to fight M battle -Mid Way: could be considered M battle -look at how navy/army work together -British: -fleet: most committed fleet in the world; patrols 3 oceans -size of fleet depends on how much space navy occupies -have bases at strategic places for coals -US: -start looking at places where can have secure bases for coal -don't have places that produce coal; just places where ships can anchor/refill On War: Clausewitz: -war pushes/escalates you to maximum strength/effort to in order to defeat your enemy -what your enemy does changes your plan -war is not something abbriational -exists on a spectrum with politics/politics use it -war is politics by other means -politics must always govern what war is doing -too important to be left to the generals; ends must always be determined politically; means can be determined militarily -batton passes btwn military/political leaders -when this relationship gets messed up --> bad things happen -Truman firing McArthur: very Clausewitz -Washington surrending pwr: very Cluase -Naepolean: isn't very Clause --> messes up the trinity -Hitler fucks the trinity up -1920s: this idea shifts to "command of the air" --> growth of air pwr (this is later stuff though) -u-boats/submarines: -Brit had the most/didn't really use it -Germans used it a lot -this changes way to strategize navy --> becomes non-Mahanian Today's glamor weapons: F16 airplane -air craft carriers pretty expensive to build -B2 was the most expensive thing military ever built at the time Spanish American War Monday, February 8, 2016 8:04 AM -declare war on Spain: April, 1989 -Spain wants to hold on to Cuba/Puerto Rico -Cuba had ind movement; Spanish A would occupy/crush rebellion w increasing levels of intensity (pretty mean) -US starts knowing about; the public pushes the US to war; feel like US has to do something to send the suffering of the Cubans -part of what a great power would do based on liberty/colonialsim/freedom -like French helped us when we were in trouble in Revolution -yellow journalism: fires ppl up to want to do something -the butcher of Cuba : Spanish gen, Willer -McKinley admin tried to do diplomatic; even buy Cuba from Spain --> go to war -first test of whether US military system is capable of keeping up with increasingly global outlook the US gov is developing -can war departments make that energy viable -competing in a war with other great pwrs -they all use militaries for diplomacies -US doesn't have any of that -navy does little better than army does -professionalism is in upper division of leadership more effectively than army -April 1898: Army = 26,000 (mostly scattered through W US) -need to concentrate those forces in order to use --> difficult to do -N is easier to concentrate/send than A -Army: -regular forces: officers/full time soldiers -state military: referred to as national guard; organized at state lvl -volunteers: going to be needed soon -how to fight: -send our soldiers overseas -can national guard be used in this war? -idk; let's just use expanded regular army (65,000 men)/volunteers (125,000, then 200,000) -more than 200,000 ppl in/staffing the army -Army is concentrated in Chicamuage, (border TN/GA?) -lots of training/drill -Commanding General (CG) Nelson Miles (succeeds Sheridan, Sherman, Grant) -in charge of all this -thinks should focus on organization/start out slow -John Pershing does same thing (he gets what he wants but Miles doesn't) -N: blockade Cuba -exists mostly in the Atlantic (spuadrons are in the Pacific) -these flying spaudrons are based in random area -most stationed in San Francisco/San Diego -Oregon in SF; sails from SF to Caribbean -later the N will go to Congress/how long it took for that --> need 2 full navies for both N's --> maybe a canal will be better/use that to move the N -keep them from getting to Cuba -hope without more Span trooped coming in, Cuba can turn the tide -Wm Sampson (Admiral): in charge of Atlantic -find Spanish fleet/bring it to battle before it can break the blockade (Mahanian) -public: -wants action now -pressure to do something starts to undermine Miles' slow/deliberate plan to hold the army until it's ready to go -wanted to wait/see if blockade would do something; will wait as long as it takes -sending troops to Cuba: 2nd resort; N is the 1st resort -if really pressed them: after October (still only late April; in the end, most come back from war by Oct) -after troop are trained/when yellow fever season kind of dies down -don't want to wait (atm: we're putting the blockade up/waiting) -McKinely doesn't want this war/feels pressured to do this -since Army made up of volunteers --> easier for public to pressure them more -kind of fucking