New User Special Price Expires in

Let's log you in.

Sign in with Facebook


Don't have a StudySoup account? Create one here!


Create a StudySoup account

Be part of our community, it's free to join!

Sign up with Facebook


Create your account
By creating an account you agree to StudySoup's terms and conditions and privacy policy

Already have a StudySoup account? Login here

Introduction to International Relations test 1 study guide

by: tess grogan

Introduction to International Relations test 1 study guide POL 103

Marketplace > University of Mississippi > POL 103 > Introduction to International Relations test 1 study guide
tess grogan

Preview These Notes for FREE

Get a free preview of these Notes, just enter your email below.

Unlock Preview
Unlock Preview

Preview these materials now for free

Why put in your email? Get access to more of this material and other relevant free materials for your school

View Preview

About this Document

These are the notes from his discussion in class with examples, and the short answer questions he will ask.
Intro to international relations
Dr. DeGeussepi
75 ?




Popular in Intro to international relations

Popular in Department

This 10 page Bundle was uploaded by tess grogan on Wednesday September 21, 2016. The Bundle belongs to POL 103 at University of Mississippi taught by Dr. DeGeussepi in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 3 views.

Similar to POL 103 at OleMiss


Reviews for Introduction to International Relations test 1 study guide


Report this Material


What is Karma?


Karma is the currency of StudySoup.

You can buy or earn more Karma at anytime and redeem it for class notes, study guides, flashcards, and more!

