Soc M138 study guide for take home final
Soc M138 study guide for take home final Sociology M138
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● Discuss racial and gender disparities in ○ Homicide rates in general by sex ■ men are 4 times as likely to be murdered than women (similar to offender statistics) ■ About 80% of men are victims of homicide yearly ■ Demographics: more male homicide victims and perpetrators, majority are black perpetrators ages 1824/2534yr olds are victims ■ Intimate homicide victimization: females are more likely to be the victim than men within an intimate relationship ○ Homicide rates in general by race ■ black homicide victims increase then decrease (similar for offenders), whereas the rate for whites remains constant→ refer to in class lecture slides ■ Interintra racial homicide: 83% of blacks were killed by blacks, 84% of whites were killed by whites (check slides) ■ Offenders: big peak after 1993, a majority are young african male ○ Alexa Cooper and Erica L. smith ■ the homicide rate doubled from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, increasing from 4.6 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1962 to 9.7 per 100,000 by 1979 ( gure 1). (See Methodology for information on rate calculations.) ■ In 1980 the rate peaked at 10.2 per 100,000 and subsequently fell to 7.9 per 100,000 in 1984. ■ The rate rose again in the late 1980s and early 1990s to another peak in 1991 of 9.8 per 100,000. ■ Characteristics 19802008: ■ Blacks were disproportionately represented as both homicide victims and offenders. The victimization rate for blacks (27.8 per 100,000) was 6 times higher than the rate for whites (4.5 per 100,000). The offending rate for blacks (34.4 per 100,000) was almost 8 times higher than the rate for whites (4.5 per 100,000) (table 1). ■ Males represented 77% of homicide victims and nearly 90% of offenders. The victimization rate for males (11.6 per 100,000) was 3 times higher than the rate for females (3.4 per 100,000).The offending rate for males (15.1 per 100,000) was almost 9 times higher than the rate for females (1.7 per 100,000). ■ Approximately a third (34%) of murder victims and almost half (49%) of the offenders were under age 25. For both victims and offenders, the rate per 100,000 peaked in the 18 to 24 yearold age group at 17.1 victims per 100,000 and 29.3 offenders per 100,000. ○ Trends by age 19802008 ■ increased rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, peaking in 1993 at 12 homicides per 100,000 for teens and 24.8 homicides per 100,000 for young adults. ■ The homicide victimization rate for children under age 14 was the lowest of all age groups, peaking in 1993 at a high of 2.2 homicides per 100,000. By 2004, this rate had declined to the lowest level recorded—1.4 homicides per 100,000—and remained stable through 2008 at 1.5 homicides per 100,000 ( gure 3). ■ The homicide victimization rate for teens (14 to 17 years old) increased almost 150% from 4.9 homicides per 100,000 in 1985 to 12.0 homicides per 100,000 in 1993. Since 1993, the victimization rate for teens has declined to 5.1 homicides per 100,000. ■ In 2008, young adults (18 to 24 years old) experienced the highest homicide victimization rate (13.4 homicides per 100,000). ■ In the early 1980s, 25 to 34 yearolds had the highest homicide victimization rate—18.6 homicides per 100,000. By 2008, this rate had fallen to 10.7 homicides per 100,000, a 42% reduction. ■ Homicide victimization rates for adults ages 35 to 49 and 50 or older have remained stable since 1999 at between 5.7 and 5.9 homicides per 100,000 for adults ages 35 to 49 and between 2.5 and 2.7 homicides per 100,000 for adults ages 50 or older. ○ Offending rate for youth ■ The offending rates for teens (14 to 17 years old) and young adults (18 to 24 years old) increased dramatically in the late 1980s while the rates for older age groups declined ( gure 4). ■ From 1980 to 2008, young adults (18 to 24 years old) have consistently had the highest offending rate. This rate nearly doubled from 1985 to 1993, going from 22.1 offenders per 100,000 young adults to 43.1 offenders per 100,000. ■ Since 1993, the offending rate for 18 to 24 yearolds has declined to 24.6 offenders per 100,000 in 2008 ■ The offending rate for teens (14 to 17 years old) increased substantially from 10.4 offenders per 100,000 in 1985 to 30.7 offenders per 100,000 by 1993. After 1993, the rate fell so much that by 2000, the offending rate for teens was near its 1985 level,at 9.5 offenders per 100,000. ■ The offending rates for adults ages 35 to 49 and 50 or older have remained relatively stable since 2000, at between 4.8 and 5.1 offenders per 100,000 for adults age 35 to 49 and between 1.3and 1.5 offenders per 100,000 for adults age 50 or older. ○ Gang related 19802008 ■ A quarter of the victims (24%) of gangrelated homicides were under age 18. Juveniles were also a fifth (19%) of persons killed by family members, and they represented more than a quarter(28%) of persons killed by arson or by poison (table 2). ○ Children under age 5 19802008 ■ black children under age 5 declined 36% between 1993 and 2008, dropping from 11.3 homicides per 100,000 in 1993 to 7.2 homicides per 100,000 in 2008 ( gure 8). ■ black children under