Test 1 Study Guide
Test 1 Study Guide PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh
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This 9 page Study Guide was uploaded by Erica Kugler on Thursday February 12, 2015. The Study Guide belongs to PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa taught by Dr. Chyzh in Spring2015. Since its upload, it has received 300 views. For similar materials see International Relations in Political Science at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa.
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Date Created: 02/12/15
Test 1 Study Guide This study guide contains key vocab terms theories and models relating to the topic of war Please do not let the number of pages or amount of information overwhelm you YOU CAN DO IT Theory of World Politics 0 World politics international relations how countries and ppl win countries get along 0 Theory set of statements to explain a phenomenon simplify assumptions 0 4 components of a theory 0 Credibility mechanism 0 Reverse causality o Covariation o Spurious relationship a thirdoutside variable influences the two observed variables 0 Probabilistic claims argument about factors that increasedecrease likelihood of an outcome 0 Framework of world politics interests interactions and institutions know these three Interests Interactions and Institutions 0 Interests what one want s to achieve via political action goalsaims of actors o Fundamental building blocks of political action 0 Interactions ways in which choices of actors combine to produce political outcomes I Two types cooperation and bargaining o Cooperation actors work together to achieve a preferred outcome 0 Both actors benefit 0 Bargaining distribution of a fixed value in an unequal way 0 One actor benefits at the expense of the other actor o Institutions rules that influence interactions gt facilitate cooperation enforce compliance Interests gt what actors want to achieve through political action 0 3 categories of interests 0 Power or security 0 Economic or material welfare 0 Ideological goals 0 3 schools of thought gt Realism Liberalism and Constructivism o Realism I Actor state I Goals enhancemaintain power and security I Focus on relative gains your gains compared to the gains of others I States have noshortlived cooperation cuz always looking for new selfserving relationships that max relative gains I Institutions NO 0 Liberalism I Actors statesindividualsinstitutionstransnatl orgs I Goal maximize wealth gt focused on absolute gains 0 Absolute gains no comparison just look at what you will gain from an interaction rather than comparing it with other interactions 0 Looking at absolute gains promotes cooperation I Acknowledges and utilizes institutions 0 Constructivism I How one responds to a situation depends on the context 0 Some parts of a situation realism other parts liberalism 0 Actors individuals or groups wcommon interests 0 State central authority wability to make and enforce lawrulesdecisions 0 Failed state countries wa loss of central authority 0 Sovereignty expectation that states have legal and political supremacy win their borders Interactions ways that choices by two or more actors combine to produce a political outcome 0 Strategic interactions each actor s strategy depends on anticipated strategy of other actor 0 Strategy your plan of action based on interests and actions of others 0 quotbest response strategy adopt strategies in best response to anticipated strategy of others 0 2 types of interactions 0 Cooperation gt actors work together so that they each get a little bit of the good I Status quo wcooperation is better for both actors than the original status quo o Bargaining gt one actor gets more of the good than the other actor I quotzerosum benefit of one actor countered by cost of the other actor I Actors work together but new status quo favors one actor rather than both 0 Bargaining quotPrisoner s Dilemma gt Analyze possible outcomes of different scenarios I Choose scenario of most benefit to you based on other person s action 0 may NOT be the best of your four possible outcome values but based on what other player will do it is best for you I do some practice quotPrison Dilemma charts so that you know how it works 0 3 obstacles to cooperation o Competing incentives ex Prisoners Dilemma 0 Collaboration work together to reach a goal that couldn t be achieved by one actor I Public Goods Problem ie freeriding p goods nonrivalrous amp nonexclusive 0 Coordination standardize actions and rules to avoid conflict 0 Factors that facilitate cooperation 0 Number and size of actors gt fewer actors easier and more cooperation 0 Information gt transparency vs secrecy trust vs distrust more vs less cooperation o Iteration repeated action can prevent inaction have reputation to uphold 0 Linkage cooperation on one issue is contingent on cooperation on other issues 0 Power ability of A to get B to do something B would otherwise not do Reversion outcome outcome when more bargain is reached 0 Bargaining power belongs to actors satisfied w or willing to endure the rev outcome Ways to shift Rev Outcome I Coercion gt threat or imposition of costs on others I Outside options gt gives actors the ability to get better deals via alternatives I AgendaSetting Power gt shift rev outcome to favor you Bargpower Institutions gt set of rules that structure political interactions Why are there wars Facilitate cooperation via enforcement behavior standards compliance solve conflicts Can have policy biases toward some states strongest most internationally influential states know how to read the bargaining model of