Final: Study Guide
Final: Study Guide PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh
Popular in International Relations
Popular in Political Science
This 25 page Study Guide was uploaded by Erica Kugler on Thursday April 23, 2015. The Study Guide belongs to PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa taught by Dr. Chyzh in Spring2015. Since its upload, it has received 253 views. For similar materials see International Relations in Political Science at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa.
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Date Created: 04/23/15
Final Study Guide Unit 1 War Theory of World Politics 0 World politics international relations how countries and ppl win countries get along 0 Theory set of statements to explain a phenomenon simplify assumptions 0 4 components of a theory 0 Credibility mechanism 0 Reverse causality o Covariation o Spurious relationship a thirdoutside variable influences the two observed variables 0 Probabilistic claims statement about probabilitypercentage of an event occurring 0 Framework of world politics interests interactions and institutions know these three 0 Interests what an actor want s to achieve via political action goalsaims of actors o Fundamental building blocks of political action 0 3 categories of interests I Power or security I Economic or material welfare I Ideological goals 0 Interactions ways in which choices of actors combine to produce political outcomes I Two types cooperation and bargaining o Cooperation actors work together to achieve a preferred outcome 0 Both actors benefit 0 Bargaining distribution of a fixed value in an unequal way 0 One actor benefits at the expense of the other actor o Institutions rules that influence interactions gt facilitate cooperation enforce compliance Interests gt goalsaims of an actor that are achieved via political action 0 3 schools of thought gt Realism Liberalism and Constructivism o Realism I Actor state I Goals enhancemaintain power and security of the state I Focus on relative gains your gains compared to the gains of others I States have noshortlived cooperation bc always looking for new selfserving relationships that maximize relative gains I Institutions no 0 Liberalism I Actors statesindividualsinstitutionstransnational orgs I Goal maximize wealth gt focused on absolute gains 0 Absolute gains no comparison just look at what you will gain from an interaction rather than comparing it with other interactions 0 Looking at absolute gains promotes cooperation I Institutions yes o Constructivism I How one responds to a situation depends on the context 0 Some parts of a situation realism other parts liberalism 0 Actors individuals or groups wcommon interests 0 State central authority wability to make and enforce lawrulesdecisions 0 Failed state countries wa loss of central authority 0 Sovereignty expectation that states have legal and political supremacy win their borders Interactions ways that choices by two or more actors combine to produce a political outcome 0 Strategic interactions each actor s strategy depends on anticipated strategy of other actor 0 Strategy plan of action 0 quotbest response strategy adopt strategies in best response to anticipated strategy of others 0 2 types of interactions 0 Cooperation gt actors work together so that they each get a little bit of the good I Status quo wcooperation is better for both actors than the original status quo o Bargaining gt one actor gets more of the good than the other actor I quotzerosum benefit of one actor countered by cost of the other actor I Actors work together but new status quo favors one actor rather than both 0 Bargaining quotPrisoner s Dilemma gt Analyze possible outcomes of different scenarios I Choose scenario of most benefit to you based on other person s action 0 may NOT be the best of your four possible outcome values but based on what other player will do it is best for you 0 3 obstacles to cooperation o Competing incentives ex game of Chicken 0 Collaboration work together to reach a goal that couldn t be achieved by one actor I Ex Prisoner s Dilemma 0 Coordination standardize actions and rules to avoid conflict ex Stag hunt 0 Factors that facilitate cooperation 0 Number and size of actors gt fewer actors easier and more cooperation 0 Information gt transparency vs secrecy trust vs distrust more vs less cooperation o Iteration repeated action can prevent inaction have reputation to uphold 0 Linkage cooperation on one issue is contingent on cooperation on other issues 0 Power ability of A to get B to do something B would otherwise not do 0 Reversion outcome outcome when no bargain is reached 0 Bargaining power belongs to actors satisfied w or willing to endure the rev outcome 0 Ways to shift Rev Outcome I Coercion gt threat or imposition of costs on others I Outside options gt gives actors the ability to get better deals via alternatives I AgendaSetting Power gt influence options available to other actors o Gives actor was power the ability to act first and dictate an outcome Institutions gt set of rules that structure political interactions UN treaties etc o Facilitate cooperation via enforcement behavior standards compliance solve conflicts 0 Can have policy biases toward some states strongest most internationally influential states Why are there wars 0 reasons for war are NOT the same as causes of war 0 Reasons for war goal or aim that a state wants to achieve 0 Causes of war actions involving achievement of said goal that leads to irreconcilable conflict 0 War is costly and there is always an outcomedeal that two states prefer to war 0 War is more of a rarity in terms of world history ie most countries aren t at war 0 War occurs when bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement gt Failure of crisis bargaining 0 Causes of war 0 Incomplete Information gt lack of info or misunderstanding 0 Commitment Problem gt state can t guarantee future compliance wterms of bargain o ndivisibiity of contested good gt can a good be divided wo losing its value 0 War event involving organized military force by at least two parties that satisfies a minimum threshold of severity I organized force I at least two parties I minimum threshold of severity more than 1000 casualties 0 Interstate war main parties involved are states 0 Civil war main parties involved are actors win states ex govt vs rebel group 0 Wars are fought over things of value gt purpose of war is to obtain the valuable good 0 Interests that lead states to conflict I Territory gt wealth strategic mil value ethnicrelHY ties I Policies gt stop what a country sees as bad govt I Regime type gt oust dangerous govts 0 Crisis bargaining bargain under threat of war gt coercive diplomacy o Bargaining range range on bargaining model where states prefer deals to war I status quo gained by deals is the same as the status quo gained by war 0 States wstatus quo closest to its ideal outcome is less likely to want war 0 39g I3939 quotI 0quot I favorite outcome ideal outcome getting 100 of object in question I p probable outcome of war status quo wwar I x is portion of the object each side gets when war is occurring p c status quo moves in A s favor ie moves closer to A s ideal point 0 state B is more inclined to war I p c status quo moves in B s favor ie moves closer to B s ideal point 0 state A is more inclined to war I area bwn pc and pc bargaining range I Compellence effort to change status quo via force gt quotgive me X or else 0 Deterrence preserve status quo by threatening other side if other side takes an action to change the status quo gt quotdon t do X or else 0 state with status quo closest to its idealfavorite outcome deterrant 0 state with status quo further from its idealfavorite outcome compellent I 3 factors preventing crisis bargaining the 3 things that cause war 0 Incomplete information gt poor info about willingness and ability of states to fight I 2 classes of unknown info 0 Capabilities state s physical ability to bear costs of war 0 Resolve state s willingness to bear cost of fighting 0 Total war all resources are mobilized 0 Limited war not all resources are mobilized I Riskreturn tradeoff tradeoff bwn getting good deal and preventing war I Credibility believability that a threat will be carried out I Brinksmanship gt take actions that put you on slippery slope toward war I Typing hands gt make threatspromises that are hard to back down from 0 Audience costs negative repercussions when a leader backs down 0 Commitment Problems