Crim C163 - Midterm 2 Study Guide
Crim C163 - Midterm 2 Study Guide Crm/Law C163
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This 10 page Study Guide was uploaded by Edward Avakian on Friday May 13, 2016. The Study Guide belongs to Crm/Law C163 at University of California - Irvine taught by Geoff Ward in Spring 2016. Since its upload, it has received 35 views. For similar materials see Ethics and Politics of Justice in Criminology and Criminal Justice at University of California - Irvine.
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Date Created: 05/13/16
05/14/2016 ▯ Week 5: Studies of Power Punishment ▯ ▯ • Wiltermuth & Flynn introduce the following concepts. Explain what each refers to: moral awareness, moral attentiveness, and moral clarity. ▯ ▯ Moral awareness → deals with the extent to which an individual can recognize an ethical dilemma ▯ ▯ Moral Attentiveness → deals with whether we act on the moral judgment (by engaging in ethical minimalism) doing the least. Extent to which individual considers morality in actions ▯ ▯ Moral clarity → regards the certainty of an individual being right or wrong (regards how power clouds judgment) ▯ ▯ • What do Wiltermuth & Flynn find regarding the link between power over others and moral clarity? ▯ In their research Wiltermuth & Flynn find that there is a direct connection between having power over others and exhibiting a clouded overall judgment. They argue that as the amount of power an individual has increases so to does one’s moral clarity and certainty. By moral certainty they are referring to the fact that people with power see things as being “black or white” and with less complexity when making a judgment. ▯ ▯ • What conclusions do they draw regarding the legitimacy of the punishment ideals of more powerful actors, and steps organizations and society in general should take to legitimize punishment practices? ▯ ▯ Their conclusions on punishment ideals and the steps society should take to legitimize punishment practices are ▯ ▯ • How do punishment strategies of cab drivers relate to their vulnerability as solo practitioners? ▯ ▯ Punishment strategies such as neglecting to help a cab driver in need, not informing a cab driver about a client’s location, and breaking ties with certain cab drivers, are all examples of street justice that these drivers practice. As solo practitioners cab drivers impose their own street rules and develop a set of accepted norms to which by they abide during their workday in an effort to collectively establish a sense of unity, a form of justice, and a collective social contract. Punishments are needed in order to promote street justice “on the frontier”, since their is no legal jurisdictional procedure that would punish cab violators, it is up to other cab drivers to preserve the ethics of cab driving when there is deviance. ▯ ▯ • Hoffman notes “instrumental” and “affective” justice agendas of cab drivers. What are these (describe) and how do they relate to interests of cab drivers (i.e., what they need to do their work)? ▯ ▯ Hoffman claims that cab drivers have both instrumental and effective justice agendas. These two categories are closely tied to relational and distributive justice. Cab drivers share norms about ensuring sufficient safety in their work environment and fairness in how passengers and other cab drivers are conduct themselves among each other. Sometimes the cabdrivers enforce their ethic of street justice by punishing those inside or outside the organization who violate these norms; other times street justice demands that the cabdrivers rescue another driver, possibly risking their own safety or income. Taxicab drivers enact street justice both alone and collectively, like the cowboys sometimes working alone, but coming together with other cowboys on occasion to see that justice is done. ▯ ▯ Week 6: Libertarianism and Distribute Justice ▯ ▯ What does social justice generally refer to (i.e., what does the term mean or inquire into?) ▯ ▯ Social justice refers to the idea that everyone deserves equal economic, political and social rights and opportunities. Social justice aims to establish a sense of overall equity, in that people should receive the same opportunities as others to achieve desired needs ▯ ▯ Describe the general idea of Libertarianism and the position Libertarians are likely to take on the specific problem of economic inequality, according to Sandel. ▯ ▯ Libertarianism refers to the idea of free will and that a true free state is expressed by having as minimal government intervention as possible in the lives, rights, and desires of people, so long as the state ensures basic civil liberties equally among people. Libertarianism is in favor of a free market, which is one in which there minimal government interference. When it comes to economic inequality, libertarians believe that the fact that people are experiencing this form of inequality is not unjust so long as this inequality did not come about because of fraud or coercion. ▯ They highlight the fact that the free market will determine what is fair and that the government should not take from the rich to give to the poor, because it is ethically wrong to take one’s liberty (property). ▯ According to Sandel, the state should not impose on the rich to help the poor, highly against paternalism ▯ ▯ ▯ Libertarians might object to wealth redistribution on utilitarian and deontological grounds. How so? ▯ ▯ Libertarians would argue that wealth redistribution is inefficient from a utilitarian perspective because it undermines the incentive to work hard and productively, thereby decreasing the overall efficiency of the market system. ▯ From a deontological perspective, libertarians argue that is ethically wrong for the government to take the wealth of the rich to give to the poor because one should not be subject to the denial of their liberty (whether there is utility or not, it is wrong to take other’s liberties) ▯ ▯ Discuss the “minimal state” envisioned by Libertarianism. What are its key limits or restrictions? ▯ ▯ The minimal state envisioned by Libertarianism involves a state in which there is minimal interference government interference in the free will of people. This minimal state involves having the state ensure national defense, security, and in a very limited way, fairness ▯ It should not engage in personal matters (no paternalism) → provided there are no third parties are harmed ▯ No