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UT / Government / GOV 312 / How is stalin related to anglo-american intitiatives?

How is stalin related to anglo-american intitiatives?

How is stalin related to anglo-american intitiatives?

Description

School: University of Texas at Austin
Department: Government
Course: Intro to Foreign Policy
Professor: Moser
Term: Fall 2015
Tags: GOV312L, Barany, and Cold War
Cost: 25
Name: Gov312L Week 3 Notes (Lecture 3 & 4)
Description: America and the Cold War: Lecture 3 & 4 This document includes Week 3 notes on Professor Barany's in-class lectures, including both information written on his lecture slides and what he says in class.
Uploaded: 02/05/2016
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America and the Cold War: Lecture 3 


How is stalin related to anglo-american intitiatives?



The Onset of the Cold War and the Falling of the Iron Curtain in Europe Monday, 2/1           Title slide: America and the Cold War, Lecture 3 

          Slide 2: U.S. Plans in Eastern Europe 

∙ November 1944, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius gives policy  speech after WWII of U.S. policy expectations in Eastern Europe o Free choice of political, social, and economic systems

o Non-restrictive trade and communications policies

 i.e. freedom of speech, press, and media

o freedom of access to U.S. philanthropic and educational  

organizations

o protection of U.S. property  


What is the reputation of stalin and his henchmen?



o settlements of territorial issues only after the cessation of  

hostilities

∙ NONE of these came true  

          Slide 3: Mutual Suspicions 

∙ Russia is not interested in minor changes in Eastern Europe

∙ Installation of Muscovite communists in Poland elsewhere in Eastern Europe

o Soviet install muscovite communists because they trust them  they are communists who are from Eastern Europe and  

decided to join the Soviet Union

o Other communists in Eastern Europe are underground – they  are local/native people in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary,

etc., but are not part of the Soviet Union


What are the things or aspects that communists institute?



If you want to learn more check out What disk was invented by the minoan civilization?

∙ Polish government-in-exile: If you want to learn more check out What does a religious totem symbolize?

o Government fled to London for 5-6 years and lobbied for their  country

o Expected to come back and retake power after the war o Instead, they arrived back in Poland are taken to Siberia to die (in gulags)

∙ Stalin is suspicious of bona fide Anglo-American initiatives (i.e.  invasion of the Balkans)

∙ The U.S./U.K. begins to recognize that Europe was becoming  irrevocably divided

           Slide 4: Stalin’s Press 

∙ “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” – axiom produces very odd  bedfellows

∙ Stalin still gets great press in the U.S. until 1945 If you want to learn more check out What is the difference between true and romatic realism?

∙ The U.S. is still very naïve about the Soviet Union

o Appreciation of a war-time ally and the sacrifices Stalin made o Lack of understanding of how the war was actually fought by  Stalin and his henchmen

 No regard for human life – many unnecessary  

causalities

 Killings were covered up with money – no press

 40% of losses were unnecessary

 unlike the U.S., there is no “no man left behind” clause  in the Soviet Union

          Slide 5: Enters Truman If you want to learn more check out What are the various measures of location?

∙ The “accidental president” from Missouri – sudden death of FDR ∙ Has a different background and outlook from FDR that was often  underestimated

∙ Represented a much hard line vis-á-vis the Soviets but at this point  he was unable to change the course of events

o Everything was prearranged, except for the future dropping of nuclear weapons, which he could control

∙ Met Stalin at Potsdam, who understood the changes in Washington  and exploits his military-strategic advantages

∙ U.S. now has nuclear weapons, which has a significant impact on  relations with Moscow

          Slide 6: The Soviets Enter Eastern Europe 

∙ The “liberators” – communists come to power in Eastern Europe o Didn’t discriminate against race or religion, which was  refreshing We also discuss several other topics like Which colleges in the us established the first departments of sociology?

