US Foreign Policy Final Study Guide Spring 2015 PSC 2446, Professor Saunders
US Foreign Policy Final Study Guide Spring 2015 PSC 2446, Professor Saunders PSC 2446
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US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 1 Table of Contents 1 Book Notes 1 2 Study Guide 21 3 Key Lists and Models 24 BOOK NOTES STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT BY JOHN LEWIS GADDIS Ch1 FDR thought the ultimate victory of WWII justi ed a certain reliance with Stalin s Soviet Union Union to help to defeat Germany and Japan Containment was the term generally used to characterize American policy toward the Soviet Union during the postwar era was a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of that wartime Faustian bargain idiom An agreement in which a person abandons his or her spiritual values or moral principles in order to obtain wealth or other benefits the idea was to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won as a result of that con ict to reshape the postwar international order a idea that seemed less dangerous than what Germany or Japan could have done with a victory One way to resolve the dilemma would be to have devised a military operation capable of containing the Russians While at the same time enlisting their help in subduing the Germans Truman ash of geopolitical cynicisms attracted little attention until he entered the White House William C Bullitt a former ambassador to the Soviet Union ambassador said in a Life magazine article that he advocated an alternative strategy five years earlier in a series of top secret memoranda to Roosevelt Stalin s war aims were not an antifascist coalition had purged the Soviet Dictator of his autocratic and expansionist tendencies were assuming on the basis of no evidence Bullitt and Churchill advocated a similar position that introduce AngloAmerican forces into Eastern Europe and the Balkans first for the purpose of defeating the Germans and then making sure the Red Army doesn t invade the rest of Europe FDR resisted this above FDR didn t think they would be able to win without the Russians FDR was concerned about preventing a deal after Pearl Harbor between Hitler and Stalin and at the same time secure the war against Japan FDR was a rm believer in arsenal of democracy concept the idea that the US could most effectively contribute toward the maintenance of international order by expanding technology but not manpower After WWII Churchill really wanted to make it point to minimize casualties FDR strategy evolved by subtle stages into one of taking on Germany and Japan at the same time the war in the Pacific became more than just the holding action that had originally been planned US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 2 One historical account has even claimed that FDR explicitly adopted Truman s 1941 recommendation to let Russians and Germans kill each other off For every American who died in the War 13 Germans dies and 90 russians died FDR ideas to stabilize the USSR as an ally was to ensure a postwar order by offering Moscow a prominent place in it by making it a member of the club The idea was that the Soviet hostility stemmed from insecurity that the sources of that insecurity was external FDR expected that making the Soviet Union a full partner in shaping the peace to come would gradually drop away Stalin s suspicions FDR realized that Stalin was the only leader in the USSR and the authority to modify past attitudes of hostility Improvements in SovietAmerican relations when they occurred during the Cold War generally did so when some basis of mutual respect if not trust but winning Stalins trust could have been impossible Stalin warned his people that America and England might team up with the Germans and he started building defensive installations in Central Europe Career Diplomats had always maintained a certain coolness with the Russians but now the FDR had stopped all toplevel dealings and relations between the state department and the Stalin W Averall Harriman was a US ambassador in Moscow since 1943 and the General John Deane advocated to keep trying to win Stalin trust and try to help shape a peace agreement at the end of WWII but within a year they didn t have grounds to trust the Russians George F Kennan was a ministercounselor of the embassy there and was one of the State Department s rst trained Russian experts saw little possibility of resolving difference with the USSR on any other basis besides acknowledgement of different views of in uence FDR and Truman continued using the quid pro quo strategy A Latin phrase meaning quotsomething for somethingquot This term is typically used in financial circles to describe a mutual agreement between two parties in which each party provides a good or service in return for a good or service None of these plans of leverage worked against Russia they were never dependent enough on American economic aid Quid pro quo proved very unsuccessful A document that immediately changed US FP was a 8000 word telegram sent by George Kennan from Moscow on Feb 22 1946 Kennan said Soviet FP bore in little relation to the relationship with the West and what they did or didn t do Many things changed in US and Soviet relations 1 They would not hide their disagreements they had with the Soviets 2 There would be no more places given to the Soviets and hence the US would draw the line 3 US military needed to be strengthened and allies armies need to become allies 4 Negotiations would still happen with Moscow but now only to win allies abroad or registering Moscows acceptance of American positions of power Patience and firmness became key words with dealing with Russia Truman proclamation on March 1947 that it must be the US policy to support free people resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures The Truman Doctrine implied an open ended commitment to resist Soviet expansionism Idea of containment became the strategy due to Kennan s ideas US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 3 Ch 2 In the summer of 1947 published in Foreign Affairs of The Sources of Soviet Conduct and in this article introduced the term containment to the world and he wrote under the name of Mr X but then Arthur Krock revealed his authorship Kissinger would say that Kennan has came close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of this era as any diplomat in our history National interest tried to create an international environment conducive to the survival and prospering of the nations domestic institutions He said our FP should always include 1 to protect the security of our nation and from the threat of interference from foreign powers 2 advance the welfare of its people by promoting a world order in which the nation can make the max contribution to peace Universalistic approach which assumed that all countries could be induced to subscribe to certain standard rule of behavior Particularized approach was to be skeptical of any scheme for compressing international affairs into legalist concepts Kennan didn t believe that the US could do the universalistic approach it would probably require them to pull out all of their international armies Kennan thought the UN was an illusion And the particularized approach would put too much power into any one country In August of 1948 how these area of the world which we cannot permit to fall into hostile hands to us and we should put forward maintenance of these political regimes at least in favorable to the continued power and independence of our nation These areas were A Nations in the Atlantic community South America from the bulge north Africa down to the bulge Canada Greenland Morocco Iceland Scandinavia the British Isles Western Europe B Countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East as far east as Iran and including Iran C Japan and the Philippines Only 5 centers of industrial and military power in the world were important to us in form of national security These countries were US Great Britain Germany and central Europe Soviet Union and Japan Only one of these powers were in hostile hands Kennan believed in coming up with a list that a change in one cannot take place without a change in the other If we ever get to the point where we can t have ideals in US FP something very valuable will have gone out our internal political life The effect of the Red Army was to effect the victory that had been to place them in a dominant position throughout Eastern Europe and East Asia bringing it in striking difference of the devastated but still very reliable industrial centers of Germany and Japan Moscow s antipathy for the west grew out of both historical and ideological circumstances Their ideology was more of a justification for action already decided upon rather than a guide to action Idea of containment should only be applied to limit Soviet expansionist and posed only a threat if they wanted to extend their instrument of that expansion Kennan did not expect the Soviet Union to risk war to gain desired ends US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 4 Communism is not a disease but only a complication Kennan saw this challenge as purely psychological in nature and