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Study Guide: Final Exams

by: Victoria De Almeida Tellechea-Rotta

Study Guide: Final Exams PSC2446

Marketplace > Political Science > PSC2446 > Study Guide Final Exams
Victoria De Almeida Tellechea-Rotta
GPA 3.54
U.S. Foreign Policy
Elizabeth Saunders

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Contains Part 2 onwards of course material, including lectures and ALL readings (unless readings were extensively discussed in class, which is the case with the Drones and Cyberwar lecture, mostly).
U.S. Foreign Policy
Elizabeth Saunders
Study Guide
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This 53 page Study Guide was uploaded by Victoria De Almeida Tellechea-Rotta on Tuesday April 28, 2015. The Study Guide belongs to PSC2446 at a university taught by Elizabeth Saunders in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 299 views.

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Date Created: 04/28/15
Page 1 of 53 US Foreign Policy Final Exam Study Guide Part 2 only 1 The Origins and Evolution of Cold WarContainment Lecture 0 WWII US and Soviet Union are allies Wipe mind clean of everything you know happens in the Cold War 0 Have been ghting on the same side Once it becomes clear what happens the day after the war Some are concerned about this from the beginning Winston Churchill very concerned about the Russians taking over Eastern Europe Converging on Berlin East and West At the time not everyone in the US assumed the Cold War was inevitable Some thought they could cooperate get along Eisenhower declined the opportunity to go for Berlin rst Was ne with Soviets getting it Argued that it should be possible to work with Russia if we follow same pattern of allied unity Visited with Truman s approval Saw nothing in the future that would impede unity same man who becomes big Cold War player General feeling in Washington that maybe after the war Soviets can be brought into context Containment by integration Bring them into the club less likely to have con ict There had already been two world wars Not looking for another Postwar economic institutions rst players Stood from belief that political disorder of 1930 s was in part tied to economic problems and if you could have free trade and integrate world economies you could contain this whole sphere of interests countries could be directly integrated no need for war and political disorder that would lead to rise of radical political movements British and French kind of wanted to maintain their spheres of in uencecolonies Bretton Woords 1944 IMF and WB emerge intended to promote free markets but active management by governments to maintain domestic markets If you don t have these big shocks like depression and such forth there is less chance of political con ict Try and prevent another war from breaking out Soviets were offered admission to this system Get the Soviets to come in less likely to see direct con ict between West and USSR Intended to be a global system UN is also a part emerges a little later FDR s Great Dream Hope is that Soviets would have been a member of the club Start with a view that US can works with Soviets External factors were to blame for Soviets to fear Doesn t go quite that way Truman take over somewhat of a shift in policy Containment by integration as quidproquo Soviets don t wan t to be members of the club maybe see it as a more relationship of interests Shipments from German occupations loans and get Soviet political cooperation Assumptions assume Soviets care what the world thinks of them and assume Soviets needdepend on things US can provide Participate in Bretton Woods don t join WB and IMF Still a sizable faction that believes that cooperation is possible There is confusion What to do next Page 2 of 53 0 In a very confused environment look towards George F Kennan O A mythical gure starts out in an ordinary job FSO Deputy Head of Mission in Moscow Cable for his views send back the long telegramquot Changes the course of American diplomacy Everyone wants to duplicate this feat after Cold War His views become basis of containment strategy l Demolishes the idea that Soviets are motivated by external threats Real problem is internal Russian problem and Marxist ideology which requires external threat Political force that with the US there can be no USSR Idea that the Soviets needed an international Boogey man to secure their own position Can t use carrots and sticks Need to depict US as terrible Good relations will only come about when Soviet system collapses Russians are basically good people but ruled by Soviet ideology that limits contacts with outside world 2 Stop trying to make nice No more concessions Accept what the Soviets had already taken Iron Curtain coming down Nothing you can do about that But you can stop them from going any further Scramble to counter communist in uence CIA gives other candidates cash against communists that can win in democracies 3 Patience and Firmness Build up US military strength to convince Soviets of their power Not enough military strength available at the time 1946 Republicans demobilize form 12 million men to 2 million men in wake of war Be ready for the long haul Kennan becomes a sought after gure In house think tank member Asked to outline vision of containment Had a very particular view of how it ought to unfold Vision l Skeptical of schemes to gure this out by international order and institutions We live in a world of diversity must deal with countries as they are Morgenthauesque Use balance of power manage interest Will not bring total peace accept that there will be war sometimes pg 27 of Gaddis 2 Prioritize interests Big complaint about Morgenthau not saying what national interest was Kennan lists national interests Certain areas of the world that should be the focus of defense priorities US Soviet Union GB GermanyCentral Europe Japan Concern is that these places may fall into hostile hands Combination of industrialmilitary capability and hostility threat One s already been lost Notice China is not on this list Korea and Vietnam Hot wars in the latter two Not on Kennan s list 3 US should work on restoring balance of power restore European power Marshall Plan comes into play 13 billion dollars in direct aid 10 of total US government expenditures If you want them to take you seriously build military forces in Europe Page 3 of 53 4 Exploit tensions within the Communist blocks Yugoslavia and Teitosim Took a while to gure Chinese separating from Soviets but things you can do to try and peel its own allies away from it 5 Nuclear war would be catastrophic But be Americans show our system is better and Kennan believed the Soviet system would collapse but would be long range fencing match People of the world would eventually decide Greece and Turkey Soviets have to pull out of it Truman Doctrine in 1947 gives aid to these countries Call to resist Soviet eXpansion anywhere Kennan in favor in part because of the periphery of vital centers that he talked about He says that we can t give money to all these people Allow some places to go communist In Kennan s view you prioritize and defend and you don t defend others I Strongpoint defense Kennan objective strongly to NATO Collective security org attack on one member attack on all Felt that it was going to lengthen the Cold War and militarize it 1959 Warsaw Pact response Kennan also had concern about the Marshall Plan cementing the lines of the Cold War Originally offered to USSR to not make it instrumental to Cold War Kennan was not for anything that was going to institutionalize and harden the battle lines in Europe Show how bureaucratic politics can take an idea and take it off in a very different direction Every time there was a Soviet victory psychological blow to US 1949 Loss of China huge political backlash Perception of weakness is damaging to morale Feeling that you have to do something in the face of these losses Sticking to Kennan s list takes a lot of political guts Strikes when iron is hot growing feeling in Washington of insecurity Build domestic support for US military buildup some people have actually seen conspiracy between NSC68 and Korean War Did Dean Acheson incur the Korean War Dean Acheson did make a speech to the National Press Club put up a map and said here is East Asia Line of demarcation Interests on one side of line we will defend Essentially said if they invaded South of Korea its not going to matter Lecture cont 0 NSC68 Defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat anywhere Thesis Cold War can be thought of as a yoyo between peripheral and strongpoint defense at least until Reagan 0 Not an accident when you look at the pattern democratic tend to go to the peripheral symmetrical and republicans for strongpoint asymmetrical Eisenhower scal conservative return to strongpoint Speeches every gun made every warship is a theft from people who need food clothes Concerned that spending might alter exactly what it was trying to defend 0 How to achieve strongpoint defense but allow opposition to believe that USSR won t nibble away at things that aren t are your list Page 4 of 53 Dulles amp Eisenhower known for the reliance of Nuclear weapons Massive retaliation Mutually assured destructions Assure other side knows your capabilities in order to avoid attack 0 What makes threats credible O Dulles amp Eisenhower Keep other side guessing Instead of Truman approach match with equal reaction keep them guessing about how much you are going to respond They know you are going to respond but they don t know how Nuke or diplomatic protest If they re not sure less likely to cross that line Cultivate an air of unpredictability Notion of being slightly unpredictable Threat to leave something to chance 0 Quemoy and Matsu O Threatens to use nuclear weapons to defend Mao backed down then 0 Eisenhower economical way defending against Soviet eXpansion But it was dangerous and was debatable to be perceived as weak 0 Covert operations was also cheap 0 Nuclear driven version of strongpoint defense 0 Johnson amp Kennedy back to peripheral 0 Flexible response Kennedy Communists preying on poverty and economical antidevelopment had to help state develop so they wouldn t be driven into the arms of the Soviets Hot war in Vietnam perception was that you could not allow small country to go communist Nixon back to strongpoint O Him and Kissinger all about balance of power Power should be evenly distributed 0 Reagan picks neither Lets go of de tente O TRANSCEND communism Relevant Readings Gaddis Strategies of Containment 0 Chapter 1 Prologue Containment Before Kennan Containment term generally used to characterize American foreign policy towards the USSR during the postwar era 0 Idea was to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won as a result of that con ict WWII to reshape the international order a prospect that seemed in the West no less dangerous than what Germany or Japan might have done had they the chance 4 0 Term was coined by George F Kennan long term patient but rm and vigilant containment of Russian eXpansion tendencies 4 Containment was already a concern before the US entered the war 0 Truman If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and in that way let them kill as many as possible 4 kind of realist Page 5 of 53 0 not president when he said this When he was president many questioned how much the US relied on the russians to defeat the Germans William C Bullet former ambassador to the USSR How We Won the War and lost the Peace Problem prevent the domination of Europe by the Moscow dictatorship without losing the participation of the Red army in the war against the nazi dictatorship 5 Bullitt s solution introduce anglo american forces into Eastern Europe and the Balkans for the purpose of defeating the Germans and barring the Red Army from the rest of Europe Roosevelt American security required preventing the coming together of potentially hostile states Need to minimize casualties Roosevelt did not orient wartime strategy toward the Cold War he hoped that it would not arise Strategy taken by Roosevelt containment by integration ensuring a stable postwar order by offering Moscow a prominent place in it Assumption that soviet hostility stemmed from insecurity External Roosevelt s main emphasis make the Grand Alliance survive Hitler s defeat by creating relationships of mutual trust among its leaders Only allied leader who didn t depend on US was Stalin Idealism in Roosevelt s mind could serve eminently realistic ends 12 Kennan saw little possibility of resolving differences with USSR on any other basis than a frank acknowledgement of respective spheres of in uence No sanction Harriman amp Dean Bohlen state department Russian experts American public would never accept this settlement Quid pro quo Roosevelt s priority was to win the war Truman harbored a healthy skepticism toward all totalitarian states ideology whether communist or fascist was an excuse for dictatorial rule Quid pro quo strategy by 1946 had failed to produce results New strategy 0 No more concealing disagreements with Russia these would be aired openly and in a non provocative manner 0 No more concessions to USSR 0 US military strength would be reconstituted and requests from allies for economic and military aid would be favorably considered 21 Negotiations w USSR would continue Patience and rmness 21 Truman Doctrine It must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures 22 American foreign policy in the cold war Chapter 2 Kennan and Containment Introduced in FA article called The Sources of Soviet Conduct in 1947 A lot of controversy about what he meant some of the things he wrote originally written in anonymity were not what Kennan was actually executing Page 6 of 53 National interest always seems to come down to creating an environment internationally where domestic institutions can prosper Kennan complete security or perfection of international environment would never be acheived How did Americans think this could be achieved according to Kennan Universalistic approach subscribe to the same values and policies 0 Particularized approach effective alliances Kennan saw universalism as innapropriate 0 Diversity over similarities Committing US to goal of elimination of armed con ict something the US did not want National interest would best be served not by trying to restructure the international order universalistic but through the particularist approach of trying to maintain equilibrium within it so that no one country or group of countries could dominate it KENNAN Not all parts of the world were vital to US security according to Kennan The ones that were 0 Atlantic community Canada Greenland Iceland Iberian Penninsula Europe Morroco The countries of the Mediterranean and the MIddle East including Iran 0 Japan and Phillipines Create political attitudes favorable to our concepts of international life in these regions Five vital power centers US Great