∙ Relentless pressure of the Red Army on population and politics ∙ Red Army transformed armies/communications tactics  ∙ NKVD and subsidiaries: forerunner of the KGB (now the FSB) –  domestic intelligence

o Became the heads of army

∙ Communists institute:

o Land reform

o Liquidating landed gentry

o Nationalization of banks and industries

∙ As a result, they have some support from the urban poor and  impoverished peasants (the Proletariat) Don't forget about the age old question of What pertains to a person or a group distinguished by their physical traits?

∙ Communists crush all opposition and assume total control o Reform was the carrot, terror was the stick

∙ U.S.S.R. establishes totalitarian dictatorships along the lines of the  Soviet examples

o Everything is state owned

          Slide 7: Different Countries and Paths

∙ Communist capture of power is facilitated by:

o the Great Depression

o World War II

o destruction of old political systems

o weakened traditional ruling classes

∙ By 1946, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland are under a firm one-part  Soviet-communist control

∙ Hungary is less crucial to Stalin, strategically – he lets the  Hungarian communists sort themselves out until 1948

o Of course, the communist party gains little popular support o Political competition is eliminated by fraud and force  

∙ Czechoslovakia expects to be a bridge between capitalism and  communism – a Finnish model? – but no such luck

Slide 8: Cold War Map of Eastern Europe, 1989 

∙ Soviet Union power over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (3 Baltic states),  Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Goerge, Kaliningrad, and Russia of  course  

o Broke in 1991

∙ Strategically, the most important countries were: Poland, East  Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,  Albania

o Border states that could give access to the West

∙ Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were not allies  of Soviet Russia

Side note: “Slavic” countries are called so because their languages are  from the Slavic family of languages

∙ There used to be some Slavic brotherhood in the Middle Ages ∙ HOWEVER, Romania, Hungary, Albania, and the 3 Baltic states  (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are not Slavic

Slide 9: Czechoslovakia 

∙ Only state with some democratic legacies, but eventually becomes  communist

∙ Some pro-communist and pro-Soviet sentiment

∙ First elections in 1946: communists get 38%

∙ They were essentially democratic until a political coup in 1948 by  pro-Soviet forces

∙ Thomas Masaryk “fell out of the window” of his office in Prague’s  Hradcany Castle

∙ Czechoslovakia becomes a communist state

Slide 10: Yugoslavia (and Albania) 

∙ Tito = Yugo’s partisan general, wanted to stay independent from the U.S.S.R.

∙ Communists dominate by the end of the war

∙ “the” different case: the Soviets were never there physically o the Soviets did not liberate Yugoslavia or Albania, so no  Russian troops were ever on the ground

∙ there was still a hard-line Stalinist type of regime until 1948, but not the kind that the Soviets wanted

Slide 11: Soviet Plans for Eastern European Economies 

∙ Lend-lease agreement was abruptly terminated (as a result of a  bureaucratic mix-up) – this reinforced Stalin’s suspicions of U.S. ∙ Most Eastern European countries were in desperate need, but  Moscow didn’t let them accept the credits and war surplus stocks  offered by the U.S., or the join economic assistance plan  

∙ U.S. protests the reorientation of the Eastern European trade to  Soviet Union

∙ Czechs ask for a loan, then drop the request due to Soviet pressure

o August 1946, Paris Economic Conference: Czechs  

enthusiastically applaud Soviet diatribes

∙ Stalin uses East European economies for the purposes of Soviet  economy recovery

o Afterwards, he establishes centrally-planned economies  entirely dependent upon Soviet raw materials, heavy  

machinery, etc.  

