Exam 1 Study Guide
Exam 1 Study Guide POLI 150
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This 7 page Study Guide was uploaded by Hadley Ashford on Friday September 16, 2016. The Study Guide belongs to POLI 150 at University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill taught by Menevis Cilizoglu in Fall 2016. Since its upload, it has received 70 views. For similar materials see International Relations in Political Science at University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill.
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Date Created: 09/16/16
POLI 150 Study Guide: Exam 1 Lecture Slide Discussion Questions: - “How can a stable and mutually acceptable system of relations be established between strong and weak states?” o Hegemonic order: one state is the most powerful by far in the world or region of the world, other states basically do what the hegemon says Can have benign hegemons o Balance of power: smaller states form coalitions to counter the power of a larger state o Constitutional order: states form institutions to limit the power of larger nations - “Do you believe that the contemporary world order is hegemonic or constitutional order?” o Hegemonic argument: if the United States (a major power in the world order) were to collapse, the institutions created would fall apart, the economies of other countries would be hit hard, and international security would be negatively affected. Therefore, the global order depends on the US. o Constitutional order argument: if the United States collapsed, the international institutions (ex. UN, IMF, World Bank, etc.) might suffer, but would not completely collapse because there are other major powers that would be able to hold them up. Additionally, the US ties its hands in a sense (limits its own power) when it agrees to certain international institutions. - “Is the United States a hegemon?” o Yes argument: The US is the largest power in the region and the world. It controls the international institutions and basically gets to decide what happens in the international world. For example, it has veto power in the UN Security Council and contributes the most resources/money to it so gets to decide a lot of the resolutions passed. o No argument: Even though the US has a lot of power, one qualification for a hegemon is that other countries begin to form coalitions against it in order to gain some power and autonomy. Other countries haven’t really done this because seem to appreciate the control/security the US provides. - “Is the United States a benign hegemon?” o Yes argument: The US does have a lot of control over international policy, but like the David and Goliath article says, other countries ultimately appreciate the things the US provides. US does things for other countries that don’t necessarily benefit itself. For example, intervening in Syria doesn’t really benefit the US, but it does it for the greater good. o No argument: The US would never agree to anything that isn’t in its own self-interest. Even if it seems to be doing something to benefit another, it still will ultimately benefit the US in a way. - “Why would the US, at the height of its hegemonic power after WWII, agree to institutionalize its power?” o Legitimacy: usually leads to stable structure, tries to appear to be benign hegemon o Reputation: wants other countries to think better of it - “How can institutions facilitate cooperation among its members?” o Reduce uncertainty in interactions, which reduces incentive to defect o Makes agreements more enforceable o Lengthens shadow of future: institutions are usually pretty long lasting, so actors must consider the long-term implications of their actions o Iteration: good chance that actors will be a part of multiple interactions, so must consider how their actions will affect other interactions with same country or other countries - “How can states cooperate with one another despite their incentive to defect?” o Encourage/incentive cooperation Ex. promise cooperation on other deals with cooperation on one deal (issue linkage) o Discourage/punish defection: Ex. impose economic sanctions with defection - “How does cooperation occur among sovereign states and how do international institutions affect it?” o Coordination: actors synchronize actions Easiest form of cooperation Neither actor gets any benefit from defection Ex. deciding which side of the road cars drive on: doesn’t matter which one is decided, but both sides will be harmed if either drives on the wrong side (defects) o Collaboration: actors agree on/support common interests, but contribute different amounts More incentive to defect to get better end of the deal Free-riding: actor uses good/service without paying or contributing Usually happens with public goods (security, clean water, etc.) Collective action problem: know that another actor will shoulder burden, so all have incentive to free ride More actors= more difficult to solve Presence of hegemon= easier to solve because understood that larger power will contribute most - “How well do institutions promote cooperation?” or “What makes some institutions more capable than others?” o Membership: inclusive or exclusive Exclusive