Semester Notes INR 2002
Popular in introduction to International Relations
Popular in International Studies
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Date Created: 10/01/15
Fall 15 INR 2002 – Intro to International tions Intro to International Relations Notes Wednesday July 1 Conflict & Cooperating • Conflict and cooperation vary dramatically over time and region • World order is a not only of circumstance (bipolarity v. unipolarity) but also of choice • Understanding why countries make the choices they do can help us understand not only patterns of conflict and cooperation but also how to enhance the prospects of peace and prosperity in the future • Questions: What are actors? ▯ Actors are the basic building blocks of IR (diverse) ▯ Usually a state • The central authority with a territory boundary • Synonymous with country • State sovereignty ▯ A “state” is a human community that (successfully) claims the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory • What Is “state sovereignty” ▯ The expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their territorial boundary ▯ Key Elements • Sate possess ultimate authority over people and territory of a given realm • Other states excluded from exercising political authority • All sovereign units are formally equal or have the same legal status (creates anarchy) • What do actors want? ▯ Interests: Goals actors want to achieve via political action; preferences over outcomes ▯ Interests can be categorized • Power or security • Economic or material welfare • Interest can be ranked • Questions: “The Iraq War” ▯ Main actors: Sadeem Husain, Bush, and the United Sates ▯ Interests • Sadden Husain: interests was to gain power and economics (oil) • Bush: Oil, to establish democracy in the middle East ▯ Outcomes for the US; establish a democratic Middle East, Disarming of WMD’s • Interaction • Interactions are the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes • Simply knowing who our actors are and what they want is not enough • Assumptions about actors in interactions • They are purposive • Actors adopt strategies to obtain desired outcomes, given what they believe to be the interests and actions of others • Two Types of Interactions • Cooperation ▯ Two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one better off relative to status quo without making others worse off ▯ Win-Win • Bargaining ▯ Two or more actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the others • When can actors cooperate? • Coordination ▯ All actors benefit from all making the same choices ▯ Requires the least amount of work ▯ Self Sustaining ▯ Easy to Solve ▯ Actors must simply need to communicate their intentions and cooperation will emerge and sustain • Collaboration ▯ All actors gain from working together • Problems Facing Cooperation • Collaboration problems often occur providing public goods ▯ Non-excludable, non-rival ▯ Example: If I enjoy clean air that doesn’t mean that you cant get clean air • Collective Action Problems ▯ Actors have an incentive to collaborate but each acts in anticipation that the others will pay the costs of collaboration ▯ Actors have incentives to free ride • Fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting form others • Example: Protests – why should I protest for what I believe if others will • Potential Solutions to Cooperation • The number of actors involved ▯ Monitoring and enforcement ▯ The lower number of actors the easier to cooperate • Strategy ▯ Repeated play ▯ For example, in the Kit Kat game collaborate now because you will encounter again • Information ▯ Uncertainty and misperception ▯ Saddam and WMD’s • Who Wins and Loses Bargains • Power ▯ The ability of one actor to get another actor to foe hat they would otherwise not do • In bargaining terms, the ability to get the other side to make concessions and to avoid having to make concessions oneself • Influenced by what would happen If no bargain is reached ▯ Reversion outcome ▯ Bargaining power belongs to those actors who are more willing to accept the reversion outcome • How do you exercise power • Coercion ▯ The threat or impositions of costs on another actors to change their behavior • Economic sanctions • Risk Taking and Resolve • Military Force • Outside Options ▯ An alternative to bargaining with another actor • Agenda Setting ▯ A first mover advantage ▯ Actions taken prior to or during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one party • What is Game Theory? • The science of rational behavior in interactive situations (decision making) • Helps us through a formal process make our assumptions about interest and behaviors explicit • Game theory can sometimes do what words cant • What s a game? • We begin with actors, that then produce all possible strategies, before creating a matrix or tree to represent their interactions • How do we solve a game? • We use the Nash equilibrium ▯ A configuration of strategies such that each players strategy is best for him ▯ The outcome where neither player has unilateral incentive to switch strategies • Why it the movie not the Nash equilibrium ▯ If they all go for the brunettes then the main character has an incentive to defect because the blonde is now wide open • The Prisoner’s Dilemma ▯ In the Prisoners Dilemma if the Player 1 chooses to cooperate then you should defect because you receive the highest payout ▯ If Player 1 chooses to defect then you should defect as well • Why is it such a huge deal? • Although the players behave rationally by pursuing their best interest they end up with an inferior outcome • Both would have been better off cooperating • Axelrod’s ▯ Hobbes says a government is necessary for cooperation ▯ The security dilemma is when one maximizes their