Date Created: 09/21/16
pol 103 exam 1 9/21/16 10:57 AM Develop a theory • How would you explain o The outbreak of ww2? o The us decision of iraq in 2003? o Putin’s decision to arm rebels in Ukraine? Levels of Analysis • Where do we start to explain political phenomenon? Who are the actors we care about? What are there interests? o Individual level o Domestic level o International system level • Ex: explore those levels of analysis in the context of iraq war 2003? o George Bush motivations o Sudam Husain motivations ▯ Cultural norms of the leader • Individual level • Domestic (state) level o State characteristics ▯ Substantial actors (presidents, congressmen, bureaucrats) ▯ Domestic institutions ( presidency, congress, state dept) • International system level o Start with the international system o Anarchy is the defining characteristic ▯ No supernatural body governing affairs o States are basically the same. They only differ in the amount of power they have o The acquisition of WMD would change the balance of power therefore the US (an allies) had to prevent it o Iraq was trying to subvert the status quo power structure Levels of analysis from the book • International level o Focuses on states with different resources • Domestic level o Sub national actors with different interests act in domestic institution and produce foreign policy • Transnational level o Groups with sub national actors across boundaries o Terrorist groups, NGO members, multi national corporation Sept 10 Actors • Abandon unitary actor assumption o Left with individuals and groups w different interests o Also have the institutions they operate within • Some actors may have strategic advantages o Remember: collective action problem o Small groups are more effective (have an advantage) • A groups influence depends on its ability to cooperate 3 types of domestic actors • decision makers o those that make foreign policy decisions o one or multiple people : president, legislatures • organized groups o interest groups: individuals w common interests that have Leaders and war • Leaders have interests distinct from a national interest o Do republican and democratic presidents act alike? Rally effect • People tend to “rally around the flag” in times of crisis. But why? o Increase in patriotism o Ease criticism of the gov o Diveret attention from other problems o Give leaders an opportunity to scapegoat country’s problems • Because this happens, it gives leaders a Diversionary incentive o Encourages the use of foreign policy as a political tool Bring bargaining model back in • Record the Do leaders “wag the dog”? • How could we test this theory • What is our hypothesis o Presidents are more likely to initiate armed conflicts when their popularity is low or the economy is underperforming • Variables? Fundamental go of beaucracies- more money Groups and war • Leaders don’t make decisions in isolation. Interest groups and beaurcrats also have prominent influence o The have specific policy interests beyond incentives for the group to “stay in power” or “maximize its budget” • Military industrial complex o An alliance of military leaders and arms manufacturers who presumable have a vested interest in aggressive foreign policy o Example of a hawkish interest group o Military is most influential bureaucracy in matters of war • Hawkish and dovish • Does the orientation of a states military influence its foreign policy o How could the military benefit from conflict in a way that would be against the national interest? Types of groups • Political parties • Economic groups o Sectors of industry (export oriented, oil, finance) o Classes (capital, land, and labor) o Ideological or ethnic groups o Bureaucratic interests ex military o Demographic groups (aarp) 9/21/16 10:57 AM The democratic peace • Democracy, what is it? o A political system in which candidates compete for political office through frquent, fair elections in which a sizable portion of adult population can vote (more or less) • Two democracies have never, ever, fought a war against each other o Though they have had lower level armed conflicts • An empirical fact with many theories o We don’t really know why they fight • Cultural norms, common • Popular explanation: o Democratic leaders are more sensitive to the economic and human costs of war because those that bear the costs keep them in power o Democracies fight a lot of wars, just not against each other. They are willing to bear the cost it appears • In the context of bargaining o Democracies are more transparent, reducing uncertainty ▯ Not only capabilities, but resolve o Democratic leaders can send credible signals ▯ Can tie their hands through audience costs (backing down looks weak) ▯ Autocrats wont be held accountable for making threats and backing down Capitalist peace • Is it democracy or something else? o Most democracies tend to be wealthy and market oriented • Maybe the costs of war are too high for those who depend on the market for income o Thus the economic costs to the private market are relevant • Those who rely on state industries have less of a stake in war outcomes o When individuals rely on the government for income, they have less power to sanction it • Alternative: capitalists are more hostile o Use power to open new markets o Neo colonialism? • Who has most hawkish toward china o Those who benefit closing off relations with china 9/21/16 10:57 AM Alliances and alignments • Alliances form when states have common interest that motivate them to cooperate • Quasi alliance – just because you’re fighting a war together does not mean you are alliances, just have a common security interest o Ex: US doesn’t have an alliance w Saudi Arabia • Alliances can help states deter war or ease war making o Institutions as a signal o Decrease cost of fighting o Increase the benefit of fighting • This influences both the likely outcome of a war and the bargaining space o Changes power dynamics and costs of conflict o Helps states get a better bargain o Also introduces uncertainty • Successful alliances o Increase odd allies will fight on each other’s behalf o Convince adversaries that the allies will fight together Cost of alliances • May not be reliable • Entrapment o Alliance partners may drag you into an unwanted war o Moral hazard: use your power to act more aggressively • Cost of autonomy o Alliance require states give up some autonomy ▯ Give up control of some foreign policy, strategy, etc Worth the paper their written on ? • Alliances are not binding o Allies and opponents may have differing opinions on the credibility of an alliance agreements • Alliances are reliable 3/4thof the time Why are(n’t) alliances reliable • States/;eaders have domestic and int’l reputations to consider o Treaties are public (sometimes private, e.g. WW1) o Time may pass, intersts change • States can abuse alliance agreements o Use of alliance to demand too much o States risk becoming “entrapped” in wars by a reckless ally o States sacrifice autonomy for security Signaling reliability • By having unambiguous mutual interests o If states really have a shared interests, adversaries can see incentives to uphold agreements o Why are US and isreal formal allies? • Sunk costs o Purposefully tying security/ economic interests together o Ex: sharing capabilities information o Investment in eachothers regimes • Domestic costs o Are democratic leaders punished for breaking agreements? • Reputation o States/ leaders that have broken agreements might not be trusted again Other reasons states form alliances • Domestic motivations o Guns vs butter trade off o Alliances allow states to share defense burden o Frees up money for domestic goods Why does the US ally with small states? • As asymmetric alliance • They don’t add much to US power • What does the US get in return Collective security • How does it work? o Help states identify mutually beneficial bargains o Provide peacekeeping (and peacemaking) Collective security dilemmas • 2 major issues o collective action problems (again…) o joint decision making problems • peace and security are public goods o member states have an incentive to free ride and shift the cost of cooperation on others o US pays for 22% of UN budget • Challenges of joint decision making o Determining which acts are considered threats o Deciding which states are aggressors o Selecting the response to aggression • Collective security works best when all the states are satisfied with the status quo ( this is rare) • Institutions help alleviate these dilemmas o Set standards Peacekeeping and peacemaking • A peace keeping operation typically requires a host nation agreement: • Parties to a conflict agree to let the UN in • Peace enforcement opetartions tend to be more heavily armed and are generally targeted against the perceived target • Who would do thiese things if not the UN? • Does the UN do a good job? o Unbiased unlike cold war interventions • Post Persian gulf war the UN gets involved in many civil conflicts o Post success optimism about UNs ability to govern the world o A “new world order” ▯ “ a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations” – G.H. Bush • crises of 90’s and 00’s expose the limits of UN intervention o Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Darfur • however, the successes are not as publicized wrapping up • several forms of int’l institutions related to war o alliances o collective security institutions • alliances have costs and benefits o can be unreliable (reliable 75% of the time o can entrap countries • collective security arrangements o help alleviate joint decision making practice short answer questions • dark purple scantron • when is it likely that interest groups will influence foreign policy decisions? o Smaller interest groups have a greater effect on foreign policy, smaller groups are more organized bc of collec o Interest groups are more effective to influence foreign policy decisions when they can overcome collective action problem and free rider problems and have intense priorities? • What is the distinction between alliances and collective security organizations? Give two examples of each o Alliances are military organizations deter outside organizations o Collective security manage internal o Alliance – NATO –north atlantic treaty organization ▯ Warsaw pact o Collective action – UN o Look to book for other examples • How do commitment problems affect the likelihood that war will occur? o Even though states can reach a bargain they have no way to assure the other side will uphold the bargain in the future o Preemptive war o • What is anarchy? how is it important to our understanding of why wars occur? •