his recommendations were to produce in the minds of the adversaries and potential allies and the American peoples attitudes that would facilitate the emergence of an international order more favorable to the interests of the US He had 3 steps to accomplish this goal 1 Restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self confidence in nations threatened by Soviet eXpansionism 2 reduction by eXploiting tension between Moscow and the international communist movement 3 Modification of the Soviet concept of international relations with a view to bring a negotiated settlement of differences All in All our policy must be directed toward restoring the balance of power in Europe and Asia said Kennan The mere eXistence of such military forces is probably the most important single instrumentality in the conduct of US FP said Kennan Kennan objected the notion that the US had to resist communism wherever it appeared 1st stage of war strategy was the balance of power had to be restored 2nd stage in his war strategy was to seek to reduce the Soviet Union s ability to future to project in uence beyond its borders 0 Installations o the use of communist parties elsewhere in the world which were at the time still reliable instruments in Soviet FP US could do was to make sure that Western Europe rehabilitation succeeded If a communist regime failed to meet its responsibilities then it would discredit itself in the eyes of their own people 3rd step of his strategy was to bring about a change to effect a shift in the thinking of Kremlin leaders away from their own versions universalism but to particularism to toleration an even encouragement of diversity US could hardly eXpect to conquer and occupy the entire territory of the USSR or to impose a surrender of its government According to Kennan the most effective means of modifying Soviet behavior lay in combo with deterrents and inducements that Kennan called counter pressure causing it grow back in a different form but not from sudden or violent application of force Soviet American relations boiled down to a long range fencing match in which the weapons are not only the development of military power but the loyalties and conceptions of hundreds of millions of people at the form and control of political organization The act of transforming eXpertise into policy guidelines distorted that eXpertise Documents produced an oversimplification and rigidity when that was needed was sophisticated assessments of changing situations and it needed flexibility It isn t smart to abandon institution in the interest of furthering this strategy No one can see it totality anything so fundamentally and so unlimited in all its implications at the development of our people in their relation to the world environment Chapter 3 US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 5 Kennan s overall strategic concept was as much as a rationalization for and sometimes a critique of what the administration did during the three years as it was an impetus to those actions Kennan did more than anyone else in the administration to articulate containment as a strategy CONTAINMENT PROCESS BY WHICH AVAILABLE MEANS COULD BE MADE TO SERVE DESIRED ENDS lst stage of his strategy is to have restore the balance of power left unstable by the defeats of Germany and Japanese and by the simultaneous expansion of Soviet in uence in Europe and Asia Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the US The approach had been implied patience and rmness strategy and in the Truman Doctrine it even appeared even more explicitly in Kennan s X article which spoke of the need to confront the Russians with an unalterable counter force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world Kennan s evolving commitment to strongpoint rather than perimeter defense at once responded to and refined official thinking Unrestrained military spending it was feared would set off either unacceptable in ation through persistent peacetime budget de cits or taxes and economic controls and driving this belief was that the Russians were trying to set out to drive the US into bankruptcy by forcing disperse resources in an ever widening circle of commitments Strongpoint Defense allowed US to choose the most favorable terrain upon which to confront the Soviets and choose their instruments Perimeter Defense required readiness to act along its entire extent whether local conditions favored the readiness to act or not Kennan strongly believed that the SU had no intention of starting a war they lacked an atomic bomb and they could get anything in europe they wanted wo military force Strongpoint defense American interest was not to dominate other power centers but to see it that no else did either 0 Universalism and perimeter defense was dropped from their minds and abandoned economic and technological means were employed selectively and asymmetrically to establish at least a degree of self confidence if not self sufficiency 0 Compare the configuration of power in Europe and NE Asia at the end of the Cold War with that established 4 decades earlier to realize the impressive success this particular strategy of containment attained o The 2nd stage of Kennan s strategy had been to try to bring about fragmentation within the international communist movement 0 Totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples that undermined the foundation of international peace and hence the security of the United States the same issue posed by germany and Japan during WWII o Truman approved 482 The US should exploit through appropriate political psychological and economic means any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between Stalinists and other elements in China while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention Where appropriate cover as well as overt means should be utilized to achieve these objectives US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 6 0 3rd stage of Kennan s strategy had been to try to bring about changes over time in the Soviet concept of international relations to convince Russian leaders that their interests could better be served by learning to live with a diverse world than by trying to remake it in their image 0 According to Kennan Many actions taken by the US narrowed opportunities for negotiations and would reinforce Soviet feeling of suspicion and insecurity for example the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the creation of the independent West German state and the decision to build the hydrogen bomb 0 the concept of North Atlantic to encompass Italy but refused to extend it to Greece Turkey or Iran or to form a comparable pact with the non communist countries of the Western Pacific seemed like they were choosing their friends to be part of the club 0 A strategy of encircling the USSR with military alliances could hardly encourage the process As Kennan noted with regard to West Germany what was conceived as an instrument became little by little an end in itself What was supposed to have been the servant of policy became its determinant instead 0 The Soviet Union set off an unexpectedly early detonation of an atomic bomb and it was during the course of this debate that Kennan worked out for the first time his position on the use of nuclear weapons in war Kennan wrote a seventy nine page paper 0 Kennan s position on nuclear weapons of mass destruction could be made to serve rational ends beyond simply deterring the outbreak of hostilities 0 War after all was supposed to be a means to an end not an end in itself it might imply an end marked by submission to a new political will and perhaps to a new regime of life but an end which at least did not negate the principle of life itself 0 Truman said We had to do it make the bomb though no one wants to use it But we have got to have it if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians o Truman accepted Kennan s assumptions that the danger of war was remote asymmetry could be tolerated indefinitely negotiations if in the interests of both sides could be productive diplomacy should be exible Kennan s concept of strongpoint defense with its idea of applying one s own strengths against adversary weaknesses assumed a hierarchy of interests in the world not all interests could be of equal importance not all threats need be of equal danger A prob with Kennan s approach was the fact that it would have required a willingness to negotiate with the Russians at a time when there are few indications of reciprocal interest on their part Kennan s strategy had a aw it sought to achieve its objectives ultimately through psychological means by installing self confidence not just in nations directly threatened by Soviet expansion but in the US itself It also depended on the ability of national leaders to make and maintain rational distinctions between vital and peripheral interests adversary capabilities and intentions negotiations and appeasement exibility and direction 909quot CHAPTER 4 0 Issues of international relations were too subtle and evanescent to be reduced to paper without oversimplification once papers had been agreed upon it was too difficult to get bureaucracies to reconsider them in the light of changing circumstances