Britain Germany Central Europe Soviet Union Japan Only one was in hostile hands Make sure no others do the same Industrial military power was the most dangerous and the primary emphasis should be placed on keeping it under control Second corollary internal organizaton of states was not a proper matter of concern for FF Third corollary No con ict between the demands of security and those of principle provided the rst were understood as necessary proceeding the second Back to concept of balance of power as the most appropriate way of reconciling national aspirations with the national interest Kennan conception of interests based on a pessimistic view of the international order Only nation that combined hostility with capability Soviet Union Russia a highly intimate and subtle connection between traditional Russian habits of thought and the ideology which has now become of cial for the soviet regime Kennan ideology serves several functions legitimize an illegitimate government Ideology was not so much a guide to action more like a justi cation for action already decided upon Serious possibility of conquest by psychological means the danger that the people of Western Europe and Japan 25 vital centers might become so desmoralized that there might be communist coups or communist victories in free elections CONTAINMENT WAS PRIMARILY AIMED AT THIS Page 7 of 53 Communism was not the disease it was the complication Kennan sees Soviet challenge as largely psychological gt yields psychological recommendations 0 Produce attitudes in potential adversaries and allies that would facilitate the emergence of an international order more favorable to the interests of the US 0 3 steps to do so 0 l restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self con dence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism 2 reduction by eXploiting tensions between Moscow and the international communist movement of the Soviet Union s ability to project in uence beyond its borders 0 3 modi cation over time of the Soviet concept of international relations 0 Long term program of American economic assistance would restore Western European self con dence 0 Together Western Europe could better withstand Soviet in uence than apart treats it as a unit 0 First stage balance of power industrial units focusing on nations and centers that are important 0 Second stage seek to reduce USSR s ability to project in uence beyond its borders In uence eXited in two ways installations of communist parties which were reliable instruments of Soviet foreign policy and through installation of communist governments subservient through Moscow 0 Would work because the Russians couldn t really handle diversity 0 Ultimate goal not a division of world into spheres of Soviet and American in uence but rather the emergence over the long terme of independent centers of powers in Europe and Asia 0 Communist Parties in countries could be dealt with gt lack of Soviet control 0 Remove what made communism popular by helping region ourish economically 0 Imperial analogue the idea that international communism diverted little from classical imperialsim 0 No policy and no concept will stick in our government unless it can be drummed into the minds of a very large number of persons including quite a few whose mental development has not advanced very far beyond the age which is said to be the criterion for the production of movies in hollywood 0 Government had an obligation to lead Exaggerated rhetoric was implied and not education 0 Central dilemma for Kennan not given to human beings to know the totality of the truth and no one can see in its totality anything so fundamental and ulimited in all its implications as the development of our people in their relation to the world Without some con dence that strategies chosen for surviving in that environment would work there would be little support for them 0 Chapter 3 Implementing Containment Kennan acknowledges having played a decisive role in certain areas 0 Emphasis placed on European Initiative and German Rehabilitation in the Marshall Plan Page 8 of 53 0 Offer to extend aid to the Soviet Union and its East European satellites under the MP 0 Reorientation of Japanese occupation policy 0 lST STAGE OF KENNAN S STRATEGY 0 Restore balance of power 0 ultimate objective build an international order made up of independent centers of power in which nations subject to soviet pressure would have both the means and the will to resist it themselves 0 Two ways to preserve the global equilibrium 0 perimeter defense concept all rimlands are of equal importance 0 strongpoint defense concentration on the defense of particular regions and means of access to them rather than on the defense of xed lines 0 Kennan strongpoint gt perimeter 0 Administration congressional attitude no matter how dangerous the external peril the country had only limited resources with which to ght it 0 Advantages of strongpoint defense 0 limited resources used ef ciently favorable terrain choice 0 asymmetric response using one s strength The American interest was not to dominate other power centers but to ensure that no one else did The truman administration implemented the rst stage of Kennan s strategy with remarkable delity Universalism was abandoned PD was deferred SECOND STAGE Fragmentation within international communist movement Assumption that arbitrary rule whether of the Right or of the left contributed to instability The administration did not see itself as setting out on an anti communist crusade us should exploit China USSR tensions The US does not fear communist if it is not controlled by Moscow and not committed to aggression 68 THIRD STAGE Try to bring abt changes in the Soviet concept of international relations Program A supervised elections in Germany War was supposed to be a means to an end and not an end in itself Against weapons of mass destruction Kennan the decision to build the bomb would inhibit bargaining with the Russians because they would be weaker Kennan s judgment seen as intuitive Kennan s policy and bureaucracy didn t mesh kennan s strategy fundamental aw sought to achieve its objective ultimately by psychological means Page 9 of 53 Chapter 4 NSC 68 and the Korean War George Kennan never took the time to write down the concept of containment Issues of IR too subtle to be reduced to paper without oversimpli cation NATO West German State the decision to retain military bases in post occupation Japan hydrogen bomb moves that seemed reasonable but inconsistent with Kennans strategy NSC 68 Single comprehensive statement of interests threats and feasible responses to be communicated throughout bureaucracy Exactly what Kennan wasnt doing Not intended as a repudiation of Kennan Systemize containment and to nd the means to make it work Differences between NSC68 and Kennan s conception Kennan unfriendly regimes in other places posed little threat to global stability so long as they lacked means of manifesting their hostility NSC68 Kennan s strategy of selecting strongpoints was no longer suf cient the emphasis was on perimeter defense with all points along the perimeter considered of equal importance Kennan view that only industriall military power was a threat World power was becoing more about perceptions of the balance of power NSC68 suggested a way to increase defense expenditures without war without long term budget de cits and without tax burderns Leon Keyserling nation could sustain more vigorous growth rates if the government would stimulate the economy and tolerate short term budget de cits Expand the pie While a principle in democracy should choose its methods selectively when confronted with an absolute threat to its survival anything is fair game NSC68 agreed with Kennan that the inability of the Soviet Union to live with differences was a big issue Kennan argued that disparities in military ower could be tolerated because Russians had little to gain from exploiting them NSC68 argued that Russians had only not provoked war because they lacked the assurance to win it Kennan war by proxy NSC68 saw american unwillingness to use nuclear weapons unless directly attacked as weakness BIG concern with the military not being up to Soviet standard Heart of disagreement Inversion of intellectual procedure Kennan looked at the Soviet threat in terms of an independently established concept of irreductible interests NSC68 derivied its view of American interests primarily from its perception of the Soviet threat De ned containment as an effort Kennan sought to block Soviet expansion by a variety of political economic psychological and military measures NSC68 concentrated almost exclusively on the lack of these Kennan emphasized reliance on existing forces of resistance NATIONALISM NSC68 stressed the need for US to be able to respond militarily when agression took place Not matching weapon by weapon but a military strength by the US To do not less but also no more than was required to safeguard American Interests US relied to heavily on atomic weapons as detterence Page 10 of 53 0 Both favored exible response conceived it in different terms 0 NSC68 peactime detterence through nuclear war vertical exibility Kennan horizontal exibility employ limited military force where apropriate but to be able to make at least equal if not greater use of economic diplomatic political and psychological issues of containment Assumed continued control of Soviets over Eastern Europe 0 NSC68 ruled out diplomacy as a means of altering the Soviet outlook Negotiation could not be reached until Soviet union changed 0 Rhetorical tone like its being addressed on the oor of Congress 0 Wanted to win over the public 0 Korean War appeared to validate NSC68 s most important conclusions 0 all interests had become equally vital Soviet Union may resort to war by proxy even with American nuclear superiority 0 Existing US forces were inadequate atomic weapoons would not deter limited aggression 0 China gets in Korean War need to review Asia policy 0 NSC 485 0 Impose a blockade of the China coast by naval and air forces 0 Military action against selected targets held by Communist China outside of Korea 0 Participation defensively or offensively of the Chinese Nationalist forces and the necessary operational assistance to make them effective 0 NSC 1353 0 Chapter 5 Eisenhower Dulles and the New Look 0 Eisenhower had supported each of the administration s major diplomatic and strategic initiatives 0 Exclusive reliance upon a mere power of retaliation is not a complete answer to the broad Soviet threat 126 0 Capacity to tolerate diversity is a strength not shared by the Russians 0 During Eisenhower assumption that economic stability and military strength were inseparable Keyserling government spending stimulates the economy 0 Kennan amp Dulles similar but different de nition of threat 0 Dulles Kennan insecurity might impel Soviet leaders to maintain a belligerent posture toward the outside world 0 Soviet objectives in order of importance 0 Security of the regime and of the USSR 0 Maintaining the Soviet hold on the European satellites keeping China within the communist bloc Elimination of US in uence from Eurasia and the isolation of the US 0 Expansion of Soviet Communist power throughout Eurasia Elimination of the US as a competing power center 0 Spread of communism throughout the world 0 Perceptions of power could be as important as power itself 0 Chapter 11 Reagan Gorbachev and the Completion of containment Symmetrical containment vs asymmetrical containment Page 11 of 53 Symmetrical protection against incremental threats against the danger that peripheral challenges to balance of power may become major Multiple levels of response Required virtually unlimited resources 0 Asymmetrical recognized the limit of resources must pick and chose your battles Apply one s strength against adversaries weakness Required steady nerves and cold blooded decisions 0 Jimmy Carter sought to balance both and failed Reagan tried again succeeded beyond all expectations 0 Carter 77 0 Wanted to reverse the preocupation with containment 3 years later describing Soviet American relationship as one of the most critical factors in determining if the world would live in peace 0 Kennan s approach asymmetrical NSC68 symmetrical Carter administration dif culty aligning itself with either 0 Continued Kissinger s practice of working with some commies to contain others 0 Personal commitment to human rights 0 Contradictory policies 0 Carter fails Soviet Union seems to be on a roll and US in retreat Reagan comes in 0 Reagan Needed to raise american preeminence Outspend USSR capitalism beats communism on this 0 Mutual assured destruction had to go 0 Rejecting de tente way to reduce the danger f nuclear war and ove towards negotiated settlement 0 Settlement would require a change in the Soviet Union itself Reagan s form of containment rejected legacies of his predecessors 0 Prepare a new kind of Soviet leader by pushing it to its breaking point Shift had more to do with Soviets than America First reagan directive 0 1982 USSR to bear economic burden and to encourage long term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied Reagan had more threatening ideology and propaganda 0 National Security Decision Directive 75 contain and over time reverse soviet eXpansion by competing effectively 0 Fear of nuclear war very present Strategic Defense Initiative program to defend the US against longer range nuclear missile attacks Denied the basic premise of MAD Extending arms race to outer space 3 Soviet Unions during era of de tente Con dent superpower Corrupt bureaucracy Soviet elite that realized it could not survive the way it was GORBACHEV Reagan and Gorbachev start talking End ballistic missiles by 2000 Soviet American consensus begins to emerge Chernobyl shows dangers of nukes Reykjavik Nuclear Summit in 1986 0 Resolve stalemate of negotiations Page 12 of 53 Phase out missiles 50 cut in Soviet and American strategic weapons across the board Gorbachev was like lol jk offer was contingent on banning SDI Goal 1 new Soviet leader think in American ways 2 change nature of regime 3 persuade Gorbachev that USSR became exactly what it was trying to destroy oppressive empires Internal developments played a huge role in what happened to the USSR Symmetrical containment but he calculated actions based on Soviet economy and not his own Retained initiative while shifting competition that favored US Gorbachev s containment strategy aimed at containing the consequences that would hit his own countries Chapter 12 Epilogue Containment after the Cold War Lecture Kennan s strategy rejected both appeasement and isolationism Sense of shared risk Depended not only on fear of opposition but eXistance of identi able regimes that could manage the running of risks for short term war Preemption strategy by Bush after Sept 11th led back to containment Countering an anticipated danger Some aspects may remain relevant some not Transferrable