war reasons for war are NOT the same as causes of war Reasons for war goal or aim that a state wants to achieve Causes of war actions involving achievement of said goal that leads to irreconcilable conflict War is costly and there is always an outcomedeal that two states prefer to war War is more of a rarity in terms of world history ie most countries aren t at war War occurs when bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement gt Failure of crisis bargaining Causes of war THE BIG THREE know these 0 Incomplete Information gt lack of info or misunderstanding 0 Commitment Problem gt state can t guarantee future compliance wterms of bargain o Indivisibility of contested good gt can a good be divided wo losing its value War event involving organized military force by at least two parties that satisfies a minimum threshold of severity I organized force I at least two parties I minimum threshold of severity of casualties length of conflict etc 0 Interstate war main parties involved are states 0 Civil war main parties involved are actors win states ex govt vs rebel group Wars are fought over things of value gt purpose of war is to obtain the valuable good 0 Interests that lead states to conflict know these three interests I Territory gt wealth strategic mil value ethnicrelHY ties I Policies gt stop what a country sees as bad govt I Regime type gt oust dangerous govts Crisis bargaining bargain under threat of war gt coercive diplomacy o Bargaining range range on bargaining model where states prefer deals to war I status quo gained by deals is the same as the status quo gained by war 0 States wstatus quo closest to its ideal outcome is less likely to want war Compellence effort to change status quo via force gt quotgive me X or else Deterrence preserve status quo by threatening other side if other side takes an action to change the status quo gt quotdon t do X or else 0 state with status quo closest to its idealfavorite outcome deterrant 0 state with status quo further from its idealfavorite outcome compellent I 3 factors preventing crisis bargaining the 3 things that cause war 0 Incomplete information gt poor info about willingness and ability of states to fight I 2 classes of unknown info 0 Capabilities state s physical ability to bear costs of war 0 Resolve state s willingness to bear cost of fighting 0 Total war all resources are mobilized 0 Limited war not all resources are mobilized I Riskreturn tradeoff tradeoff bwn getting good deal and preventing war I Credibility believability that a threat will be carried out I Brinksmanship gt take actions that put you on slippery slope toward war I Typing hands gt make threatspromises that are hard to back down from 0 Audience costs neg repercussions when a leader backs down 0 Commitment Problems gt inability to promise compliance with deal terms I Things that increase commitment problems 0 good in question is a source of future bargaining power 0 Expected future shift in power 0 Preventative war 0 firststrike advantage gt striking first increases state s chance of winning 0 preemptive war 0 Preventative and Preemptive war gt difference bwn them time o Preemptive response to imminent threat so act now 0 Preventative anticipate future threat so act now 0 ndivisible Goods gt good can t be divided wo destroying its value quotallornothing I ndivisibiity isn t usually a physical property but the way the good is valued o Decrease likelihood of war Raise cost of war gt bargaining range expands so deals more likely Domestic Politics and War 0 Reality actors win states make decisions and carryout actions on behalf of the state 0 General national interest interest that most citizens win a country share 0 Narrow particularistic interest interest shared by a few number of actors in a state 0 For every particularistic interest an alternative national interest can be found 0 institutions determine which actors and interests have influence 0 3 kinds of actors leaders organized groups and the public know these three 0 2 types of organized groups 0 Bureaucracy different organizations making up the state s structure mil intel etc 0 Interest Groups groups of individuals wcommon interests that organize to push for policies that benefit their members 0 Role of the public in the actions of states depend on the regime type 0 Democratic regime public is influential o Autocratic regime public has little influence over what the states does Divergenary war war fought to divert public s attention from domestic issues and boost the ratings of the country s leader quotrally effect rise in a leader s popularity in response to an international crisis 0 Tendency of citizens to become more supportive of their govt during times of crisis 0 Scapegoating blame problems of the crisis on a third partyforeign adversary Diversionary incentive o Temptation of leaders to spark conflicts to invoke the rally effect and get public support I quotgambling for resurrection gt Taking a risk war to regain political quotlifequot 0 BUT international conflicts are mostly started by leaders who are politically secure have high support before the warcrisis begins 0 Problems of diversionary incentive Rally effect is temporary political costs if war lost War amp Special Interest Groups orgs that have a specificspecial interest worth securing 0 Thomas Hobson s theory for Britain s imperialism gt satisfy the economic elites and military 0 Eisenhower quotmilitaryindustrial complex gt Collusion bwn military and industries creates disproportionate influence over politics War amp Bureaucracy gt Foreign policy shaped by a state s bureaucracy mil is usually hawkish War amp Economic