up C's triangle -Teddy Rooseelt: -super eager to get in the war -Army: -agrees to dispatch troops to Tampa, Mobil, New Orleans -doesn’t think if those ports are required to do what needs to be done --> they're not -this war shows what happens when you don't pre-plan --> Cluster Fuck -Tampa: Mobil bad too but T is the worst -ports there are totally unprepared for this -rail system: totally unprepared/can't handle all of this traffic -back up all the way until Georgia -the main port bc closest to Cuba -N has mercenary/small ships to ship them all the Cuba -not prepared for this -need special equipment/a ship to load horses onto ship --> don't have that available -only shipped the horses but no soldiers/saddles -end up just shoving the horses off the boats/they have to find their way to land --> lots of calvary don't have horses to ride; most scattered once got to land -Wm. Shafter -in charge of 5th Corps -focus on Santiago; really good port/position -disembark in Daiquiri -Guantanamo Bay -gradually: a buildup of resources -need to plan before you do it; need N/A to cooperate -strategic thought: the most important thing need to do; need joint planning with 2 forces beforehand --> this was a good learning lesson -Spanish fleet: -able to make it into Santiago Bay w/o Sampson's detection -idea: concentrate, wait, take to Caribbean -public opinion: -worried the Spanish would come to US coast --> sends a few of his ships to protect the coast -the fleet in Cuba is much smaller than should've been -"Rough Riders" -come from Galveston -Teddy R in charge of these guys -end of June: -Spanish fleet in Santiago -US N blockading Span in -Army goes in on land ^ ^ ^ reteams 1111111 Santiago Spanish Amer War (cont) Wednesday, February 10, 2016 8:01 AM -Navy war college had some operational concepts when US may go to war with Spanish -looking at attach Sp fleet at Phillippines -no one really think about Phill except the navy (public didn't know/care about there; how did Phill tie into Spanish/Cuba) -Span fleet there was pretty big --> a thret --> need to think about it -so think about operations in Cuba and Phill -the fleet in Phill is going to get in the way of US later on so can't ignore it even though so far awayyyyy -teddy r: -assistant of sec of N (1898) -big imperialist; been with the navy for a while -sends an order to Commodore G. Dewey -Pacific "fleet": -more like lots of squadrons instead of one big fleet -there for single operations -George Dewey -he's out at the Pacific with his squad -Teddy tells him to go to Manila immediately to catch the Sp fleet -ppl say this was just Teddy being Teddy -lol jk: that was the plan all along losers; don't just think Teddy was just being his usual aggressive imperialist (he isn't insubordinate so didn't just send the operations out of nowhere) -send 3-5 ships new ships at Manila -Manila Bay: about the same look at Santiago, just faces the West -May 1, 1898: Battle of Manila Bays -attacks/annihilates Sp fleet (Sp had about 8-10 ships; sinks them all mwahahaha) -Dewey becomes a hero from this -modern ships against non-moderns stuff --> they win -long range weapons help out a lot; the shells are faster -chaos in the Phill starts up -Philippines: -fighting against the Spanish -Emilio Aguinaldo: in charge of this -Dewey helps them defeat Spanish; surround Manila city -other countries ships start showing up -Germany, Britain, Japan etc.: want to see what US is going to do; they want Phil but don’t want to go to war w/ US right now -Japan/Germans: the most aggressive against US w/ Phil -Germans: want anything they can pick up; Japan: so close to Phil so want that stuff (just defeated China: 1st Sino-JP war -JP: "snubbed" by Russians, Brit, French; force to renegotiate the treaty that they signed with China/take less territory --> JP is pissedddddd esp at Russia -this kind of effects JP/US rivalry that later comes up -aggressively pursuing their own agenda w/ resentment towards W power bc couldn't get what they really wanted -Dewey: wants more troops to do shore duty -War department: infusion of US troops to secure the Phil -send: VIII Corps from San Francisco; under command of Gen Wesley Merritt (one of few West Point grads in this war); mid summer deployed to Phil w about 10,000 troops -superintend the surrender of the Sp but then whattttt -Spanish fleet in Atlantic: -coming to Cuba -makes it way into Santiago (alludes Sampsons' fleet) -US fleet blockading harbor --> Sp can't get out -transfers attention from Havana to Santiago -were focusing on Havana before -McKinley/Army wants fleet to destroy the Sp -do what Dewey did, duhhh -sin embargooooo: forts are really heavily armed --> Sampson won't take