What is the format of the exam:
Part 1 definition of terms.
5 choices from 10.
2 out of 5 essay questions (topics one from each week i assume)
1 out of 2 essay questions (general question on themes from the whole course) ex: How did Russian foreign policy changed since 1990 and how did it affect outside parties.
*Please note this study guide is a general overview more comprehensive one will be posted later today (April 18th)
eu foreign policy/russian policy
starting week 7.
how did foreign policy shape relations with third party/ frozen conflicts.
eurussia relations ,us, canada, nato
Week 7 March 1, 2: The EU, Russia, and the Shared Neighbourhood (continued)
Readings: Keukeleire and Delreux, “EU Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood,” pp. 250262 Tsygankov, Chpt. 4, pp. 97130
Rilka Dragneva and Kateryna Wolczuk (Dec. 2015) “Eurasian Economic Integration: Institutions, Promises and Faultlines,” LSE Ideas Special Report,
If you want to learn more check out What is the meaning of the information-processing approach?
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR019/SR019DragnevaWolczuk.pdf (optional) Trenin, D. (July 2014) “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry”, Carnegie Moscow Centre, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf Main themes:
Efforts for integration among postSoviet countries
The EU’s response to Russia’s regional initiatives
The Ukraine crisis , know Primakov’s policies (see Tsygankov)
Questions from Week 7:
(7,1) K and D argue that there was a ‘major structural flaw’ in the EU’s policy toward its neighbourhood as embodied in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Describe, in your own words, the nature of that structural flaw and consider whether it applied equally to the EU’s approach to the Mediterranean region and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.
(See page 252+)The three major issues which the ENP failed to address are: too little/ too late effort to resolve regional conflicts, a failure to increase market access for neighborhood members in areas which interested them, and a lack of any interpersonal improvements which increase mobility and access for neighborhood members.
According to the authors, these issues are symptoms of a major structural flaw: In essence, this is the lack of conviction in making internal reforms necessary for increasing contact with neighbourhood states, whilst also asking the neighbourhood states to reform without adequate compensation. We also discuss several other topics like What is the field that uniquely identifies a given record in a table?
I would argue that the EU was not equal in its treatment of its southern and eastern neighbours, as there was no provision for expansion and eventual membership for most Mediterranean states that are no already members of the EU, whereas Eastern European states are allowed to obtain membership status. I don’t really have an issue with this since the nonmember Mediterraneans are not in Europe, so they shouldn’t be members. Even so this is an example of uneven treatment by the EU. If you want to learn more check out What is the meaning of peacekeeping?
(7,2) Tsygankov describes Primakov’s strategy toward the former Soviet area as involving ‘using strong bargaining relations.... to obtain more informal control over their economic and security policies, without being overly responsible for the costs of such control.’ What were the motivations for this strategy and what tools did Russia use to exert influence with these neighboring countries, giving examples. To what extent was the EU’s ENP a reaction to this Russian strategy?
(117+) The motivations behind this strategy would be largely related to the relative weakness of Russia following the collapse of the SU. While still strong, Russia didn’t have the resources to expand into and oversee other state’s affairs, so they used informal pressure to manage the states’ behavior to keep control in the region.
Primakov’s Policy strategy:
Primakov’s main goal was balancing Western power and resisting NATO expansion (*See Great power balancing)
he had three main objectives We also discuss several other topics like What is a substance that always has the same composition and properties no matter where it is found?
If you want to learn more check out How many species are there that is already been identified?
1. maintain Russian military presence in the former Soviet Union. Don't forget about the age old question of What is the meaning of phonology?