US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 7 0 President Truman early in 1950 authorized just the sort of study Kennan had resisted a single comprehensive statement of interests threats and feasible responses capable of being communicated throughout the bureaucracy o NSC 68 National Security Council Report 68 was not intended as a repudiation of Kennan He was consulted at several stages in the drafting process and the final document of some sixty six single spaced typed pages re ected his views at several points The objective rather was to systematize containment and to find the means to make it work But the act of reducing the strategy to writing eXposed the differences that had begun to develop between Kennan and the administration 0 Kennan argued that all that was necessary to maintain the balance of power and thereby safeguard diversity was to keep centers of industrial military capability out of hostile hands 0 Wording suggested that the Kennan s strategy might have been considered appropriate for less trying times but the balance of power had swung so far in favor of the Soviet bloc that no further losses could be tolerated o Kennan had argued that all that was necessary to maintain the balance of power and thereby safeguard diversity was to keep centers of industrial military capability out of hostile hands 0 NSC 68 had a point of view different from Kennan s any further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled and again the assault on free institutions is worldwide now and in the context of the present polizaration of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere 0 The SU believed the changes of power could occur not only as a result of economic maneuvers or military action but from intimidation humiliation or even loss of credibility 0 World order and it American security had come to depend as much on perceptions of balance of power of what that balance actually was 0 NSC 68 did was suggest to a way to increase defense eXpenditures without war without long term budget deficits and without crushing taX burdens Only 6 7 of the gross national product was being devoted to military eXpenditures it was point out adding investment in war related industries brought the figure to around 20 in US 0 One of the most significant lessons of our WWII eXperience NSC 68 pointed out was that the American economy when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a higher standard of living 0 NSC 68 underlying principle when confronted with an absolute threat to its survival anything was fair game The same reasoning could be applied to the problems of differentiating interest and providing means as well consideration of priority and economy might be appropriate in normal times but in the face of a threat such as that posed by the Soviet Union reoccupation this sort had to go by the board 0 Objectives of the SU and international communist retain and solidify their absolute power first in the SU and 2nd in areas now under their control 0 Kennan took the position that the USSR had already overextended and was already in total control of these areas NSC68 believed it the USSR had too much strength 0 Their con icting viewpoints rested on whether or not the USSR would risk war US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 8 o NSC 68 thought they hadn t risked war yet because they were unsure if they could win it o The idea here in short was a calibration to do no less but also no more than was required to safeguard American interests 0 NSC 68 approved the idea to build an atomic bomb 0 Taiwan in the spring of 1950 was developing second thoughts about its policy of not opposing a Chinese Communist take over for fear of driving the Russians and the Chinese closer together 0 NSC 68 thought Kennan s 3rd stage of containment changing the Soviet concept of IR was desirable but balked at the method of which it did it 0 According to NSC 68 it stressed the importance of doing nothing in war or peace that might irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime that enslaves them It also ruled out diplomacy as a means of altering soviet outlook o This doc pointed out that the US GDP was 4 times the SU 0 Nothing to negotiate between 1945 49 0 Nothing changed within the IR system of the SU o Scare campaign might have been a bit strong for the actually intended but there was no question that the admin did seek to present its issues in a dramatic and exaggerated terms 0 Korean War seemed to validate the NSC 683 most important conclusions all interests had become equally vital and that any further shift in the balance of power no matter how small could upset the entire structure of the post war IR 0 Truman told everyone If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea it would be an open invite to new acts of aggression elsewhere We cannot hope to maintain our freedom if freedom elsewhere is wiped out There was also a North Korean attack that con rmed NSC 68s and Kennan s assumption that the SU might resort to war by proxy even in the face of an American nuclear superiority 0 Korea could have been a distraction but became a an opportunity to not so much build military strength in Asia but to bolster the obviously inadequate defense of Western Europe 0 The consequences of sending ships to help Taiwan made something clear our policy toward the rival Chinese regimes is one almost sure to strengthen Peiping Moscow solidarity rather than weaken it 0 China s entry into the Korean War in November put an abrupt end to any immediate hopes in trying to separate Moscow and Beijing 0 NSC 68 in a nutshell Presumption of Western weakness the fear that the coordinated short term actions of adversaries were too dangerous to wait for inevitable strains to develop between them the convention that strengthening alliances should precede efforts to resolve difference with adversaries and that adversary hostility could actually be helpful in that process the belief that the american people were too unsophisticated to grasp distinctions between hierarchies of interest varieties of aggression or gradation of response the pursuit of credibility for its own sake o NSC 68 came to overshadow and modify the original and modify the original strategy of containment o NSC 68 version of containment did not escape challenge through either within or outside the administration 0 NSC 141 was an admission of failure after 25 years of strenuous effort the nation still had not attained an adequate level of security US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 9 0 When Dulles allowed the term retaliatory striking power to creep into the Republican platform Eisenhower was furious I ll be dammed if I run on that he told amazed aides at a Chicago convention 0 Finally Eisenhower s declaration served notice that his administration like the authors of NSC 68 believed the world balance to be so delicately poised that no further victories for communism anywhere could be tolerated without upsetting it 0 Where in hell can you let the Communists chip away any more He asked Congressional leaders in April 1954 We can t just it o Eisenhower and Dulles could agree that the chief American interest in the world was access to the world and that in turn required a world of at least minimal congeniality o Eisenhower administration s view of American interest differed little from the found in NSC 68 despite disclaimers of aspirations to world leadership it was necessary to assume that role to protect the very diversity deemed vital to the nation s survival 0 President Eisenhower regularly lectured press conferences on this point We are now conducting a cold war That cold war much have some objective otherwise it would senseless 0 Not present in NSC 68 is to equate security with the defense of permanent interests rather than with the replusino of transitory threats 0 The zero sum view of the world was consistent with the position taken in NSC 68 with one exception whereas that document like Kennan had argued that communist ideology was more often the instrument rather the determinant of Soviet policy Dulles in his public utterances sought to convey the opposite impression o The concentration on the ideological roots of Soviet behavior had several effects One was legitimize an inclination the administration had already been driven toward by economic constraints 0 Ideological writings of Marx Lenin and Stalin Dulles believed made Soviet intentions knowable o The implications were clear to attempt to match Soviet military capabilities in all respects that would be to play into Moscow s hands since it was unlikely that those capabilities would be employed for a purpose other than to frighten the West into exhausting itself 0 The president was particularly prone to see the diligent but subtle hand of the Kremlin at work in a variety of otherwise unrelated incidents around the world 0 Communism is a movement to bring all of the people in the world under one all powerful central authority and I define nationalism as the passionate desire of people to live their own lives in their own way 0 A National Security Council study early in 1955 concluded that the Soviet leaders can be expected to seek constantly by every means they find