fleet into Santiago; wants the Army to come on land/wants them to knock out the forts -not scared of the fleets, just the forts -so Army should attack the forts so he can then come in -thinks Army should land on Coast/attack -Shafter: -doesn't want do that; wants to land away from Santiago but surround the city/attack the city -always overestimates the contribution of native rebel forces -thinks they'll be able to help block -US tends to want to incorporate indigenous forces as much as possible so we don't get as involved -El Caney: the strongest point in the perimeter of Santiago's defenses -Shafter: detach a big part of his force in order to attack this -wants to secure his right flank by attacking the strongpoint ---> hope Sp will flee into the hills; can use that to progress/push Sp back -turns about to be harder to take --> keeps going on/lots of US dies -Shafter orders to do something else/meet up with Teddy and his "Rough Riders" -Shafter: not good field general/dealing with battleship; most of the time he's way in the back/in his tent worrying about stuff; not much leadership up there -weakness of the Sp opposition makes this more successful than would've -Kettle Hill: -if Sp had been stronger there --> would've been much harder (but they weren't) -Sampson, Shafter, Miles: -Shafter tied/surrounding the city -Sampson: waiting for Shafter to take forts out -McKinley: needs to get in the middle of this argument/offer leadership --> Commander in Chief's job: tell these general officers what to do -impressive in other ways: watching this war very closely; modernizes -adds a war room in the White House; brings all the communication of the War Depart into the WH --> gives him more direct communication than any other president before -Sampson: tells Shafter we need to meet in person/talk it out -Sp fleet comes out while he's at the meeting -their fleet isn't doing very well at all -Sampson's 2 in command: runs the Sp down/destroys all the ships -Nelson Miles: -developed an idea to get Puerto Rico -about to attack San Juan but hears about Sp surrender (Aug) -wanted Army to be slow/but his idea was ignored -troops end up in Cuba/Puerto Rico: -last two remaining parts of Sp war -Leonard Wood: -overseas transition of US leaving Cuba/another gov set upM -public pressure: -although things didn't go terribly in the W, if SP had been stronger, things could've gotten worse -lesson learned: -more institutional cooperation btwn N/A (more permanent/established relationship) -War: -lasts for the summer/ends pretty neatly --> public likes this -Phil: -think go sour more quickly -8 Corps: work in sync with Aguinaldo at first but -deployed at the read of his army -Sp commander: -will surrender to the US but not to the rebels -Merritt/Aguinaldo agree that US will pass through Manila/Sp surrender -take one army, pass it through another then Sp says going to offer token resistance --> doesn't work out like that; ppl die who don't need to -Phil rebels pissed too/thinks US has alternative motives --> the relationship starts to get sour from here -end of the year: US in front/Phil forces behind them -Feb: they're fighting each other; US annexes Phil -political history left out -Panama: -before Canal there was Rrd -rebels were attacking the Rrd to draw in Columbian gov -US wants to protect Rrd (bc it was in our economic interests) -didn't have ambassadors down there but maybe some ministers -at least some reps were down there Picture: Santiago (S coast of Cuba) Manila Bay Philippines Friday, February 12, 2016 8:06 AM -West Merrit -Elmell Otis -Arthur MacArthur -Wm H Taft -Emilio Auginaldo: -makes constitution; creates Republic -Feb, 1899: -US/Phil start fighting -later in 99: resort to guerilla warfare -challenges with these guerilla war: -don't know who's civilian/enemy -almost impossible to ID who's the enemy --> can't plan -Nat Amers: -fought more regular guerilla; Phils fight more irregular -Pacifications: -generals want -difficulties: -such strange environment (jungle terrain); climate (uber humid); diseases -uncomfortable --> more frustration --> maybe more savagery -moral is down; confidence as a whole army -wool uniforms (omg that's literally death) -this is not normal way to fight; usually big field/formation --> jungle, can't make more in a unit -line of sight is basically gone -can't train for these terrain bc no jungle in the US; would have to have a space in Phil -tactical integrity: way for unit to work in conjecture with itself -natives have advantage bc know the area/used to the land/weather -possibly thought Phils were Allies against Sp but maybe shouldn't have had such a "good" relationship -makes operations more difficult --> we