∙ First case where the imperial center is not extremely developed –  “like Burkina Faso with permafrost”

          Slide 12: Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1946 ∙ Relations continue to deteriorate

∙ Stalin continues to point out the ineluctable conflict between  communism and capitalism

∙ Realizations of Soviet nuclear espionage in operations in Canada ∙ Problems in the middle east and far east

o Soviet is reluctant to evacuate Iran

∙ March 1946 opinion polls: Americans disapprove of Soviet policy  and think the Administration is being soft on communism

∙ U.S. Policy becomes more firm

∙ Members of Administration suggest that the best policy option is to  confine Soviet influence to Eastern Europe

∙ Truman administration concedes that the EE has slipped  irretrievably into the “Soviet Sphere of Influence”  Europe is now  viewed as a divided entity  

Slide 13: Churchill’s Fulton Speech 

∙ Former British prime minister Winston Churchill popularized the Iron  Curtain phrase in his “Sinews of Peace” address on March 5, 1946,  at the Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri

∙ “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain  has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the  capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe.  Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia: all these famous cities and populations around them lie in  what I must call the Soviet sphere, are all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet Influence, but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow”

∙ note: after its fall, a section of the Berlin Wall was transported to  and erected at Westminster College

          Title slide: Lecture 4

          Slide 2: Alternatives to Containment 

∙ February 21, 1947: UK acknowledges its exhaustion

o No power left to protect U.S. interests in Europe

∙ Previously, the U.S. had two war-time options:

o Isolationism – staying out of it

o Preventative war – exploiting our nuclear monopoly

 This option was never seriously considered because it is  contrary to U.S. tradition

∙ Isolationism, however, no longer possible: America must get  involved  

o Non-use of force means the continuation of conflict

Slide 3: Containment: The U.S. Response 

∙ George F. Kennan (1904-2005)

∙ head of State Department’s new Policy Planning Staff (appointed by  George C. Marshall)

∙ Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his  era as any diplomat in our history

∙ He was originally a Russian specialist and a diplomat there and in  the Baltic states (in the 1930s)

o He actually spoke Russian, and previously had a position in  the U.S. Soviet embassy

          Slide 4: The “X” Article 

∙ The most important article in the Cold War

∙ Appeared in the July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine

∙ Basic objectives of the U.S. foreign policy:

o Protect security of nation

o Advance the welfare of the people

∙ U.S. understood that their national interests were best served not  by trying to restructure the international order, but by trying to  maintain the equilibrium within it so that NO one country could  dominate

∙ Kennan’s particularistic approach: only worry about the countries  that are hostile AND capable of posing a threat to U.S. national  interest

o There is only one such country: The Soviet Union

Slide 5: Background 

∙ Soviet post-war expansion into Eastern Europe + attempts at  Greece, Turkey, and Iran

o Eastern Europe is long gone, including all American influence  and money there

∙ The U.S. also needed to support the U.K., who were traditional  guardians of American interests

∙ Truman Doctrine of March 1947: “It must be the policy of the United  States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted  subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure”

o Economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece shortly  follows

          Slide 6: New Positions 

∙ Soviet role in Eastern Europe provokes the U.S. and leads to the  crystallization of new policy positions:

1. Keep troops in Europe (Churchill)

2. Only mutual trust could help (Henry Wallace, Commerce  Secretary)

3. Policy of firmness and patience  

 Don’t give in or give up

          Slide 7: Kennan on the Soviet Union 

∙ Kennan presents the basis of what was to become the basis of new  American Foreign Policy

∙ He recognizes the hostile character of the Soviet regime, and  focuses on the communist outlook on world affairs

∙ Main principles:

o Soviet hostility is a constant factor and will continue until the  capitalist world is destroyed

o Stress on the internal nature of Soviet power

 i.e. the purges, cyclical rejuvenation of party zeal, etc.

o Realization that the Soviets don’t have an ideological  

compulsion to accomplish their objectives quickly  

 Rather, Soviets focus on a gradual increase in trend and  acreage in their power

          Slide 8: Kennan’s Original Containment  

∙ Articulated and implemented in 1947-1949

∙ Position: “long term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment” à calls for intelligent, long-range policies

∙ Idea: to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position  it won at the end of World War II