institutions promote cooperation more effectively because less members that need to agree and usually have similar interests o Scope: what issues the institution is responsible for Small scope makes institutions more effective because can use all resources for one thing to ensure that best work is done o Centralization: does a single body make decisions/perform tasks? Highly centralized institutions make cooperation easier because less actors have to agree, but then the policies only reflect the interests of the governing body and not of the entire organization o Monitoring/enforcement: extent of ability to punish/reward Institutions with strong ability to enforce policies are more effective because reduces incentives for members to defect - “Why is achieving collective security challenging on an international level?” o Collective action problem: dependent on members for resources Member states face risk when provide resources (especially military), so incentive to free ride Causes many collective security actions to be weak or unsuccessful o Joint decision making: must work together to determine which acts are aggressive and what action to take in response States allowed to use force in self-defense, so collective security organization must decide what is self-defense and what is not Each state’s actions determined by individual interests - “How effective is the UN Security Council?” o Passing resolutions requires unanimous vote from P5 members (Russia, US, UK, France, and China): difficult to coordinate actions, many have conflicting interests o P5 members have incentive to free ride because they can have a lot of power without contributing Ex. Russia doesn’t contribute much, but still has equal power as US (who contributes the most) and has veto power o Has no way to enforce resolutions - “What are the main challenges that the UN is facing? (Patrick)” o Identity: inefficient structure, difficult to coordinate all parts o Relevance: other institutions/organizations are more effective and used more than the UN o Authority: unable to enforce policies o Performance: too overextended, too ambitious, stretched resources - “Can you think of any other challenges?” o Joint decision making: difficult for UN members to agree because many have competing interests - “How must the UN / UNSC adapt to remain relevant in the current international system?” o Must make P5 reflect current world order Ex. make Germany a member o Must make it easier to get rid of obsolete organizations within system - “What are the conditions under which the UNSC is effective?” o Common interest of P5 members o Peacekeeping missions Difficult for any one nation to publicly oppose these because will make them look bad Usually non-violent, so less risk - “What actions by ISIS suggest that its leaders have ambitions of state-creation or state- building?” o Create/enforce sharia law that resembles state law o Try to acquire territory to be internationally considered a state Don’t have legitimate claim to territory, so can’t officially be considered state Difficult to implement Islamic law in contested territory Current Events from Class: - 8/30/16: Peace negotiations between Columbian government and FARC, set to sign agreement in September o US and Cuba are involved o UN also an actor- FARC weapons will be turned over to UN if they sign agreement o International law= issue because many FARC crimes will go unpunished o Disproves realist theory: shows that not only national/state actors are important FARC is a criminal organization, not a state actor and is extremely important in international relations o What challenges may prevent agreement? Realist idea of distrust: difficult for each group to trust that other will follow through with agreement Commitment problem: difficult for actors to promise to follow through and be certain other will as well Can lead to prisoner’s dilemma: both actors try to figure out what other will do o Ex. if FARC disarms, they will be unable to defend themselves if government doesn’t follow through. If FARC doesn’t disarm, the government must fight - 9/1/16: Iranian boat in Persian Gulf came too close to US navy boat o Not first time there have been issues between US and Iranian boats o Institutions prevented escalation security dilemma o Discussion question: What is a possible outcome if these interactions continue? Security dilemma Treaty negotiations Shooting war between US and Iran US-Iranian nuclear deal might fall apart Issue linkage - 9/1/16: first commercial flight to Cuba o Background: US always interested in Cuba (wanted sugar), so bought it from Spain Us put leader in Cuba (Batista) Castro overthrows Batista US put sanction on Cuba- restricted trade Obama recently lifted most of them o Discussion questions: 1. Is this a good deal? Yes, because no one was really benefitted before, US as benign hegemon o Why is it happening now? Obama trying to establish legacy, in light of terrorism it helps to have friends in West - 9/6/16: US and China have both ratified treaty to reduce carbon emissions o Set targets to lower emissions for each country o But no legally binding contract to meet them o Example of liberalism perspective in success of international