own interest to secure against another interest • The Evolution of Cooperation ▯ I individual s have a greater chance of future interaction then they are less likely to defect and more likely to collaborate • The Chicken game is a metaphor of coercive bargaining ▯ What is an institution ‘Institutions” are a set of rules, know an sacrifice qus • How do institution affect cooperation • Do Rules Matter in World ▯ International institutions generally lack the capacity to impose punic ▯ Varying Compliance Notes Monday July 6 • Why War • The Purpose • Given the human and material costs of military conflict why do states sometimes wage war rather than resolving their disputes through other means • Questions: What is the purpose of war? , Why does it occur? • Core of analysis • War occurs when the bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement • Bargaining fails o There is incomplete information o Commitment to the terms of the deal is questionable o Disputed good is hard to provide • Promoting peaceful conflict resolutions requires efforts to o Increase cost of conflicts o Promote transparency and communication o Bring a third party to enforce • What is war • War is an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfied the minimum threshold of severity o Interstate War: the main parties to the conflict are states o Civil war: when the actors are within the state o Carl von Clausewitz: “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means” • War is not o Mass killings against a nonviolent group o Case of minor disputes • Theories of War • Anarchy o “War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it” • Fear o The growth of the power of the Athens, and the fear which this inspired in Sparta • Mutual optimism, Misperception • Positive utility from war • Many of the explanations above are incomplete • War begins when two states wish to resolve a dispute • What Do Sates Fight Over • States fight over things of value the purpose of war is to obtain something that the state wants • The most common source if conflict has been over territory • Territory is a good that is valuable o Contribute to the wealth of state through industrial or agricultural resources o Have military or strategic value • War may be used as a mechanism for compelling policy change o 2003 Iraq • Conflicts over regime type or the composition of another government o Proxy wards between US and Soviet Union o Conflicts may spring from concerns • Bargaining and War • Why do some conflicts become war while others do not o Must consider the strategic interaction that states engage in when trying to settle disagreements o In domestic political systems many disputes that could lead to violence are instead • A crisis occurs when at least one start seeks to influence the outcome of bargaining by threatening to se military force if it does not hg et what it wants o Crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy • Bargaining types o Compellence ▯ Actors bargaining under the threat of war is known as crisis bargaining or coercive bargaining o The expected outcome and costs of war define the range d acceptable outcome during crisis bargaining o For a bargain to prevent a war, each state must decide that they prefer the bargained outcome of the fighting war o Because war is costly a settlement that all side prefer to war generally exists • Wars From incomplete Information • When states have poor information about each others willingness, ability to go to war, two bargaining mistakes are possible o A state may yield too little or none o A state may demand too much • Poker analogy o When playing you only know what’s in your hand and assume what’s in the other players hands • Two types of unknown o Capabilities ▯ The states physical ability to win o Resolve ▯ A states willingness to fight • How does uncertainty lead to war o When states have incomplete information about the capabilities or the resolve of their opponents bargaining may fail o Under uncertainty states face a risk return tradeoff in bargaining o The more a state s willing to risk war, the greater the payoff they can potentially get from the bargain • Crisis Bargaining o States try to communicate their capabilities and resolve to their opponents o But due to the fact that states have an interest in communicating private information they struggle to do so credibly • Why is credibility so hard to achieve • Carrying through on threats is costly • States have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities or resolve to to get the best possible deal o Similar to a poker game • Communicating Resolve • For threats to be credible they have to be costly in a way that the sender would only make the threat id they intended to carry it out • Costly signaling o Brinkmanship ▯ Taking actions that increase the risk of accidental war with the hope that the other side will give in o Tying hands ▯ Publically make a threat ▯ As a result if you do not go through with the threat the one who threatens suffers audience costs o Sinking costs ▯ When a state actively mobilizes its war to prepares for war ▯ After beginning the process the cost of following through has now gone down Notes Tuesday July 7 • Actors: State A and Sate B • Interaction: Bargaining over a good, lets say a dollar • Interest: Obtain as much of the dollar as possible • Actions: Divide the dollar, or go to war (and pay some cost). The winner of the war gets the whole dollar • U (war)>U (bargain) • P= Probability of winning the war • Ca = Cb = Costs of going to war • Wars From Commitment Problems o States struggle to make promises to abide by the bargain ▯ States may use threaten to use force in the future to change the terms of finial bargain ▯ No enforcement mechanism o