morals legislation: do not impose notions of virtue or other moral convictions of majorities (example of prostitution) ▯ ▯ What is Rawls’ overarching objective or goal in developing a theory of justice? ▯ ▯ In developing the theory of justice, Rawls hopes to point to the basic structure of society and the way it allocates rights and duties, income and wealth, power and opportunities. ▯ ▯ Sandel stresses Rawls’ understanding that a social contract may not be fair, and the need to clarify what fair terms of a Social Contract would be (or, what terms would emerge if negotiated fairly). Discuss autonomy and reciprocity as concerns related to the fairness of contractual terms ▯ ▯ Autonomy as a concern of fairness deals specifically with free will, whereby individuals consensually agree to contracts and undergo certain acts that are specified by this contract. Although contracts are consensually accepted, they may not be completely fair. The idea here is that an individual had the fair opportunity to make a choice based on will and not coercion thereby asserting their consent no matter the overall true fairness of the contract. ▯ In terms of reciprocity, the obligation to repay others for the benefits they provide us. Some agreements, though voluntary, are not mutually beneficial. And sometimes we can be obligated to repay a benefit simply on grounds of reciprocity, even in the absence of a contract. This points to the moral limits of consent: In some cases, consent may not be enough to create a morally binding obligation; in others it may not be necessary. ▯ ▯ ▯ o Discuss the objection to “meritocracy” (whether by virtue of effort or natural ability) as a morally arbitrary (random) basis for justifying inequality. ▯ ▯ Meritocracy attempts to remedy unfairness by claiming that people who put in more work deserve more. Rawls believes that the meritocratic conception addresses some of the randomly distributed advantages, but still falls short of justice. Even though you give everyone same shot, others will still have advantages. ▯ Rawls critiques the meritocratic system by claiming that it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by natural distribution of abilities and talents, thereby not producing a just distribution, thus producing inequality ▯ ▯ To reach his theory of “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls’ introduces eight “fundamental ideas.” Discuss at least two of these, including how they relate to his theory of justice (whether as a project generally or its specific claims). ▯ ▯ Difference principle: only those social and economic inequalities are permitted that work to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society. It corrects the unequal distribution of talents endowments without handicapping the talented. In essence, the difference principles is an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be ▯ Rawls theory is not meant to assess the fairness of this or that person’s salary, it is concerned with the basic structure of society, and the way it allocates rights and duties, income and wealth, power and opportunities (question if gate’s wealth arose as a part of a system that as a whole works to the benefit of the least well off). ▯ 1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. ▯ 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. ▯ 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. ▯ 4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. ▯ 5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reason other than self. ▯ 6. Peoples are to honor human rights. ▯ 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. ▯ 8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime ▯ ▯ ▯ ▯ What is the “veil of ignorance,” and what is its role in Rawls’ theory of justice? ▯ Rawls believes that people choosing principles to govern their fundamental life prospects would take such chances. Unless they knew themselves to be lovers of risk ( a quality blocked from view by veil of ignorance), people would not make risky bets at high stakes. ▯ Veil of ignorance: it’s saying that we can only relate to the thought of experiment that Rawls uses to arrive at his theory of justice (we cannot ask people agree upon principles of justice if we just let them argue from their actual position because we are all bias ) we would advocate for principles that would benefit us ▯ ▯ Rawls contends that if “rational persons concerned to advance their interests” found themselves in this type of Original Position, they would agree to a Social Contract in which there existed an equal distribution of liberties and social goods. As an illustration, he describes the following situation: ▯ the parties to the Social Contract being drawn up will want make certain that —no matter what physical, mental, economic, or social condition they wind up with in the coming society— they will get a fair share of the things they need to make for themselves a good life. Rawls calls these necessary things Primary Social Goods, and they include: 1) Rights and Liberties, 2) Powers and Opportunities, 3) Income and Wealth, and 4) conditions for Self-Respect. ▯ “These Primary Social Goods “are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these values is to everyone’s advantage. ”Rawls says that the parties to the Social Contract will eventually reason their way to a pair of fundamental laws that he calls the Two Principles Of Justice: ▯ 1 — each person will be given the most extensive basic liberties possible without intruding upon the liberties of others, and nd ▯ 2 — there will be equal opportunity for everyone to climb the economic and/or social ladder and that any social or economic inequalities that are allowed must be arranged so that they improve the access to Primary Goods for the Least Advantaged. ▯ ▯ ▯ What are the three principles of his resulting theory of justice as fairness? What aspect of society are they directed toward or focused upon, and why? ▯ ▯ Theory of justice- he argues that the way to think about justice is to ask what principles we would agree to in an initial situation of equality ▯ ▯ Rawls’ idea of social contract → ▯ Veil of ignorance → ▯ The first provides equal basic liberties for all citizens, such as freedom of speech and religion. This principles takes priority over considerations of social utility and the general welfare ▯ The second principle concerns social and economic equality. Although it does not require an