institutions and cooperation o Incentive to break agreement because increasing emissions can increase economic output o Targets laid out in Paris Agreements o China may be willing to move forward with environmental policy because ratified first (signaling) o US will probably not comply if they think China will not because want to stay economically competitive with China - 9/6/16: Obama cancels plans to meet with President Duerte of Philippines because of some rude public remarks on behalf of Duerte o Philippines has historically bad drug trade o Duerte declared war on drugs after his election Basically calls for vigilante shoot to kill policy Now almost 2,000 dead o Obama wanted to confront Duerte at meeting of Southeast Asian Leaders o Related to concept of US as benign hegemon: benign hegemons only exist when other countries are okay with the order, but looks like Philippines is not okay with it o Related to concept of role that international institutions play in IR: Human Rights Watch asked International Narcotics Control Board and UN Office on Drugs and Crime to speak out against Filipino policy o Discussion: Do remarks against US discredit it as a benign hegemon and what effect might that have on future US-Filipino relations? It adds toward the discredit of US as benign hegemon, but doesn’t completely disqualify it because a larger coalition against US hegemonic rule would have to form - Related to David and Goliath reading: benefits Filipino president to publicly not support US, but still actually likes the things that the US does for them - 9/8/16: IS loses control of Turkish border o Turkish government against Kurdish groups in Syria o Related to game theory o Discussion: Does Turkey have incentive to lie about driving IS out of border? Yes because showing progress against IS may give other countries incentive to help o Discussion: How should US deal with possible conflict between Turkey and YPG (both US allies)? Best/most obvious solution: US mediates conflict to keep both allies If mediation fails, US would have to choose which ally to support (probably Turkey) US could also implement issue linkage to encourage cooperation o Syrian government (Shia) + Russia vs. Syrian rebels (Sunni) + US + Turkey + YPG (Kurds) Has civil war component ISIS taking advantage of unrest- recruiting people and taking territory - 9/8/16: failed attempts at cooperation b/w Russia and US – Obama says “gaps of trust” are preventing cooperation o Related to new “Where is the Love” music video by the Black Eyed Peas Shows that ending terrorism should be common global goal o Related to theme of cooperation o Discussion questions: Why are US-Russia relations so bad? Putin is stubborn world leader Russia is allies with Syria and Iran and US is against them, so US and Russia have very different interests Do you think the music video is effective in increasing public action/support? May increase donations to cause, but isn’t the most effective method o The fact that two strong powers are backing opposing sides is prolonging the conflict - 9/13/16: US and Russia agree to ceasefire agreement o Terms of agreement are vague o Includes caveats and unenforceable provisions o Aleppo citizens say violence still going on after agreement went into effect o After 7 days of compliance, US and Russia will agree on joint decision to fight against ISIS o Cooperation difficult when either side has incentives to defect Uncertainty from unenforceable provisions less trust and incentive to defect US and Russia don’t have complete control over ceasefire Only stops violence between Syrian government and rebels o Is a United Syria realistic after ceasefire? Ceasefire is only a small step Need real peace agreement and enforcement before fighting will end completely “united” Syria is also a vague concept For many people it means democratic elections, which isn’t necessarily realistic o Issue with ceasefire: Actual violence not between Russia and US, so can’t guarantee compliance of Syrian government and rebels But, have very strong influence over each group o Other incentives to defect: Uncertainty about life after ceasefire, but certainty about mutual defection because would be status quo, no huge incentive to comply Worst case scenario= defect-comply (for either side), huge incentive to avoid this outcome by both defecting o No discouragement from defection because agreement not enforceable - 9/15/16: Obama met with new leader of Burma/Myanmar o Promised to lift sanctions put in place to discourage human rights violations o Looked like Burma/Myanmar is taking steps toward democracy o Related to benign hegemony Do sanctions invalidate US as benign hegemon? No, because US was trying to promote human rights and sanctions are peaceful, Invasion would invalidate benign hegemony Why did US choose to impose sanctions instead of just negotiating? Negotiations wouldn’t have worked because obvious that Burmese government doesn’t care about international opinion. Sanctions have more discouragement for defection than negotiations (game theory) o Lifting of sanctions is form of signaling from US that they now recognize Burma as equal/sovereign nation
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