MASTER NOTES v1
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A Preview of Policy Sciences Lasswell 1971 Annie s thought the 50s 60s and 70s public administration theory was trying to get people to realize that everyone acts in their own selfinterest Chapter 1 The Evolution of Policy Sciences 1 A Working Definition A B C D E Distinguishes knowledge of systematic empirical studies and knowledge in application of knowledge to decision making Contrasts science and nonscience and makes the case that policy should be scientific Points out the distinction between public and civic order and states that the line is fuzzy and dependent on context ie in a totalitarian state public order crowds out any sort of civic order Discusses difference in functional importance from conventional relevance Talks about the implications of applying scientific principles to policy in particular that scientific neutrality is difficult for the RS 2 Policy Science Careers A B The gift of the policy scientist mediating between his colleagues and the social environment Talks about the progression of the policy science career from college through the working world including international possibilities though points out it can be difficult to be a PS in a nation where private control of resources is the main MO Goes into how your POV as a PS might be different given where you started your career law economics other 3 Historical Trends A Policy science has been around since the beginning of civilization a Ur Nammu of Ur and code of Hammurabi are early policies but Lasswell points out that as long as there have been people who have the concerns of the aggregate policy scientists have been around b Early policy scientists were prophets symbol specialists and magicians and medicine men that addressed societal rather than individual interests Describes contemporary policy scientist as one who combines skill with enlightenment on aggregate processes and decision consequences Chapter 2 Contextuality Mapping the Social and Decision Processes 1 Introduction A B C We are interdependent We must have contextual analysis We must stay in touch with the client our selves the student colleagues and nonofficial individuals and organizations 2 A Social Process Model This is a nice part of the chapter pp 1526 where Lasswell outlines the social process model it s worth a review if only the table on page 19 A A simple process model is actors interacting between one another or actors interacting within a resources environment Maximization Postulate as in Decision Process model holds that living forms are predisposed to complete acts in ways that are perceived to leave the actor better off than if he had completed them differently Interaction is reciprocal So a revised model is that participants seeking to maximize values utilize institutions which affects resources C a b c d e f g h D E F C Operationalizes 8 values of Power Enlightenment Wealth Wellbeing Skill Affection Respect Rectitude freedom to do what is right Describes the institutions most suited to each of the 8 values Defines a contextual approach as Science does not accept or reject an assertion that something is inevitable Instead scientists turn to a hypothesis for empirical observation An elaboration of the model Participants with Perspectives are in Situations and act on their Base Values to Create Strategies to achieve Outcomes to produce a desired Effect A Decision Process Model Good news this is just a rehashing of the 56 article Chapter 3 Problem Orientation The Intellectual Tasks 1 Introduction Decision makers have two choices either stumble along trying to be everything to everyone and eventually crack up or rely on scientists to take a measured disciplined approach to the decisions at hand This gets done through the main intellectual tasks a 6 Goal Clarification What ought I to prefer Broad postulates of sufficient generality then move toward specificity Lasswell gives the example here of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights that is helpful in explaining the move from a postulate to a clear goal Trends Asks the questions Where are we How far have we come Measurements of success and failure along the way Analysis of Conditions Use an equilibrium method to identify a pattern of relationships Projection Project futures based on the absence of actions or the consequences of actions based on experts or extrapolation of sequences Alternatives This is the pay off function Nice set of related questions on page 56 Symbols we create symbols and blow them out of portion to the point where you cannot see the real issue anymore Example Bush publishes campaign after success in Iraq Mission Accomplished then we forget about the problems Chapter 4 Diversity Synthesis of Methods 1 O SJ PP N Introduction Lasswell says that the evolution of policy sciences will necessitate some PS to become participant observers he waxes poetic for a couple of pages here and lost me a bit Contextual Mapping what are the trends what are the concepts embedded in the trends Developmental Constructs Prototyping Technique Incorporating Computer Simulation Participant Observation and Other Standpoints Araral J r The Advocacy Coalition Framework A Development a ACF has roots in issue networks implementation learning policy subsystems belief systems bounded rationality and the role of science and technical information in public policy process B Scope a ACF serves as an analytical guide for research on advocacy coalitions policy change and policy oriented learning C Assumptions 1 Subsystem is unit of analysis Subsystems are nested and interdependent parts of the whole policy system 2 Actors are anyone trying to in uence the subsystem 3 Bounded rationality individuals have limited ability to process info 4 Subsystems are simplified by aggregating actors into coalitions 5 Policies and programs have implicit theories and assumptions that re ect the beliefs of coalitions 6 Scientific and technical info is important 7 Researchers should adopt a longterm plan when using ACF 10years D Theory a Theories narrow the scope of inquiry link concepts and provide causal mechanisms b The author presents the key questions and hypothesis for the three areas that you use ACF to test coalitions policy change and policyoriented learning Williamson O 1981 The Economics of Organization The Transaction Cost Approach 1 Research Question a What is the scope of the transaction cost approach in relation to org behavior 2 Contributions to the Literature a Greater attention to anatomy viewed through transaction cost reasoning is indicated provides a research agenda 3 Main Argument a Transaction is the basic unit of analysis this is a focus on ef ciency b Three levels of analysis in the transaction cost approach i Structure of the enterprise how should operating parts be related ii Operating parts Which activities should be preformed in the firm outside it and why iii Structure of human assets do internal governance structures match the attributes of the work group c This approach comes from 3 literatures i Econ ii Org theory iii Contract law d Transaction cost economizing needs to be located within larger economizing framework and the relevant tradeoffs need to be recognized i Transaction costs are the comparative costs of planning adapting and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures e Behavioral assumptions i Recognition that human agents are subject to bounded rationality ii Some agents are given to opportunism f Dimensionalizing the critical dimensions for transactions i Uncertainty ii the frequency with which transactions recur iii degree to which durable transactionspecific investments are required to realize least cost supply asset specificity g asset specificity sitespecific physical and human i when asset specificity is high buyers and sellers are incentivized to design an exchange with good community properties h Human assets i Skills acquired in a learning by doing fashion and imperfectly transferrable across employers need to be embedded in a protective governance structure lest productive values be sacrificed if the employment relation is severed ii Four types of human asset governance structures metering and assests 1 2 Internal spot market employers and employees have no to few costs associated with terminating employment Primitive team cannot determine compensation little measurement due to the production being done by teams Obligational market firmspecific learning but tasks are easily metered Procedural safeguards are created to maintain the employment contract Relational team very firm specific knowledgeskills but tasks are difficult to meter Employees must dedicate to firm s mission and firm then provides considerable job security i Can compare transaction cost approach to population ecology model emphasizing adaptive fitness j Autonomous contracting can be supplanted by rules or mutual efforts to discourage aggressive sub optimization k The contract execution can in uence the availability of future bidders during contract renegotiation if transaction specific investments were made by previous contract winners and those investments provide an advantage over other firms 1 Power theory can add detail to the transaction cost approach ie efficiency but not much other explanatory power m Three methodological features i Employs functional analysis ii Straddles the approach that separates maximizers and satisficers focuses on economizing iii Relies on the operation of natural selection forces Simon H A 1998 Why public administration Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory J PART 81 111 This was a speech that Simon gave Simon argues against the traditional definition of the invisible hand as a viable model to meet social needs Following is Simon s argument from start to finish The invisible hand is tied less to selfinterest and more to identity of the organization Thus if identification is the driving motive in organizational behavior then productivity and ef ciency will not necessarily be reached by privatization A democratic society requires that power is dispersed Decentralized government accomplishes this To avoid corruption in government we should work through organizations This model fosters human identification with these organizations and their goals What are the inherent values in American society Equity Responsiveness Efficiency Effectiveness Expertise Morality Individualism Free expression Weiss CH 1977 Research for policy s sake The enlightenment function of social research Policy Analysis Fall 1977 1 Introduction a Weiss sets up the article by stating policysocial science researchers do what they do bc they want to make a difference b That s problematic bc most research studies at the time bounce off the policy process without making a dent in the course of events c The lack of utility is inherent in the process with the problematic factors being concreteness speci city representativeness timelines and prediction of future conditions 2 What is research utilization a Often it s framed as problem solving but that may not be the case b Really research is best utilized when it is the result of longterm percolation of social science concepts theories and findings c This isn t always satisfying to the researcher who gets frustrated that people don t sit up and take notice of the work as soon as it happens i This is also difficult for the researcher as policymakers sometimes don t even remember where they got a particular idea no reference list for a particular chain of thought 3 Three Studies a The author looks at three studies that seem to reinforce that the in uence of research is not problem solving but rather enlightenment i Univeristy of Michigan Study Caplan 1 204 federal decision makers initially thought to not use research couldn t cite it later recoded to determine that the concepts and perspectives from research were used ii Viennese Study Knorr 1 70 government officials in Vienna as well as over 600 Austrian social scientists 2 Found the key to use of research was in the changing of opinions learning as in ACF iii Columbia University Study authors of article 1 Main question Which characteristics of research studies were associated with usefulness a Research Quality b Conformity to User Expectations c Action Orientation d Challenge to the Status Quo all of these have positive correlation to usability 4 There are value cleavages between the researchers and the users of research Value dissensus precludes use Enlightenment models however speculate that the role or research is not to gain utility but rather be a social critic Weible An ACF Approach to Stakeholder Analysis 2006 This is a piece of Chris dissertation PURPOSE ACF can be used as a policy analysis tool and to identify coalitions This work fills a gap to provide policy analysts with a way to understand policy disputes by understanding who is involved in the issue p96 WHAT IS STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS stakeholder analysis helps policymakers conceptualize the dynamics of a policy subsystem essentially by conducting a stakeholder analysis the analyst will evaluate different categorizations of policy core beliefs coalition membership usable resources and accessible venues p112 WHAT THIS PAPER MEANS TO YOU Chris conducts a case study so you could use his methods if you want to conduct a study using ACF Nordshadt ACF case study on Chernobyl amp Sweden Nuclear Policy 2008 SUMMARY The author uses ACF to understand postcrisis nuclear energy policymaking in Sweden His research challenges ACF assumptions that policy core beliefs are rigid and selfinterests play a limited role THEORY The idea that crises cause policy change is a key assumption in ACF However Nordshadt writes that the crisis policy change linkage is difficult to verify because crisis definition is so broad The crisispolicy change theory stems from Kingdon s Multiple Streams Baumgartner amp Jone s puctualited equilibrium and Birkland s Event Related Policy Change EPC Model CRITICISM POLICY STUDIES DO NOT FOCUS ENOUGH ON CAUSALITY FOR POLICY CHANGE Nordshadt cites Schalger who criticized ACF for being too focused on belief systems and not explaining policy change This is where ACF needs to develop METHODS ACF assumes learning presence of minority coalitions and that people pursue policy interests but also selfinterest This study tests those variables 1 identifies coalitions that testify in parliamentary meetings on energy 2 48item coding scheme based on beliefs 3 cluster analysis to understand policy subsystem FINDINGS 1 ACF theory assumes external shocks lead to policy change if minority coalitions act However political stability prevailed 2 Rigid beliefs did not screen out policy alternatives as assumed by ACF People did not have rigid core policy beliefs 3 ACF doesn t eXplain how minority coalitions go about eXploiting crises Nordshadt ACF case study on Chernobyl amp Sweden Nuclear Policy 2008 SUMMARY The author uses ACF to understand postcrisis nuclear energy policymaking in Sweden His research challenges ACF assumptions that policy core beliefs are rigid and selfinterests play a limited role THEORY The idea that crises cause policy change is a key assumption in ACF However Nordshadt writes that the crisis policy change linkage is difficult to verify because crisis definition is so broad The crisispolicy change theory stems from Kingdon s Multiple Streams Baumgartner amp Jone s puctualited equilibrium and Birkland s Event Related Policy Change EPC Model CRITICISM POLICY STUDIES DO NOT FOCUS ENOUGH ON CAUSALITY FOR POLICY CHANGE Nordshadt cites Schalger who criticized ACF for being too focused on belief systems and not eXplaining policy change This is where ACF needs to develop METHODS ACF assumes learning presence of minority coalitions and that people pursue policy interests but also selfinterest This study tests those variables 1 identifies coalitions that testify in parliamentary meetings on energy 2 48item coding scheme based on beliefs 3 cluster analysis to understand policy subsystem FINDINGS 1 ACF theory assumes external shocks lead to policy change if minority coalitions act However political stability prevailed 2 Rigid beliefs did not screen out policy alternatives as assumed by ACF People did not have rigid core policy beliefs 3 ACF doesn t eXplain how minority coalitions go about eXploiting crises Waldo D 1965 The administrative state revisited Public Administration Review 251 On Origins and Reception 1 Waldo admits that TAS was snarky which was because at the time he was contemptuous of all the literature on PA as were his mentors at the time He was a political theory guy 2 A valuable part of this piece is Waldo s description of the place where sciencetheory and artpractice meet I love this line I was not content simply to be Right I had a determination to prove that I we were also Relevant and Useful 3 Waldo goes into his history as if we haven t heard enough from all the Waldoworshipers we ve read But it s sort of funny because his humility really shines he counts his time working fumbling in PA as being some of his most important and formative of his career 4 Waldo lists the big PA guys he didn t even mention in his book like Barnard and Weber and also is down on himself bc he so quickly dismissed the Hawthorne experiments On Some Matters of Content Waldo recounts what he wrote and thinks about areas he would adddo differently listed below 1 The Material and Ideological Background a He would add a long discussion about the role of Business Administration techniques in gov t organizations b He would add information on the rapid advance of automation c He would add something on Psych and human relations d He would still discuss training etc of govt officials but he would struggle as he didn t think much progress had been made e He would discuss the role of Scientific Management 2 The Good Life a He starts a rant about Logical Positivism that he really digs in a little later b Budgetary theory would stay but he would add economics c He would talk about the crisis of authority 3 Principles Theory of Org and Scientific Method a Again with the logical positivism Basically he s kicking himself bc he didn t know a thing about it when he wrote TAS and Herbert Simon bludgeoned me about it in the early fifties b Comparative PA is important c He would talk about Economy and Efficiency still today On the Agenda In his revised book he would have a chapter called On the Developments of Two Decades where he would include the following 1 Environmental Challenges to PA That Waldo Would Include a Development of govemmentbycontract b Growth of the Military c The rise of Science d The fourth cannot be summed up in an allembracing accepted name per Waldo e The UrbanMetropolitan revolution 2 Intellectual Problems important to the field a The meaning and significance of democracy b Natural harmony vs manmade harmony c Deciding what to make of Behavioralism and Logical Positivism poor Dwight d What are the potentialities of and the related focus of activity and research Development Administration e What should we can we make of public administration vs plain old regular administration i Waldo says this is pretty important if we re going continue with the discipline 3 Institutional Problems for the institution of PA a ASPA doesn t have enough members i The members they do have aren t diverse enough ii Academics and practitioners don t get along very well b What is the relationship between PA and Poli Sci Should they get divorced c What are PA relationships with other schools and curricula Like will be stay ten steps behind Business Admin bc we re so insistent on doing our own thing Nickel P M amp Eikenberry A M 2007 Responding to natural disasters The ethical implications of the voluntary state A Argument The wake of natural disasters eXposes the ethical dif culty of the voluntary state a Public admin must argue on behalf of marginalized populations esp in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina response B RQ a What happens when nationstates create conditions that violate human rights on a large scale b How do we understand the state and PA s responsibilities in relationship to disasters and response to disasters that do not adhere to social and cognitive constructs of geographic boudaries C Evidence a Failures of the neoloberal state that lead to institutionalized poverty and racism i Neoliberalism has devolved public and social responsibility to the market b The voluntary state i Market ideology makes voluntary all but the protection of the market itself ii the state must concern itself only with profit generation iii all other responsibility beyond concern for the market is personal c Outcomes of the voluntary state i Creation of wealth and poverty wealthy determine the mechanisms for helping the poor ii Voluntary response is then considered benevolent and removed from the conditions that created the need in the first place iii The poor choose to be poor d Hollow state leads to voluntary action by non state actors i Action in response to disasters is in the hands of NGOs who may lack resources and skills to effectively respond e The Case of Hurricane Katrina as evidence of neoliberal voluntary state i Katrina was not so much a case of systemic bureaucratic failures but a system designed to all some parts of the population to escape while others could not Spike Lee s movie follows this argument ii Groups of citizens are considered to be disposable in neoliberal society generally bc of race D Conclusions a The voluntary state is cool with suffering as long as you are in the expendable group of humans b It is our role in PA to argue much more vocally for the marginalized populations c Deliberative discourse can help maybe to open other options need to study Van Riper P 1990 The Literary Gulick A Bibliographic Approach Main Idea The author researches the entire known catalogue of Luther Gulick s work The reference list is a nice compilation of his work 1 Early In uences a Important family connections doesn t say what b Apprenticeships at Columbia and the Training School for Public Service of the NY Board of Municipal Research The Grand Design a First love public finance then became more involved in governmental organizational design b Then described administrative chaos 1923 added principles in 1925 and applied municipal reform proposals to state government and wrote the article we love so much about the alleged politicsadministration dichotomy 1933 c Dabbled in policy analysis World War II a Defense and postwar planning studies Metropolitan and Foreign Affairs Miscellany Tapering Off a All the rest that the author didn t feel should be categorized in the above Ends with a poem by LGulick The tides of reform revisited Patterns in making governments work 19452002 By Paul C Light Abstract He describes the 4 philosophies of administrative reform and explores the link between government performance and reform Research design The article is based on reading the 177 administrative reform statutes between 19452002 and coding the statutes according to year and type of reform to understand the pace and pattern of reform over time Four tides of reform 1 Scientific management with a focus on rulemaking job definitions competitive examination job growth ladder meritbased 2 War on waste focus on efficiency and lower costs 3 Watchful eye with creation of 5member commission to monitor merit system 4 Liberation management insulates bureaucrats from politics Conclusion 1 Reform causes confusion and may have done little to actually improve government 10 2 The pace of reform gives staff little time to settle into reforms 3 Measurement of reform performance needs to be done to assess past reforms Steinberg economic theories of nonpro t organizations 2006 1 This chapter discusses the economics of nonprofit organizations 2 Definitions a Nonprofit an organization precluded from disturbing in financial form its surplus resources to those in control of the organization Hansmann 1980 i The owners do not enjoy the usual rights of ownership ie profits 3 Distinctions a Hansmann came up with a classification system based on the following variables governance financing b Subsequent studies looked at donative or commercial differences HHNFEGFH FIRMS ritual F i 1 tr mantratwinquot i 1i IE39DIMJI WE intuition Mum wrap al i rml RLIniiui tjm 5Lrti39nt 1 r eifiag39 h f Dimm PH I H I I U435 rt m 1 SELF n 1 I 11111 lEFEEdI Airmir39irari uEunwuziii lra H5H i flrlili iHE EJEFELIJI Tit Eli I E U Tl iiquot 1397quot i 3 H E C Mini 1 r1 I 5 139 i r1135 1111 Eu Li H I I LI Iiii D HE E m p Mural 11 quot115 77quot EL39i miam mn H VT f Ha mi ipit sgij in nu 4 Three failures theory a Weisbrod 1975 was the first to look at nonprofits in the context of the broader economy He says nonpro ts fill the gap when private and government sector fail Hansmann 1980 added contract failure to eXplain when nonpro ts arise because private sector uses information asymmetry to take advantage of people so nonprofits become a good alternative Salamon 1987 examined when nonprofits are eXpected to fail voluntary failure b The following schematic shows under what circumstances markets fail so government steps in then governments fail and then nonprofits have to step in and then nonprofits fail NOTE THIS IS NOT A STAGES HUERISTIC Nonprofits could come first and markets last 5 Shortcomings of the three failures theory a It is an incomplete theory because we don t know why people would use or donors would donate to nonprofits Without know that we don t know when they will be created b The theory focuses too much on efficiency and leaves out other roles for the nonprofit sector 11 Journal Article Critique 2 J C Martel Steelman T A amp Kunkel G F 2004 Effective community responses to wild re threats lessons from New Mexico Society and Natural Resources 178 679699 Research question i What is the decision process for community responses to wildfire threats Are both structural and social responses needed for effective community responses to wildfire threats ii The question is adequately justified as important to society but not to academia For societal importance the authors explained the costly and burdensome impact of wildfires in Western USA For academic importance the authors referenced the functional decision process but did not discuss why it is important to academia Contribution to the literature i The puzzle that the article is tackling is attributes of effective community responses to wildlife threats The authors describe the gap as case studies on the communitylevel decisionmaking process in response to wildfire threats ii The article successfully provides two detailed case studies iii The contribution to academic literature is not at all justified as a significant advancement In fact in the conclusion of the article the authors only discussed the work as a contribution to practitioners Main arguments and findings i The authors argue that structural responses to wildfire threats are ineffective unless paired with social responses ii The arguments were clearly stated in the conclusion iii The research questions were adequately answered by the author s key argument iv The main argument may fill a gap in the literature if previous studies only focus on structural responses to wildfire threats The main argument could be tested in future studies to see if the main argument is generalizable The researchers provided a detailed historical account of how these two communities have evolved to wildfire threats This information helps scholars and practitioners understand the puzzle Research design i The research design and data sources are archival data collection telephone interviews and site visits During site visits the researchers conducted inperson interviews photo documentation document collection participant observation and onsite tours ii The technique used to interview transcribe and verify was adequately described but sampling methods for interviews or site visits or inclusion rules for photo documentation or document collection were not disclosed Moreover participant observation was not discussed in the methods section but findings are implied in the results section of the article iii The research design and data gathering method is certainly not explicit enough to replicate iv Data limitations are not addressed v The research design and data sources are adequate for answering the research question as long as it is not expected to be generalizable The methods are more of a practitioner s level of rigor than academic s The authors need to be more systematic about their methods discuss their limitation and tie their conclusion back into the functional decision process literature that they claim to be situated within Tables and figures i Table 1 is clear but tangential to the main argument of the paper Table 2 is moderately clear The authors used acronyms that muddy the table and are not easily decoded unless the reader goes back through the article ii Detailed captions make each table easy to understand iii Table 1 was clear The variables in Table 2 were clearly defined earlier in the paper iv Significant impacts were not clearly marked in the tables Table 1 could be improved if Ruidoso and Santa Fe were highlighted indicating that those communities were chosen for case studies v Table 1 was not effective at expressing the basic arguments of the article and should have been 12 excluded Table 2 was effective at summarizing the key actions and actors for wildfire in the two communities However the social category was limited to the main person in charge of the structural action when this paper is supposed to be about the community responsiveness Theoretical approach i The casual argument focuses on a mechanism namely the community decision process ii The dependent variable is the effectiveness of the decision process The independent variables are social responses and structural responses iii The researchers make the following causal arguments 1 Social responses to wildfire threats have a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of the decision process 2 Structural and social responses to wildfire threats have a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of the decision process 3 Structural responses to wildfire threats have a low impact on the effectiveness of the decision process iv The authors do not identify theories or hypotheses for the causal arguments The researchers quoted Lasswell s work on the functional decision process and structured their paper according to the seven stages that Lasswell articulated however the researchers did not use Lasswell s or any other scholar s theories to explain their causal arguments v The authors do not discuss threats to the causal process Operationalization i The variables are inadequately operationalized in a transparent and convincing way The authors did not measure the variables ii na iii Moreover some independent variables were not discussed in the article At a minimum population government funding and the extent of wildfire threat were implicit in the research but not operationalized For example Santa Fe only received 50000 of National Fire Plan NFP funds whereas Ruidoso received over 2 million The researchers shame Santa Fe for having a less robust community decision process but they do not discuss funding limitations as a possible cause Moreover the authors disclose that both communities were on the Twenty Most Vulnerable Areas List but did not discuss where each community ranks on the list or to what extent wild re threats are a high priority compared to other threats or risks in the community Ruidoso could be far more susceptible to wildfire threats than Santa Fe which could cause differences in the decision process Lastly population differences could be a cause which was also not discussed The authors disclosed that Ruidoso has only 8500 full time residents whereas Santa Fe has over 70000 but they did not discuss the effects of population size on the decision process Analytical techniques iThe analytical techniques are not appropriate given the data research questions and research design Rather than regurgitate the interviews and historical research the researchers could have coded the data and created a mathematical system for assessing which actions fit into social structural or both types of responses The authors focused too much on fitting their research into Lasswell s seven stages rather than operationalizing the variables Further the researchers set up their research design to support their hypothesis They specifically chose a social response decisionmaking to contrast with structural responses The researchers isolate social responses as separate from structural responses The researchers ignore the social components of creating structural responses Consider building codes as an example At code hearings the community may propose provisions to protect against wildfires This is an example of a social action that requires a decision process comprised of building officials elected 13 officials industry representatives and citizens The social aspect of structural responses should have been discussed in the article ii The data does not provide clear support for the main argument iii The authors do not discuss alternative interpretations Generalizability i It is difficult to determine generalizability of the study The two communities that were examined are drastically different in terms of population size and amount of funding they receive to wildfire threats The authors presented their arguments and findings as general statements implying generalization to a larger population This is incorrect because the sample size of only two communities is not generalizable to all communities For example the authors state This research suggests a diversity of approaches and strategies are used at the community level in crafting social responses 698 They only tested two communities so should frame their findings with that acknowledgement ii Generalizations are not valid Implications i The authors explain that communities should engage in both structural and social responses to wildfire threats They also state that more case studies should be developed to help practitioners understand how other communities structure their decision making process ii The aforementioned implications were stated iii The policy implications are not adequately justified because the authors contradictorily say that communities should have strong social responses to wildfire threats but that every community is different and needs to develop what works for them Clarity of writing i The article is easy to read and understand on the surface but concepts are not adequately explored or linked ii The writing is clear but iii not succinct Smith S and Lipsky M 1993 Nonpro ts for Hire The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting Cambridge Harvard University Press P 120 167 Thesis Nonprofits are continually on the edge of a scal cliff and in programmatic compromise Argument Nonprofits seek to maximize opportunities for growth and sustainability while also pursuing a purpose and mission Evidence 1Cash ow a govt can withhold payments unilaterally costs are fixed but payments may be made per client costs can increase during contract period bnonprofits are accused of poor management but the reality is that systematic problems lead to the dire cash ow problems 2Dance of Contract Renewal a The market for govt contracts is often limited bOngoing contracting creates a standard supply of services by nonpro ts c Govt does not have enough monies to match in ation leads to uncertainty for nonprofits d Must diversify funding sources fee for service private or foundation money 3 The question of goal succession 14 aNprofs must be opportunistic bid on anything bFollow prefs and behavior of the govt officials and contractors c Are nonprofs giving up their own goals for contracts Maybe i Grow as they learn shift from behavioral to cognitive treatment Shift to meet social and policy goals driven by the public Directors make these decisions in good conscience iv Can result in a deterioration of services Conclusions 0 New organizations are more susceptible to needing govt contract support 0 What are the public obligations of nonprofit agencies Smith S and Lipsky M 1993 Nonpro ts for Hire The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting Cambridge Harvard University Press P 120 167 Thesis Contracting has changed the service profile of nonprofit providers forever Argument we conclude that what American society actually provides in social services has been significantly altered under contracting The underlying argument government appears to winning the back and forth between nonprofits and govt 1 mission drift of the nonprofit to conform to govt contract appears to be an ongoing issue to the authors govt has the upper hand 2 ultimately they nonprofits are at a disadvantage in their relationship with government contracting officials because of increased regulation funding cutbacks and greater competition among nonprofit agencies for public and private dollars Consolidation of nonprofits and the end of small nonprofits is the future Evidence 1 Government agencies and non profits have different imperatives a These often con ict with each other i Equity 1 Government will favor equity with clear unambiguous eligibility criteria 2 Non profits are able to selectively provide services only for individuals in order to follow the org mission or defined population ii Responsiveness 1 Nonprofits value responsiveness to their clients usually as a part of their own mission 2 Govt may be more responsive to broader social problems iii Accountability iv Efficiency v Fiscal Integrity b Con icts Differences btwn nonprofits and govt 15 i Non profits will allow for individuals to self report whereas the government requires proofevidence to render services 1 Govt will favor equity over effectiveness ii Private agencies can provide first come first serve services iii Govt will equally distribute aid a little to a lot of ppl but nonprofits can provide a lot to a few c Guidelines for purchasing human services not always met i Reliable ii Effective iii Responsible iv Defend purchasing decisions with strategic rationale d Changes in practice under contracting i Diversification increase services to meet demand and create new nonprofits as a response to newly created govt contracts ii Control over Service Programming nonprofits are vulnerable to mission drift as a result of contracting more uniformity in services across nonprof iii Facilities improve as a result of contracting regulatory iv Control over client base govt attaches stings to contracts that requires nonprofs serve certain client populations examples 1 Deinstitutionalization 2 Child and family services 3 Emergency shelters 4 Great cheese giveaway Conclusions Consolidation of nonprofits and the end of small nonprofits is the future Shanahan amp McBeth 2011 Policy Narratives and Policy Processes See row added to theories shared google spreadsheet on NPF I tried to capture key things though DVIV can shift depending on focus and hypothesis NPF s originationintro within context of the ACF a NPF developed in response to Sabatier s assertion that social construction theories were nonfalsifiable and can t be empirically tested aren t true science b narratives in uence beliefs and coalitions strategies empirical testing developed c Narrative policies are predictably embedded in policy narratives of competing advocacy coalitions to achieve expansion or contraction of the policy subsystem as well as impede policy learning 2 Conceptual scaffolding of the NPF a Definition of narrative way of structuringcommunicating our understanding of the world all have a policy setting or context and include structural components setting plot characters hero victim villain b Assumptions i policy narratives are central in policy processes ii operate at three levels of analysis micro individual meso policy subsystem and macro institutionalcultural least developed iii A broad set of actors can generate policy narratives politicians media interest groups basically coalitions iv policies and programs are translations of beliefs that are communicated through policy narratives c ACF beliefs are causal driver NPF dissects into how policy narratives contain beliefs mobilize citizens strategically deply scientific info in uence public opinion 16 ii ii iii 5 Table 1 page 541 outlines broad framework seems like each column is one theory Mesolevel Applications Figure 1 page 543 causal mechanisms DVIVs uses Cape Cod fight over wind farm off Nantucket Sound as case study one coalition perceives it is winning its narrative strategies seek to containretain status quo and maintain monopoly vs losing coalition seeks to expand participation mobilize individuals and change policy status quo all through narrative tools NPF s synergies and divergences from ACF Belief system glue that bind advocacy coaltions Stability over time strength of belief and cohesion of coalition beliefs all measured through narratives Hypothesis 1 coalition glue and policy outcomes Advocacy coaltions with narratives that have higher levels of stability strength and cohesion glue will be more likely to in uence policy outcomes Policy learning enduring alteration in thought of behavior by coalition H2 Policy Narrative Persuasion Variation in policy narrative elements helps explain policy learning policy change and policy outcomes Public opinion exogenous constraint internal shock and coalition resource H3 Exogenous Public Opinion When it is congruent with coaltion s preferred policy outcomes offer policy narratives to contain the subsystem coaltion maintaining the status quo membership H4 Endogenous Public Opinion When public opinion shocks are incongruent with a coalition s preferred policy outcome coalitions will offer policy narratives to expand the subsystem coalition How H5 Power of Characters The portrayal of policy narrative characters heroes victims and villains has higher levels of in uence on opinion and preferences citizens politicians and elites than scientific or technical info H6 Narrative Scope of Con ict Advocacy coalitions use differing policy narrative strategies depending on whether they perceive themselves as winning of losing on an issue with the intention of expanding or containing membership of the public in the policy subsystems H7 Devil Shift Higher incidence of the devil shift in policy subsystems is associated with policy intractability Weible Conclusion policy narratives matter in policy change one strategy to use and study ACF Schmidt 1993 Grout Alternative Kinds of Knowledge Main Argument mainstream scientific knowledge ignores and suppresses other insightful kinds of knowledge under the common model of reality science engineering and bureaucratic institutions create Case study of a dam on Teton River in Idaho structure collapsed 11 died 3k homes damaged 16k cattle drowned 100k acres farmland ooded failure in engineers design and bureau of REclamation s overconfidence the grout mixture to seal holes in fractured rock on which the dam was built just didn t work let s use an extended metaphor about grout now Four types of knowledge Feel for the hole grouters building the dam should feel the hole how deep how much sand or salt to add to solidify holes knowledge only learned in the field handson experience under craftsman guidance over time Hummel 1985 bottomup knowledge in mundane understanding of tools and work a feel for the whole people acquire only fragmented knowledge communication limited due to around the clock shifts and emphasis on efficiency collective knowledge nescaled passivecritical knowledge crews and workers knowledge expressed as feelings not consulted bc engineers specs were followed intimate knowledge acquired over time to know a thing and know irregularities Engineering Science and Bureacracy depends on science technical experts and heirarchy where past is reliable guide to future topdown approach with communication little bottomup communication or knowledge oversimplify reality 17 ii iii iv i1 iii iv V1 t H H H o worms10699 9 H Alternative model of science and reality eg McClintock didn t dismiss exceptional cases as irrelevant focused on anomalies and feel for the HOLE and WHOLE shifts from heirarchysimple state of dichotomies to inquirybased attentiveness Social Rationality manmadeorganizational approach and technology acknowledge limits of understanding value feelings Perrow Schlager 2004 Common Pool Resource Theory RQ Under which conditions are selfgovemance regimes that preserve commonpool resources more or less likely to arise When is longterm cooperation more or less likely to occur Previous Theories of Collective Action M Olson 1965 Hardin Gordon amp Scott saw selfinterested individuals rarely acting in common good and exhausting commonpool resources solution was a strong central state imposing standards and laws US National Research Council NRC Panel in 1985 E Ostrom found that selfgovemance was possible when the appropriators create and monitor rules and contribute their voluntary time and resources rules and monitoring are defined as public goods by Ostrom monitoring creates longterm sustainability in selfgovemance regimes Emergence of Cooperative Behavior conditions positively related to initial collective selfgovemance not 100 accurate or necessary precursorspredictors Attributes of commonpool resources that support emergency of cooperations feasible improvement not already too deteriorated to fix indicators of condition are available at low cost predictable ow of resource spatial extent sufficiently small to obtain knowledge of whole Attributes of appropriators that support cooperation salience dependent on resource system for livelihood or other important activity common understanding of how resource system operates low discount rate in relation to future benefits achieved from resource trust and reciprocity keys autonomy able to determine access and harvesting without external authorities countermanding them prior organizational and local leadership experience in simple settings cooperation is easier and more likely values of all variables are dependent and interrelated highly contextual Designing longterm cooperation 8 design principles rights to withdraw clearly defined appropriation rules restricting quantity of resource related to local conditions individual can modify operational rules monitors accountable to appropriators violations assessed with graduated sanctions rapid access to lowcost resolution mechanisms rights to devise own institutions not challenged by external gov authorities appropriation provision monitoring enforcement CR governance organized in multiple layers These principles garnered support in lots of research 30 case studies of fisheries irrigation studies groundwater basin West Basin under LA fresh water source p 159161 Rules crafted to each context and system are essential Governments greatest benefit by supporting and encouraging appropriators to devise own solutions CPR Theory Challenges Choices Opportunities Appreciating wider applicability Only small homogenous communities 2nd gen researches say no Lam Yang Agrawal 18 ii iii ii iii iv ii iii iv ii iii iv V1 rhsvpupp ae Coming to terms with contextual and configurel nature collective governance IS possible in diff contexts Blomquist Heikkila Shlager study of water management in AZ CA CO defining community providing aid and assistance to communities essential to craft towards diverse communities intercommunity divisions and inequalities may be exacerbated no real community may have previously existed key for policymakers considerations catalyzing a resultsbased sense of common purpose how can public managers and policy makers capitalize on selfgovemance potential facilitate public education and deliberation about public problems in a process of civic discovery problem solving partnerships lower info and enforcement costs for appropriators invest in appropriators governing capacities NOT commandandcontrol policy prescriptions this last section provides an interesting solution and significant overlap with questions of Public Administration Schlager 2004 Common Pool Resource Theory RQ Under which conditions are selfgovernance regimes that preserve commonpool resources more or less likely to arise When is longterm cooperation more or less likely to occur Previous Theories