age 5 have remained substantially higher than rates for white children or children of other races. ■ white children under age 5 remained relatively stable between 1980 and 1990, with an average rate of 2.4 homicides per 100,000. The rate rose to 2.8 homicides per 100,000 by 1996, then dropped down to 2.1 homicides per 100,000 in 2006. Since 2006 the rate has risen slightly to 2.3 homicides per 100,000 in 2008. ○ Most of the victims and offenders of homicides involving children under age 5 were male, 19802008 ■ Since 1980, the number of homicides involving male children under age 5— ■ killed by male offenders increased dramatically in the early 1990s before dropping in 1997 ( gure 11) ■ followed a similar pattern for female victims killed by male offenders, although the changes were less pronounced. ○ Elders 19802008 Most are male ■ Between 1980 and 2008, males accounted for nearly 6 out of 10 homicide victim's age 65 or older. ■ Since 2000 the number of homicides involving elderly males (age 65 or older) has increased slightly, while the number involving elderly females has decreased ○ Trends by sex 19802008 ■ Males were nearly 4 times more likely than females to be murdered in 2008 ( gure 15). ■ The homicide victimization rate for both males and females was at its highest in 1980—16.1 homicides per 100,000 for males and 4.5 homicides per 100,000 for females. By 2008, the rates for both groups had fallen, reaching 8.5 homicides per 100,000 for males and 2.3 homicides per 100,000 for females. ■ Homicide on lending rates for both males and females followed the same general pattern as homicide victimization rates ■ Males were 7 times more likely than females to commit murder in 2008 ( gure 16). ■ The offending rate for females has declined from 3.1 offenders per 100,000 in 1980 to 1.6 offenders per 100,000 in 2008. ■ The offending rate for males peaked in 1991 at 20.8 per 100,000, then fell to a low of 11.3 per 100,000 in 2008. ○ Females and intimate relationships 19802008 ■ Females were more likely than males to be the victim of intimate killings (63.7%) and sexrelated homicides (81.7%) (table 5). ■ Males were more likely to be involved in drug (90.5%) and gangrelated homicides (94.6%). ■ Female murder victims (41.5%) were almost 6 times more likely than male murder victims (7.1%) to have been killed by an intimate (table 6). ■ More than half (56.4%) of male murder victims were killed by an acquaintance; another quarter (25.5%) were murdered by a stranger. ○ Blacks ■ In 2008, the homicide victimization rate for blacks (19.6 homicides per 100,000) was 6 times higher than the rate for whites (3.3 homicides per 100,000). ■ The victimization rate for blacks peaked in the early 1990s, reaching a high of 39.4 homicides per 100,000 in 1991 ( gure 17). ■ After 1991, the victimization rate for blacks fell until 1999, when it stabilized near 20 homicides per 100,000. ■ In 2008, the offending rate for blacks (24.7 offenders per 100,000) was 7 times higher than the rate for whites (3.4 offenders per 100,000) ( gure 18). ■ The offending rate for blacks showed a similar pattern to the victimization rate, peaking in the early 1990s at a high of 51.1 offenders per 100,000 in 1991. ■ After 1991, the offending rate for blacks declined until it reached 24 per 100,000 in 2004. The rate has since fluctuated, increasing to 28.4 offenders per 100,000 in 2006 before falling again to 24.7 offenders per 100,000 in 2008. ○ Drugs and race 19802008 ■ Black victims were overrepresented in homicides involving drugs, with 62.1% of all drugrelated homicides involving black victims. By comparison, 36.9% of drugrelated homicide victims were white and 1% were victims of other races. ■ Compared with the overall percentage of murder victims who were black (47.4%), blacks were less likely to be victims of sexrelated homicides (30.4%), workplace killings (12.5%), or homicides of elders age 65 or older (28.6%) (table 7). ■ While twothirds of drugrelated homicides were committed by black offenders (65.6%), black offenders were less likely to be involved in sexrelated killings (43.4%), workplace homicides (25.8%) or homicides of elders age 65 or older (41.9%) compared to their overall involvement as homicide offenders (52.5%). ○ Interracial murders 19802008 ■ 84% of white victims were killed by whites ( gure 19). ■ 93% of black victims were killed by blacks. ○ Perpetrators vs offenders ■ The offending rate for white male young adults (18 to 24 years old) was 20.4 offenders per 100,000 in 2007 and 2008, which was an alltime low ( gure 22a). ■ Between 1980 and 2008, young adult black males had the highest homicide offending rate compared to offenders in other racial and sex categories. ■ The offending rate for black male teens peaked in 1993 at 246.9 offenders per 100,000 before declining. In recent years, the black male teen offending rate has increased from 54.3 offenders per 100,000 in 2002 to 64.8 offenders per 100,000 in 2008. ■ The offending rate for black male young adults — ● Intimate homicide ○ Nearly 1 out of 5 murder victims (16.3%) were killed by an intimate (table 9). ○ 2 out of 5 female murder victims were killed by an intimate. ○ The percentage of males killed by an intimate fell from 10.4% in 1980 to 4.9% in 2008, a 53% drop. For