equal distribution of income and wealth, its permits only those social and economic inequalities that work to the advantage of the least well off members of society ▯ Autonomy and reciprocity? ▯ Benefit-based theory → idea that an obligation to repay a benefit can arise without consent is morally plausible in the case of Hume’s house. But it can easily slide into high-pressure sales tactics and other ▯ ▯ ▯ Week 7: Deliberative Theories of Justice ▯ ▯ What are at least two general critiques of the “distributive logic” of social justice? ▯ ▯ One of the major critiques is that the distributive logic promotes de- differentiation and thus not acknowledge or affirm difference (undermine difference) ▯ The first is socioeconomic injustice, which is rooted in the political- economic structure of society. ▯ Redistribution claims, in contrast, often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity. Thus they tend to promote group de-differentiation. The upshot is that the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution appear to have mutually contradictory aims. Whereas the first tends to promote group differentiation, the second tends to undermine it. The two kinds of claim thus stand in tension with each other; they can interfere with, or even work against, one another. ▯ ▯ In the real world, to be sure, political economy and culture are mutually intertwined, as are injustices of distribution and recognition. ▯ ▯ What are the roots of socio-economic injustice (briefly explain). What do these terms refer to: ▯ The first is socioeconomic injustice, which is rooted in the political- economic structure of society. ▯ ▯ What are the roots of cultural or symbolic injustice (briefly explain). What do these terms refer to: ▯ any attendant cultural injustices will derive ultimately from that economic root ▯ In the real world, to be sure, political economy and culture are mutually intertwined, as are injustices of distribution and recognition. ▯ It only exists as a collectivity by virtue of the reigning social patterns of interpretation and evaluation, not by virtue of the division of labour. Thus, any structural injustices its members suffer will be traceable ultimately to the cultural-valuational structure. The root of the injustice, as well as its core, will be cultural misrecognition, while any attendant economic injustices will derive ultimately from that cultural root. At bottom, therefore, the remedy required to redress the injustice will be cultural recognition, as opposed to political-economic redistribution. ▯ ▯ Exploitation- having fruits of one’s labor appropriated for benefits, we don’t enjoy the benefits ▯ ▯ Economic marginalization: being confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labor altogether ▯ ▯ Deprivation: being denied an adequate material standard of living (housing, health) ▯ ▯ Cultural domination: being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and alien or hostile to one’s own ▯ ▯ Non-recognition: being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretive practices of one’s culture ▯ ▯ Disrespect: being routinely maligned disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and or in everyday life ▯ ▯ ▯ § What are the key differences between remedies of redistribution vs. recognition? (contrast objectives in terms of promoting social justice) ▯ ▯ § What is the “redistribution-recognition dilemma”? ▯ With the decentering of class, diverse social movements are mobilized around cross-cutting axes of difference. Contesting a range of injustices, their claims overlap and at times conflict. Demands for cultural change intermingle with demands for economic change, both within and among social movements. Increasingly, however, identity-based claims tend to predominate, as prospects for redistribution appear to recede. The result is a complex political field with little programmatic coherence. ▯ People who are subject to both cultural injustice and economic injustice need both recognition and redistribution. ▯ ▯ ▯ ▯ What are “bivalent collectivities”? Explain and give an example of such a group and its bivalence. ▯ ▯ Imagine a conceptual spectrum of different kinds of social collectivities. At one extreme are modes of collectivity that fit the redistribution model of justice. At the other extreme are modes of collectivity that fit the recognition model. In between are cases that prove difficult because they fit both models of justice simultaneously. ▯ ▯ ▯ § What is the key difference between remedies of affirmation and remedies of transformation, in terms of their objectives and likely impacts? ▯ ▯ ▯ § Fraser argues that affirmation remedies reinforce subordination. Why or how so? ▯ ▯ ▯ § What does Fraser mean when proposing we “finesse” the redistribution-recognition dilemma? What is a practical means of doing so? ▯ ▯ when we situate the problem in this larger field of multiple, intersecting struggles against multiple, intersecting injustices ▯ the combination of socialism and deconstruction will again prove superior to the other alternatives. ▯ First, the arguments pursued here for gender and ‘race’ hold for all bivalent collectivities. Thus, insofar as real-world collectivities mobilized under the banners of sexuality and class turn out to be more bivalent than the ideal-typical constructs posited above, they too should prefer socialism plus deconstruction. And that doubly transformative approach should become the orientation of choice for a broad range of disadvantaged groups ▯ In general, then, as soon as we acknowledge that axes of injustice cut across one another, we must acknowledge cross- cutting forms of the redistribution–recognition dilemma. And these forms are, if anything, even more resistant to resolution by combinations of affirmative remedies than the forms we considered above. For affirmative remedies work additively and are often at cross-purposes with one another. Thus, the intersection of class, ‘race’, gender, and sexuality intensifies the need for transformative solutions, making the combination of socialism and deconstruction more attractive still. ▯ Our best efforts to redress these injustices via the combination of the liberal welfare state plus mainstream multiculturalism are generating perverse effects. Only by looking to alternative conceptions of redistribution and recognition can we meet the requirements of justice for all. ▯ ▯ ▯ ▯
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