of Collective Action M Olson 1965 Hardin Gordon amp Scott saw selfinterested individuals rarely acting in common good and exhausting commonpool resources solution was a strong central state imposing standards and laws US National Research Council NRC Panel in 1985 E Ostrom found that selfgovernance was possible when the appropriators create and monitor rules and contribute their voluntary time and resources rules and monitoring are defined as public goods by Ostrom monitoring creates longterm sustainability in selfgovernance regimes Emergence of Cooperative Behavior conditions positively related to initial collective selfgovernance not 100 accurate or necessary precursorspredictors Attributes of commonpool resources that support emergency of cooperations feasible improvement not already too deteriorated to fix indicators of condition are available at low cost predictable ow of resource spatial extent sufficiently small to obtain knowledge of whole Attributes of appropriators that support cooperation salience dependent on resource system for livelihood or other important activity common understanding of how resource system operates low discount rate in relation to future benefits achieved from resource trust and reciprocity keys autonomy able to determine access and harvesting without external authorities countermanding them prior organizational and local leadership experience in simple settings cooperation is easier and more likely values of all variables are dependent and interrelated highly contextual Designing longterm cooperation 8 design principles rights to withdraw clearly defined appropriation rules restricting quantity of resource related to local conditions individual can modify operational rules monitors accountable to appropriators violations assessed with graduated sanctions rapid access to lowcost resolution mechanisms 19 ii iii ii iii iv rights to devise own institutions not challenged by external gov authorities appropriation provision monitoring enforcement CR governance organized in multiple layers These principles garnered support in lots of research 30 case studies of fisheries irrigation studies groundwater basin West Basin under LA fresh water source p 159161 Rules crafted to each context and system are essential Governments greatest benefit by supporting and encouraging appropriators to devise own solutions CPR Theory Challenges Choices Opportunities Appreciating wider applicability Only small homogenous communities 2nd gen researches say no Lam Yang Agrawal Coming to terms with contextual and configurel nature collective governance IS possible in diff contexts Blomquist Heikkila Shlager study of water management in AZ CA CO defining community providing aid and assistance to communities essential to craft towards diverse communities intercommunity divisions and inequalities may be exacerbated no real community may have previously existed key for policymakers considerations catalyzing a resultsbased sense of common purpose how can public managers and policy makers capitalize on selfgovemance potential facilitate public education and deliberation about public problems in a process of civic discovery problem solving partnerships lower info and enforcement costs for appropriators invest in appropriators governing capacities NOT commandandcontrol policy prescriptions this last section provides an interesting solution and significant overlap with questions of Public Administration Sabatier 1996 Main Argument critique of both topdown and bottomup approaches and proposal of new path forward beginning of ACF I TopDown Approaches to Implementation 0 Strengths I Importance of legal structuring of policy I Proved importance of veto points and causal theory I Six conditions of effective implementation is a useful checklist I Manageable list of variables I don t think so I Less pessimistic view than first generation focus on longer time span heped this 0 Weaknesses I Emphasis on clear consistent objectives of policy design usually not possible policy change can t be too minor OR too drastic to be headed and meaningful I No conceptual vehicle for analysis spanning over a decade I Neglected noncentral actors underestimated streetlevel bureaucrats and target populations I Policy formulation and implementation is a misleading distinction Sabatier disagrees with this last critique in a comical So what kind of way I BottomUp Approaches to Implementation Hjern et al critiqued 0 Strengths I Empirical ways to identify and map a policy network I Shows importance of policy visavis private organizations and markets I Can study a multitude of programs in one policy area not just one statute like topdown I Strategic interaction over time 0 Weaknesses 20 IIIO O 000 000000000 0 I Takes structures and resources at that point in time as a given doesn t look what made them that way or changed them I Takes present participants as a given I Not grounded in explicit theory of social economic or legal factors impacting participants and policies I How to synthesize You could use a comparative approach based on situation and approach s strengthsweaknesses OR a NEW FRAMEWORK FOCUS ON POLICY CHANGE OVER TIME I would read this part if nothing else 0 Policyoriented learning over decade or more 0 Start from policy problem see policy or subsystem use bottomup approach to map networks rather than policy decision strategies used by actors incorporate legal and socioeconomic factors 0 Advocacy coalition groups can be aggregated by belief systems table 3 on page 43 I deep core beliefs policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs impacted by policyoriented learning Rosenbloom 1983 Main Argument Three distinct aspects of PA are 1 managerial 2 political and 3 legal These approaches re ect constitutional separations of powers which are all represented now in administrative branch due to rise of Admin state What is PA No distinct theoretical core but three traditions each valid and none totally distinctThey have pulled PA in opposite directions Rosenbloom to the rescue with SYNTHESIS Managerial Approach associated with Exec branch Origins civil service reform Wilson businesslike Taylor scienti c management White and the first textbook Organizational Structure promotes Weber s ideal bureaucracy functional specialization View of individual impersonal even as strong as dehumanizing Political Approach associated with Legislative branch Origins Sayre Appleby PA during New DealWWII Org structure representativeness responsiveness accountability pluralistic View of individual part of an aggregate group collective Legal Approach associated with Judicial branch Origins historically eclipsed look to Goodnow judicialization to protect rights new interest in constitutional law Org structure independence impartiality view of individual focus on due process substantive rights and equity unique person and circumstances Separation of powers All three approaches represented primarily in one branch to provide checks and balances designed to be slowly changing not superquickresponsive Rise of Admin State to deal with socialecon problems all three powers in administration scary for Americans Counter to founding principlesideals Rosenbloom argues the three functions check and balance each other within administration How PA as a field should recognize importancevalidity of each approach and redefine itself Each approach is more or less relevant to different agenciesfunctions PA should take more from political theory improve separation of powers in PA listen to practitioners Ritchie Oppenheimer and Clark 2012 Social Processes in grizzly bear management 21 1 Research Question Unclear this study examines lessons learned from a stakeholder process uniquely grounded in and directly applying the policy sciences a This is descriptive 2 Contributions to the Literature a This article is not so much testing the Lasswell policy sciences but instead implementing his proposed process and then describes the outcomes from that process i They create a group GBDG to clarify common interests among stakeholders and create a new social process for consensus and collaboration b How to teach and solve problems using the policy sciences 3 Main Argument a Adaptive governance appears to be the best way forward from the current state i This would emphasize common interest over special interest 1 Need to move decisions away from park management and focus on procedural rationality b Propose alternatives as i Scientific management ii Current trajectory 1 Combo of scientific management and stakeholder groups iii Adaptive governance 1 Decentralize decision making c Findings i Conditions 1 Changes in management 2 Contributions to organizers and facilitators 3 Participants different perspectives behaviors orientations ii This process clarified human behavior and the compleX interactions related to socio political problems 4 Research DesignData Sources a Interview 30 GBDG participants 8 stakeholders from June to Aug 2010 i Then utilize the problem orientation Tables and Figures Table 1 highlights the processes before during and after the GBDG Theoretical Approach Policy Sciences Operationalization descriptive Analytical Techniques Interview analysis Generalizability maybe could convene similar groups but those groups must start with a plan for sustainability of process and outcomes 10 Implications a At first the group has positive impacts and outcomes but the way in which the group terminates leaves lasting negative impressions i Take care with the termination 11 Clarity of Writing a fairgood b needs improvement in identifying argumentthesis early 990995 IAD ACF NPF PE are all actorbased models that use the individual as the unit of analysis but individual is defined differently ACF beliefs PE attention Punctuated Equilibrium Notes 22 Downsian argument is that we lose interest quickly so change has to occur incremental Lindblom s Muddling Through is a foundational piece Key theoretical underpinnings positive feedback incrementalism structure of political con icts issue definition image of the issue Down s 0 Mobilization uses enthusiasm to develop new institutions 0 Issue attention cycle people get wrapped up in a topic and then it goes away 0 Down s missed the fact that institutions are developed during that cycle interest groups have formed there was a window of opportunity maybe policies created Schattsneider 0 Mobilization looks at subsystem destruction by expanding con ict definition 0 Organizations are the mobilization of bias 0 expand the con ict to get more attention to the issue and destabilize the system Redford 0 Wrote Democracy and the Administrative State General argument is that policy subsystem exists outside of the public eye For many issues the public does not know about the groups involved The groups are resistant to change Research methods They use cross sectional and longitudinal data for the first time Public Management Old and New 1 The book a Research questions p3 In light of the long history of public administration and management in organized societies are claims on behalf of such a transformation credible What is actually new and to what extent is the new changing in fundamental ways not only public management policies and practices but the field s intellectual and institutional infrastructure To the extent hat we can discern significant continuity in the managerial institutions of mature democracies what are the implications of such a reality for the prospects of the further managerial reform b Argument p3 that the old and new that is public management s historical and contemporary structures practices and institutions are so intimately interrelated that answers to the foregoing questions require an understanding of the paths and patterns of national institutional development 2 Public management comes of age a Idea of administration i Under sovereign mandate sovereign is a one that exercises supreme permanent authority ii Definition appeared in dictionary in 1839 management of affairs of government Often management and administration were used to de ne the other term b Idea of management i Individual not sovereign mandate ii Initially defined to describe management of large corporations of industrial capitalism p7 23 iii iv V c Distinct i ii iii iv Scientific management grew after publication of Frederick W Taylor s The Principles of Scientific Management in 1911 Public management became really established in USA and Great Britain in 1940s p8 Public management is broadly defined as systematic administrative effort on behalf of the interests of the sovereign and subjects of a state 35 Scholars have worked to create a distinction Some say management is a subfield of administration p9 Other use the terms are synonymously Woodrow Wilson Roscoe Martin Paul Van Riper James Stever etc In short administration might be said to embrace politicaladministrative institutions as a whole whereas management is concerned with the organizations that conduct the actual operations of government within an institutional framewor p10 d Public management or public management i 3 i ii b Public m i ii iii Public m i C ii Fundamental question in the field is or should management be different in the private and public sectors 1 some say yes others say no History and contemporary public management Some argue that public management and public sector managerialism was invented in 1979 by Great Britain s Margaret Thatcher Some say nothing is really new Many argue path dependency anagement a 3 dimensional view Structure and process 1 Bureaucracy organization and programmatic and regulatory responsibilities requirements of administrative procedure acts or civil service regulations statutorily mandated POSDCORB 2 Institutional rules subordination of different levels of government rules governing elections and of ce holdings levels of concentration or centralization of power separation of power Craft 1 Concern for decisions action and outcomes and for the personal skills needed to perform in managerial roles 2 Craft perspective overlooks politics and focuses on management only Institutionalized values 1 Bureaucratic values have been more suspect in US than Europe 29 2 In European Rechtsstaat service to the state has been legitimatized more so than US 29 3 Christopher Hood 1991 established 3 sets of core values in PM parsimony and economy honest and fairness and reliability survivability and adaptive capacity 31 anagement by country France 1 Democratic republic in Napoleonic tradition which relies on central state authority more so than Germany UK or US 2 Generally regarded as having strong central government and strong administration tradition and strong executive since 1958 32 3 Has civil law system and judicial review of administrative but not legislative acts 33 4 Rechsstaat administrative system is regulated by legal rules which conceive the state administration as inhabiting an autonomous domain apart from civil society 33 5 French PA historically built around administrative law 59 Germany 24 iii UK 5 iv USA 1 Rechtsstaat German Rechtsstaat is a doctrine in continental European legal thinking quotconstitutional mquot in which the exercise of governmental power is constrained by the law Rechsstaat imposes limits on managerialism 59 Constitutional federal republic 3 main principles separation of powers federalism and local government 33 Constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy governed by an unwritten constitution 35 No formal separation of powers UK comprises Great Britain England Wales Scotland and Northern Ireland National government is only level with permanent legal status Subnational levels can be reformed at will of national government 35 Monarch plays largely ceremonial role Head of government is prime minister Constitutional federal republic v Differences 1 2 3 Sharper separation between politics and administration eXists in US and UK than France and Germany UK constitution is often amended unlike US and Continental Europe History of PM in UK is constitutional history whereas in US France and Germany it is administrative history 63 4 Old public management Continental traditions a PreWestphalian public administration i Ancient China entry examinations into public service ii Roman law adopted principle that head of state receives power from the people distinction between private and public personalities hierarchal nature of administrative strucutres and division of government into major constituent parts 42 b Absolutism and the Modern State i Absolutism is pre scientific management but had scientific principles ii Cameralism administrative technology aim was to achieve common happiness of ruler and people through rules that end in ef ciency of resource allocation 47 iii Hood and Jackson refer to late 20th century NPM as new cameralism 48 iv Cameralism re ects scientific rationalizing economizing spirit of the age in order to ensure the wealth of the state and happiness of its people cameralists applied principles of economic rationality to issues of policy and administration 165 c Sovereignty i Peace of Westphalia established Europe of sovereign states d Bureaucracy and Rechtsstaat i 17801850 emergence of constitutional state and bureaucracy ii Rechsstaat generally refers to law as the foundation for PA 52 iii Classic Rechsstaat state stood above society had legal personality of its own 53 iv Tensions between Rechsstaat and welfare state 54 e Welfare state i PostWWII reconstruction phase welfare state is born 5 Old public management British traditions a Unwritten constitution i Parliament has a lot of power and could change constitution itself b Bureaucracy and civil service i Little formal bureaucracy prior to 19th century ii Relied on liberty and free choice to produce rational decisions 68 iii Weberian 71 25 C Common law i Common law governed British PA 72 d Governance 6 i 20th century Age of Anxiety international relations imposed new demands on governance ii executive power could impement far reaching management reforms simply by announcing the desire to do so 76 Science and ethics i Scientific management Taylorism rejected by British ii Assumed a fusion rather than separation of politics and administration 75 6 Old public management American traditions a 0 r7 F 9L 9 Democratic governance with unique characteristics parts tend to dominate the whole more units of government than any other nation attributed to nature and authority of constitution 79 Hamiltonian tradition echoes cameralism Madisonian emphasizes interplay of group interests Jeffersonian local level government 82 Spoils system and beginnings of bureaucratic government created by President Jackson 83 J acksonian is mostly described by DeTocqueville Federal government expansion after 1880s councilmanager welfare state Presidents T Roosevelt and Taft promoted efficient government goal was to strengthen executive control over state policies and programs Wilson drew from Europe bureaucracy as political force thus separate administration from politics 86 Waldo liked local government power 87 Rise of scientific management during Wilson s presidency 19131921 0PM assumes core of political life is lawmaking interpretation implementation and enforcement Public mangers are governed by rules and hierarchy and by public service values of reliability consistency and predictability and accountability to legislatures and courts 142 7 New public management reform change and adaptation D 9L rv 9r 9 Iquot 8 New public management incentives competition performance Reduced cost public service delivery thirdparty implementation Rise of managerialism NPM coined in 1989 by Christopher Hood NPM referred to allocation of resources by competitive markets that suited neoconservative times 107 See analytical model of NPN by Toonen 107 PlanningProgrammingBudgeting System PPBS best practices steer don t row 8 New p blic management delegation and accountability a b c JOE397 Concern for political accountability less intense in democratic regimes with Rechsstaat and parliamentary democracy More of a problem in UK America s distrust in bureaucratic power leads to managerial accountability needs 136 See Mechanisms of accountability 139 Departmental integration and cohesion canons of OPM are replaced by organizational dispersion and managerial autonomy is separated from political accountability 143 See lessons of NPM and German New Steering Model 144 Accountability New institutional economic theory principalagent problems new political economy 146 i public choice theory emphasizes role of political authorities as elected representatives seeks to diminish interest groups ii managerialism paradigm reasserts politicsadministration gives high priority to bureaucrats as responsive to policy constituencies Agency theory parliamentary democracy as regime of delegation and accountability has advantages in administrative efficiency 149 26 i Managerialism has made the issue of democratic accountability more complex 154 9 Of wine and bottles old and new a NPM came to describe PM reforms of every kind b New institutional economics incentives competition results c Traditional PA hierarchy bureaucracy separation of politics and administration replaced by NPM partnerships networks decentralization participation 157 argument of book proper context is long history of governing 158 Continuity and punctuation 159 162 17th century contemporary PM emerged rise of formal bureaucratic administration dates from Europes Age of Absolutism 160 bureaucracy is inherently undemocratic 169 institutional change Douglas North 1990 path dependence Gianfranco Poggie 1978 If North sees a constitution or judicial order as an institution that affects transaction costs Poggi sees such institutions as affecting the creation and allocation of values that sustain or legitimize the state 169 networks Powell 1990 m bureaucratic surveillance processes of information gathering storage processing retrieval and its application to decision making 171 W39f39E39FQOWS DP p r o Provan KG amp Milward HB 2001 Do networks really work A framework for evaluating publicsector organizational networks Public Administration Review 61 4 Main Question With all the hype about networks what is the relationship between interorganizational network structures and activities and measures of effectiveness the networks of focus are human services Issues for Evaluating Network Effectiveness 1 Like the difficulties in evaluating organizations but even more compleX 2 Too much focus on the clients which are important but not the beall 3 Joint production problem of more than one agency delivering only part of a certain services Proposal THREE LEVELS of Effectiveness Network Effectiveness at the Community Level 1 Communitybased networks must be judged by their level of service delivery the community One way to do this is to measure whether the network is delivering services in a way that could NOT be done in a singular agency 3 Another way is to measure the social capital the network brings to the community Effectiveness at the Network Level Does the network achieve viability in the community Everybody s got to remember they re in a network for one Not the number of members but that the RIGHT agencies are members of the network Range of actual services of the network A range of services from critical to peripheral is key The authors LOVE the concept of multipleXity which refers to the strength of ties between network agencies I had to add that to my MS word spell check That s two words this week Homophily was the other one I will get them into the dictionary O SJ PP PF 27 O 000 O IIOIOOOIIIO IIOOIO 7 Evaluate the administrative structure of the network NAO vs not Effectiveness at the organizationparticipant level 1 Client outcomes 2 Legitimacy 3 Resource acquisition 4 Cost Integration across levels of analysis The authors present some conceptual frameworks on integrating Figure 1 is a nice visual Pierson 1993 Policy Feedback This article is kind of a summary of the recent literature and emergence of case studies looking into policy feedback effects Main Argument Policies themselves are politically consequential structures Policies beget politics EE Schattschneider wasn t this also what Lowi said Public policies create incentives and resources which causes feedback effects InterestSocial Groups to respond through countermobilization to retain or enhance benefit or reduce costs Skocpol key scholar regulatory capture or corporatism can result Governmental elites also respond to the policies which eXpand or contract their power the administrative state Mass publics respond in line with Rational Choice Theory EspingAndersen key scholar welfare state in uences public behavior North Rational Choice key scholar path dependence and lockin effects people may behave collectively in a suboptimal ways Public policies have interpretive effects Governmental Elites respond through policy learning Heclo policy incrementalism based on previous eXperience readopted considered natural vs negative learning based on policy failure which new initiatives address Hall key scholar 3 orders of policy change 1 settings of policy instruments 2 modifies instruments and settings 3 shifts settings instruments AND goals negative learning Some learning hypotheses on p 617618 Mass Public effect depends on visibility and traceablity of policy response is electoral for politicians e g taX backlash vs hidden taxes reminded me a bit of Social Construction and Policy Design Heclos powering and puzzling power can facilitate or impeded individuals actions and individuals efforts to understand p 621 InterestSocial Groups apparently both effects learning and visibilitytraceability but author doesn t really elaborate at all Key assumptions foundational theories Historical institutional analysis intensive scrutiny of specific historical paths rational choice theory individual behavior study Key research agendaquestions moving forward How common are these effects Under what circumstances are they more likely to occur and What particular types of in uence are most important Why is learning positive or negative Case studies are great but let s investigate large samples across time and subject matter to see trends and get some answers YAY STATISTICS 28 pg 626 Figure 1 The Dimensions of Policy Feedback is a great summary Pierce et al 2013 Social Construction and Policy Design A Review of Past Applications 1 10 11 Research Question How is the theory of Policy Design and Social Construction being applied Sub questions Who is applying it and using what methods In which policy domains Is it becoming more or less prevalent How can theoretical development continue through further research Contributions to the Literature a Article seeks to answer main criticisms of theory that it is not falsifiable Sabatier 1999 lacks inclusion of institutions Lieberman and lacks clear causal driver DeLeon 2005 through analysis of applications b Provides summary of theory including 8 assumptions pg 56 overview of applications in literature Main Argument a Policy Design amp Social Construction theory is a theory growing in strength and popularity with tmany empirical applications which answer some criticisms it is falsifiable b Findings it has been applied widely across policy domains but mostly only at the federal level of government c Findings also detail the number of studies that focus on which target populations are most commonly studied deviants 35 dependents 32 less on contenders and advantaged 43 of applications discuss how target could change d Authors argue for further research to document change in power lowhigh and social construction positivenegative among target groups Research DesignData Sources a Compiled list of all references to Schneider and Ingram 1993 and 1997 reviewed for application or theoretical development coding for identifying articles and content of publication to decpher application of the two propositions target populations or feed forward Tables and Figures pg 4245 somewhat clear I found Figure 1 to be most helpful Theoretical Approach examines one theory through a literature review NA Operationalization not really applicable Analytical Techniques discussed findings and coding Generalizability Not really part of article does suggest further research see 3d Implications No policy implications suggest 9 potential causal drivers of change in target group construction could possibly be applied table 2 page 45 Clarity of Writing Clear good overview of literature on the theory The authors state this theory has two core propositions 29 1 Target Population Proposition conceptualization of target populations identified by social construction and or power highlow 2 Feed Forward Proposition treatment of target groups through policy design has enduring effects on the political orientation and participation of target populations Do you guys agree that these are the two core propositions of the theory I thought this kind of left out a main point that target populations influence the type of policy design Pielke Jr R A 2004 What future for the policy sciences Policy Sciences 3 7 34 209225 Research questions What is the future for the policy sciences framework considering the generation who started it Lasswell and McDougal and then studied under Lasswell will retire Main arguments and findings 1 External factors working against the sustainability of the policy sciences are a scholars want to be predictive now and the policy sciences framework is not predictive b social scientists want to be scientific general and are attracted to theory development modeling and quantitative research now and c the increasing politicization of science where scholars favor advocacy over analysis and promotion over intelligence 211213 2 Internal factors are a there are no degree programs specifically for policy sciences and no faculty taking positions to teach policy sciences speci cally b CU Boulder is one of the only institutions with course syllabi for policy sciences specifically and c the policy sciences lack a distinctive identity within the policy movement Pielke explains the differences between policv scientists and social scientists 1 My perspective is that the policy scientist is neither a social scientist as defined by conventional standards nor a political advocate for special interests but instead an analyst whose skills of integration of knowledge and contextual mapping can contribute intelligence to decision makers enhancing the likelihood of attaining desired outcomes 2 Policy sciences are problemoriented and transdisciplinary Pielke expresses opposing opinions of Ostrom and Brunner as to whether or not you can measure and empirically test frameworks Then he presents his opposing debates with Sabatier and deLeon about the perceivably outdated stages heuristic in policy sciences Pielke says that policy sciences can be upheld in the future if we 1 decrease our reliance on prediction 2 change the value system of policy scientists and 3 create a better connection between policy and sciences Pielke ends with articulating the difference between Lasswell s work as a policy scientist and Lasswell s work as a social scientist Annie s thought on policy sciences You have to embed steps to test your assumptions throughout the policy process You have to ensure all stakeholders are present throughout the process And you have to understand that there is a scientific method to doing this The critique is that there is not really a scientific method because of context For example you cannot always get all stakeholders in the room 30 i1 0 O O OIOIIO OO O 000 0 PP Main Argument There is an increased political need for the appearance of a small federal government through workforce reduction which leads to contracting out This leads to questions of how to apply ideals of the merit system and instill a public service ethic in private and nongovemmental contractors There is no easy answer 1970s1990s and probably to today there is a delegitimizing of the fed gov yet people still want all of the benefits of big gov only 4 of fed gov budget is on public servants but the workforce is reduced symbolically as a symbol contractors are used for value of efficiency specialized knowledge special projects eg census P Light has revealed shadow gov actually just as big Ideal of Merit Pendleton Act 1883 was threefold 1 competitive hiring 2 promotion and penalty based on performance 3 protection from partisan political pressure Also enhanced through vet pref GS system Hatch Act equal opportunity unions stability in fed career though not so much anymore how do we prevent partisan pressure and nepotism with contractors key Q in contracting system focus on essentials of merit not impose all burdens of federal hiring protect from bad management Public Service Ethic and Accountability contractors must have focus on mission accomplishment over profit and public service but how he offers some half baked ideas and case studied p 547548 contractors are now part of the Public Service community Organizational accountability no longer through hierarchy but now through contract tempting environment for fraud fed gov create management capacity to write exible but firm contracts manage them effectively and guard against threat of fraud Individuals and the Public Service ethic Frederickson patriotism of benevolence and public servants role to protect public good and citizen should override careerism There is maybe selfselection for wellestablished contracting firms for employees want to do public work contract firm management needs to instill public service ethos Conclusion contracting is imposing negative constraints on merit system and offers challenges of how to instill spirit of public service and commitment to mission accomplishment in private and nonprofit organizations Goerdel H T 2009 Public administration and the political world Three prospects Public Performance amp Management Review 344 618625 Main Argument Call for the need to look more closely at how public administrators interact with elected officials and the political world visa vis citizen representation networks and democratization of performance management Representational Capacity To a greater extent than ever before elected officials are relying on administrativepublic officials to relay citizen concerns info asymmetry public servants have more bottomup knowledge of citizen s direct concerns through NPM customerfocused value Need to institutionalize this bottomup knowledge mechanism Future RQ what is bureaucrat s responsibility given greater knowledge Political Networks Little knowledge about the political networks administrators interact in and lobby to increase political support intergovernmental activity multiagency work increases nodes Use previous literature to build this knowledge ACF Sabatier JenkinsSmith bureaucratic autonomy literature Carpenter 2011 31 iii iv ii i1 iii iv network governance literature in PM Meier amp O Toole 2001 Managing political networks in collective bargaining environments Moe Future RQ Importance of election cycles to PA polarized politics bureau matching and bashing How can an admin theory of political network formation inform the connection between PM and political networks Democratizing Performance Management Increasing value of effectiveness being added to efficiency value of 1900s institutionalize bottomup processes for performance measure development conceive measures within the organization public interface and larger feedback process on performance measures Future RQ How can performance management perge managerial and democratic values Ostrom 2010 Beyond Markets and States Main Idea Ostrom outlines the scholarly development of the IAD and main contributions and research findings then points out some ways forward Early scholarship on organizations and goods organizations that do not fit into simplistic models considered chaotic Only two types of goods Private controlled by market excludable and rivalrous consumers buy Nonprivate regulated by government nonexcludable nonrival citizensvoters choose Individuals fully rational perfect information strategic decisions made linked to others behavior rankordered preferences Developments Polycentric systems with many centers of decision making V Ostrom Tiebout Warren 1961 multiple public and private agencies could productively organize resources in multiple scales efficiency of smalltomed sized cities citizens vote with feet incorporated small communities contract with larger neighbors if not satis ed large neighbors have less control metro areas with high of autonomous direct service producers higher technical efficiency Doubling of types of goods rivalrous becomes subtractability of use conceptualizing subtractability and excludability on a low to high scale commonpool resources added subtractability and excludability toll or club goods also added low subtractability and not excludable See Figure 1 p 645 The IAD Framework its nested multitheoretical Good discussion of framework v theory v model and Fig 2 causal chart 646 Action Situations affected by external variables biophysical conditions goods attributes of community shared rules agentbased models structured for theorists to predict outcomes Important findings and scholarly contributions NRC metaanalysis across disciplines of commonpool resource users found the capacity to overcome dilemmas and create effective governance when they communicate effectively and have shared norms and rule conformance property rights system was developed with 5 rights access withdrawal management exclusion and alienation Schlager amp E Ostrom 1992 Developed categorization with 7 broad types of rules parallel 7 working parts of game boundary position choice information scope aggregation and payoff design principles eXplain long sustained regimes of resource sharing and include user and resource boundaries congruence with local conditions appropriation and provision collective choice arrangements monitoring users and 32 9969511 resourse graduated sanctions con ict resolution mechanisms minimal recognition of rights local users rights recognized by government nested enterprises university laboratory experiments confirmed cooperation increased with facetoface communication between actors it increased even more when actors created their own sanctioning system experiments in CPR show predictions of conventional theory of collective action noncooperative game theory does not hold irrigation systems governed by farmers perform significantly better all 3 constructed performance measures than government operated in Nepal and many other countries protecting forests and biodiversity through govowned property isn t the best think about forced relocation of indigenous peoples that s bad local ecology and specific rules as well as legitimacy with users is more important What s next for theoretical developments Call for no simple policy prescriptions like turning resources over to government Need a more in depth theory of human behavior bounded rationality heuristics individual preferences Study of the central role of trust microcontextual and socialecological system understanding of decision situations needed Figure 6 page 663 not really explained Final words no single normative theory of justice or simplistic understanding The most important lesson for public policy analysis is that humans have a more complex motivational structure and more capability to solve social dilemmas than posited in earlier rationalchoice theory Core goal of policy bring out best in humans Pay more attention to how diverse polycentric institutions and multiple scales can achieve innovativeness learning adapting trustworthiness levels of cooperations of participants and more effective equitable and sustainable outcomes Ostrom E 2009 A general framework for analyzing sustainability of socialecological systems Science 325 419 1 All resources used by humans are organized in complex socialecological systems SESs a One problem is that the social and ecological sciences have developed in silos and do not speak to one another b Consequently theoretical scenarios about common pool resources lead to onesizefitsall policy solutions that fale 2 Some SESs are sustainable and some are not a We must examine SESs across multiple levels and HARNESS the COMPLEXITY 3 Ostrom proposes an updated version of a nested framework with four main subsystems a Resource systems b Resource units c Governance systems d Users 4 Ostrom hypothesizes that when expected benefits of managing a resource exceed the perceived costs of investing in better rules and norms for most users and their leaders the probability of user s self organizing is high 5 There are ten second level variables that lend to a positive or negative possibility that users will self organize a Size of resource system 33 Productivity of system Predictability of system dynamics Resource unit mobility Number of users Leadership Normssocial capital Knowledge of SES Importance of resource to users Collectivechoice rules 6 Of course the success or failure of SES systems is based on CONTEXT 7 Sustainability of rules also depends on monitoring and enforcement swamps Gaus J M 1948 American Administrative History PAR 84 289 292 Thesis Public Administration can only be understood in the context from which it comes ie the events individuals and institutions must be considered Argument In order to advance the study of public affairs we should further study not only the academic aspects but also civic affairs Evidence Remainder of article reviews Leonard White s The F ederalists A Study in Administrative History Book 1 Examines the ways in which the Federalists Washington and Adams create a government how should we interpret the constitutional provisions established at the Philly convention 2 Hamilton Jefferson feuds coordination and organization is an issue regardless of a large or small govt Article then proceeds to describe White s writing and possible future works Conclusions White crafts an argument for how public administration grows out of the Federalists and Hamilton Case H L 1964 Gordon R Clapp The Role of Faith Purposes and People in Administration Public Administration Review 242 p 86 91 Thesis Gordon Clapp s distinguished public service record leading the Tennessee Valley Authority is an exemplar to other public administrators Argument Several key tenets of Clapp s administrative practices can be adopted by others Evidence 1 Practices to adopt include a Interest in other men s ideas i Listen carefully and thoughtfully b Encourage and cultivate a sense of responsibility i Essentially theory Y management c Serve your org loyally 34 i Org first self second d Maximize participation i freeing people in an organization to do the job of which they are capable e Enlightened Collective Bargaining f Authority of Knowledge i Respect the facts g Decentralize authority i Allow individuals to work toward the larger mission of the org Conclusions Article is an example of the practice of Theory Y management TVA was successful because individuals could act in line with their personal expertise advance the mission of the org and serve effectively Caldwell L K 1947 Perfecting State Administration 1940 46 Public Administration Review 71 p 25 36 Thesis The role of the states has increased in significantly in the past decade Argument This increasing role is observed as a result of legislatures reorganizing state governments to allow for a larger executive role ie governor Evidence 2 Strengthened Finances 3 Effective Cooperation a Particularly through the Council of State Govts 4 Public Reaction against the fed govt centralizing 5 Four key areas organize the recent state govt developments a Consolidation i Of administrative functions ii Systematic overhauls of agencies within state govt lead to service improvements iii Consolidation efforts particularly lead by Missouri New York Virginia b Coordination i Of admin policy and action ii The consolidation efforts of states mentioned above lead to increased coordination reporting and supervision iii Signals the rise of governors as chief state officers iv States establish planning committees civil service systems and budget of ces c Cooperation i Among states in intergovernmental programs ii Particularly coordination between state and federal agenciesprograms d Control i Over admin procedure by governors legislatures courts ii Establish secretaries of state treasurers and agencies to handle administrative needs of the state but this has the effect of strengthening the governor and cabinet Conclusions 1 States must further improve administrative personnel and procedural systems to sustain increasing responsibilities 2 Increasing govemor s responsibilities is in effect increasing the administrative roles of each state a Suggests further movement to a strong executive even at the Federal level 35 Beard C A 1916 Training for Efficient Public Service Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 64 215 226 Thesis Training public servants requires careful consideration of the tensions posed in American life between democracy and order Argument In order to train public servants they must practice doing the work of the public and systems which recruit train and retain quality individuals must be in place Evidence 1 the supreme public question of the hour is whether democracy and efficiency are inherently irreconcilable Everywhere serious students of government are asking themselves whether it is possible to have thorough going democratic control over the government and at the same time secure the efficient fulfillment of the great tasks which modern social and industrial conditions have imposed upon the state 2 Democracy and the expert a Democracy distrusts the expert b Aristocracies rest on the notion of expertise c The only kind of an expert that democracy will and ought to tolerate is the expert who admits his fallibility retains an open mind and is prepared to serve d Scientists not politicians have the will and knowledge to solve community problems 3 The Negative Aspects of Civil Service Reform a Ending the spoils system is not enough must recruit train and retain the best b Ridiculous is the precise word to employ What our governments federal state and municipal in effect say to young men and women looking forward to entering the public service is this We have no treatises which will give you accurate and adequate information about the matters with which you should be familiar We will not allow you to get any instruction from anybody who is actually doing the work for which you want to prepare yourself We will not give you any advice about how to prepare yourself Although we spend millions on education in the United States we cannot spend one dollar in preparing you to serve your country in a civil position All we can do is to give you a list of sample questions which have been asked sometime in the past and may never be asked again You must get your instruction and information in some haphazard unsystematic trusttoluck scheme which may by the skin of your teeth pull you through an examination c Not until we have accepted the principle established in private business experience that persons will not be regularly admitted to employment until they have demonstrated that they can do the work which is required of them can we build our recruiting systems upon a solid foundation 4 Universities and Training for Public Service a Doing and knowing are two fundamentally different things public servants must practice doing b Public service requires training from many disciplines and from every branch of knowledge 5 The New Science of Administration a Public Administration may have a clearer curriculum i The work of management ii Such a program should consist in part at least of the following elements 1 Administrative law 2 Taxation finance and budgetmaking 3 Scientific management 4 Public works management 5 Methods of recruiting and maintaining an ef cient personnel 6 City planning 7 Problems of departmental organization 8 Preparation of reports 9 Statistics and graphic presentation 6 The Direction of Public Service Training at University a The committee that would oversee this training must be representative of all Schools within the University Conclusions 36 This author is hilarious and worth reading if for his running commentary Suggests how academia can provide credit and support for the doing of work not just the knowledge gaining 3 with directors of public service training in all our large institutions of learning