gt inability to promise compliance with deal terms I Things that increase commitment problems 0 good in question is a source of future bargaining power 0 Expected future shift in power gt preventative war 0 firststrike advantage better chance of winning gt preemptive war 0 Preventative and Preemptive war gt difference bwn them time o Preemptive response to imminent threat so act now 0 Preventative anticipate prevent a future threat so act now 0 ndivisible Goods gt good can t be divided wo destroying its value quotallornothing I ndivisibiity isn t usually a physical property but the way the good is valued o Decrease likelihood of war Raise cost of war gt bargaining range expands so deals more likely Domestic Politics and War 0 Reality actors win states make decisions and carryout actions on behalf of the state 0 General national interest interest that most citizens win a country share 0 Narrow particularistic interest interest shared by a few number of actors in a state 0 For every particularistic interest an alternative national interest can be found 0 institutions determine which actors and interests have influence 0 3 kinds of actors leaders organized groups and the public 0 2 types of organized groups 0 Bureaucracy different organizations making up the state s structure mil intel etc 0 Interest Groups groups of individuals wcommon interests that organize to push for policies that benefit their members Role of the public in the actions of states depends on the regime type 0 Democratic regime public is influential o Autocratic regime public has little influence over what the states does Divergenary war war fought to divert public s attention from domestic issues and boost the ratings of the country s leader quotrally effect rise in a leader s popularity in response to an international crisis 0 Tendency of citizens to become more supportive of their govt during times of crisis 0 Scapegoating blame problems of the crisis on a third partyforeign adversary Diversionary incentive o Temptation of leaders to spark conflicts to invoke the rally effect and get public support I quotgambling for resurrection gt Taking a risk war to regain political quotlifequot 0 Usually done before an election 0 BUT international conflicts are mostly started by leaders who are politically secure have high support before the warcrisis begins 0 Problems of diversionary incentive Rally effect is temporary political costs if war lost War amp Special Interest Groups orgs that have a specificspecial interest worth securing 0 Thomas Hobson s theory for Britain s imperialism gt satisfy the economic elites and military 0 Eisenhower quotmilitaryindustrial complex gt Collusion bwn military and industries creates disproportionate influence over politics War amp Bureaucracy gt Foreign policy is shaped by a state s bureaucracy mil is usually hawkish War amp Economic Ethnic Interest 0 Economic motives when an actor s interest depends on events in other countries 0 Ethnic motives ethnic attachment to state A can influence state B s interests Small Groups and Big Influence on Foreign Policy 0 Easier to organize small groups of people to get things done 0 Collective action problem gt quothijackquot policy hijack free ride Bargaining wdovish actors increases the bargaining range deal agreement more likely Bargaining whawkish actors decreases the bargaining range war more likely Bargaining range NEVER disappears gt hawksdoves only change size of the bargaining range Democratic Peace gt theory as to why and which wars democracies get involved in o Dyadic phenomenon Two democratic states are unlikely to fight each other 0 Monadic phenomenon Democracies usually fight nondemocracies Democracy political system in which candidates compete for political office via frequent and fair elections where a sizable portion of the adult population can vote 0 Contestation competition for office 0 Participation engagement in selection process of a leader via voting 0 2 types of democracies liberal illiberal 4 things that uphold the democratic peace theory 0 Institutional Explanation I Cost of war falls on the ruled Public has greater incentive to not want war I Accountability ability to punish or reward leaders for their decisions I Dyadic two democratic govts have actors win them that restrain the leaders I Monadic autocracies lack public restraint so they can provoke a war 0 Normative Explanation I Externalization of state s domestic norm for conflict resolution 0 Democracies look for peace Autocracies use violence and threats 0 Selection Effect I Democracies are selective about the wars they fight bc war is politically costly I Nondemocratic leaders may be willing to gamble ie start a war 0 Bargaining Explanation I Democratic institutions increase transparency decreases risk of preemptive war by sending credible signals of resolve and capabilities 0 quotnear misses crisis bwn two democracies that heated up but not to the point of war 0 Trent Affair 1861 gt US and Great Britain 0 Venezuela Crisis 18951896 gt Great Britain and Venezuela 0 Ruhr Crisis 1923 gt France and Germany 0 number of democracies worldwide is increasing 0 when interests and institutions empower those who bear the cost of war those pplgroups can influence a state and its decision to gonot go to war 0 opennesstransparency decrease risk of war by solving commitmentincomplete info problems International Institutions and War 0 Institutions set of rules that shape political behavior 0 International governance anarchy gt absence of a central govt o 2 types of international institutions alliances and collective security organizations Alliances o quotinstitutions that help members cooperative militarily in the event of war 0 Types of alliances o offensive or defensive I offensive states agree to take action together Power in numbers I defensive states agree to defend one another if attacked o nonaggression pact I states agree to not fight each other ex 1939 NaziSoviet NonAg Pact o consultation I states consult to provide strategy options rather than military forces 0 neutrality I state chooses to stay out of a conflict completely does not favor either side 0 symmetric vs asymmetric I symmetric states in an alliance provide equal resources to the conflict I asymmetric states in an alliance provide unequal resources to the conflict 0 General or specific I General nonspecific alliance wording regarding when a state helps out I Specific specific conditions laid out as to when a state will help another state 0 Public or secretive I Pubic existence of an alliance is publicly known goal deter future attacks I Secretive existence of an alliance kept secret offensive element of surprise 0 Balance of Power Theory of alliances states join together to balance out power of adversary o Bandwagoning behavior gt join conflict on side of likely winner to get postwar spoils o Alliances alter bargaining by influencing states belief about what the third party ally will do 0 Prevent alliance desertionabandonment involve a state s reputation o Abandonment abrogation of an alliance 0 Reputation Typing hands Audience costs publicpolitical punishment 0 Two effects of alliances deter challengers embolden states to demand more from enemy o Alliances are good BUT states look to avoid entrapment state entrapped in unfavorable war Collective Security Institutions CSIs o Institutions of states that work together to facilitate peace and respond to internatl aggression 0 Goal if global status quo is to change make sure it happens peacefully 0 Influence bargaining increase aggressor s costs of war probability of winning favors the victim 0 One way to help solve commitment problems enforcement of agreement terms 0 2 major challenges of collective security collective action and joint decisionmaking o Collective action problem gt free riding is a problem 0 Joint decisionmaking problem gt more states harder to communicate and cooperate o Dilemmas are averted when states are agree upon a common status quo 0 UN gt decisionmaking power is held by the Security Council 0 10 nonpermanent members 5 permanent members P5 have veto power I Veto power of the P5 gives way to biased policy outcomes gt quotstatus quo bias 0 2 kinds of military operations peaceenforcement peacekeeping I Peaceenforcement establish peace bwn warring states I Peacekeeping maintain peace in a region after an interstate war or civil war I Peacekeeping used the most 0 UN must have quothost nation agreement gt can t send peacekeepers wo consent of the warring states 0 Cold