PHIL 150B1 Exam 3 Study Guide
PHIL 150B1 Exam 3 Study Guide PHIL 150B1
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This 10 page Study Guide was uploaded by AmysNotes on Monday January 18, 2016. The Study Guide belongs to PHIL 150B1 at University of Arizona taught by Ana Sartorio in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 396 views. For similar materials see Personal Morality in PHIL-Philosophy at University of Arizona.
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Date Created: 01/18/16
11/20/2015 EXAM 3 STUDY GUIDE 1.EXTRA CREDIT A. Distinction between consequentialist and deontological views. i. Consequentialist Views: 1. The moral status of an act is determined only by the consequences it produces. 2. this moral philosophy is probably best captured in the aphorism "the ends justify the means." 3. Example of a consequentialism system of ethics would be utilitarianism, in which the most morally desirable situation is that in which people's happiness is maximized. ii. Deontological Views: 1. The view that there is a moral distinction between doing and allowing harm. 2. the ethical system in which morality is determined by duty or laws. 3. One example would be Kantian ethics, in which the only actions that are moral are those performed out of one's duty to follow the moral law, as opposed to acts performed out of desire. 4. A simpler example of deontological ethics would be Christianity, in which moral acts are those that obey the ten commandments. B. Within deontological views: distinction between principles and theories i. Principles: 1. DDA: a. The view that there is a moral distinction between doing and allowing harm. 2. DDE: a. Killing one's assailant is justified, he argues, provided one does not intend to kill him. In contrast, Augustine had earlier maintained that killing in self-defense was not permissible, arguing that “private self-defense can only proceed from some degree of inordinate self-love. ii. Theories: 1. Kantian ethics, in which the only actions that are moral are those performed out of one's duty to follow the moral law, as opposed to acts performed out of desire. 2.DEONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES A. DDE i. What is DDE? 1. a deontological principle. 2. The morality of an act is not just determined by its consequences. It matters HOW those consequences are brought about. ii. Examples that motivate DDE (Shafer-Landau and Foot) 1. Shafer-Landau: a. General Motivation: there is something problematic about aiming at evil b. Example: i. Permissible to bomb weapons factory even if it will result in civilian casualties ii. Impermissible to target civilians directly c. The difference: whether the civilian deaths are intended 2. Foot: a. General Motivation: There is something problematic about aiming at evil b. Example: i. Giving a lifesaving drug to 5 instead of 1 ii. Using the 1’s body to manufacture a drug for the 5 iii. Diverting the runaway trolley from 5 to 1 iv. Framing an innocent and hanging him so as to avoid a riot that would result in more deaths c. The difference: 2 i. The first case may seem permissible ii. The second case may seem impermissible iii. Distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences 1. Intended effect: a. Any effect that is conceived as the ultimate end or as a necessary means to that end. (Any effect that is part of the plan) i. Crossing the street, entering campus, attending class 2. Merely Foreseen Effect: a. Any effect that is not intended, but is merely foreseen (a side-effect). i. Getting wet. iv. Distinction between direct and oblique intention. 1. Direct Intention: a. When the relevant consequence is intended 2. Oblique Intention: a. When the relevant consequence is merely foreseen. v. Foot’s formulation of DDE 1. Application to the examples a. It is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intent b. It is sometimes permissible to bring about a bad consequence if its merely foreseen, but not if its intended vi. Objections to DDE: 1. There may be no intention to kill in impermissible cases a. Merchant who sells poisonous oil in order to make a profit i. Acts impermissibly ii. Doesn’t intend anyone to die 2. The issue of “closeness” a. Objection: Death is almost never strictly intended in the impermissible cases i. We didn’t want to kill him, only to blow him into pieces!” 