advantageous to extend Communist power and to weaken those forces especially US power and in uence which they regard as inexorable enemies of their system 0 Soviet objectives were 0 The security and regime and the USSR US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 10 o Maintaining the Soviet hold on the European satellites and keeping China within the Communist bloc o Elimination of US in uence from Eurasia and the isolation of the US 0 Expansion of Soviet Communist power throughout Eurasia o Elimination of the US as a competing power center 0 The spread of Communism throughout the world There were to be sure those who thought that by being nice to the Communist Chinese we could wean them away from the Soviets But that would only produce competition with Russia for China s favor thus giving Beijing the best of both worlds The removal of Soviets had originally been the plan for containment but not where the parts of the doctrines instruments that were to be perpetuated as a means as ends in themselves The summer of 1953 in the White House the Eisenhower administration known as operation Solarium designed to consider all options and decide upon the most appropriate course of action Dulles speech was publicize because of the term massive retaliation Eisenhower administration s New Look strategy was not revolving primarily around this concept of massive retaliation but around centrally that of asymmetrical response of reacting to adversary challenges in ways calculated to apply one s strengths against the other side s weaknesses even if this meant shifting the nature and location of the confrontation and was meant to reduce costs Atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed forces said the President to the UN in 1953 The idea was to open up a range of possible response so wide that the SU would not be able to count on retaining the initiative lacking that it would could to see the risks of aggression as outweighing the benefits Terms like brinkmanship and massive retaliation have tended to obscure the non nuclear components of the New Look strategy One of these was an alliance NSC 1622 argued that the US could not meet its defense needs even at exorbitant cost without the support of allies Dulles in this 1954 Foreign Affairs article listed alliances ahead of even nuclear deterrent capability as the cornerstone of security for the free nations Eisenhower and Dulles emphasized more the deterrent power of alliances The secretary of State s goal to make SU and China an ally not with any expectation that the countries could contribute directly to the defense of the US but rather with the hope an American security umbrella over them could discourage Russian or Chinese attacks A third element in the New Look strategy was what the administration liked to call psychological warfare This could be from the singing of a beautiful hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage It primary meant a robust faith in the efficacy of public posture the belief that by merely making The weakness of Soviet imperialism is being made manifest And in 1957 how powerful must be the forces for change which are at work with Russian and how perplexed the rulers must be as to how to cope with these forces and at the same time maintain absolute power Psychological warfare had other dimensions as well it involved of course the constant use of propaganda both printed and broadcast It could involve self serving gestures as the offer of 100000 to the first Soviet pilot to defect in a MIG or such US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 11 A 4th element of the New Look strategy closely related to psychological warfare known as covert operations which the National Security Council de ned as all activities so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them A year later NSC 5501 the successor to NSC l622 put the matter more simply The US should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that US security interest will be served thereby and it extended this approach to China as well although without implying any change in non recognition policy Reliance on nuclear superiority could delay negotiations with the other side until it had made an effort to catch up it also could unsettle allies who could see in it the possibility that they themselves might become targets in any future war and they could expect to bear the burden of fighting at the conventional level Psychological warfare and covert action measures could easily backfire causing problems at home as well as with allies and adversaries Power involves more than simply reserving the right to make final decisions it requires as well as the determination to monitor implementation closely to ensure correspondence with original intent together with the ability to instill in subordinates some sense of what the strategy is so that where monitoring cannot take place it need not Ch 7 Kennedy s stance toward previous admin s conduct of foreign policy and nat l security affairs wasn t simply a ploy to win the election they were articulated well before July 1960 and shared by most other democrats and by a substantial amount of Republicans this stance was mixed with a generational imperative symbolized by the shift from oldest gt youngest president fresh new leadership passing of the torch to a new generation of Americans born in this country tempered by war p 197 inaugural address impatience with bureaucratic structure National Security Council was bloated and focused on formality which just got in its own wayallowed for key decisions to be made by only Eisenhower so Kennedy cut it down as main decision maker and simplified with the goal of removing inaction and increasing responsiveness exibilitygt idea of the Grand Objective Sec of State Dean Rusk passed over role of coordinator for foreignnat l security gt given to McGeorge Bundy White house staff Robert McNamara at DOD strong leader Gen Maxwell Taylor chairman to Joint Chiefs of staff resulting in no single dominant voice like with Eisenhower and Dulles overall strategic concept intellectual framework for Kennedy by Walt Rostow as Policy Planning Council State gt basic parts and top advisors above remained into Johnson s admin support independence of nations so that one bloc cannot gain suf cient power to nally overcome us p 200 not to remake the world just to balance the powers in it gt world safe for diversity not opposed to intervention just to such that leads to humiliation escalation or inaction not everyone needs our image just some majority of indiv freedomliberty US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST Ni PAGE 12 believed E relied too much on MAD nuclear threat inherently escaladed linked domestic to foreign increased spending protects our interests not hinders them NSC68 Truman s last years democrat tradition Kennedy clear about interests not so about potential threats to them strategic missiles and conventional forces in EU clear that US was more powerful militarily ICBM count from U2 planes USSR economy shown not able to support US equivalent though this did not wholly relax the US still weary of unconventionalcovert attacks on liberty in Asia Africa Latin America esp going through revolutions w transitional probs looking for leaders from which to adopt modemization gt we would have to be a good democratic example also implied common action of all communist actorsall hostile of the west not necessarily true Rostow saw national factions on horizon which would balance world communism in a tolerable way to the US gt quotquot CONTRADICTION left unresolved by Rostow US would need a world in its image to balance not every threat to balance of power is ideological not all US allies democratic SinSoviet split was real and being realized by Russia as failure of plan to unify under ideology as they now differed from China on sooo much ex Kruschev willing to incur Moa s wrath to move toward detente with West Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 1963U S considering aligning with USSR against China s growing nuclear capability HUGE departure from Eisenhower s willingness to incur risk in order to stop minimal communist gain different dangers require different policies and actions Johnson p 210 same zerosum game as E any victory for communismloss for US raises questions about who the actual enemy is if communism is no longer a monolithwhy should every balance shiftthreat antidiversity especially with commie fragmenting and willingness to work w capitalists bc they too are subject to nationalistgeog interests Chinese replace USSR as biggest global threat large land army and indifference to nuclear war unlike USSR though lacking industrial base to sustain warless reckless threat of embarrassment seemed to have become paramount by not maintaining the status quo p 211 EDulles commitments couldn t be easily abandoned wo calling into question ally obligations living up to treatiessupporting friends gt perceptions of power just as important as the real thing p 212 called for exible but appropriate responses regardless of cost NSC68 minus new vagueness of what s being contained asymmetric VS symmetric response DullesKennan asymmetric responding with best calculated