Three Types of commitment problems ▯ Bargaining over a good that are a source of future bargaining power • Examples: weapons programs important territories o Libya nuclear weapons program • A threatened state may choose to fight today rather than face a future in which it is weaker o Russia-Finland in 1939 ▯ Prevention: War in response to changing power • Balance of military capabilities expected to change in the future • Economic growth; nuclear weapons o German-Russia in st1 o China in the 21 century o Iran o Pursuing nuclear weapons • State A’s power is expected to increase so that in some point in the future the new war outcome will be better for State A o In the future State A will demand more • State B prefers the war outcome it could obtain under the initial power distribution over any outcome it could obtain in the future bargaining rang o State B would rather fight a war now than face worst terms in the future • The logic works only if war will halt or significant delay a shift in power • Preventive war: a war that is fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future ▯ Preemptive War • First-strike advantage: when there is a benefit to being the first to launch an attack o Arises when technology enables a state to launch a blow that disarms the other state military or renders it incapable of responding effectively • Creates a commitment problem unless each state can credibly promise to not launch a first strike • There are two different war outcomes depending on which state lands the first blow o Each state expects o do better in a war that it starts • Unless states can credibly promise not to act first, both will try to pre-empt each other and start the war o Example: Six Day War • Preemption and prevention both arise from the difficulty of making credible commitments not to use ones military power o Preemption is a response to an imminent threat o Prevention is a response to anticipates threats in the more distant future o The difference between the two revolves around timing and the inevitability of war ▯ Credible Commitment Problem • Common root od commitment problems o The difficulty of connecting not to use ones power in the future o Discuss: How can states credibly not to use force • War is more likely to occur when: o The good in dispute is a source of power o Dramatic changes in military balance are likely o The military strategic situation creates substantial advantages for first strikes ▯ Is Compromise Always Possibly? War from Invisibility • Indivisible good: a good that cannot be divided without destroying its value • Compromise solutions are impossible to reach o Example: The city of Jerusalem • It is important to not exaggerate indivisibility as a source of bargaining failure o There are ways od dividing goods that do not involve physical division o States may have strategic incentives to claim they cannot comprise on a particular issue • A claim of indivisibly may simply be a incomplete information or credible commitment problem o A form if showing resoluteness ▯ How Can we Make War Less Likely • Raising the costs of war • Increasing transparency • Providing outside enforcement of commitments • Dividing apparently indivisible goods ▯ Raising the cost of war • As war becomes less attractive states will be more willing to make compromises to avoid war • Alliances ▯ Increasing Transparency • Mechanism that increase transparency about state capabilities can reduce dangers of miscalculation ▯ Providing outside enforcements of commitments Notes Wednesday July 8 • Domestic Politics and War • Unitary state assumption: the treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interest that belong to the state • This assumption can be useful starting place for analysis ▯ However, states are legal and political constructs, not beings capable of taking actions ▯ War is costly, but the costs of war are distributed unevenly ▯ Questions: Do wars serve the national interest? • National vs. Particularistic Interest • General interest (national) ▯ Something that most actors within the country share • Particularistic interest (narrow) ▯ Interests held by a relatively small number of actors within the country ▯ Example: The Us had a consistent interest in the oil and the Middle East • Institutions and Influence • Without the unitary actor assumption, individuals and groups come into play. ▯ Institutions determine which actors and interests have influence: ▯ In some countries decisions are made by a single person (autocracies) ▯ In other countries decision makers are sensitive to the interests of other actors (democracies) • Some actors may have strategic advantages. ▯ Due to the collective action problem, small groups may have more effective influence • Domestic Actors • Leaders ▯ Authority to make foreign policy decisions ▯ Constrained by the political institutions of their state • Organized groups within the state ▯ Bureaucracy • Collection of organizations that carry out most tasks of governance within states ▯ Interest Groups • Groups of individuals with common interest that organize to influence public policy ▯ General Public • What Do Leaders Want • Leaders of states have many interests of their own ▯ Ideological beliefs personal motivation ▯ We assume they desire to remain in power • Strategic politicians can use their control of policy for their own ends ▯ May then use war as an instrument to maintain their hold on office • Principal Agent Problem ▯ Conflicts of interest that arise when a principal hires an agent to perform specific duties that are in the best interest of the principal but may ne costly, or not in the best interests of the agent • Should we assassinate leaders rather than fight their armies • Contradictory evidence on the success