3. Foot’s reply: 3 a. But something very close to death is intended 4. The craniotomy/hysterectomy abortion cases a. On reflection, it seems implausible to suggest that the specifics of the method used could matter b. Catholics: When a pregnant woman will die unless she has an abortion, two methods are available. i. Hysterectomy: removal of the uterus ii. Craniotomy: crushing of fetus’ skull 5. The Lethal Fumes case a. Foot’s counterexample i. 5 patients in a hospital will die unless we manufacture a drug that will inevitably release lethal fumes into the room of another patient (who cannot be moved) ii. Seems impermissible iii. But the 1’s death is not intended, it is merely foreseen B. DDA i. What is the DDA? 1. Doctrine of doing and allowing: 2. There is a moral difference between doing harm and allowing harm ii. The relation between DDA and DDE 1. A generalization of: a. There is a moral difference between killing and letting die 2. Many examples that motivate DDE also motivate DDA a. Not war examples 3. Both avoid the bad man strategy 4. Differ with respect to lethal fumes and abortion iii. Foot’s definitions of “doing harm” and “allowing harm” 1. Doing harm: starting a harmful sequence of events a. Ex) shooting someone 2. Allowing harm: letting a pre-existing harmful sequence go to completion 4 a. Ex) letting someone drown iv. Foot’s definitions of “negative duties” and “positive duties” 1. Negative duties: duties not to harm a. Doing harm=violation of negative duty b. More stringent than positive duties: i. When negative and positive duties are in conflict, we should comply with our negative duties 2. Positive duties: duties to help or benefit a. Allowing harm=violation of positive duty v. Foot’s formulation of DDA a. More stringent than positive duties: i. When negative and positive duties are in conflict, we should comply with our negative duties b. This formulation doesn’t entail that there is always a moral difference between doing and allowing harm vi. Illustration with similar examples to those that motivated DDE 1. The intended/foreseen distinction is difference from the doing/allowing distinction a. One can do harm that is merely foreseen (Lethal Fumes) b. One can allow hard that is intended (child in bathtub case) 2. Impermissible acts: a. Manufacturing drug for 5 w/ 1 body b. Framing innocent to avoid riot c. Blowing up man in mouth of cave d. Torturing 1 to avoid torture of 5 3. Permissible acts: a. Conflict between two positive duties: giving drug to 5 instead of 1 i. Allowing harm in both cases b. Conflict between two negative duties: driver of trolley steering it from 5 to 1 i. Doing harm in both cases 4. Hysterectomy and craniotomy: both doing harm to fetus a. Not both impermissible vii. Advantages over DDE: 1. Doesn’t have the disadvantages that DDE has 2. DDA on Lethal Fumes 5 a. Not refuted by the same counterexamples b. Doesn’t face objection that DDE faced i. The harm itself needn’t be intended 1. (Foot thought this problem could be addressed with the closeness reply) 3. DDA on craniotomy/hysterectomy a. Both doing harm to the fetus i. Not both impermissible ii. Depends on ones views about rights of fetuses viii. Thomson: 1. A problem for Foot’s formulation of DDA: “the trolley problem” a. Foots formulation is improvement over other more simplistic of DDA i. It is permissible for the driver of the trolley to steer it from5 to 1 because he does harm no matter what. ii. But, what about a passenger of the trolley or a bystander? iii. Their choice is between doing harm to 1 or allowing harm to 5. b. The trolley problem i. The problem of explaining why it's permissible to act (do harm) in the trolley example, but not in the transplant example. ii. In both cases, the choice is between doing harm to 1 person and allowing harm to 5. iii. Hence, the problem suggests that Foot's formulation of DDA is wrong. 2. Discussion of possible solutions to the trolley problem a. DDE: The harm is merely foreseen in the trolley case, but not in the transplant case. b. Appeal to special duties of doctors. (Problem: Doesn’t generalize to other cases) c. Thompson's Solution: i. Acting on the victim vs. acting on the threat. 