females, the percentage killed by an intimate increased 5% across the same period ( gure 26). ○ The percentage of females killed by an intimate declined from 43% in 1980 to 38% in 1995. After 1995, that percentage gradually increased, reaching 45% in 2008. ○ Campbell, Glass, Sharps, Laughon & Bloom,: ○ Women in the US are killed by an intimate partner (married or unmarried) nine times more than by a stranger ○ About 30% of women are killed by an intimate partner than men5.5% who are killed by an intimate partner ○ Rates have decreased in the past 30 years, more for men than for women ○ Rates may be misclassified because there is no category for ex ○ Unemployment seems to be the largest risk factor for IP homicide rather than race ○ • Important risk factors for IPHs after prior domestic violence are gun access, estrangement, threat to kill and threats with a weapon, nonfatal strangulation, and stepchild in the home if a female victim. ○ Risk factors for IP homicidesuicide (almost always a female victim and male perpetrators include prior mental health problems in the perpetrator and the other risk factors true of IP homicide without suicide. ■ Like perpetrators of other homicides, male perpetrators of IP homicides in the United States are disproportionately poor, young, a member of an ethnic minority group, have a history of other violence, and have a history of substance abuse (Weiner, Zahn, Sagi, & Merton, 1990). Resource theory of IPV from sociology may offer a partial explanation. This theory suggests that when a man’s personal resources, such as education, income, job prestige, and community standing, are lower than his spouse’s, he may use violence to decrease the perceived status difference (Howard, 1986; Walker, 1984). Often young ethnic minority males are poorly educated, unemployed, or underemployed in comparison with their female partners (Bowman, 1993; Jaynes & Williams, 1989; NIJ, 1997; M. N. Smith & Brewer, 1990). As a result, a small percentage may resort to violence and eventually murder as a means of exerting power and control to elevate or equalize their status in their intimate relationships. In the 11city intimate partner femicide study (Campbell et al., 2003b), unemployment was the only significant demographic characteristic in the final model, increasing the risk of IP femicide by OR = 4.42, although race and/or ethnicity (being African American in comparison to White or Hispanic/Latino) and low education (less than high school) increased the risk in the bivariate analysis. The apparent increased risk of femicide attributed to race may actually reflect increased risk related to unemployment only; however, because African American men are so much more likely to be unemployed or underemployed in this country, race appears to be a risk factor when unemployment is not considered in the same analysis. ■ Immigration status may also increase the risk for IP femicide for women. Frye et al. (2005) found that the strongest risk factors for being a victim of IP femicide in New York City, in contrast to female victims of murders by other perpetrators, was living in a private residence, having children younger than age 18 years, and being foreign born ■ In every age group females victims were more likely than male victims to have been killed by an intimate (table 10) p19 ● Gang homicides ○ Papachristos ■ Most gang members are between 1728yrs, from poor and isolated communities, majorily african american or latino ■ Most gang members do not kill and those who do, resemble each other demographically and socially ○ Argues that the social structure of gang murder is defined by the manner in which social networks are created and by people’s placement in them ■ Individual murders bw gangs creates an institutionalized network of group conflicts. Within this network, murders spread like an epidemic as gangs evaluate the highly visible actions of others in their networks and negotiate dominance considerations that arise during violent incidents ■ And indeed, despite some variation, we know from these studies that individuals of minority groups, especially males between the ages of 17 and 28, who live in poor, isolated neighborhoods bereft of social and human capital are the most likely perpetrators and victims of murder. Papachristos p75 ■ gang murder is best understood not by searching for its individual determinants but by examining the social networks of action and reaction that create it. Gang members do not kill because they are poor, black, or young or live in a socially disadvantaged neighborhood. They kill because they live in a structured set of social relations in which violence works its way through a series of connected individuals. The gang qua group carries with it a set of extraindividual adversaries and allies that shape individual choices of action, including the selection of murder victims. As corporate actions between groups gang murders do not end with the death of the victim but persist in the organizational memory of the gang, which is governed by norms of retaliation and violent mechanisms of social control. Gang murder occurs through an epidemiclike process of social contagion as competing groups jockey for positions of dominance, and aggregate patterns of murder arise