we could look forward confidently to the solution of the problem presented at the opening of the paper namely the reconciliation of democracy and efficiency 1 Therigult Pendleton Act The Pendleton Act was passed 1883 stating that government jobs have to be awarded based on merit Before then politicians were strategically putting their constituents in positions this was known as the spoils system The researcher is questioning why the Pendleton Act was passed He reveals why other studies have said it was passed and identifies the holes in their arguments Other studies said it passed because of 1 inefficiency politicians spent too much time and energy getting the right people into office 2 political parties Republicans pursued reform and 3 public pressure The reason the reform passed couldn t be inefficiency alone because that doesn t explain why it took 19 years to pass The reason couldn t be political parties because it was Republicans pursuing the reform but Democrats ultimately wrote the bill The author introduces the argument for public pressure operationalizes it and says public pressure is a key factor in why the Act passed Roberts Leonard White Overall White s work was concerned with the macrodynamics of administrative development 772 White studied the first century of existence of the federal government This article reviews White s contribution to the field of public administration He wrote the first PA textbook and won a Pulitzer Prize in History He had great insight into the field way beyond anyone else at that time Unfortunately White is left out of some compilations and historical accounts of PA Roberts said that it is tempting to dwell on White s weaknesses such as ambiguities in his analytical framework preoccupation with earlier administrations and obsession with the personal system 766 But he excelled at picking his data sources from correspondences government records and diaries White argued that efficiency and economy were central reform 1ssues In the Order of Anarchy section Roberts discusses the state of affairs and White s contribution to interpret affairs as circumstantial 768 White s analytical framework was that personalities and ideologies matter but broad forces hinder or empower leaders and determine whether ideas are likely to be affirmed or denied in practices 768 Roosenbloom 2013 Roosenbloom introduced law management and politics as a framework for the field of public administration This article re ects on his work 30 years ago Specifically he is questioning if his framework is still accurate considering collaborative governance and reinventing government The article did nothing new but it provided a structural functional framework and institutional anchor 382 Roosenbloom says other frameworks are good but not as in uential because they describe what public administration does rather than grounding their arguments in thought or history alone Roosenbloom provided this very simple approach to understanding the complexity of the PA field The articleframework DID NOT do a few things Roosenbloom s critique 1 it did not explain clarifications or attention to limitations of the framework Eg It did not sufficiently define politics 2 it is based on the premise that the separation of powers collapses into administrative practice 3 legal political and managerial functions are in con ict but article does not describe how to deal with that 4 framework is based on historical values pre1980s Is the framework still relevant Two main issues that challenge it 1 Collaborative governance embraces steering not rowing and contracting out 2 New Public Management since 1980s embraces marketoriented government 37 Under the politics piece Roosenbloom cites Lasswell the who gets what why and how Lynn L E 2001 The myth of the bureaucratic paradigm What traditional public administration really stood for A Argument a Attributing traditional PA to narrowly considered bureaucratic paradigm does not accurately re ect the history of PA that is focused on law politics citizens and values New public administration offers inadequate superficial thinking and does gives up moral and intellectual authority of traditional PA B RQ a How did the traditional public administration mind actually work b Does the old orthodoxy shoe fit C Evidence a PA is charged both with expanding admin capacity but also finding responsible and responsive limits on the bureaucracy i Three values 1 Representativeness 2 Neutral competence 3 Executive leadership b Simon and Dahl launch critiques on traditional thinking i This leads to a revisionist history being written ii Authors jump on this bandwagon starting in the 1970s and it seems to just go unchecked from there iii The old orthodoxy becomes classified as a Weberian bureaucracy insulated from politics and viewed as technocratic and scientific 1 Facts separate from values c Reconsideration of traditional thinking is in order i Reconcile tension between admin capacity and democratic control ii Wilson does not make an argument for politics admin dichotomy iii Goodnow does not believe politics and admin are the domains of specific branches of govt politics should supervise and control admin iv Cleveland government should exist for the common welfare d Consolidation i Law and the courts role in admin are a challenge ii Administrators are granted wide discretionary options in rulemaking and implementation iii From where does the public interest and public opinion come D Conclusions a Basically the concepts of traditional PA are unfounded in the actual writings of early scholars b New public management is actually overlooking the moral in interjurisdictional implications of public administration and this is problematic i NPM does not do enough to recognize the democratic tensions in the administration Moynihan DP 2009 Our usable past A historical contextual approach to administrative values Public Administration Review 695 813822 Main Argument Professor Lawrence Lynn wrote an article that basically said PA is lost because PA went towards management rather than law Lynn cited the differences between Leonard White and Frank J Goodnow and the fact that the field followed White management and not Goodnow law Moynihan in this article is trying to reconcile the divergence using historical context 1 Introduction 38 a Outlines the debate managementWhite vs lawGoodnow as the grounding principle of PA and which would make the field more legitimate b Outlines the reconciliation between the arguement historical context and values 2 The Search for Legitimacy A Historical Contextual Approach a Using White as an example this section makes the case that the values of public administration re ect developments external to the field rather than a conscious choice internal to the field b States PA is a reactive field particularly due to the close relationship between practice and scholarship The only way to understand this the author reasons using White as support is to understand the historical context c White s view is that holding ANY value law management etc above others is only done because the context demands it d Goodnow and White were not contemporaries and so had different contextual demands to the field at the time of their writing e Goodnow was very focused on making PA a legitimate field f Author points out that Goodnow never mentions management bc the field of mgmt had not yet been extablished g States that while White was critical of law he pays more attention to law than other textbook authors in PA Saw the role of law as practical and argued that lawyers were illequipped to be public servants 3 Assessing the Threat to Law a Author says that Lynn argues law has been given a back seat to other values in PA b Author points out that those arguing for management as a primary value do not argue that we do away with law c Maybe more important to examine the difference between law as a framework and law as a values set i Law as a formal framework is discussed ii Law as a discretionary value is discussed because Lynn said law should be more than a framework 1 Outlines the arguments against law as a value set value tradeoffs the ambiguity of law the function of law is to minimize discretion and feasibility 4 Can Law Provide Administrative Legitimacy a Legitimacy for practice of PA is discussed because the public will not respond positively to a new legal emphasis b Legitimacy for scholarship is discussed and the author talks about that struggle in PA but notes that legal scholarship has the same issues with legitimacy 5 Conclusion a Continuity in underlying values of PA lies underneath the pick of the week b To avoid repetitive discussions PA needs better historical documentation c White himself did a lot of work on historical context Models of Management Abstract This paper presents 4 models to manage across scales of government The research was conducted with an empirical study of 237 governments Literature review 39 Elazar 1964 Grodzins 1966 Leach 1970 Walker 1974 were early scholars who created management models Expansion of federal programs in 60s spawned the term intergovernmental management The four models Definition Model A scientific metaphor that directs attention to certain resemblances between theoretical entities and the real subject matter one type of system can be shown to be a consistent interpretation of another 672 definition by Kaplan 1964 266277 Top down model leans towards executive control national consistency and a minimum standard Often facilitated by comprehensive plans joint boards quasigovemmental groups Local compliance is key and bureaucrats spend a lot of time proving compliance Donor recipient model The premise is the mutually beneficially relationship between the national and subnational governments Local governments have more autonomy than in the topdown model They are able to make adjustments to fit better with the local community This model comes from implementation studies Pressman amp Wildavsky Jursidictionbased model The premise is that jurisdictions do not only use federal funding They also use private nonprofit and state level funding This model emphasizes power of the jurisdiction Network model Various actors are involved and none have the power to control the others The premise is interdependency Milward H B amp Provan K G 2000 Governing the hollow state Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 102 359380 ALERT This is often cited and is a good comps reference for both PA and PM 1 Introduction The Hollow State is a metaphor for using third parties like nonprofits as providers of public services The authors wrote this piece after focusing on the phenomenon of the hollow state in health and human services for ten years 2 Non governmental Governance While government refers to formal structures at the state and federal level governance is about delivering public services a The authors point out the worldwide trend from government delivery of services to government procurement of services They also note that there s no solid evidence this is more effective b They point out that there is a tendency for governments to fund programs not research which leads to programing on the basis of one or two success stories 3 The Hollow State a The authors further explain what they mean by the hollow state the degree of separation between a government and the services it provides It is also a term used to denote that public policy choices center on governance rather than government The policies try to steer rather than row b The hollow state relies on networks which the authors state is less solid than markets or hierarchies Networks are not as stable and predictable over time c Flexibility is a strength in the hollow state but coordination is complex and accountability can be difficult to determine 4 The Elements of Governance a Clear principalagent relationships being really intentional when contracting 40 b Stability the authors argue that in the case of health and human services stability promotes performance Mental health practitioners are NOT garbage haulers 5 Extending the Findings in New Directions a Solving Social Dilemmas b Risk and Property Rights the authors quote North 1990 and state that if that means higher transaction costs 6 Conclusions of the authors based on their work a Have a clear principalagent relationship between govt and contractors b Make sure that the principal still produces SOME similar services then they are better at governing the situation c Contracts should be rebid infrequently they don t specify Resources are important but don t throw money at problems but also don t underfund solutions e Stability is good 9 Mettier S 2002 Bringing the state back into civic engagement Policy feedback effects of the GI bill for World War II veterans The American Political Science Review 962 351365 Research Question Does a vast commitment of public resources yield only social and economic benefits such as increased education with no effect on democratic governance itself Using the policy feedback theory the author examines the GI bill and it s impact on the civic participation of recipients Contribution to the Literature Application of policy feedback theory adds civic participation as a type of feedback which I know Annie will find interesting I Main Argument Veterans who used the GI bill were significantly more likely to be active participants in civic organizations in 19501964 She tests a reciprocity thesis from policy feedback to see if GI bill folks felt an obligation to give back due to their receipt of the GI Bill Results suggested that this thesis has some merit but does not entirely explain the phenomenon The author then tested the critical effects thesis which showed that in alignment with policy design those that increased the most in civic engagement were those that had grown up with little and went on to receive the GI bill Research Design What a fabulous gig she ew around the country interviewing past recipients of the GI bill It worked for what she wanted and the quotes from the interviews illuminated the data very nicely Theoretical Approach The causal argument is that the policy design of the GI Bill produced a critical effect that impacted the level of civic engagement by recipients Implications The implications are to use a social capital lens in policy design and consider the results of this study in doing so This seems logical to me but I m exhausted so who knows I McGrath R 2013 The rise and fall of radical civil service reform in the US states Public Administration Review 734 Research Question 41 The author introduces the research question why some states essentially repealed merit systems in favor of decentralized atwill ones at the end of the same century that saw every state besides Texas adopt comprehensive civil service reform Background The first state to make this transition was Georgia At the time this was considered radical hence the title The author states that this is a transition from traditional management practices toward New Public Management NPM The hope was to create extra linkages between theory and practice and consequently performance The Pendleton Act of 1883 is mentioned again which if you remember is the rst major reform of the federal civil service and enshrined the Progressive ideal of the politically neutral and competent civil servant in federal legislation and signaled the ideological defeat of spoils Then the author goes into a nice rational of his controls in this model which I think are helpful in conceptualizing this part of OUR papers It s worth a look and is strongest in the 4 paragraphs prior to the Data and Methods section on page 641 Conclusions I will give you the conclusions as I don t want to take the time to summarize the methods except to say the author uses event modeling 01 based on the length of time states stuck with traditional merit systems after the radical Georgia shift of 1996 The author argued that the political context of each state electoral competiveness effect of electoral dominance ideologically liberal states as well as the inhabitants of the institution institutionally weak governors divided government unified legislature economic interest groups economically healthy states are the main determinants of diffusion of radical civil service reform among states A nice table on 654 lays out the results of his hypotheses Market as Prison Lindblom 1982 MAIN ARGUMENT Take note that my argument is that policy is imprisoned in marketoriented systems My main point has been that market systems imprison policy FLOW Lindblom begins the article asking how we could design a political system that is resistant to change After brainstorming a few options he settles on the idea of change being met by punishment After discussing unions he moves into a discussion on markets and how business works within the political system He says that regulating business creates a con ict because businesses provide jobs and business people contest that regulation increases unemployment He says that political elite and top business entrepreneurs run society and keep people employed This section reminded me of Romney s campaign speeches on job creators explicitly supporting capitalist failing to consider the repercussions of negative extemalities Then Lindblom discusses social movements and the inclusion of restrictions for environmental and social purposes In this section he talks about how these things make it so no one group of people can control everyone s lives 42 Madison s Managers Ch 13 1 The book s main argument a Our central claim is that a mechanism of governance ensuring the optimal performance of our separation of powers regime is a precept of managerial responsibility 12 b American public administration is a constitutional institution legitimized by the separation of powers between executive legislative and judicial and implementation preface i The separation of powers keeps the central government weak ii The separation of powers causes a lot of problems such as competence and accountability iii How can we gauge public managers managerial responsibility How can managerial responsibility be institutionalized 2 People a Mosher wanted responsible government b Wilson wanted responsible government in 1887 essay said Americans should not fear overbearing Europeanstyle bureaucratic government 6 c Madison concerned with perfecting the institution that control faction and power in the public s interest 45 16 d Collin Diver 1928 public managers are public servants 7 e O Toole rejected European formalism 13 f Gulick promoted PA research amp case study 27 3 Values a Public service values range from equity individual rights representation constitutional trusteeship resolving dilemmas resulting from separation of powers 6 b O toole values pragmatism institutionalism behaviorism legal realism economic determinism historicism 17 c PA is series of movements ie scientific management economy and efficiency Waldo 1984 principles training themes values ie representativeness neutral competence executive leadership Kaufman 1956 doctrines politicsadministration dichotomy neutral competnance bureaucratic paradigm 27 d Politicsadministration dichotomy argue for separation Wilson Goodnow Waldo 1984 Stillman 1990 4 PA History 20 a PA first code of ethics 1924 b Deduced Councilmanager type of government started in early 1900s 5 Seminal publications 29 Chapter 4 Raising the Bar Law and the Administrative Process 1 Administrative law was developed at the federal level 2 Rules are developed when Congress passes enabling statute that leaves the specifics to the administrative level 3 Delegation occurs when the rules allow for adjudication or judging whether or not single cases get certain treatment 4 So judging is the role of the judicial branch and that s why we have separation of powers Neither the executive nor the legislative have that much power 5 The authors cite case law on both sides of the non delegation doctrine 6 There s a balance though You don t want to put too much into lawstatute bc you have to open that up every time you want to make a major change It s best to allow some exibility and that means delegation to rule 7 1934 ABA forms a Special Committee on Administrative Law Nicknamed the Pound committee after this Pound guy who thought admin law was Marxist 8 The Pound committee puts forward the WalterLogan bill which would have imposed courtlike hearings for any instance where there was administrative discretion 43 9 The WalterLogan bill passed both houses but was VETOED by President Roosevelt who was like WTF Lawyers might be comfortable in court but not everyone is 10 The war ended and a compromise was reached The Administrative Procedure Act APA This act allowed for due process for some administrative adjudication tasks 11 This say the authors was the end of PA keeping pace with the judicial branch Chapter 5 A Theory of Politically Responsive Bureaucrats This chapter is a layout of theoretical basis for Chapters 67 so you can skip it the authors even say you can if you re not so inclined 1 There are two main problems with our setup a Delegation of authority the administration and executive branch can exert authority in ways that are not the intent of congress b Political control of the bureaucracy congress can be TOO prescriptive and consequently take TOO much control of the bureaucracy s actions 2 There are two areas hidden from congress a The bureaucracy knows more about a given area which is a hidden information problem b The bureaucracy does too much to have constant oversight so there is a hidden action problem 3 These problems come to a head when you throw all the stakeholders together so the authors contend that a Madisonian approach is to have various stakeholders and administrators discuss issues openly which would then create the checkbalance 4 This makes the administrator selection really important and it s important to hire good ones There are three tensions at play a Neutrality vs responsiveness b Patronage vs merit c Efficiency vs effectiveness 5 This is the theoretical part a Game Theory b Social Choice Theory c The Theory of Mechanism Design 6 Put it all together and you get the d AGVA mechanism not for your tea a This was constructed by Claude d Aspremont LouisAndre GerardVaret b The full d AGVA mechanism description is on page 130 Chapter 6 Managerial Responsibility A Precept 1 Managers must use judgment balance rationality and accountability 2 Wilson argues that responsibility is the bulwark against the administration going rogue and becoming a fourth branch 3 Starting on page 133 there s a nice bunch of quotes from PA scholars about responsibility 4 Enter postpositivism post modernism where the authors say that bureaucrats are encouraged to use their own values as a moral compass 5 Remember the FredrichFiner debate when thinking about responsibility and the legitimacy of PA as a field 6 Use the AXioms of Responsibility as listed in 1 7 The conclude the chapter The appropriate aspiration for public managers under our constitution is to be public servants guided by a precept of managerial responsibility and thereby cognizant of their role in governing our republic Chapter 7 Public Management The Madisonian Solution 1 They start the chapter out with a pretty interesting quote by James Madison 44 a If angels were to govern men neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary 2 We NEED separation of powers and the authors draw their theory of administration from that that there should be mechanisms to screens selects disciplines and promotes those who will come to hold managerial roles 3 The field needs to come back from its obsession with performance and ethics and participation their finger quotes not mine 4 The focus needs to be on constitutional governance otherwise all will be lost and PA will become a puppet for one of the other branches or worse yet become what John Millet calls a headless fourth branch Lowi Title Four Systems of Policy Politics and Choice Author and Date Theodore J Lowi 1972 Research questions what is the taxonomy to articulate policy and the power of government Contribution to the literature Lowi states that political science already has a taxonomy but policy does not Main arguments Lowi explains that findings from national policy analysis and research are not very generalization Lowi claims that his work looked at a smaller piece of the puzzle so is more generalizable Lowi argues that we should have many models rather than one model with many centers of power Research design Lowi examined 17 published case studies and interviewed the authors He also examined 6 laws to code if Congressional members proposed amendments Tables and figures Table 1 presents ways in which governments can coerce people including regulation function of Congress and actor roles Table 2 presents the results of 17 case studies and interviews with authors Table 3 presents evidence of creativity as measured by amendment proposals and adoption Theoretical approach Operationalization Lowi measures actors groups as distributive regulative or redistributive and the attributes of their roles as lobby committee oor and executive roles He reviews multiple laws and their amendment packages to understand if the house and senate are creative on the oor measured by how many amendments they had on each bill and if their proposals were successful Lingonomics McClowsky 2008 McClowsky argues that economics should not just be about models and instead take into account human virtues and interactions which he explores through language He runs through all of the ways that language is at play in economics with a special focus on persuasive language Here are a few referencesexampleskey terms that he uses 1 Every market participant is participating oratory To get out of an unhappy social situation you can use 3 tactics exit voice loyalty He discusses circumstances where you would or wouldn t use voice 3 Certain people you will talk about certain things to ie stranger on bus Prices get their meaning from economic conversations ie Bemanke alone does not set the interest rate 5 Language persuades Data is gathered and communicated to decisionmakers 5 45 Two economic theories address communication information asymmetry and transaction costs Sometimes there is misinformation and manipulation Signs and signals and rhetoric and advertising are meant to change people s minds Many whitecollars workers are paid to sweet talk 10 Information and commands become cheaper and cheaper but persuasion does not become cheaper 11 The limits and patterns of human speech do of course give limits and patterns to the economy 12 Even unknown knowledge generates profits 13 Language is the essence of entrepreneurship 14 Communication is a cooperative game 15 Ostrom et al found that when players were not allowed to talk joint rewards were low and communication radically increased amount of cooperation 16 There is a gap between rational choice theory and the way people actually behave in bargaining situations 9 99 gt9 Lindbloom Charles E 1979 Still Muddling Not Yet Through Thesis Incrementalism is and ought to be the standard method of policy making Argument Strategic analysis is preferable to disjointed and incremental analysis and it is preferable to conventional scientific analysis synopsis Although disjointed incrementalism is one aspect of strategic analysis Incr is perceived as an inadequate policy making system in the US Evidence Incr a Improving Incr is possible with better scientific evidence and dealing with policy problems as cohesive wholes not just emissions but energy consumption more broadly for eX ii Incr change might actually be faster than a single major change as the likelihood of regular small changes is much higher a The problem with slow change is the US is a result of too many veto players in the political system i To get fewer veto players however we would need to reduce market enterprises causal connection is unclear to me Partisan mutual adjustment is diff from incr a Partisan mutual adjustment is when autonomous participants impact each other decentralized decisionmaking Conclusions ii There is error or incompleteness in every study strategic analysis is a way to at least clarify that you are not going to achieve perfectionfully eXplain any complex phenomenon iii Must separate ANALYSIS from POLITICS is the main takeaway a Incremental analysis differs from incremental politics and not trying to capture the entire picture that would leave you with too much incompleteness 46 oo sww 9695009 iv Understanding a social problem is not always necessary for its amelioration a simple fact still widely overlooked p 525 Lewis D 2013 Testing Pendleton s premise Do political appointees make worse bureaucrats The Journal of Politics 694 Research Question Are appointees or careerists better for federal management What differences between appointees and careerists matter for management performance Background The Pendleton Act of 1883 is mentioned again which if you remember is the rst major reform of the federal civil service and enshrined the Progressive ideal of the politically neutral and competent civil servant in federal legislation and signaled the ideological defeat of spoils Using the Pendleton Act as a basis for the research question the author examined the backgrounds of bureau chiefs as well as the PART scores for individual bureaus at the federal level The PART scores were established during the Bush administration to measure performance of federal programs and the author lays out a description of how this score is attained on page 1076 Methods Regression of the PART score on whether or not the bureau chief is an appointee or careerist with controls of 1 program characteristics 2 the bureaus that implement the program and 3 the policy or political content embedded in the program Conclusion Concludes that careerists have better performance on PART scores than appointees LASWELL 1956 The Decision Process Need more than tripartite 3 branches of government organization for policy study Seven Functions of the Decision Process a main idea b who c neglected topics d base values e Supreme Ct Intelligence agenda setting information prediction planning How is the information that comes to attention of decision makers gathered and processed Who CIA Census Bureau legislators during debatebill writing Key questions sources of intelligence who do we tell formal or informal communications Fragmentary huge stream of information input and output Varies value eXpectation of disclosure of threats e g foreign affairs or savingsinvestments SCOTUS can enhance by raising awareness can restrict support privileged communication RecommendationPromotion promotion of policy alternatives How are recommendations made and promoted Who legislature proposals presented president promotoes Key questions who hears recommendations Who urges policies 47 d Varies values impacted by more recommendations e g 19th century rise of parties to specialize in recommendations now institutional networks interest groups protecting one s value position SCOTUS doesn t really advocate specific policies it s CHARY cautiouslysuspiciously reluctant Prescription adoption the enactment of general rules How are general rules prescribed WhoWhat constitutional conventions lawmaking organs Key questions go beyond formal prescription what RX does an agency make for itself and other I think he is talking about norms customary law whose support was pivotol varies growth of legislation groups seeking legal equality labor disabilities SCOTUS see above doesn t really prescribe it s chary again Invocation asking for help implementation demand for application How are general rules provisionally invoked in reference to conduct Who law enforcement legislature Key questions to whom and by whom are RX invoked Characterizations of legality Varies with demand and capability embarrass and damage rivals power by bringing to court impeachment perhaps SCOTUS decides what is in harmony with constitution statutes previous decisions Application the nal characterization of conduct according to prescriptions How are general rules applied Who courts commissions departments public administrator congress ratifying appointments appropriations Key questions concerning whom is application made Is it participatory varies to extent it is private or public SCOTUS major role final determination of how community prescriptions apply in circumstances Appraisal evaluation the assessment of the success and failure of a policy How is the working of prescriptions appraised Who Evaluators Courts appraise legality Key questions whose activities appraised by whom eXpanded role connected to big government and the Great Society compleXities multiplies dangers of corruption inefficiency and indifferent administration eXpanded surveillance SCOTUS statements about effects of public policy and their causes limited to factual statements Termination the ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their framework How are prescriptions and arrangements entered into within framework of such rules brought to termination WhoWhat Agencies commissions to revise statutes congress Key question who ends increased now too bc of big government weed out obsolete and obsolescing SCOTUS supreme terminator All agencies perform all functions to some extent actors outside of government also in uence official and unof cial participants in process Component parts of American society eXpected to eXpress themselves at least through the electorate Everyone participates through these one some or all of these 7 functions Lasswell to the rescue He directs us to neglected topics within these seven functions see bullet c 969099 9969st 90 9 5 saw 90 9 5 5110 000 90 9 gt10 Cyclical and Structural Changes new interaction patterns emerge in cycles and become stable Changes of a Function maximization postulate people do what they do in the hope of being better off than if they didn t do it aka values preferences people seek out their own preferences Everything changes with a demand for more of it and 9 base values see bullet d 1 Structured changes functions change structure depending on shifts in social structure and contextural linkages Institutions can become indulged in terms of power value more powerful and declining institution is deprived of power change in base values g 2 changes involve more or less of below 0 00 CO 48 OOIIIIIIII 0 III 0 O DO 000 centralized concentrated e g state gov t cycles for more boards then reforms for consolidation democratized away from democracycoercion bribery valueownership driven e g religion power in few intelligent legalized formal authority and effective control formalize power in law valueinstitution patterns of society sought for selves and the collective in 8 categories page 13 woven into discussion of SCOTUS page 1920 wealth economics power national security political democracy respect freedome from humiliating discrimination rectitude standard of ethical responsibility skill and taste wellbeing health enlightenment history civic knowledge affection loyalty Intensive Methods The Supreme Court Discussion of power of institution what institutionsindividuals external to X were sources of indulgence or deprivation for X Values and strategies employed by X employed by outsiders in uencing X Base values and strategies utilized value demants of X perspectives of the participants in the internal decision process of X page 1516 if you re interested SCOTUS could set aside Federal or state statute refuse to give effect in US to foreign government statute or advance int l law interpretation so powerful e g Dred Scott decision could have made Civil War and crisis much worse repercussions felt throughout society of one institution s power indulgence impacts 8 values above for individuals and society See bullet e for its role in 7 functions Ends with call for expansion of Intelligence and Appraisal functions the scientific observer who is willing to adopt the goal values of human dignity as working postulates and who then considers how decision processes are to be made more effective Case studies aren t sufficient diminishing returns only certain variables instead SURVEYS and laboratory studies methods testing pretests to see if innovative practices can be installed elsewhere make a compulsive personality type well trained Emphasize a contextural approach GOAL free societv Kiser and Ostrom 1982 The Three Worlds of Action A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches 1 Research Question a What is the institutional approachframework 2 Contributions to the Literature a Overview of politicaleconomy literature that examines how institutional arrangements affect the level type and distribution of outcomes b Develops a typeology applicable to institutional conditions i The entry and exit conditions for participating orgs ii Allowable actions and allowable outcomes iii Distribution of authority iv Aggregation of joint decisions v Procedural rules in complex situations that link decisions vi Information constraints in orgs c Types of rules address these issues 49 3 i Boundary rules ii Scope rules iii Position and authority rules iv Aggregation rules V Procedural rules vi Information rules Main Argument a b S39 0 Institutional arrangements are the rules that guide decision situations Changes to rules i The individuals impacted by change must realize a change occurred and abide by the change ii Change affects the strategies of individuals iii Aggregation of these changed strategies leads to different outcomesresults Institutional framework is metatheoretical because it does not provide theory but instead describes important elements of theories The individual is basic unit of analysis DV interdependent choicemaking situations 5 institutional structures i the decision maker ii the community impacted by decisions iii events goods or services that individuals seek to produce and consume iv institutional arrangements that guide decisions v the decision situation in which individuals make decisions Can predict two types of results i The individual s strategies or actions ii The aggregation of individual actions into outcomes for the community 3 different levels of analysis i Operational level the world of action ii Collective Choice level explains the world of authoritative decisionmaking iii Constitutional level explains the design of collective choice mechanisms Must make assumptions about individual which include i Individual s level of information about the decision situation ii Individual s valuation of potential outcomes and of alternative outcomes iii Individual s calculation process for selecting among alternative actions or strategies Compares neoclassical fully rational and perfect information with Simon s more bounded incomplete satisficing assumptions Explores the attributes of decision situations from game theoretical perspective Free riding is more likely to occur in large group situations Actions v strategies i Action is the behavior set ii Strategy is whenhow an actor uses the available action Attributes of goods and events that shape decision incentives i Use available to individuals can be partially nonsubtractable but at some point increased use by many will decrease utils to others erosion ii Goods can be excluded iii Measurement of public goods supplied is dif cult iv Public good situations require some form of collective action with sanctions compelling each individual to share in production costs v Institutional arrangements with coercive sanctions are not sufficient to guarantee optimal amounts of public goods The community all individuals directly or indirectly impacted by the decision i Levels of common understanding ii Similarity in individual prefs 50 iii Distribution of resources among those affected by decision p Feedback can occur at all levels of analysis constitutional collective action and operational 4 Research DesignData Sources a Lit review 5 Tables and Figures The working parts of institutional analysis and Three levels of institutional anaysis 6 Theoretical Approach IAD review Working with Culture The Way the Job Gets Done in the Public Programs By Anne Khademian 2002 Summary by J C Martel Major Theme Working with Culture The Way the Job Gets Done in Public Programs eXplains why and how culture is created and its implications on public programs including suggestions to manage culture The book is premised on the idea that public managers don t directly manage culture They manage the integration of a task with resources and environment p 53 Khademain 2002 conceptualizes common understandings among people working together as commitments and commitments create the culture which are reoccurring terms used throughout the book p 3 Chapter 1 lays a foundation for thinking about culture Chapter 2 comprises a scarcely cited literature review that examines the debate over whether managers can transform a culture The author juxtaposes two stances advocates and skeptics Advocates stemming primarily from business literature p 88 argue that i strengthening culture can improve performance and ii the leaders role is to foster a strong culture p 18 In contrast skeptics viewpoints are premised on the idea that leadership during formative years of the organization has a lasting effect on culture so change occurs less due to current leaders actions Skeptics coming from the public policy angle p 88 focus on how environmental factors in uence culture arguing that environmental factors are more instrumental in culture than managers actions p 24 Based on this literature review Khademian in Chapter 3 proposes a framework for understanding and managing culture Khademian argues task resources and environment are the roots of culture which serves as the basis for the framework p 43 Within the framework the author proposes strategies for change with regards to managing cultural roots i Identify the commitments that form the eXisting culture and identify the connections between the roots of culture and commitments ii Think about what needs to change and articulate the change iii Relentlessly practice and demonstrate the desired change in culture iv Capitalize on incremental change and institutionalize it pp 4749 Chapter 4 evaluates the frameworks predicative ability for cultural change by applying the framework to four case studies Indeed Khademian 2002 argues that the framework does have predictive ability because i it is crucial for leaders to understand commitments within their program ii environment matters such as in the banking regulatory agency in the 1980s iii cultural roots can be managed as in the case of South African police force post apartheid and iv sometimes culture can be maintained when a leader leaves pp 103105 Chapter 5 provides insights into how to identify commitments and cultural roots Chapter 6 discusses what we learn from the framework including that both advocates and skeptics are correct leaders and environment matter Study Setting The primary study setting is the East St Louis Action Research Project ESLARP East St Louis was an area that was economically devastated for many years until a professor at the University of Illinois fostered collaboration to develop a public program that fits the culture The unit of interest is not organizations per se it is a public program as a whole Additional study settings were brie y discussed in Chapter 4 including the US banking regulatory agency and South African police force Contribution to Literature 51 This book is written partially for public managers and also provides a framework for academics that want to study culture leadership and change within public programs Interesting Ideas to Review Later I would recommend this book to scholars that are interested in the cultural roots within program and organizations to expose them to the dichotomous perspectives of advocates and skeptics as well as the cultural roots framework to use as the basis of analysis JenkinsSmith Hank C StClair G K amp Woods B 1991 Explaining change in policy subsystems Analysis of coalition stability and defection over time American Journal of Political Science 354 851 880 1 Research Question a What are the stability and defection patters of elites in policy subsystems over time 2 Contributions to the Literature a The authors suggest they seek to bridge a gap by utilizing longitudinal data by connecting principalagent theory to elite behavior and by examining defections 3 Main Argument a Exogenous and political events can shape coalition structure over time 4 Research DesignData Sources a Congressional hearing transcripts 1969 1987 i Coding frame to capture expressed beliefs b Method Linear regression with clustered errors robust to correct for autocorrelation Tables and Figures a Table 1 lists participants in the policy subsystem Theoretical Approach ACF coalitions are subject to stability over time in high con ict Operationalization Congressional hearings Analytical Techniques OLS regression Generalizability Sure this appears to be fairly generalizable to other policy domains and is a quality contribution to the literature 10 Implications a Mission driven purposive groups are more restrained on policy positions than material groups this is an important causal story in other coalitions 11 Clarity of Writing 5quot 99 99 Implementation and public policy Chapter 1 Literature trends early literature dismissed implementation problems as trivial or wanted to solve the issues through rational scientific methods multiple studies after WWII revealed the role of interest groups intervention by legislators and other politics in uence over administrators then arose a systems approach to political theory This allowed scholars to think outside of just the administrative system and look at other systems like new technologies and changing public preferences 52 Pressman and Wildisky s Implementation book set the stage for future implementation literature New focus on policy objectives prior to implementation and followed by evaluation complexity of joint action articulated casual assumptions of what could be expected if policy goals were met implementation core distinct difference between formulation and implementation is challenged by 1 adaptive implementation where administrators adjust implementation techniques to better meet goals and 2 modifying goals throughout the process conclusion implementation literature must compare outputs or outcome with original objectives to what extent where objectives outlined initially what factors are affecting goal attainment modification etc from class first generation Pressman amp Wildavsky 1973 focused on policy failures second generation Sabatier amp Mamanian moved towards systems approach Hoffebert would say that socio economic and geographic factors and other factors affect policy outcome more so than policy design IAD Carter et al 1 Main purpose Topical purpose is understand organic farming policy using IAD but advancing the IAD framework is the real purpose 2 Theoretical approach Previous IAD studies do not address rules that are created as a result of policy design This paper lays out a 4 step process to understand this in the context of organic farming policy see Methol Approach 3 Methodological approach Four steps to understand rules that are created as results of policy design a Dissect rules that target human behavior b Classify the rules c Match rules with actions d Identify rules that enable adaptation of policy 4 Research design a In IAD unit of analysis is action situation b Broad categories of variables are biophysicalmaterial conditions attributes of the community and rules c Apply the 4 steps 5 Contribution to literature a This research design integrates building blocks of IAD in a single analytical approach which has not been done before They integrate institutional grammar rule typology rule con gurations and decisionmaking Hudson RB amp Gonyea J G 2012 Baby boomers and the shifting political construction of old age The Gerontologist 522 1 Research Question 53 What is the political construct of the target population represented by the Baby Boomer generation How has the social construction of the aged changed over time What does the future look like for the social construction of Baby Boomers The question is justified based on past literature that categorized the aged as Advantaged That same literature acknowledges that social construction can change over time and the authors reasoned that this has occurred with the aged as the Baby