aspects 0 Intellectual geography Desirable alternative of enemies defeating themselves 0 Coherence and accountability combined 2 Cuban Missile Crisis Cuban Missile Crisis Why was the US so hostile towards Castro Hostility was not there initially Washington pretty happy to see him go in the beginning Kennedy Batista was awful maybe Castro won t be so bad Initially doesn t seem to be a source of con ict Hostility starts when Castro begins to nationalize American owned facilities and got friendly with the Soviet Union First and primary purpose Cuban nationalist By the time Kennedy is elected in 1961 there is a plan well underway to overthrow Castro Nip this in the bud before it becomes a problem Bay of Pigs Latin America had been a sphere of in uence for the US far back as Monroe doctrine Cuba particularly part of sphere American economic and political domination less than real independence in the years since Spanish American war Eisenhower Admin aversion to do things with large scale military but fond of covert operations Page 13 of 53 CIA failed to estimate the amount of popular support Castro had Kennedy authorized it without taking much of a look makes him really skeptical in the future Particularly skeptical of JCOF and CIA Joint Chiefs of Staff Cuban Missile Crisis 0 Nikita Khruschev takes over Stalin Interprets Bay of Pigs as a sign of US strength oddly enough Cuba at risk of being invaded again Under some pressure at home USSR had fallen behind in nuclear strategic balance US had more ICBMs 0 First strike capability idea that if we both have nukes and we both know details the worry is that I might re one off and then you attack me and we both die If I know that my nukes are protectedyou don t have enough to take out my missiles SURVIVABLE Attack you without fear First strike capability Destabilizes deterrent value Harden your target hide them and put them in bunkers 0 Why does US risk nuclear war in order to get missiles out of Cuba It is a political threat on some level Monroe Doctrine Domestic pressure Republicans International stakes connected and tied together with Cuba particularly the Berlin problem All happing amidst Congressional elections 0 Themes that are recurrent today Danger of nuclear weapons Fear that if you invade what are the troops going to do Tricky problems with human beings involved US massively underestimated number of Soviet troops in the islands Do not shoot spy planes down Soviets But they did Can t always be sure orders you give will be followed Tapes amp bureaucratic policies how things play out Interconnectedness of American foreign policy Role of intelligence Dealing with dictators can be very challening O 3 interpretations of the crisis Three Models I Model I Khruschev puts missiles in debate about what to do put in blockade Soviets blink missiles out US chooses blockade as most likely way Khrushchev decides he fears nuclear war Lecture Page 14 of 53 I Model II September intelligence says offensive missiles into Cuba will not be introduced no need for U2 ights Not one until Oct 14th But US knew that there was intelligence on Soviet lumberships Cuban refugees talking about missiles Report of Castros s private pilot we will ght to the death we have everything including atomic weapons Intelligence routines SOPs are not just a US problem why didn t the Soviets camou age the missiles until after the US knew about them I Model III US perspective why did the US choose blockade instead of taking missiles out 14 people involved very signi cant 3 The Vietnam War Confusion about Vietnam war and distrust about public gures in Washington Era of protests students Look at its origins and how it happened At the beginning it was a pretty popular war supported by a majority of Americans 58000 dead Think of Vietnam War in context a lot in Vietnam in Kennedy administration Feeling that there would be triumph and many of the decisions makers of Cuban Missile Crisis were also involved in Johnson admin for Vietnam WHY 0 Why did the US get involved so signi cantly and risk its own troops when most people look back and agree there are no vital interests at stake Why could they not accept the loss of Vietnam 1 Why should we still care Major event longest American invasion of the Cold War ecological devastation of the war last 6 months of 1973 Cambodia gets more bombs than all of Japan in WWII The shadow of Vietnam has been cast over how the United States uses war Vietnam Syndrome shy about using weaponry until Gulf War in 1991 There have also been a lot of parallels w Iraq and Afghanistan nation building quagmire insurgents Vietnam does have way more deaths American side and other side Interest in Vietnam goes back to Truman French established colony in Indochina but lost control to Japanese in WWI 1945 Japanese are defeated Ho Chi Min asks for support for independence because France would just come back US had never been invested in the idea of an empire doesn t respond due to alienation of the French keep Europe together focus was really there Let s not rock the Page 15 of 53 boat Only after the communist went into China in 1949 that the Chinese begin to give Min some support Truman Korean War the loss of any single country in Southeast Asia would lead to all countries commie Early articulation of domino theory Ideaconcern that if Indochina fell everyone would go communist Gave a lot of aid to the non communist portion Accepts the loss of North Vietnam and Ho Chi Min establishes communist government US helps establish guy on the South By the 1950s the man in South provokes a lot of opposition which communist begins to eXploit Want to get rid of division and unify Vietnam Kennedy elected in 1960 Eisenhower has committed 1500 military advisors and a big aid program Kennedy accepts this basic idea that we cannot allow South to fall to communism raises advisors ten fold Essentially help VietCong in counterinsurgency in South State of affairs of Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 Big decisions to increase US involvement in 1961 and 1962 until he dies South leader is increasingly seen as a dictator US did consider supporting a coup against the leader Johnson inherits the Kennedy commitment and the South vietnamese government becomes incredibly unstable Johnson decides to make major military effort Drafts call up Johnson decisions that were taken in 1965 A series of events like Tompkin Gulf resolution led up to this Could he have stepped back Conceals resolution and intention to escalate until 1965 February launches rolling thunder against Vietnam Four main explanations that help illustrate whv QuagmireSlippery Slope Thesis Thompson reading First draft in the early years after war Seen as not knowing what they were getting themselves into adding small steps and then they see they committed a 50000 troops Slow boil it never tripped any alarms Trouble early 70s Pentagon always writes postmortems and they produced this incredible document Never intended to be made public and was actually made public When they came out the Quagmire thesis was proven to be not true The System Worked Gelb All presidents knew exactly what they were doing particularly LBJ knew that the military options probably wouldn t work The system did what it was programmed to do Presidents all assessed that Vietnam was important due to reputational cost of not intervening no one will believe us in the future if we won t defend Vietnam has very little to do with it itself None of them Page 16 of 53 stop to re assess this idea They didn t do enough to guarantee victory because their goal wasn t to win but to not lose Continuity arc doesn t matter who was president Inevitability Johnson s Fault individuals Logevall This wasn t inevitable by 1965 many of the Allies that were supposed to be reassured by the Americans the Europeans were telling them not to ght Vietnam Congress also warned of dire political consequences and public opinion there was shallow support LBJ was a master politician should have known Johnson s obsession with credibility is what drives him to chose war and could have walked back commitment in 65 Defense Spending Gaddis Big defense expenditures of the exible response strategy which has to do which spending on peripheral and strongpoint defense once you build these capabilities you want to start to use them A war like Vietnam is more likely when you are in conditions of higher defense expenditures 0 Four Prescriptions to have saved Vietnam Quagmire Improve information ow x the bureaucracy etc Better information The System Worked Curator Mentality Challenges assumptions J ohnsons Elect better leaders Defense Spending Starve the beastquot Readings l Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam Logevall Argues that decision to enter largescale war with Vietnam was not forced on Johnson Choice is dif cult to explain but it happened 0 Incrementally entered war 0 1964 two phase escalation in ghting 0 l armed reconnaissance strikes in Laos men and material to south 0 2 graduated military pressure against North aerial bombing and dispatch of troops to south 0 Operation Rolling Thunder after 32 Americans killed in bombings of US installations in South Vietnam 0 Why did he decide to not approach a non military solution 0 People think a lot of inevitability 0 Cold War mindset to defend South Vietnam Page 17 of 53 Realpolitik Johnson had to Author argues however that choices did exist Puts no choice under scrutiny Saigon incompetence corruption and in ghting 0 North WAS prepared to negotiate an agreement Did US of cials know this Author says yes McNamara says that he didn t know but truth is he did US knew they had little chance big hubris presumption love this word now THEY KNEW WHAT THEY WERE UP AGAINST The Americanization of the war cannot be preordained Severe doubts both at home and abroad about Vietnam s importance to security pessimism War could have been avoided Could have cost him politically Appeaser by cold war standards 0 But there wouldn t be an exorbitant political price 0 Humphrey Don t engage in Vietnam any more 2 How Could Vietnam Happen Thompson How the fuck did something so costly happen Central ingredient 1950 loss of china Korean War Far East policy of Dulles Inherited and somewhat shared a general perception of China on the march a sense of China39s vastness its numbers its belligerence a revived sense perhaps of the Golden Horde This was a perception fed by Chinese intervention in the Korean War Inherited monolithic conception of the Communist block Domino Theory in play Uneasy sense of communist challenge after Bay of Pigs Where were the experts the doubters and the dissenters Were they there at all and if so what happened to them American gvt lacked IndoChina expertise Shadow of loss of China blurred reporting Doubters and dissenters domesticated Dissent was made to feel at home some were institutionalized ok I have no idea how this is relevant Effectiveness trap is the trap that keeps men from resigning in protest and airing their dissent outside the government Preocupation with Vietnamese PR rather than policy making Ironically lots of dissenters were employed Keep them off the backs of the policy makers Executive fatigue 0 They were tired and basically made bad decisions Curator mentality Collective intertia about changing policy within Department of State Bureaucratic detachment Muted the reality of war from civilian policy makers Cryptoracism Page 18 of 53 Literally says that there are so many Asians that they don t care if there is a lot of fatality 0 Vietnam was signi cant because we made it signi cant 0 The rise of a new breed of American ideologues who see Vietnam as the ultimate test of their doctrine I have in mind those men in Washington who have given a new life to the missionary impulse in American foreign relations who believe that this nation in this era has received a threefold endowment that can transform the world 3 The System Worked Gelb 0 Vietnam was a quagmire but leaders knew Optimism was limited 0 Proposition that the US was gradual in Vietnam 0 1 US leaders considered vital not to lose Vietnam to Communism international and domestic loss soft power enlarging opportunity for right wing reelection 2 Presidents were never seeking victory only did what was minimally necessary Negotiated settlement without realizing that war cannot be ended by political compromise 3 Presidents were not deluded by optimistic reports Recognized steps they took were not adequate to win Strategy to persevere would cause then to have the Communists relent 0 Had to prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism 0 Hard to change things without costs 4 The PostCold War Era 911 and the Iraq War LECTURE NOTES AMERICA BETWEEN THE WARS Persian gulf war containing and stopping the USSR becomes irrelevant 0 Years between fall of Berlin Wall 119 to 911 were sort of forgotten 0 What to call this window 0 Authors thought it was important to reclaim A lot of the things we associate with 911 actually had its roots before Kennan regrets using the word containment Democratic enlargement Jeremy Ronser the more democracies around the world the better 0 Kennan sweepstakes Kennan felt like having a word or phrase as a determinant of foreign policy is not a good idea 0 Thesis of Goldgeir and Chollet 911 did not change as much as it is thought to have change 0 What are the issues that emerge 0 Globalization Bill Clinton believes this is what would be the main theme of his term Page 19 of 53 0 Ethnic con ict and humanitarian crises idea that the Cold War had frozen ethnic con icts they came back after the war Somalia goes into but keeps it quite limited Clinton expands but fails 0 Bosnia 0 US pays Russia to secure its nuclear weapons 0 Iran Iraq North Korea under the radar Democratization seemed pretty easy after the fall of the Berlin Wall 0 Terrorism 0 Osama bin Laden was very much under the radar s screen during the Clinton administration There was no political urgence to do something about it 0 Iraq is often associated with the post 911 world Clinton was very much interested Congress and admin were investing in regime change 0 There were bombings in Iraq repeatedly in the 1990s 0 Themes of the 1990s 0 Use of force when and how was it appropriate 0 Even Bush wanted to cut defense spending 0 Small minority of neoconservatives thought ds should be used to democratize 0 Where do threats come from First it was communists Now trans national threats Proliferation of HIV climate change Others still need to worry about States that have the AXis of Evil China now has economic power 0 Role of the US unchallenged and ultimate superpower Should it act unilaterally or multilaterally Persian Gulf George HW Bush wanted to act in multilateral way even brought Cuba on board 0 Issue resource constraints Want security at a low cost Don t want to spend money on military but want Bosnians to stop killing each other 0 1994 Republican victory in both houses of congress 0 Congress is impotent