American strength Kennanecon aidDulles nuclear deterrent Kennedy AdminRostow symmetric we must expand our arsenal to match what commies are doling out to us correlate to high spendingmakes sense includes capacity to act at all levels diplomatic to covert guerrilla warfare and control calibration and integration as part of strategy the bolstering of unconventional military capabilities symmetric guerilla strategic missile buildup even after we had superior numbers complements smaller steps US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 13 3 renewed efforts to solidify alliances NATOgtnat l nuclear ability w risk of incoordinationaccidents MLFmultilateral nuke forces on subs mobile gives allies role in decision though not incentive enough to give up own missiles 4 new emphasis on nonmilitary instruments of containment removing elements that might make 3rd world attractivedesirous of communism exchange programs edu econ programming tech assistance capital trade institutions for indiv libertiesgov t based on consentex Alliance for Progress 20 billion for reform in L America middle class rev gt peasant rev through nation building 5 attempts to manage domestic resources for defense more effectively PPBS cost benefit analysis alt methods shotlong term goal re ect coupled with high domestic growth rate w tax cut stimulus 6 expansion of E s efforts to open areas for possible negotiations w USSR wo imperative for appeasement fruitful in 1963 w USSR China not included bc they re liars about autonomous Taiwan uses Cuba as model to support this increased of usable forces to put steps before nuclear action proved effective in Cuba crises gt allies were worries this was weakness of nuclear confidence push for public to take a less passionate more rational complex view of Cold War rather than Dulles s hardsoft rigid view relatively unchanging we don t need to love each other just mutually tolerate each other for peace we US are still the keystone anchor for freedom Ch 9 Nixon promised to end Cold War but didn t say how or when just criticized Johnson s inability to do so also for relaxed tensions w USSR for negotiations new relationship w China hint also put cap on US troop numbers and began Vietnamization move toward withdrawal China emerging from selfimposed isolation Russia s economy making it more dependent on west Nixon ideologically rigid and politically pragmatic Kissinger lacked prior admin s fascination with process gt concentrated unprecedented power in W house uninformed bureaucracy the pair seemed to be using containment in the vision of its creator Kennan the US was against universalism we just wanted to preserve diversity and saw ourselves as the only qualified protector for such a serious job every threat was real all interests were vital the effect had been to push the US into universalism by the back door the defense of diversity in what seemed to be a dangerous world had produced most of the costs strains and selfdefeating consequences of indiscriminate globalism p 274 kissinger believed this happened because the admin had lost focus of conceptual cohesion and made ad hoc decisions without consulting the end goal an obsession with means had led to the neglect and even corruption of ends perfect desc of what happened to Kennan s containment Kissinger prescribed reanalyzing the current situation and its complexity no specific measure of state in uence esp with the decline of nuke parity symmetric response didn t seem to be helping either perceptions increasingly important no longer a zerosum game where one s gains another s losses sought to reduce the perception of Vietnam s importance focus on global relations US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 14 context nationalismgeopolitical interests w mutual constraint gt ideology unrealistic ideas of US transcending int l order had created bouts of isolationismoverextension NK still obliged to stick with prior commitments for same reasons as predecessors but rejected idea that econdemocratic liberalism would enhance US security in themselves recognition of limits and multipolar world better bc bipolar implies that one gaining one losing hostile focused mostly on military power also linked to Kennan s priority zones US EU USSR China Japan mostly for econ reasons and opened up areas of interest in which varying countries could be on top and another where same country could be at bottom and that s ok also made the balance of power more stable though making a move away from this concept from a clash of competing intereststo the evolution of mutual restraint coexistence and cooperation detente p 281 first used by Kennedy to describe relaxed tensions with Soviets stability gt reformuniversalism interests that could stand on their ownas intervening strategies had not been of both threats and commitments exible Kissinger best understood Kennan threats more narrow NK looked to eliminate ideology as main way to identify threats no permanent enemies p 282 focusing rather on individual action policy toward rest of the world and us Nixon ipped toward ideo exibility seen as soft last P on 282 containing communism had become an interest in and of itself wo regard to the precise way in which communism as a uni ed force might endanger American security Threats had been allowed to determine interests rather than the other way around p283 we could now work w diff ideological nations security for Russia meant insecurity for its neighbors basically expansionism justifled still hard to differentiate between actual threats and the perception of threat why deal will obviously communist China yet intolerant of indigenous marxism elsewhere lag between their policies and actions successful movements would have seemed a shift in status quo preserve dignity while cutting losses DANGEROUS NATION BY ROBERT KAGAN Chapter 1 First Imperialist 0 stuff we learned in world history 0 Some think of Franklin as a realist 0 Everyone knew America would become the next great thing since Athens 0 Adams prothized about how great America would be Chapter 2 The Foreign Policy of the Revolution 0 in uences from John Locke from natural rights and social compact 0 Declaration of Indepence first foreign policy doc that is why French took us so seriously US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 15 National Interest protecting those witin it and then also causing liberalism and republician inside and outside their borders BECAME UNIVERALISTIC GW and Ben Frank always reminded people that they were doing this war for the betterment of humankind and liberty and all that rhetoric Brazilians looked to Ameican for their role model of revolution against colonist French revolution made American leaders hearts happy Once war was over in 1783 colonist still held their guard against any government American asked France to help with Indians but French colony in America was still very weak at this time International law was a big deal when the US was still weak but now since we are strong we don t care Trade restrictions and commerce is really what made America a world hegemony Thomas Paine wrote the Common Sense and talked about isolationsim and intern peace founded on commerce Federalist papers were made to persuade people that a new consitution was needed and that the republic should remain strong with a centralized gov Chapter 7 Foreign Policy of Slavery After Monroe Presidency the Nation seemed to be slowing in expansion and seemed to be breaking apart from the republican liberty in the Old and New Worlds The US had to be born with a split personality towards a commitment to human equality and natural rights embodied in the Declaration of Independence dence and a practical commitment to the defense of the institution of slavery as embodied in the Constitution In 1791 the Slave revolt erupted in Haiti and for the next decade slaves massacred their masters in a civil war that culminated in the indepence of a new republic in 1804 After the abortive Prosser Gabriel slave rebellion of 1800 and another uprising in 1802 Virginia slaveholders claimed to uncover plots of insurrection allegedly involving thousands of slaves who has been directly inspired or so it was believed by emissaries from the black republic 20 years later South Carolinians learned their horror that Denmark Vesey a free black who conspired to lead another slave rebellion had been in contact with Haitian blacks and had expected a Haitian invasion to aid his uprising South Carolina was threatened by British invasion local slaveholders faced a choice between arming their slaves to help in the struggle or letting Charleston be sacked They chose defeat at British hands over a risk of a slave uprising Fear of a slave rebellion concentrated the minds of slaveholders and their protectors in Washington as no purely economic or geopolitical interest possibly could Exports to Haiti worth almost 7 million in 1806 fell to 15 million in 1808 with the bulk of pro ts directly transferred to America s top commercial competitor Great Britain The War of 1812 British strategy envisioned a landing on the Gulf Coast to encourage armed uprising by both the Indians and slaves During the war of 1812 British forces in Florida had recruited armed and