of decapitation strikes; data problems • Conflicting effects ▯ Less lives lost ▯ May allow newer more radical leaders rise ▯ If institutions remain the same what will make the successor behave differently • Do Politicians Spark Wars Aboard in Order to Hold On to Power Domestic • Argentina sparks war with Britain by invading Falkland islands in 1982 ▯ The territory was not valuable and Britain had a far more superior navy • Both governments had domestic issues ▯ Had economic recessions • The Rally Effect and Divisionary Incentive • Rally around the flag effect – peoples tendency to become more supportive of their own government during a crisis ▯ Approval rating for leader typically jumps around time of war onset • People rally around the flag because international conflicts can ▯ Cause an increase in patriotism ▯ Ease criticism of the government ▯ Gives leaders an opportunity to scapegoat or blame the country’s problems on foreigners • At times political leaders may face a diversionary incentive ▯ A temptation to spark an international crisis in order to rally domestic public support • Wagging the Door • There is little evidence that leaders systemically resort to force when they are in trouble domestically ▯ International conflict is more often initiated by leaders who are politically secure • Why do we not see stronger evidence of divisionary incentives • The Political Costs of War • Leaders who fight a losing or costly war are more likely to be removed from office • Do Countries Fight wars to Satisfy Military or Special Interest Group • Military industrial complex ▯ An alliance of military leaders and arms manufacturers who presumably have a vested interest in an aggressive foreign policy • Bureaucratic Politics and the Military • Decisions about war and peace are shaped by interests of bureaucratic organizations • What Do Interest Groups Want • Economic motives – when an actors income depends on events in other countries • Ethic motives – when groups are motivated by ethnic attachment or ideological interest to support or oppose a particular country Notes Thursday July 9 • Why Don’t Democracies Fight One Another • Democratic Peace – a well established observation that there are few if any clear cases of war between mature democratic states o The strength of the claim depends on how one defines democracy and what event one considers war ▯ What Is Democracy • Democracy - a political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent fair elections in which a sizable portion of adult population can vote • Two Major Aspects of Democracy o Contestation – the ability of different individuals and groups to compete for political office • Participation – the ability of a large portion of the country too be involved in the selection process of voting • Liberal is often associated with democracy o Liberal meaning ▯ A philosophy that emphasizes the value of individual liberty • Most liberal democracies have o Numerous protections of individual civil and political rights, such as rights to free speech, religion, political association and a free press ▯ What explains democratic peace • Two ways o By influencing the interests of leaders o By influencing the bargaining interaction between and among countries • Representation, Accountability, and Interests o The cost of war are paid by society at large, not by the leader who makes the decision to do to war o The interests of the ruler and the ruled are not aligned ▯ Ruler enjoys the benefits while the ruled suffer the costs (Principal agent problem) o Political institutions with representation can then serve it align the interests of the ruler and the ruled o The primary mechanism for influencing decisions on war is accountability ▯ The ability to punish or reward leaders for their decisions ▯ Elections provide means for citizens to punish leaders for unpopular policies o Autocratic leaders are accountable to a small group ▯ Example: Kim Jun Un ▯ As long as he pleases the small group he remains in power o Selectorate Theory ▯ Selectorate (S) – citizens who have a say in selecting the leader ▯ Winning coalition (W) – the set of citizens whose support is necessary to remain in office o For leaders to remain in office, they must provide goods to their winning coalition ▯ Private goods: political appointments ▯ Public goods: national defense, clean eater ▯ When the W to S ratio is small, leaders use private goods to gain support ▯ When W to S is large, leader use public goods to gain support o How would accountability explain the democratic peace o Increase in costs of war diminishes willingness to challenge status quo reducing opportunities for conflict o Democratic leaders will be more selective about starting conflicts and wars ▯ Democratic leaders should only be willing to begin wars they can win ▯ Nondemocratic leaders may be more willing to gamble on war, because violent removals from office are difficult to orchestrate ▯ Thus, the probability of war between two democratic states is low because both have to believe they win o If the war is very costly for democratic leaders, democracies may be tempting targets for nondemocratic leaders ▯ The high costs of war may make democracies unwilling to go to war; so non-democracies will attempt to exploit them and make higher demands o Democracy and Bargaining ▯ Democratic institutions make it easier to overcome information problems • Political systems are much more transparent, media, and opposition parties ▯ Transparency can reduce the risk of preemptive war between democracies o What If All the World Were Democracies ▯ Caution • Democratizing countries may be more prone to fight • Although the number of democracies has increases over time the spread of democracy has also experienced