War Paralysis of the UN 45 89 USUSSR rivalry I quotabusequot veto power against each other 0 Gulf War and quotNew World Order successful UN mission against Iraq to free Kuwait 0 quotTriumph of the Lack of the Will littleno UN involvement I Bosnia 1992 0 Ethnic civil war Serbs vs Croats vs Bosnians 0 UN sent in peacekeepers but later pulled out peacekeepers ineffective 0 US steps in 3 years later wair strikes gt Dayton Peace Agreement 1995 I Rwanda 1994 0 Belgian colony that was ethically divided 90 Hutu 9 Tutsi 1 other 0 Tutsi s were the elites when Rwanda was under Belgian control 0 1962 Rwanda gained independence gt Reversal of ethnic elite status 0 1994 Hutus prez s plane shot down gt Tutsis blamed Hutus kill Tutsis 0 UN peacekeepers started to be killed and UN pulled out 0 US did not step in when the UN pulled out I Kosovo o Kosovo majority Albanian declared independence but Serbia claimed it 0 Serbia Slavic state backed by Russia protector of the Slavs 0 Russia vetoed UN resolution against Serbia no UN action 0 NATO gets involved gttakes on the role of a CSI 0 Postwar issue was NATO justified in getting involved 0 Why act as a CSI Got involved to serve Western interests I Sudan2003 o Gov t supports militants killing citizens gt Arabs vs NonArabs Muslims vs Christians Violence by NonState Actors Civil War and Terrorism 0 Difference bwn civil war and terrorism scale civil wars are larger in scale Civil War gt intrastate war occurs at the domestic level 0 quotthe pitting of two or more groups win a country against one another 0 When compared to international wars civil wars are generally 0 More bloody harder to resolve more common longer in duration 0 3 interests underlying civil wars territory policy and regimetype the 3 reasons for war 0 There has been an increase in the number of civil wars around the globe since the end of WW 0 Decolonialization and breakdown of authoritarian regime o Greed gt people or groups want something that they cannot or do not have 0 Grievances gt discrimination ethnicreligious conflict 0 Civil war actors seccessionists and irredentists o secessionists claim autonomy seek to get a piece of a state s territory for its own state 0 rredentist claim that a territory of one state should belong to another state 0 3 causes of war I Incomplete information gt incentives to misrepresent info I Commitment problems gt expected power shifts security spiral I ndivisibiity gt allornothing state tries to avoid giving into concessions 0 Ultra Bad Boys violent Serbian soccer fans gov t used them as paramil force against Croatia Terrorism 0 quotthe use or threat of use of premeditated politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually to influence an audience 0 3 actors in terrorism perpetrator target and gov t 0 Domestic terrorism Terrorism that doesn t cross international borders 0 All three actors are from and within the same state 0 Transnational terrorism terrorism that crosses international borders 0 One or more of the three actors is from different states 0 Terrorism is declining and terrorists attack politicalbusiness targets 0 Most deadly attacks are done by separatist or nationalist groups 0 2 explanations for terrorist actions 0 Terrorists are hatefilled irrational people hate yes irrational generally not true 0 Terrorism is the result of bargaining failure due to incomplete information Terrorists think rationally gt they rank alternative outcomes by looking at costs vs benefits 0 Quantify benefits and costs so benefits gt costs overall gain What may be irrational to us may be part of rational strategy for terrorists ex random attacks Terrorism is an extreme form of quotasymmetrical warfare o Asymmetrical warfare fighting bwn parties of highly unequal military capabilities Extremists have interests that are NOT widely shared by others gt extremists minority group 0 Extremist model bellshaped curve on a graph wextremists at margins Organization of terrorism networks quotcellsquot decentralized I Ex ABCD 0 Communication occurs along the line 0 Ex B knows A and C but not D 0 because of this taking out one member of the cell doesn t do a lot in terms of defeating the whole network Terrorism is a form of bargaining that uses violence to increase costs on the state 0 3 causes of failed bargaining that lead to violence and terrorism I Incomplete information gt terrorists exaggerate strength and resolve I commitment problems gt are terrorists willing to follow through wdeal terms I indivisibility gt when a party doesn t want to negotiate they will claim that the thing in question is indivisible and thus prevent future negotiation attempts 4 strategies terrorists use to win 0 Coercion Induce policy changes by imposing threats or costs on the other side 0 AVOID having to fulfill coercion threat 0 Costs by using coercion Resources Existential threats Provocation 0 Attack state so that it retaliates in a way that alienates people and makes them sympathize wthe terrorists goal terrorists gain supporters Spoiling o Sabotage peace agreements bwn the target and the leadership of the terrorist home society no peace terrorism can continue good for terrorists Outbidding o 2 or more terrorist groups that have the same interests and are in the same area compete with one another to gain local support Prevent Terrorism deterrence counterterrorism preemptation and negotiation Unit 2 International Economy International Trade Trade liberalization free trade Results of free trade gt lower commodity price good for consumer bad for producer 0 The winner is the consumer gt price is less so spend less money o The loser is the producer gt price is less so less profit made How to help losers of free trade subsidize import restrictions of foreign goods 0 subsidization reduces the costs of production so the producer benefits 0 import restrictions make consumer buy domestic goods How to get subsidies collective action problem gt easier to mobilize fewer actors o Producers are small in number Consumers are large in number Subsidization policy allows producers to operate and to keep domestic jobs Adam Smith gt Specialization or Division of Labor 0 Divide up production process and have each person specialize in one part of production I Result increase productivity and efficiency need access to newlarger markets Protectionism is harmful gt price of goods increases leads to inefficient industries Liberalism gt free trade specializationdivision of labor Mercantilism gt based on Realism benefit the state at any cost 0 quotautoarkyquot quotselfreliance domestic production of everything gt NO trade Absolute advantage producing a good more efficiently than any other country 0 Absolute advantage belongs to the producer woverall lowest cost per product value Comparative advantage producing a good at a lower opportunity cost than another country 0 Comparative advantage belongs to producer woverall lowest opportunity cost value All countries have a comparative advantage in something but not all countries have an absolute advantage in something Supply and Demand result of changes in the supplydemand of a commodity 0 Increase supply gt price decrease and quantity increases 0 Decrease supply gt price increases and quantity decrease 0 Increase demand gt price increase and quantity increases 0 Decrease demand gt price decrease and quantity decreases Consumer Surplus monetary gains savings by consumers when buying a product 0 Difference bwn what a consumer expected to pay and what was actually paid o It is the triangle ABOVE the equilibrium line on a supplydemand graph 0 Size of the Consumer Surplus can change if there is a change in supply or demand Producer Surplus monetary gains profit by the producers 0 Difference bwn what a producer expects to sell an item for and what it actually sells for o It is the triangle BELOW the equilibrium line on the supplydemand graph 0 Size of the Producer Surplus can change if there is a change in supply or demand Tariffs gt type of protectionist policy to help losers of free trade the producers o Produces Dead Weight Loss DWL inefficient production or consumption of an item I represents the efficiency losses to society 0 Causes the price of a commodity to increase above the world price I Quantity demanded decreases but quantity supplied increases 0 Leads to DWL of inefficient consumption due to supply surplus 0 Tax Revenue for the government is a byproduct of adding a tariff HeckscherOhlin model gt 4 factors that determine comparative advantage 0 4 factors Land Labor unskilled Capital