Is there such a thing as a Rep or Dem approach to politics 0 Democracy promotion democrats Aggressive use of military republicans Neoconservatives boundec around 0 Containment is seen as bipartisan 0 Split in Republican party 0 Isolationist approach led by Buchanan 0 Obama democratic realist Choses for theUS to be less involved If we agree with book with issues post 911 and issues were there before 911 it is nonetheless true that something changed after 911 Terrorist attacks brought home the reality of fear shatters geographic isolation factor War in Afghanistan initially widely supported Hard to imagine Al Gore not attacking Afghanistan after 911 It was a natural thing to do Page 20 of 53 A year and a few months March 2003 US invasion of Iraq Iraq 0 Huge issue in the 2006 elections in 2008 the economy had taken over and for a couple of years Iraq kind of seems to be fading ISIS Iraq not going away any time soon Iraq war is very important event to understand 0 Has implications for the future of American military and power Why Iraq 0 Why of Afghanistan harboring terrorists Iraq not so clear 0 Put in context Wipe minds clean of what we know happened after 0 Take home surprise youremind you that there were people on both sides that were for and against this war 0 Four possible grand strategiesforeign policy goals and priorities for America not only goals but also resources and means required to achieve them Kennan esque exercise As people are grappling with Post Cold War world between wars basically 1 Strategic Disengagement Isolation Epitomized by right wing of Republican and Pat Buchanan but still very much present by the year 2000 Embraced by Ralph Nader prominent commentators in political science community Fought Cold War its over Withdraw from European Asian alliances NATO has outlived its usefulness focus on protecting US interests in the western hemisphere Small nuclear arsenal not planning to ght very many wars with boots on ground 2 Balance of Power Realism Kissinger Many had served in George HW Bush Acknowledge Cold War is over but don t see architecture as outdated Want to make sure that there can t be another power that can replace the Soviet Union Uninterested in domestic policies of other states not for pulling back Protect vital interests accept that there might still be con ict Resources as limited but not as extremely limited Sees a greater need for overseas basis no interest in closing them believe you need some conventional military power hope you don t have to use it My New way of labeling it but familiar idea Kagan and neoconservative friends Proposed this kind of approach back in the 1990s Benevolent Global Hegemony Primacists believe you need to act to be powerful prevent other powers from gaining more power and differ with balance of power realists because they want to expand the zones of market oriented democracies Believe that ideology and power are inseparable US Is better off and more secure when people have the right kind of domestic institution Accept the role of power and con ict and the use of force not after Page 21 of 53 just the balance of power they want a preponderance of power Want the US to be number one Idealistic and muscular approach See states as sources of threats View the world as a world of states as do the other two Primacists are focused on democracy amp institutions still tend to look at states and borders Don t see so many limits in resources tried to not cut defense as much Tools of power projection want to take military troops Tend not to look so favorably on use of tools of nation building don t want to use troops for occupation or nation building Liberal Internationalism Updated version of Wilsonianism Share with the primacists the idea of promoting americanized world order spread democracy and free markets Not necessarily by force Multilateral institutions rather than American predominance is better They want US to be embedded and constrained by this order so more states are more likely to abide by it IN favor of engaging Russian and Chinese peaceful means to democracy sanctions etc Don t disavow the use of force Clinton is an example Not quite as activist as primacists Tend to be more sensitive as what they view as new class of transnational stateless threats climate change terrorists disease things that don t respect borders Resource wise tend to think big and small See a bigger role and want to spend on it but not as much as primacists More amenable to the tools of nation building Like the idea of operating in a multilateral way Diverse set of options more expansive list of options than Cold War In the 90s more of a situation of which of these is going to win Before 911 even competition about which should win particularly in George W Bush Rice Balance of Power Realism Powell as well Campaign trail very opposed to Clintonian interventions of the 90s Paul Wolfowitz Primacist in Pentagon Rumsfeld was kind of a wildcard Basically you have BoP realists and primacists inside the administration of George W Bush before 911 After 911 what to do Strategic Disengagement taken of the table after 911 BoP Realists Don t really see non state sources of threats as real threats Concerned about states and balance of power Shocking and devastating as 911 was the world looked basically the same Contain Iraq Primacists don t really see state threats Shift towards them after 911 Preemptive strikes and not have to wait to visible mobilization WMDDemocratize Iraq transformative event Liberal Internationalism Page 22 of 53 Most interesting case How would they have responded More multilateral approach 911 to focus on the internal causes of terrorism Have to democratiz tem Tony Blair intervening Use force to stop killing 0 What was the point in invading Iraq How do you de ne success HM 120000 troops initially Brainchild of Rumsfeld Counterinsurgency need to support people Need troops Nation building interventions of l990s Original idea READINGS 1 America Between The Wars Chollett and Goldgeier 0 Chapter 2 0 Anthony Lake Cold War ends says that there is an eXpansion of the center wing in politics 0 Bush senior lacking mission out of touch with foreign policy world needs something new He was a realist who cherished pragmatism wanted to manage great power rather than bold solutions or big ideas Resists change 0 Clintons enters the scene New Democrat Robust internationalism Policies stressd a strong defense and rooted in liberal values spread of democracy 0 But there was debate amongst democrats 0 A lot of people left the party due to Vietnam 0 1992 elections Bush council tells him to stop talking about foreign policy 0 Neo New Democrats bring back neoconservatives Had a lot of in uence wanted to get them on board 0 Clinton s team also wanted an intellectual foundation Georgetown Speech can t allow false choice between domestic policy and foreign policy to occur 0 Task for Clinton recognize that the world was embracing democracy and that America s national interest rested on supporting this transformation 0 Clinton basically attacks Bush s FP the entire time 0 Bush s opponents in the RP Buchanan and Perot Buchanan isolationist idea 0 Perot strongly opposed to MeXico free trade agreement 0 Clinton address in WIsconsin last FP address democracy as centerpiece to democratic party 0 2 views were spurring within government about how to deal threats and opportunities 0 1 Defense Planning Guide by Cheney really aggressive drafted a set of policies to guide the US to be a superpower Very skeptical of global cooperation Objective prevention of a rival to US superpower Page 23 of 53 2 State Department Warren Christopher more humble view of the US more internationalism Never aired publicaly Eagleburer creates a policy memo US has opportunity to shape the international community in a new way not just seeing things through prism of security threats Broadest de nition of security 0 Defense Planning vs Eagleburer Chapter 4 Concerns of potential rivals vs Disintegration of states as threats Traditional concepts states and threats vs compleXity of how security was evolving Cheney 1993 It is more important than ever that our president be a foreign policy president 86 0 Republicans had disagreements on what this foreign policy should be 0 THE CONTRACT REPUBLICANS 1994 Contract with America gauge of where conservatives placed US defense and foreign policy among their priorities 0 A TALE OF THREE CRISES Rwandan genocide barely registered as an international crisis in Washington under bill Clinton Instead of weighing actions to stop the slaughter the State Department dithered over whether to classify what was happening in Rwanda as genocide which would obligate Washington to act under international law 92 Worst act of omission ever committed in the history of American foreign policy New dilemma instability in Haiti North Korea nuclear proliferation Polls Americans opposed military intervention in places such as Haiti but believed the US had to play an active leadership role in solving the world s problems Age of hope 0 THE NEOCONSERVATIVE CRACK UP Lack of catchy foreign policy concept was particularly troubling for people who believed in ideas above all else neoconservatives public opinion surveys showed that a majority of Americans consistently supported active US engagement in the world working through international institutions 107 0 THE CONTRACT COMETH 0 Chapter 8 Clinton engages in Kosovo Engages in pep talk unlike other wars Campaign he had led from the start to end dictator Milosevic and his oppression of the Albanian population 1994 Republicans won both houses of Congress Contract Republicans took over congress Page 24 of 53 This is the rst instance that NATO goes to battle for the rst time and NOT because of a counterresponse to an attack to its members We cannot be indifferent at home or abroad That is why we are in Kosovo 11 weeks bombing targets that eventually lead Milosevic into submission Tried to strike an agreement but couldn t First Humanitarian War 0 First time they pummeled an adversary into surrendering without american casualty from enemy attack using airforce 0 Responsibility to Protect R2P Doctrine of International Community Tony Blair Common law over canon law Experience over doctrine Fueled debate in public that policies were ad hoc and lacked conceptual rationale Kosovo NATO s credibility had to bomb to prove it could bomb 0 Con icts within the pentagon about the use of American military power Kremilin leaders furious about NATO scared it could be used against them ABM treaty 0 Chapter 11 Twelve hours after the rst plane slammed into the world trade center George W Bush addressed the nation and declared the war against terrorism Bush set forth a bold global agenda for the US which the centerpiece was the spread of democracy 9 ll polarized the public Many critics Allies 0 Leading Democratic politicians Retired and active duty military leaders 0 Bush s former top of cials 0 Donald Rumsfeld 0 Colin Powell The consequences of 911 did not have the same clarity of purpose for US foreign policy as did the Cold war 0 But it did have consequences 0 Americans and their leaders became more aware of the danger radical Islam poses Prompted the gov t to institute major intelligence reforms and create the Department of Homeland Security 1990s moment during which the ideas and dynamics that characterize the current era took shape Kennan argued that the failure to nd a single foreign policy rationale was a good thing He regretted having simpli ed foreign policy to a single word containment He believed it should be a thoughtful paragraph or more rather than trying to come up with a bumper sticker 316 1990s Americans and their leaders believed the world was more benign 3 presidential campaigns of the era spent little time on foreign policy issues Page 25 of 53 American people are not inherently isolationist Clinton said after his presidency that the most important thing is to create a world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world s only superpower 318 LIBERAL LEGACIES 0 As democracy promotion became associated with the war in Iraq it became increasingly dif cult to gain Democratic support 0 Clinton elevated economic policy to be a coequal of foreign policy 0 From 1989 to 2001 US averaged one large scale military intervention every eighteen months rate bigger than any other country of the time CONSERVATIVE S CONUNDRUMS 0 Bush didnt campaign for president as a neoconservative but after 911 he adopted their ideology Newt Gringich We have no interest in running the planet we just want to shape it 324 THE THIRD IRAQ HAND OFF 0 Throughout the 90s the US struggled to keep its UN Security Council partners united in keeping sanctions on the Iraqi regime 0 It s easy for the most powerful nation to employ military force it s a lot more dif cult to rebuild another country 328 The 90s was the same case as the 1790s when Washington gave his Farewell Address The last decade of the previous century has set America on its course in the new one 329 2 Bush The National Security Strategy of the United States US to create a balance of power that favors human freedom Defend nation against enemy main point Danger in technology and radicalism Overview of International Strategy 0 Champion aspirations for human dignity 0 Strengthen alliances to defeat terrorists 0 Work with others to defuse regional con icts Prevent enemy threat from weapons of mass destruction lol 0 New era w free markets and free trade 0 More development 0 Cooperative agendas EXpand liberty speak out about non negotiable violation of human dignity 0 use foreign aid to help peeps 0 freedom and development of democratic institutions key themes 0 special efforts to promote freedom of religion and speech Disrupt and destroy terrorists 0 Direct and indirect international power 0 Defend the us ok duh Deny sanctuary or support capabilities to terrorists Ok this entire document is uber boring and its basically about global cooperation and preventing terrorists from getting WMD Page 26 of 53 3 Packer The Liberal Quandary Over Iraq Antiwar movement small Why is there no organized liberal opposition to the war History Go back 10 years American military now has the power to serve goals of human rights and democracy Liberal hawks 2 tendencies that opposed liberal hawks Conservative like when Bush took of ce 0 Leftist any american move imperialist tendencies Now Republicans are like omg yay military for human rights out of no where and liberal hawks are like THE FUCK Liberal internal debate for war 0 l Saddam is cruel and dangerous 0 2 Saddam has used WMDs and has not tried to stop developing them 0 3 Iraqis are suffering under tyranny and sanctions 4 Democratic Iraq could drain in uence from Saudi Arabia 0 5 Could unlock the stalemate of Israel Palestine 6 Democracy would bene t Iraqis 7 Begin to liberalize Arab world 0 8 Al Qaeda is going to war regardless of Iraq Liberal internal debate against war 0 l Containment has worked