Chapter 2-6 CPO 2002
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Date Created: 09/29/15
CPO Notes Principle of Comparative Politics Ch 2 What is science 0 O 0 It s not facts and not a body of knowledge science is a method for discovering truth relies on criticism and requires allowing for the possibility that our theories and claims are wrong Falsifiability is the thing that distinguishes science from nonscience Scientific statements must be falsifiable I all scientific statements must be potentially testable I There can be an observation that falsifies or refute our theory Nonfalsifiable statement I Tautologies a statement that is true by definition I Ex strong states are able to implement policies I If we define strong states as states that successfully implement policies then this statement is tautologies I Statements about unobservable phenomena I this doesn39t mean that non science is nonsense Scientific method I describes the process by which scientists learn about the world I 1 Question I 2 Theory I 3 Implications hypothesis I 4 Observation test hypothesis I 5 Evaluation Theory I a set of logically consistent statements that tell us why these things we observe occur I a model informal or formal very simplified I Theory construction I Consider the puzzle Who What Why Hypotheses I The expectations to be next I deduce implications from the model other than those we set out to explain in the first place Empirical Observation I Test our claims examine the model39s implications of the model are consistent with what we observe in the world around us difficult tests or critical tests Evaluation I If we observe those things implied by our theory then we say that our theory is supported I We do not say that our theory is proven I We look for evidence that will falsify our theory I If we m to observe the expected implications then our theory is probably wrong and goes back to reconstructing your theory Scientific Process I one way of explaining things I science is tentative objective and public I invites criticism and improvement I Political science employs the tools of the scientific method to study the political word I Comparative politics is a subfield of political science Introduction to Logic I Arguments are valid or not I We are confronted regularly by people trying to convince us of certain thing through arguments I Argument A set of logically connected statements typically in the form of a set of premises and conclusion An argument is valid when accepting the premises compels us to accept its conclusion An argument is invalid if when we accept the premises we are free to accept or reject its conclusion One way to represent an argument is in the form of a categorical syllogism has a major premise minor premise and conclusion I Major premise typically a conditional statement such as If P then Q I If antecedent I Then consequent I Minor premise consists of a positive and then a negative claim about either antecedent or consequent I conclusionclaim Antecedent Consequent Affirm Valid Invalid Deny Invalid Valid Chapter 3 0 Testing Theories O logical claims based on confining carry less weight than those that deny 0 All of our knowledge remains tentative and cannot ever be proven O Theories vs confirming observations I In order to falsify our theory we must start with implications derived from our theory and then find observations I if not theory will never be wrong I if the observations are consistent with our theory then we have greater confidence 0 Deductive learning formulates expectations based on a theory and then finds observations 0 Inductive learning start with observations find patterns that can be used to generate explanations I potentially problematic relies on affirming the consequent I theory is never exposed to potential falsification 0 Comparative Method I observations of the word are collected and then used to develop general laws or theories I a cause is a necessary or sufficient condition I Necessary condition a circumstance in which absence the event in question cannot I Y never happens unless X happens I Necessary condition If you have chocolate you can make brownies But if you have chocolate that doesn t necessarily mean you have brownies O Sufficient Condition I A circumstance in whose presence the event in question must occur I Y always happens if X happens 0 Necessary amp Sufficient condition I A circumstance in whose absence the event will not occur and in whose presence the event must occur I Ex thunder lightning I Mill I the systematic search for necessary I method of agreement I method of disagreement 0 What type of observation would show that wealth is not a sufficient condition I We would need to observe a wealthy country that is not a democracy I As a result we need to use the method 0 Mill39s Method I Assumptions I causal process must be deterministic I a deterministic cause is one that always leads to the specific outcome I we have identified all of the possible causes and they don39t affect each other I problem It is hard to know if we have ruled out all of the possible