for investment Human capitol skilled labor 0 Countries will export goods that use the factors they have in abundance 0 Countries will import goods that use the factors they are scarce in o Protectionism specific measures to shield domestic producers from imports 0 Trade barriers impediments to importation of foreign goods I Tariff tax on imports levied at the border and paid by the importer I Quota quantity limit on imports I Nontariff barriers regulations targeted at foreign goods 0 Losers of protectionism consumers winners of protectionism domestic producers I Price of imported goods rises so consumers forced to buy domestic goods 0 3 Costs of Protectionism gt consumers pay higher prices redistribution of income DWL I Redistributive effect income is redistributed from domestic consumers to the protected domestic industry 0 3 losers of protectionism gt consumers domestic exporters politicians I Consumers gt have to pay more for the product quotlosequot money I Domestic exporters gt other countries retaliate and levy tariffs on our exporters I Politicians gt upset consumers and exporters bad for elections 0 1850s Britain pushed for more countries to liberalize their trade policies 0 Start of WW1 to end of WW2 international trade relations entered a 30 year crisis 0 Post 45 trade liberalization restarted wUSA as leader in global economic and political affairs 0 2 theories regarding tradepolicy interests StolperSamuelson RicardoViner o StolperSamuelson Theorem gt used to predict which industries to protect or liberalize o Protectionism benefits the scarce domestic factors I Keeps cheap foreign products of same factor out of market 0 Protectionism hurts abundance domestic factors I Prevents domestic products of abundant factor from being sold at cheap price 0 Owners of scarce factor favor protectionism 0 Owners of abundant factor favor free trade 0 RicardoViner Theorem gt asks why whole industries often act together 0 Some factors of production are industry specific and hard to convert to other uses I High incentive to keep those industries productive and safeguarded from competition since the workersmachinery have no alternative work option 0 Workers interests flows from hisher sector of economic activity to the whole economy 0 Domestic institutions that reward narrow interests will be more protectionist 0 Labor abundant labor use free trade scarce labor use protectionism 0 Local vs national interests local favors protectionism national favors free trade 0 Trade makes wages and profits similar across countries 0 quotfactor price equalization prices of the factors of production tend to equalize 0 Free trade decreases the wages of domestic workers and increases the wages of foreign workers 0 Govts consider other states likely tradepolicy responses when making their own tradepolicies 0 international trade bargaining problems Prisoner s Dilemma impediment to cooperation 0 Both sides benefit by reducing trade barriers but competition leads to noncooperation o quotdumpingquot on the market selling goods below true cost of production to drive out competition 0 Dump consumers buy cheaper foreign good hurts domestic producers 0 Factors facilitating cooperation few actors hegemon iteration linkage internat l institutions 0 Small number of traders easy for governments to monitor each other s behavior 0 Hegemon can ensure trade cooperation o Iteration repeated interaction provides incentives to avoid cheating 0 Link policy issues to trade cooperation 0 International institutions gt GATT which became the WTO 0 quotMost Favored Nation MFN status 0 Status giving a country trade privilegesrights equal to other states wMNF status International Finance 0 International Finance Relations the borrowing and lending of money bwn states or bwn states and private financial institutions 0 Creditor entity that money is owed to money loaner o Debtor entity that owes money to someone or something else moneyloan taker 0 Interest rates high IR gt hurts domestic loan takers benefits foreign investors o 2 categories of foreign investment portfolio and foreign direct investment FDI 0 Portfolio investment PI claim part of an income no investment management I Ex shares or stock in a company I Sovereign lending loan by private financial institutions to sovereign govt 0 Foreign direct investment FDI a company operates facilities in other countries 0 PI is more mobile bc it s easier to trade and exchange stock than a whole company 0 Overseas investments have one goal make money gt move capital to high profit areas 0 According to HeckscherOhlin model capital in poor countries is scarce so price is high 0 In the same way investment can be thought of in terms of supply and price with capital being the supply and interest rate being the price I Low supply capital high price interest rate gt good for investors 0 Capital flow reality gt 90 bwn wealthy states 10 bwn wealthy and poor states 0 Tensions can arise over loan payback bwn the investor and the country they invest in o Concessional Finance loans lent at low IRs to countries at risk of default 0 Concessional finance is a form of financial aid 0 Debtor states prefer grants S not paid back rather than loans S paid back 0 Governments often impose unpopular measures in an attempt to payoff their loans 0 unpopular measures raise taxes limit govt spending limit consumer spending I Austerity measures name for the collection of unpopular measures 0 worst case scenario of debt repayment difficulties default 0 defaulting on a loan failing to meet loan agreements about repayment o bailout way to help countries that are on the verge of defaulting on loans 0 bailout providing monetary aid money to help countries pay off their loans 0 Possibility of default is problem for borrowers gt must assure loaner you ll pay the loan 0 Creditor can use predefault threats to make debtors solve their issue before defaulting o DebtorCreditor Interactions are characterized by incomplete information o Debtor withholds info on repayment ability to get concessions on loan payback 0 Countries wdebt can use IMF to negotiate economic policy programs and avoid default 0 IMF member countries contribute funds to an aid pool Those funds are then allocated out to different countries that are in financial distress o IMF can certify a debtor country as being in compliance wIMF norms o certification makes that country more attractive to future creditors 0 Some feel that the IMF reflects geopolitical concerns of the US since the US is its largest and most influential member donates the most S to the IMF aid pool 0 Overall trend being friends wUS get financial benefits from the IMF o 2 criticism of IMF violates sovereignty by dictating economic policies hurts poor states 0 US 2008 financial crash 0 Excessive government spending and borrowing banks lent out too much 0 Government intervention 1 tril bailout package to financial industry 0 Multinational corporations MNCs operate facilities overseas o Corps go multinational to gain access in 1 local markets and 2 local resources 0 Criticisms of MNCs gt outsource jobs avoid regulations relaxed ethics standards 0 Contradicts the notion of corporate responsibility 0 MNCs bring skills and investment capital to the host country gt boosts the economy 0 MNCs prefer to invest in more democratic regimes 0 1960s LDC governments began to restrict and regulate MNCs ISI policies 0 1980s MNCs regained popularity due to LDC govt s increased need for capital debt crisis 0 FDI uses bilateral investment treaties to protect each actors state company investments 0 1800s early 1900s high international labor migration rates 0 Applying the HeckscherOhlin theorem to international migration of workers 0 inflow of unskilled labor from abroad will reduce the wages of local unskilled workers I why Think about the SupplyDemand graph with wages being price 0 Benefits of immigration gt employers profit from lower wages decreased cost of production International Monetary Relations 0 18601930 Gold Standard gt currencies backed by gold moneygold exchanged at fixed rate 0 1930s WW2 currencies off the gold standard 0 WW2 1973 Bretton Woods system gt currencies rebacked to gold 0 Many currencies became pegged to the US dollar which was backed to gold 0 1973 now paper currency gt currency backed by faith in what the government says it s worth 0 3 paths that governments can choose in regards to monetary relations 1 Give up their own currency and adopt the currency of another country 2 Peg value of one currency to currency of