were on the same team but now we're not -force to make decisions don't want to make; switch enemies so quickly -had a concept to defeat the Sp but that's not the same way you can defeat Phil -the regular force is always the reactive one; the guerilla force is always the advantage/initiative -really hard to overcome that -moral: -why are they (the US) here/fighting; what’s the mission -in the city: -more pacification compared to warfare in less modern cities --> may confuse the army bc pacification isn't really the army's main goal, but this is also a volunteer service so it's not like they're evil, baby killers; but know that going there to fight a war -relationship btwn Aguinaldo and the natives -how can the army learn from Philippines? -so many difficulties; how do you fix this -not really material tactical difficulties; more intangible difficulties -still have to fight/we still won: -ability to isolate the battlefield/the opponent in certain areas -cut off their aid/supplies -Vietnam: -this didn't work -active external assistance given to the South/Vietcong -Monday: -how Phil requires mil thought to change Philippines (cont) Monday, February 15, 2016 8:04 AM Warplans -Most famous: war plan Orange 1909ish -in case have to go to war w Japan -note how detailed these are -UK weaknesses: -look at all the weaknesses geography plays into -look at what trade is going on -could have an economic warfare with them/shut their trade down -has info on their ships/speed/size, etc -Spanish Amer War: -realized how unprepared we were/our planning suckedddddddd -no coordination btwn A/N -can't happen again -all future operations are going to work together (except invasion of Mexico 1915-1916) -Joint Army-Navy Board: -before the war: -arrange for ordinance/supply/fuel; coordinated btwn supply ppl -wasn't the planning board that was needed but sketched out general assumptions of how the war is going to go -worked best when gov didn't mess with the board -Teddy R messed with them a lot; Traft didn't do too much; Wilson was just like no man, stopppp -freezes in 1913 -come out again for WW1 -1905: -sec of war: Taft -talks with JP gov about Philippines -Teddy: couldn't get Cong to fund a suitable security for Phil -is the Phil defendable by the Army? -Teddy/Army says yes; N says no -Cong doesn't want to spend the money to defend it -Taft comes up with: Taft-Katsura agreemend -Katsura: Taft's parallel in JP -US stays out of JP's interest in Korea; JP will stay out of Philippines -not a formal agreement but neither of them don't want to worry about each other -intent: to make war less likely -Philippine insurrection: over at this time -Aguinaldo wants to push US out -guerilla warfare: first time fought like this -can't compare to the Plains War: -both represent irregular warfare but Nat Amers were not an insurgency -differences between Phil/Natives: -Phil: want a base there to in influence but there is a rebellion to break out -wanted it to be a quick thing but in the end had to pacify/subdue the resistance -need Philippine support --> eventually make them stop fighting -where is the culminating point of victory: -difficult to tell if beaten them; hard to see if winning/where the enemy is -are you pushing them back? Are you -center of gravity: -Phil: break the US will/their moral so US won't think it's worth it for US to stay there/spend more money on it -vulnerable: -Phil couldn't use regular warfare -once start irregular war --> moves US out of their comfort zone -weakness for Army: -tends to make counter force (the US) reactive -their moves depend on the Phil -they lose the initiative -Otis: pacification efforts/civilian leaderships that become the Army's proactive element -US must contain the effectiveness -1900/01: most of the bad fighting happens away from the center -learn in what way to be reactive when forced to be reactive -if cont to be force v force would've tired army out -more can take recruitment ability away --> weaken guerrilla war -pacification: the civs/win them over -take the will of the ppl to support the insurrection so they will support you -does this affect Vietnam/Iraq -Vietnam: -initial idea: helicopters used as cavarly to move troops in/out fast -68/69: deploy smaller/more specialized forces -pacification: the big army deals more with this -couldn't really win the civilian side over bc civ/mil didn't ever have unity -Nat Amers: -just want them gone --> don't need their support -keep fight until take land/kill them all of push them out -culminating point of victory: easier to see -how many are on the reservation vs off; it's easy to see if you're beating them or not
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