International Politics Exam 2 Review
Transfer of materials and personnel which designated purpose is for destruction or organization of destruction from one actor or another.
-Major Convectional Weapons (MCW)
-Small arms and lights weapons (SALW)
Types of Goods:
–Licensed production: License to produce in the state
White, grey, and black
Grey: Retransfers, African countries
Black: small arms, instate wars
Minor supplier, market strategies, part supplier, market strategies Part supplier: make money because they’re not making the full spectrum Market strategies: substitute –alternative
Don't forget about the age old question of Name and briefly describe the 4 characteristics of consciousness?
Elastic: supply demand
-Institutional: during 80’s-2000 cost and benefit approach Central Theme
Strategic Interaction of recipient and supplier
Interdependence We also discuss several other topics like What is the definition of ethnicity?
Nothing is truly free
During cold war, MCWS direction to developing countries was the major concern
-following the end of the cold war, increase in interstate -A recipient is dependent on a supplier for arms
-Recipient fears the threat that supplier will cut of its arms suppliers -recipient will acquiesce to supplier
Israeli: Arab war of 1973 (Yam Kipper War)
-October 22, 1973: Israel threatens to encircle the third Egyptian army
-U.S. threatens that all future military aid would be contingent in Israel agreeing to cease fire and Israel adheres to cease fire.
-Joint production of systems by multiple states
-What theoretical medianism does this describe?
Arms Sanctions Embargos
-Comprehensive vs. smart sanctions
-What are arms Sanctions?
-Bilateral vs multilateral arms sanctions
-Bilateral – common (Used by the United States) Don't forget about the age old question of What are the factors that can inhibit the synthesis of vitamin d in the skin?
Arms sanctions Iraq - Iran war
Effectiveness: fall of cold war see increase in Arms sanctions 90% affective for UN multilateral sanctions
Example Arms transfers as policy
-Russians proceed to intervene in Ukraine in February
-Russia annexes China
-European Union responds to Russia through a variety of foreign policies France and Russia:
-France must respond to Russia
-Comprehensive sanctions punish Russia for regression -Provide military
War sometimes happens by mistake:
You reject an offer you should have taken
Things to know before war:
How strong is your military?
Cost of war
Your will to fight back
Can adversaries be trusted to honor a deal?
Sometimes you don’t trust your adversary can cause war War happens:
-Under incomplete information
-Implications are that if you have enough info you can strike a deal easily -But if trust is an issue with your adversary commitment problem Commitment problem:
Def: the difficulty that states can have making credible promises to not use force to revise the settlement at a later date. Don't forget about the age old question of What needs to be present and at what temperatures to make a good oil recovery site? what is the oil window, source rock, seal rock, porosity, permeability, etc.?
-adversaries can violate this commitment
-no enforcement mechanism: countries can sign any international agreement and still disobey later on because there is no international government that can punish them.
Three types of commitment problems (CPs):
-all three connected because they all have an expected shift in power. The country getting more powerful has an incentive to revise the agreement to get a bigger piece of the pie.
-difference in three: source of power shift
1.) Bargaining over goods that are a source of future bargaining power
-the thing bargaining over is itself a source of power and…
- If you give it to your adversary, you lose power and make the other country more powerful
-shift in power can create a commitment problem
Types of goods: territory (some lands that have sources of power such as oil, value, strategic location that gives a military advantage) Need to have logic.
Ex: Iran and North Korea being told to give up their nuclear power if they do, they transfer power and no longer have a way to bargain
Mechanisms: We also discuss several other topics like A place is defined by its what?
State today will be made weaker and decide to make a war today
Future state becomes stronger because they have the ability to obey or reject commitment in the future
1994 agreement to not create bombs
2002 declaration: they disobeyed their agreement
Their greatest fear is that the U.S. try to interfere and unite both south and North Korea. North Korea does not trust the U.S to commit and not try to interfere and try to unite them. Thus, they do not want to give up their weapons program.
2.) War in response to changing power
In this case there’s no negotiation with a source of power and shift in power not related over good bargaining over
Def: Going to war in order to destroy the source of the power shift and prevent enemy from getting stronger in the future.
Logic is: you only lounge preventative war because you think you can successfully destroy source of power shift
3.) War in response to first-strike advantage
First-Strike advantage: By lounging an attack first, you have an advantage that you are almost guaranteed victory
-If you know that, how can you be sure you won’t take advantage of it and commit to agreement?
Ex: National Missile Defense (NMD): idea that country will build a system that can monitor missiles and prevent being hit by one. A way of defense against missiles. We also discuss several other topics like What is the meaning of the humerus?
-First strike creates an incentive to go ahead and strike instead of waiting and negotiating.
-also called preemptive war
In summary: war most likely to happen when good bargained over is a source of power, change in military balance, technology creates first strike advantage
Common theme: expected power shift. Country made weaker rather go to war.
Is compromise always possible?
-is the good indivisible?
Indivisible Good: a good that can’t be divided without diminishing value of a good
(Ex: Judgement of Solomon: 2 mothers disputing over a baby. They think to cut the baby in half and each keep half of the baby, but if doing so, it would kill the baby and destroy its value.)
Problem? We have a good that can’t be divided without destroying value. How can we compromise?
Key: not the physical property but…if divided you destroy value
(Ex: City of Jerusalem: Important for at least 3 major religions, Israel Basic Law, East Jerusalem Holy places. Who should own it or how to divide it? )
-Reasons to be skeptical:
-divisibility usually possible
How to make war less likely?