causes I The method tells us what happens but not why something happens I It tells us Y happened when X was present and so on but we do not know why 0 Comparative method revisited game theory The problem that these scholars are relying entirely on the process of affirming the consequentinvalid arguments Theories only need to be falsifiable Science can be done only when experimental manipulation is possible science is valueneutral NO Science leads to certain and verifiable truths NO Politics cannot be pursued in a scientific manner I What is Politics 0 subset of human behavior that involves the use of power or in uence power is involved when people can t accomplish their goals without I trying to in uence I escape the in uence 0 How to study politics 0 one tools political scientists use to study is known as game theory game theory models the interaction between two or more political actors using forma math notation 0 In any game an individual s ability to achieve goals depends on other s choices Players actions are interdependent I decisions based on other players and what they are doing Players are faced with choices available course of action I small amp discrete I Small number of players Players face a decision at a choice node I payoffs distributed at age s terminal node payoff indicated how the players value each of the outcomes I assume players are rational O Characterizing game behavior one main goal is to identify player s strategies I strategy plan that specifies what a player would do under every possible circumstance an important solution concept for game is a Nash equilibrium I a set of strategies one for each such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally by themselves switch to another strategy A game can be represented I game tree extensive I payoff matrix normalstrategic We solve extensive form games by finding sub game perfect Nash equilibrium or SPNE I sub game is the part of a game beginning at one choice node We solve for SPNE using backward induction O O E exit pay off I means starting at the end of the game and reasoning backwards I The setup exit voice loyalty game citizens must decide whether to I Accept change remain loyal L I Resist change exit situation E I Protest to get benefit back voice V Exit means they re going to find something else leave the situation and find another benefit Loyalty state keeps benefit citizen suffers loss voice the state gets a chance to respond L the state s value from having a loyal citizen C the cost associated with using one s voice 0 These exible parameters allow us to evaluate game dynamic EVL Exit voice and loyalty game 0 The sections are called sub games 0 You solve them by backwards reduction Start from the endback I when Egt0 it is a credible exit threat 0 it sometimes depends 0 Example choice depends on whether the state is dependent Lgtl or autonomous Lltl 0 Assumptions 0 Egt0 Exit is credible some positive benefit to existing 0 Elt0 Exit has no credible exit threat 0 EltlC Exit is less beneficial than speaking up 0 Lgt1 the government cares about citizen loyalty Dependent 0 Lltl The state is autonomous 0 Sub game Perfect Nash Equilibrium O the sub game is the voice exit respond 0 Outcome 0 The citizen uses voice the state responds I Payoffs O The citizen gets lC the state gets L Example I Now we assume that Elt0 the cost of exiting is negative no credible exit gt in the book it goes toward to exit but it should be going toward loyalty 0 The state chooses between reversing the unpopular policy or implementing it Either way the state enjoys staying loyalty 0 The Citizen has no credible exit threat Elt0 and the state is dependent Lgt1 O Equilibrium Loyal Loyal Ignore Example 0 The citizen has credible exit threat Egt0 and the state is autonomous Lltl 0 Equilibrium exit exit loyalty Ch4 the origin of the modern states 0 Defining the State 0 a given territory 0 the use of force or the threat of force to control the inhabitants I A state is entity that uses coercion and the 0 States vs Nations and Nation States 0 A nation is a group of people who share some sort of common identity 0 A nation state is a state in which a single nation predominates 0 States are coercive O unlike other social organizations the state is a violence producing enterprise Lane I all states use the threat of force to organize public life I this force is never perfectly monopolized I states ever perfectly enforce their will 0 Coercion may be justified in different ways and may be used for different purposes I but all states use it 0 Failed States 0 states that cannot coerce or control the inhabitants of a given territory I like Afghanistan Somalia sierra Leone Congo Iraq and others 0 How to think about the state 0 Contractarian view I where the state is granted these course of rights because we agree I a social contract is an agreement among individuals to create and empower the state I the social contrast should produce a state that is strong enough to dole out punishments to individuals who steal I Thomas Hobbes John Locke I Contraction thought experiment