as these individual disputes create a network of group relations that shape future patterns of conflict, collective action, and murder. ■ that gangs are not groups of murderers per se, but rather embedded social networks in which violence ricochets back and forth. Individual murders between gangs create an institutionalized network of group conflict—sustained patterns of interaction—net of any individual’s participation or motive. Within this network, murders spread through a process of social contagion as gangs respond to threats by evaluating the highly visible actions of others in their local networks. Individual murders, especially those public in nature, directly threaten the social status and ranking of groups, thus signaling to the gang and others in the social context that a threat has occurred. Additionally, norms of reciprocity intimately link matters of social status with vengeanceseeking behavior and the desire to avoid subjugation to other gangs. Gangs must constantly (re)establish their social status through displays of solidarity—in this case, acts of violence—which, in turn, merely strengthen these murder networks. p 76 ● Individual gang murders, especially those that are reciprocal in nature, create and sustain group relations by continually defining the nature and direction of intergroup relations. Violence spreads to other gangs as status disputes arise and are settled with violence. What begins as a single murder soon generates a dozen more as it diffuses through these murder networks. P76 ■ [individual gang members attempt to protect their face (reputation) by engaging in criminal activities iefight the bigger man when he is picked on in order to protect his self image ■ Yet, actors in violent exchanges often seek not only to save their lives but also to minimize future victimization and to assert their social standing. Iea pecking contest, a chicken who has won a pecking contest is less likely to be a victim of future attacks bc it has proven its dominance , the losing chicken becomes the victim of future attacks and/or can reestablish dominance by defeating a weaker chicken than itself, through acts of aggression or display of dominance ■ One protects his honor/reputation by engaging in displays of dominance such as acts of aggression. nsults become dangerous bc their consequences directly influence the social standing of the insulted. P 78 ■ Not engaging in violenceOtherwise, the group loses status visa`vis its opponents and others in the network and, in turn, increases the likelihood of subsequent attacks or future victimization. As a result, gang murder is often retaliatory in nature, an attempt at achieving a sort of street justice ■ , the way in which murders spread in the network paints a picture far different from just one actor killing another. The spread of murder takes on the traits of an epidemic. As one murder occurs, it sets off a chain reaction in the network that results in many more murders across the murder network. Murder, therefore, spreads like a social contagion, but rather than a fashion trend changing what people may wear on their feet, this contagion results in the deaths of many young gang members. ○ Racial disparities ■ Descriptive network analysis reveals distinct racial cleavages of these murder networks. Black gangs interact within a highly active and densely connected network, whereas Hispanic gangs exist in a diffuse starlike network with a clearly identified center of power. Both networks are conducive to contagion, but the black network is more resilient to external shocks. Furthermore, a positive and direct correlation exists between network exposure and activity, regardless of network structure: the more a gang is on the receiving end of murder (indegree), the higher its total murderous output (outdegree). P116 ○ Racial and ethnic differences in social structures ■ Figure 1 shows a densely connected network among black gangs with several highly active groups and a sparsely connected, starlike network of Hispanic gangs with a single gang at the center. White gangs are only peripherally connected in the larger network and Asian gangs are completely isolated, and, for these reasons, they are largely excluded from the remainder of the analysis.20 On average, each gang in the network is involved in approximately three homicides. It is here, however, that racial differences become most apparent. Black gangs are three times more actively involved in murders than Hispanic gangs: black gangs, on average, are involved in 5.21 homicides whereas Hispanic gangs are involved in 1.46. ■ Density is a basic network property that reflects the overall connectedness of actors: the more connected the social units, the greater the network density. The density of the total network, measured as the proportion of ties present of all possible ties, is 0.065: approximately 7% of all ties that are possible are present.21 Disaggregated by race, the black gang network is more than five times as dense ( ) as the Hispanic D p 0.304 network ( ).22 D p 0.058 Such differences in density create local (intraracial) networks that affect the structure of gang relations, as well as the diffusion of violence within these networks. ● In epidemiological terms, the black murder