trained a contingent of 400500 runaway slaves and free blacks at Prospect Bluff along the Apalachicola River in the Florida panhandle After the British withdrew in 1815 the blacks took over the British position and it became known in the US as the Negro Fort US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 16 o The national Interest of both the European despot and the American slaveholder therefore lay in diminishing the areas of freedom around them Dangerous pockets of liberty had to be destroyed When this was impossible rulers and slave owners had to wall off their fiefdoms to keep out dangerous outside in uences 0 Northern States had mostly abolished slavery by the end of the 18th century 0 Southerns often depicted slavery as an unfortunate burden that had been foisted upon the US as Jefferson had charged in the Declaration of Independence by the hated British to appeal to the common liberal morality softened sectional differences 0 As John Quincy Adams remarked in words he would no doubt later wish to take back Slavery in a moral sense is an evil but as connected with commerce it has important uses thus did America s slave territories expand rather than contract 0 Both the North and the South were partaking in a market revolution of the early 19 C to a hybrid capitalist economy 0 The North was more urbanized with several great cities swelling in population while the South was thinly populated The North was more industrialized especially in the NE where domestic manufactures had blossomed during the protracted con ict with England The southern economy was built almost entirely around the production and export of cash crops like cotton and tobacco 0 Only Northern states were in possession of shipping manufactures railroads and canals In the South where the interests of plantation owners dominated their economy required little domestic infrastructure 0 The North was the world s incubator of that modern breed of human the liberal capitalist that always on the move and on the make looking for the main chance to become wealthy and to rise above his station 0 The South labor was confounded with the idea of slavery and the poor white men who worked feared being compared to black slaves The southern plantation owner meanwhile lived in idle independence his tastes are those of an idle man 0 Northerners valued success individualism drive and selfimprovement Southerners generally valued honor family and community SO CUTE o In the north where slavery had been abolished a freelabor ideology emerged extolling the virtues of work celebrating social mobility and change and seeking equality of opportunity if not of results for all The northern idea of free labor which would eventually form the ideological foundation of the Republican Party s challenge to the southern slave power in the 185 9s was a comprehensive vision of advancing civilization 0 If slavery is wrong then nothing is wrong Abe Lincoln 0 The North became a breeding ground for reform movements of all kinds and the South became the home of religious and social orthodoxy In the South Protestant evangelical ministers stressed individual piety not social reform and perfectionism c When the Missouri territory applied for statehood A NY congressman James Tallmadge Jr proposing barring the introduction of new slaves and freeing all existing slaves born after admission once they reached age 25 o The prospect of more slaves entering the Union their disproportionate in uence guaranteed by the Constitution 35th clause the apportionment of the Senate seats and the allocation of electoral votes stirred fears among the NE politicians that had been quieted since the original Louisiana Purchase US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 17 o 42 years before the firing on Fort Sumter im pretty sure the start of the Civil War Calhoun and Adams like Americans across the country weighed the possibility of a civil war 0 The Missouri Compromise which permitted Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state but prohibited slavery above latitude 36 30 degrees temporarily settled the crisis But it did not settle the fundamental con ict between the North and South It left bitter taste in southern mouths foas Nathaniel Macon complained the South had acknowledged the right of Congress to interfere and to legislate on the subject 0 The tie between slavery strict construction of the Constitution and the Republican party was implicit not explicit After Missouri it was explicit Southerners believed that if the losse constitutional construction of the day were allowed to prevail the time might come with the government would be held to have the power to deal with slavery 0 Increasing differences between slaveholding and free labor America manifested themselves in foreign policy matters both great and small Northerners and Southerners differed on what to do about the international slave trade overseas revolutions nations on the Western Hemisphere and on territorial expansion 0 Adams was not alone in viewing the SW expansion as contrary to the national interest and indeed as a threat to the nation39s survival President Monroe though a Virginia slaveholder agreed that Texas was poison as Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren during their presidencies o In the 1790s the differing perspectives of Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans on the struggle between Great Britain and France were shaped by differing aspiration for the development of America s political economy 0 Southern politicians who had irted with the progressive nationalism during and after the war with Great Britain now had shifted course and adopted the Constitution jealous guarding of states rights against the federal government and the retrenchment and parsimony in federal spending Every program of the American System from eh national building of roads and canals to the protective tariff to the establishment of a national to spending on the military came under attack 0 After the Missouri crisis even the idea of nationalism came under assault 0 The question of interfering in the internal affairs of others had taken on new importance in the South since the Missouri crisis US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 18 Floyd of Virginia criticized it as violating the spirit of the Constitution If a president could assume such powers to shape American policy abroad he could turn those powers against the South 0 The believe Monroe had committed the US if not a hemispheric alliance then at least to support common hemispheric principles Clay in a moment of political indiscretion had even referred to Monroe s memorable pledge of 1823 If they had their was the Monroe Doctrine would blossom into a policy of Pan Americanism and lead to the creation as Daniel Webster put it of a great American Family of Nations 0 These ambitious plans to strengthen and deepen the Monroe Doctrine collided with southern hospitality and the Van Buren coalition now bolstered by the inclusion of Adam s vice president John C Calhoun 0 The ideological and territorial ambitions of the Monroe Doctrine and had sought to go further in recognizing Greek independence and even sending US naval vessel to put force behind American words He joined Jefferson and Madison in favoring a virtual alliance with Great Britain against the monarchies of Europe 0 Van Buren forged a link between the Constitution and the injections of Washington s Farewell Address insisting that just as the Constitution must be strictly and narrowly interpreted so should the foreign policy principle enunciated in the Farewell Address 0 The national debate about the true meaning of America s foreign policy tradition o Washington s non entanglement principle was universal and immutable acknowledging no distinction of time or place His warning against foreign connections was the sole principle that must guide foreign policy and both the the Monroe Doctrine and American participation at the Panama conference violated became strong we may go abroad and from foreign alliances Washington s dictum could no more be modi ed by future generations than could the timeless principles embedded in eh Constitution To be represented at a congress of Independent confederated nations declared Andrew Jackson is an event the framers of our constitution never thought of o The attack on the Panama httpenwikipediaorgwikiCongress of Panama conference was also an attack on the Monroe Doctrine and it culminated in a congressional resolution sponsored by James Buchanan congressman from PA supported of Jackson 0 Many 20th century diplomatic historians have commented that after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine the US simply drifted as if its leaders had never intended to do much to back up their bold declaration 0 John Quincy Adams entered Congress in 1831 and started his own second career as an anti slavery crusader fighting the slaveholding Monsters at home Southern politicians provoked by the northern abolitionist minority launched a counteroffensive that in turn offended majority opinion in the North Southern congressmen insisted that antislavery petitions sent to Congress by northern constituencies had to be blocked the so called gag