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Notes from Midterm to April 13

by: Amber Notetaker

Notes from Midterm to April 13 PSC 321

Amber Notetaker
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These notes cover outside reading and in-class lectures
US National Security
Dr. Frazier
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This 13 page Bundle was uploaded by Amber Notetaker on Wednesday April 13, 2016. The Bundle belongs to PSC 321 at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa taught by Dr. Frazier in Spring2015. Since its upload, it has received 23 views. For similar materials see US National Security in Political Science at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa.


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Date Created: 04/13/16
Deterrence  Bargaining with threat of force in an effort to prevent another state from acting as it otherwise might do o Examples:  U.S./USSR Mutually Assured Destruction  Iran/US Iran/Israel  China/Taiwan/US  Goals of deterrence o Countering an enemy o Avoiding war  Sometimes these two goals are not consistent  Types of deterrence o Simple  Threats to prevent direct attack towards ones own territory o Extended  Threats to prevent attack on a third party  China and Taiwan  All US Alliances o General  Over a long period of time without sign of imminent attack  Military, diplomatic, economic, cultural o Immediate  Specific and perceived imminent attack  Signaled by mobilization, deployment, diplomatic actions  An example is the 6 days was in 1967 where the Arab masses were against the Israelis o Egypt had the capabilities to invade, so Israel preempted the attack  Deterrence Mechanisms o Development of Capabilities  Nuclear (Monad, dyad, triad, second strike)  Triad consists of intercontinental, air force, and submarine capabilities  Conventional (Stealth, Precision Weapons) o Balance of capabilities with respect to adversary  Internal Balancing (i.e. China builds, you build)  Alliance building o Collective Security  Georgia wants to join NATO and Ukraine wants to join EU in order to counter Russia o Diplomacy  Must sell willingness for this tactic to work  Rational Deterrence Theory o Defenders Calculations  Benefits vs. cost of failed deterrence  Does the challenger present a credible threat o Challenger’s Calculations  Is the defender credible  What are the costs of backing down  Challengers will back down when the costs of doing so are less than the probability of a defender carrying out the threat o Two Examples  Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962  Credible threat from the United States but did not lead to action because Cuba and Russia perceived a way out  Iraq and Hussein in 1990  There was no credible way out  The potential high cost of regime survival and miscalculated probability of US coalition carrying out threat to restore Kuwait sovereignty leads to refusal to back down o US in 1980 had supported Iraq vs. Iran  Problems with Deterrence o Failure to set clear “redlines”  Leads to lack of credibility  US/USSR  US/Syria and use of chemical weapons o Difficulty of choosing then to utilize deterrence  NATO vs. Russia  US and Iran o Has become much more complicated  Non-state actors  Threat to civilians is unacceptable (MAD) o Difficulty with credibility and willingness  U.S. vs. Philippines dispute over the Spartlays  Vulnerable: Does the US actually want to clearly commit to their stance at the risk of going to war over something that means very little to our national security?  Changes in perspectives o Move away from deterrence toward preventative/pre- emptive behavior  Failure to deter Iraq in 2003 in lieu of prevention o Belief is that non-rational actors are resistant to deterrence  Iran  Al Qaeda  ISIS  We do not want to negotiate with each other— we just want the other gone o Success often depends on  Military capability  History  Alliances  Economic strength  Proximity  Political/Military Linkage  Success of Extended deterrence is also linked to: o Increased trade ties o Political/military ties o Strong capability of the defender o Iranian Proliferation  Sagan says no  Waltz says yes o DPRK  Rhetoric escalates to possible use of nukes  North Korea continues its program o Do nuclear weapons increase or decrease security?  Criteria for stable nuclear deterrence  Relatively equal capability  Survivable second strike capability  Avoidance of accidents o Arms control vs. disarmament  Arms control is an agreement to regulate, limit, or restrict use of weapons  Disarmament focuses on reducing or eliminating weapons o History of arms control has not been positive  1899, 1907 Hague Conferences  Washington Naval Conferences (1921)  Baruch Plan (1946)—UN authority over use of atomic energy  Rapacki Plan (1957)—prevention of nuclear weapons in Central Europe o Superpower Arms Control  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  Stabilized nuclear arms race  Strategic Offensive Reductions Treat, 2002  2/3 reduction in strategic nuclear warheads over next 10 years to about 2,200  Strategic Arms Reduction Talks  Reduction of nuclear arsenals and weapon types o Global Arms