reversals • Not all democratic countries are liberal, some are built on ethnic or religious identifies that can foster conflicts • Summary o Political leaders care about hats best for the country but also what’s best for them to stay in office Notes Friday July 10 • Overview of Institutions • Collect security organizations o Govern relations among their members o Provide for peaceful conflict resolution o Organize responses to acts of aggression • Alliances o Represent attempts by small numbers f like minded states to look out for one another • Collective security organizations vs. alliances • Both influence whether or not outsiders will intervene in the event of a war • But they differ greatly in operation ▯ Core of Analysis • Alliances o Institutions that help their members cooperate militarily in the event of war o Form when states have common interests o Facilitate cooperation o Successful when allies have strong interests in coming to one another’s aid • Collective security organizations o Form around a public interest in promoting peace o Help resolve collective action problems o Successful when states stop an act of aggression ▯ Why Promise To Fight Someone Else’s War • Offensive alliance – states pledge to join one another in attack state • Defensive alliance – sates pledge to come to one another’s aid militarily • Symmetric Alliance – two equal sates • Asymmetric Alliance – one weak state and one strong state ▯ Alliances and Alignments • Alliances form when states have common interests that motivate them to cooperate • State A and State B are in a dispute over some good. If State C has common interests with State B, then C wants to make sure B gets a good deal. o In this circumstance, B and C’s interests are “aligned.” • ▯ Balance of Power Theory • No clear military advantage for wither side • Alliances form when two states need to combine to form the power of one state • Balance of power theory doesn’t account for o Band-wagoning o Implausible alliances ▯ Example: Saudi-Arabia and Israel ▯ Alliances and Likelihood of War • States sign alliances to signal their common interests to others • Alliance credibility o Commitments are costly, no enforcement mechanism o We must treat alliances like institutions, not actors • To be successful an alliance must o Increase the odds that allies will fight on behalf of each other ▯ Decrease cost of fighting. Joint military planning ▯ Alliances increase the cost of abandonment o Public treaties o Wedding (royalty) o Troop deployment ▯ Convince adverseness that the allies will honor each others commitments ▯ Why do states hesitant to form alliances • Alliances have 2 potential effects o Good: deter challenges o Bad: embolden states to demand more from adversaries • Alliance Entrapment o The state now becomes more active because it has support o There is tradeoff between credibility of alliance and the efforts to restrain alliance partners ▯ The Success and Failure of Alliances • Alliance success depends on o The strength of common interests o The ability to make fighting preferable to abandonment o The effectiveness of the alliance in deterring adversaries o Mitigating the risk of entrapment Notes Monday July 13 ▯ Dilemmas of Collective Security • Collective Action Problem • Joint Decision Making Problem • Collective security works when all parties with voting power agree ▯ Conclusion • Collective security organizations can only police international politics when there is broad agreement among states • Member states must care enough to contribute the necessary resources • Collective security organizations have had more success in keeping the peace between antagonists who otherwise lack credibility. Notes Tuesday July 14 • Why Does War Occur within states? • Civil war o Armed conflict that occurs within a state that reaches a threshold of violence, causalities on both sides ▯ Why Rebel? • Conflict between government and subset of population, territory, policy, resources o Grievances – not being represented properly o Greed – bad argument but because citizens want to start war • Why Men Rebel • Political Violence o “All collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors, or its policies” o Guerilla wars, coups, rebellions, riots ▯ Challenge the monopoly of force ▯ Interfere with normal political processes • “The primary causalities sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent; and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors” • Relative Deprivation o Perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities o Civil war is the highest level of political violence • What do groups reel for o Dissatisfied groups generally have three options ▯ Migration ▯ Try to alter policies ▯ Try to gain control of state or establish new state • Separatism – when you try to create a new state • Irredentism – when you try to join an existing state • When does dissatisfaction lead to violence o Grievances abound, yet civil is still rare o Collective action problem o Group Level factors, country level, international level • Group Level factors o Shared religious, ethic, or ideological beliefs ▯ Social disincentive to free ride ▯ Recruitment, raise funds o Selective incentives ▯ I can give you something of value to make you join the cause • Example: Sierra Leone blood diamonds o Forcible recruitment ▯ Abduction • Example: RUF in Sierra Leone • Country Level Factors o Political institutions ▯ Political process allows peaceful methods for redressing grievances • Elections, courts • Ability of state to repress o Wealth and resources ▯ Mechanism unclear o Population o Terrain • International Factors o Foreign support ▯ Troops, arms, money, training o Why support rebels? ▯ Shared interest with the rebel group • Example: Irish rebels in Northern Ireland received support from Irish Americans • China, Soviet Union supporting spread of communism ▯ Influence government of new state • Why support rebels? o Conflict with government of the state ▯ Low cost way to force government to use resources overthrow existing government o Proxy wars ▯ Conflicts in which two opposing states support opposite sides in a civil war in some third state ▯ Cold War ▯ External support and longer wars • Potential for Civil Violence o Subset of population with grievances relative deprivation o Political institutions do not lend a voice to this subset of the population o Overcome collective action problem ▯ Resources ▯ State weakness ▯ Foreign support • Civil War Due to Bargaining Failure o Compromises exist that would be preferable to war ▯ Negotiated secession; power sharing arrangements; policy concessions • Incomplete Information o Capabilities difficult to observe ▯ Rebel groups generally engage in covert operations ▯ Hide strengths and weakness • Commitment Problems o Frequent changes in relative power of actors ▯ Preventive war ▯ Rising power cannot credibly commit not to exploit its power in the future o In civil conflict, economic shifts alter balance of power ▯ Weak economy weak government incentive to fight for rebels ▯ Once economy recovers government likely will not abide by concession it made while weak o Combatants remain in the same country once fighting has ended ▯ Contrary in interstate war both sides maintain armies and retain coercive power ▯ In civil conflict rebels mobilize and arm themselves against to state to obtain concessions ▯ The state might gran these concessions with the expectation that the rebels will demobilize and disarm ▯ The state now has no need to honor deal ▯ Rebel groups struggle to police themselves • How do civil wars end o Civil wars rarely end with a negotiated peace ▯ Usually the a one side win ▯ Only 20 percent of civil wars end in peaceful settlement o Peaceful settlement requires a mechanism • Strategies of Civil War o Rebel groups use insurgency (guerilla warfare) ▯ A military strategy in which small lightly armed units engage in a hit and run attack against military government and civilian targets ▯ Actors • State • Noncombatant citizens • Rebels • How Rebels Fight Civil War o Avoid conventional warfare o Remain hidden amongst noncombatants o Encourage or force noncombatants to join or support the cause o Undermine confidence in the government o Punish the state, destroy its will to resist, wait for political concessions • How Governments Fight Civil War o Conventional military technology and strategies will be of little use o Discerning between combatants and noncombatants o Indiscriminate violence ▯ Violence against anyone who gets in the way o Heart and Minds ▯ Winning the support of population win through peace • Indiscriminate Violence o Attacks against noncombatants leads free riders to side with rebels o Can possibly erode rebel resources o Creates a rift between noncombatants and insurgents • Heart and Minds o Focus on winning the support of the noncombatants o Provide security and support to local population ▯ Gain information on insurgents ▯ Erode support base for insurgents • What Can be done about Civil Wars • Outside support for government and rebels generally leads to longer bloodier wars • Third parties have been successful in maintain peaceful settlements o Resolve credible commitment problem by providing for the safety of disarmed rebels o Establish new political institutions ▯ Summary • Grievances with the state create the conditions for citizens to engage in political violence • Civil war is characterized by insurgency • Third party enforcement can maintain peace; democracy and development the potential solution • Bargaining failure occurs principally due to Notes Wednesday July 15 • What is Terrorism? • Terrorism o The use or threatened use of violence against noncombatant targets by individuals or nonstate groups for political ends • Goal: targeted population will cede to demands o Transnational o Domestic • Sometimes used within civil war o 30% of rebel groups strategically target civilians o IRA in Northern Ireland ▯ Are Terrorists Rational? • Extreme preferences o Rationally: purposive behavior or the strategies which individuals or groups pursue their interests o Terrorists groups choose targets and respond to risk in a strategic manner ▯ Enders and Sandler 1993 ▯ Example: when metal detectors were put in the airports o Individual cost v. group gain ▯ Example: suicide bombers o Terrorist attacks appear to be random ▯ Unpredictability makes them effective ▯ Why Terrorism? • Terrorist organizations are weak o They are weak relative to the state o They are weak relative to their demands • Terrorist organizations are composed of extremists in pursuit of an interest o Interests not widely shared by others o ISIS interest: to establish a caliphate governed by an extremist interpretation o f Islamic law • Extremists face a larger majority that will not share their views o Unlikely to be able to use the normal political process to further their interests o So groups turn to violence to gain concessions • Asymmetric Warfare • Terrorist are weak relative to their agents • States have a large population, economies to fuel war effort • Terrorists often forced to use criminal means to obtain resources for their initial funding • Attack civilians, government embassies, and other official buildings o Avoid confrontation with states military • Organize in loose networks • Hide with sympathetic populations ▯ Terroism as Bargainig Failure • Terrorists use violence in hopes of obtaining a concession • Incomplete Information o Terrorists have private information