rule 0 A 19C version of mild totalitarianism unlike that practiced by the absolutist courts of central and eastern Europe eroded southern democracy stricter limits on freedom of speech 0 When Mexico abolished slavery in 1829 the South was suddenly surrounded by 3 sides by free territory And when Great Britain emancipated the slaves in its Caribbean colonies in the 1830s the South was all but isolated in the hemisphere Brazil and the Spanish US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 19 colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico stood with the South in upholding an institution that increasingly seemed a relic of antiquity in a modernizing world The House of Commons deemed it necessary to abolish slave trade in 1806 from the early 19C and onward British leaders devoted vast time and energy to stamping out the international slave trade In 1819 Congress authorized President Monroe to send armed vessels to the African coast to join the British in patrolling for slave ships Van Buren struggled to keep slavery out of the national conversation and to concentrate on economic and political issues that transcended the NorthSouth divide Many presidents had just choose to ignore the Texas problem The British Prime Minister offered the Texan government support against Mexico in return for the abolition of slavery The mere threat of abolition could be enough to discourage people owning slaves or bringing them into Texas If Texas was lost to the North then Upshur feared that southern slavery could not exist surrounded on all sides by free states Adams declared that the freedom of this country and all of mankind depends on the direct formal open and avowed interference of Great Britain to accomplish the abolition of slavery in Texas Adams no longer conceived of the US as a single nation The South and its slaveholding oligarchy had become the enemy far more to be feared than the liberal crusading Great Britain CHAPTER 8 Manifest Destinies Manifest Destinies the most prodigious expansion of territory in American history and who came to symbolize this era Jan 1846 Polk sent American into the disputed zone between the Nueces River and Rio Grande When Mexican troops came across to challenge them they declared war on Mexico in May of that year and by the time that war finished the US had acquired missions of square miles of new southwestern territory Polk accepted a compromise boundary at the 49th parallel giving the British what northerns such as Adams insisted was by rights American territory north of the line Polk s policies did face signi cant opposition precisely because there was no little agreement on what constituted the American interest in the 1840s Whig party was in major control at this time main goal was to preserve the Union but were not part of the north or the south 2 decades before the war the North had superiority and it seemed to be visible in any number of social and economic indicators North had superior economy and growing population would force the South to abandon its failed economic system and adopt northern ways Peaceful conquest was the primary tool used to push British French Spanish and the Indian peoples from the continent but were now being used in battle with the south for the western territories of the US Abe Lincoln elected on platform to get rid of slavery Manifest Destiny was the nation s destiny had become subsumed by sectional destines The sectional con ict had turned the US in on itself not because Americans were isolationist or introspective but because until the question of slavery was settled until the US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 20 question of the national identity was settled it was impossible to reach a common understandini of the nation s role in the world 0 The concept of manifest destiny fact deliberately skirted the problem which was why it was so useful It advocated tried to argue that the expansion itself whether slave or free soil was both in the national interest and part of the American mission to bring the enlightenment to the benighted The Era of Manifest Destiny began when it did in 1843 because of extremist southern slaveholders unexpectedly nding themselves in control of the nation s levers of power decided that the preservation of slavery and southern civilization required the immediate annexation of Texas in 1865 Kansas was fou ht over and divided between the north and south If a slave uprising occurred in Cuba as a result of British policies Buchanan warned no human power could prevent us from entering in favor of the Creoles blunt southern FP of self interest and selfpreservation South wanted to acquire Cuba and keep as a slave nation A southern secretary of State to Lincoln would not anything past that would assist or permit the extension of slavery The dream of the South was the Caribbean states to become theirs especially if they had won the civil war Government might have been a totalitarism rule if South won in Civil War Thanks Lincoln Chapter 9 Beyond the National Interest 0 Northern Dems hoped to have it all including civilization for southern slaves o Whigs preferred a diminished pro le in ir and warned against empire building and was more for internal development rather external accession o The Whigs of the 1840s and 1850s were in some respects the more conservative of the 2 parties 0 Whig conservativism was more because it was the North and had no where to expand o Seward opposed expansion to Cuba and for it to become part of the US until slavery had stopped o The belief in the power of commerce to tame the world as old as the republic but whereas the founding generation American global dominance through commerce was more of a dream and the FP at this time was to become the mastery of the commerce of the world which is the empire of the world 0 The saw ex ansion into Asia for economic develo ment 0 Even though the south has a smaller population they had a higher rate of in the army for the Mexican war US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 21 Southerns still adhere to these non entanglement and noninterventionist policies because US has not reached its peak yet Whigs joined Republicans in 1854 Lincoln elevated the Declaration of Independence of the Constitution because all men s natural rights should not be infringed upon The doctrine in the Constitution about slavery was made about South s defense acting in their selfinterest no right principle of action but selfinterest Lincoln and Seward both insisted right principle of action was not selfinterest but justice and it was only to be found in the declaration Jeffersonians WE SHOULD HELP FRANCE Hamiltonians WE SHOULD HELP BRITAIN Federalist The US FP according to Lincoln was to makes the universal restoration of power to the governed around the world and slavery because of empire and liberty should be destroyed everywhere 2 Study Guide over Unit 3 the essays will be on this part but want you to bring in parts from units 1 and 2 Unit 3 Iraq Iran Afghanistan onwards Humanitarian InterventionChina NK Trade Drones Cyber security Iraq 4 Grand Strategies See below Why go into Iraq Balance of Power people wanted to contain Iraq and were against war in Iraq Secretary of State Powell believes Iraq War was not the best idea Powell pushes Bush to do war in multilateral way just like his father did in Persian Gulf Primacist were looking for state to ght don t care about multilater way Primarist look at through 90s Iraq democratization fits in idea that it would spread in the Middle East and Domino Theory Primarist thought Afghanistan was too small of a state Bof P were more activist than Primary Idealist Coalition of the Willing Bush conference trying to get more states involved in the wars Liberal Internationalism believed that some saw freeing Iraq from Saddam s rule and tight hold would be good 120000 troops were sent into IraqRumsfeld idea and was much faster than usual US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 22 Army chief of staff Chenzicy said Iraq would require many troops So few troops meant people all in tanks Little trust was built among the Iraqi people Would have needed force of 500000 thousand people to properly take over Baghdad Only about 6 troops per 100000 people in Iraq Iran Nuclear and Missile Technology and North Korea NK Rogue state state that supports terrorism attempting to get a hold of weapons of mass destruction examples NK and Iran US only came up this concept we don t have an embassy or talk to them or have any type of trade with these countries Iran Iraq war fought each other to keep a balance China stabilizes NK but still doesn t like but doesn t want their refugees NKKim Jung Il leader and shows power Iran is educated and supreme leader but also h as president unlike NK Deterrence vs Compliance see below In 90s sanctions were important but unless its vital for their country or relates to the thing that US wants Kroenig argument We need to attack now but its going to cost a lot and we hope they won t respond or do anything the Iranians are rationale enough Kahl Rally around the ag Iran could retaliate with not using bombs but would do something with oil Humanitarian Intervention DefDeploying military forces