for 10 years inspections could work 0 2 No wars should start without immediate provocation and international support 0 3 Casualties by US and Saddam 4 Potential of regional war dangerous levels of anti Americanism 5 Can t impose democracy 0 6 What are Bush s political aims 7 US has limited nation building capacity 0 8 War in Iraq distracts from war on terror Battle between wish and fear 0 The Theorist Walzer Uncertainty The Romantic Hitchens Americanization is the strongest force in the world 0 The Skeptic Rieff 0 Revolution too far can t impose shit 0 The Secularist Wieseltier 0 Slow process to democracy The Idealist Berman 0 Free Iraq 0 3 Assassins Gate Packer Chapter 4 0 Young American Andrew P N Erdmann was working for the Coalition Provisional Authority in central Baghdad 0 Iraq had been destroyed Erdmann concluded that long term success in wars depends on international support Page 27 of 53 0 One assumption was attempted to be proved Saddam had ties to al Qaeda and was likely to hand WMD to terrorists 0 It would take more forces to provide stability in Iraq than to actually conduct the war itself 0 Phase I buildup of troops in the region 0 Phase II initial mostly covert operations 0 Phase III main air and ground assaults 0 Phase IV postwar operations 0 This would mean a victory in Phase III 0 Arab proverb Better fourty days of dictatorship than one day of anarchy 0 Iraqis were asking for authority 6 Afghanistan Guest Lecturer We39re in a period of time where a lot is changing up for grabs crazy making for policymakers Important in understanding how we got out of Iraq war for security policy 0 When Bush was at the end of his term in 2008 We have to ask you to leave in order for you to stay Sense that US forces would have to leave the country in order to have longer enduring presence How much was Iraqi resistance and how much was Obama responsible Vote to give US troops immunity and rely on US justice system December 19th 2011 US troops out of Iraq only normaldiplomatic number Timing wasn t good Civil war in Syria began in 2011 Impossible to look at Iraq without understanding Syria Civil war was falling apart domestically remnants of main insurgent groups Sunni Al Qaeda ed over border to Syria Changed their name and became what is now known as ISIS Roots of ISIS in the end of the war in Iraq and combining with civil war US is now with some troops back in Iraq nothing like the scale seen during the war starting with a strong ground presence Ongoing security issues drawing back in Afghanistan 0 O 0 Large debate about why ISIS was allowed to grow Republicans who want to be critical blame Obama in pulling out too early in 2011 President decision to extend timeline of Afghanistan troops Iraq and Afghanistan on the ground very different wars What is going on in Afghanistan is different They are much more dependent in US forces particularly the army Also dependent of outside donors for nancial support one of the poorest countries in the world Government is dependent on outside assistance and don t pay at all for security forces US has its own strategic interest conduct its own counterterrorist Big issue is the US going to go to zero in 2016 Middle East in ames Yemen Saudi Arabia aftermath of Arab Spring Egypt Page 28 of 53 0 Future thinking about national strategy what is over the horizon beyond issues being faced today Always a challengetensions between balancing the needs of today and the needs of tomorrow 0 Resource constraints 0 Defense budget Sequestration Fiscal a lot of billions Why were sequestration cuts so bad Defense dollar does not buy as much as it used to Base closures Congress hates closing bases Defense budget is being spent on things that don t buy you ghting capability Must be reformed but Congress is uninterested 0 Needs conventional capabilities not only Special Ops Must deter traditional wars 0 Army how they spend the money 0 Tension between how you spend resources that you allocate 0 Clear that the administration has been more reactive than proactive unaware of a lot of events in ME But its not all our fault US leverage to affect what happens as the ground is not that big RELEVANT READINGS l NYTIMES Article A Policy Puzzle 0 In Yemen the Obama administration is supporting a Saudi led military campaign to dislodge Iranian backed Houthi rebels despite the risks of an escalating regional ght with Iran But in Iraq and Syria the United States is on the same side side as Iran in the ght against the Islamic State contributing airstrikes to an Iranian supported offensive on Tikrit on Thursday even while jostling with Iran for position in leading the operation 7 Nuclear Proliferation LECTURE NOTES 0 North Korea very fond of announcing its latest advancements important holidays in the US like Columbus Day LOL 0 Iran continuing issue 0 Two states and former partner in crime Iraq were called Rogues States and AXis of Evil 0 History 0 What is a rogue state Other terms have been used in IR commentary goes back to Reagan administration didn t get widespread currency until after Cold War Not everyone agreed that they were rogue states fell outside bounds of international community don t deal with them in normal way French didn t like this notion that there are rogue states have no equivalentquot In part driven by economic interest and also different way of doing business with these regimes better to engage and maintain open channel of communication Page 29 of 53 0 Dealing with these states before 911 Clinton spoke to people of Iran that didn t require permission talk to Iranian elites Clever way to make progress without treading on longstanding traditions of not talking directly North Korea direct negotiations that lead to 1994 Greed Framework light water reactor Real hope that more normal diplomatic things would ensue Clinton almost went to Pyongyang while in Of ce Attempt to make nuclear deal with India gt why with India and not with other states India isn t a rogue state and if you are a responsible member of international community you will take care of environment Catch in the 90s Rogue states can kind of push US to the brink and then pull back Saddam Hussein used to do this no military intervention Like a toddler 0 After 91 1 WMD grounds had to show they were serious to stop Saddam pushing them around Iraq war would make the UN more credible since Saddam made a mockery of the UN inspection process North Korea are now an acknowledged nuclear power For a while still plausible deniability Bill Clinton visit victory for North Korea No sort of opposition to back in NK In Iran there is a base opposition Detterence versus Compellance If you want to get a state to do something or give up thats a compellance problem IMPORTANT Deterence don t have it and you re trying to prevent them Compellance at negotiation table hard Switzerland Trying to counter proliferation missile defense particularly in 90s Could we live with a nuclear Iran and Iraq Should the US attack Irannegotiate a deal If we use military force Kroning argument attack now to avoid larger containment problem later pessimist camp If we attack them little chance for retaliation because they know that Caw author rally around the ag whatever domestic policies are now they will favor leadership in attack also could retaliate without weapons Strait of Hormuz RELEVANT READINGS 0 Time to Attack Iran 2012 Kroeni g 0 Iran is really dangerous if equipped with nuclear powers Page 30 of 53 Faulty assumption that the consequences of the US assault on Iran would be as bad or worse than those of Iran achieving its nuclear ambitions Option is to calculate military strike Nuclear armed Iran will limit any US freedom of action in the Middle East Says that others in the Middle East would take lead to acquire these weapons Deterrence would come at a heavy price Would have to deploy forces and troops extend their nuclear umbrella To contain Iran they need to invest political and military capital in the middle east Know where the weapons are US can mitigate consequences Also targeted US operation is not that threatening to Tehran Make it clear that only intention is to destroy nuclear program and not to overthrow a government Economic consequences of a strike Surgical strike is best option 0 Not Time to Attack Iran 2012 Khal No evidence Khomeini decided to make the weapons Even if Iran could produce enough weapons it would take at least a year to produce testable device has bad chronology Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much quickly or out of sight which could be years away Any war with Iran will be messy and violent Iranian leaders have stacked their domestic legitimacy on halting international pressure 0 Tehran would overreact to a surgical attack Con ict would be won by Washington but not limited and critical like Kroenig suggests Other states would get involved in con ict Little guarantee that strikes would produce lasting results 0 Nuclear knowledge would not be reversed 0 Rally domestics for hardliners of regime 0 Still Time to Attack Iran 2014 Kroeni g Two sides cannot agree on right to enrich Tehran can violate terms of the deal only follow them for a limited time comprehensive deal may not happen Basically states what he stated in his rst article 0 Still Not Time to Attack Iran 2014 Opportunity of comprehensive agreement has never been brighter Rouhani elected as moderate seeks nuclear accommodation with the West 2013 interim agreement in Geneva Page 31 of 53 0 Does not solve the problem but is designed to create at least a six 0 Going for broke month diplomatic window to negotiate a nal solution 0 Rouhani is not going to give up enrichment entirely 0 Playing chicken 0 Since he won t don t employ more economic sanctions 0 Given the dangers associated with a nuclear armed Iran Obama is right to keep the military option alive But he is also right to strongly prefer a diplomatic outcome Leadership changes in Tehran and the diplomatic momentum created by the Geneva interim accord mean that there is a real chance that the Iranian nuclear crisis a challenge that has haunted the international community for decades could nally be resolved peacefully No one can say for sure how high the odds of success are But given the enormous dangers associated with both an Iranian bomb and the bombing of Iran it is imperative to give diplomacy every chance to succeed 8 Humanitarian Intervention LECTURE NOTES 0 Albreight Invasion in Iraq rendered intervention impossible O Justi cation one of them liberate from Saddam Hussein But since Iraq we have seen humanitarian intervention Afghanistan 0 2010 2011 Libya Benghazi Darfur crisis Sy a OOO Somalia Mugabe s Zimbabwe Congo stemmed back to Rwanda in 1994 Places that are under the radar now and may have humanitarian interventioncrisis 0 Iraq Crisis which triggered return to country beginning of combatting ISIS Humanitarian intervention is never going to go away Deploying military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from manmade violencequot 0 Manmade Not just disaster relief Not Haiti Page 32 of 53 Sometimes governments get in way of outside help in order to close them off to foreigners Cyclone in Burma talk about intervening forcefully and override Burmese sovereignty gt blurs line between natural disaster and manmade Civil war violence or suffering result of what people do rather than act of nature Dif cult if not impossible to separate humanitarian concerns from political concerns to security concerns Evacuation of US nationals not intervention 0 Background 0 Issue associated with 90s Cold War meant that the US could not engage in causes unless directly related to them Humanitarian intervention in the past had more to do with religion Greek war for independence gained traction in US Monroe wanted to recognize it Adams made him tone it down because US had no power to do anything about it Russia threatened to use force protect orthodox christians who had suffered atrocities in hands of turks Russia had a strategic interests in weakening the Ottoman Empire Current form is a manifestation of an older idea Robert Kagan US involvement in Spanish American war humanitarian intervention 0 Did the Cold War Suppress Civil War 0 O O Laitin and Fearon Its not that there were more Civil Wars after the Cold War found that its very hard to end civil war over time they break out at a higher rate than actually ending So the number accumulates even though the rate of break out may be the same Rate of civil war breakout is basically similar Humanitarian intervention only happens when top leaders become involved Somalia Bush administration was aware for a long time about how much people were suffering Realists didn t see strategic interests at stake Problem almost impossible to intervene impartially Fence s article Either one side achieves a decisive victory or negotiated compromise Compromise only probable when they believe that they can gain more with peace Selection effect when you see a population of phenomena that is not random Strategies for Intervention Peacekeeping Peace has been made Detterence Chapter VI Peace Enforcement at least one side is still ghting Make peace from nothing Compellence Chapter VII O Page 33 of 53 Impartiality can be problematic Unless you just take over i e Cambodia If you really want to do peace enforcement instead of peace keeping what usually happens can t get to them without getting in the way of people who are not wanting you to do stuff Take hits No easy way to do humanitarian intervention Genocide and the US Come at Rwanda at a perspective of US foreign policy why it didn t intervene and assess if intervention in any of these cases will ever be likely Have to get the diagnosis right in order to provide treatment Brief recap of HI dilemmas O In civil con icts violence is manmade Critical thing civil wars are hard to resolve Either one side achieves decisive victory or both sides reach negotiated compromise Latter is only possible if both believe they have more to gain from compromise Cold War suppressed civil warperceived rise of civil wars after cold war ended not actually case that they are breaking out at higher rate rate of breakout if pretty similar but civil wars end at slower rate that they breakout so more accumulate 1990s No such thing as humanitarian surgical strike hard to make pinprick intervention Non Intervention in Rwanda O Context 1994 US has pulled out of Somalia violence in Bosnia is signi cant and hasn t done anything Clinton FP is kind of a mess First few years were not in general a success of foreign policy Why didn t the US intervene Samantha Power perspective of wanting to prevent this from happening again 2 different explanations Creeping non intervention Never a moment where anyone decided they were not going to intervene in Rwanda No meeting about this Susan Rice There was such a huge disconnect of the decisions we took along the way and the moral judgements Tyranny of small decisions nobody ever really focused on it US policymakers were