network looks similar to a “core infection” model in which highly active and interrelated groups continually (re)infect each other and then infect others in the periphery (see Laumann and Youm 1999). Although some gangs may be more active than others, as discussed in the next section, each group is engaged in murders with multiple gangs. Moreover, more than 35% of all relations are reciprocal. This suggests that interaction flows quickly because actors consistently interact and are sensitive to changes in the local network. ● The highly public nature of gang homicide and the density of such networks further imply that others in the network would be aware of failure to respond to local threats. The failure to respond is therefore easily conveyed and interpreted in the action (or inaction) of highly visible alters.23 The result is a local network structure that looks like small feuding nationstates with persistent conflict between multiple groups. P93 ■ Gang falls apart when removing the central hub ● Much of the activity in the Hispanic network happens within the large component centered on a single gang, the Latin Kings (node 21), at the center of the starlike structure. In short, the Latin Kings hold the network together and act as a significant point source of diffusion. While such a structure is highly efficient for the diffusion of violence, it is also extremely fragile. The removal of the Latin Kings would break this graph into eight smaller subgraphs, essentially reducing it to five isolates not involved in any homicides, two dyads, and a small spanning tree component of 10 gangs that is itself extremely fragile. P94 ■ Multivariate analysis provides evidence that prior network structure and competition for dominance disputes significantly predict the presence of a murder between gangs as well as reciprocity. With respect to dominance, it appears that murder—reciprocal or otherwise—is more likely to occur between gangs with greater amounts of turf overlap. As seen in some of the qualitative evidence, turf disputes are less about a parcel of land than about a gang’s status and perceived dominance, and thus, greater overlap will have greater consequences on the social standing of the conflicting gangs. Truck, a member of the New Breed, describes the importance of turf this way: ● Truck: Shit, if a nigga’ steps to you, tries to take what is yours, what he’s really doing is seeing what you’re made of. Got it? It’s like this: say, some crew [gang] rolls up and tries to take your spot [street corner hangout]. They’s disrespecting you on your ’hood, you gots to step up [retaliate]. That’s, like, the worst fucking thing they could do. Author: Does the spot really matter that much? Truck: Man, ain’t you listening? It ain’t about no fucking corner. I mean, yeah, it’s about corner, but, fuck the corner—it’s about not looking like a punk [weak]. If you a punk, a corner ain’t going to help, see. Plenty of bitches [gangs perceived as weak or of lesser status] got corners they can’t keep. What good is a corner to them? You can only keep a corner if you down [loyal to the gang] and everyone knows you and your mob [gang] are down too. If people know you’re solid [strong/willing to fight], and that you and your boys [gang friends] [are willing to] throw down [fight], then you be all right. You’re straight. You got your corner and your rep [reputation]. That’s just the way it is. p116117 ● Truck’s remarks and those of the gang members throughout this article highlight the importance of turf not just as an economic or political resource, but as an essential determinant of social standing. Turf disputes are occasions in which gangs struggle for dominance. What is more, turf’s symbolic value is contingent on the ability of a group to fight and avoid subservience to other groups. The regression findings demonstrate that when two gangs share greater degrees of contested turf, they are more likely to engage in lethal violence and reciprocate when murder does occur. p117→ the gift of murder must be returned in order to establish one's position in the network / reciprocity requires retribution, gang violence is a product of dominance disputes . a gang’s pattern of murder reflects its position in the social network ■ Gang murder in Chicago is not merely an outcome resulting from the convergence of individual or ecological variables. It is a consequential action that shapes intergroup relations, the product of dominance disputes that perpetuate murderous interactions over time. The groups are not a set of pedagogical constructs, but are readily identifiable by name, geography, and history. The Gangster Disciples engage the Four Corner Hustlers in battles over social standing, and the Latin Kings and Two Six go to war over verbal and physical insults. In short, there is an order to gang murder evident in the social networks created through individual transactions that manifest themselves in the relations among and between actors p118 ○ School shootings ■ Mostly done by white men ■ Majority of troubled youth are poor ● People need to be marginalized ● Psychosocial problems magnify students marginality ● Failure of surveillance problems ● Availability of guns ● Cultural script on how to do something: a masculine solution to