Boomers came of age Schneider amp Ingram 1993 2 Contributions to the Literature a b The authors attempt to outline the significant changes that can occur in social constructs over time which contributes to application of social construction theory and The authors explain gaps in the theory identified by Lowi and also illustrate the three faces of power in play with regard to the social construction of the aged Gaventa 1993 The authors state they are responding to the call of Schneider and Ingram to further explore the dynamic relationship between the members of an individual policy target group the policy outcomes that result from the social construction of that group and the impact on the ability of the group to pursue advantageous policy or prevent changes in policies where there is already an advantage for the group 3 Main ArgumentsFindings a The authors argue that the aged through the mid part of the 20th century had a status of dependents then changed to advantaged as Social Security and Medicaid bolstered their quality of life and remained sacred as policy Then the authors state that the ageing of the baby boomer population coupled with increased longevity and economic wellbeing have shifted this group to contenders Finally the authors pose that the group could fracture of a dependent group of those Baby Boomers who are not economically advantaged in their retirement The authors list various policy events as illustrations of their finding however they do not review the ways in which they arrived at their findings The main argument is explanatory and had an implicit question within it To that end it answers the question it implies The article lacks a real method or analysis and consequently articulates a part of the overall theory but does not illustrate this with any sort of empirical data other than selected events that articulate the argument 4 Research DesignData Sources 999 6 The authors examine historical events to make their main argument The design and method is unknown The piece is not overtly replicable The data limitations are not addressed NA 5 Tables and Figures a A simplified version of the Schneider and Ingram framework is included in the piece There are no other tables or gures 6 Theoretical Approach a This article makes a very loose causal argument that describes the mechanisms of social construction and the effects of policy development for the aged while guessing about the impact this may have on Baby Boomers in the future Some variables are identified but not all and not consistently For example the authors mention quotes from elite actors that re ect the Baby Boomer generation is a drain on the economy These quotes are presented as evidence that the policy legitimacy of the aged is being called into question Changing social economic and political environments impact the social construction of groups which may cause shifts in overall power of the group in gaining advantageous policy The theory used is social construction theory and the hypothesis is that the social construction of the aged has changed over time and will continue to the changes as the baby boomer reach old age 54 e The authors do not offer rival explanations other than reminding that the social construction of a particular group is dependent on context and audience 7 The main variable that was operationalized was that of the status of the aged over the past 100 years The independent variables were scattered throughout and were not consistently utilized throughout the three argued changes 8 The analytical techniques of the authors are unknown 9 The authors generalize to the generation of baby boomers and draw conclusions about possible future directions including the fracturing of the entire policy target 10 The implications of the article are somewhat normative in that the authors seek to establish a pathway for change in a specific group given contextual variables 11 The writing was clear Ida Drury Article Critique 2 Henry AD Lubell M amp McCoy M 2010 Belief systems and social capital as drivers of policy network structure The case of California regional planning Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance access published August 20 2010 Research Question In this article the authors explored factors that either united participants in the policy making process or distanced them from one another Specifically the research foci were belief similarity and social capital The analysis was important as it furthered understanding of a main premise of the Advocacy Coalition Framework ACF ACF asserts that coalitions are composed of actors with similar belief systems This article also contributed the use of Exponential random graph ERG models as a method for understanding the complex web of linkages among the individuals in issue networks Contributions to the Literature The authors were straightforward about their plans to contribute to the literature which added to the strength of this article They set out to answer a longstanding critique of the ACF namely that ACF does not contain a model that explores relationships between individual members of a coalition which the authors argued would support the assertion that coalitions have similar belief systems In their answer the authors explained the linkages between theoretical concepts and the actual structure of networks The authors strategized that developing more precise descriptions of social networks would not only benefit the ACF but also the literature on social capital Main Argument or Findings The examination in the article of four regions of California embroiled in a land usage dispute revealed consistency with findings from other applications of the ACF In particular the authors found belief similarity as a driving force for coalitions whether attractive or aversive Conversely the authors observed divergent belief systems had a strong negative impact on collaborative ties The authors found that social capital had a strong impact on coalition cohesion The study highlighted the strong role of the policy brokers who in this application were found to have developed strong triadic connections between actors in networks The authors also noted an inconsistency with ACF Policycore beliefs of individuals did not appear to consistently have a stronger impact on network structure as compared to deepcore belief and secondary aspects The authors argued that the threetiered belief hierarchy of the ACF may be outdated and might benefit from revision toward a more distributed arrangement of beliefs This conclusion was a somewhat difficult sell as will be discussed in later sections of this critique 55 One hypothesis in the study Policy actors form collaborative ties on the basis of specific reciprocity was not supported by the data consistently across the four regions The main takeaway by the authors for this finding was that there might be some unrealized social capital in the regions on a didactic level though not so on a triadic level In sum the authors ineffectively punted to policy brokers to realize the remaining connections and left their argument undeveloped in this area This hypothesis and weak conclusion could have been dropped without detracting from the piece Research DesignData Sources The authors obtained information for the study via a survey process The sample for the survey was derived from a universe of anyone who had commented on or participated in the environmental impact reports for each region The authors also included landuse planners local government officials and lists of stakeholders obtained from regional collaborative partnerships The approach was somewhat tenacious in that individuals were emailed then emailed again then called then called again and issued the phone survey if they hadn t responded to the email The outline of the data collection was clear which is helpful given the possible effects of different strategies e g phone versus online on analysis The authors presented these possible confounders in an organized manner The research design was clear enough to promote replication though it is important to note that the design was geared toward networks that had eXisted for some time and had large numbers of actors collaborations and coalitions The selection of the landuse issue network in California was integral to the success of the design The authors further justified this choice by outlining the range of individual beliefs gathered through the survey process the sum of which was a contribution for the literature around the ACF Tables and Figures Overall the tables and figures aided digestion of the main arguments The most pertinent data was clearly displayed in several tables with significance clearly marked A couple of the figures were small and more difficult to read Figure 3 would have been more impactful had it been larger and formatted for ease of reading with sans serif font Also the illustration of the dyadic configuration in Figure 4 was confusing and did not assist in understanding of the collaborative linkages it was supposed to represent The arrows were onedirectional and seemed to indicate some sort of causal linkage which was not the intent according to the text Theoretical Approach The authors approached the causal argument belief systems and social capital impact network structure with both effects and mechanisms The authors admit that more work is needed with regard to the measurement of belief systems as a mechanism for structural impact Specifically the call at the end of the paper is for more finely tuned statistical measurement and more attention tuned to the role of cognition in belief systems The study addressed four hypotheses 1 Policy actors form collaborative ties on the basis of specific reciprocity 2 Policy brokers encourage the formation of collaborative ties embedded in transitive triads and three cycle configurations 3 Policy actors form collaborative ties on the basis of shared policyrelevant beliefs and 4 Belief homophily effects are strongest for shared policycore beliefs and weaker for shared deepcore beliefs and secondary aspects The latter two hypotheses were directly connected to testing of the ACF whereas the first two were directed toward the impact of social capital All four were congruent with theory and assisted in further understanding of the causal argument The authors were intentional about eXploring rival explanations Control variables were logical and addressed possible threats The authors maintained a balanced eXploration throughout the piece often mentioning other potential impacts on the data or modeling The logic of their argument was sound Operationalization 56 The operationalization of social capital variables was a highlight of the article The survey data was rich and had depth from the crossregional approach The authors used checklists related to linkages that assisted participants in brainstorming their relationships and this approach ultimately led to strong modeling of the network The operationalization around homophily of belief systems was less sophisticatedly realized For the variable Problem Severity the authors used a typical Likert scale to measure beliefs in this area The authors then used the median score for this and other beliefs for aggregate analysis Though a footnote explicitly states that the analysis was also run with mean scores and mean scores were more conservative with regard to the ACF hypotheses the authors missed an opportunity to eXplain what this might be about or at least link this to the later assertion that more work is needed in this area This variable was also used to establish belief clusters which once aggregated were used to symbolize the overall belief of the organization The authors employed a twothirds standard classifying an organization in a particular belief cluster if at least twothirds of the group were in the same cluster The authors did not eXplain how this standard was established Analytical Techniques ERG modeling of linkages between and amongst members of the network was impactful in understanding the main argument Though the method was compleX the authors were transparent about how they used it to draw conclusions The modeling seemed particularly useful when eliciting the unique role of a policy broker and the more simplistic top ten lists of impactful people in each region further supported the modeling The difficulty with modeling as a technique unfortunately is that the nuances of the work necessary to arriving at a final model are too numerous to effectively describe With that caveat the presentation of the final data supported the main argument Generalizability The authors imply that generalization is possible but appropriately suggest further testing of ERG modeling as a means to develop the architecture of networks as related to theoretical concepts The conclusion that the ACF should eXplore change as a result of this research is a bit too liberal of an application of the findings and implies generalization that is beyond the scope of the piece Implications The authors illustrated both practical and theoretical implications most of which were appropriate The ERG modeling process was presented as promising in understanding the intricacies of networks The implications for the ACF were overstated particularly given the limitations in belief system measurement and generalizability as discussed earlier Clarity of Writing Overall the article was presented in a clear and logical manner The writing was dense but succinct The article could have been improved by more consistent ordering of belief systems and social capital in each section For example an early outline of the research presents belief systems first then social capital The hypotheses however are outlined in the reverse as are the analyses Then the conclusion rounds out by discussing belief systems followed by social capital Consistently ordering the two topics would improve the article composition Annie Miller Heikkila Tanya Edella Schlager and Mark Davis 2011 The Role of CrossScale Institutional Linkages in Common Pool Resource Management Assessing Interstate River Compacts Policy Studies Journal 391 121146 Research Question 57 The authors succinctly and clearly articulate the research questions Primarily Heikkila et al 2011 examine how to measure and define crossscale linkages to more fully understand why actors invest in these linkages and ways to assess the linkages that form Specifically the research questions utilize Ostrom s Common Pool Resource CPR theory to indentify the types of linkages that exist for western river basins and this typology of linkages includes criteria that guide evaluations of the quality of existing linkages While it is clear that these linkages are primarily defined as connections across levels of social boundaries and organizations that create interdependencies between actors I am left unclear as to what makes a linkage crossscale Scale was not clearly defined and I am not certain what exactly different scales or levels of scales would look like Based on the authors usage throughout the paper the term scale may be a synonym for level of government however this remains unclear The question is justified and effectively further supports Ostrom s work on CPR In Ostrom s conception resource users that can effectively communicate with each other are better able to overcome problems related to overuse of community resources This study examines how groups in a shared resource environment western water basins build connections between organizations particularly organizations that may operate at different levels of government or with varied agendas This study contributes to better understanding how to capture those linkages and assess their effectiveness As such this paper is useful for bureaucrats and academics alike Contributions to the Literature This is a very ambitious study that attempts to find a place in the literature by suggesting ways that various types of linkages can support desired outcomes for actors and high quality management of common pool resources Utilizing the design principles of CPR to frame a typology of linkages produced by the ruleinuse provides a clear path for future researchers in this venue and made for clearly defined and explicitly description of linkages It is difficult in many ways to pinpoint other exact contributions to this particularly literature since it is so vast and I know so little of the what is out there I firmly believe that if the authors of this article nd a place to publish their peers support the need for this study in the literature Main Argument or Findings Boundary linkages are most frequent in constitutional rules while monitoring linkages are most frequent at the collective choice level Interestingly very few of the compacts establish penalties or sanction that would suggest there is generally very little con ict over the use of water or other mechanisms overcome the need for sanctioning which is what CPR would suggest if all basin linkages are open lines of communication The argument and evidence provided to answer the research question of the types of linkages is clearly answered and explicit Beyond the discussion of the types of linkages present in the river basin compacts the authors find that clearly defined and articulated boundaries are essential for resource management and that appropriation rules need to be clear and perceived as fair Governing commissions in many of the compacts may be able to write new rules or revise old ones that solve mismatch issues related to allocation and provision This function while not available to the compacts without commissions seems to prevent some con ict that could arise within the basin Monitoring of water use is another important function of linkage quality and the authors find that arrangements with more information and watermasters are of higher quality than those with only stateline ow monitors There are not clear sanctions or con ict resolution mechanisms in the compacts and this leaves little evidence of linkage quality in those areas This also suggests that the judicial branch becomes the mechanism for solving most problems related to water resources in the basins Research DesignData Sources The research design focuses on the operationalization of CPR s design principles These principles are presented in an appendix and form the theory for determining the types of linkages in the basins and the quality of those linkages Interstate river basin compacts are the unit of analysis for the paper and fourteen basins are included The authors code rules strategies and daytoday functions of actors that comprise the constitutional collective choice and operational levels of Ostrom s work in order to more fully understand the connections among actors throughout the basin systems 58 There is a great deal of variation in the constitutional level governance documents ie the compacts themselves which leaves ample room for comparison However this large amount of variance could also make it difficult to trace the rules or institutional arrangements creating particular types of linkages or the quality of linkages found as a result of the compact The authors do not attempt to explain how the constitutional rules lead to high quality linkages causality and are thus able to utilize the compact variation instead to indentify which types of linkages exist boundary allocation and provision collective choice and monitoring enforcement and con ict resolution In order to better understand the collective choice and operational levels the authors added additional data sources including meeting minutes agendas and reports as evidence to identify linkages Based on the description provided in the article it would be feasible to replicate this study to answer the research question related to identifying linkages however I am not convinced that the measures of quality are described effectively The authors appear aware of this shortcoming and suggest that the quality can be measured qualitatively by examining the ways actors use linkages historically However the data for these observations is not clearly identified and are not quantified Tables and Figures There are 3 tables included in the paper and 2 appendices Tables 1 and 2 list the number and type of linkages found at that level constitutional or collective choice The tables are clearly and effectively labeled but are only descriptive in nature They are clear and informative but they could be improved by adding a total column for the basins that would effectively highlight which basins have the largest and smallest number of linkages Table 3 focuses on the issues faced in the river basin communities prior to compact formation The appendices are very helpful particularly the rst one which identifies the types of linkages under consideration in the study The second appendix is further information related to each of the fourteen basins in the study Theoretical Approach This study very closely follows the common pool resource theory and the broader institutional analysis framework introduced by Ostrom The authors very effectively connect their study to the broader tenets of the framework for example the analysis conducted from the constitutional collective choice and operational levels and the typology of linkages provides a useful structure for the study Utilizing the theory and framework provided by CPR is one of the greatest strengths of this particular paper As mentioned in the research design section this study is not an attempt to examine a causal mechanism related to the CPR framework By emphasizing the rulesinuse component of institutional analysis the authors identify important aspects of shared water use in these river basins but do not attempt to describe or explain an action situation It is therefore difficult to clearly articulate dependent and independent variables in this type of research study While not explicit in the article by studying the quality of linkages through qualitative analysis of the formal and informal rules structured at the constitutional collective choice and operational levels the authors make several assumptions about types of linkages that are more important than others They also suggest that some structures may enhance better outcomes for the actors involved with these compacts There are not hypotheses provided for which rules of the game will provide higher quality linkages but they do utilize causal reasoning when discussing why the compacts formed and how certain issues precipitated the linkage arrangements Con ict droughts and ooding or multistate water projects tended to be indicators for compact creation These predictors appear to in uence the number of linkages present in a given basin but are not addressed in an inferential way Operationalization The authors effectively operationalize the types and number of formal linkages provided by the compact s constitution and other documents of each compact after establishment In order to effectively address the research questions however this operationalization is not enough Since the authors include 3 different goals for the research indentify linkages assess the quality and determine why actors invest in linkages the data and operationalization of the variables would need to address a causal mechanism that traces the rules in the constitution which create 59 outcomes at the collective choice and operational levels that then promote more effective use of water in the basins Operationalizing a dependent variable for quality in this way is very difficult and would require some explicit assumptions around how water is to be used most effectively According to the authors the design principles of CPR suggest that quality equals welldefined boundaries but the causal mechanism for how boundaries relate to quality was not clearly articulated in this piece The authors do an excellent job of operationalizing the rules related to the first research question but are not clarifying how actors select rules that create low cost linkages or how speci c types of linkages produce effective use of the common pool resource to answer the second and third parts of an ambitious research study It is also important to recognize that a formal linkage does not equate to an open point of communication While the compact may identify which actors can be present at the table studying the linkages only through the compacts does not indicate if those actors actively participate or if the agencies have ongoing relationships Analytical Techniques As mentioned elsewhere I firmly believe the authors utilized an effective and reliable coding mechanism for the linkages and clearly match that protocol to the design principles of the CPR The data support the research question and the authors discuss several ways to interpret the linkage findings Other types of data appear necessary to more deeply examine the argument and research agenda on the quality of linkages The techniques provided in this study may be the overall weakness of the paper It is also feasible that I misunderstand the concept of quality within the CPR and IAD framework but from my perspective the argument of quality as defined by defined boundaries and wellmatched appropriation does not fully address if the linkages are of high quality to the actors Generalizability The authors suggest the coding scheme and use of the typology would be generalizable to other studies but utilizing the unit of analysis to suggest broader claims about CPR rulesinuse wound not be tenable Implications Clear boundaries monitoring allocating and lowcost con ict resolution appear particularly important in river basin compact design Further examination of the actors roles in developing linkages beyond the constitutional compact that allow for informal rules addressing those rule types would enhance this particularly study and appears to be a research agenda worthy of time and effort in the future Based on the findings the authors also appear to suggest that better understanding the costs related to con ict resolution and available alternatives to Supreme Court hearings could benefit the administration of water in these basins Clarity of Writing The writing is very clearly and effectively communicates the author s ideas In particular the abstract is an excellent example of the strong writing throughout The authors are able to succinctly indentify the question theory frame findings and future directions Additionally the authors provide clear examples of rules drawn from the different basins throughout the paper This helps readers understand how the coding mechanisms worked in practice and would assist in future replication of rule coding Heclo H 1978 Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment 1 Research Question a How might the expanding role of government be changing the connection between administration and politics 2 Contributions to the Literature a Establishes concept of issue networks 60 i is a sharedknowledge group having to do with some aspect of public policy ii Webs of in uence provoke and guide the exercise of power iii Iron triangles subgovernments and autonomous knowledgeable lobby groups b Leads to many of the assumptions of Advocacy Coalition Framework i Some networks can be mobilized to create coalitions or interest groups c The growth of these groups can make democratic politics more difficult 3 Main Argument a Open networks are increasingly acting on government b Sheer mass of govt activity increasing i Govt eXpands as the bureaucracy remains stable cost of established programs quickly increases medicareMedicaid social security transfer payments etc ii Federal bureaucracy stable bc fed moneyprograms distributed to states contractors local govs and thirdparties iii This produces an intergovernmental lobby Beer c Successful policies will naturally lead eXpansion and creation of lobby groups i These groups become specialized and very knowledgeable ii Leads to professional bureaucratic compleX d The creation of coalitions and issue networks mean more complicated and difficult policy creation and government leadership e Individuals who move into leadership do so through these issue networks i They come from academia corporate business law and govt bureaucracy f What is good for policy making may be bad for democratic politics i these knowledgeable groups may make few individuals much more in uential and involved while leading to making all other persons less knowledgeable and interested in the issuepolicy a form of polarization ii how accountable are these groups 4 Research DesignData Sources a Evidence from various government orgs and interests Washington law firms Carter s cabinet 5 Tables and Figures Carter s cabinet not much from the tables 6 Theoretical Approach Issue Networks ACF 7 Operationalization 8 Analytical Techniques 9 Generalizability 1 0 Implications a Issue networks will further the distance between policy makers and the general public this can decrease democratic legitimacy 11 Clarity of Writing Hart D 1984 The virtuous citizen the honorable bureaucrat and public administration Public Administration Review 44 Mar 0 Note this article is composed during an economic recession and at a time when public administration was being viewed in an increasingly negative light according to the author I think he s trying to rally the troops History of PA The author contends PA has lost touch with its raison d etre and has suffered an identity crisis due to the increased prevalence of business administration as a field The author sets up a history based on the founding fathers and their enlightened philosophical backgrounds He argues that public administration is a higher calling 61 CO 00000 CO 000 The Role of the Citizen After laying out that virtue is voluntary and cannot be imposed on individuals by the gov t Hart describes the virtuous citizen Essentially virtuous citizens practice moral discretion in everyday life believe in the underpinnings and practice of American values and take individual moral responsibility don t lie don t take control of other people and keep your promises Oh yes and virtuous citizens practice civility including forbearance and tolerance The Honorable Bureaucrat This guy gets pretty preachy about bureaucrats not sure if he has been one but it s evangelical in a way continuing with the higher calling theme He suggests the subheading here should be public administration is not a kind of technology but a form of moral endeavor The professional obligation of bureaucrats begins in Hart s view with their duties as virtuous citizens He says that even more than the average citizen bureaucrats have to have a complete understanding and belief in the American regime values Also the bureaucrat should CARE about the public and the public needs at their core to believe that bureaucrats do care about them Part of the calling in Hart s view is to be a moral entrepreneur and a risk taker to make improvements in the work Finally Hart reminds us of Noblesse Oblige I m assuming this is to whom much is given much is expected but I want to check I m also thinking it might be a good tattoo if that is indeed the case Guy 2003 Ties that Bind President s speech at 2003 Southern Political Science Association 100 years after founding of APSA Strong words and Main Argument The compulsion to forge a grand elegant scientific canon has produced theories of little relevance to real politics Kasza 2001 Simplifying political problems to the point that they can be excised from their historical and cultural context and numerically assessed has elevated tri ing coefficients to the realm of penultimate scholarship pg 642 Problem separation of political science as empirical theory and things governance related PA challenge theoretically rigorous but practically useful Timeline page 645 Early years 18861939 Founding of rst political science journal and association turn of century followed by academic courses departments degrees All in response to progressive era and need to reform against corruption PA started to follow business management principles of Frederick Taylor founding of separate institutions APSA forms ASPA in 1939 Two Roads Diverged 19391968 PoliSci behavioralist positivist approach rigors of scienceempiricism PA efficiency above all else 1968Present PoliSci postbehavioral movement constructivism PA New Public Management market model of gov Dr Guy doesn t seem to like threatens to eliminate democracy as guiding principle and Minnowbrook focus on equitydemocracy Institutionalism rising patterns of shared norms and meaning within structures Big lessons 62 O O 0 methods aren t neutral be aware of implications of models and information produced should challenge moral arguments administration is central to functioning civil society and democracy challenge to make communities work Move to mixed methods and more integration Guy ME amp McCandless SA 2012 Social equity Its legacy its promise Public Administration Review 721 Pg S5S13 Main Argument Because of the unique characteristics of America we continue to value equity despite the fact that it is contrary to the capitalist economy 1 Equity Compared to Equality a Equity and equality are often used interchangeably but equality is distinct because it can be measured mathematically b Initiatives that advance equality are less controversial than those that promote equity 2 The Term Social Equity a Social Equity means there is a calculation of fairness right and justice b Equity has been around since the founding of American i Historical nesting in the philosophy of Rousseau Locke and Hobbes ii Normative and empirical functions for the eld c Authors did a count of articles in J Stor for the term equity i 54 mentions pre 1969 since 1969 close to 800 ii H George Frederickson and James Q Wilson are authors that further the discussion in literature 3 PreMinnowbrook a Equity as a concept evolved from the philosophical social contract to the structural constitution to an administrative concern i Started to appear as an administrative concern in the mid1940s beginning of social equity ii Names Paul Appleby as almost sole author at the time 4 The Minnowbrook Era a The 1960s Minnowbrook Conference was a conference for doctoral students at Syracuse where they eXpressed that they didn t like what they were being taught Minnowbrook shaped the field for the next 20 years b Frank Marini published an anthology in 1971 of the Minnowbrook Conference essential inserting equity into the field The term was born New Public Administration c Cities and Suburbs the Case for Equity Pettingill Chen and Uppal 1970 was first book written about distribution of financial aids linked to inequity in cities d Chitwood 1974 is representative of the discussion change postMinnowbrook He argued that distributive function should occur in one of three patterns equal services proportional services or unequal services Equal employment opportunity came out of this era f Raises central question of who gets what and the concept of social equity added who ought to get what Campbell 1976 5 Modern Political Philosophy and Social Equity a The most important modern work is cited as John Rawl s A Theory of Justice 1971 b A second important work is Spheres of Justice by Michael Walzer 1983 c A third is A Matter of Principle by Ronald Dworkin d A fourth is an article by Regens and Rycroft Measuring Equity in Regulatory Policy Implementation 1986 6 The Social Equity Lens S39 63 a Social equity is a lens through which needs are identified The authors give the following examples as distinct but quite interconnected areas i Socioeconomic status ii Sexuality iii Safe schools iv Public transportation V Health care vi Environmental threats vii Intergenerational viii Human traf cking b Discusses social equity as a performance lens for Public Administration 7 Challenges Ahead a Middle class erosion and political polarization b Interdependence among the people of the world c The concept has become a normative touchstone for the field of PA Cooper 2004 and has become a moral imperative Granovetter Mark S 1973 The strength of weak ties Thesis The needs to be improvement in the analysis of social network Argument 1 Processes in the analysis of interpersonal networks provides the most importantin uential bridge between micro individuals and macro group phenomenon Evidence 1As network size increases there will be many bridges or connection among distant points rare for a bridge to be the only path between 2 points 2Bridges among groups of individuals are formed from weak ties and create shorter distances in paths between individuals 3Method Job hunters in Boston a Conducts a sample of individuals who recently got a job in Boston and has them say how frequently they saw the person who told them about the job opportunity seeing was the strength of the tie b Over 80 reported weak ties told them about the job c Job information was usually 2 degrees away or less distance from the source a friend of a friend Conclusions 1 This article is THE foundational piece to kick of the study of networks a connects individuals to groups b highlights how certain weak associations can be much more important in connecting individuals than strong ties weak ties travel further social distances and reach a larger number of people i explains bridging social capital before Putnum c introduces a methodology for the study of networks i examines the strength of ties within networks strong weak absent ii job study as the method and operationalized strength this becomes important in business and marketing theory today 64 e weak ties are a way to overcome collective action problems and to spread informationdiseaseand connection through a network quickly PROFESSIONALISM VS DEMOCRACY FRIEDRICH VS FINER REVISITED abstract This article presents a study which focused on the implications of strict adherence either to the principle of democratic accountability or the principle of professionalism as the sole principle informing administrative decision making The debate between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer in the 1930s and 1940s constitute a classic public administration scholarly exchange Confronting the reality of bureaucratic power and looking to the emerging technocratic culture foreshadowed in a country preparing for war Carl Friedrich saw aws in the strict interpretation of administrative responsibility In response to the redefinition of administrative responsibility by Friedrich as responsibility to the fellowship of science Finer charged that such notions obscured the very meaning of responsibility in a political context Explicit analysis of the values behind bureaucratic decisions is the bridge that would link Finer39s requirement for bureaucratic accountability with Friedrich39s claim for professional autonomy Public servants need an ethical framework for representing the values and norms of their professions as well as for responding to legitimate demands for democratic accountability Frederickson Chapter 3 Theories of Bureaucratic Politics 1 Introduction What are Theories of Bureaucratic Politics a Administration is not purely technical valueneutral Waldo 1948 b Rejection of PoliticsAdministration dichotomy c Questions of political power are the focus i Source of power ii Administrative vs democratic processes which determines policy 2 Administrative Theory as Political Theory a Critique of false dichotomy based in Waldo s The Administrative State b Waldo critiqued Herbert Simon s Administrative Behavior 1947 argued administrators must sceparate facts from values be scientific work for efficiency c Democracy may be hostile to efficiency and other business practices Waldo it is egalitarian hence inefficient 3 Graham Allison s Paradigm of Bureaucratic Politics Essence of Decision 1971 a Model I classical decisions as result of single rational actor pursuing own self interest b Model II numerous actors involved highly structured decision making based on Standard Operating Procedures SOPs reliance on organizational bureaucratic routines c Model IIIbureaucratic politics paradigm actions result of bargaining and compromise amoung various organizations and individuals four propositions pg 49 policy outcomes re ect narrow bureaucratic interests d Model III critiqued local bureaucracy dominance when presidential involvement low Rosati 1981 not true in empirical studies of Navy Rhodes 1994 Not distinct from Model II no attention to hierarchy Bendor and Hammond 1992 Model III not a true theory 4 Politics Power and Organization a Bureaucratic behavior re ects incentives autonomy and clrea missiongoals leads to policyadministrative success James Q Wilson b Organic about powerpolitics bureaucracies play political games defend own interests and power Seidman 1970 c Bureaucratic assignment and organizational focus impacts likely policy success or failure ie policy assigned to agency outside its main mission will likely not succeed 65 5 Representative Bureaucracy a Key Scholars Levitan Long Meier b Legitimate bureaucratic political control only in the context of democratic values c Institutions representativere ective of population as whole will exercise authority and discretion in ways that align with values of citizenry Frederickson et al 2012 Chapter 9 Theories of Governance A Intro PA s Need for a Theory of Governance a Changes around the 1970 s lead to alternative policy methods i Marketbased management and resource allocation techniques ii Reliance on private sector to deliver public goods iii Deliberate and sustained effort to downsize and decentralize govemment s role as the central policy actor b Hollowstate i a metaphor for govt that contracts public service provision out to networks of mostly nonprofit orgs and reduces its role as a direct supplier of public goods ii therefore we must redefine what the public in public admin means iii we replace the concept of administration with the notion of governance iv aka old PA is obsolete v However governance does not give us much in the way of theory or intellectual grounding particularly like Weber did c Five problems with governance i It is fashionable used as a catchall phrase ii The term is imprecise iii Governance is laden with values iv Governance is about change also a descriptive phrase v Gives disproportionate weight to nonstate actors B A new model of governance a Lynn Heinrich and Hill 1999 2000 2001 provide a framework and guiding research agenda for governance i Research Q How can publicsector regimes agencies programs and activities be organized and managed to achieve public purposes ii Def of governance as the regimes of laws administrative rules judicial rulings and practices that constrain prescribe and enable government activity where such activity is broadly defined as the production and delivery of publically supported goods and services 1 Inherently political 2 A governance regime includes the ends and the means of govt activity policy domain type of govt activity jurisdiction organizations 3 Logic of governance process linking values of citizens with actions of legislators executives and courts 4 The central theoretical problem in governance research is applying the theories that impose a causal ordering or a priori structure on the logic that links contexts governance and consequences or outcomes iii Institutionalism and network theory are antecedents public choice scholars 66 M E environmental factors C client characteristics T treatments missions and objectives of orgs S structures M managerial roles and actions b O fE C T S i O outcomes ii iii iv V vi c Problems with this theory i Neither the concept or the model is parsimonious might just be a handy list of variables ii Doesn t generate general conclusions specificity in each policy domain makes for very little generalizablity from utilizing this model 1 iii Difficult to operationalize any of the variables Definition of governance is so broad and inclusive that it loses specific meaning C Governance as New Public Management a NPM a reform mvt that redefined relationships btwn govt and society b SiX core issues Kettl 2000 i Productivity ii Marketization iii Service Orientation iv Decentralization v Policy vi Accountability C Many variations of NPM but 2 main ones differ due to political structure parlia v prez i Westminster New Zealand Australia UK and Canada 1 2 ii 1 Sweeping privitization Due to the centralization of parliamentary govts this model more effectively carries out the systematic effort to identify what government should do what it can do and what should be privatized Annie note I suspect this model grows quickly in UK through Thatcher s time when she dramatically privatizes public services Reinventing govt model US only Focused more on creating cooperative arrangements for public service provisions d NPM is really a debate about what govt should do and how to do those things effectively i Can be considered a theory of governance 6 Peters and Pierre 1998 argue governance and NPM are two separate concepts i Governance is 2 3 4 ii iii 1 2 3 4 5 iv NPM is 1 2 The State s declining capacity for direct control The blending of public and private resources Use of multiple instruments indirect inducement of behavior Govts should steer rather than row policy entrepreneurs are essential Governance is about A Concept relationship btwn govt and society Process Focused on the relationship between govt and society a theory of politics Seeks to keep a clear line of responsibility and control btwn public services and public officials Does not share the ideological baggage of NPM about Ideology normative view of how public private relationships should be structured Outcomes 67 3 Essentially organization theory predicative and explanatory 4 Seeks to bring about sweeping change in public sector and replace Weberian org orthodoxy however this is still heavily used in this literature 5 Imposes corporate values objective and structures on public service provision D Governance as a Unifying Framework for Public Administration a Another def of governance the political science of making fragmented and disarticulated state wor i Multijurisdictional b Theory of Administrative Conjunction i Problems across jurisdictions are problems of diplomacy ii Jurisdictions matter greatly in politics but not somuch in PA iii Backed with empirics tight and loose coupling can result from the various arrangements made across jurisdictions c Regime Theory of Governance i The study of how entities states adapt to changes in the environment and how they collaborate to produce a public good ii Three part theory 1 Interjurisdictional govt vertical and horizontal arrangements 2 Thirdparty governance extension of state jurisdiction through contracting 3 Public nongovernmental governance iii Accountability and legitimacy are absent from this theory d Accountability and Global Governance i Who is responsible in publicprivate partnerships ii Long rant on Global Governance Orgs GGOs E Conclusions finally This was a long chapter a Governance is a body of theory that comprehends lateral relations interjurisdictional relations the decline of sovereignty the diminishing importance of jurisdictional borders and a general institutional fragmentation b This leaves governance as the attempt to comprehend the lateral and institutional relations in administration in the context of the disarticulated state Frederickson et al Chapter 8 Rational Choice Theory and Irrational Behavior A What is Rational Choice a Begins with neoclassical econ Smith Wealth of Nations i People acting in purely selfinterested ways can produce benefits for society b Emphasis on a rational selfinterested actor c Two assumptions i The average individual is a selfinterested utility maximizer methodological individualism 1 Preferences are known 2 Can rank order those prefs transitive 3 Selects the preferences that max utility and min cost ii Only individuals not collectives make decisions d Both positive theory how the world does work and normative how the world should work predictive B Rational Choice to explain organizational behavior a Explains the actions of bureaucrats bureaucracies b Tullocks The Politics of Bureaucracy 1965 i Motivation for personal advance eschews public service mission c Downs s Inside Bureaucracy 1967 i Individual goals are not limited to advancement 68 h ii Typology of bureaucratic personalities 1 Climbers maximize power or prestige 2 Conservers max security and convenience 3 Zealots pursue a policy no matter the cost 4 Advocates open to policy feedback 5 Statesmen promote