another country 3 Use own currency wits value determined by the supply and demand of the market 0 Exchange rates price of a national currency relative to other national currencies o The price at which one currency is exchanged for another 0 Exchange rates can change gt appreciate or depreciate a country s currency 0 If the value of the US S goes up it appreciates gt S grows stronger o If the value of the US S goes down it depreciates devalues gt S growers weaker 0 Supply and demand of currency determines the exchange rates and thus the currency value 0 Governments can raiselower their interest rates as part of their monetary policy 0 Higher interest rate and exchange rates appreciation of a currency 0 Lower interest rates and exchange rates depreciation of a currency 0 Lowering the interest rate Depreciation Policy weaken the currency 0 People take out loans gt low IRs make it easier for people to borrow money 0 Consumersbusinesses spend more 0 Money supply increases economy grows unemployment decreases o demand by foreigners for US S decreases I People want to exchange dollar for another currency to invest Depreciation leads to an increase in exports and decrease in imports o Eventually inflation occurs gt combat inflation by appreciating the currency I Demand from foreign importers cause a demandpull inflation I Higher import prices 0 Raising the interest rate Appreciation Policy strengthen the currency 0 People take out less loans gt higher IRs make it harder to borrow money 0 Consumers and businesses spend less 0 Money supply decreases economy shrinks unemployment increases 0 demand by foreigners for USS increases I People want to invest in US and have to exchange their currency for the dollar 0 decrease in exports and increase in imports o Eventually deflation occurs gt combat deflation govts depreciate the currency 0 o Depreciation policies used 0 To stimulate the economy after an economic downturn o For politicians to gain favor wpublic right before elections lower prices cheaper loans 0 Appreciation policies would be used to combat inflation caused by depreciation policies 0 Appreciation of US dollar 0 Winners foreign investors foreign exporters US tourists o Losers domestic consumers and businesses foreign tourists o Depreciation of US dollar 0 Winners domestic consumers and businesses foreign tourists o Losers foreign investors foreign exporters US tourists o Fixed exchange rate government promises to keep the national currency at a constant value 0 Also known as pegging a currency 0 Countries that trade a lot use fixed rates 0 Developing countries operate on a fixed exchange rate to avoid financial risks 0 Floating exchange rate currency value fluctuates freely o Floating rates is more risky because a currencies value changes from day to day 0 Countries with strong economies developed countries use floating rates 0 Adjustable peg government fixes its currency value for long periods of time but allows for adjustments to the currency value if necessary such as in econ downturns o Bretton Wood system of 19451973 gt fixed rate but allowed instances of floating o Fixed exchange rates provide tradeinvestment stability 0 Fixed rates reduce a govt s ability to control its own monetary policies 0 Floating exchange rates offer monetary policy freedom gt gov t can change currency value 0 Consumers and businesses wdomestic economic activity favor a floating rate to earn profit 0 People who invest abroad favor a fixed exchange rate gt reduce any chance of investment risks o All domestic actors favor a currency policy that ensures stable prices 0 International monetary regime governs relations among currencies 0 An international monetary regime is a public good but it has to overcome freeriding I Govts want to benefit from currency regulations but don t want to provide resources to help with regulation 0 2 features I Must identify currencies as fixed floating or mixed I Must establish a common base or benchmark for currency comparison 0 commodity standards 0 commoditybacked paper standard 0 national paper currency standard 0 Competition and Prisoner s Dilemma gt can lead to devaluation of currencies 0 Countries have an incentive to depreciate to make it more competitive on world market 0 Gold Standard Stability of system was tied to Great Britain France and Germany 0 US on gold standard dollar appreciated so exports less competitive hurt farmersexporters o Wizard of 02 contains elements of US goldsilver debate 0 PostWorld Great Depression govts tried floating rates based on paper international currencies o PostWW2 Great Britain pushed for Bretton Woods monetary system gt fixed and floating rates 0 Bretton Woods tied many currencies to the US S which was pegged to gold 0 Later the IMF was created to oversee currency relations 0 1970s US went from gold standard to floating currency monetary policy freedom 0 Today there are few major currencies in global market and they use a floating rate system 0 Currency crises result from governments failing to credibly commit to a fixed exchange rate 0 The typical currency crisis cycle 0 Government faces pressure to devalue o This scares investors who sell off their currencies 0 Government eventually devalues o It is more difficult for citizens to pay off foreign debts o This increases defaults and banks collapse triggering a recession 0 The currency crisis can spread through contagion contagion of uncertainty 0 Uncertainty about a country s currency value can feed uncertainties about others 0 Cases of currency collapse or near collapse 0 Europe I Many countries pegged their currency to the Deutsche mark and when the German Central Bank increased interest rates it threatened to throw other European nations into recession countries eventually devalue their currency I Pegging currencies to the Deutsche mark wasn t working so European Central Bank established and Euro was introduced in 2002 0 Mexico I Peso pegged to US S but forced in 94 to devalue the peso causing a recession 0 East Asia I 1997 East Asian economies grew inflation was high and banks gained debt I Led to currency speculation as investors feared imminent currency value drop 0 Caused currencies to devalue and economies to collapse 0 Major economic powers have common interest in containing currency crises I Economic stability Public good nonrivalrous nonexclusionary o IMF and other institutions support governments in crisis via financial aid Development Wealth and Poverty of Nations 0 3 factors for lack of development geography domestic factors politics domestic institutions 0 Three geographic disadvantages to development landlocked diseaseridden desolate 0 Climate and development tropical regions are usually poor temperate regions are usually rich 0 Geography is important but it is not deterministic of a country s development 0 Wealth is concentrated in countries that are the most developed 0 Divide bwn the Northern and Southern Hemispheres Northern contains most of global wealth 0 Domestic factors have most influence on a country s economic growth and development 0 Government policies can impact economic growth by either encouraging it or impeding it 0 Encourage provide public goods ex infrastructure things necessary for social activity I Three types of infrastructure physical roads economic banks social edu o Governments must do two things protect and provide 0 Protect property rights ensure the security of property against seizure 0 Provide public goods through credible commitments o Hindrances to gov tbacked development lack of expertise and resources conflicting interests 0 Groups wmost access to policymakers are able to influence policy decisions 0 Collective action problem hard to mobilize large groups 0 Interests of social majority are harder to organize than narrow interests of minority I majorityminority in terms of support of an interest or policy I Easier to organize few actors minority rather than many actors majority 0 Domestic institutions can influence development 0 Institutions influence a group s ability to press for implementation of certain interests 0 Representative institutions favor broad interests over narrow interests 0 These institutions are more representative of interests of majority 0 Democratic political institutions provide more public goods than authoritarian institutions 0 Resource endowments can produce groups and institutions with contradicting interests 0 Ex contradicting interests exploit or conserve a resource 0 resource curse states wnatural resources usually have stuntedno