ameliorate an inferior social position, and how to carry the solution through a shooting ■ Cultural script ● People are educated on School shootings by the public through means such as the social media and popular culture, ■ Kiilakoski: This article argues that youth subcultures need to be emphasized in order to understand school shootings. recently , the Goth subculture, music, violent videos etc have been the point of reference for joining youth crime. Through this, teenagers create a cultural script: a schema which organizes an individual’s understanding of school violence and allows that person to have expectations about the nature of the event ● analyze the cultural meaning system related to school shootings and study how school shooters use cultural products including books, films and music to create what some authors have called the ‘cultural script of school shootings’ P 248 ■ Newman argues that in order for the cultural script to have an impact, youth have to be troubled and have access to weapons ● The cultural script portrays a masculine position to improve an inferior social position (seen in films) . the script describes a shooting as a solution to one's problems and as a guide to conduct the shooting and gain fame by using a specific media strategy ■ Conclusion: teens emulate the cultural script in the media, are fans of it; shooters see themselves in the script and may modify it → shootings become searches for fame ■ The American author Julie A. Webber argues that we need to understand that school shootings are embedded in social practices in schools and in society. School shooters were angry at the entire environment of the school (Webber, 2003: 18, 195). School becomes a symbol of what is wrong in one’s life. School shootings, if anything, relate to agency. Acting out violence restores the subjective meaning that has perhaps been lost. How to act violently relies on the existing script which offers both the general justification for violence and examples of how to wreak havoc and gain notoriety. The script also offers points of reference (such as films, music and quotes) which one can use to associate oneself with the imagined community of school shooters and to create an individual image and identity with which one can hope and fantasize—to quote a KMFDM song the Jokela shooter used as a soundtrack for his manifesto—to ‘be godlike’. ● The Jokela shooter referred to the limited potential of the individual in his manifesto but was hopeful that his ‘actions will inspire all the intelligent people of the world and start some sort of revolution against the current systems’. Images of martyrdom and Robin Hoodtype defenders of the poor, the meek and the downtrodden contribute to the fact that at least some shooters see themselves as part of the ongoing struggle and thus contribute to the existing cultural script of school shootings. p25 ○ Suicide terrorism ■ Discussionyouth are trained as terrorists, male ■ Pape argues that people engage in terrorism for political reasons. They do so in order to reach a political goal and are often in a weaker position. People engage in terrorism in order to persuade their target to do what they want. This has lead to drastic political changes as a result. Furthermore, acts of terror are sometimes announced before they take place and the participant is usually idolized and glorified (receive much media attention) ■ Types of terrorism ● Suicide terrorism (check notes) ○ Aggressive and participant does not expect to survive ● If terrorists did not believe that suicide attacks would advance their political goals they would not do it p28 ● Without social support from the terrorists’ national community, suicide terrorism campaigns could not be sustained p28 ● The community has to convince individuals that they must give up their lives for a greater cause, or suicide terrorism would not exist p28 ● Strategy of terrorism is aimed at political coercion , suicide terrorism is a response to foreign occupation (uses the threat of punishment to coerce the government to change its policy part 1 first page) ■ According to Pape, suicide bombers share a number of features: “suicide terrorists are weaker than their opponents, their political goals, if not their tactics, are broadly supported by a distinct national community; the militants have a close bond of loyalty to comrades and devotion to leaders, and they have a system of initiation and rituals signifying an individual’s level of commitment to the community References Campbell, J. C., Glass, N., Sharps, P. W., Laughon, K., & Bloom, T. (2007). Intimate partner homicide review and implications of research and policy.T rauma, Violence, & Abuse, 8 (3), 246269. Cooper, A., & Smith, E. L. (2011). Homicide trends in the United States, 1980–2008. W ashington (District of Columbia): Bureau of Justice Statistics. Kiilakoski, T., & Oksanen, A. (2011). Soundtrack of the School Shootings Cultural Script, Music and Male Rage. Young, 19( 3), 247269. Papachristos, A. V. (2009). Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure of Gang Homicide. American Journal of Sociology , 115 (1), 74128. Pape, R. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism . Random House.
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