Ethnic Interest 0 Economic motives when an actor s interest depends on events in other countries 0 Ethnic motives ethnic attachment to state A can influence state B s interests Small Groups and Big Influence on Foreign Policy 0 Easier to organize small groups of people to get things done 0 Collective action problem gt quothijackquot policy hijack free ride Bargaining wdovish actors increases the bargaining range deal agreement more likely Bargaining whawkish actors decreases the bargaining range war more likely Bargain range NEVER goes away gt hawksdoves only change the size of the bargaining range Democratic Peace gt theory as to why and which wars democracies get involved in o Dyadic phenomenon Two democratic states are unlikely to fight each other 0 Monadic phenomenon Democracies usually fight nondemocracies Democracy political system in which candidates compete for political office via frequent and fair elections where a sizable portion of the adult population can vote 0 Contestation competition for office 0 Participation engagement in selection process of a leader via voting 0 2 types of democracies liberal illiberal 4 things that uphold the democratic peace theory know these four 0 Institutional Explanation I Cost of war falls on the ruled Public has greater incentive to not want war I Accountability ability to punish or reward leaders for their decisions I Dyadic two democratic govts have actors win them that restrain the leaders I Monadic autocracies lack public restraint so it could provoke a war 0 Normative Explanation I Externalization of state s domestic norm for conflict resolution 0 Democracies look for peace Autocracies use violence and threats 0 Selection Effect I Democracies are selective about the wars they fight bc war is politically costly I Nondemocratic leaders may be willing to gamble ie start a war 0 Bargaining Explanation I Democratic institutions increase transparency decreases risk of preemptive war by sending credible signals of resolve and capabilities 0 quotnear misses crisis bwn two democracies that heated up but not to the point of war 0 Trent Affair 1861 gt US and Great Britain 0 Venezuela Crisis 18951896 gt Great Britain and Venezuela 0 Ruhr Crisis 1923 gt France and Germany 0 number of democracies worldwide is increasing 0 when interests and institutions empower those who bear the cost of war those pplgroups can influence a state and its decision to gonot go to war 0 opennesstransparency decrease risk of war by solving commitmentincomplete info problems International Institutions and War 0 Institutions set of rules that shape political behavior 0 International governance anarchy gt absence of a central govt o 2 types of international institutions alliances and collective security organizations Alliances o quotinstitutions that help members cooperative militarily in the event of war 0 Types of alliances o offensive or defensive I offensive states agree to take action together Power in numbers I defensive states agree to defend one another if attacked o nonaggression pact I states agree to not fight each other ex 1939 NaziSoviet NonAg Pact o consultation I states consult to provide strategy options rather than military forces 0 neutrality I state chooses to stay out of a conflict completely does not favor either side 0 symmetric vs asymmetric I symmetric states in an alliance provide equal resources to the conflict I asymmetric states in an alliance provide unequal resources to the conflict 0 General or specific I General nonspecific alliance wording regarding when a state helps out I Specific specific conditions laid out as to when a state will help another state 0 Public or secretive I Pubic existence of an alliance is publicly known goal deter future attacks I Secretive existence of an alliance kept secret offensive element of surprise 0 Balance of Power Theory of alliances states join together to balance out power of adversary o Bandwagoning behavior gtjoin conflict on side of likely winner to get postwar spoils o Alliances alter bargaining by influencing states belief about what the third party ally will do o quotIf you attack my ally then I will attack you gt Deterrence threat 0 Prevent alliance desertionabandonment involve a state s reputation o Abandonment abrogation of an alliance 0 Reputation Typing hands Audience costs and publicpolitical punishment 0 Two effects of alliances deter challengers embolden states to demand more from enemy o Alliances are good BUT states look to avoid entrapment state entrapped in unfavorable war Collective Security Institutions CSIs o Institutions of states that work together to facilitate peace and respond to internatl aggression 0 Goal if global status quo is to change make sure it happens peacefully 0 Influence bargaining increase aggressor s costs of war probability of winning favors the victim 0 One way to help solve commitment problems enforcement of agreement terms 0 2 major challenges of collective security collective action and joint decisionmaking o Collective action problem gt free riding think back to public goods example 0 Joint decisionmaking problem gt more states harder to communicate and cooperate 0 States satisfied when they agree on a common status quo gt satisfaction dilemmas decrease 0 UN gt decisionmaking power is held by the Security Council 0 10 nonpermanent members 5 permanent members P5 have veto power I Veto power of the P5 gives way to biased policy outcomes gt quotstatus quo bias 0 2 kinds of military operations peaceenforcement peacekeeping I Peaceenforcement establish peace bwn warring states I Peacekeeping maintain peace in a region after an interstate war or civil