I How would people behave if they did worry about being punished by state I the state of nature I It would suck I Life in the state of nature described as a War of every man against every man I Life is solitary poor nasty brutish and short 0 State of Nature Attack or Be Attacked I people in the state of nature face a dilemma I citizens can gain by attacking their neighbor I citizens will frequently be vulnerable I collectively everyone would be better off if they could agree not to attack one another 0 Predatory view I a group of people that take over and can use this method to exploit society I Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally switch to another 0 A dominant strategy is when you have the best reply and is the same 0 Any square in which both numbers are underlined is a Nash equilibrium 0 both players are playing best reply 0 Solving the game 0 Individual rationality leads to an inferior outcome I Both players agree that the same alternative outcome is better but in reality you both know that you will still steal to benefit 0 The Prisoner s Dilemma 0 two criminals are caught for a crime they committed together they are held and interrogated separately by the police 0 each faces a decision I sustain cooperation with your partner shut your mouth I defect the partnership rat him out 0 Ratting your partner admits your guilt in the crime 0 A desire to avoid being the sucker gives incentives not to cooperate I so you will then rat him out 0 examples I environment pollution I political protest and collective action 0 Predatory View I the predatory approach sees the state as an organization that trades security for revenue 0 So states resemble an organized extortion or protection racket I Chanes Tilly used this idea to explain the rise of the modern state in Europe 0 This view emphasizes that the state is not just a neutral referee 4 Strategies that lead to rise of modern European State 0 War making 0 State making I Contraction neutral behind the scene passive Chapter 5 Conceptualizing and measuring democracy 0 Measuring Democracy 0 Democracy Dictatorship DDPACL O Polity IV 0 Freedom House I Strengths and weaknesses 0 Evaluate measures more generally 0 Validity O Replicability O Reliably I Conceptualizing O minimalist view I democracy depends on the presence of institutions no reference to outcome I DDPACL amp polity IV I Substantive view 0 institutions are necessary but sufficient O representation accountability economic equality 0 freedom house 0 Democracy Dictatorship DD 0 Country is democracy if I the chief executive is elected I legislative is elected I more than one party competing I there has been an alternator in power under identical electoral rules 0 If these conditions do not hold then the country is a dictatorship 0 DD is a minimalist view or democracy 0 Polity IV 0 provides an annual evaluation of democracy and autocracy 0 Democracy measure 010 0 Autocracy measure 010 I Which provides a polity score 0 Based on 5 attributes I competitiveness of executive recruitment I Openness of executive recruitment I Executive constraints I Regulation of participation I Competitiveness of participation I Each attribute is weighted differently 0 Freedom House I Not a measure of democracy but of global freedom I freedom has two broad categories I political rights I civil rights I Based on universal declaration of human rights I Political rights 17 scale I Civil rights 17 scale I Freedom house takes a substance view of democracy 0 Questions I Free and fair elections I Corruption I Government accountability and transparency I Right to organize I Competitive opposition I Minorities autonomy 0 Evaluating measures 0 depends on What you care about I conceptualizing I validity I reliability I replicability I Conceptualization is the process of creating mental categories that capture meaning of objects events ideas 0 Validity is the extent to Which our measures correspond to the concepts they are intended to re ect 0 measurement level 0 attributes 0 Aggregation issues 0 Measurement level 0 discrete categories 0 DDPACL O Ordinal I Rank I More or less demo I level of education 0 Interval measure 0 Quantifies how much more or less I Reliable one that repeatedly and consistently produces same results 0 DD measure is more reliable Chapter 6 Economic determinants of democracy Development and modernization O O Modernization theory I All societies develop through a series of stages I Modernization leads to societal change that leads to political change As countries develop economically they are I more likely to become democratic I more likely to remain democratic Empirical Analysis DependentIndependent Variable O O Dependent Variable I This is the thing we want to explain I outcome variable I Ex the probability that a country becomes a democracy given that it was a dictatorship in the previous year Independent Variables I These are the things we think explain or determine the value of the dependent variable I explanatory variables Economic Determinants of transitions to Democracy 0 O O A positive coefficient indicates