public interest through broad policy goals The rational selfmaximizing bureaucrat led to public agencies that were unwieldy difficult to manage and at best only partially oriented toward publicinterest concerns embedded in their putative missions Niskanen s Bureaucracy and Representative Government 1971 i Provides specific variables for utility calcs salary pension prestige etc ii Some ppl will seek to advance the public interest but they cannot fully know the public interest information asymmetry problem iii Rational bureaucrats will maximize budget just as business profit maximizers Conclusions less budget and less centralization should improve the bureaucracy By 1991 tho these claims seem difficult to prove empirically instead bureaucrats maximize discretionary budgets for control over decisions i Bureaucracies are also shown to be responsive to public interest and the political principles that feed and constrain the agencyorg ii crats can derive utility from the psychological connects with coworkers and the public which shifts the payoff functions and suggests managers can improve efficiency among other things Followership Theory i Relationships between leaders and followers in the org are important ii Trust and competence seem essential qualities for leaders C The selfmaximizing citizen a b Rational choice theory is actually best applied to citizens not crats There should be a market for public goods where people can move to suit their preferences argues against Weber who would suggest this centralized monopoly of public goods is just what the Dr ordered Citizens can vote with their feet Many agencies competing in the same jurisdiction will actually provide higher quality service at a lower price to keep citizens i This is debatable empirically book lists some examples Teske et al and movers D Ostrom solve collective problems through communication win a nobel prize Whomp there it is a b Disproves principle agent model Must foster TRUST E Rational Choice and the New Orthodoxy a Vincent Ostrom says 1973 PA scholarship is breaking down and argues against several Wilsonian propositions i Particularly suggests that Wilson favors technical ability of the bureaucracy while ignoring how that impacts the democratic process ii Weber says power must be concentrated if it is to be controlled and V Ostrom says no way jose iii Haque 1996 has a crappy argument against rational choice doesn t represent values of the public 1 The critics appear to fundamentally misunderstand rational choice 2 Using rational choice does not mean you make public goods private and values can be an important consideration for maximizing utility ugh F Conclusions a A fair criticism of rational choice if the validity of the starting assumptions in the theory model are incorrect valid under very limited circumstances then the widely adopted prescriptive implications are suspect 69 b Rational choice is a widely utilized theory of public administration Frederickson et al Chapter 5 Theories of Public Management A Developments in Public Management Theory a Public management has been heavily in uenced by scientific analysis i Taylor starts this field with timeandmotion scientific study 1 Total Quality Management TQM 2 Problem identification problem solving ii Operations research is mathematical way to understand management 1 Most scientific version of management study b Social Equity theory has a similarly long history in the field i This is the main issue of PA from 50s 70 s but management comes back in during the 80s c Don t confuse management with organization they are different i The authors here keep them separate ii However empirically they are not likely different C Traditional Management Theory Thrust Forward a Start wTaylor civil service tests b Gulick applies this to public managementadministration i POSDCORB c Hawthorne effect people work differently when watched d Human Resources model i Theory X 1 People don t want to work must direct tell coerce ii Theory Y 1 People actually want to work its natural what they need is motivation and organizational capacity e Weber i Establishes the notion of Bureaucracy 1 Hierarchical should be rational and impersonal 2 Should be merit based ii He describes characteristics which he frames as ideal types iii Still considered empirical accurate enduring descriptive iv Critiques 1 Too mechanistic impersonal leads to trained incapacity f Simon s Decision Theory i Obliterated interest in management theory from 50s to 80s MiddleRange Theories the main focus of scholars from 1950s 1970 s these form the guts or basics of public management theory D Group Theory a Theories of organization contrasting approaches to managerial control b What makes groups effective are shared goals objectives values norms and behaviors c Effective management must then cultivate these shared experiences in a context that supports the institutional mission and purpose d See table 51 p 106 in book for further description E Role Theory a Because we can observe orgs as a collection of acts conducted by individuals in particular positions within the org each positionofficerole is relational to the org and the other position b Criticism 70 i Individuals often misperceive their own roles and the roles of others which leave little room for prediction in this theory F Communication Theory a b c G Today a Resembles systems theory with feedback loops homeostasis inputs outputs Anthropomorphizes the org so human descriptors can be utilized org learning etc Tells PA scholars that downward communication is directive and overly focused on policyprocedure and therefore overlooks the importance of mission driven conversations decreases morale Simon s proverbial critique of the field has left us with many unanswered questions and suggests the positivist notion of decisionscience is not advancing our understanding H Principles scientifically verifiable v Doctrines understood principles a b I a J a b Doctrines these are based on analytic techniques of Rhetoric i Ubiquitous found always with orgs ii Based on soft data or soft logic iii Metaphor Rhetoric Packaging Received Wisdom iv Often contradictory v Unstable changing with individuals vi Rotate old ideas in new clothes There is a long list of other doctrines of PA p 113 i What the list encompasses are the enduring questions of public management 1 Under what circumstances do we favor political responsiveness or neutralscientific expertise 2 What circumstances lead to decentralization or to centralization 3 What criteria should we employ when selecting public employees 4 How much discretion should we give streetlevel bureaucrats ii New Public Management the devil is bureaucracy New Public Management Focused primarily on the best practices model of research rather than empirically veri able positivist social science i See critiques on p 116 for more details Leaders as Public Managers The study of management has come to be the study of leadership what leaders do i Labeling the difference between leadership and management might be a straw man simply labeling what is important and what is not as important Unfortunately this study is also heavily reliant on onetime observations proverb and lacks much empirically viable evidence K Management by Contract a b Management is increasingly less about daytoday operations and more about managing contractual arrangements Can govt by contract be a form of management yes What would the salient feature of this form of management be Principleagent theory has conditions that are rarely met in the world of contracting so that is unhelpful Proj ectmanagement approach i Govt is not a smart buyer of contracts because there is not a market large enough for the types of contracts govt needs too few qualified contractors Contracting decreases govt responsibility increases instability and pushes off some of the key functs of management Providers are incentivized to deprofessionalize ii iii L Governance a b We need theories to incorporate networks and contract management into understanding PA How should we address the increased lobbying that happens as a result of contracting 71 i Tradeoffs between equity and responsiveness c Again a critique of principleagent theory s capacity to explain this new relationship i Govt actor as principle and contracting org as agent does not tell us how the public is engaged how con ict is solved how new players enter the market etc d Unclear how contracting of public management duties like construction or social services pervades policy decisions but the authors suggest there is a connection between management and policy I don t quite understand that argument Fredrickson Chapter 4 Outline PUBLIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 1 The two essential parts to the modern study of public organizations are a The organization and management of institutions explained by institutional theory b Interinstitutional interjurisdictional and thirdparty linkages explained by network theory and governance theory chapter 9 c THIS CHAPTER IS ABOUT THE FORMER Definition Institutionalism is not a theory in the formal sense it is the framework the language and the set of assumptions that guide empirical research and theorybuilding in much of public administration 67 Institutionalism sees organizations as bounded social constructs of rules roles norms and the expectation that constrain individual and group choice and behavior 70 READ PAGES 7071 FOR MORE DEFINITIONS Foundation documents March and Johan Olsen s Rediscovering Institutions 1989 and James Q Wilson s Bureaucracy What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It a Works address hierarchy individual and group behavior in the context of institutions and political social and economic contexts and the in uence of norms on institutional behavior longevity and productivity 68 Big tent scholars are those using the key conceptual frameworks see page 69 for theories within Difference between organizations to institutions The differences have to do with the comparative emphasis on formal structure and on management in organization theory the emphasis in institutional theory on patterns of collective behavior and social economic and political contexts 75 See Institutions and Organizations 1995 by W Richard Scott SUBTOPICS Details 6 Hierarchy pages 7580 hierarchy is usually thought to be something that needs to be scraped and replaced with a better form of organizing formal structure and hierarchy are central to understanding of institutions and are hear to stay 7 Highreliability systems 8081 mostly failurefree but when a failure occurs it is highly visible and disruptive ex Airlinees utilities tv 8 Lowreliability systems 8182 failures do not result in total catastrophe 9 System fragmentation 8586 there is a longstanding debate over Tiebout Thesis which insinuates multiple small jurisdictions in a metro area aid marketlike individual choice competition and public service ef ciency both in separate jurisdictions and in entire metro areas 10 Garbage cans and rentseeking 8689 among the bestknown elements of institutional theory is the logic of the garbage can In the garbage can one finds order 11 The diffusion of innovation 8990 The study of the diffusion of institutional innovation change is a core body of research in institutional theory CONCLUSION 72 E99 ii ii iii PFPP 12 Like organization theory critique is that there are dozens of hypotheses variables and lack of a core premise There are methodological preferences and biases Fieldbased empirical testing has tended to be observational interpretive case based and qualitative not rigorous enough However there is a growing theoretical structure set of definitions etc Rentseeking when politicians give bribes to get votes Pork barrel committes provide support financial to get votes Frederickson chapter 7 Decision Theory Origins Herbert Simon scientific approach orgs make choices that lead to stability and equilibrium decisions as key unit of study means to an end chain Waldo criticized positivism philosophical logical deductive decisions not value v fact Is this really a debate Rationality particular and very familiar class of procedures for making choices March 1994 Consequences decisions anticipate future results ends Simon s early conceptions eg costbenefit analysis performance measurement risk analysis quantitative study appropriateness choices based on shared understanding procedural rationality eg institutional historical analysis contingency theory narrativedeductive Bounded rationality Decisionmaking through logic of consequences not pure rationality artifact used in prisoners dilemma etc based on limits of rationality how is it bounded information constraints of individuals to process info causal connection infoactionoutcome is weak individual and institutional memories are faulty attention time and capabilities is limited communication problems in compartmentalized organizations Attention public and legislative bodies have limited attention think Kingdon organizational attention managing by exception failure driven airport security or success drive benchmarking Risk Taking risk management is to overcome uncertainty about present and future actions and outcomes based on past success and overestimation of experiences salience in stable environments Formal testing of bounded rationality Bounded decision rationality and the logic of appropriateness March amp Olsen decisions oriented towards goals identities and sensemaking deeply contextual organizations are socially constructed ambiguity uncertainty logic of appropriateness In the social construction of reality decisionmakers conserve belief by interpreting new experiences in ways that make them consistent with prior beliefs avoid ambiguity construct narratives of organizations that are winning aligns with NPF this week in 8030 loose coupling garbage cans and attention Loose coupling decentralizing delegating and contracting out trade central controlstandardization for less uncertainty Garbage cans An organization is a collection of choices looking for problems issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer and decision makers looking for work processoriented decision making order in chaos methodology storybased research look at constructs of identity streetlevel bureaucrat often define choices in terms of relationships to citizens coworkers and organizations MaynardMoody amp Musheno Summing UpConclusion and Main Arguments Ch 8 are closely related Ch 4 are also closely related level of 73 decision making through logic AND appropriateness are increasingly intertwined and in uenced by one another Simon 2000 by emphasizing move away from marketmodel power and fairness decisions best made by nonmarket democratic institutions Fitch Lyle 1990 Luther Gulick Public Administration Review A Luther Gulick is a giant in the field of Public Administration a He coins POSDCORB b Describes the principles for hierarchical orgs which is still the standard c Moves the field out of the notion that administration is mechanistic instead it is sociobiological d Successful because he was able to link multiple social sciences to the study of administration B This article is a biography piece a Rest assured Gulick is a kickass practitioner C Main takeaway a His contribution to making the field interdisciplinary was essential to furthering social impacts of administration Finer Herman 1941 Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government Finer vs Fredrickson debate Finer believed in external controls over public servants whereas Fredrickson believed that if the right workers are hired who are motivated and with the right skills then you shouldn t have to carefully oversee them Thesis A sense of duty or responsibility is not the same as subjective responsibility Subjective responsibility results in increased efficiency and is necessary for public service Argument Finer suggests that responsibility is an arrangement of correction and punishment His argument is in direct competition with Friedrich 1935 who claims a sense of responsibility without direct accountability to it is enough for public service I actually wonder if this article is about responsiveness not responsibility Evidence 0 Not really evidence per se but further argument 0 Public servants cannot decide their own course they must be responsible to elected of cials and the public 0 Public officials can be held responsible through 0 Courts and disciplinary controls 0 Through authority exercised over them by ministers other bureaucrats and elected officials 0 Responsibility is defined as X is accountable for Y to Z Conclusions 0 Essentially arguing for the delegate form of government must consult and be responsive to the willwishes of the people 74 0 Public servants are equally as responsible as elected officials 0 This must be a foundational piece in the trustee vs delegate debate 0 Friedrich believes officials and public servants are trustees 0 Finer believes officials and servants are delegates Fesler J W 1987 The Brownlow Committee fty years later Public Administration Review 291296 Fesler won Waldo Award at some point The key takeaway from this article is that the Brownlow Committee s work was misused to hire more administrators than the Committee recommended and move into a period of continuous reorganization of federal government agencies The Setting and People Involved Fesler wrote about his experience as staff of the President s Committee on Administrative Management in 1936 and his time serving on the Brownlow Committee beginning a year after his dissertation At the time Luther Gulick was directing the Institute for Public Administration and Charles Merriam and Louis Brownlow were spending a lot of time in Europe participating in international public administration scholarship Fesler Robert Connery John F Miller Spencer Thompson rented a house together to work on committee reports Herbert Emmerich said that Merriam and Brownlow invented the phrase 39administrative management but Fesler found the Republican Platform of 1896 had used the phrase There was debate about the Brownlow Committee some said it reinforced presidential power Fesler said it did not The Committee had proposed administrative assistants for the president and continuous reorganization authority for the president The Reorganization Act of 1939 was a result which allowed the President to create the Executive Office of the President This gave rise to continuous reorganization This led to other changes The recommendation to extend the merit system upward outward and downward was recent enough to make probable a connection to two events the Hatch Act of 1939 prohibiting executive employees39 active political management or campaigning and the Ramspeck Act of 1940 under which presidents significantly extended the merit system from the 61 percent coverage in 1936 to 73 percent in 1941 and to the 80 and 90some percentages from 1947 into the 1980s Misuse of the Committee report The ignoring of the Committee39s key concepts accounts for later dismay over White House performance First in the Committee39s view the number of aides both secretaries and assistants was about ten a number permitting the President to give personal direction to his staff and to have regular meetings of the whole group20 No question was likely to arise as to what did the President know and when did he know it Second the aides were to engage purely in staff assistance activities that facilitated the President39s own decision making and communicated his decisions to affected agencies They were not to involve themselves in line operational activities Third consistently with their staff role they were to be inconspicuous What came of this fire ghting rather than effective policymaking a group too big to have effective meetings selecting aides that aren t a good fit for the position Fesler discusses Congress micromanagement of the Executive branch and says it is necessary There became a lot of tension between Congress and staff Simon H A Drucker P F amp Waldo D 1952 quot Development of Theory of Democratic Administrationquot Replies and Comments The American Political Science Review 494503 0 Simon and Drucker write comments on Waldo39s paper Simon s Criticisms 75 0 Simon argues that Waldo39s comments on Simon s Administrative Behavior did not disclose the logic and empiricism that he used to deduce his criticisms Simon asks for Waldo to undertake the task of giving more specific feedback 0 Simon criticizes Waldo39s work for being unconvincing and all over the place 0 all of page 495 is a critique of Waldo39s rhetoric including his misuse of factvalue decision versus factvalue judgment and lack of imperative sentence for unproven assumptions Drucker s Criticisms 0 Waldo criticizes some social scientists for their paternalistic approach to study which involves suppression of con ict 0 Waldo39s argument on the political character of the basic problems of largescale organizations does not meet the social science approach that Waldo is advocating for He too loosely constructs the term quotdemocracyquot 0 Drucker notes 3 problems with largescale enterprises 1 Relationship between bigbusiness and society as a whole a Drucker asks three enduring questions on this topic 2 Internal organization of management 3 Relationship of employee to decisionmaking process 0 Drucker ends by saying that Waldo39s work was a tremendous contribution in terms of quotemphasizing that the internal structure of the large organization is a field for political theoryquot Waldo Responds 0 Waldo responds to Drucker He says Drucker did not understand what he was saying regarding the definition and tools of democracy especially regarding participation 0 Waldo agrees with Simon39s charge that Waldo misused logical positivism but says the issue is not so simple as stated by Simon Waldo says Simon quotwishes to rest his reputation solely on his proficiency in logicquot but this is not always useful 0 p 502 Waldo critiques SImon39s Administrative Behavior Demir 2009 Politics and Administration Administrative Theory and Praxis Wilson considered politics and administration polar extremes and mutually exclusive functional realms separated by values structures and objectives yet connected to each other under a hierarchical arrangement Leonard White 1937 who is recognized as the author of the first public administration textbook A Argument This article suggests that the politicsadministration dichotomy literature can be broken into 3 theoretical schools politics separation interaction and three research agendas historical empirical conceptual B Schools This article suggests that the politicsadministration dichotomy literature can be broken into 3 theoretical schools a Separation Characterized by efforts to separate politics from administration i Politics just provide guidance ii Public administration is neutral competencyfocused expertdriven and more about management should not be connected to politics Seek consensus and centralization Giving power to central actors allows action Clear roles and responsibilities to central actors who can be held accountable 9 Political 76 i Public Administration should not be separated from politics politics are inherently connected in the act of governance Practitioners cannot separate themselves from the politics surrounding administration Morals and values must be part of administrative decisionmaking and the political lens makes room for that gives Representation for the oppressed ii Legitimacy of administrators is determined by following politically and socially relevant policy agendas c Interaction i Combines separation and political schools 1 Recognize the need for collaboration among politicians and administrators and recognize where to limit the administrator s role in politics 2 Division of labor and power making PA role clearer ii Also presented as a continuum argument some administrators will lie along a continuum based on their role and closeness to power C The state of research a Historical i Limited scope too individualistic great man leadership ideals 9 Conceptual i Search for Theories ii Roles of different levels of analysis 1 PA person unit of analysis 2 Politics admin dichotomy 3 Political system as unit of analysis iii Comprehensive models for explaining admin management etc iv Focus on concepts not necessarily data c Empirical i Various research methodologies used but primarily able to indentify the role of public administrators ii This has shed light in many important theoretical areas but remains too narrowly focused D Suggestions a Some schools addresses certain problems better than others i Focus on speci c questions b Create empirical testable hypotheses c Conceptual theoretical models should better communicate across each other in regard to the politics admin dichotomy Therigult Pendleton Act The Pendleton Act was passed 1883 stating that government jobs have to be awarded based on merit Before then politicians were strategically putting their constituents in positions this was known as the spoils system The researcher is questioning why the Pendleton Act was passed He reveals why other studies have said it was passed and identifies the holes in their arguments Other studies said it passed because of 1 inefficiency politicians spent too much time and energy getting the right people into office 2 political parties Republicans pursued reform and 3 public pressure The reason the reform passed couldn t be inefficiency alone because that doesn t eXplain why it took 19 years to pass The reason couldn t be political parties because it was Republicans pursuing the reform but Democrats ultimately wrote the bill The author introduces the argument for public pressure operationalizes it and says public pressure is a key factor in why the Act passed Roberts Leonard White 77 Overall White s work was concerned with the macrodynamics of administrative development 772 White studied the first century of existence of the federal government This article reviews White s contribution to the field of public administration He wrote the first PA textbook and won a Pulitzer Prize in History He had great insight into the field way beyond anyone else at that time Unfortunately White is left out of some compilations and historical accounts of PA Roberts said that it is tempting to dwell on White s weaknesses such as ambiguities in his analytical framework preoccupation with earlier administrations and obsession with the personal system 766 But he excelled at picking his data sources from correspondences government records and diaries White argued that efficiency and economy were central reform 1ssues In the Order of Anarchy section Roberts discusses the state of affairs and White s contribution to interpret affairs as circumstantial 768 White s analytical framework was that personalities and ideologies matter but broad forces hinder or empower leaders and determine whether ideas are likely to be affirmed or denied in practices 768 Roosenbloom 2013 Roosenbloom introduced law management and politics as a framework for the field of public administration This article re ects on his work 30 years ago Specifically he is questioning if his framework is still accurate considering collaborative governance and reinventing government The article did nothing new but it provided a structural functional framework and institutional anchor 382 Roosenbloom says other frameworks are good but not as in uential because they describe what public administration does rather than grounding their arguments in thought or history alone Roosenbloom provided this very simple approach to understanding the complexity of the PA field The articleframework DID NOT do a few things Roosenbloom s critique 1 it did not explain clarifications or attention to limitations of the framework Eg It did not sufficiently define politics 2 it is based on the premise that the separation of powers collapses into administrative practice 3 legal political and managerial functions are in con ict but article does not describe how to deal with that 4 framework is based on historical values pre1980s Is the framework still relevant Two main issues that challenge it 1 Collaborative governance embraces steering not rowing and contracting out 2 New Public Management since 1980s embraces marketoriented government TOPIC INHERENT VALUES IN AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SUMMARY these readings traced the history of public administration in the context of forming American values We started off by reviewing ancient history in a comparison between Roman Athenian and Egyptian public administration and then the American founding fathers Caldwell 1976 discusses the implications of early government as Americans first settled including the debates between colonialism imperialism federalism and competing values of selfgovemance independence equality etc Caldwell also said that government is all about limiting power Hence the Hatch Act was passed to keep government employees from participating in politics Epstein 1950 Then we moved on to comparative politics and looked at the Netherlands France America and development administration Kickert 1996 wrote that The Netherlands highly institutionalized organized societal groups is unique and a major difference with American pluralism which essentially means that governments are in control and interest groups lobby the government It is also different from other types of corporatism organized societal groups such as the SocialDemocrat Swedish type the social market German type and the language based corporatism in Belgium and Switzerland 78 The decentralized unitary state of The Netherlands differs from the highly centralized French state from the German federal state and from the much more decentralized but still unitary Danish state Such differences ought to be somehow re ected in the models and theories of the administrative and policy sciences What makes America unique Clear definition of separation of power federalism Political Sterilization Epstein 1950 This article is about the Hatch Act which restricted government employees from engaging in political activity What do I think about the Hatch Act I think that the American public has limited understanding of politics and government and people in government may have a better understanding of the issues Therefore by restricting their involvement we may be doing a disservice to the political advancement of the country However some of the requirements such as not taking money to buy someone s vote is rational and make moral sense in my opinion A government employee can sign a petition but cannot ask anyone else to sign can vote but cannot try to win someone else s vote A decade ago the Hatch Act was loosened up Now employees can engage in political campaigns but cannot be solicited by bosses to contribute to campaigns States have little versions of Hatch Acts Marin said that you can t fundraise or wear campaign clothes The US approached this with a one size fits all approach and Great Britain was less restrictive Civil servant of the ancient world Beyer 1956 Egyptian and Roman government differed significantly from Athenian The former followed the trend to be born into office and they had prestigious and wellpaid positions and a King or Pharaoh led the whole government The latter had volunteer boards citizen assemblies and there was more civic engagement Heritage Caldwell 1976 This article traces values in American heritage from 17761976 Caldwell eXplains the historical implications of the colonial government as separate from imperial British government and the debate around if the two should be separate There was a stark contrast between British government which is led by Parliament and American government which was founded on citizen representation He discussed the founding of the constitution and the fact that some New England states such as Delaware and Pennsylvania had been selfgoverned under their own declarations and set of laws for over a century before the US constitution was founded I imagine there was a lot of turmoil at the time and debates over federalism versus colonialism Caldwell went on to discuss 10 principles of American government and some issues and practical implications with each For example equal rights is an American principle but there has been a history of debate about how that should play out The key point of this article is to reveal American constitutionalism and the key differences or paradoxes between theory and practice The whole goal of American government is to limit the power of government The author argues in the conclusion that limited government is not a problem in America the problem is actually selfgovernment and people not being motivated to participate in the way that the founding fathers set up for us 79 French Martin 1987 Martin illustrates the ways in which American public administration had already been written on French public administration first Constitutional and administration systems Heady 1987 Heady explains the American innovative concepts of federalism presidentialism and constitutionalism as models for other nations Other countries have revised their constitution far more than us Some people have fixed and living constitutions Presidentialism doesn t apply well to other countries because it gives strong executive control We have such a distrust of centralized government which makes us very different We have checks and balances all over the place We kick elected officials out so we don t build up bureaucracy PA in France Chevallier 1996 The legal aspect of public administration including limiting government power dominated France through the 19th and early 20th century and then socialbased public administration dominated until the 1960s France has a high degree of state and social autonomy They have a long history of interventionism Chevallier dissected the construction of public administration the legal model sociological model managerial model They had to create a new public administration to deal with the rise of the welfare state the state got big to deal with people s problems Why our uniqueness is exceptional Riggs 1998 This article is about comparative administration The author explains that Americans were tasked with helping developing countries newly democratic improve their administration systems The author criticizes this approach for being ethnocentric We have become the bully of the world How can we teach others about governance when we haven t properly looked at ourselves in the context of others The Netherlands 1996 Kickert The country is very divided between Catholics and protestants who are the biggest providers of service delivery Stillman does pa make the modern system Could we have a different types of government 80 Diffusion of innovation framework 1 2 9 Necessities a Use event history modeling book Issues with framework a hard to measure learning I think you really need surveys or interviews b typically does not take into account the complexity of a policy but can You can score the policies based on certain characteristics framework includes a models Figure 3 equation unified model of state government innovation event history time series regression b theories leaderlaggard national interaction regional diffusion scope amp level of analysis a level of analysis country state local household individual b types of questions i what are the patterns of policy adoption descriptive ii What determinants include the diffusion explanatorycausal Assumptions a Reasons for diffusion emulation learning competing coercion preemptive socioeconomic political amp geographic factors b Implicit assumption of bounded rationality c Diversity across units of study Dependent variable adoption Independent variables a for diffusion adoptions of places outside the model of interest b for internal determinants demographics population urbanization political ideology wealth leaderlaggard competition Causal process a Motivation resourcesobstacles other policies presenceabsence in govn t of other related policies external the diffusion Hypotheses X produces an increasedecrease in likelihood that a particular policy or policy type will be enacted 10 Revision event history modeling because of the falsification in Walker s model Diffusion of Innovation Walker 1969 The research questions are 1 2 why do some states act as pioneers by adopting new programs more readily than others and once innovations have been adopted by pioneers how do these new forms of service or regulation spread among the American states The author justi es why this topic is important to society and academia The paper is grounded in theoretical research and contributes to our understanding of American federalism as it guides policy diffusion 81 Contribution to the literature Argues that previous studies have examined economic and social factors and missed the impact of political conditions Advances literature on diffusion I m not really sure how it was a significant advancement I assume that this was the first real study on diffusion of innovation The data set on national innovation scores is a good contribution to build on in future studies Walker says in his conclusion that the main contribution is that this work paints a picture of competition and emulation of policy in the US Main findings and findings The main arguments of the paper are that wealth somewhat determines new adoption but also people in uence adoption ie group behavior theory trade associations new communication techniques Research design The variables were not clearly stated but could be picked out by the reader The dependent variable is rate of innovation The independent variables are literacy rate population change manufacturing farms per acre political party legislative affiliation etc Walker did a good job disclosing the control variables Half way through the paper Walker switched gears and stopped looking so much at wealth and literacy and started looking more at political theory He examined group behavior and organizational theories in the context of innovation theory This is where he switched to a section on emulation Tables and figures The tables and figures do not have captions The readers have to read to figure out what the tables mean Theoretical approach The hypotheses are listed on page 884 It is that wealthier more industrialized states would have a higher innovation score because it would adopt new policies faster Operationalization The researchers developed an innovation score to rank the status of policy adoption They did not explain how the dealt with categorizing the strength of the policies that were adopted This insinuates that policies are similar across the nation but really policies are messy and very different stronger and weaker Is there a way to get at the nuances of the policy differences I think this topic is difficult to operationalize but walker did a good job with it However his research questions were how and why not which states which is mostly what his operationalization measured Analytical techniques I don t think he really discussed alternate interpretations He brought in a lot of information that supported his findings but didn t dispute his findings Implications Walker concludes that states are more ready to adopt a new policy if they have already made strides in that direction or if policymakers think that other states in their league have already adopted the policy This informs policy advocacy strategies Daley and Garaland 2006 82 Research questions What factors in uence hazard waste policy and program adoption at the state level Contribution to the literature This research confirms results from previous studies pertaining to the internal determinants and external pressures that in uence state level policymaking This research is a benefit to society to help us understand why hazard waste policies are adopted Main findings and findings The main findings are that internal determinants ie liberalism and external pressures ie interest groups are key to explaining why hazard waste policies are adopted Research design the researchers used 11 characteristics of hazard waste policies to determine how weak or strong the policies were and then examined things like liberalism and green policies to determine why these policies were adopted Tables and figures Theoretical approach The theoretical approach was very detailed and laid out the various theories that their research questions and hypotheses were grounded in Operationalization Each of the variables were measured with some data point Analytical techniques The statistical techniques and commentary were appropriate for this data set and research questions Implications Innovations and Diffusion Berry and Berry 2006 also in Theories of the Policy Process 0 This article is a complete overview of the diffusion of innovation theories and models 0 Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated by different channels over time among members of a social system 0 Emulation is a type of diffusion done through learning competing or confirming 0 Diffusion models 0 The national interaction model assumes that states learn from each other across the nation 0 The regional diffusion model assumes that states learn from others in its region 0 The leaderlaggard model assumes that some states lead and other follow 0 The vertical in uence model assumes that federally states are required to confirm 0 Internal determinant models assume that states change policies due to internal determinants like social political and economic factors 0 Dependent variable is the propensity for a state to adopt new policies How the variable is defined is a debatable in this model 83 0 Hypotheses usually look at the cause of innovativeness typically at the individual level of analysis ie wealth of state or region 0 The authors put forth a model equation of state government innovation re ecting both diffusion and internal determinants 0 Adopt motivation X resourcesobstacles X other policies X eXtemal factors 0 The authors discuss early ways to test diffusion pre1990s The early models tested internal determinants but not diffusion or diffusion but not internal determinants 0 Testing internal determinants model dependent variable is propensity for a state to adopt new policies and independent variables are political and socioeconomic variables of the state This is done with a crosssectional analysis 0 Testing national interaction model measured by timesseries regression 0 Testing regional diffusion models Walker 1969 uses factor analysis good for neighbortoneighbor diffusion 0 The authors go back to talking about their model using an event history analysis that is represented as zeros until the policy is adopted and then by a 1 This model can hold certain variables constant to understand the miX of independent variables that lead to state adoption which can be predictive I think Mechanisms of policy diffusion Shipan and Volden 2008 Research questions The research question wasn t clearly stated but had to do with understanding how and why states adopt new policies based on the four categories learning competing emulating and coercion Contribution to the literature I don t think it really does In the first paragraph of the conclusion the authors state that previous studies eXamine diffusion from country to country and state to state whereas this study eXamines local level diffusion across cities Main findings and findings Diffusion occurs from city to city and cities are susceptible to horizontal and vertical diffusion Small governments are disadvantaged they are at risk of coercion by state governments and simply emulate others which could put them at risk of adopting inappropriate policies These findings insinuate that it is bad for small governments to emulate or be coerced by state governments maybe it is not They authors don t justify why it is not ok Imitation fades over time How to untangle these four components of mechanisms to nd the true reasons for policy decisions Research design 25 year times series for 3 policies relating to antismoking in 675 cities If they were testing at the city level how did they make so many findings about interaction between city and state Did they also test at state level They disclosed where they got the data and pooling data because some years did not have data for all three policies I think that the data discussion is clear and transparent enough to replicate Without collecting state and national level data I don t think the researchers can really get at the national interaction Theoretical approach I think they did a pretty good job looking at causal arguments because they pulled in a lot of variables to eXplore why diffusion is occurring The dependent variable is diffusion and independent variables are proportion of state population with local restrictions out ow cities concern that it may loose out economically nearest bigger city 84 state law city population government spending mayorcouncil The hypotheses are multiple The author s main strength of the article was clearly stating hypothesis and giving causal explanations Operationalization The variables are effectively operationalized and convincing Analytical techniques I think the analytical techniques are appropriate for this data set Implications I don t think they really justified why this is important to academia or society They claim to disentangle the motivations for innovation ie learning competing etc and understand why a government adopts a new policy and diffusion occurs but why is that important And I think that may already be addressed in other studies The other two studies that we read talked about that too POLITICSADMINISTRATION Administration is the buffer between politics and people This session is all about the politicsadministration dichotomy This dichotomy was originally intended to detach partisan politics from public management The early theorists on this topic included Hamilton and Jefferson They differed because Hamilton believed in steady strong stable government and Jefferson believed in uid exible government Jefferson s focus was how to best represent the people s beliefs Later Wilson Waldo and Mosher produced writings about the dichotomy Waldo got into narrow applications of these concepts and Overeem suggests that some people misrepresent Waldo s work Overeem represented Waldo s perspective as a layered construct of politicsadmin dichotomy as decidingexecuting valuefact legislativeexecutive democracybureaucracy civic culture traditionimperial tradition Alexander Hamilton Caldwell 1994 RESEARCH QUESTION what is the difference in functions of the executive and legislative branch according to Hamilton who helped frame the constitution MAIN ARGUMENT The theory of the national executive as leader in the formation of public policy is therefore the greatest construction contribution of Hamilton to American government This article reveals that Hamilton was perceived to be antidemocratic but in reality he just believed in strong centralized government SUMMARY executive branch is for policy planning proposals and administration of enacted legislation Legislative branch is for deliberation ratification and investigation Hamilton believed that the executive branch should hold the most power He believed that people are guided by 5 principles interest opinion habit force and selfinterest Therefore he thought that people should participate in policy but be regulated by government so that no one group claims more power than others He didn t understand how the government that governs least could govern best or how local governments could be good rather than just a strong national government 85 Thomas Jefferson Caldwell 1943 RESEARCH QUESTION what did Jefferson think of the role of government and how did that differ from Hamilton SUMMARY Jefferson exemplified popular resistance to Hamilton s centralizing tendencies Jefferson saw problems with administration and wanted to take power away from administrators he wanted government to be uid to change for social advances or to serve the democracy as needed MY THOUGHT Jefferson was far too idealistic People do act in selfinterest What did Woodrow Wilson really mean about PA Guy et al SUMMARY This paper says that PA is becoming a study not within government but between government and society and how government can facilitate and convene citizens to selfgovern Then the authors ask did wilson s thinking inform this type of study The answer is yes and no Wilson s 1887 piece was really