development 0 Countries wabundant resources are usually ruled by a small group of political elites that make it hard for the public to have control over how those resources are managed I Elites use the resources for their own interests and to get money corruption 0 States wa natural resource have little incentive to develop other industries 0 All countries benefit from international economic systems but problem is that all states want the benefits but none want to provide resources for sustaining those systems 0 Efforts of colonization depend on similarity of interests of the colonized and the colonial power o If their interests were similar then the infrastructure spurred development o If their interests were dissimilar they engaged in predatory policies hurt development 0 Areas of colonizer settlement made the colonizers more willing to develop those regions 0 Areas wo colonizer settlement meant the colonizer had little incentive to develop those areas 0 Resource exploitationextraction by the colonizer was bad for development in the colony 0 Theory of settler mortality and economic development 0 Areas of high mortality rates of settlers underdeveloped regions today 0 LDCs have deteriorating terms of trade ToT relations bwn export and import prices 0 LDCs export primary products agriculture raw materials gt cheap prices fluctuate 0 Advanced economies export manufactured goods gt prices fixed by oligopolistic firms I Oligopolistic market dominated by a few economically elite firms 0 LDCs get less for what they sell and they pay more for what they buy net loss 0 LDCs are politically weak against developed states so developed states control trade interactions 0 Developed countries can gain easy access to LDC markets while LDCs have harder time gaining access to markets of developed countries 0 Developed countries can impose trade protection barriers against cheap foreign products to protect their own industries hurts the LDC exporter I Ex Agricultural subsidies to US cotton farmers impacts cotton producers in LDCs o Subsidy allows US farmers to produce more cotton which increases the supply of cotton and lowers the price of cotton worldwide This price decrease is bad for cotton producers in LDCs as they will get less profit 0 International institutions IMF World Bank tend to promote interests of wealthy countries 0 Importsubstitution industrialization S gt policies to encourage domestic development 0 Goal reduce countries dependence on imports gain economic selfsufficiency 0 Goal have states move away from primary production and focus on industry 0 Goal Produce for domestic market rather than for export o S tools trade barriers gov t subsidies gov t provision of industrial services I Attempt to keep foreign goods out of market 0 Used in mainly in Latin America 0 Exportoriented industrialization EOI gt policies to increase production for export o Encouraged producers to produce goods for foreign consumers 0 Tools of EO Tax breaks lowcost loans and weak currencies 0 Used mainly East Asian think about South Korea s development 0 S countries hurt more by 80s debt crisis than EO countries 0 To get debt reconstruction LDCs adopted Washington consensus proglobalization I Goal switch from economic nationalism to economic openness 0 Trade liberalization gt remove trade barriers to importsexports o Privatization gt sell off gov t owned enterprises to private investors 0 Fiscal conservatism gt avoid future debt and high inflation o Openness gt allow foreign investment 0 LDCs attempted to counter global power imbalance bwn developed and developing countries 0 NonAligned Movement group of countries not aligned wUS or USSR during Cold War 0 G77 gt coalition of developing countries in UN 0 New International Economic Order gt change internatl economy s management to be more favorable to poor countries 0 LDCs have influenced commodity cartels association of producers who control a good s price 0 Ex Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC 0 Foreign aid won t help underdevelopment aid values are small aid misses underlying problem 0 Growth of globalization Globalization of LDCs has problems 0 Contagion of crises gt currency crisis of one country and can affect many other countries 0 Winners and Losers gt globalization has benefits market expansion and costs crises o Increases inequality gt unequal economic growth internal divide bwn poor and rich ppl Unit 3 Laws Human Rights Global Environment International Law and Norms 0 quotInternational law is a body of rules that binds states in world politics 0 Focus is on sovereignty 0 International Law has 2 types of rules primary and secondary rules I Primary rules regulate behavior gt positive do X negative don t do X I Secondary rules address rulemaking gt who makes laws what laws are made 0 2 ways international law is made custom and treaties 0 Custom accepted practice 0 Treaties constrains of law that states voluntarily accept I ID a behavior make a treaty regarding that behavior operate by that behavior 0 4 dimensions of international law spectrum obligation precision delegation hardsoft laws 0 Obligation gt degree to which actors are legally bound I highobligation law requires unconditional compliance I lowobligation laws require aspirationalvoluntary compliance 0 Precision gt specificity of a law s obligations I High precision laws are specific low precision laws are ambiguous I Internat l law should be high in precision to reduce the scope of interpretations I But some laws can be ambiguous to allows actors some wiggle room in terms of how they act or upholdenforce the law 0 Delegation gt Thirdparty interpretation and application role of courts I Courts make new laws when precision is low and delegation is high 0 Hard and soft laws gt combination of obligation precision and delegation I Hard law obligatory precise gives third parties courts lots of authority 0 high on each of the three dimensions 0 alters behavior gt makes states do things infringement on sovereignty I Soft law ambiguous flexible gives third parties courts less authority 0 low on each of the three dimensions 0 state action is voluntary less obligatory less violations of sovereignty I Laws usually begin as soft and then become hard 0 Views of international law O Managerial School of Thought I Reasons for compliance 0 Interestsbureaucracy of states support certain laws 0 Status quo bias gt states support laws to keep their favorable status quo I Reasons for noncompliance o Ambiguity of a law s wording gt leads states to not act 0 Timeinconsistency gt state may no longer be able to follow the law due changes in circumstances 0 Capacity gt state lacks the capacity to uphold the law 0 Skeptics of internat l law mprecision prevents effectiveefficient behavior 0 Norm standard of behavior for actors based on voluntary collective compliance 0 O O Norms are most seen when they are violated Norms define what actions are quotrightquot or appropriate under particular circumstances 3 types constitutive procedural and regulative I Constitutive norms that define legitimate actors in certain circumstances I Procedural norms that define decisionmaking between multiple actors I Regulative norms that govern the behavior of actors interacting weach other Formation of norms people advocate for states to standardized new behavior I Advocates norm entrepreneurs gt ex TANs Norms can contradict secondary rules like sovereignty gt ex ResponsibilitytoProtect I Responsibilitytoprotect if a country cannot protect its own people then global community has responsibility to intervene violate the sovereignty of another state and protect those people Threestage life cycle of norms convince near universal acceptance internalization I Actors attempt to convince a population to accept and embrace their belief I The norm becomes a near universal standard of behavior 0 Norms cascade gt support for the norm passes the point needed for it to be regarded as a universal behavior standard 0 Make a norm a universal standard of behavior via 2 ways 0 coercion gt threat of force or sanctions for noncompliance o socialization gt peer pressure I The norm is internalized internalization of a norm acceptance of a norm 0 Transnational Advocacy Networks TANs 0 00000 0 Actors united by a common interest and desire to bring about political and social change TANs operate through social mobilization and changes in norms and political pressure Transnat l crosses borders advocacy raise awareness networks pplmedia TANs can be individuals groups