that the variable increases the probability that a democracy will emerge Indications of statistical significance signal the relationship The y axis is the dependent variable vertical the x axis is the independent variable horizontal CORRELATION IS NOT CAUSATION I just because something is correlating it does not mean that it s causing it SO even if we see this correlation we might want to take a closer look at other implications to test our theory Two Rival Explanations O O Modernization theory Survival story I Development does NOT make democracy more likely to emerge I But countries are more likely to remain democratic I No democracy collapsed so long as it had a per capita income higher than that or Argentina in 1975 6055 Why would income help democratic survival 0 0 Citizens face a choice between I A system in which you are guaranteed a minimal standard of consumption democracy or I a system in which you win or lose everything dictatorship When you are rich getting a bigger share of the pie affects your welfare only a little In contrast losing everything would be disastrous I If you re rich autocracy is a big gamble I If you re poor autocracy is less of a gamble Wealth makes countries more likely to democratize AND less likely to fall to dictatorship Wealth has no effect on likelihood of democratizing BUT does make countries less likely to fall to dictatorship 0 Modernization theory and Survival story 0 O O O O 1 Democracy is more common in rich countries than poor countries 2 Transitions to dictatorship become less likely as income increases Modernization theory I transitions to democracy become more likely as income increases I Regime transitions may or may not become less likely as countries become richer Survival story I Transitions to democracy are unaffected by increases in income I Regime transitions become less likely as countries become richer Observational Equivalence 0 A variant of modernization theory 0 A variant of modernization theory posits 0 Structure of the economy 0 O O O The state can really tax or invade only those assets that they can observe Structural changes occurred in early modern Europe Liquid Assets investment banking merchant I merchants could easily move their capital elsewhere or easily hide them from the state Fixed Assets Agriculture manufacturing The ability to hide assets from taxation change the balance of power I the monarchy had to negotiate to extract revenues I in return for paying taxes the economic elites demanded limits to state predation Example I Assume the crown is dependent I the crown needs taxes I this means that Lgt1 I Assume that Parliamentarians can hide their assets I Outcome is the parliamentarians demand for limits and the crown accepts limit I Payoff The crown gets L and the parliamentarians get lC I Nash Equilibrium the strategy I SPNE Demand Limits Disinvest Accept Limits I Observed Outcome Limited Government and Growing Economy 0 Another Example this is from the charts Assume again that the Crown is dependent Assume the Parliamentarians do not have mobile assets they can t hide their assets France in early modern Europe I Observed Outcome unlimited government and growing economy I Payoff The crown gets loyalty and Parliamentarians get 0 I SPNE Pay taxes pay taxes reject limits I this is a negative outcome where the state benefits by taxing you 0 What if the state is autonomous it does not depend on any elites this is when Lgt1 where the voice won t be an option this is where it s either exiting or loyalty 0 So what does this mean for democracy the state must depend on a group of people with credible exit threats for democracy to thrive I the viability of exit options depends on quasirents I this concept allows us to generalize the argument even further I it s not just about the mobility of assets it is also 0 Resource Curse the resource curse refers to the paradox that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to experience things Why do natural resources help dictators stay in power I revenue from natural resources allows dictators to but support without raising taxes I raising taxes would produce demands for increased representation and accountability I citizens have little information about the country s finances I oil revenues allow dictators buy military s support 0 Foreign aid the argument suggests that democracy is unlikely when the state is autonomous aid goes not depend on its citizens foreign aid can reduce the dependence of the state on its citizens numerous studies show that foreign aid to dictatorships harms the welfare of the average citizen in these countries and help dictators hold on to power I this effect may be conditional on the institutional structure of the recipient country 0 Evidence suggests that countries are more likely to become democratic and remain democratic as their economies become more modern 0 higher averages of income encourage the emergence and survival of democracy 0 Changes in economic structure that accompany increases in income also matters
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