Control  Non-proliferation treaty, 1968  Biological Weapons Convention, 1975  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996  Chemical Weapons Convention, 1997  Anti-personnel mine ban convention, 1997 o Positive Utility of missile defense  Prevents proliferation by non-nuclear states  Allows US and its allies to protect others  Limits destruction brought about by failed deterrence  Allows for formation of coalitions against nuclear aggressors  Saves lives o Negative Utility  Systems are incredibly complicated  More expensive than offensive nukes  Reduces ability to pursue arms control  Undermines nuclear deterrence  Sagan (1996): Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? o “States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain non-nuclear states.” o Argues that national security is not the only reason for proliferation o Supports inspections and transparency  Reduction of security dilemma by the commitment by the US to not use nukes o 57 states have reactors and 30 more have the capabilities o The Security Model  Neorealist principles of anarchy and protecting self interest  Strategic Chain reaction of proliferation after WWII  “The case of South Africa has most often been analyzed in this light, with the new security threats that emerged in the mid-1970s seen as the cause of South Africa’s bomb program and the end of these threats in the late 1980s as the cause of its policy reversal.”  “Similarly, it has been argued that the non-Russian former states of the Soviet Union that were “born nuclear”-Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus-decided to give up their arsenals because of a mixture of two realist model arguments: their long-standing close ties to Moscow meant that these states did not perceive Russia as a major military threat to their security and sovereignty, and increased U.S. security guarantees to these states made their possession of nuclear weapons less necessary” o Domestic Policy Model  Three types of state actors encourage or discourage proliferation  States nuclear energy establishment  Professional military  Politicians  Best example is Indian nuclear weapons experience  “Instead of producing a united Indian effort to acquire a nuclear deterrent, the Chinese nuclear test produced a prolonged bureaucratic battle, fought inside the New Delhi political elite and nuclear energy establishment, between actors who wanted India to develop a nuclear weapons capability as soon as possible and other actors who opposed an Indian bomb and supported global nuclear disarmament and later Indian membership in the NPT.”  “Indeed, a traditional realist view would predict that the experience of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War-in which Argentina was defeated by a nuclear power, Great Britain-would have strongly encouraged Argentina’s nuclear ambitions. Instead, the important change was the emergence of liberalizing domestic regimes in both states, governments supported by coalitions of actors-such as banks, export-oriented firms, and state monetary agencies-who value unimpeded access to international markets and oppose economically unproductive defense and energy enterprises.” o The Norms Model  Sees nuclear proliferation or nonproliferation as symbolic in establishing a states identity  States think they need nuclear weapons to be modern productive states  Best example is French proliferation  Betts (2013): The Lost Logic of Deterrence o Argues that the US has made the world a more hostile place through deterrence when it wasn’t necessary (Cold War) and not utilized it when it was necessary (US and Iraq)  Rosen (2006): After Proliferation; What to Do After States Go Nuclear o The use of nuclear weapons is most likely with a state that seems as if they are going to be on the losing side of a nonnuclear war o “In a multipolar nuclear world, international politics will continue but in an environment dominated by fear and uncertainty, with new dangers and new possibilities for miscommunication adding to and complicating familiar ones.” o Argues that nuclear use must be punished severely to limit effects of proliferation  Sagan (2006): How to Keep the Bomb from Iran o Argues that many states have a morose perspective where nuclear weapons falling into Iran’s hands is inevitable, but contends that Iran can be persuaded not to o Encourages minimizing the US threat towards Iran  Ivanov (2000): The Missile Defense Mistake o Argues that everything rests on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 o International politics must become stable and predictable o “A realistic assessment of "new missile threats" would characterize them as hypothetical and not sufficient cause for sacrificing the ABM treaty. None of the "problem" states, as they are now referred to in the West, are likely to acquire missiles capable of reaching the United States in the foreseeable future.” o Encourages global missile and missile-technology control system  Bahgat (2011): A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East; Myth or Reality? o Argues that Iranian nuclear weapons would destabilize the Middle East but would not result in a new nuclear arms race o Must take into account:  Leadership/cognitive and psychological approaches  Internal Dynamics and Domestic Politics Model  Nation pride and prestige  “Instead of nuclear proliferation, the Egyptians have pursued several other options that might improve their security and enhance their national prestige. These include building a strong conventional weapon capability and championing the call for making the entire Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Furthermore, Egyptian leaders have always asserted that they would acquire nuclear weapons if the need arises.”  