not directly engaged at all civilian leadership was preoccupied with other problems domestic mostly Biases Peace process almost gets in the way of getting on the ground The Peace Processors In order to not happen again more information more expertise shock policymakers break habits of diplomacy expecting con ict Similar to slippery slope idea nobody ever said lets commit 500000 troops to Vietnam bureaucratic problem Power s explanation CONSCIOUS CHOICE US policymakers knew exactly what they were doing Labeling this genocide gt issue Genocide convention says explicitly Page 34 of 53 in Article II Referred as acts of genocide Irony that NSC Richard Clarke wrote the PDD 25 went through great pains through listing the conditions that would be acceptable to involve US in peacekeeping Writes these and makes bar very very high Affected support for other nations pulling the UN forces out of the genocide 0 Somalia had been a half measure sent very little troops 0 To x Only way to change this is to challenge the assumptions of the system 0 What happened after Rwanda 0 Darfur why did the US not intervene there Compare the nature of the problem Rwanda small and urbanized killing in Kigali Darfur is enormous and diffuse Sudan has natural resources oil revenues If not in Rwanda hard to imagine intervening in Darfur Labeling it genocide Colin Powell labeled it genocide Bush did nothing happen Labeling it genocide didn t really come with an expectation that the US had to do something Indictment of Omar al Bashir hasn t done anything Development of R2P Each state needs to protect itself but more importantly international community must use peaceful means to protect populations In this context prepared to take collective actions Means that states could sort of hide behind sovereignty UN didn t really have the right to tell states to interact with their own people R2P says that if you aggregate your responsibility you can t hide behind sovereignty anymore 0 Syria Oh my fucking god Military Who is the alternative RELEVANT READINGS The Delusion of Impartial Intervention Richard K Betts PREVENTING PEACE 0 US and Un since the Cold War have either intervened in civil con icts around the world or unwillingly prolonged suffering where they meant to relieve it 0 This happened by following a principle intervention should be both limited and impartial 0 Limited intervention may end war if the intervenor takes sides tilts the local balance of power and helps one of the rivals to win 0 Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete command of the situation overawe all the local competitors and impose a peace settlement 0 Both aren t possible 0 WHO RULES Page 35 of 53 Constant root issue who rules when the ghting stops Wars between countries Sovereignty over disputed territory Suzerainty over third parties In uence over international transactions Wars within countries Which group will control the government How the country should be divided so that adversaries can have separate government When political groups resort to war it is because they cannot agree on who gets to call the tune in peace War will not begin unless both sides agree who will control whatever is in dispute Two ways to stop a war 0 One side impose its will after defeating the other in the battle eld 0 Both sides accept a negotiated compromise Compromise probable 0 When both sides believe they have more to lose than to gain from ghting COMPROMISES THAT KILL In bosnia peacemaking needs help most but fails US and UN threats were weak and hesitant Bosnia and Somalia destimulated people in the US from supporting other peace operations In Haiti the problems were not due to impartiality US and UN supported the eXhiled president Jean Bertrand Aristide Impartiality works best where intervention is needed least 0 IMPERIAL IMPARTIALITY Best example UN operation in Cambodia Grand scale takeover of much of the administrative authority in the country program for establishing a new government through supervised elections and a constituent assembly Cambodia operation was the most expensive in UN history UN success was linked with impartiality in principle but not in effect 0 MEDDLING WITHOUT MUDDLING UN s peacekeeping does not create peace as it s supposed to Bosnia remaining mired in indecision and hamstrung by half measures Somalia facing failure and bailing out Haiti acting only after a long period of limited and misdirected pressure Rwanda holding back from action where more disaster than anywhere else called for it Recognize that to make peace is to decide who rules Avoid half measures Make sense in domestic politics because peace already eXists Do not confuse peace with justice Do not confuse balance with peace or justice Page 36 of 53 0 Make humanitarian intervention militarily rational Samantha Power Bystanders to Genocide 0 People Sitting in Of ces 0 Hutus murdering Tutsi s Clinton hadn t really been interested 0 Many claim the US didn t know what was happening knew but didn t care or thought nothing could be done 0 Accounts for hundreds of people 0 1998 Clinton Apology at Kigali Airport US did more than just not send troops removed peacekeepers blocked technologies US didn t do jack shit 0 Deaths referred to as wartime casualties Slaughter did not receive top level attention 0 Need to talk about suffering The Peacekeepers 0 Romeo Dallaire UN posting command in Rwanda Were there originally to patrol cease re and assist in demilitaralization and secure environment for Tutsis didn t happen Arusha Accords 0 Didn t get alarming reports from the UN Impression that situation was straightforward UNAMIR was really shitty Nobody listened to Dallaire The Early Killings 0 President s jet shot down Also Burundi Hutus take command of Kigali Belgians killed 0 The Last Warquot 0 Simultaneous war and genocide Faulty analogy of Last War Failure of Somalia body of US soldier dragged through Mogadishu PDD 25 Richard Clare develop US peacekeeping doctrine Peacekeeping was almost dead tried to keep it alive 0 The Peace Processors 0 EVERYONE BROUGHT THERE BIASES Ambassador in Kigali couldn t believe Rwandans were engaging in genocide Blindness bred by familiarity knew to eXpect violence 0 Foreigners First 0 Clearing out foreigners Genocide What Genocide 0 US of cials knew about killers intentions Reports were clear enough to distinguish Genocide convention gt obligation to act 0 Not Even a Shadow 0 Americans evacuated kind of went under radar Page 37 of 53 0 President loses interest after Human Rights activist is found 0 three months of genocide 500000 killed let that sink in The UN Withdrawal Killings began Dallaire expects reinforcements US opposed US completely resisted intervention 0 The Hutus would back off if there were foreigners Pentagon Chop Attempt to achieve arms embargo Dellaire wanted Full scale deployment End up not doing anything Nobody senior was paying attention to the mess One group feels strongly about what shouldn t be done nothing is done PDD 25 0 Late April pressed major powers to send UNAMIR II to Rwanda Secure Kigali and create safe havens for those who ed 0 By the time they responded genocide had already happened and ended The Stories We Tell 0 Could have deployed forces UN reinforcements intervene militarily 0 Reasons it didn t sources of pressure didn t care about Rwanda 0 Administration policy makers appeared to notions of greater good Could not afford another Somalia 0 Took solace in Mini victories 0 Inside Obama s War Room Michael Hastings BHL Bernard Herni Le vy waiting for Libyan rebels who had been ghting to overthrow Qadaf meet with Hilary Clinton J ibril France recognized opposition Convinced he had failed he needed Clinton to support no y zone arm rebels and launch attacks US had been distancing itself because they used to support these dictators Before Libya Obama xed himself on misadventures of Bush Trying to x predicated foreign policy doctrine After how he saw America s role Two camps on how to act on Libya one skeptical of intervention allies who viewed Libya as an opportunity to enact a new form of humanitarian intervention Susan Rice R2P Responsibility Clinton was the wildcard controlling and paranoid First supported Gates no intervention Didn t meet with youth groups in Egypt got shaken up Didn t want to mess up Libya too Had a bunch of day after scenarios White House started leaning on arming the rebels Not the best option Hillary wants no y zone Concern about genocide Wanted plans beyond no y zone Rice said she could get support from UN for intervention Obama agrees Page 38 of 53 Qadda is a dumb bitch and goes on TV and is like yeah we re going to kill all the rebels 0 LOL 0 He s fucked NATO intervenes War Powers Act Wasn t following congress Thought it was going to end quick What to do to secure peace is the big question 0 Pick Your Poison Richard K Betts America has many options in Syria none are good President Barack Obama passed the buck on authorizing a military strike on Syria to Congress because it was a way out of it He declared the use of chemical weapons to be a red line without having thought through whether or how to go to war if the line was crossed If Congress denies it would be an embarrassing retreat Members who chose to back the president must endorse the intent to use moderate amount of force Six potential objectives 0 Symbolic statement against war crimes 0 Punishment of the Assad regime for its crimes 0 Coercion of the regime to change its policy 0 Ending the war by helping to defeat Assad Demonstrating credibility to foreign audiences Demonstrating credibility to domestic audiences American air strikes on any scale may not serve some of these objectives The most limited attacks are likely to be the least effective except rst and last Li ghtest strikes would be counterproductive and ineffective for the most important purposes Symbolic use of force can be accomplished with very small scale strikes Punishment is the most obvious rationale for retaliation Coercion to deter Assad from further use of chemicals or to compel him to make political concessions Example of successful coercion by air attack alone War over Kosovo Massive 78 day assault that in icted a huge amount of destruction More costly to NATO than anticipated Uncertainty over whether Serbia s surrender was due to the air war or to other causes Obama administration was clear that it does not intend to bomb on the scale of the Kosovo war Trying to coerce the Assad regime to make concessions to the rebels would b a long shot Ending the war by adding enough US power to the equation to enable rebels to eventually defeat Assad is the most ambitious possible objective Also the most legitimate Page 39 of 53 Foreign credibility assumes that other governments will not take American deterrent threats seriously if they see it back down from 1 Concerns about credibility are overblown Domestic credibility is a dubious justi cation for bombing other countries 9 Arab S rin Guest Lecture Onl Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy 0 1 How much should the US be an agent of changerevolution in the region What is the US role in the Middle Eastern transformation 2 How can the US ensure its security in terms of a social mobilization that can nd its supply on radical movements 3 How does the US deal with adversaries with different visions of the region i e Iran 4 Bigger umbrella question Does this all matter Can the US just pack up and go home Egyptian military doesn t shoot at protestors realizes that Mubarak is not supported Somewhat easy for them to support Mubarak because they saw the military would help usher a new government US did not depose him nor did they start these revolutions If the US doesn t promote revolutionsdecide when Presidents should go or stay what is their role in all these moments Are they just a responsive role 0 O The US has to anticipate think ahead and realize what are the causes and sources of instability that led to these movements ISIS doesn t seem to be planning NYC building but decentralized and diffuse world view that is very dangerous Prompts sympathizerscopycats to either start their own ISIS chapter but attracts an unprecedented around foreign ghters US has been very good with Homeland Security and intel sharing in the past 15 years US role in the regionBalance with intervention and non interventionism O O O O This January was supposed to be a seminal moment US wars supposed to be over in the Middle East Is it worth Obviously Iraq War of 2003 Involved so many US combat soldiers that ended up changing the nature of the war Obama Doctrine why he was willing to authorize in 2011 but not in Syria Regional and multilateral coallitions in place 2011 Euro and Arab were pushing to go into Libya Not only a multilateral coalition but a regional presence What to do with adversary O Diplomacy should be rst resort Page 40 of 53 10 Trade Policy LECTURE NOTES 0 Issues where the US cannot act unilaterally involve interactions with a lot of countries at the same time and particularly in the shadow the rise of China 0 Trade Policy in the context of US Policy 0 End of WWII intended to include Soviet Union The idea of a Cold War was not inevitable and didn t crystallize by 1947 Window when IMF WB institutions were created to not be confrontational Closed autonomous regions before WWII had contributed to depression and war and opening them up would help include peace and security i e Germany and Japan Institutions that are intended for liberalizing trades getting rid of tariff barriers GATT then replaced by WTO Soviet Union was not a participant but was an original intention rounds of trade liberalization would last many years named after meetings places Uruguay Round 1994 Takes a really long time to negotiate trade would involve trade representatives get some stuff done get another meeting Just when the round would stop having momentum US would come in and be the closer hegemon that would enforce and make everyone make an agreement Worked for a while until DOHA round started in 2001 and essentially failed Doha Round last attempt Motto was everyone in a circle room global negotiations and come to a big grand bargain Opposed to going by region or going bilaterally Like UN general assembly Collapsed in 2008 without the US stepping in at the end Why Doha tried to tackle big tough issues like textiles international property agriculture Before it was manufactured products Once you get into agro and services call centers in india read radiology lms gets harder Agro is bedrock of some societies fundamentally talking about the fundamental destruction of their societyeconomy Rise of Chinese power US can t close a deal anymore China may prefer bilateral model because it allows them more leverage Alternatives Stitch together the bilateral agreements US China trade deal announced last year alongside climate deal Has been some progress on that front Track of future trade negotiations that is bilateral Regional trading blocks US negotiating something like