Buy Material

Are you sure you want to buy this material for

75 Karma

Buy Material

BOOM! Enjoy Your Free Notes!

We've added these Notes to your profile, click here to view them now.


You're already Subscribed!

Looks like you've already subscribed to StudySoup, you won't need to purchase another subscription to get this material. To access this material simply click 'View Full Document'

Why people love StudySoup

Steve Martinelli UC Los Angeles

"There's no way I would have passed my Organic Chemistry class this semester without the notes and study guides I got from StudySoup."

Jennifer McGill UCSF Med School

"Selling my MCAT study guides and notes has been a great source of side revenue while I'm in school. Some months I'm making over $500! Plus, it makes me happy knowing that I'm helping future med students with their MCAT."

Steve Martinelli UC Los Angeles

"There's no way I would have passed my Organic Chemistry class this semester without the notes and study guides I got from StudySoup."

Parker Thompson 500 Startups

"It's a great way for students to improve their educational experience and it seemed like a product that everybody wants, so all the people participating are winning."

Become an Elite Notetaker and start selling your notes online!

Refund Policy


All subscriptions to StudySoup are paid in full at the time of subscribing. To change your credit card information or to cancel your subscription, go to "Edit Settings". All credit card information will be available there. If you should decide to cancel your subscription, it will continue to be valid until the next payment period, as all payments for the current period were made in advance. For special circumstances, please email


StudySoup has more than 1 million course-specific study resources to help students study smarter. If you’re having trouble finding what you’re looking for, our customer support team can help you find what you need! Feel free to contact them here:

Recurring Subscriptions: If you have canceled your recurring subscription on the day of renewal and have not downloaded any documents, you may request a refund by submitting an email to

Satisfaction Guarantee: If you’re not satisfied with your subscription, you can contact us for further help. Contact must be made within 3 business days of your subscription purchase and your refund request will be subject for review.

Please Note: Refunds can never be provided more than 30 days after the initial purchase date regardless of your activity on the site.