2. protect ethnic Russians
3. gain valuable resources and economic assets from the former soviet states. The things that Russia has to its benefit:
politically (seat on the UNSC) western organization
the Commonwealth of Independent States (economic and political integration/unification of policies between post soviet states and russia policy under Primokov* in 1995)
(7,3) In reviewing the successes and failures of Primakov’s policies, Tsygankov concludes that ‘Russia would have accomplished more by attempting to engage the West in cooperative projects rather than by trying to assemble a coalition of those unhappy with Western policies.’ Do you agree or disagree with this analysis, and explain why, using specific evidence. pg 129
On one hand Tsy. is most certainly correct, though it’s hard to blame Russia as the West wasn’t exactly willing to be very cooperative.
Following the fall of the SU, the West used its financial influence over the country to create relations with the elite who had the economic power within the new Russian nation, while largely ignoring the transformation of the system.
The West also used a policy of containment after the collapse on the new state, putting pressure on a country that posed very little threat to the West.
That said, giving up on working with the West and taking a defensive posture was probably a bad move. It allowed the West to justify its containment policy, and allowed NATO to continue expanding while the West condemned the expansion of the CIS. If Russia had kept trying to work with the West it could have developed its modest economy much more effectively than it did, and it would have stronger ties with the West politically.
(7,4) When and why did the EU develop the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)? What concerns was the policy designed to address? What tools did the ENP use to address those issues?
(7,6) How did the Eastern Partnership alter the EU’s ENP?
Prior to the ENP, the EU and Eastern states had personalized agreements between them that governed the relationship between the two. Following the ENP’s creation, the ENP didn’t supersede the PCAs but rather it complimented them, doubling down of the normalising pressure the EU usually tries to exert. However, following the implementation of the ENP it became apparent for states that wished to join the EU, that ascension was out of the question and the ENP was not a path to ascension, but an alternative. This caused the reform plans and relationship between the states to turn cold in many cases, affecting the success of the policies. (7,7) What were the most important successes of the EU in its neighbourhood policy? In what sense was the EU successful and why?
ENP action plans have been cited as primary engines for social and political reform in Morocco, Moldova and Ukraine. Helped them accept long term consitions which would foster growth instead of monetary support from Russia in the short term. Though the impact of these has been negligible in important countries like Egypt.
(7,8) In the chapter you read, Tsygankov refers to ‘new security challenges’ facing Russia in the 1990s. What were those challenges?
1: Growing internal threats of separatism in Chechnya
2: Ethnic conflicts in Moldova, central Asia and Caucasia which threatened to spread to Russia and its neighbours.
3: NATO’s continued expansion.
4: Lack of recognition by the West.
5: Confusion regarding the Russian identity.
6: New, monopolar world order. Lack of greatpower balancing.
(7,9) What were the two main strategies or methods involved in Primakov’s ‘statist’ strategy (p. 100)? How did these differ from the approach that was
favoured by the Westernizers?
Two goals of the statists: I: Contesting the USA’s status as the only greatpower, II: Integrating the FSU states into a unified group (attempting to regain its sphere of influence). This differs from the Westerniser approach as they would have wanted to cooperate with the west, and would not have made it a goal to contest the hegemonic power of the USA. The Westernizers also wanted to turn away from central Asia, whereas the Statists wanted to regain their former sphere.
Week 8: March 8, 9 “The US, NATO, and new security challenges: European viewpoints” Readings: K & D pp. 14355, 172196, 273279
Questions from week 8:
(8,1) What are some of the main areas of tension between the EU and the US identified by K and D. Do you think tensions are likely to increase or decrease under a Trump administration, and why?
Although there are many commonalities that unite the EU and the US, numerous relational tensions exist. One area that creates strain is the US preference to act bilaterally with individual EU member states over the EU as a whole. This reflects the US perspective that multilateralism can be erosive to individual state interest, which is counterproductive to European integration. The relationship between the US and NATO is another strenuous area that indirectly affects the EU. The US remains very critical of NATO member states not meeting the minimum defence budget requirements.
