PHIL 241 Extra Credit Final Exam Study Guide
PHIL 241 Extra Credit Final Exam Study Guide PHIL 241
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This 5 page Study Guide was uploaded by Taylor Russell on Wednesday May 4, 2016. The Study Guide belongs to PHIL 241 at University of Arizona taught by William Leonard in Spring 2016. Since its upload, it has received 12 views. For similar materials see Consciousness and Cognition in PHIL-Philosophy at University of Arizona.
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Date Created: 05/04/16
Taylor Russell PHIL 241 Lecture Summaries 4/14 Property Dualism The Zombie argument o David Chalmers’ updated version of the conceivability argument o Zombies are unconscious human duplicates o Physical facts are not substantial, there are still some questions to be answered about consciousness Zombies are ideally conceivable What is conceivable is metaphysically possible Zombies are metaphysically possible...therefore it is possible for a brain to exist without consciousness…therefore conscious is not anything physical The Knowledge argument o It seems inconceivable that physical facts are explanatory of consciousness Science tells us only about the physical features and structure of the world Consciousness is intrinsic feature of the world Science does not explain consciousness o Structural features: relational properties characterize how parts of a system are related 4/19 Property Dualism Cont’d Intrinsic features: characterize what the stuff in a system is like Scientific law does not describe what a substance is like Explanatory gap o Gap between the physical, scientific qualia and the phenomenal features like consciousness o Physical features are structural properties, therefore nonstructural properties are nonphysical properties o So therefore there is a need for science of consciousness…property dualism?? Nonreductive approach o David Chalmers o Must explain how consciousness relates to the physical world already described o “the ontology of physics had to be expanded” to explain electromagnetic phenomena o Electromagnetic forces were irreducible to physics already known to man o So we propose the expansion in the context of consciousness Principles of the science of Consciousness o Structural Coherence There is a direct correspondence between structural awareness and the conscious experience Ability to discriminate, categorize, integrate info, focus on aspects, control behavior (gives us a functional structure) 4/21 Property Dualism Cont’d Visual processing Variation in color corresponds to variation in visual processing structures o Organizational invariance Systems with same functional organization have the same conscious experience Chalmers suggested replacing neurons with silicon chips (??) Nonreductive functionalism: conscious experience arises from functional structure, but it is not identically the same thing as the functional structure o Doubleaspect theory of information A physical and nonphysical, experiential aspect to information Organizational structure of a system that gives rise to consciousness: informational content Correspondence of structural awareness and structure of experiential awareness, they bear the same info Future directions o Does it entail epiphenomenalism? Yes and no, it is counterintuitive… but not obviously false Chalmers 4/26 Representationalism Definition: o Conscious states all represent the world around us, no change in consciousness without a change in representation Reductive Representationalism o 1. Consciousness arises from representational content o 2. We can understand representational content in naturalistic terms o 3. We can understand consciousness in naturalistic terms NonReductive Representationalism o 1. Consciousness arises from representational content differ in kind of representational content in naturalistic terms Arguments against o Veridicality Veridical=accurate, non veridical experiences are things like hallucinations of illusions Ordinary experience is typically veridical ALL experiences evaluated for accuracy, therefore they all have representational content o Transparency The only introspectible features of conscious states are representational features Any other features of consciousness…also introspectible Therefore, conscious state is only representational info o Seeming Representational content of your own consciousness is the way the world seems to you If conscious state changes, your world seems to change If conscious state remains the same, your world doesn’t seem to change If the way the world seems changes, then conscious state has changed Therefore, conscious states cant change without change in representational content 4/28 Representationalism Cont’d o Nonrepresentational mental states o Some conscious states have no representational content o Representationalism is false Other appeals: mood Pleasure Elation Depression Anxiety Other appeals: experiences Pain Tickling Orgasm Smell (?) o Same representational content o Same representation, even though they are in different conscious states o Therefore, change in consciousness and no change in representational content Barack Obama picture example Square Grid example Response of representationalist o Argue there is a change in representational content Changing focus Differences in information processing when looking at the same figure Basically they just argue that there always is a representational content change Arguments for representationalism o Two theoretical dimensions: 1. What is it for M to represent something in the right way? (Representational theory of consciousness) Higher order representationalism: M must be represented by another state M o HOT theory: “M is conscious just in case M non inferentially causes a belief that I am in M” Noninferentially…forming the beliefe on your own Selfrepresentationalism: M must represent itself Sameorder representationalism: M’s content must be available to guide thought/ action o Even if you think this is bs, when we explain the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness you must use this representational content 2. What is it for M to represent something? (Psychosemantics) o Rosenthal’s Reportability argument If M is conscious, I am able to report its content If I can report this content, I have HOT that I am in M Cannot report content of unconscious M Therefore, if I can not report content I have no HOT that I am in M. abductive argument o M's being conscious just is M's being targeted by a HOT o Highway hypnosis case Reason for unconscious driving from point A to point B without active attention You unconsciously drove because during that time period no Higher Order Thought was attributed o Blindsight Still able to navigate through objects without the use of their visual experience HOT explanation: first order visual state, cortical damage prevents HOT about the visual state, so the experiences are unconscious o Evolutionary Argument (abductive argument) claims that the ability to have higherorder thoughts would confer reproductive benefits on an organism Arguments against HOT o Is unconscious sensory experience possible? According to HOT, we can have sensory experiences that are unconscious But we cannot have sensory experiences that are unconscious Therefore, HOT is false o Dog argument
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