Security  Grendergast (2007): Blowing the Horn o The Horn of Africa is very unstable, but the US is focusing too much on terrorism instead of working on establishing solid governments  Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda  Two Clusters of Problems o “The first centers on interlocking rebellions in Sudan, including those in Darfur and southern Sudan, and engulfs northern Uganda, eastern Chad, and northeastern Central African Republic” o “The second cluster links the festering dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the power struggle in Somalia, which involves the fledgling secular government, antigovernment clan militias, Islamist militants, and anti- Islamist warlords”  Somalia is the only country in the world without an operational government  United States counterterrorism policy o Unconditional support for the Ethiopian government o Extremely close cooperation on counterterrorism with Khartoum o Occasional but spectacular forays into Somalia in the hope of killing or capturing al Qaeda suspects  “Ethiopia has been the United States' closest ally in the Greater Horn for the last decade, partly because the fight against Islamic extremism resonates powerfully with Ethiopian officials. Although the country is half Muslim and half Christian, its political and intellectual elites have historically been Christian.”  Recommendations o Comprehensive peace initiative o Boost peace keeping capacity  Garner international support for penalties  Patrick (2009): “Failed” States and Global Security o Looks at how we define a failing state and what the threat actually is  As failed state is classified with “endemic civil wars; inability to control peripheral regions; increased criminal violence and lawlessness; rampant corruption; dramatically declining economic growth; and loss of political legitimacy”  However, all failed states are very different demographically  Some states have NEVER been effective  Not just the fault of the government—many other factors o Different Factors for measuring failed states include  Failed state index  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)  Sovereignty Index  Security  Political  Economic  Social Welfare o The Sovereignty Index reveals the relationship between means and motivation  Endemically Weak States  Resource-Rich Poor Performers  Deteriorating Situations  Prolonged Political Crisis  Post conflict situations  Brittle Dictatorships  Reform minded governments o Argues failed states are becoming less attractive to terrorists—Iraq remains a stronghold  Larger threat of small arms  “The easy availability of conventional weapons further weakens state capacity by fueling civil wars and insurgencies and fostering a culture of criminality and impunity.” o Threat of infectious disease  90% in low- and middle-income countries that account for only 11% of global health spending (Pirages 2005:46) o Threat of Energy Security  Believes there will be lack of resources and rise in price  A Duty to Prevent; Slaughter and Feinstein o Deterrence and defense are not adequate—must stop attackers before they start o Idea of responsibility to protect was created by International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty o When the security council cannot reach consensus, the regional power that will most be impacted must act  Addressing the Perils of Peacekeeping Operations; Tanner o Peacekeeping needs to be the norm in states (bottom-up approach) o Coherence, Coordination, Complimentary o Westphalian Bias and North South disconnect  Our Craving for Kindred Blood; Jacoby o Intrastate conflict is 5x more common than interstate wars o Most violence is homegrown o “others” are typically insiders in our own culture o Orientalism was coined in West vs. them kind of argument o Fraticide o Similarity causes groups to have the same desires— competition  The Banality of Ethnic War; Mueller o “The mechanism of violence in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, then, is remarkably banal. Rather than reflecting deep, historic passions and hatreds, the violence seems to have been the result of a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly nonideological marauders were recruited and permitted free rein by political authorities.”  