about how government works He said that administration is a branch of government that should be studied He had prepared this piece for an interview with faculty and he didn t get the job This piece wasn t really recognized as important until the 1930s Wilson looks at the dichotomy as administration not free from politics but more as a business sphere Wilson actually sees politics as integrally embedded in administration This was the thesis of Sean s paper He said that the PA field was wrongly constructing Wilson s theories Sean revealed that future scholars funded by Rockfeller Philanthropy were funded to forward ideas that administration and politics can and should be separated This was because Rockerfeller Philanthropy wanted to advance the executive Wilson is arguing partisan politicsadministration dichotomy Others dichotomize policy and administration with policy as politics Beyond heterodoxy Dwight Waldo and the PoliticsAdministration Dichotomy Overeem 2008 In this article Overeem reviewed Waldo s writings to understand if popular opinion on Waldo s perspective of the politicsadmin dichotomy is correct Overeem concluded that other scholars had just scratched the surface of Waldo and misrepresented him Much of Waldo s writing was narrow In the broader sense the dichotomy can be presented as follows Overeem represented Waldo s perspective as a layered construct of politicsadmin dichotomy as decidingexecuting valuefact legislativeexecutive democracybureaucracy civic culture traditionimperial tradition MY THOUGHT I don t understand the legislativeexecutive dichotomy How is administration linked to executive Book review Democracy and public service Plant 2008 reviewing Mosher s 1968 work Democracy and Public Service was ranked the 5th most in uential books in PA written between 1940 and 1990 This book is about forming and sustaining a body of public servants in the US democracy scheme 86 The politicsadministration dichotomy in US Historical Context Rosenbloom 2008 This dichotomy was originally intended to detach partisan politics from public management This articles gives a history of studies on the dichotomy and how the angle has changed over time Agendas Alternatives and Public Policies Kingdon 2002 1995 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE This is arguably the most famous book on agenda stetting and alternative selection Builds on Cohen et al 1972 garbage can model RESEARCH QUESTIONS How do subjects come to officials attention How are the alternatives from which they choose generated How is the governmental agenda set Why does an idea s time come when it does MAIN ARGUMENTS It explains the internal and external actors the process the problem policy politics streams and the role of the policy entrepreneur at the time of the policy window opportunity RESEARCH DESIGN Chose health and transportation policy areas Conducted 247 interviews Coded data Read case studies THEORETICAL APPROACH multiple streams framework agenda setting and alternative selection framework explores rational choice incrementalism builds on garbage can model GENERALIZABILITY US national policy A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice Cohen et al 1972 CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE They invented the garbage can model as a decision making model for organized anarchy This was necessary for situations that do not meet the conditions of classical models of decision making due to one or more of the following preferences are problematic technology is unclear or participation is uid The model explains the systematic interrelatedness of organizational phenomena The Dynamics of Agenda Setting Cobb and Elder CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE Provides definitions about who participates in agenda building when they participate and on which types of political agendas MAIN ARGUEMNTS Issue creation is a dynamic interaction between the initiator and triggering device Secondly there are two types of political agendas systemic and institutional which have different rules BACKGROUND There are four identifiable groups who shape the agenda readjusters exploiters circumstantial reactors and dogooders There are two types of triggering devices or unforeseen events internal and external events that are domestic or international Within the internal there are five types natural catastrophe unanticipated human event technological change bias or unbalanced event like civil rights or labor strike and ecological change There are four types of external war innovation in weapon technology international con ict and changing 87 global patterns Issue creation is a dynamic interaction between the initiator and trigger device There are two types of political agendas systemic and institutional governmental or formal Systemic is all issues that are generally perceived as issues of the public The latter is active and serious items that go to authoritative decisionmakers such as minimum wage The article eXplains the content and form of agendas and how issues get on an agenda The agenda item must be appropriate to the types of agenda Understanding local policymaking Policy elites39 perceptions of local agenda setting and alternative policy selection Lui et al 2010 CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE This research is significant because few studies have applied Kindgon s multiple streams framework to local level agenda setting so this study advances our understanding of the topic The article effectively advances Kingdon s agenda setting and alternative selection framework by introducing a new very important category that contributes to alternative selection called policy compatibility Previously Kingdon had only identified technical feasibility value acceptability and anticipations of future constraints as the three factors that shape policy priorities Lui et al 2010 81 Second this study applied Kingdon s framework to a fairly new unit of analysis local level which creates different discoveries than Kingdon s national level analysis and offers opportunities for future comparative research For example Lui et al 2010 found that consensus and coalition building are important and highly in uential in the policy process at the local level whereas Kingdon had found that the in uence is less apparent at the national level The study by Lui et al 2010 lays a foundation for future local level analysis to test other regions for consensus and coalitions which can be used for comparative purposes MAIN ARGUMENTS 1 Interest groups and government actors have the most in uence on agenda setting and the media has the least in uence 2 Budgetary considerations are the most important factor shaping local policy priorities 3 Policy compatibility is the most important attribute that contributes to alternatives 4 Consensus and coalition building greatly in uence the local policy process 85 RESEARCH QUESTIONS pertain to the following variables policy participants attention attractors key alternative attributes and factors that shape local policy dynamics 7576 To elaborate the research questions pertain to who participates in the local policy agenda and alternative selection processes and how important they are to the process why certain issues attract attention and what factors contribute to the issues and alternatives that are selected 74 RESEARCH DESIGN the authors conducted 271 interviews with local policy actors across the Gulf Coast region The research questions are clear and comprehensive and the research methods are appropriate for the chosen questions Each of the variables are operationalized and presented in charts consistently throughout the paper The analytical techniques coding of interview data provided data analysis results that effectively translate into answers to the research questions LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH DESIGN First they recognize that the snowballing interview technique might have generated participation from people who are perceived to be elites by their recommenders but who are not policy elites in actuality Second the research may have poor generalizability to other policy issues because many interview conversations were speci c to environmental issues and policy Third the research lacks discussion on the interaction between the convergence of the multiple streams problem policy politics or policy windows which were key components of Kingdon s framework Lui et al 2010 86 There may be some bias with the interview subjects that may have in uenced the results Specifically academia is slightly underrepresented and government and nongovernmental NGO staff are overrepresented 19 people interviewed from higher education and k12 compared to over 120 from government and NGOs This may 88 i ii iii i ii iii have affected a key finding of the paper that interest groups and governments have a far larger role in agenda setting than academics and consultants The region that the researchers chose for interviews may have been too narrow for largescale generalizability For example interest group participation may be less active in remote areas of the country compared to the heavily populated Gulf Coast region Additionally the most important factor shaping local policy priorities was budgetary considerations however this may have been circumstantial due to recent events For example Hurricane Katrina had hit the Gulf Coast region in 2005 costing in the ballpark of 100 Billion in relief and repairs Given that these interviews were conducted in that region this and other events may have caused government budgets to be a higher concern than it would be in other parts of the country Moreover budgetary constraints may be less of a concern to wealthy communities with a sufficient tax base THEORETICAL APPROACH to this study has some weaknesses The variables are clearly stated but causal arguments are not discussed The paper adequately provides data analysis results but does not discuss reasons why the results occur For example the research helps us understand which actors factors and attributes have important roles in agenda setting and alternative policy selection but it does not help us understand why The Multiple Streams Framework Structure Limitations and Prospects Zahariadis fairly recent book chapter CONTRIBUTION provides policy entrepreneur with better lens MAIN ARGUMENTS 1 provides a lens to view the policy making process under one umbrella 2 discusses the connection between broad political events and narrow sectoral policy communities 3 explores issues relating to ideas and does not ignore selfinterest 4 explores individuals and institutions THEORETICAL APPROACH advances multiple streams framework Discusses rational choice versus constructivist social construction views of policy decisions Constructivists are more interested in getting into the minds of the policymakers and understanding how they process information and then framing the issue accordingly Dahl 1947 Science of public administration a b Jl K Values Let s be honest about the normative debate in PA don t conceal values Is efficiency the utlimate goal concentration camps were efficient yes he goes there State ends honestly cannot be totally divorced from means as they in uence each other Individual Personality PA is the study of human behavior capitalism Taylor and Urwick focus on PA efficiency took human behavior relationships preferences and subversions to organized production out of the equation perfectly rational individuals this was discounted as scholars became practitioners importance of biography Administrative research does not seek its goal in the formulations of mechanical rules or equations into which human behavior must be molded Rather it looks towards the systematic ordering of functions and human relationships so that organizational decisions can and will be based upon the certainty that each step taken will actually serve the purpose of the organization as a whole 89 b Social Framework If we have problems understanding administrative man as individual man in societal context is even more difficult to grasp anthropological view Need deep contextual view generalizations from one nationstate cannot be universally accepted and applied to PA Long explanation of why British context and civil corps is so different than US and cannot just be transferred to America not just techniquesprocesses Science of PA must have Clearly defined placement of normative values better understanding of conduct and predictability of the nature of man Chojnacky 2012 RQ How can the Forest Service become the leading effective organization it once was upon its founding Answer focus on PA leadership design theory Chojnacky s Personal Experience staff vs line officers followed distinct and different patterns of career advancement low employee morale many demands for compliance little time for innovation or interest in leadership study Kaufman 1960 and recent insights on organization impact on leaders The Forest Ranger 1960 found high conformity in Forest Service through selection transfers upward reporting bureaucracy internal reviews and languagesymbols little change into today high levels of organizational socialization formal centralized power structures risk aversion and focus on efficiency over collaboration Four ideas from complex organization theory how and why does compliance behavior persist even when org structure changes RulesDrive Management PA Weber 1947 Forest Service is a classic bureaucracy based on scientific management amp Weber s concepts division of labor hierarchy of authority written rules for consistency not based on social or cultural context Unobtrusive Control Decisionmaking Theory Simon 1957 March and Simon 1958 bounded rationality organization communication and indoctrination creates norms and limits managers choices based on precedent The way we do things institutional theory organizations instill values create reality and reinforce structures through belief systems and norms rely on laws for legitimacy Position Power PowerDomination Theory blend of previous theories position power how managers articulate old bureaucratic power relations despite structural change accepted by staff and managers Summary and Conclusions All four theories are at work in different ways explaining why despite change initiatives culture remains change directive is just another compliance measure to be obeyed in same mode as before Author suggests compliance for compliance sake is outdated and not effective in complex organizations need for recognition of organizational culture 90 H 0 iii 9999 rad th iii ii iii Future RQ link org theory to empirical evidence of mechanisms at work Forest Service would be a good place to start Carroll 1997 Warfare Forms of Warfare onagainst Government constitutionallegal SCOTUS questions federal decision e g gunfree school zone act lack of emphasis on law in PA e g National Performance Review Administrations carelessness about law economic eg income gap majority don t care about gov t programsfunctions political money and politics interest groups etc moral American decay christian right see Morone book mediaexploitative pundits commentators vitriol and divisive positions politicians running against government Carter Reagan government shutdowns oh hi 930 nihilistic anarchichate groups What does Waldo say about this page 202 review distinct Waldo thought Seems like Guy really likeemphasizes it Method antinomic analyse tensions bw sound analyses look for assumptions and limitations of one form of warfare most warfare is unidimensional thought lazy multidimensional warfare is reductionist if PA is reductionist it will fail e g National Performance Review too simplistic mechanistic historicalcomparative warfare is ignorantdisingenuous presuppose ordered complexity indifference for admin capacity eg Clinton pg 203 Context fundamental Q relationship of civilization and administration questions of the good life core and other functions of government relationship to change relationship between administrative and democratic processes and values assimilative cautions against formalized solutions page 202 Function of bureaucracy government diverse contextual historically positive or negative politics bureaucracy and democracy many interdependencies cautions defining unit of gov t I think this article really points to that httpwwwslatecomarticlesnews and politicspolitics201309navy yard shootings federal employees and co ntractors were the victimshtml also reconciling libertyequality with economyef ciency universal prescriptions not likely to work contextual balance of tensions etc Campbell A L 2012 Policy Makes Mass Politics 1 Research Question a What is the state of literature on policy feedback effects on the mass public 2 Contributions to the Literature 91 a Contemporary synthesis of policy feedback literature with comments on the future of the literature Need to connect large N empirical analysis with indepth study to connect the policies to behavior and attitudes of mass public 3 Main Argument a Policy feedback theory how institutions including public policies shape interests and choice among elected politicians bureaucracies interest groups and other elite actors through mechanisms such as path dependence increasing returns and selfsustaining processes b This literature connects political behaviorists and policy scholars c Main DVs are political attitudes and political behavior 4 Research DesignData Sources a Compiles literature from Europe and US on policy feedback 5 Tables and Figures NA 6 Theoretical Approach NA Americanist poli sci 7 Operationalization 8 Analytical Techniques Synthesis of the lieterature 9 Generalizability Sure this is an attempt to generalize the state of the literature 10 Implications a Need moreconitnuned emphasis on how policy structures provide incentivesresources to mass publics that shape their behaviors and attitudes we understand the clear connections to elites 11 Clarity of Writing clear Burnier 1984 Frances Perkins RQ Why was Frances Perkins rst female state and federal exec and head of Dept of Labor during New Deal constructed as a marginal historical subject Main Argument Due to prejudiced voices in the media the labor movement and Congress that sought to disipline her for having become something she was not supposed to be a prominent public official with power and authority she was wrongly left on the margins of historical and PA narratives focused less on New Deal more on progressive reforms She made incredibly important contributions to PA and American history in general Frances Perkins lifeaccomplishments NY State Dept of Labor FDR s Secretary of Labor first woman cabinet member resided over SSA Minimum Wage Fair Labor Act PA reforms meritbased system implemented based on expertise and experience professionalized bureau of Labor Statistics first time with usable data focused labor on more than just organizedunion labor interests poor She was highly educated married with a mentally ill husband and daughter whom she supported with her income and commuted to NYfamily every weekend 92 00 O OO Genealogical approach Foucault way of knowing and doing to illuminate operating assumptions subversion of fixed meaning Burke reviews Perkins portrayal by media congress photographs and biographiesbooks including her own book on FDR congress tried to impeach her blamed of being a communist with a different namebirth date media always portrayed her as surprisingly feminine or in overtly objectifying ways female bodies mother type too vociferous etc books even Eleanor Roosevelt s portrayed her as a microcosm of their view on genderwomen and power in general Burke 1984 Eleanor Roosevelt Eleanor Roosevelt was awesome More honorsmedalsbadgesetc than any other American woman but also much vicious criticism There is a dearth of information on her life and importance to policies New Deal dedication to individual from Eleanor political movements women s and civil rights Why First ladies treated anecdotally Formative years shy fearful child parents died early raised by mean grandma strict victorian upbringing upper class Married FDR began volunteering frequently saw slums poverty conditions of naval hospitalsgt growth into an advocate FIVE KIDS Politics growing sense of political system began building coalitions observerreporterinvestigator during FDR administration contribution to PA indirect and direct encouragement of others political actions Finance Chair of NY State Democratic Party developpresent women s platform at national Democratic Convention later UN international expert Peace Corps involvement Brandeis U visiting lecturer rst chair of National Commission on the Status of Women under JFK Always cared about disadvantaged womens issues personally responded to all requests for help 300k first year of FDR s presidency 150K thereafter only women reporters at her WH press conferences Legacy deep belief in justice of the cause power to organize and inspire other women ability to speak uently outspoken support of racial equality through her actions commitment to world peace constantly rethinking and reshaping her values Individual service many small acts Inspired others to have an active stake in democracy Brinkerhoff The State and International Development Management 1 Outline of past International Development approaches a 1950s60s state as solution citizen recipients inactivepassive b 1970s problems with this approach became apparent patronage nepotism authoritarianism c 1980s New Public Management focus on effectiveness and efficiency business model as solution d 1990s rehabilitate state as strategic approach with politics policies and process taken into account 2 Today securitydevelopment and diplomacy combined new actors in the arena 93 d 6 Institutional Agendas donorcountry relationships bypass or override statecitizen relationship and re ect donor s agenda Tools public choice econ and principalagent relations are dominant paradigm need to look beyond this and incorporate social capital and embeddedness from sociological approach be culturally sensitive Development Management Processes good governance and process is the end and the means now Values dimension State needs to mediate con icting expressions of citizens values 3 Emerging Questions for Theory and Research a b NPM problematic lacks causal linkages and analytic approach Good governance approaches need to focus on citizenstate relationship negotiation and contestation to produce a social contract Capacity development usually focuses on endogenous variables but needs to look at historical exogenous and institutional in uences Fragile states big questions for politicalinstitutional and security problems what causes spiral How can we mediate it Missing tapping incountry expertise and institutions 3D s development diplomacy and defense are linked but roles are unclear USAID beginning to lack capacity and knowledgestovepiped bureaucracy without shared knowledge Ideas of universal technical fixes fail to take in historic knowledge Boris amp Steuerle 2006 Scope and Dimensions of the Nonpro t Sector Main Argument This article attempts to map the diverse nonprofit sector in the US by showing size and types of organizations and organizational nances revenues and expenses It ends with some general praise of the nonprofit sector s growth and vibrancy as re ective of pluralistic society with dedicated citizens I m not convinced how this ows from the argument There are a lot of very good graphs and charts in the chapter so recommend looking at those 0 Brief lit review of attempts to map nonprofit sector starting with Filer Commission in 1977 O Difficulties organizations that are very small fewer than 4 employees and religious organizations do not need to report don t need to register with IRS 0 Overview of Nonprofit sector defined as organizations for public purposes selfgovemed and which do not distribute surplus revenues as profits e g artsculture humanities education environment health human services civic and public benefits religion 0 O O 1998 6 formal organization in US were nonpro ts 501c3 charitable organizations 23 of all nonprofits taxexempt 501c4 social welfare organizations permitted to do unlimited lobbying eg NRA AARP NOW Rotary Club PTAs page 68 complete list 94 0 Size estimates difficult could be about twice as large as 16 million due to small organizations Grongjerg 2002 study 0 Finances 0 Expenses organizations with over 10m in expenses only 39 of all public charities but over 80 of all charities expenses like big nonprofit hospitals converse for small orgs I Employment is major expense variations in infrastructure by geographic location 0 Revenues fees for goodsservices private contributions government grants investment income I Total amount of gov support hard to estimate many different sources and types of benefits e g tax credits bonds grants transfers estimated around 3040 of nonpro t revenue 0 Difficulty tracing money some nonprofit foundations pay to other nonprofits 0 Assets on upward trend most in higher education and hospitals 0 42 of US GDP in 2000 government sector 108 down from 139 gt likely due to contracting out an increasing share of the national economy involves the types of services that can and often do ow through nonprofit providers 0 Hard to measure output value and nonprofit wage differentials overall hospitals and education higher but lower in job training primary and secondary education with more volunteer labor 0 Feel good conclusion data is a bit better now nonprofits play vital roles and show texture and depth of society The logic of collective action Public goods and the theory of groups By Mancur Olson Review by J C Martel Mancur Olson s 1971 The logic of collective action Public goods and the theory of groups advanced the understanding of circumstances under which rational selfinterested utilitymaximizing individuals will participate in collective action and problems that arise as a result of collective action Prior to this publication it was widely believed that individuals would participate in collective action simply if they could achieve a benefit Ostrom 1990 pp 56 Olson 1971 challenged this perspective arguing that this is true only under certain circumstances Olson 1971 argued that costs and benefits of collective action determine individual participation in groups He developed an equation of the costs and benefits of collective goods at the group and individual member levels p 2333 Combining theoretical in uences especially rational choice theory and mathematical results Olson 1971 found that rational selfinterested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests unless the group is small or in a large group if some mechanism such as coercion entices individuals to act on behalf of the group pp 2 33 Olson 1971 argued that individuals will participate in collective action within small groups if benefits exceed costs to the individual except under special circumstances such as if the group is privileged or intermediate A privileged group is one in which one or more members can bear the costs for other group members An intermediate group is one in which one members exit from the group would cause a noticeable change in the cost or supply of the collective good to other group members Olson 1971 pp 34 53 Olson 1971 argues that different criteria hold true for individual participation in large groups Olson 1971 explains that individuals in large latent groups may not participate in collective group action Latent groups are ones in which one members exit from the group would not cause a noticeable change in the cost or supply of the collective good to other group members In this regard an individual s action does not have a significant and costeffective impact on the group so the individual may not actively participate pp 12 65 95 However Olsen 1971 argued that individuals will participate in a large group if coercion selective incentives process benefits andor conditional cooperation are at play Olson 1971 pp 5365 These mechanisms can be implemented as policy tools indicating an implication for public affairs For example governments can enact policies that support trade association membership To illustrate many individuals participate in the US Green Building Council USGBC primarily because governments have adopted public policies that require construction to adhere to the USGBC s building standards This is an example of coercion ie commandandcontrol and selective incentives ie rebates that encourage individual participation in a large group for a collective good Hindmoor 2009 notes that many scholars wrongly state that Olson viewed collective action as irrational and overlook the fact that Olson offered solutions to overcome collective action problems p 102 Indeed Olson 1971 conceptualized numerous collective action problems largely associated with freeriding and offered solutions to overcome these problems Drawing from political and economic theory Olson s 1971 book contains rich theoretical analysis on collective behavior and contributes to public affairs political science economics and sociology by positing that collective action problems arise when rational actors participate or not in the struggle for collective goods Olson s explanations for individual participation in collective action is useful to understand if and when collective goals may be achieved and what policy mechanisms such as command and control or voluntary tools can foster individual participation in collective action 96 Basurto 2005 Title How Locally Designed Access and Use Controls Can Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons in a Mexican SmallScale Fishing Community Author and Date XAVIER BASURTO 2005 Research questions Community members devise rules to control access and use to avoid overexploitation of their Common Pool Resources What shapes do access and controls take How are the Seri able to avoid the tragedy of the commons What are the institutional mechanisms inside the Seri community that have allowed them to control access fishing effort and prevent overexploitation despite their internal disputes Contribution to the literature Application of CPR advances our understand of access and controls example of a self governed smallscale fishery managed by the Seri Community in the Gulf of California of northwest Mexico Main arguments and findings 1 Communities that face tragedy of the commons dilemmas might still be able to develop access and use controls to avoid overexploitation Results are contrary to Hardin s 1968 prediction 2 The presence of boundary rules under all entry mechanisms explains the Seri s continued ability to control entry regardless of who government officials or community members grants access and withdrawal rights to outsiders in the first place 3 Seri fisherman use institutional mechanisms to exclude outsiders and monitor and enforce collectively designed rules 4 The Seri are willing to grant access in exchange for economic gain up to the point where other value dimensions are not compromised These results support the claims made by Dietz et al 2003 5 From a policy analysis perspective proposals can be made to replace rules that have unintended effects or more desirable outcomes Research design 32 fishing trips participantobservation informal unstructured interviews with 7080 of the fisherman in that area Theoretical approach CPR controls and use Operationalization Measures number of times entry mechanisms were used Generalization Small community s common pool resources Analytical techniques Uses the Ostrom et al 1994 rule typology to identify entry rules and scope Balfour D L amp Adams GB 2008 Rethinking the banality of evil Public Administration Review NovemberDecember 2008 So I had to look up banality and here is what dictionarycom said It s been awhile since the GREs guys 97 banality noun 1 the fact or condition of being banal unoriginality quotThere is an essential banality to the story he tellsquot synonyms triteness vapidity staleness unimaginativeness lack of originality prosaicness dullness This is a book review of a book about Adolf Eichmann called Becoming Eichmann Rethinking the Life Times and Trial of a Desk Murderer Adolf Eichmann was a part of the Security Service Division SD of the SS during Hitler s regime He was responsible for the deaths of many many Jewish people in the concentration camps There are two basic theories about why he became so good at such a horrific thing 1 He was acculturated to antiSemitism and became a radical eliminationist due to the pervasive nature of that culture at the time he was a bureaucrat 2 In the context of complex organizations it is a universal tendency to obey authority and deny responsibility for evil acts The author warns that you must see Eichmann from BOTH these lenses lest you decide that Eichmann was essentially just a pawn in Hitler s game and bore no responsibility for his antiSemitism OR you believe that he was just a bad bad man who happened to be a bureaucrat Bachrach amp Baratz 1962 Two Faces of Power American Political Science Review 564 947 952 1 Research Question Why do sociologists and political scientists disagree on the notion of power Why do sociologists argue power is highly centralized in communities and political scientists argue power is diffused 2 Contributions to the Literature a Article is an attempt to make a broader argument about power across the social sciences b Suggests that the pluralists psci and elitists socio can find common ground by studying how hegemony is utilized to limit the scope of policymaking to only non controversial issues particularly arguing against Dahl s rulingelite model 3 Main Argument a There are actually two aspects of power that both political scientists and sociologists overlook that are vitally important to the study of power b thesis that there are two faces of power neither of which the sociologists see and only one of which the political scientists see p 947 c Findings 4 Research DesignData Sources a No real clear research design this article appears to be a piece suggesting that further research in the field of social science should examine power under two additional contexts the ways in which individuals and groups suppress controversial issues and the fact that power studies gen start examining power under decisionmaking conditions not with the values in the community that make certain issues important or not 98 b The data for this critique is primarily related to the works of rulingelite authors Dahl and pluralists Kaufman and Jones 5 Tables and Figures no tables or figures 6 Theoretical Approach NA 7 Operationalization not really applicable 8 Analytical Techniques presenting an argument for studying power differently 9 Generalizability should be very generalizable to other studies of power 10 Implications The authors suggest that studying power should be done in the following way a Begin with the mobilization of bias which include values myths and established political procedures rules of the game b Then examine which persons or groups gain and who is handicapped by it c Next examine the dynamics of nondecision making status quo oriented individuals d Finally analyze participation in decisionmaking 11 Clarity of Writing Decent a little muddled in parts Article critique on Understanding local policymaking Policy elites39 perceptions of local agenda setting and alternative policy selection J C Martel Research questions The research questions are 1 Viewing from an agendasetting perspective what are the major forces and factors as well as their relative importance in local agendasetting and alternative selection 2 How does the agendasetting framework fit at the locallevel of policymaking Lui et al 2010 70 The first question is useful to policy entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs need to know what forces and factors in uence agenda setting at the local level so that they can in uence the process The first and second questions are useful to academia because the multiple streams framework has not been adequately used in case studies or applied at the local level Contribution to the literature Lui et al 2010 worked to identify the level of in uence of various actors in local level agenda setting and alternative policy selection and the circumstances in which the actions take place The authors compare and contrast their research with John Kingdon s research that was published in Agendas Alternatives and Public Policies 2002 Moreover Lui et al 2010 examine local policy making theories local elite theory urban regime theory and the application to their research This research is a significant contribution to the literature because few studies have applied Kindgon s multiple streams framework to local level agenda setting The findings in this study are 99 useful to policy makers and entrepreneurs by contributing to knowledge of who participates and is in uential in the policy process at the local level Main findings and findings The main arguments of the paper are clearly stated but do not adequately answer the second research question The stated findings are 5 Interest groups and government actors have the most in uence on local agenda setting and the media has the least in uence 6 Budgetary considerations are the most important factor shaping local policy priorities 7 Policy compatibility is the most important attribute that contributes to alternatives 8 Consensus and coalition building greatly in uence the local policy process 85 These findings relate entirely to the first research question The issues with the variables discussed in the findings are explained in the operationalization section Because the researchers did not discuss key components of the agendasetting framework they did not adequately answer the second research question Research design The authors adequately and clearly disclosed their interview questions and snowball technique and steps of gathering and analyzing the data in a way that would be easy to replicate The authors conducted 271 interviews with local policy actors across the Gulf Coast region One limitation to the research design that the authors disclose is that the snowballing interview technique might have generated participation from people who are perceived to be elites by their recommenders but who are not policy elites in actuality This is a weakness of the paper that was not corrected Tables and figures The tables and figures throughout the paper are clear and informative with titles but no detailed captions The text must be searched to understand the tables and figures The variables are appropriately labeled Points of interest are not indicated in the tables and figures so the reader must identify what is interesting about the illustration The tables and figures are effective in expressing the basic arguments of the article but graphic illustrations may help the reader understand the complexities of local agendasetting rather than just presenting the information with numbers and charts Theoretical approach The theoretical approach to this study has some weaknesses The variables are clearly stated but causal arguments such as how or why multiple streams converge are not discussed The paper adequately provides data analysis results but does not discuss reasons why the results occur For example the research helps us understand which actors factors and attributes have important roles in agenda setting and alternative policy selection but it does not help us understand why However the researchers had not intended to include a casual argument As an example of a rival explanation the most important factor shaping local policy priorities was budgetary considerations however this may have been circumstantial due to recent events For example Hurricane Katrina had hit the Gulf Coast region in 2005 costing in the ballpark of 100 Billion in relief and repairs Given that these interviews were conducted in that region this and other events may have caused government budgets to be a higher concern than it would be in other parts of the country Moreover budgetary constraints may be less of a concern to wealthy communities with a sufficient tax base Operationalization Each of the variables are operationalized and presented in charts consistently throughout the paper The variables were explained clearly and examples of each variable were given ie an example of the variable 100 attention attractors is a focusing event such as hurricanes 76 The policy participants variable was measured in a transparent way which revealed possible bias with the interview subjects that may have in uenced the results Specifically representation from academia seems low compared to government and nongovernmental NGO staffs 19 people interviewed from higher education and k12 compared to over 120 from government and NGOs This may have affected a key finding of the paper that interest groups and governments have a far larger role in agenda setting than academics and consultants The attention attractors variable could have been weighted to describe not only how frequently each factor ie budget or focusing event was mentioned but also how significant that factor was to agenda setting For example Hurricane Katrina may have been an immediate and necessary item added to the agenda whereas budgetary constraints may be a reoccurring longterm agenda factor This was not discussed in the paper The key alternatives attributes variable is questionable because a few factors may overlap Specifically technical feasibility and value acceptability contribute to policy compatibility and the authors did not discuss how those factors were separated This is significant because previously Kingdon had only identified technical feasibility value acceptability and anticipations of future constraints as the three factors that shape policy priorities and then Lui et al 2010 added the category policy compatibility 81 Similarly for the forces variable the authors did not explain how the organized political forces and coalitions are different Analytical techniques The analytical techniques coding of interview data provided data analysis results that effectively translate into answers to the research questions However the research lacks discussion on the interaction between the convergence of the multiple streams problem policy politics or policy windows which were key components of Kingdon s framework Lui et al 2010 86 This is a key limitation to the second research question how the agendasetting framework fits at the local level The paper seems to claim to contribute to advancing Kingdon s framework but the researchers missed a main component of the framework Nevertheless the research still laid a foundation for future agendasetting research at the local level Generalizability This study applied Kingdon s framework to a fairly new unit of analysis local level which creates different discoveries than Kingdon s national level analysis and offers opportunities for future comparative research For example Lui et al 2010 found that consensus and coalition building are important and highly in uential in the policy process at the local level whereas Kingdon had found that the in uence is less apparent at the national level The study by Lui et al 2010 lays a foundation for future local level analysis to test other regions for consensus and coalitions which can be used for comparative purposes The local level is important to study because some issues such as urban planning are largely localized and the regulatory structure in the United States supports policymaking at the local government level The region that the researchers chose for interviews may have been too narrow for largescale generalizability For example interest group participation may be less active in remote areas of the country compared to the heavily populated Gulf Coast region Implications Interest groups and government actors are most in uential at the local level so affiliating or becoming one of those actor groups may be an effective way to get an item on the local agenda Also participating in a coalition or leading a consensusbased exercise could help get an item on the agenda A budget conscious proposal that is not too complex may be more likely to succeed at the local level Lastly expending resources on media outlets may not be effective for local level agenda setting Clarity of writing The article is very wellwritten clearly and succinctly 101 Aligica PD amp Boettke P 2011 The two social philosophies of Ostroms institutionalism Policy Studies Journal 391 2949 This is an essay so I won t use the main analysis framework 1 Introduction a The authors indicate that the Bloomington School where the Ostroms operate is often viewed simplistically b The argument is that Ostroms studies emerged from social theory or social philosophy c The main objective of the article is to explore the social philosophy that shapes inspires and defines the Ostroms research program 2 Social Theory of Polycentrism a Woodrow Wilson s work and the work of other early scholars outlined a monocentric picture of government b V Ostrom in his 1971 book The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration outlined that while Wilson s theory was a paradigm shift at the time he was about to drop another paradigm shift polycentrism BOOM c Polycentrism reframed government and the institution of PA from one center to many and from there also devoted attention to the concrete actions of social actors in the institution d To make polycentrism work as new model the Os needed a nice conceptual farmworker which they found in Public Choice 6 This was a big challenged to current views that the market could save the state and vice versa In fact it developed a third principal of public economy 3 A Social Theory of Institutional Order as a Knowledge Process a There s an additional dimension of social theory at play in Os work the Human Condition We make choices and in doing so select alternate futures Hence organization solves problems but creates new ones c Fallibility uncertainty ignorance learning and adaptability are the key concepts in this stylized narrative of social order d Two key challenges presented in the human condition i The threat of potential chaos basically the acquisition of new knowledge opens up more possibilities and destabilizes the status quo making it more likely for folks to go off the rails of the crazy train ii The threat of tyranny since there are rules we are either the ruler or the ruled Consequently we re all two steps away from being tyrants and have to rely on the Faustian bargain sanctions for rule breaking are a necessary evil This is a tragic element of the human condition 6 Just when you think they re done they add two more threats of importance in the IAD i The threat of uncertainty Knowledge reduces uncertainty in some places but increases it in others This makes a big challenge designing rules and arrangements that leave open to choice a range of learning and actions but channel them in a beneficial way ii The threat of Ignorance So specialization causes us to know more and more about less and less therefore decision makers are fallible no matter the setting Consequently we need institutional bulwarks against error 4 Summing Up a Basically the social theory underpinnings of the IAD are worth examining and developing There may be need for a metalevel conceptualization of the two concepts of Public Choice and the Human Condition Lots of questions These are for sure complicate ers I Arganoff 2000 Getting Agencies to Work Together 102 0000000 0 O This is a succinct book review of Eugene Bardach s book on network analysis Bardach sought to understand policy implementation through networks or joint production through sociological surveybased study RQ Do networks product their intended outcomes What are the causal qualities linked to managerial craftsmanship Operating components of functioning policy implementation networks 5 design challenges exibility for contingencies opportunities and problems motivation increasing mutual intelligibility and trust accountability financial exchanges collaborative ethos values equality adptability discretion and results vs bureaucratic ethos which values hierarchy stability obedience procedures Next research agenda questions of multifaceted dimensions of trust and power in network interactions Baumgartner amp Jones Agendas and Instability in American Politics Chapter 1 Punctuated Equilibria in Politics 1 Governance and Agendas a Pluralism sets up the idea that mobilization