nonprofits NGOs TAN vs terrorists nonviolence vs violence terrorists are a subset of TAN TANs vs IGOs no government involvement vs government involvement I One difference is their source of income donations vs taxpayer money I Concerns regarding IGOs legitimacy bias and regulations TANs help states overcome 3 cooperation problems Commitment info indivisibility TANs influence on politics change mindsinterests pressure states facilitate coop I Changing Minds Altering Interests gt promote new norms alter states behavior o TANs do this by bringing new information to public attention 0 Norms affect behavior by raising the costs of inappropriate actions I Putting Pressure on States gt quotnaming and shaming 0 Calling attention to norm violations to make states change behavior 0 Boomerang Model NGOs in nondemocratic states activate transnational linkagesNGOs in democratic states to force the nondem government to change its behavior I Facilitate Cooperation gt TANs as endorsers and monitors 0 Endorsers TANs endorse normative beliefs for universal standarization o Monitors TANs help wensuring compliance in interstate negotiations 0 States gain info about compliance by selfreporting monitoring each other or using 3rel party monitors I Selfreporting 0 Not efficient bc states can lie about compliance I Monitoring one another s behavior directly 0 Not effective bc states can hold back info so that they pass compliance inspections I Monitoring by third parties TANs third parties 0 TANs are trustworthy monitors 0 Transnational networks and world politics gt traditionalists vs globalists o Traditionalists believe states are still the dominant actors in world politics 0 Globalists believe TANs are becoming a form of governance without govt Human Rights HRs 0 quotRights possessed by all individuals by virtue of being a person regardless of their status 0 United Nations Charter Article 55 gt first attempt to est human rights provisions 0 Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR gt most authoritative HRs standard I First attempt to define what constitutes human rights I Soft law gt its provisions on human rights influence a state s decisionmaking I four pillars of HRs dignity liberty equality brotherhood least developed pillar 0 First hardlaw human rights treaty Genocide Convention 0 Two documents created bc of differing views on what constitutes HRs The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights ICESCR quotTwin Covenants ICCPR and ICESCR The West favored ICCPR gt West democracies favor civil political rights 0 Communists favored ICESCR gt Communists favor socialeconomic equality o ICCPR ICESCR are legally binding ratification means you must follow treaty terms 0 ICCPR gt secures right to life equality before law free thought religion marriage family 0 Protection against torture and slavery antideath penalty antiwar antihate crimes OOOO o Signed by US ratified later on after some provisions to reconcile wdomestic laws 0 Focus is on individual rights 0 ICESCR gt secures econ social cultural rights equal pay unions strikes free primary edu 0 US has signed but not ratified the treaty 0 Focus is on collective rights gt rights for whole groups or classes working class etc 0 Problem wICCPR ICESCR how to reconcile required provisions with internaldomestic laws 0 International Bill of Rights UDHR and the Twin Covenants CCPR ICESCR 0 States human rights interests differ bc of conflicting political institutions norms and ideals 0 Cold War division bwn East and West states continues to undermine US support for the ICESCR 0 US favors civil and political rights CCPR because all people can have those rights 0 US problem wICESCR it promotes groupclassbased like the working class which the Communists favors socialecon rights rather than rights for all ppl regardless of status 0 quotHuman rights manmade evolves based on social political economic and cultural norms 0 Evolution of human rights some presentday HRs were not considered so in the past 0 CCPR has nonderogable rights rights never suspended doesn t mean they are enforced more 0 ICESCR has no nonderogable rights 0 Severity of punishment for HRs violations shows which rights states care about the most 0 Severe punishment state probable values that right 0 Lenient punishment state probably doesn t value that right as much 0 Actual sanctions against violators are scarce bc they hurt the recipient and imposer 0 Ex economic sanctions result in loss of trade loss of profit for all actors o 4 reasons for HR violation lack of capacity defend nat l sec preserve rule political instability 0 Some states lack the capacity and resources to prevent human rights violations 0 Some states violate HRs to defend their nat l security prevent or respond to attacks I Government views national security as being above individual rights 0 Some states seek to preserve their own rule when citizens protest the government 0 Unstable democraciesautocracies more likely to violate HRs than stable democracies 0 Reasons to sign HR agreements promote democracy gain good reputation please the public 0 Some newly formed states sign human rights treaties to quotlockin new institutions and practices as a means to show that they are committed to promoting and upholding democracy 0 More countries are now signing HRs treaties gt 2 reasons for this trend 0 Gain rewards provided by others eg linkage I Ex if state A signs a HRs treaty then state B will provide it with financial aid 0 Be able to influence human rights elsewhere 0 Moral and Philosophical Motivations for human rights 0 Humans are social and feel personally affected by treatment of others empathy 0 Some see own human rights as secure if they are universal in principle and practice 0 SelfInterest Motivations for human rights 0 Selfinterest peace and prosperity gt state wants to ensure it will prosper and survive I global HRs protections global stability good geopolitical environment 0 Modern HRs began during Great Depression and WWII gt fight fascismtotalitarianism o Suppressing human rights creates domestic political unrest and potential revolts 0 External actors get involved to prevent spill over abuses expand to other areas 0 US Europe demand that HR clauses be inserted into regional trade agreements RTAs 0 Problem HR clauses act as a trade protectionism policy poison pills hurt trade 0 Most human rights violators are governments o Deadliest and most frequent form of violence is by governments against their own citizens o Democide governmentsponsored killing of its own citizens o HRs practices have remained the same or deteriorated in the past 25 years 0 Improvements in HRs protection South America Central and Eastern Europe I Both had democratization movements after military regimes and communism I Democratization move toward democracy democracy prohuman rights 0 States that are good at protecting HRs New Zealand Western Europe 0 States that are bad at protecting HRs S Asia SubSaharan Africa Middle East 0 Research ratifying HR treaties is associated wan increase in individual human rights violations 0 Three possible explanations I International HR laws may not matter gt no global police to enforce compliance 0 Enforcement of HRs laws falls on shoulders of victims or TANs I States may ratify treaties simply to mask their continuing patterns of abuse I Countries signing human rights agreements are most likely to abuse them 0 Ex Dictatorships sign antitorture treaties but still use torture 0 Two types of states that sign HRs treaties I Upholders gt states that already uphold human rights before the treaty signing I Violatorsgt states that already violate human rights before the treaty is signed 0 Longterm benefit of international HRs laws empower actors to advocate for rights 0 International human rights laws allow TANs to create political pressure gt name and shame o TANs name and shame expose states who violate human rights 0 Most states escape any punishment for abusing the rights of their citizens 0 Low probability of intervention by others emboldens violators to continue wabuses o Ineffectiveness of human rights laws gt inconsistent enforcement due to high enforcement costs 0 States want benefits from HRs protection but don t want to pay the costs of protection 0 Three conditions make states more like to protect human rights 0 Domestic pressure gt make state quotdo something prevent or stop HRs abuses I Sources of domestic pressure citizens TANs o Geopolitical interests gt protecting human rights benefits a state geopolitically I