The Delusion of Impartial Intervention o To peacekeep means to decide who rules o Avoid half measures o Peace cannot be confused with justice  Interstate Conflict o Civil Conflict  Conflict between members of a group that disagree on who should run a state and how it should be run  US Civil War  Colombia (Govt vs. FARC)  Dynamics  Flexibility of loyalties  Survival not dependent upon victory  Ends usually in victory for one side or power sharing  Determinants of victory  Political Competence  Limited outside intervention o Ethnic Conflict  “Conflicts in which groups that define themselves using ethnic or national criteria…make claims on behalf of their collective interests against a state, or against other political actors”—Gurr in Crocker et al 1996  Rwanda (1994)  Bosnia (92-95)  Categories are not mutually exclusive  Sudan and Iraq have a blend of both  Ethnic Composition  Common descent  Shared historical experiences  Shared cultural traits/values o Example of Israelis and Palestinians shows how these classifications are problematic  Ethnic Claims  Political demands o Example with Syria and rebel groups demanding Assad regime steps down  Typically a demand for autonomy  Cultural demands o Want your culture to be recognized  i.e. want to be able to speak own language  Religious demands o Egypt where Christian minority wants a right to express religious preferences  Material demands o Most apparent o One group has more stuff than another o Tuttis in Rwanda in 1994  Ethnic conflict strategies o Exit and rebellion  Authoritarian system  Consistent state repression  Weak states o Equal access  Democracies  History of ethnic accommodation  Strong states  Sources of ethnic conflict o Unequal economic development  Influence of location?  Tend to be relatively poor places with less economic development o Restricted political access  Influence of location?  Theories of ethnic conflict o Primordial arguments  Israeli/Palestinian—they’ve been fighting for thousands of years and that’s just the norm  “The best we can do is just manage things” o Instrumental Explanations o Relative Deprivation  Managing and resolving ethnic conflict  Political coexistence vs. assimilation?  It takes two to tango  Third parties  Empathy o Construction of ethnic war  Beginnings  Deprivation  Insecurity  Acts of violence by one side on the other  Reinforced enemy image  Violence as method of retaliation against earlier “injustice”  Government becomes dysfunctional  Rule of law ineffective and violence intensifies o How do they end?  Complete victory by one side  Third party military occupation  Self-governance by separate communities  Ethnic conflicts are difficult for the international community to prevent or combat because it happens so fast  Human Security: A Challenge to International Law? –Oberleitner o “Definitions range from narrow concepts focusing on physical integrity to a broad understanding that also encompasses psychological and emotional aspects of security.27 The Commission on Human Security— arguably the most wide-ranging and in-depth attempt to explore the concept—has defined human security as “protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.” o Protecting humans from natural and societal pervasive threats and ensuring vital freedoms  Narrow approach focusing on human rights  Humanitarian approach that focuses on genocide and wars  Broad approach that looks at connection to economy, environment, etc… o Human security is a challenge to international relations because it shifts focus onto the individual and is based in common shared values  No state can be secure with insecure people  Limits military because:  “It gives priority to the protection of people over pursuing military objectives, and it puts limitations on warfare that go beyond the constraints of international humanitarian and human rights law”  Clash between territorial sovereignty and human rights  Non state actors will begin to have more influence o TED TALK Ending Ethnic Conflict and Civil War  Leadership  Uniting Northern Ireland example  War is a man made disaster, so their end must be manmade and visionary as well  Diplomacy  Well resourced, sustained, and pressures on leaders and followers  Equitable compromise  Broad coalition of local, regional and international supporters are there to help  Institutional Design  Innovative thinking and well funded implementation  Resolving Ethnic Conflict o Territorial Separation  Typically has negative implications and precedent  Population transfers are difficult  Ethnic conflict become interstate conflict  Small “rump” states are not viable  Does not resolve underlying ethnic hatred o Suppression o Reconstruction of ethnic identity o Power sharing o State building  International Terrorism o South Asia  Ahmadabad, India  July 26, 2008  Indian Mujahedeen killed 51 through 19 bombings with 200+ wounded  Aim: Incite Hindu-Muslim Violence  Islamabad Marriott Hotel  20 September, 2008  Suicide Truck bomb  53 killed  260+ injured o Europe  March 2010 Moscow Metro  39 killed  60+ injured  Jan 2011 Domodedovo Airport Attacks  37 killed  180 injured  Is Terrorism and International Security Issues? o Factors to Consider  Number of fatalities  Number of incidents  Type of incidents  Location of occurrence  Components of terrorism o Deliberate threat or act of violence o Political motives o Non-combatant casualties o Audience o Fear as effect not a by-product


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