in one group leads to countermobilization in another group TrumanMadison b Lowi argues that intense mobilizations of the minority interest are granted the most power c Kingdon describes multiple streams framework which BampJ argue is most applicable when new policies and principles are being introduced d Subsystems are in a constant state of ux according to BampJ and are impacted by negative feedback shrinking their appearance on the agenda or positive feedback enhancing prominence on agendas 2 Policy Monopolies a A positive image that you ve got things moving in a good direction for maintaining a policy monopoly b Two main goals i Keep low so as to maintain autonomy ii Keep the interests of group members in line c Policy monopolies are hard to maintain i Splinter into issue networks Heclo ii Whenever understanding of an issue changes it can undermine a policy monopoly 3 AgendaSetting and Equilibrium a Though incrementalism certainly occurs it plays little role in agenda setting i EE Schattschneider points to the importance of enlarging the scope of political con ict when getting policies on the agenda ii Kingdon calls these windows of opportunity iii Milward and Laird found issue definition policy knowledge and opportunity interacted to yield agenda success b As a consequence incremental changes are less important than dramatic alterations in the mobilization of bias 4 Searching for Equilibrium a Stability is not equilibrium b Stability is maintained by two things i The institution where the policy is housed ii The enduring imagery of the information surrounding the policy 103 c Issue definition is the driving force in both stability and instability 5 Positive Feedback in Politics a Positive Feedback causes issue expansion b Negative Feedback is the absence of attention c Many systems are characterized by long periods of negative feedback and short bursts of positive feedback 6 Attention Apathy and Punctuated Equilibrium a Typically congress employs re alarm oversight they only pay attention when the alarms are going off b Media attention is either feast or famine c To get something on the agenda it s important to mobilize the apathetic 7 The Structure of Political Con ict a Organized by political parties around the central issue How much government b If an issue is elevated to the level of politics it is typically reframed to appeal to the electorate of both parties 8 The Approach of this Book a Devoted to understanding the issue definition process b Studies agenda control and access Chapter 2 Policy Images and Institutional Venues 1 Policy Images a Policy images are key to mobilizing the formerly apathetic b Every public policy is understood in simplified and symbolic terms c Policy images are a mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals facts and values 2 Social Conditions and Public Problems a Deborah Stone calls this problem definition b Objective conditions are rarely compelling Majone c Active manipulation of images of conditions strategic portrayal of causal stories Stone 3 Problems and Solutions a Kingdon says that the policy process is the artful connection of problems and solutions Garbage Can b But BampJ argue that one person cannot determine a policy definition 4 New Dimensions of Con ict a These guys cite William Riker every five seconds in this book b Policymakers differs systematically in the way they describe a policy problem depending on their position my own example Obamacare vs ACA 5 Policy Venues a Kirp gives five ways policies can be defined professional expertise political judgment bureaucratic standards legal norms or let the market x it b Big changes in policy outcomes are often the result of changes in the institutions that have the most control over them c Large public problems often involve a variety of institutions d Images and venues are closely linked The institution that controls the policy lends to the image of said policy 6 Interactions a Because of the close association between image and venue strategic political actors will venue shop by manipulating the image of the policy b Because institutions are so good at promoting stability when you CHANGE the institution it can create a pretty dramatic shift in policy 7 ImageVenue Interaction and Punctuated Equilibria a Image and venue change reinforce one another b So much so that it might snowball 104 Chapter 3 Studying Agenda Change 1 The Research Design Problem a Researchers have done this two ways neither of which answer all the questions i Crosssectional using typology researchers examine a crosssection of policies and examine which ones are in the spotlight Bamp J says that this ignores the dynamics ii Longitudinal looking at one policy over time researchers examine changes in attention toward the policy BampJ says this always contradicts the findings of the crosssectional folks but is limited to a single issue 2 Developing a New Approach a B amp J propose an alternative approach to the study of agendasetting one that would allow a synthesis of the best elements of the longitudinal and crosssectional approaches Their variables are as follows i Media Coverage Coverage has both frequency and tone that lends to an understanding of problem definition ii Venue Access Congressional attention is the main measure iii The Nature of the Problem The actual severity of the problem iv Policy Outputs Alterations in the structures of policy making expenditure patterns changes in the activity of government officials v Secular changes in institutional structures Encyclopedia of Associations and changes in government institutions Chapter 4 The Construction and Collapse of a Policy Monopoly This chapter outlines the rise and fall of the civilian nuclear energy system There s a really great table on page 81 Table 43 which goes through the main events in the rise and fall The four main arguments of the chapter as summarized by the authors are on the bottom of page 80 and I will paraphrase below 1 Schattschneider s idea of con ict expansion needs to be modi ed for the US to include multiple policy venues that exist in the US federal state local industry 2 Policy venues get involved in a sequential manner 3 Image change and venue access are simultaneous and interact with one another creating reinforcement for example nuclear energy starts looking unsafe it gets regulated every time a fine is imposed it reminds us that it s unsafe more fines are developed and imposed etc Chapter 5 Two Models of Issue Expansion 1 The Dual Mobilization Theories of Downs and Schattschneider a Downs Mobilization is the result of momentous enthusiasm or alarmed discovery Public interest occurs in cycles but usually the initial enthusiasm results in expansion of institutions that last long after the newness has worn off b Schattschneider Mobilization occurs due to fear mistrust complaints and criticism Some see the solution as the problem and so the issue must be expanded Either way the issue is expanded 2 Testing the Dual Mobilization Models a BampJ code the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature and the New York Times index for the two issues of pesticides and smoking tobacco b They also code the Congressional Information Service Abstracts to get a handle on what issues are coming to hearing during the same time frames c BampJ conclude that Downs and Schattschneider are BOTH right but only half right that both types of mobilization exist in the punctuated equilibrium of the policy process Chapter 6 The Dynamics of Media Attention 1 Media has a really varied way of impacting public opinion 105 0 0 a Different groups of reporters cover different foci and interests b Media is about sales 2 Choosing a single focus in a bottlenecked debate a Simon reminds us that human beings have limited cognition He characterizes a bottleneck of attention which the media panders to b The media is limited to just a few concerns at a time c Heavy reliance on symbols and metaphors d The media amplifies issues in that it provides more intense coverage than is warranted by the actual situation e The media serves as a gatekeeper for what s important 3 Noncontradictory arguments a It is more effective in a debate to simply shift the focus b Where the media focuses on an issue sets the tone and consequently the favor of the coverage 4 The authors go through pesticides and smokingtobacco as examples a Contrasted to automobile safety which is way more dangerous much is made of pesticides and tobacco leading to the overall negative trends of public attitudes and policy outputs toward both Chapter 7 Cities as National Political Problem Scope of chapter Urban affairs issue tied up in partisan con ict indicators of policy output from agenda process includes housing crime discrimination poverty financial disparities mass transit suburbancity disparities water sewer etc RQ Why did the initiative happen and why did it collapse 1 urban initiative followed waves of policy activity corresponding to changes in issue definition and solution proposals Policymaking as reaction to changing political and social circumstances Media coverage measuring systemic agenda access of attributed triggering event and congressional hearings measuring formal agenda access See Figure 71 finding media interest sustained at a high level for years prior to congressional attention both predated triggering events positive relation bw congressional hearing activity spikes and subsequent policybudgetary action Fig 72 3 periods of extensive urban disorder 191719 1943 and 196568 only last connected to broader problems and policy initiatives Mid 60s mid70s plight of cities was a big issue on nat l agendas driven off by Reagan conservative coalition in 80s urban matters emerge in 1940s absent public conerninterest following 43 riots prelude to 1949 Housing Act connected to wartime concerns housing to address slums and highways also emerge 194060s Social Programs Community Development late 1950s 1970s and Nixon s block grant program new understanding of problem and solutions proposed pattern of gov t attention and policy response positivefeedback system resulting in nonincremental wave of policy outputs a national urban initiative aggregation of enthusiasm activist dem presidents a comprehensive nat l program aimed directly at cities bypassing states focused on problems uncoordinated with solutions 1970s media interest declined rapidly congressional attn declined in infrastructure then in racial affairs and social problems then in intergovernmental fiscal structure partial system collapse of fiscal support decrease in infrastructure environment and community dev and increase in redistributivecollective consumption programs 2 Window of opportunity affected by partisan competition and race relations Con uence of 3 factors postwar American prosperity social attention turned from econ to social issues high water mark of Democratic Rooseveltian coalition and activist president public trusting and favorable towards gov t than before or after Gallup poll No countermobilization with urban agenda was pushed aside interesting discussion on Nixonian and Reagan era approaches Chapter 8 Connecting Solutions to Problems Three Valence Issues 106 00000 O 0 O O O 0 GOO GOO IIIOO O 0 Scope Three valence issues in which only one side of an issue is legitimate drug abuse alcohol abuse child abuse think WICKED PROBLEMS with many solutions and agenda problems what solutions exist to agreedupon problems Powerful communities of specialist in each of three problems remain and dominate official responsesafter public concern dwindles Drugs Henry Anslinger was a dick 193060s responsible for harsh enforcement of narcotics users not dealers low public profileattn so he did as he pleased mental health community grew after WWII but knew Anslinger was too powerful of a dick to fight window of opportunity when he retired in 1962 federal drug treatment facilities created mid 60s under Dept HEW education and treatment as issue was on formal agenda Nixon ReaganBush enforcement tone interdiction 1989 WAR ON DRUGS 8x increase in media coverage of drugs 60 say it s the most important 1960s increased systemic and formal agenda attn formal agendacongressional attn remained high while systemic attn fell policy experts in Washington fought over drug policy pie ie budget Alcohol Abuse media and congressional attn lurches like for drugs with little relation to problem severity once attn rises it doesn t usually descend back to lows new agencies budgets other considerations are entrenched Child Abuse policy image changes and venue shopping in 1980s redefinedamplified issue Fig 84 Shift from private misfortune to public outrage congressional action in 70s led to selfreinforcing system of expert Conclusion once public attn of valence issue increases congressional action is taken and institutions are formed which reinforce the problem through more measures and statistics hence public attn remains high in self reinforcing cycle Part III Institutional features of the American system secular trends and changes that have affected the entire political system not just one issue at a time Chapter 9 Interest Groups and AgendaSetting Scope Changes in interestgroup system as it relates to constructiondestruction of policy subsystems environmental lobby RQ How has the mobilization of interests changed as different groups organize for political action Crosssectional and longitudinal perspective important because degree of con ict or consent in community determines political concern or debate history policy process more crowded with interests now than ever Fig 91 nonprofit sector organization in early 1900s industry experts mobilized onesided postWWII profit sector iron triangles consumer and environmental interests only mobilized later citizen sector diffuse issue networks ratio of profit sector to citizens groups declined from 35 in midcentury to 18 in 1985 Methods Walker s 1985 survey of interest groups Encyclopedia of Associations 60 70 80 90 Case Study Environmental interest groups grow by 400 from 1960 to 1990 mostly in 60s and 70s Strong positivefeedback cycle agendasetting had longlasting organizational implications in voluntary sector not just gov agencies congressional subcommittees or statelevel gov growth in budget and professional staff Agenda Setting and the Mobilization of Bias interest groups structure incentives and possibilities of policymakers expansion or contraction of supportparticipation mobilization of bias changes the likelihood of political con ict and agendasetting under criticism Schattschneider mobilization 107 CO I I IIOOOOIIO OOOIIOO O O O 00 O onesided interest groups decrease possibility of con ict and political debate mobilizations of enthusiasm more likely subsystem politics rule e g pesticides and nuclear power pre70s Conclusions longitudinal analysis reveals patterns of mobilization over time with important consequences for agendasetting Chapter 10 Congress as a Jurisdictional Battlefield Scope congress and committee system is an important policy venue in mobilization process cases of pesticides smoking drugs and air transportation RQ how does congressional structural re organization impact the system of positive feedback instability and policy outcomes General institutional reforms were perhaps a symptom of changereinforcing element rather than a cause 2 reinforcing mechanisms that structure changes in congressional behavior 1 jurisdictional boundaries are uid in uenced by policymakers interest groups exec agencies venue shopping 2 entrepreneurial congress members push seek political payoff Secular trends in congressional activities decentralizing admin reforms of 70s congress gave itself increased budget and staffing resources and oversight powers increased information capacity and policy input Outcomes increased changing rules and jurisdictional battles more venues available for appeal detailed legislation and longer bills became the norm Jurisdictional Encroachments and policy change policy changes from changes in policy image and institutional venue rapid reversals in policy shifting jurisdictions both create and respond to changes in issue definition examples pesticides both health and agriculture concerns heard in separate committee venues drugs congress and interest groups tightly linked in network of enforcement education hearingsinterests in diff venue smoking new intruding committees discuss diff aspects of same issue health not price controls ideological not fact differences air transportation turf battles and freeforall no more equilibrium new institutions wave of deregulations intense competition for political gain Congress and Subgovemment Stability different venues create potential for policy subsystem instability as seen through microcosm of congress policy change often stems from congressional changes in jurisdiction which in turn stem from citizenmedia mobilization of bias Chapter 11 Federalism as a System of Policy Venues Scope crosssectional variant and longitudinal trends MA federal structure essential to study of policymaking in US federalism does not limit change as much as it makes changes less controllablepredictable due to numerous venues The Federal character big and diverse multiple levels of representation Secular change in the federal system longrun trend move toward centralization 1930s 1978 move away from centralized policymaking since 1978 after cutbacks and federal gov less willing to assume responsibility for problems decoupled venues Policy specialization federalism pushed states and localities toward distinct policy specializations 108 OOOOOIOOOIIOIOO I I IOIIIOOO 0 Peterson states better at development policies promoting economic growth federal gov better at redistributive policies bene ting disadvantaged Authors examine this assertion and policy performance by looking at expenditures in investment dev t and consumption policiesredistr Federalism and selection pressures investmentconsumption ratio confirms theory that localstate specialize on investment and feds on consumption redistr policies Federal in uence on state and local policy priorities grantinaid program in uences states and localities examine imposition of central priorities and venues linkages reveals that state investmentconsumption ration affected by of federal grants designated for consumption negative relationships federal grantinaid to individuals was around 50 in 55 fell to 31 low in 1978 and is again at 54 in 89 causes states to deviate from preferred investment policies to federal priorities Conclusion policy priorities vary at diff levels of gov t subnational gov ts more similar to each other than fed gov t in spending patterrns Role of federalism in systems of positive and negative feedback Why would states deviate from normal focus on investment development policies and diffuse other consumptionredistr policies framing of policy in both ways e g education and state demographicsliberalismcontext also a factor Venue linkages in policy subsystems nationalization of federal system increased capacity and had lasting effects for diffusion of policy ideasimages in states Nuclear power amp nationalization of interests local utility planning was targeted venue of policy entrepreneurs levels of gov t linked by national organizing power of environmental interest groups Diffusion through national coordination Child Abuse and Traffic Safety intergov grants encourage action e g diffusion of childabusereporting statutes linking of statebased interests to national agenda transportation officials and NHSA did the same national policy specialists working across states Pesticides the environment and three forms of diffusion stateto state statetofederal and federaltostate diffusion variations of stringency and regulations states took initiative in fed deadlock linked venues diffusion via professional associations and federal gov t activities Conclusions national vs local gov pursue difference mixes of policies competitive pressures and differences in venue receptivity opportunities for policy entrepreneurs and in uence of change every venue is biased and offers different opportunities multiple ve Chapter 12 Governing through Institutional Disruption Our primary thesis is that the American political system built as it is on a conservative constitutional base designed to limit radical action is nevertheless continually swept by policy change change that alternates between incremental drive and rapic alterations of existing arrangements Myriad problems issues assigned to policy subsystems dominated by experts and specialization for parallel processing Vast nonincremental bursts of change not comprehensiverational either waves of enthusiasm or pessimism SUMMARY of Approach and Findings three sources of explanation 1 agendasetting approach manner in which new policy ideas are selected for adoption implies change 2 analysis of policy subsystems insulating organizational arrangements 3 social choice school role of equilibrium processes in politics could be rare MAIN FINDINGS The American political system spawns numerous policy subsystems which are characterized by inclusion of the interested and exclusion of the apathetic Policy subsystems are often institutionalized as structureinduced equilibria in which a prevailing policy understanding dominates Those excluded from the policy subsystem constitute slack resources that can be mobilized by policy entrepreneurs policy change when new participants come to issue 109 00 O O GO 000 00 III I I Mobilization typically occurs through a redefinition of the prevailing policy image There are 2 contrasting types of mobilization criticism often destroys eXisting arrangements eXpansion of con ict Schattschneider mobilization enthusiasm construction of favorable institutions Downsian Multiple venues in American political system constitute many opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to appeal and Many venues of politics work against conservatism ie policy monopolies New ideas or policy images may spread rapidly across linked venues thus setting in motion a positivefeedback process Venues may be more or less tighly linked and these linkages may change over time The intervention of the macropolitical institutions generally reinforces the possibilities of rapid change Presidential involvement can be decisive Problems and solutions are linked but are considered separately During periods of positive feedback the rapid diffusion of new ideas often appears due to the actions of one or a few actors or events when in fact its causes are more diffuse Longrun societal changes affect policies across the entire political spectrum Cycles and instability in politics subsystems continuous creation modification and destruction is this a cyclical model and dynamic equilibrium Some support but not full support no links to political motivations and structures to imply cycling punctuated equilibrium model differs greatly from cyclical model implying recurrences of past and historical repeating trends new issue definitions more important than actionreaction cycle model National Moods and Public Policies do broad trends in gov t match broad swings in national moodpublic opinion mass mobilizations and public opinion reactions often later after policy action why study the audience when the actors are up on the stage Schattschneider strikes again Punctuated Equilibrium and the question of bias organizations mobilize bias but they are fragile and impermanent quotThe aw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upperclass accentquot EE Schattschneider 1960 class exclusion unclear conclusion elite vs middleclass interests but not certain that lowerclass have no say and small elites totally control the process Limited attention spans and government parallel processing capabilities of overall system increasing over time in layered serial processing systems bottleneck of attention Simon agendasetting process creates lurches and lulls equilibrium value of waves sporadic mobilizations and interest actually hinders incrementalism adaptive system Final words Political scientists would do better to eXplain these disruptive periods and their implications than to try to t them into models of stability and incrementalism Part IV Agendas and Instability 15 years later RQ Do the arguments hold over time What new arguments can be made with evidence since 1993 A Yes AND even broader implications PE view not limited to study of policy monopolies disruptive dynamics puctuated policy equilibrium only one part of general process Chapter 13 Policy Subsystems Punctuated Equilibrium and Theories of Policy Change policy punctuations are not confined to America also seen in European parliamentary systems focus on cognitive limits of human decisionmaking as explanation in The Politics of Attention Nuclear Power findings revealed no real movement 110 OO O CO C OO O 0 Smoking new antisecondhand smoking movement not just venueshopping for policy interests but venues also seek out solutions tension bw positive and negative feedback Worsham 1998 2006 Theory of CoalitionFormation blends PET and ACF second wave of interest in secondhand smoking but now quiet after SCOTUS refuse to let FDA regulate state level legislation continues little doubt that subsystem of tobacco interests was destroyed in selfreinforcing process they were right we get it Urban policy incoherent policy not all of subsystem was destroyed still very reliant on partisan politics this area reinforces partisan differences still Chapter 14 Punctuated Equilibrium and Disruptive Dynamics RQ Are punctuated dynamics more general than particular policymaking pattern A Yeah broader political and social processes may also follow punctuated patterns including political parties president elections disruptive dynamics broader patterns of political change similar as dynamics in policymaking Party systems realignments shift in macropolitical party alignment of demographic groups usually tied to electoral matters not policy matters can we integrate positive and negative feedback that operate within policy system must operate at other larger political areas Disruptive dynamics are a function of how political systems process information disproportionately ie can ignore info for a long time reinforcement of institutional drag and resistance to change final conclusion continued theoretical and empirical study trying to place PET in broader context to understand more complex systems would be great Mueller D C 1997 Public choice in perspective Perspectives on public choice 117 Thesis Vlain Argument Basically this is a lit reviewsummary of public choice theory Public Choice is interdisciplinary approach which integrates economics modeling and behavioral assumptions in the study of politics and political institutions Mueller argues it could be the basis for a common perspective on human action and a methodologially integrated social science p 17 Roots took hold with french mathematicians de Borda 1781 de Condorcet 1785 English economists Dodgson aka Lewis Carrol Stuart Mill and Wisksell 1896 Swedish economist in uenced James Buchanan Modern field developed post WWII Downs 1957 Olson 1965 Buchanan amp Tullock 1962 first generation normative emphasis on ideal type democracies focus on voting rules majority rule primarily negative e g Arrow 1951 no institutions can produce pareto optimal and nondictatorial outcomes Tullock 1959 simple majority rule leads to wasteful spending vs more positive but single dimensional views of issue spaces Downs competition in two party system produces equilibrium outcome second gen closely tied public finance expenditure side and public choice neglect of taxation side Accomplishments failures potential salient characteristic is behavioral assumptions that have been challenged since inception helps us understand work of governments and size of institutions failure in simple behavioral assumptions that may prove to be false assumptions Contribution to literature See above basic lit review and recap of other authors contributions 111 Keywords Concepts methodological individualism individual agent as building block for econ analysis assumed to have objective preferences act in self interested ways demand revelation process Groves 1973 possible to induce people to reveal preferences and aggregate in a normatively appealing way MethodsData Lit Review and really listing of other lit reviews summary of book chapters to come Ostrom and Ostrom 1971 Public Choice a different approach to the study of public administration Public Administration Review 31 2 203 216 DEFINITIONS none SUMMARY 0 The purpose of this paper published after a conference and the birth of the journal Public Choice was to relate the public choice approach to the theoretical traditions in public administration 0 Public choice theory is concerned with individual as unit of analysis association of public goods as outputs of public agencies and the effect of decision rules on decisionmaking 0 At the end the questions is raised Would an individual expect to get the best results by having all public goods and services provided by a single integrated bureaucratic structure Or would he expect to get better results by having access to a number of different entities providing services in response to a diversity of communities of interest Public choice theory and traditional public administration theories provide insights into answering these questions KEY POINTSTHEMES 0 Early theories 0 Woodrow Wilson contributed the notion that hierarchy and technicallytrained civil servants creates a perfect and efficient system 0 Simon was fascinated by the lack of logical cohesion between administrative principles Simon suggested that individuals engage in a consideration of facts and of values in choosing among alternative possibilities bounded by the ordered rationality of an organization 204 In sum hierarchy and technical training are not the only important things to individual s choices 0 Effect of decision structures on collective action 0 Theories came from Olsen then Buchanan and Tullock Olsen argued that individuals will not voluntarily participate in large groups for collective actions except under certain conditions Buchanan and Tullock argued that public agencies are a means for advocating decisionmaking capabilities in order to provide public goods and services responsive to the preferences of individuals 0 Majority vote and social preferences 0 Duncan Black argued that the median preference position will dominate voting 112 0 Bureaucratic organization 0 Focused on reducing costs and having bureaucratic ordering Ida Mitchell WC 1988 Virginia Rochester and Bloomington twentyfive years of public choice and political science Public Choice 562 101119 A Argument Outline major contributions of public choice scholars both to public choice and political science assessment of impactreception by political scientists and establish informal theory of how schools of thought develop and disseminate a Rochester positivists led by Riker who applied to game theory to Down s Economic Theory of Democracy founding piece in public choice literature b Virginian public choice including Buchanan and Tullock who wrote another formative choice book The Calculus of Consent which Maren WISELY traded out for a book review this weekholy smacks that would have been a butt kicker c Bloomington School with Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Contribution to the literature a This piece provides a nice picture of the three different schools of thought in the public choice paradigm It contrasts and compares the schools and further establishes Public Choice as an overarching paradigm with offshoots and generations of scholars b The piece serves to orient past and present Public Choice scholars in the field and provides nice analysis of the subtleties between the three schools Further the author provides insight into dissemination of public choice scholarship as well as adoption or lack thereof by political scientists Heikkila T 2006 The Contribution of Public Choice Analysis to Decision Making Theories in Public Administration in The Handbook of Decision Making ed Goktug Morcol New York Taylor and Francis pp 2138 Rational Choice Andrew Hindmoor Chapters 1 5 8 9 Chapter 1 Introduction Thesis Rational choices involves application of economic methods to political science and has 5 guiding principlesassumptions of rational choice Methodological individualism use of models rational selfinterest political individualism Contributions 0 Marginal revolution 18701950 Stopped the separation between economics and politics Classical and neoclassical economics commit to methodological individualism political individualism model building and rational individuals 113 o Emergence of rational choice 19501970 Behaviorists developed theoretical foundations New Right liked it o Criticisms of rational choice 1970s1980s 14 0 Recent research Rational choice institutionalism in a camp with historical and sociological institutionalism 19 Analytical narratives accounts of actor s interests beliefs and desires 19 Key termsthemes o Commonly known as public choice theory 1 o Methodological individualism emphasizes agency ie political processes and outcomes are determined by actions of and interactions between individuals over structure ie agents are products of and constrained by their environment 0 Political individualism argue that not only do individuals have preferences but policies and institutions are judged based on satisfaction of these preferences 4 Datamethods none Chapter 5 Mancur Olsen and the Logic of Collective Action Thesis Olsen identified the collective action problem when it is in nobody s individual interest to contribute to the provision of the collective good Contributions 0 Resolving collective action problems Olsen offered ways to overcome problems Coercion by the state eg legal frameworks to distribute benefits Privileged groups bear the costs and tolerate the freeriding of others Selective incentives encourage members to contribute to the collective good using positive reward or negative punishment incentives Process bene ts are a form of positive selection incentives They are the benefits that the individual receives from participating in the collective Conditional cooperation requires that everyone agrees to the terms of cooperation 0 Size of the group is important variable Key termsthemes o Collective action problem commonly known as freeriding problem 0 An intermediate group is one whose members are in a position to notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the collective good Datamethods 114 o Olsen s arguments can be clarified using game theory and within that prisoners dilemma Chapter 8 Rationality Thesis Hindmoor assesses two of the core assumptions of rational choice rational and selfinterested and identifies two ways in which rationality might be de ned and defended axiomatic and optimizing approaches He argues that people are not rational and selfinterested Contributions 0 In the axiomatic approach a rational person is someone who s preference ordering is re exive complete transitive and continuous In the optimizing approach a rational person is someone who possesses optimal beliefs and acts accordingly 0 The argument is that the optimizing approach is inaccurate because people do not hold optimal beliefs or act accordingly 0 By identifying the instances in which individuals act in optimal ways he pinpoints circumstances in which rational choice explanations are effective 0 He also argues that people are not selfinterested and only act in selfinterested ways when the costs of not doing so are higher Key termsthemes o Axiomatic approach defines rationality in terms of a person s possession of a preferenceranking which satisfies certain logical criteria 0 Optimizing approach defines rationality in terms of a person s possession of optimal beliefs and their selection of those actions which can best realize their desires given those beliefs Datamethods none Chapter 9 Rational Choice Explanation Thesis the question is Does rational choice offer good explanations Hindmoor argues that while it is routinely argued that rational choice theory is positivist it can actually be understood as scientific realism or interpretivism as well Contributions 0 Depends on what good explanations are thought to require based on positivism scientific realism interpretivism these philosophical paradigms can help determine whether or not you think rational choice offers good explanations Key termsthemes o Positivists equate explanations with the identification of general laws 0 Scientific realists equate explanations with the identification of causal mechanisms 0 Interpretivists equate explanation with the identification of the beliefs and desires which lead a person to act in a particular way Datamethods none Maren Shepsle PartI Chapters 1 amp 2 115 Chapter 1 A Shepsle K 2010 Analyzing Politics Rationality Behavior and Institutions 2nd Ed Norton Press B Thesis There has been a sea change in the study of politics from storiesanecdotes to thick description and history writing around WWII then to systematic measurement and more recently to explanation and analysis Movement has followed a scientific trajectory C Contributions to literature Summary of broad movements in political literature in Shepsle s understanding D Key TermsThemes a Theory embellishment of a model such that features abstract in the model become more concrete and speci c p9 b Politics Easton the authoritative allocation of values for a society Shepsle broadens the definition to include any phenomena of group life B MethodsData historical scientific analysis of political studies founded on rationality Chapter 2 A See above B Thesis general goal is to explain social and political eventsphenomena through rationality a individual is basic unit of analysis b individuals characterized in abbreviated forms in terms of beliefs and preferences for prediction and explanation c individuals are rational act in accordance with beliefs and preferences d Stakes are low uncertainty is high choices matter more likely to be consistent in preference ordering B Contributions to Lit NA Basic explanation of rational choice theory C Key TermsConcepts a methodological individualism Individual is basic unit of analysis b Comparability alternatives are comparable preference is xPy ny or ny prefer x to y prefer y to x or are indifferent between x and y ie you can compare preferences c Transitivity preference is transitive for any three possible alternatives if xPy and sz THEN xPz p 25 d Preference ordering if preferences satisfy comparability and transitivity e Maximization paradigm capacity to order preferences and aptitude to choose from the top of the order f Belief probability statement relating to the effectiveness of a speci c action or instrument for achieving various outcomes p 30 B MethodsData Use of Claire MacCaskill s Senate race to demonstrate rationality 116 WEEK 2 Tiebout Polycentricity amp Leviathan Ida Tiebout C 1956 A Pure theory of Local Expenditures Journal of Political Economy 64 5 416424 1 Thesis Main Argument In response to Musgrave s 1939 The Voluntary Exchange Theory and Samuelson s 1954 The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures Tiebout argued that while valid for public finance at the national level there are different forces at play at the local level He proposed seven assumptions 1 1 Consumervoters are fully mobile 2 2 Consumers have full knowledge of the local revenuedifferences 3 3 There is a large enough number of communities so as to offer choices that match with a wide variety of consumer preferences 4 4 Everyone gets their income from dividends so there s no need to worry about where one works as ones J OB in this model is to consume ones preferred public goods 5 5 There are no external economies 6 6 Every community is of the optimal size so if there s a public beach in it that thing has enough space for everyone 7 7 Communities below the optimal size try to recruit people so that taxes are also optimized to pay for the public goods 2 Contribution to the literature Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature Tiebout s argument ultimately gave rise to a body of literature that addresses the manner in which local governments are competing for consumers residents in a market The assumption underlying this model is that in the case of Public Goods consumers vote with their feet What other authors or literatures does this work speak to This piece didn t initially speak to much of anyone including Musgrave and Samuelson However in 1969 Oates wrote a piece where he empirically tested Tiebout s theory Since then variations of Tiebout s theory have formed a literature stream that Oates discusses nicely in the Tiebout Model at 50 2 Keywords Key Concepts and Themes a ConsumerVoter Tiebout s model doesn t address actual voting but rather considers that individuals will vote with their feet for the optimal arrangement of public goods and services Moving In Tiebout s model moving is considered the market test of willingness to buy the best community Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available All theory no fun 117 Jesse Two chapters from the Tiebout model at 50 on blackboard A B D Chapter 1 Footloose at Fifty An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary Essays William A F ischel Thesis Main Argument This chapter has two main arguments 1 After a historical overview of Tiebout s life and work that the most likely reason the Tiebout model had a slow start in academia was due to it not being right for its time and 2 That scholarly trends are clearly expansive although founded from a rigorous original article a Include the evidence for argument Fischel gives an overview of the book and depicts applications of the Tiebout model to areas such as public school zoning large urban governments racetobottom Ryan would dig this discussionbook chapter p 16 Contribution to the literature a Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature Tiebout s model took the idea that geography was constant and introduced the concept of voting with your feet This ties microeconomic ideas to political science and public administration public goods and services have an impact on the choice people make on where to reside b What other authors or literatures does this work speak to Literatures 1 public choice 2 State and local government 3 public nance 4 school choice 5 Rational choice b Authors 1 Samuelson and Musgrave 2 Oates 3 Paul Teske yup the dean 4 Ostroms Keywords Key Concepts and Themes Keywords 1 Tiebout 118 2 Vote on your feet 3 rational choice 4 economics 5 public nance b Key Concepts and Themes 1 Salience of local government attention oscillates 1 Currently toward centralization ii Model not rigorous but maintains broad applications and followers E Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available 1 Lit Review 2 Chapter 2 The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model Wallace E Oates B Thesis Main Argument Oates s purpose of this chapter is to describe the many applications of the Tiebout model and to illustrate the direction of research stemming from the Tiebout principles a Include the evidence for argument See Summary C Contribution to the literature a Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature 1 This piece contributes to the field by illustrating the pervasiveness of the Tiebout model in local government finance and other decision applications b What other authors or literatures does this work speak to 1 Literature 1 Local Government 2 Finance 3 Zoning 5 Public production 5 Economic theory 6 Public vs Private debate b Authors 1 Wallace Oates 2 Paul Seabright 119 3 Bruce Hamilton 4 Peter Mieszkowski 5 Epple 6 Zelenitz 7 James Buchanan 8 Ostroms D Keywords Key Concepts and Themes 1 Keywords 1 Tiebout model 2 Tiebout sorting 3 Local Government Finance 4 Zoning b Concepts and Themes 1 Tiebout model 1 Provides normative framework for thinking about the provision of local public goods 2 Tiebout sorting promotes an efficient use of scarce resources in a manner analogous to that of a competitive market 3 When augmented with some local politics it offers further insight into how both eXit and voice options for individual households can enhance the efficient operation of the local public sector ii Tiebout vision provides the framework for a useful explanatory model of local finance iii Criticisms 1 Stratification and diversity that such a world fosters can come into con ict with other social values 2 Equality not addressed E Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available 1 Lit review Commentary Robert Inman Chapters 1 5 from Polycentricity and Local Public Economics on blackboard 120 Chapter 1 Maren A Ostrom V Tiebout C M amp Warren R The organization of government in metropolitan areas A theoretical inquiry in McGinnis M D ed 1999 Polycentricity and local public economics University of Michigan Press B ThesisMain Argument a metropolitan area should be conceived as a polycentric political system To the extent various jurisdictions in a metro area function through competition contractual relationships and have recourse to resolve con ict they are a system a governments are in the business of providing public goods see def below b determining appropriate delivery of public goods package requires i control specifiable boundary conditions ii efficiency most favorable economy of scale iii political representation inclusion of appropriate political interests ie political community this may differ from public impacted iv selfdetermination choice of local public services presumes variety in patterns of public organization think Tiebout hypothesis b Therefore GARGANTUA public organization covering all of metro area may not be best option i clumsy in meeting demands of local citizens too compleX to be responsive production inefficient b Public orgs in a polycentric systems arise i Competition provision of public goods is internalized wo spillovers then competition increases as vendors increase greater responsiveness and efficiency ii Con ict involves serious spillover effects iii Con ict resolution mechanisms arise 1 courts on a casebycase basis 2 cooperation eg coalition of communities in SoCal importing CO River 3 informal negotiation arrangements justified in order to maintain local authority and power position B Contribution to literature a This ts loosely into the public choice literature Tiebout builds on his previous 1956 article per Oates chapter b Rat ChoiceEconomics is relied upon in the discussion of competition public goods and extemalities Though Ostrom ch 2 argues this is not a strict market economic model but quasimarket B KeywordsThemes a Public Goods and Services 121 i Dewey public good are those for which one cannot control of indirect consequences extemalities and spillovers ii Musgrave exclusion principle cannot readily be packaged or excluded iii maintenance of prefered states of community affairs therefore not readily distinguishable B Methods NA theoretical Chapter 2 Maren A Ostrom V Polycentricity Part 1 in in McGinnis M D ed 1999 Polycentricity and local public economics University of Michigan Press B ThesisPolycentricity can be seen in diverse political processes in decisionmaking arenas of judicial decision makingconstitutional rule political leadership and finally in provision and production of public goods a in market systems market relationships occur based on mutual adjustment b in judicial decision making reasoned solutions in judicial process occur due to traders contracting for enforcement of contracts Tullock 1971 c constitutional rule general institutional framework is limited organized apart from other legislative processes diverse decisionmaking capabilities assigned to diverse structures assigns overlapping jurisdiction limitations on authority lead away from monocentric gov d political coalitions electoral machinery leads to competition bw politicians shifting coalitions in open public context in US concurrent regimes in federal system e public service economy competitive rivalry in quasimarket conditions to provide public services reliance on multiorganizational arrangments B Contribution to the literature a Builds on Michael Polanyi 1951 who defines social organization as either deliberatedirected or spontaneouspolycentric i deliberatedirected order coordinated by one central ultimate authority with unified command ii spontaneous or polycentric