the TPP try to stitch together a trading block that involves countries that have some reason to be in common this reason transpaci c region Countries Japan Vietnam Singapore Brunei Malaysia Australia NZ Chile Peru Canada MeXico China is also trying the same kind of thing does this represent a new form of competition Who has the dominant block Page 41 of 53 Why bother with thisWhat is so great about free trade for US 0 Comparative advantage one country is better at making something better you specialize and trade Everyone is using their factor endowments productively and factors of production are mobilized in a way that makes most sense When every country specializes total production increases In theory not a zero sum game since pie is getting bigger What is good for US must be good for all partners 0 Political effects 1 Democratization Drezner overview is extremely clear Bene ts and downsides Look at this reading Trade promotes economic growth and prosperity democracy Only when there is prosperity there will be peaceful leaving of of ce The ability to make money in the private sector is a way that helps smooth the eXit of elites who lose power If not becomes attractive to stay in power to maintain goodies Strong statistical evidence that there is a strong correlation between GDP per capita and democracy Level above which when country is wealthy enough democracy is more likely to survive Trade is habit forming and promotes the rule of law By opening market states become accustomed to habits that they need in order to trade with liberal markets Property rights and customs forms LOL ok 2 Trade s international effects In theory democracy promotes peace Democracies do not ght each other Trade may directly promote peace by producing more democracies and promoting interdependency between states International institution version of habit forming if you are involved in trade and get into a dispute and you re not used to having to resolve disputes peacefully but join WTO get into WTO and solve it peacefully Trade teaches good habits US Policv should therefore promote free trade Whats not to like about this What is the case for a fair trade Drezner takes more into account domestic policies and circumstances 0 Within the US Nature of free trade agreements means that there will inevitably have winners and losers There will be industries where the US has become less competitive Gains from trade are bigger than the losses and you can try and use those gains to bene t the losers But its hard to get access to that unemployment move ie Detroit Costs are concentrated in few places and bene ts are not so concentrated Nature of issue This has political costs Interest groups that suffer have more of an incentive to lobby against trade provisions Hard to mobilize people to say I want cheap clothing in Vietnam Would do that if you thought you would lose your job Has an impact in Congress for members represent places and if they represent a place with factories that will suffer they end up opposing trade provisions and treaties because of Page 42 of 53 concentrated costs in their districts Jim Lindsay Power of the Purse TPP negotiated in secret Role of the Public perceived job losses even in areas that are not hurt by trade Can be hard to convince the public that your tv is cheaper because of free trade Trade can bring more women into formal employment some places may come into clash with eXistant traditions cause con ict 0 China and Trade Policy 0 Absent from TPP deliberate Make the argument that what is TPP is twofold Anything that increases US economic power is good and in Asia even better Pure money and power basis this is a good way to counter Chinese economic in uence Establish rules for trading in this region Standards Canada US biggest trading partner China is second Enter WTO in 2001 China has been growing at a phenomenal rate fueled by eXports In turn those eXports are fueled by a low value of the Yuan China has had an interest in keeping currency arti cially low in order to maintain eXport driven growth Propped up the dollars value and investing in the United States James Fallow article Somehow China has to take control of the dollars authoritarian regime can do that Government is actually able to control these dollars so when a factory owns dollars from trade it takes dollars to a bank has to go to exchange surrendering those dollars to Chinese government need to turn in to central bank Government is amassing dollars and what to do with them China invests domestically avoid in ation and social unrest RELEVANT READINGS 0 James Fallows The 14 Trillion Question 0 Stephen Schwarzmann Co founder and Ceo of Blackstone group 0 threw himself a 3 million party 0 bad image in us 0 admirable in china 0 Chinese government bought 8 of Blackstone shares 0 Chinese leaders held down living standards for their own people and propped them up in the US 0 Chinese trade surplus is used in US Treasury Notes 0 Every rich person in the US has borrowed about 4000 from someone poor in China 0 American s have been living better than they should economists argue 0 When a nation s total consumption is greater than its total production 0 Despite the Chinese billionaires China s people have been living far worse than they could 0 China consumes only half of what it produces 0 This arrangement is convenient for both governments 0 China 0 Helped the regime guide development 0 Keep the domestic economy s growth rate stable Page 43 of 53 0 US 0 Cheaper goods 0 Lower interest rates 0 Reduced mortgage payments 0 Lighter taX burden Arrangement now shows sign of cracking down 0 China might move some of its holdings into stronger currencies 0 When the dollar is strong this goes down 0 Price of food 0 fuel 0 imports manufactured goods 0 Goes up 0 Stock market 0 Real estate 0 About all other american asset The opposite applies when the dollar is weak 0 WHYA POOR COUNTRY HAS SO MUCH MONEY 0 Debate whether it is good to rely so heavily on money controlled by a foreign government 0 America has never before been so deeply in debt to one country 0 Average income for workers in a big factory is about 160month 0 Why is China shipping money to America 0 THE VOYAGE OF THE DOLLAR Oral B electric toothbrush 30 at CVS 0 Only 3 goes back to China 0 The government doesn t want to increase domestic spending because it fears that improving average living conditions could intensify the rich poor tensions 0 By creating new factory jobs they reduce China s own social tensions and create opportunities for its rural poor 0 WHAT THE CHINESE HOPE WILL HAPPEN 0 Chinese public is beginning to be aware that its government is sitting on a lot of money 0 A BALANCE OF TERROR 0 US amp Chinese governments are always disagreeing Drezner US Trade Strategy Free versus Fair 0 Four recurring challenges 0 Managing current account de cit which is growing 0 Intersection of trade policy over other policy issues The accelerating pace of technological innovations and economic globalization blur the boundaries between domestic and international regulatory concerns labor standards intellectual property rights immigration and environment 0 Distribution of bene ts and burdens of trade eXpansion Page 44 of 53 0 Find balance among multilateral regional bilateral and unilateral tracks of trade diplomacy 0 Free trade posture 0 Greater weight to economic ef ciency dynamism and growth than to job security of workers employed in import competing industries 0 Facilitates US diplomacy on other foreign policy issues 0 Requires signi cant amounts of political capital to implement Carries danger of being viewed as uncaring toward Americans who are negatively affected 0 Fair trade posture Emphasizes economic security and the stability of import competing sectors over economic ef ciency dynamism and groth Resonates w American public 0 Antagonism abroad toward US foreign policy 0 Carries danger of mutating into blanket protectionism Trade offs among the multilateral regional bilateral and unilateral approaches to trade are clear 0 Multilateral approach 0 Drawn out and dif cult negotiations across a wide range of issues 0 Signi cant political capital to ensure congressional support 0 More immediate and tangible successes on the tradefront from regional and bilateral agreements 0 Economic impact would be considerably less and in the long run would threaten WTO accomplishments Unilateral approach potentially allows the US to extract trade concessions without having to reciprocate in kind The cost however subsumes the cost of regional and bilateral approach and also raises larger foreign policy concerns 11 Climate Change and Energy LECTURE Climate Change and National Security 0 Initially US role was to be the deal closer 0 NEW MODEL Regionalism bilateralism US is the policemancloser in these large agreements Domestic politics can get in the way 0 Climate change and trade are not issues that should be taken on by faint of heart 0 Bene ts of trade are diffused costs are concentratied 0 Large proportion of the public does not realize the bene ts of free trade 0 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 0 Under Nixon 0 Somewhat connection with Vietnam massive defoliation Page 45 of 53 0 It is not until Clinton and the end of the Cold War that this shows up on the agenda 0 Could bring more instability abroad more people ghting over resources more military intervention 0 Is this actually a threat to national security ENERGY 0 Has been seen as a national security threat for a long time 0 US president pledge to become self suf cient in oil 0 US gets most of its oil from ME and Canada 0 Thomas Friedman US citizens usually pay more attention to this when oil prices are high CLIMATE CHANGE 0 Carbon emissions 0 Is not a problem that stays within borders 0 Its very easy to exacerbate the bene ts from eXploiting our resources and not think about the costs it has for everyone 0 US cutting emissions but China not doing anything not enough 0 We all have incentives to free ride 0 People have addressed this problem by treating it as a business problem 0 Humans are very good at responding to economic incentives FREE MKT CAP N TRADE O Harness the powers of free market by trying to get emission levels under control 0 Governments don t want to get involved Set a number and leave it to the businesses to decide 0 Hand out permits Businesses trade permists O Lets the market sort out how emissions works out 0 Was successful for acid rain in 1990s 0 Attempted to do it worldwide for C02 in the Kyoto Protocol 0 Its not so easy for developing countries to implement these 0 Need a lot of monitoring 0 Pretty much everything emits C02 0 US withdrew from Protocol 0 Criticism that it was done in a very unilateral way did not pose any limits on China Sends a signal that the US was not a leadership Developing world does not understand why it should have limits on them when the inustrially developed didn t during their revolutions O The way the permits are initially distributed is critical global approach hard to implement A DIFFERENT WAY O Smaller bottom up approach 0 Madisonian approach 0 Arrange cap 11 trade between small and developing countries Page 46 of 53 O The global model get all world leaders in one room to agree is top down 0 Is it important for the US to take lead Last November US and China reached a progressive climate change agreement December 2015 Paris Global meeting US plans to reach a deal in paris Not everyone agrees RELEVANT READINGS Climate Change Seen as a Threat to US Security John M Broder Strategic challenges militar intervention to handle violent storms drought migration and pandemics etc These climate induced chaoses could topple governments make a good space for terrorists to grow and destabilize regions MUST LOOK AT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS Intelligence studies point sub Saharan Africa ME South and Southeast Asia are areas that this could happen in National Defense University Bangladesh threat deal with refugees Focus on national interest regarding this not just political debate on substitutes and whatever US needs to take lead in reducing fossil fuels in order to secure interests and security John Kerry lead advocate Department of Defense assesses the issue in 2008 budget authorizations by Hilary Only now considering the effects of global warming and geopolitical challenge Air Force Bases destroyed in Florida Diego Garcia hub at risk We will pay one way or another National security heats up Stephen M Walt 9 6 CNA report climate change poses a serious threat to national security threat multiplier for instability in some volatile regions recommends integrating national security consequences of climate change into eXisting defense and national security strategies dog bites man insipid common sense If the purpose was to take climate change serious OK Trying to convince people that its going to be more expensive later on because its already expensive now CNA hubristic imperialism Instead of immediately concluding that American national interests are at stake aren t the countries that will suffer this the most important part of the equation Instability in volatile regions does not equal that US interests will be affected in a signi cant way Says that national security implications are modest that US military force will be humanitarian Form of global philanthropy and sells it as defense of the American people when it shouldn t be 101 ok The Power of Green Thomas L Friedman We need to start thinking green We are paying prices for fossil fuels Conserving oil to put less money in hands of hostiles Page 47 of 53 First Law of Petropolitics The price of oil and the pace of freedom move in opposite directions in states that are highly dependent on oil eXports for income and have weald authoritarian governments Geostrategy of conserving energy has moved up to the pentagon the more energy they can save in the heat of battle the more power they can project Iraq War Green Hawks 0 Diesel on trucks that were being eXploded 0 Military goes greencountry can go green Global Warming no longer so wishy washy China knows it has to go green Mobilize free market capitalism Become more energy ef cient threatens China Stewardship to Green movement A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy Victor House Joy Fragmented and multispeed effots akin to the messy federalism that Madison embraces in US constitution Bottom up approach to carbon trading 0 Ability to tap stronger national and regional institutions for governance Progress needed on three fronts 0 Suitable framework is needed to help stitch these fragments into fuller global approach Formal coordination Treaties focus drafters on legal compliances and are conserative They are good at locking in but poor what to chart uncertain course 0 Set ambitious non binding goalsL20 group idea 0 New strategy is needed to engage developing countries 12 ChinaUS Relations Future of USChina RelationsRise of China Is the USA still the dominant power in