3.KANT’S THEORY A. The Right and the Good 6 i. Consequentialism: the right defined in terms of the good 1. For Mill ( a consequentialist) the right is defined in terms of the good: a. The right act= the act that brings about the most amount of good (the most happiness). b. Good>Right ii. Kant’s deontological theory: the good defined in terms of the right 1. The good is defined in terms of what is right 2. Right >Good B. The Good i. Motives for action: 1. from duty , from self-interest, and from natural inclination 2. Only have moral worth if acting from duty is one of motives ii. Kant on acting from duty: the “Good Wlll” as the only thing that is good in itself iii. The only thing that is intrinsically good: 1. Good Will= a stable disposition to act from duty 2. Why isn’t good will just a disposition to do the right thing? 3. Kant’s motivation: because otherwise it is only an accident that we do the right thing iv. Illustration with examples 1. Shopkeeper (p.487): Doesn’t overcharge customers but only because it benefits him. No moral worth. 2. Man who isn't naturally disposed to help others but helps them because he sees it as his duty (pp. 487-8). Has moral worth. v. Objections 1. Kant's view entails: If you help others just because it is your duty, your will is good. But not so if you do it just because you're naturally inclined. 2. This seems odd… 3. In particular, if you are naturally inclined to help others, you'll have a stable disposition to help others. Isn't it good? 4. How Kant might reply… a. We don’t control our desires. 7 b. In contrast, as rational beings, we can work to identify our duties, and be moved by reason 5. Kant’s theoryof the good will is a deontological idea a. Consequences don’t add/ subtract from moral worth C. The Right i. Principles of practical reason: 1. Imperative about what to do 2. hypothetical imperatives a. contingent on specific goals b. Examples: i. Open the door (goal: to enter) ii. Pursue your dreams (goal: happiness) 3. categorical imperatives a. not contingent on goals b. moral imperatives can be categorical ii. Moral imperatives as categorical imperatives 1. Specific: don’t lie 2. General: a general categorical imperative which can be formulated 2 ways a. Formula of the universal law b. The formula of humanity D. The Formula of the Universal Law i. The concept of a maxim 1. A rule that guides your conduct ii. The Universalization Test 1. In such an such circumstances, for a certain purpose, I will do A 2. Is A moral? a. Identify Maxim on which you'd be acting. b. Imagine everyone acted on that Maxim. c. Can I will that? i. Yes: A is moral ii. No (contradiction/irrationality): A is immoral General Idea: Don't make an exception for yourself. 8 iii. Two kinds contradiction: contradiction in conception and in the will 1. In conception: a. The universalized maxim scenario is inconceivable 2. In the will: a. Conceivable, but the agent still cannot rationally will it. 3. Kant’s examples a. False Promise (conception) b. Committing Suicide(conception) c. Failing to cultivate your natural gifts (will) d. Failing to help others (will) E. Korsgaard i. 3 Interpretations: 1. Logical: universalized maxim scenario leads to a logical impossibility 2. Teleological: universalized maxim scenario involves contradictory “natural purposes” 3. Practical: action cant achieve its purpose because universalized maxim is self-defeating ii. Contradictions in conception: 1. The difference between the Logical and the Practical interpretation: the job candidates case a. Killing the person ahead of you is immoral b. Maxim i. In circumstances like this, in order to get the job, ill kill the person ahead of me c. Killing the person ahead is ineffective in the world where maxim is universal i. Youll get killed too d. But universalized maxim scenario is not a logical impossibility i. Just involves a lot of people getting killed and many frustrated goals e. 2. Korsgaard’s argument for the Practical interpretation iii. Contrast with contradictions in the will: 1. Contradiction internal to the maxim itself vs contradiction external to the maxim a. Contradiction in conception: i. Happens within the maxim 9 1. The very purpose of the act is frustrated by the universalization of the maxim 2. Immoral because you’re trying to make an exception of yourself b. Contradiction in the will: i. Happens “outside” the maxim 1. Some other general purposes (essential to the will) is frustrated by the universalization of the maxim 10
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