order many elements capable of making mutual adjustments for order relationship within general system of rules b Ostrom argues polycentricity is implicit in Madison and Hamilton s arguments in The Federalist advocating separation of powers and principles of federalism B Keywords Themes a political relationships exist as set of possibilities within a larger domain of all sets of possibilities inherent in potential variety of human behavior b social organization potential variety of human behavior is constrained to exclude some acts and permit others 122 c Decision rules means for partitioning set of all possibilities into authorizedproscribed relationships d monocentric political system government prerogatives are all vested in a single office or decision struction with monopoly over legitimate use of forcecoersion e Polycentric political system many officials and decision structures are assigned limited and relatively autonomous prerogatives to determine enforce or alter legal relationships p 55 B Methods NA Chapter 3 J C A Ostrom V amp Ostrom E Public Goods and Public Choices in McGinnis M D ed 1999 Polycentricity and local public economics University of Michigan Press B Thesis Private and public services are distinguished by two variables exclusion and jointness of use Further degree of measurement can it be measured and degree of choice do individuals chose are significant to public organizations These elements pose implications for organizations and lead to an understanding of the public economy and problems faced by public service industries a Include the evidence for argument Exclusion occurs when potential users can be denied goods or services unless they meet the terms or conditions of the vendor Jointness of use or consumption does not occur when consumption by one person precludes the use by another person No jointness of use when exclusion is feasible is a purely public good Measurement of public goods and services is difficult when they are hard to package Degree of choice refers to a consumer s ability to chose their good or service Implications for organizations include freeridership difficulty in achieving voluntary cooperation difficulty in measuring outputs and monitoring Organizations of a public economy govemments are collective consumption units production units can be produced by the consumption unit a private vendor through standards of collective service by collecting taxes through contracting with another unit of government or by a miX of production and consumption units Public service industries have problems of financing regulating patterns of use and dealing with duplication of functions and coproduction between consumption and production units Problems can be alleviated by competition bargaining and cooperation Contribution to the literature a Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature 123 Ostrom amp Ostrom propose a new mode of anlaysis that applies economic reasoning to nonmarket decision making which can be used to reconsider the basic structure of hte public economy b What other authors or literatures does this work speak to economic and political theory but scholars were not specifically mentioned Keywords Key Concepts and Themes Public goods are goods subject to joint consumption where exclusion is difficult to attain Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available na Chapter 4 J C A Ostrom V amp Ostrom E A behavioral approach to the study of intergovernmental relations in McGinnis M D ed 1999 Polycentricity and local public economics University of Michigan Press B Thesis Main Argument More efficient and responsible performance in the public sector may be attainable if selective consideration is given to the formulation of user service charges to re ect deliberate public pricing policies to the development of general criteria for public expenditure and public investment decisions and to the development of quasimarket and pseudomarket arrangements to regulate the conduct of public agencies a Include the evidence for argument proposes the concept of industry as an effort to characterize a set of interrelated enterprises that uses a common body of knowledge and methods in the production of similar goods and services which serves as a systematic analysis of the set of events being regulated and transformed by certain control and production methods performed by several agencies operating in a single public industry proposes that there is a disparity of interests within an industry which has implications related to its technology production methods type of product it produces and the internal decisionmaking structure describes problems with regulating interrelationships among independent agencies that function in public industries mainly that regulations typically apply to only one function within the industry Contribution to the literature a Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature They apply findings and concepts from economics to the study of intergovernmental relations b What other authors or literatures does this work speak to 124 D Keywords Key Concepts and Themes industry concept an intermediate level of organization where many separate enterprises have developed interdependent patterns of organization based upon a complementarity of functions in producing and using a similar type of product or service The study of intergovernmental relations must move beyond listing and describing relationships among governmental units The study must move to a concern with the systemic character of intergovernmental relations meaning the nature of the order that eXists within compleX relationships among government units E Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available na Chapter 5 J C A Ostrom V Polycentricity Part 2 in McGinnis M D ed 1999 Polycentricity and local public economics University of Michigan Press B Thesis Main Argument There are implications of polycentricity on research on metropolitan governance including problems with language and differences in approaches of monocentric versus polycentricminded scholars a Include the evidence for argument discusses problems with using the term government unit in this type of research when there are so many types of government units discusses the differences in approaching public administration from a monocentric viewpoint ie Wilsonian tradition or a polycentric perspective C Contribution to the literature a Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature lays out four hypotheses for studying metropolitan governance and problems with research approaches b What other authors or literatures does this work speak to na D Keywords Key Concepts and Themes see above really short chapter 125 E Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available na Maren Oates W 1985 Search for Leviathan an empirical study American Economic Review Sept 1985 75 pp 74857 A Oates W 1985 Search for Leviathan an empirical study American Economic Review Sept 1985 75 pp 74857 B Thesis Main Argument Oates seeks to disprove or cast into doubt the Leviathan theory Brennan amp Buchanan 1977 1978 1980 of a strong centralized government seeks to exploit its citizenry by maximizing taxes He attempts to prove that there is no strong systematic relationship between the size of government taxing and spending and the degree of centralization of the public sector a a more centralized statelocal sector is associated with a smaller statelocal sector ie tax receipts counter to prediction of the Leviathan model but not statistically strong still little support for Buchanan amp Brennan s hypothesis b industrialized country study shows a large size of public sector and less centralized government c developing countries have relatively small but highly centralized public sectors d no significant correlation in any case bw government size taxingexpenditures and government centralization B Contribution to the literature a Oates responds directly to Brennan and Buchanan and Musgrave to a lesser degree b Incorporation of median voter theory as an hypothesis for the opposite leviathan outcome c Oates relies on John Wallis historical economist contention that individuals empower local government bc they have more control at that level leading to larger government spending at the local level B Keywords Key Concepts and Themes a Leviathan theory of government a strong centralized government seeks to exploit its citizenry by maximizing taxes The theory posits that citizens and decentralization must act to constrain this Leviathan B MethodsData a Testing of a null hypothesisgovemment size and the extent of decentralization bear no relation to one another b Statelocal analysis i DV statelocal tax receipts operationalizing size of government ii IV decentralization operationalized as state share of general revenues share of total expenditure and absolute number of local government units 126 iii Second multiregression analysis for a more robust DV p 752753 world sample of 43 countries similar methods as above Oates regresses a measure of size of the public sector on fiscal centralization ratio Data sources 1977 Census Data World Almanac IMF Government Statistics UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics and Demographic Yearbook p 756 Ida Holcombe RG 1989 The median voter in public choice theory Public Choice 612 115 125 1 Thesis Main Argument The median voter model in the public sector has served in much the same role as the model of pure competition in the private sector Further the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the MVM is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world Evidence Holcombe reviews empirical evidence that he says is consistent with the model 1 2 5 McEachem 1978 nonreferendum states already at a median voter equilibrium Holcombe 1980 and Munley 1984 Romer and Rosenthal 1982 test MVM against agenda setting and fail to make a conclusion Pommerehne and Frye 1976 Pommerehne 1978 and Inman 1978 find tested median vs mean incomes and found median to be the better predictor Mueller 1979 also concludes that empirical work is consistent with the MVM Contribution to the literature 1 Where does this piece fit in the public affairs literature This piece addresses the rise and rapid fall from favor of public choice theorists and argues that public choice may have been too quick to drop the MVM What other authors or literatures does this work speak to A prominent work is Niskanen 1971 which was the first piece to call the MVM into question Keywords Key Concepts and Themes Median Voter Model Definition being argued against in this article The public sector produces what the median voter wants Median Voter Model Definition advocated in this article Under general circumstances the demand for public sector output in a democracy is the median voter s demand Methods Data specifically the dataset if its publically available NA Theoretical piece Annie Boyne G 1998 Bureaucratic Theory meets reality public choice and service contracting in US Local Government Public Administration Review 58 6 474484 WEEK 3 Challenges to Rational Choice 127 Maren Green amp Shapiro 1994 Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory a critique of application in political science Yale University Press I ll be reading this all thoroughly for my synthesis anyways so I can just outline the book That way none of you will ever dare question my argument M uahahahaha The first few pages of this review are useful httpsfacultvfuquadukeedumauchoicechoice pathologiespdf especially see key italicized terms on pg 23 A Green amp Shapiro 1994 Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory a critique of application in political science Yale University Press B Thesis Main Argument Rat Choice has not yet delivered on its promise to advance the empirical study of politics a Empirical testing must occupy a central role it doesn t currently b formally rigorous parsimonious and deductive theory is good but along doesn t provide the answer c rat choice paradigm is not being attacked by the authors the assumptions and heuristic value are taken as given d applications of models have not been shown to withstand scrutiny findings that don t align w theory are dismissed e authors take no objection to normative implications or prescriptive dimensions of rat choice B Contribution to the literature 1 Critique of Rat Choice studies of American Politics collective action Olson 1965 party competition Downs 1957 median voter model and legislative policy making Arrow 1951 2 Against Riker Kavka Knight Abell Monroe Ordeshook all scholars that praise Rat Choice s contributions really A Keywords Key Concepts and Themes a logic of microfoundations basis for rat choice starting w study of individual B Methods Data Na Chapter 2 The Nature of Rational Choice A ThesisMain Argument The authors outline the key tenets and points of disagreement within Rational Choice Theory a Key Tenetsgenerally accepted assumptions rationality is homogenous among individuals i rational action is utility maximizing ii agent s available options can be rankordered ie connectedness 128 b b b iii preference ordering is transitive iv each individual maximizing expected value of payoff rather than actual utility unknown v collective action must be explained by reference to individual maximizing behaviors vi models apply equally to all decisions rules and tastes are stable over time Competing viewsdissensus i Thin vs Thick Rationality ii Degree of information available Conceptions of explanation i intentions as causes action taken to satisfy belief formed by evidence given agent s desire 1 intemalist assume psychological microfoundations vs extemalist explanations for actions 2 SatzFerej ohn interpretation evol theory ii Universalism and the search for equilibria seek consistencyuniversality of rational choice explanations to explain all political life iii is Rational Choice a family of theories vs one theory Scientific method instrumentalist vs coveringlaw views B Contribution to the literature C Keywordsthemes a Thin rationality agents assumed to be rational only in the sense that they efficiently employ the means available to pursue their ends Riker Thick rationality additional description of agent s preferences agents value same sort of things over time and space wealth power position etc Equilibrium forces balance one another and process repeats itself stems from purposive behavior of individuals Nash Segmented universalism rat choice explanations only successful in certain domains of political life Friedmaninstrumental view test of a theory is its predictiveexplanatory power not its internal structure or concurrence with prior wisdom coveringlaw model any variance with observed data in a model must be abandoned or modified B MethodsData Lit Review 129 Ch 3 Methodological Pathologies A Main ArgumentThesis Green amp Shapiro assert there are fundamental recurrent methodological failings rooted in universalist aspirations that motivate much of rational choice p33 stem from methoddriven instead of problemdriven approach to research a Post Hoc theory development Ordeshook 1993 establish almost any reasonable outcome as an equilibrium at some point example of curvefitting to given theories i development of post hoc theories is antithetical to empirical testing ii ambiguity in meaning of rationality makes disconfirming instances into recase theories iii rational choice theory can be constructed to predict both X and notX b Formulating Tests de ection of empirical scrutiny by parsimony and relying too heavily on claims of simplification i slippery predictions ratio of latent constructs unobservable to observable measures underidentification of latent variables ii vague operationalization of predictions hypotheses do not match empirical tests used to evaluate them b Selecting and interpreting evidence i searching for confirming evidence tendency to adduce confirming instances e g results don t show Whether observed outcome would have occurred for reasons unrelated to theory in question ii projecting evidence from theory theoretical convictions guide inferences in findings iii arbitrary domain restriction Posner does this disregarding problematic data by saying theory doesn t apply in certain cases b Authors caution methodological pathologies and problems aren t inextricable from Rat Choice but Rat Choice needs to be fundamentally rethought B Contribution to literature a It appears they build off of Ordeshook and Shepsle to some degree b Argue against Posner other major rational choice theorists for above methodology problems B Keywordsthemes a point prediction location of an equilibrium under static conditions b marginal predictions comparative statics analysis direction of equilibrium may move in response to exogenous change Ch 4 The Paradox of Voter Turnout 130 A Main ArgumentThesis The paradox of Voter Turnout demonstrates the methodological pathologies of rational choice specifically post hoc theorizing slippery predictions and failure to formulate a null hypotheses a post hoc theorizing to address paradox of voting post hoc theorists added exogenous variables to the equation e g civicmindedness psychic value or manipulated perceived benefits and reduced costs b game theorists if there is any degree of uncertainty equilibrium will not exist and game theoretic models do not provide the answer c marginal effects can show why individuals vote but still do not equate to rationality or prove expected utility analyses d overall inability to state and maintain hypothesis about what rat choice does not predeict e Green amp Shapiro suggest partial universalism approach in which rational maximizing is only one of several factors at work applied statistical studies of various policy intervention s effect on voting turnout could help strengthen case and be within domain of Rational Choice B Contribution to Literature a Argues against Downs 1957 characterization of voter turnout as a rational choice collective action problem b against Riker amp Ordeshook s 1968 post hoc theorizing to add civic mindedness as a benefit Palfrey amp Rosenthal 1985 game theoretical attempts which turned into post hoc theorizing Aldrich 1993 arbitrary domain restriction many others B Keywords NA C Methods lit review some modeling see Table 41 p 60 Ch 5 Social Dilemmas and Free Riding A ThesisMain Argument rational choice scholarship does not improve in quality from voter turnout to collective actionvoluntary political activity in social movements and interest groups more generally a social dilemmas exist in true prisoner s dilemma situation rational choice predicts no one should cooperate and does not take into account i interpersonal communication ii changes in expected collective benefits iii expectations of a finite number of repetitions of the game in the future b Olson maintains large groups shirk in collective action problems but selective incentives may motivate individuals i authors imply this argument is incidental to collective good being pursued e g christian fundamentalist will join prochoice group if they have refreshments but prolife group has nothing 131 ii comparison of potential participants is diffuse and unsystematic cannot account for large groups with many numbers iii rat choice preference for behavioral indicators over verbal ones strangely takes into account honored causes as explanation Selective statistics null hypotheses rarely make sense collective incentives are shown to generate collective action contrary to prediction slippery predictionspost hoc embellishments i using individual s overestimation of their impact as reason for joining cause ii perceived efficacy of individual is not considered in rat choice estimation of utility but is a primary cause for collective action Empirical evidence is thin lab experiments are difficult shows that communication is a key factor likelihood of repeated interaction as generating collective action is not supported over long run B Contribution to Literature Mancur Olson s 1965 Collective Action is the primary focus authors maintain he is methodologically sound but the empirical testing of his hypotheses and ad hoc explanations are not against post hocslippery slopes Muller amp Opp 1986 Tullock 1971 Chong 1991 Moe 1980 Green amp Shapiro argue 1 study decision environments that vary in respect to IVs and 2 keep rational choice explanations analytically distinct from other explanations B KeywordsThemes a Ch provides an explanation of social dilemmas through prisoner s dilemma and game theory for the setting Table 51 Structure of a Prisoner s Dilemma p 76 Rational Ignorance Hypothesis Downs citizens have an incentive to spend minimal time and resources to obtain information about public affairs B Methods lit review Ch 6 Legislative Behavior and the Paradox of Voting A thesis Spatial models of legislative voting and instability in majority coalitions are also empirically unsupported a These rely on thin not thick accounts of rationality b general state of disequilibrium makes any situation possible instability stability or status quo thus empirical testing is dif cult c Theories don t seem to be built on systematic observation and analysis and come to very different hypothetical propositions in Rat Choice see below 132 d Experimental evidence isn t sufficient i vague null hypotheses ii no taking into account of socialpsychological factors iii sterile political environment of experiments even produces anomalies iv Lack of adequate control factors b interpretive ambiguity of experimental data no generally supportive theories i deductive empirical testing poses particular problems b cognitive complexity and interpersonal variability undermines theoretical claims c core outcomes may not exist with so many arbitrary con gurations of players preferences within one coalition d structuralinstitutional manipulations in game experiments also fail to produce expected outcomes but theoretically irrelevant variables ie perception of allies does have profound effects e distinction bw rational choice theory vs social choice theory or spatial theory is not clear B contribution to literature a Argues against Riker 1965 hypothesis that instability in majority coalition rule is pervasive adduction of confirming instances of instability b Also against second strain of rational choice Tullock 1981 that instability is rare and one theoretical possibility post hoc accounts of stability c against structureinduced equilibrium post hoc arguments of Shepsle amp Weingast 1981 B keywords C methods Ch 7 Spatial Theories of Electoral Competition A thesis B contribution to literature C keywords D methods Ch 8 Responses to Likely Counterarguments 133 A thesismain argument restating the main findings of the book and responding to 10 possible common critiques a naive falsificationism charge associated with Kuhn 1962 and Lakatos 1970 burden is on rat choice scholars to prove corroborated empirical evidence overall that has not been done authors are not trying to destroy paradigm with one or two falsifying examples no alternative theory there are a variety of alternative hypotheses social normative psychological institutional etc perhaps no theory can provide for so much generalization and still capture causal processes antitheoreticaluntrue they argue against intellectual divide bw theory builders and appliers advocate for a commonsense enterprise to build midlevel theories scientific value of advocacy competition may help advance theories but systematic rigorous testing and a critical approach is also needed impossibly demanding standards not true there are some solid empirical application Fiorina Aldrich all theories simplify via abstraction theories abstractions should capture essence of causal mechanisms authors doubt whether this has been shows for rational choice rational choice is not one theory segmented universalism may be one way to salvage rational choice yet it would need to be freed of pathology of arbitrary domainrestriction p 192 tyranny of disciplinary divisions ie econ vs political science rat choice is interdisciplinary but also exceedingly narrow only econ not psychology etc theory should be problem not method driven rat choice treats every problem like a nail BC it s a HAMMER supremacy of rational choice stature it has achieved as a leading theory shouldn t be discounted but should it be eXpect too much a edgling theory converse claim to the above authors say nothing inherent in rational choice that would prevent it from contributing but attention must be shown to rigorous empirical inquiry and methodological pathologies FINAL Conclusions rational choice must overcome methodological deficiencies i be problemdriven not methoddriven making theories to fit data ii relinquish commitment to pure universalism iii RQ should be how does rationality interact with other facets of human nature and organizations to produce the politics that we seek to understand B contribution to literature a b Argues with Clifford Russell 1979 critique about lack of empirical evidence for ratpublic choice critiques Thaler 1991 Lane 1991 Rosenberg 1992 Responds to Riker again in a big way boom B keywordsthemes none C methods na 134 WEEK 4 Bounded Rationality New Format 1 Citation 2 Summary 13 Lines 3 Main Argument 12 Lines 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines 1 Citation Conlisk J Why Bounded Rationality Journal of Economic Literature Vol 34 No 2 Jun 1996 pp 669700 2 Summary 13 Lines 3 Main Argument 12 Lines 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Conlisk argues and provides evidence on the extent to which and when bounded rationality should be included in economic models 1 Citation Sen AK Rational Fools A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory Philosophy amp Public Affairs Vol 6 No 4 Summer 1977 pp 317344 2 Summary 13 Lines a RQ In what sense and to what extent would egoistic behavior achieve general good p321 1 Explores what would happen in a decentralized economy where individual selfinterest was fully exercised 2 Sen argues that individuals are concerned with their own interest because it is the only interest that one is able to control 3 Main Argument 12 Lines Emotions norms values etc should be a component of economic theory cited by Conlisk 1996 135 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Sen exposes new ideas on selfinterest in relation to economicsrelated choices ie rational choice 1 Citation Jones B D 1977 Rational fools A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory Journal of Public Administration and Theory 134 395412 2 Summary 13 Lines 1 Jones views rational choice as plaguing the study of public administration and public policy He sets out to illustrate the shortcomings of rational choice in public administration and public policy and illustrate why bounded rationality lends itself to the fields 3 Main Argument 12 Lines 1 Bounded rationality is superior to comprehensive rationality in public policy and public administration 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Jones extrapolates individuallevel behavior theory to the organizationallevel and proposes that rational choice plagues social science but that bounded rationality is fundamentally a complete model 1 Citation Forester J Bounded Rationality and the Politics of Muddling Through Public Administration Review January 1984 Pgs 2331 2 Summary 13 Lines See table 2 for different types of bounded rationality and strategies to overcome 1 comprehensive unbounded optimizesolve algorithmic 2 cognitive limits Simon satisficehedgelower expectations 3 socially differentiated networksearch and satisfice 4 Pluralist Lindblom bargainincrementadjust and check 5 Structurally distortedPoliticalEconomic Habermas anticipatecounteractorganizedemocratize 3 Main Argument 12 Lines 136 Forester argues that a onesizefitsall recipe for decisionmaking is not appropriate Instead decisionmakers need a repertoire of strategies 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Forester offers a heuristic to understand the type of bounded rationality at play and various actors settings problems information time and practical strategies for overcoming bounded rationality 1 Citation Padgett J F Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research The American Political Science Review Vol 74 No 2 Jun 1980 pp 354372 2 Summary 13 Lines 3 Main Argument 12 Lines 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Padgett proposed the serial judgement theory to eXplain decisionmaking to replace theories of incrementalism regarding budgetary processes because it allows for greater temporal exibility rather than linear decision rule formulation WEEK 5 Jesse 1 Citation Coase R 1937 The Nature of the Firm Economica 4 386405 2 Summary 13 Lines In this article Coase eXplains the conditions that determine Whether the gains from specialization and cooperative production can better be obtained Within an organization like the firm 3 Main Argument 12 Lines Firms arise from market failure The reason for market failure involve the different transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts there is a cost of using a price mechanism 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines This article is a foundational piece that illustrates how firms are means to produce efficiency in the market This piece is fundamental to many of the organizational economic arguments surrounding hierarchy 137 JC 1 Citation Alchian Armen and Harold Demsetz quotProduction Information Costs and Economic Organizationquot American Economic Review 62 1972 316325 2 Summary 13 Lines 3 Main Argument 12 Lines This paper is concerned with the nature of rms in that the owner and customer do not have a contractual relationship like the owner and employee do There are actually a multipleXity of relationships and dependencies within the firm 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines This paper advances the field by proposing that ordinary contracts that give way to comparative advantage are not the only type of contracts The authors propose a special class of contracts that are used for joint inputs to a team production process J C 1 Citation Williamson Oliver Transaction Cost Economics The Governance of Contractual Relations Journal of Law and Economics 22 1979 233261 2 Summary 13 Lines DEFINITION of transaction cost economics 0 cost incurred while making an economic exchange 0 Transaction cost economics studies how trading partners protect themselves from the hazards associated with exchange relationshipsTCE maintains that in a compleX world contracts are typically incomplete Shelanski amp Klein 1995 in review of TCE This paper affirms the proposition that transaction costs are central to the study of economics identifies the critical dimensions for characterizing transactions describes the main governance structures of transactions and indicates how and why transactions can be matched with institutions in a discriminating way 3 Main Argument 12 Lines Williamson argues for specialized governance structure under a variety of circumstances such as when a natural monopoly is occurring Formally The argument is that specialized governance structure is needed to the degree efficient supply necessarily joins buyers and sellers in a bilateral trading relation of a continuing nature p 258 These arguments comprise the idea and new field of study on TCE 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Some argue that Williamson 1975 1985 1995 first articulated transaction cost economics Shelanski amp Klein 1995 Others date it back to RH Coase in The Nature of the Firm 138 March J G 1991 Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning Organization Science 2 7187 1 Citation 2 Summary 13 Lines 3 Main Argument 12 Lines 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Maren 1 Citation Eisenhardt K 1989 Agency theory An assessment and review Academy of Management Review 14 1 5774 2 Summary 13 Lines DEFINITION Agency theory is about risk sharing among individuals or groups and resolving problems between principals and agents It is the relationship in which one party the principal delegates work to another the agent who performs that work Describes this relationship by using the metaphor of contracts 3 Main Argument 12 Lines Recommendation is to incorporate agency perspective into studies on the problems associated with having a cooperative organizational structure 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines The author developed testable propositions for agency theory and calls for expanding the use of agency theory in organizational studies WEEK 6 Feel free to editadd to this section I just wrote brief summaries J C R B ampR Part1 ampPartII pgs 3 110 New institutionalism This was a divergence from rational choice Institutionalism had faded as political science became focused on formal methodologies and institutionalism studies were not meeting that rigor In addition new institutionalism spun off of behavioralism This was a move away from traditional legaloriented analysis of formal rules towards an approach to understand how politics really works March and Olson 1984 1989 reconceptualized political institutions in this way Rational choice institutionalism There are two ways to view institutions exogenous constraints in which actors strategies outcomes preferences etc are determined and game form with less focus on rules and more focus on actors playing the game the way they want to play Theories of collective action have roots in rational choice institutionalism Challenges to rational choice institutionalism include bounded rationality behavioral economics transactioncost economics and analytical narratives Historical institutionalism HI assesses longterm accounts of institutions and the consequences Paul Pierson 2000 articulated the idea of path dependence This chapter talked a lot about social movements as they shape politics and policy Constructivist institutionalism see pages 5859 for a table 139 Network institutionalism 4 principles relational actors complex relationships networks pose resources and constraints on behavior networks mobilize information in uence resources and social capital in differentiated ways 5 domains policy networks organizations markets political mobilization and social movements social in uencepsychologyculture Old institutionalism see page 92 for a table Maren Institutional Economics 1 Citation Commons J R 1936 Institutional Economics The American Economic Review 26 S1 237249 2 Summary Author creates de nition of Institutional Theory of Economics nationalistic theory of reasonable value under sovereignty of US Supreme Court p 246 0 institution body of collective action in control of individual action 0 Reasonable value determined by sovereign judiciary branch fiat 3 Main ArgumentSupport Maximum netincome economics is individualistic maX profit min loss a question of economic power Goodwill economics is the meeting point of NetIncome Econ and Institutional Econ defined by willingness of both the buyer and seller Institutional Econ ruled by plaintiff buyer defendent seller and judge SCOTUS or other third party delegated authority from state 4 Contributions to Literature Argues against Bentham and other early economists for money economynetincome economics provides basis for institutional economics Hodges Williamson and others build on his work WEEK 7 J C 1 Citation Bendor J ampMookherjee D Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action The American Political Science Review Vol 81 No 1 Mar 1987 pp 129154 2 Summary 13 Lines quotOur aim in this paper is to formalize these intuitions about the fragility of cooperation in the repeated game involving large numbers and to show that this instability has implications for the institutional structure of interest groups and other organizations striving for collective benefitsquot Data setting is game theory modeling 3 Main Argument 12 Lines Thesis When groups have repeated action rules change 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines 140 As the authors claim their work looks at collective action problems not only as central or decentral structures but as nested institutions that can help overcome problems These nested institutions quotcombine strategies of conditional cooperation at local levels and strategies of selective incentives at the global levelquotThe idea of nested institutions comes from SImon 1969 and is a recurring phenomenon in subsequent institutional studies 1 Citation Lubell M Feoick R amp Ramirez E 2005 Political Institutions and Conservation by Local Governments Urban A airs Review 40 pp706729 2 Summary 13 Lines The scholars develop the political market framework to eXplain the mediating role of local political institutions operationalized by conservation amendments in county general plans This framework draws from and alters the property rights framework and interest group frameworks by reconceptualizing and greater emphasizing the mediating role of political institutions in contrast with the emphasis on economic political and interest group in uence within the other two framworks 3 Main Argument 12 Lines the central argument of our research is that the structure of local political institutions will facilitate or impede the in uence of specific demands and community interests on landuse decisions 713 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines The key theoretical advancement in this article is to develop an understanding of the mediating role of local political institutions on the local provision of conservation policies 707 1 Citation Feiock R 2009 Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Collective Action Urban A airs Review vol 44 no 3 356377 2 Summary 13 Lines Institutional collective action problems are collective action problems eg freeriding that are caused andor solved at the institutional level The researchers provide evidence for their main argument by describing the following tools for regional governance managed or coordinated networks regional authorities regional organizations collaborative groupcouncil contract network policy network 3 Main Argument 12 Lines The researchers argue that urban politics and PA literatures have focused primarily on the establishment of regional governments or authorities as the mechanism for solving horizontal collective action problems in metro regions Instead we argue that there are an array of mechanisms that vary in the extent to which selforganization is evident in their creation and use 359 See summary for list of mechanisms 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines The researchers draw from and add to actorcentered frameworks Scharpf 1997 and IAD Ostrom 1990 by extending theories of contracting and collective action among individuals to institutional actors such as cities counties government agencies and other organizations They had already developed the ICA framework and this article builds on it 141 1 Citation Ostrom E A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action 1997 The American Political Science Review Vol 92 No 1 Mar 1998 pp 122 2 Summary 13 Lines Ostrom lays out why we need a behavior theory for bounded rationality Then she turns to findings that challenge the general fit between behavior observed in socialdilemma experiments and the predictions of noncooperative game theory 5 3 Main Argument 12 Lines Reciprocity trust and reputation are at the core of cooperation If you don t have these things then collective action can fail Ostrom says we need to rethink policy analysis and political science to account for this 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines Ostrom develops a behavioral theory of boundedly rational and moral behavior She integrates reciprocity reputation and trust as variables in economic models 1 Citation Lubell M Schneider M Scholtz J T and Mete M 2002 Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions American Journal of Political Science Vol 46 No 1 pp 148163 2 Summary 13 Lines The research question is Despite the long intellectual and policy tradition of creating centralized institutions to deal with con ict between local actors why is the policy process moving toward cooperative decentralized institutions and what factors make these solutions viable They look at watershed partnerships as political contracts devised by actors at a decentralized level to govern a common pool resource Command and control mechanisms are good because they have lower transaction costs and clear benefits This is centralized strategies associated with state and national agencies Lubell et al look at the other side of the coin voluntary partnerships as a decentralized strategy associated localized activity The researchers choose watershed partnerships because water is a common pool resource so they can use Ostrom39s theories They also use collective action theories to provide insight into how individuals act in groups e g will participate when benefits exceed costs The researchers create a predictive model and indicate that problem severity and institutional opportunities ie sharing costs for infrastructure improvement are signi cant factors that in uence if partnerships will emerge 3 Main Argument 12 Lines The premise is that environmental issues used to be solved by centralized mechanisms but now governing institutions that promote cooperation among local actors are promoted so why do these decentralized institutions emerge We have argued that partnership emerge because of their competitive advantage over commandand control institutions in responding to the increasingly acute unresolved problems of local natural resource management The disillusionment with state and federal alternatives among both environmental and economic interests has provided a niche for the emergency of decentralized institutions that encourage cooperation among divergent interests 4 Contributions to Literature 12 Lines The researchers test political contracting theory as it pertains to institutional supply by creating a predictive model and indicate that problem severity and institutional opportunities ie sharing costs for infrastructure improvement are significant factors that in uence if partnerships will emerge 142 WEEK 8 RB amp R Part III Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 13 Chapter 19 Chapter 21 Chapter 25 WEEK 9 Posner RA 1998 Rational Choice Behavioral Economics and the Law Stanford Law Review 505 Summary Main argument Contribution to literature Ida Kahneman D 2003 Maps of Bounded Rationality Psychology for Behavioral Economics American Economic Review 9351449 1475 Summary Main argument Contribution to literature Maren Simon H 1985 Human Nature in Politics The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science American Political Science Review Vol 79 No 2 pp 293304 Summary Main argument Contribution to literature Ida Tversky A Kahneman D 1981 quotThe Framing of decisions and the psychology of choicequot Science 211 4481 453 458 Summary Main argument Contribution to literature Ida Tversky A Kahneman D 1986 Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions Journal of Business 594 S25 1S27 8 Summary Main argument Contribution to literature Druckman J 2001 The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence Political Behavior 23 3 225 256 Summary 143 Main argument Citizens appear to consciously weigh the considerations suggested by elite frames compare these considerations to their predispositions and information and contemplate about the source of the frame This all suggests that citizens deal with elite frames in a relatively competent and wellreasoned manner Contribution to literature J C Druckman J 2004 Political preference formation competition deliberation and irrelevance of framing effects American Political Science Review 984 671686 Summary A framing effect occurs when different but logically equivalent phrases causes individuals to alter their preferences He develops a psychological theory to eXplain if framing effects will occur under various conditions Main argument framing effects are not robust across political contexts Further counterframing and heterogeneous groups show little effect from framing People are not firm in their preferences The frame consistent with preferences bolsters confidence levels Contribution to literature This contributes to political communication literature WEEK 10 Dobbin F 2004 The new economic sociology a reader Princeton press Chapters 1 5 Chapter 17 Chapter 18 Chapter 20 WEEK 11 Dobbin F 2004 The new economic sociology a reader Princeton press Chapters 8 13 Granovetter M 1973 quotThe Strength of Weak Tiesquot American Journal of Sociology Vol 78 Issue 6 May 1973 pp 13601380 Thesis There needs to be improvement in the analysis of social networks Argument 1 Processes in the analysis of interpersonal networks provides the most importantin uential bridge between micro individuals and macro group phenomenon Evidence 1 As network size increases there will be many bridges or connection among distant points rare for a bridge to be the only path between 2 points 2 Bridges among groups of individuals are formed from weak ties and create shorter distances in paths between individuals 3 Method Job hunters in Boston a Conducts a sample of individuals who recently got a job in Boston and has them say how frequently they saw the person who told them about the job opportunity seeing was the strength of the tie 144 b Over 80 reported weak ties told them about the job c Job information was usually 2 degrees away or less distance from the source a friend of a friend Conclusions 1 This article is THE foundational piece to kick of the study of networks a connects individuals to groups b highlights how certain weak associations can be much more important in connecting individuals than strong ties weak ties travel further social distances and reach a larger number of people i explains bridging social capital before Putnum c introduces a methodology for the study of networks i examines the strength of ties within networks strong weak absent ii job study as the method and operationalized strength d reaching early adopters those one step removed from marginal isolates is how innovations spread through networks this becomes important in business and marketing theory today e weak ties are a way to overcome collective action problems and to spread informationdiseaseand connection through a network quickly John F Padgett and Christopher K Ansel 1993 Robust action and the rise of Medici American Journal of Sociology 986 1259 1319 Provan K G amp Milward H B 2001 Do Networks really work A framework for evaluating public sector organizational networks Public Administration Review 414423 Main Question With all the hype about networks what is the relationship between interorganizational network structures and activities and measures of effectiveness the networks of focus are human services Issues for Evaluating Network Effectiveness 1 Like the difficulties in evaluating organizations but even more compleX 2 Too much focus on the clients which are important but not the beall 3 Joint production problem of more than one agency delivering only part of a certain services Proposal THREE LEVELS of Effectiveness Network Effectiveness at the Community Level 1 Communitybased networks must be judged by their level of service delivery the community 145 2 One way to do this is to measure whether the network is delivering services in a way that could NOT be done in a singular agency 3 Another way is to measure the social capital the network brings to the community Effectiveness at the Network Level 1 Does the network achieve viability in the community 2 Everybody s got to remember they re in a network for one 3 Not the number of members but that the RIGHT agencies are members of the network 4 Range of actual services of the network 5 A range of services from critical to peripheral is key 6 The authors LOVE the concept of multipleXity which refers to the strength of ties between network agencies I had to add that to my MS word spell check That s two words this week Homophily was the other one I will get them into the dictionary 7 Evaluate the administrative structure of the network NAO vs not Effectiveness at the organizationparticipant level 1 Client outcomes 2 Legitimacy 3 Resource acquisition 4 Cost Integration across levels of analysis The authors present some conceptual frameworks on integrating Figure 1 is a nice visual 146
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