the international system American declines especially after 2009 nancial crisis Is some other power China rising fast enough to make a big difference AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE O This is not the rst time people started talking about declinism Japan was believed to be competing power in the 90s Imperial overstretch great powers eXpand too much It s very hard to measure the absolute power of the US China s growth has been rapid but they are starting from a low level Bigger aging population in China than in US 0 Chinese military power is inferior FRIEDBERG ARTICLE Is china a threat or not IS CONFLICT WITH CHINA INEVITABLE 0 Liberal optimists trade is a pacifying force produces growth and democratization OOOO Page 48 of 53 0 Liberal pessimists China isn t a democracy so the argument that democracies don t ght each other becomes invalid Realists don t care about the inside Liberals believe that the nature of Chinese institutions matters a lot It may be that democracies don t ght each other However countries in the process are fragile and aggressive O Realist pessimists Human nature is fundamentally con ictuous US has been the dominant player in the system and its natural fear is that it will be replaced Why does China want to host the winter and Summer Olympics 0 Realist optimists China s growth curve can t stay steep forever As powerful as Chinas is it still doesn t have the capabilities to do the things that they say they re doing What does China really want Why do we assume they want world domination China could be a status quo power US could accommodate some of the eXpansionist goals of China and not freak out about it Russia should not be seen as a threat at all WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THIS 0 IF YOU ARE A LIBERAL OPTIMIST push for liberalization democratic reform speeches on human rights 0 IF YOU ARE A LIBERAL PESSIMIST stay quiet on issues like human rights and democratization IF YOU ARE A REALIST PESSIMIST pivot to Asia Downside its dangerous 0 IF YOU ARE A REALIST OPTIMIST look for ways to keep things calm pull away end US commitment to Taiwan 0 All options want China to democratize RELEVANT READINGS Is con ict inevitable Friedberg Relationship with US and China is uncertain in future He talks about the realist optimist pessimists liberal optimistpessimists Problem With the Pivot Ross Relationship with US and China is uncertain in future He talks about the realist optimist pessimists liberal optimistpessimists In 2010 the Obama administration initiated what it called a quotpivotquot to Asia a shift in strategy aimed at bolstering the United States39 defense ties with countries throughout the region and eXpanding the US naval presence there This shift was based on a fundamental misreading of China39s leadership Beijing39s tough diplomacy stemmed not from con dence in its might China39s leaders have long understood that their country39s military remains signi cantly inferior to that of the United States but from a deep sense of insecurity born of several nerve racking years of nancial crisis and social unrest The risks of the pivot become obvious The new US policy unnecessarily compounds Beijing39s insecurities and will only feed China39s aggressiveness undermine regional stability and decrease the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington China has more to worry about than just military social con ict in ation Page 49 of 53 China39s maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes China sent combatready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and after the Philippines withdrew its ships established a permanent presence there Also this year Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters the other claimants have been active in these waters for years and the pla formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country39s territorial claims in the South China Sea Since then China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands Pivot has not yielded stability By threatening China and challenging its sovereignty claims over symbolic territories Washington has encouraged Chinese leaders to believe that only by adopting belligerent policies will a rising China be able to guarantee its security Over the next several years Washington should reshape its Asia policy to restore the consensus of previous administrations that increasing the United States39 military presence on the East Asian mainland is not vital for US security and that the United States should avoid entanglement in compleX sovereignty claims in the region 13 Cyberwar and Drones Drones and Background Info 0 Announcement of accidental killing of two american aid workers in January by drones Coverage has emphasized lack of oversight Discussion on how this is something that happens behind so many levels of secrecy that even Congress can t complete its oversight These topics surface same kinds of issues we have talked about all along in the course 0 Raise issues of presidential power and accountability american ability to use power internationally realism vs idealism what are the purposes for these weapons 0 Are these new tools really that new Be skeptical when people say something is new Cyberwar China 0 Cyberwar interested in if you acquire strong cyber capability what does that do to the overall power vis a vis another state US China relative power and how fast this gap is closing Important to know how they are relative towards each other Question is can cyber materially change this Why is there debate over the nature of Cyberwar 0 When Russians invaded Crimea a lot of discussion as how they had used Cyberwar to soften ground on their way in Russians had a tremendous advantage People dug into this they had advantage in the physical war Physical worked well had infrastructure ethnic Russians on ground How much O O O O Page 50 of 53 did Cyber really help the Russians Hard to disentangle material power from cyber Cyber is electroniccomputer related activity Both virtual and physical components some cyberactivities cannot be undertaken wo military power Can have effects of cyberwar within or outside cyberspace Barriers to entry to this capability are low and entity that is on the offense is in advantage Anybody can sit in their living room and engage in Cyber war Pessimist Different kinds of threats economic espionage cyberwar and cyberterrorism Key governments are key actors still Have capabilities that non state actors don t have Barriers are low for states Cyberwar will not take place Ridd Cyberwar not stealing secrets not crime not Nigerian scams must have 3 features 1 Violent 2 Instrumental have to use violence to do something 3 Political Doesn t deny that this is possibly a theory but none of the attacks on record come close to this No cyber attack has injured killed or damage Ridd extension of old tools Is he being too dismissive of the damage If Georgia wants to make a case in international sphere but its voice is suppressed w communication technologies doesn t this affect politically Does actual violence have to take place or can it just further present violence People have an image of cyber as easy Falls in the same category as Nye Stuxnet in ltrate For cyberwar Human intelligence Can t send in through wall they have protections and you need to get past them Technician mole to insert these materials on site Not easy for a country to do Conclusion cyber in the really offensive sense is actually a tool of the strong Not a tool of the weak IN that sense not going to allow Russia and mainly China to catch up faster that it otherwise would Doesn t have the same militaryhuman ability US does US advantage in other areas translate into Cyber Debate is still ongoing 0 Drones O O Byman and Cronin s dueling articles Byman Drones as tools as counterterrorism works lower cost in casually more politically palpable no problem with what to do when terrorist is captured If you oppose drones still recognize you can t disinvent them Cronin Drones don t work Create more terrorists than they kill Lead to local con icts US problem Don t get same intelligent that you get when you do a human attack i e Bin Laden hard drives This kind of intelligence requires boots on ground O O O Page 51 of 53 Drones and US no way to know who its going to kill Don t have the inteligence to know who is in what compound at any given time Transparent and rare Not be backbone of our counterreorism Because we use drones that s how we think about whats possible Picture we have of certain countries is driven on where drones can go rather than sourcing accordingly Americans like drones amp are popular because they appear to save american lives doesn t require boots on ground Cannot have perfect security at lowno cost Have to pay price if you want to prevent terrorism Legal and moral challenges In common with Cyber Are drones a weapon of the strong or weak US has been primary user in evident effect Could China undertake these operations someday How soon Would it have to have these other trappings of militaryintelligence operations Do we understand drones and cyber together as lower cost tools that will be increasingly popular in an era of war weariness Presidential power Silicon Valley to enlist them to not be so hostile to NSA surveillance invest Realism and Idealism Use weapons in surprise attacks Are they justi ed Is collateral damage undermining american values or ruthlessly pursuing national interest at relatively low cost How different is this from previous times where we talked about cost and bene ts RELEVANT READINGS Cyberpower Nye 0 Power depends upon context and the rapid growth of cyber space is an important new context in world politics The low price of entry anonymity and asymmetries in vulnerability means that smaller actors have more capacity to exercise hard and soft power in cyberspace than in many more traditional domains of world politics Changes in information have always had an important impact on power but the cyber domain is both a new and a volatile manmade environment The characteristics of cyberspace reduce some of the power differentials among actors and thus provide a good example of the diffusion of power that typi es global politics in this century The largest powers are unlikely to be able to dominate this domain as much as they have others like sea or air But cyberspace also illustrates the point that diffusion of power does not mean equality of power or the replacement of governments as the most powerful actors in world politics Table 2 Three Faces of Power in the Cyber Domain lst Face A induces 8 do what 8 would initially otherwise not do Hard Power denial of service attacks insertion of malware SCADA disruptions arrests of bloggers Soft Power information campaign to change initial preferences of hackers recruitment of members of terrorist organizations 2nd Face Agenda control A precludes B39s choice by exclusion of 8 s strategies Hard Power rewalls lters and pressure on companies to exclude some ideas Soft Power lSPs and search engines self monitor lCANN rules on domain names widely accepted software standards 3rd Face A shapes B s preferences so some strategies are never even considered Hard Power threats to punish bloggers who disseminate censored material Soft Power information to create preferences eg stimulate nationalism and quotpatriotic hackersquot develop norms of revulsion eg child Pornography Table 3 Relative Power Resources of Actors in the Cyber Domain A Governments Development and support of infrastructure education intellectual property Legal and physical coercion of individuals and intermediaries located within borders Size of market and control of access eg EU China US Resources for cyber attack and defense bureaucracy budgets intelligence agencies Provision of public goods eg regulations necessary for commerce Reputation for legitimacy benignity competence that produce soft power 9 9quot Key vulnerabilities High dependence on easily disrupted complex systems political stability reputational losses 8 Organizations and highly structured networks Large budgets and human resources economies of scale Transnational exibility Control of code and product development generativity of applications Brands and reputation 1 3quot 7 Key vulnerabilities Legal intellectual property theft systems disruption reputation loss name and shame C Individuals and lightly uncured networks 1 Low cost of investment for entry 2 Virtual anonymity and ease of exit 3 Asymmetrical vulnerability compared to governments and large organizations Key Vulnerabilities Legal and illegal coercion by governments and organizations if caught Page 53 of 53 Cyberwar will not take place Ridd O Outlines what would constitute cyber war a potentially lethal instrumental and political act of force conducted through malicious code The second part shows what cyber war is not case by case Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own The nal part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks In an act of cyber war the actual use of force is likely to be a far more complex and mediated sequence of causes and consequences that ultimately result in violence and casualties If the use of force in war is violent instrumental and political then there is no cyber offense that meets all three criteria There are very few cyber attacks in history that meet only one of these criteria But all known political cyber offenses criminal or not are neither common crime nor common war Their purpose is subverting spying or sabotaging Clausewitz s three criteria are jumbled These activities need not be violent to be effective They need not be instrumental to work as subversion may often be an eXpression of collective passion and espionage may be an outcome of opportunity rather than strategy And nally aggressors engaging in subversion espionage or sabotage do act politically but in sharp contrast to warfare they are likely to have a permanent or at least temporary interest in avoiding attribution Stuxnet Sabotage For the time being it remains unclear how successful the Stuxnet attack against Iran s nuclear program actually was But it is clear that the operation has taken computer sabotage to an entirely new level Only very few sophisticated strategic actors may be able to pull off top range computer sabotage operations GOES AGAINST NYE IN THIS SENSE Espionage But cyber defenses of the most sophisticated countries should be more transparently presented Only openness and oversight can eXpose and reduce weaknesses in organization priorities technology and vision Subversion deliberate attempt to undermine the authority the integrity and the constitution of an established authority or order gt Anonymous Virtual training camps cannot replace brick and mortar training camps and when such substitutes were tried the technological sophistication of attacks has dropped gt yields the limitations of the subversive groups


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