across border to protect foreign nationals from a man made disaster Civil war ends by 0 One side has large victory o Compromise of peace between people Selection effect selected few where grievance is so bad that civil war is only the option Gets tougher as the civil war goes on costs accumulate families die stalemate has to be reached and nothing can by continuing Iraq vs Iran US has the only available resources rather any other state in the world Politicians want the smallest cheapest limited missions don t actually x problem and the problem could result in a much bigger problem Resources constraint Rwanda 339 Creeping NonIntervention Movement US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST China 0 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 O 09 PAGE 23 0 Clinton was busy dealing with Domestic politics Republicans had just taken Congress Military hates doing humanitarian intervention Pentagon always the last to want to intervene All of this was unintentional 0000 No expertise on Africa in Congress 0 Impartiality always ends up being biases 339 Conscious Choice explanation 0 Clinton choose to not get involved because there are no US interests Trade is dominated by US deal close TPP regional trade agreementsbilateral and regional agreements are the future Will the US be policemen of Trade Is the US still the World Power Hard to measure strength of the US After Iraq and Iran military was overstretched Best education institutions are in the US US still has a lot more aircraft carriers than the Chinese who have 1 from Ukraine China is rising but the US is very much ahead but who big is the gap If we are equal will a war happen Or is life more equal Is the rise of China a threat 0 4 different Viewpoints I RealistOptimist I RealistPessimists I LiberalOptimist I LiberalPessimists Fred Freeburg article is on the Final What should we do about this Liberal Optimist Push for liberalization in China pushing China for Human rights Chinese government hates it if you get it wrong you could spark con icts with Russia and China Liberal Pessimist Don t do anything you could leave it to con ict itself Realist Pessimists Pivot to Asia and USFP look on Asia could force China aggregated to make more military to want to attack against US its dangerous if you choose the wrong side Ukraine we could choose wrong side and US has no interest there Realist Optimists RossGlazer US should end relations with Taiwan could make China mad and go to war China could be like US in the revolutionary War could comeback strong US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 24 No perfect policy every side has its downsides Cyber and Drones in the US War 0 v Barriers of entry Easy for states not individuals 339 Actual Cyber War needs 3 features 0 Violence 0 Instrumental 0 Political 0 v None of the attack on record come close to this NO end to this war Drones Take out terrorist leaders easily Less human causality Cost less There are here to stay 0 O O O O 90 90 90 90 90 Regulating them 3 KEY TERMS MODELS AND LISTS 0 v No such thing as a bipartisan foreign policy ever Idealism certain ideals beliefs need to be spread in the world Liberalism set of principles used in trade free trade Wilsonianism combo of these above the spread of liberalism and the spread abroad see 3 components below A Political Liberalism a Democratic Institutions B Economic Liberalism a Free Trade C Institutional Liberalism a International institutions 3 MODELS Model 1 Unitary Actor Model 1 state 1 mind President isn t that important follows through with decisions Model 2 Organizational Culture Model Has a standard operating procedure SOP for certain organizations Driven by more organizations working together Examples State Department Federal Government and Pentagon US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 25 Model 3 Bureaucratic Politics Model by Allison and Halperin Spelling Where you sand depends on where you sit Different peoples viewpoints change when they move offices PROS OF SINGLE VOICE 1 Can be secretive and contact and have agenda setting power and prioritize and more persuasion of a person 2 Central coordination and less confusion 3 Acts faster CONS OF SINGLE VOICE 1 Single mindness can be bad 2 Checks and balances need time to kick in 3 What if they make the wrong decision then its all on them 4 Secretary can be too much and abused and no accountability Branstanding what congress does to get public support for their issue Why should Congress have a voice at all 1 Checks and balances 2 When Congress and Prez are in agreement its more a believe threat to another county 3 Holds everyone accountable Why shouldn t Congress have a voice in FF 1 Take too much time and out of session 2 Congress is divided 3 They don t have much affects besides the monies 4 Are too political and make grandstands that are for their own political good Kagan s 3 episodes A GW s Farwell Address B Adam s Speech C Monroe Doctrine 339 Realism LOVES Idealism inseparable Kennan s List of Top 5 Military Powers in the World US Britain Germany Soviet Union Japan U PP PF 4 Diagnoses of Vietnam War 1 Quagmire Slippery Slope a US of cials didn t realize what they were getting into US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 26 No idea it was going to be this large c Slow boil adding a few troops and more and more and then BOOM a large amount d No idea that it was going to be this large 2 The System Worked a The President knew that this was going to happen All of the presidents passed this info on to one another JFK LBJ Truman Eisenhower all wanted this to continue to happen b Had nothing to do with Vietnam but wanted to show the World they were serious about there threats the Presidents never put in enough to actually win the point was to keep fighting and to win in the long run 3 Johnson s Fault individuals a LogevallJohnson idea to do this all b Wanted to focus on domestic priorities c Didn t want to be seen as weak 4 Defense Spending a Democrats are likely to spend more on war which leads to more wars and fighting Issues that emerged after 911 1 Globalization Clinton says the economy it too big trade is a huge issues in the 90s 2 Ethnic Con icts were frozen since start of Cod War a Bosnia b Somalia 3 Iraq Iran North Korea still on our radar for nuclear weapons Socialist 4 Eastern Europe Democratization states came down 5 Terrorism Issue a Osama Bin Laden b Oklahoma Domestic Attack c Afghanistan 4 Grand Strategies Goals and resources means of Post ColdWar with Kennan Viewpoint 1 Strategic Disengagement aka isolationism a Take out military of bad zones and impose economic sanctions and total removal 2 Balanceof Power Realism a Want to make sure that there is no great power to replace the Soviet Union b Closest to Kennan c Protect vital sources of power d Aiming to protect wide range of interests 3 Primacy Kagan NeoConservative view US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST W999 g PAGE 27 Benevolent hegemony Prevent another power from taking American POWs Expanding democracy Thinks US is more powerful with democracies in the world Want US to be the REAL 1 No separation between ideals and resources Still thinks only states are real threatening actors 4 Liberal Internationalism a b Wants the US to join UN and others will follow c d Loves UN and NATO Believes multilateral unions are the only groups that can create peace Humanitarian introversion of use of force DETERENCE VS COMPLIANCE Deterrence is preventing someone from doing something they want to do peacekeeping Compliances is getting a state to do something it does not originally want to do peace enforcement Theories of Trade 1 Trade promotes Capital Open Economy Democracy a b c Elites who lose power private sector jobs in US GDP is high enough that democracy is a lot more to be able to survive States get used to customs forms track property and rights and health scares 2 Democracy promotes Peace a b c Promoting free trade will promote democracies Democracies don t ght each other because they would lose trade and money Don t ght with armies but go see WTO Including only free trade Viewpoints on China 1 Liberal Optimists a b Fundamental good things are trade growth with China They don t ght each other and get into international organizations and form habits of not fighting 2 Liberal Pessimists a Democracies don t ght with each other sure but China is not a democracy these dollars are totally controlled by the Chinese government China tries to promote its ideology A theory when China starts to transition into a democracy it will be the most dangerous time to get in a war with them US FP STUDY GUIDE SPRING 2015 FINAL TEST PAGE 28 3 Realist Optimists a b c d 6 Chinese growth can t stay that increasing it has to level off soon Don t think Chinese have caught up that much to the US Does not have the capabilities to do the things that it threatens to do Their aircraft carrier is a joke Don t worry about Russia at all there economy is still really bad 4 Realist Pessimists a b Always and inevitable war worrywarts They want their power that they deserve why wouldn t China want its power it deserves the IMF and World Bank are in the US and Europe
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