and incentives to misrepresent ▯ Small organizations, hidden within populations ▯ Exaggerate claims of strength and commitment to obtain better deals from target ▯ Target (state) knows this, often discounts terrorist threats o Credible commitments ineffective ▯ Threats will undermine the attack o Terrorists use attacks to signal capabilities, resolve ▯ State communicate using strategies short of force ▯ Terrorists cannot make public display of willingness to use force instead use force to signal their resolve • Credible Commitments o As part of a deal, target will insist no use of terrorism in the future ▯ Loosely organized so they cannot control their own terrorists organizations o Terrorists group can commit by renouncing terror and disarming • Indivisible Goods o Terrorists have goals that are nonnegotiable ▯ Religious goal: Islamic regime in Israel ▯ Strategies of Terroism • Two Audiences o Government, population of the target o Home population • Coercion o Induce policy change by imposing or threatening to bring costs on the target • Target may change its policy or offer coercion to avoid costs’ o Threats of future attacks to motivate individuals to press their own government to change its policy • The actual attack is then a means to make the threat of future attacks credible ▯ Provocation • Provoke government into disproportionate response • Target government has little political choice but to respond with counterstrike • Hidden within their home population; collateral damage • Increased support for terrorism from home population ▯ Spoiling • Peace talks between target and moderate from home population • Terrorist attacks to sabotage a prospective peace ▯ Outbidding • Terrorists groups compete for support of home population ▯ Can Terroism Be Prevented • Deterrence o Preserve the status quo by threatening challengers with unacceptable costs o Problems in deterring terror ▯ Hidden, no clear center to attack, difficult to find ▯ Provocation – play right into their hands ▯ Threat of retaliation may not be credible • Preemption o Take the imitative and destroy terrorists before they attack ▯ US policy after 2002; Patriot Act • Problems with preemption o Extensive intelligence gathering needed infringe o civil liberties o Provocation strategy • Defensive Measures o Guard against possible attacks o Problems with defensive measures ▯ Super expensive to maintain ▯ Divert terrorist attacks toward other targets • Criminalize o Reactionary: deter future attacks via threat of arrest o Problems with criminalization ▯ Difficult to find other states provide safe heavens ▯ Human rights violations • Example: Guantanamo Bay • Negotiation and Compromise o Make concessions bargain with terrorist o Problems Notes Monday July 20 • International Trade • International trade today is largely free o However trade policies differ between industries • Trade stands at the intersection of international and domestic policies o Foreign trade impacts domestic producers and consumers • Both domestic and international institutions shape trade policies ▯ Core of Analysis • Trade is product of specialization • Even though trade barriers protect certain industries barriers to trade hurt economic growth • Trade liberation creates winners and losers – thus proponents and opponents • International institutions can make cooperation on trade policy easier ▯ Why Trade • The Wealth of Nations o Founding texts of classical economies o Division of labor, specialization, and gains from trade • The pin maker o Analogy only works in large markets • Actors engage in foreign trade to realize the benefits of specialization o Division of labor allows society to focus on different economic activities • Self sufficiency or producing everything you consume is inefficient o Instead produce what you are most efficient at then trade for everything else • Specialization increases productivity o However it requires access to large markets • Comparative advantage is the core concept of the economics of trade o Ability of an actor to produce a particular good more efficiently than other goods or services o Producing at a lower opportunity cost ▯ Opportunity cost: what an actor gives up in order to produce a particular good o Absolute advantage ▯ Ability of an actor to produce more of a good than other countries or firms using the same amount of effort or resources • What Is Good About Trade? o When trade is free, countries can follow their comparative advantage ▯ Export goods that we are efficient producing ▯ In exchange import goods that we are less efficient producing o Economic logic suggests that barriers to trade are harmful to the economy as a whole ▯ Government policies that keep out imports force the country to produce goods that are not to its comparative advantage o When every country focuses on their comparative advantage and trades with others the prices of those goods are lowered for the consumers o Trade protection policies force the country to produce goods that are not to its comparative advantage ▯ This hurts consumers: • Consumers forced to buy from inefficient producers • If it cost an inefficient producer more to produce a good than a efficient one, the final cost of that good will be higher o Economic logic suggest that imports represent gains from trade ▯ This runs contrary to a lot of policy makers ▯ We need to stop buying goods from China • What Explains Trade Patterns? o Two Swedish economists produced the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory ▯ Characterizes state’s in term of national factor endowments – the material and human resources they possess o The basic national factors of production are ▯ Land ▯ ‘Labor (unskilled) ▯ Capital for investment (machinery, equipment and financial