A) Raise the cost
-Is war worth it due to cost?
-Countries try to make war more costly to make it less attractive B) Transparency
-Increasing transparency can limit how often you make mistakes Capabilities
Providing enforcement mechanisms
Overcoming commitment problems
In the last few years
-certainly normative reasons
-but also it could impact foreign policy and government type in Arab nations
(Ex: Egypt and U.S.: Egypt government rules by Muslim brotherhood. Western governments like U.S. worry about what this will cause)
Whose interest count the most in IR outcomes?
A) National vs particularistic interests:
∙ Neorealism and interests
-problem? Not all countries have the same interest or same primary interests
∙ General Interests
-national (Ex: wealth, national security)
∙ Particularistic interests
-narrow (fall within different groups in the country who have preferences over outcomes that may not be shared within majority of people in the country)
-Historical context: U.S. has made access to oil an important part of the agenda
-Why Oil? Protection of Saudi Arabia important to U.S. because of oil trade (Carter and Roosevelt)
Explanation 1: Oil is important to military U.S. Security depends on oil (energy, fuel, tanks, planes etc)
Explanation 2: US economy needs oil for transportation
-Particular interest: oil companies in US who care about access to oil
National and narrow interests
-difficult in practice
-clear that oil influences US policy but it is important to know what interests are driving that.
B) Interactions, institutions and influence
∙ Dropping unitary actor assumption
-Lots of individuals and groups – how do we know who’s
-To find out we look at institutions and who has a seat at the table
-Interests and outcomes
Institutions and Interactions
∙ domestic institutions determine who has a seat at the table ∙ Important variation
-autocratic institutions: small portion of people have a voice -democratic political institutions: more people have a voice ∙ Key: institutions tell us who has a voice
∙ Collective action problem
∙ -we all have same interest but may have to pay the cost to organize it. I want to see policy change but I don’t actually want to do the work “free rider”
(Ex: United Fruit Company 1954: US company in Guatemala. Policy change where they cease lots of acres from Fruit Company. Guatemala offers 2 million for land but US wants 16 million. US installs 3 million to settle regime in Guatemala that would allow the Fruit Company to continue. US citizens don’t care about this issue but taxes cost citizens. But small group (the company) has more chance of getting heard by government and making an impact.
Domestic Interests (key groups)
Do politicians spark wars abroad in order to hold power at home? (Ex: Falklands war 1982: Argentina vs British fight over who owns it)
Trigger: Argentina decide to militarily cease the island and start war
Falklands Island have very little value, and British have way more power economically and in military so…
Why would Argentina pick a fight over it? And why would the British defend? -British had already been losing interest in it before war
∙ Domestic vs international politics
-domestic troubles in Argentina
-they try to gain as much power as they can get
∙ Domestic problems in Great Britain
-in the midst of a deep recession
-defend islands as a way to boost power/popularity
What do leaders want?
Are they making decisions based on personal or national interests?
∙ Varied interest of their own
-more basic interest such as staying in power
How can office seeking affect decisions?
-responsive to interests
-not just interests
-Strategic actors who use policies to shape their own interests -war is used to enhance leader survival and not always national interests
-rally effects: population gathers and supports national action in order to go against external threat. Sometimes even if they don’t like leader they will support (at the moment) just to avoid threat.
-psychology: threat increases cohesion
-opposition: many don’t go against government when there is a threat
-Diversion: Government can use rally affects in order to distract people from hating government
-scapegoat: can be used as opportunity to blame outside threat for bad things happening domestically
-diversionary incentives: leaders know external crisis can create rally affects and may choose to manufacture a threat in order to increase their domestic power (public support)
2 strategies when a country is under threat:
1.) Massive Retaliation
2.) Flexible Response
-Massive assured destruction (M.A.D)
-Cost of war is too high
Logic: neither side would attack the other because they would both end up destroyed
Requirements: force structure=massive destructive power -ensure counter side
Weakness of M.A.D
Ex: USSR vs US
In order for USSR to feel threat and that the US won’t back down, USSR must believe
- US will risk national suicide
-follow attack on US
-attack on Europe
-use for nuclear or conventional attack
Proportional to Soviet Union
More credible to the Soviets
Overcoming Credibility Issues
“Game of Chicken”: 2 cars driving fast towards each other, the first one to steer away first is the chicken
Problems with massive retaliation and flexible response?
-Game theoretic illustration: game of chicken
-The dead hand: you automate the response process so it looks like there’s no way to stop it
Ex: Throwing the steering wheel away and making sure the enemy sees you do it, so they feel threat and back down
Game of Chicken in Practice: Brinkmanship
Logic of M.A.D.
-Second strike = defense impossible
-Relies on deterrence
-Conflicts of interests still exist
Fundamental Credibility Problem
M.A.D: Cost outweighs gains
How to credibly commit?
Scheling: Leave it to chance
Brinkmanship take actions that risk spiral crisis out of control Each action = potential dire
Decision making during crisis?
Reckless behavior? No, both countries are aware of risks
(Ex: Cuban missile crisis)
Dynamics of Brinkmanship:
-fundamentally a contest of resolve’
-role of uncertainty
-role of resolve
-No uncertainty over resolve?
When do crisis occur?
-when the balance of resolve is uncertain -crisis with 2 potential outcomes
-risk threshold reached=peace
-hostility spiral = nuclear war
-Crisis duration depends on…
Probability (crisis spiraling out of control) More resolve state = risk more
Brinkmanship/threats = leaves something to chance