war I peacekeeping used the most 0 UN must have quothost nation agreement gt can t send peacekeepers wo consent of the warring states 0 Cold War Paralysis of the UN 45 89 USUSSR rivalry I quotabusequot veto power against each other quotsat on the sideline of conflicts 0 Gulf War and quotNew World Order successful UN mission against Iraq to free Kuwait 0 quotTriumph of the Lack of the Will littleno UN involvement I Bosnia 1992 0 Ethnic civil war Serbs vs Croats vs Bosnians 0 UN sent in peacekeepers but later pulled out peacekeepers ineffective 0 US steps in 3 years later wair strikes gt Dayton Peace Agreement 1995 I Rwanda 1994 0 Belgian colony that was ethically divided 90 Hutu 9 Tutsi 1 other 0 Tutsi s were the elites when Rwanda was under Belgian control 0 1962 Rwanda gained independence gt Reversal of ethnic elite status 0 1994 Hutus prez s plane shot down gt Tutsis blamed Hutus kill Tutsis 0 UN peacekeepers started to be killed and UN pulled out 0 US did not step in when the UN pulled out gt avoid Somalia repeat I Kosovo o Kosovo majority Albanian declared independence but Serbia claimed it 0 Serbia Slavic state backed by Russia protector of the Slavs 0 Russia vetoed UN resolution against Serbia no UN action 0 NATO gets involved gttakes on the role of a CSI 0 Postwar issue was NATO justified in getting involved 0 Why act as a CSI Got involved to serve Western interests I Sudan2003 o Gov t supports militants killing citizens gt Arabs vs NonArabs Muslims vs Christians Violence by NonState Actors Civil War and Terrorism 0 Difference bwn civil war and terrorism scale civil wars are larger in scale Civil War gt intrastate war occurs at the domestic level 0 quotthe pitting of two or more groups win a country against one another 0 When compared to international wars civil wars are generally 0 More bloody harder to resolve more common longer in duration 0 3 interests underlying civil wars territory policy and regimetype lt 3 reasons for war 0 There has been an increase in the number of civil wars around the globe since the end of WW 0 Decolonialization and breakdown of authoritarian regime o Greed gt people or groups want something that they cannot or do not have 0 Grievances gt discrimination ethnicreligious conflict 0 Civil war actors seccessionists and irredentists o secessionists claim autonomy Seek to get a piece of a state s territory for its own state 0 rredentist claim that a territory of one state should belong to another state 0 3 causes of war know these they are the same as with international war I Incomplete information gt incentives to misrepresent info I Commitment problems gt expected power shifts security spiral I ndivisibiity gt allornothing state tries to avoid giving into concessions 0 Ultra Bad Boys violent Serbian soccer fans gov t used them as paramil force against Croatia Terrorism 0 quotthe use or threat of use of premeditated politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually to influence an audience 0 3 actors in terrorism perpetrator target and gov t 0 Domestic terrorism Terrorism that doesn t cross international borders 0 All three actors are from and within the same state 0 Transnational terrorism terrorism that crosses international borders 0 One or more of the three actors is from different states 0 Terrorism is declining and terrorists attack politicalbusiness targets 0 Most deadly attacks are done by separatist or nationalist groups 2 explanations for terrorist actions I Terrorists are hatefilled irrational people I Terrorism is the result of bargaining failure due to incomplete information Terrorists think rationally gt they rank alternative outcomes by looking at costs vs benefits 0 Quantify benefits and costs so benefits costs overall gain What may be irrational to us may be part of rational strategy of terrorists ex random attacks Terrorism is an extreme form of quotasymmetrical warfare o Asymmetrical warfare fighting bwn parties of highly unequal military capabilities Extremists have interests that are NOT widely shared by others gt extremists minority group 0 Extremist model bellshaped curve on a graph wextremists at margins Organization of terrorism networks quotcellsquot decentralized I Ex ABCD 0 Communication along the line 0 Ex B knows A and C but not D 0 because of this taking out one member of the cell doesn t do a lot in terms of defeating the whole network Terrorism is a form of bargaining that uses violence to increase costs on the state 0 3 causes of failed bargaining that lead to violence and terrorism I Incomplete information gt terrorists exaggerate strength and resolve I commitment problems gt are terrorists willing to follow thru wdeal terms I indivisibility gt when a party doesn t want to negotiate they will claim that the thing in question is indivisible and this prevent future negotiation attempts bc they want quotallornothing 4 strategies terrorists use to win 0 Coercion Induce policy changes by imposing threats on costs on the other side 0 AVOID having to fulfill coercion threat 0 Costs by using coercion Resources Existential threats Provocation 0 Attack state so that it retaliates in a way that alienates people and makes them sympathize wthe terrorists goal terrorists gain supporters Spoiling o Sabotage peace agreements bwn the target and the leadership of the terrorist home society no peace terrorism can continue good for terrorists Outbidding o 2 or more terrorist groups that have the same interests and are in the same area compete with one another to gain local support Prevent Terrorism deterrence counterterrorism preemptation and negotiation
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