Promoting HRs protection you good state violators bad states 0 Sovereignty and nonintervention I Action against HRs abuses is more likely when action doesn t involve intervention and thus doesn t infringe on the sovereignty of other state 0 Five innovations of human rights institutions to promote future HR protection 0 Transitional justice gt truth commissions violators confess abuses and get amnesty 0 Individual petition I Individuals have right to file a complaint against a state and take a state to court I European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ECHR 0 Individuals are allowed to petition the Court directly if they claim a state has violated rights that are denoted in the ECHR o UniversalJurisdiction I Countries can prosecute citizens of other countries for crimes against humanity 0 International Criminal Court ICC gt lastresort for criminal prosecution of HR abusers I Criteria for the ICC to hear a case ie for it to have jurisdiction 0 Person being prosecuted must be a citizen of one of the ICC member states member state quotstate party 0 Crime in question occurred within a state that is an ICC member 0 UN Security Council referred the case to the prosecutor 0 Regional Trade Agreementsgt link RTAs and human rights obligations The Global Environment 0 Initiatives by the global community to combat negative environmental changes 0 Kyoto Protocol gt C02 emissionsgreenhouse effect US not on board mixed success 0 Montreal Protocol gt protect the ozone layer US on board successful 0 CLRTAP gt acid rain US on board successful 0 success vs failure US presenceabsence threat s immediacy of issue contributors o It is difficult to coordinate a large number of individuals and states gt collective action problem 0 Incentive to free ride gt states avoid the costs ie changing their behavior of reducing pollution 0 Outcome Pareto suboptimal inferior for society bc little change in states behavior 0 Prisoner s Dilemma wincentive to defect defect don t change behavior I Reality one state s actions has negligible effect on situation leads to defection 0 Many states thinking this way everyone defects and no change occurs 0 Externality costsbenefits for actors other than the decisionmaker byproduct of decisions 0 Positive externality too little of the good is produced gt underproduction 0 Negative externality too much of the good is produced gt overproduction o 4 types of goods based on how excludable and rivalrous they are 0 Public good nonexcludable nonrivalrous 0 Common pool resources nonexcludable rivalrous 0 Club goods excludable nonrivalrous 0 Private goods excludable rivalrous 0 Public good nonexcludable nonrival in consumption 0 Nonexcludable goods available to one actor can t be kept from other actors o Nonrival in consumption consumption doesn t decrease quantity availability for others 0 quotglobal commons global environment is available for use by everyone 0 common term used to describe something that is available to everyone 0 Ex English commons were pasture land that all farmers could use for free common pool resource Overfarming led to bad soilland so the government started making people pay to farm on that land became a club good 0 Ex Emissions Trading Scheme ETS gt companies buysell credit for pollution levels I High polluters buy credit usually developed states I Low polluters sell credit usually developing states I More beneficial for developed states companies to bought credit than reduce pollution levels bc cost of operation reform would cost moneylessen profit 0 Many environmental issues are common pool resources nonexcludable rivalrous o Overexploitation is a side effect gt sum of actors overuse depletes resource 0 4 factors to solve collective action probs few actors iterationlinkage bundle privileged group 0 Smaller group of actors gt easier to coordinate wless actors I Larger of actors less cooperation no solutions to problem free ride I Smaller of actors more cooperation solutions made less free riding o Iteration linkage I Iteration cooperation based on repeated action that action becomes a norm I Linkage tie different issues together to ensure cooperation I Goal incentivize states to contribute to solving environmental problems 0 Bundle public goods with private goods gt result joint product I Efforts to gain the private good give off the private good as a byproduct 0 Presence of a privileged group gt increases probability of a public good being provided I Privileged group actors who benefit from a public good and are willing to undertake the cost of providing that good 0 Environmental policy laws zerosum bargaining situation gt presence of winners and losers 0 Winners public future generations 0 Losers dirty industries that give off negative environmental externalities 0 Diffuse costs are costs that are distributed over a long period of time I Ex not passing regulation environment will gradually get worse and worse 0 Environmental laws reduce the competitiveness of domestic industries 0 increase cost of production higher prices consumers buy less less profit 0 Loose environmental laws benefit domestic industries and consumers 0 lower cost of production lower prices consumers buy more more profit 0 Balance of power favors entrenched interests gt industries advocate for loose regulations 0 Groups that lose from stricter environmental regulations are few in number I Fewer actors overcome collective action problem able to lobby the govt for loose regulations shows that these minority groups are politically powerful o Incentive to lobby for less regulations in order to keep jobs jobs entrenched interest 0 Firms wstrict regulations quotlevel the playing field via stricter regulations on foreign firms 0 Often the biggest violators will become the most prominent advocates 0 Currently a majority of pollution comes from richdeveloped states 0 Future source of new pollutants will come from developing countries ex China 0 Why Developing countries will go through industrialization so pollution will increase 0 Why developing states continue developing despite negative environmental effects I They can t afford the high tech machinery that would reduce pollution I They don t care gt interested in economic development not the environment I Double standards gt if current developed countries were allowed to pollute when they developed why can t we the developing states do the same 0 Political conflict over environmental protection who should bear the cost 0 Ronald Coase gt economist who said taxpayers should pay the cost of env protection I Taxpayer money is used to subsidize dirty industries gt offset cost of production that industries would incur if they change their behavior Environmental Protection Index EPI measures a country s environmental policies vs GDP 0 High EPI good environmental policies Low EPI bad environmental policies 0 Findings GDP and EPI value are directly correlated if one goes up so does the other 0 countries with high GDPs rich states have good environmental policiesgt high EPI value 0 countries with low GDPs poor states have bad environmental policies gt low EPI value States are limited to voluntary cooperation on global environmental issues bc there is no higher authority that can force states into compliance and cooperation International institutions help facilitate compliance among states by several ways 0 set standards verify compliance reduce costs resolve disputes help wdecisionmaking International environmental institutions establish behavior standards and verify compliance 0 States negotiate and agree on general principles known as quotframeworkquot I After a framework agreement stricter regulations are put in place I frameworks lead to consensus decisionmaking which results in agreements I Framework soft law stricter regulations hard law 0 Complete bans are easier to verify than simple restrictions bans best regulations 0 Environmental TANs quotfire alarm call attention to govts who violate agreements Environmental institutions and decisionmaking bwn states serve as a forum for negotiations International environmental agreements lack dispute resolution clauses Montreal Protocol was first to use noncompliance system gt facilitate compliance not enforce it Kyoto Protocol has Compliance Committee wfacilitative branch and enforcement branch 0 Facilitative branch gt gives advice to the states on ways to implement the Protocol 0 Enforcement branch gt regulates states to see if they re meeting Protocol requirements
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