∙ Kennan insists: Soviet foreign policy bore little relationship to what  the West did or did not do à the USSR’s party-line was not based on  any objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia’s borders

o i.e. The Soviet Union will continue to lie; the U.S. can’t trust  what they say, only what they do

          Slide 9: Departures from Past Policies 

∙ A policy of patience and firmness

1. No concealment of disagreements with the Russians

2. No more concessions to the U.S.S.R. – no more benefit of the  doubt

3. U.S. military strength will be reconstituted, and requests from  the Allies for military and economic aid will be favorable  

considered

4. Negotiations with the Soviets will continue, but only for the  purpose of registering Moscow’s acceptance of U.S. positions  Trying to see what the Russians think

Slide 10: Kennan’s Particularism 

∙ Kennan objected to the notion that the U.S. had to resist  communism wherever it appeared – focus only where it would be  harmful to the U.S.

∙ Ultimate goal: NOT a division of the world to Soviet and American  spheres, but the emergence of independent centers of power in  Europe and Asia

∙ This plan is not immediately accepted – still some skepticism

          Slide 11: The Implementation of Containment: Stage 1 ∙ Restore balance of power left unstable by defeats of Germany and  Japan and the expansion of the USSR to Eastern Europe

∙ American objective: not to dominate power centers itself but to  ensure that NO ONE else did either

∙ Anti-communism in American politics: mobilizes congressional and  public support for the policy of containment

∙ Specifics: Marshall Plan and the encouragement of economic  development in Europe and Japan

          Slide 12: The Implementation of Containment: Stage 2 ∙ Bring about the fragmentation of the international communist  movement

o support Yugoslavia, encourage Sino-Soviet rift

∙ The Russian Break with Yugoslavia

o Yugoslavia has a highly personalistic Stalinist-type model o Before the break, Tito tolerates Communist intrusions but by  1948, Soviet meddling becomes very intrusive – Tito will not  stand for it

o Tito and Yugoslav Leadership protest but in vain

o open break between Moscow and Belgrade – no longer have  diplomatic relations

o they are threatened with invasion, but these threats are  empty – Yugo is extremely hard to penetrate due to its  mountainous terrain

∙ After the break: Yugoslavia gradually alters domestic and foreign  policies, moving closer to a market economy

∙ 1948-1953: Yugo drifts away from the Soviet sphere, and develops  alternative model of socialist development

o “user-friendly” communism

o more developmental and pragmatic, not ideological and  restrictive

o alternate model ticks off the Soviets – they would almost  prefer them to be democratic

o beneficiary of U.S. and West European economic and military  aid

Slide 13: The Implementation of Containment, Stage 3 ∙ Trying to bring about changes in the Soviet conception of  international relations

∙ Convince Soviet leaders that their interests could be better served  by learning to live in a diverse world

∙ Establish NATO (1949)

∙ Creation of an independent West German state

o Germany was divided, like Korea

o 4 zones of occupation belonging to U.S., U.K., France, and  Soviet Union

o the western parts join together and become independent from the east

o The West becomes the Federal Republic of Germany o The East becomes the Democratic Republic of Germany ∙ Berlin also has 4 zones of occupation (U.S., France, U.K., U.S.S.R.)

∙ Retaining our forces in Japan

∙ Building a hydrogen bomb, which the Soviets almost have also,  through espionage

          Slide 14: Kennan’s Influence Diminishes by late 1949 ∙ Why? – because American domestic policy changes (due to paranoia created by McCarthy)

∙ Truman and his advisers could not accept his assumptions that: a. Danger of war was remote

b. Negotiations, if in the interests of both sides, could be  productive

c. Diplomacy should be flexible

∙ basic flaws in Kennan’s strategy:

o he sought to achieve its objectives through psychological  means, by instilling self-confidence (not just in nations directly threatened by Soviet expansion but in the U.S. also)

∙ what Kennan failed to take into consideration:

o chance that insistence on rational distinctions might induce  irrational fears thereby undermining self-confidence

o a.k.a. irrational fears had by the public

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