assets) ▯ Human capital • The Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory o The Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory argues: ▯ A country will export goods that make intensive use of the resources the country has in abundance ▯ A country will import goods that make intensive use of the resources in which the country is scarce ▯ The pattern of specialization explains trade patterns ▯ Industrial countries are rich in capital and skilled labor • Therefore they export goods that make intensive use of these endowments • They are more likely to have a comparative advantage in producing innovations in technology rather than producing agriculture or textiles o Developing countries are rich in land, raw materials or unskilled labor ▯ So they export agricultural products, minerals, and labor intensive products like textiles o HO Theory can also explain changes over time in trade ▯ Poor country with abundant land and labor but little capital will export farm goods and labor intensive goods th • US in 19 century ▯ As the country develops it accumulates capital and skilled workers starts to export capital intensive goods • US in 20-21 century • What else explain trade patterns? o Shared currencies; lower transactions costs ▯ European Union with the euro o Proximity; lower transaction costs o Noneconomic factors such as diplomatic relations also influence trade patterns ▯ Trade between hostile nations is riskier then trade with friendly nations ▯ Governments often pursue economic tires wit their allies establish credible commitments o National trade policies tare the most important noneconomic source of international trade ▯ Governments attempt to address the interests of cooperation’s, consumers, farmers, and bankers • What is trade protection o Protectionism: the use of specific measures to shield domestic producers from imports ▯ Nearly all governments restrict at least some imports o Trade barriers: iimpediencts to import of foreign goods o Form of barriers ▯ Tariff: a tax on imports levied at the border and paid by the importer ▯ Quota: limits the quantity of foreign good that can be sold domestically ▯ Nontariff barriers to trade: regulations targets at foreign goods o Effect is to shelter domestic producers from foreign competition • Trade and History o Trade liberalization in middle of 19 century ▯ Great Britain the leading power adopts free trade permitted foreigners to sell anything to Britain without tax or restriction o Trade remained free until 1914 with outbreak WW1 o Smoot Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 ▯ Raises Us tariffs on agricultural and industrial goods US trading partners pass retaliatory tariffs ▯ Severity of Great Depression • Why Do Governments Restrict Trade? o Trade barriers most often reflect domestic interests ▯ Trade barriers assist national producers even as they cost consumes more ▯ US steel producers seek barriers to import of foreign steel o Benefits and cost to trade barriers ▯ Direct benefit goes to domestic producers of the protected good • Trade protection makes imports more expensive which allows domestic producers to sell more of their products or rise their prices ▯ Direct costs is consumers of the protected goods • Winners and losers in International Trade o Protection creates returns above the normal rate of profit by artificially restricting competition and supply ▯ Domestic producers win ▯ Some politicians who receive fro domestic producers o 3 groups lose from trade protection ▯ Consumes of imported goods ▯ Exporters in other countries ▯ Some politicians who maybe punished by citizens due to the costs that protection imposes on them • The Stapler Samuelson Theory o Protection befits scarce factor of production ▯ But protection hurts the abundant factor o Trade benefits owners of factors of production used it produce exported goods o Protectionism hurts owners of abundant factors, help owners of scarce factors • The Ricardo-Viner Approach o The Stropler Samuelson theorem refers to very broad groups but most demands for protection comes from specific industries ▯ For instance the steel and farmers o The Ricardo Vernon theorem asks why whole industries often act together ▯ The answer some factors of production are specific to particular industries ▯ For instance certain types f Notes Tuesday July 21 • The Strolper – Samuelsson Theory o Protectionism benefits owners of the scarce factor of production ▯ In a capital intensive country • Trade barriers restrict supply of foreign made labor intensive goods Increases the demand fro domestic labor intensive goods Increases the prices for domestic labor o Trade Liberalization helps owners of the abundant factor of production ▯ In capital intensive country • Free trade allows domestic products to export capital intensive goods Increases the demand for capital intensive goods Increases for capital owners o Owners of scarce factors favor protectionism o Owners of abundant factors favor free trade o Actors attitude vary the counters factor endowments ▯ Farmers will be protectionists in land scarce Japan ▯ Farmers will be free traders in land abundant Argentia • The Ricardo Vener or Specific Factors Approach o Some factors of production cant be easily converted into equipment for computers ▯ Machinery for farming cant be easily converted into equipment for computers ▯ The interests of an individual flow from the sector of the economy from which he or she is employed • Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy o Trade protection helps specific concentrated groups ▯ But it harms the econmy as a whole o Policy intuitions that are responsive to concentrated groups will be more favorable to prote
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