Tensions between the EU and US have been highstrung since the inauguration of President Trump. His threat to withdrawal support to NATO would significantly impact the EU and spark a need for the CSDP to undertake a more active role in European defence. However, it appears that this issue has waned for the time being. Additionally, tensions are currently on the rise due to President Trump’s proposal of protectionist policy on steel and aluminum. The possibility of steep tariffs being imposed by the US in these industries has caused a major scare in Canada and a harsh response from the EU.
pp. 14355, 172196, 273279
(8,2) Ironically, K and D argue that the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy is not mainly about defense nor is it very ‘common’, thus it is a bit of a misnomer. Why do they say this? In your view, should the EU take a more active role in terms of military defense policy, and in what ways? Why or why not, and what have been and would be the main obstacles to doing so?
K and D argue that the CSDP is not mainly about defence because it is more oriented for expeditionary purposes, including the mission profiles covered under the Petersberg Tasks. The actual defence of member states and the EU is more directly addressed by individual militaries
and the collective security alliance of NATO. Additionally, K and D argue that the CSDP is not very common because it operates under a voluntary basis. Member states choose the degree in which they commit their military assets and personnel to CSDP missions or, like Denmark, there is potential to wholly opt out of the CSDP altogether. I do not think it necessary for the EU to take a more active role in terms of its military defence policy so long as the US maintains its commitment to NATO. In addition to the collective security provided by NATO, individual member states undertake their own national defence and the EU has developed its Battlegroup Concept as well as PESCO on security and defence. However, I am curious how the EU will fill the future military void in the CSDP left by the UK after Brexit.
(8,3) K and D identify some key characteristics of CSDP crisis management/peacebuilding missions: they are usually part of a multilateral effort, they usually have a strong civilian element, and they are usually ‘conducted in lowintensity crises and lowrisk situations’ (p. 185). K and D point out EU involvement in over 25 missions in the last decade (see pp. 186 87, as well as other examples in boxes on pp. 148, 19091). How do you assess the success and weaknesses of EU activity in the areas of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and crisis management, given these facts.
The Common Security and Defense Policy have various strengths and weaknesses in the areas of peacebuilding, crisisprevention and conflict management. One of the obvious strengths is in the ability to use the collective resources of member states to solve issues. This allows for intervention in a variety of scenarios without utilizing a disproportionate amount of resources of any one nation. Furthermore, having official channels for cooperation between states allows for far more efficient and effective intervention in conflict and/or crisis scenarios.
Despite the successes there are various weaknesses in the CSDP as seen in the 2008 European Union Force Chad/CAR mission. One primary weakness is the influence the “big three” (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) have on the involvement of conflict scenarios. For the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission Germany and the United Kingdom chose not to deploy any troops and the mission itself experienced funding problems. Only after France offered further support was the mission able to continue. This occurred despite unanimous agreement with regards to action in this scenario. Finally, Denmark has an opt out of the CDSP and did not take part in this mission. This all serves to demonstrate that while the cooperation between members can be beneficial to the success of the CDSP. It also has the potential to cause further conflicts that would not occur otherwise.
(8,4) K and D ask how security and defense moved from being a taboo area for EU policy to being an important part of CFSP. How did this happen? pg 172.
Europe’s security and defence methods have been taboo in the early days of the european integration project. This was because of the failure to ratify the European defence Community Treaty of the 1950’s and the Fourchet plans of the 60’s. This resulted in putting defense on the
back burner for European priority. This made room for the North Atlantic treaty organization to flourish (and france falling back on its national policy). France is still part of NATO.
west balkans 1990.
st malo declaration launched ESDP.
(8,5) What are the areas of agreement and disagreement in relation to nonproliferation among EU member states? How have these been resolved?
UK and France are nuclear powers within the EU, whilst the northern states have often used their voice to advocate for nonproliferation and the reduction of WMD stockpiles. The EU is forced to remain silent for the majority of talks regarding nonproliferation globally due to cleavages between different groups. The EU faces a credibility crisis when involved in these disputes because some of its major players are nuclear powers themselves that refuse to give up their WMDs.
This appears to have been solved by a set of frameworks which represent EU policy around WMDs, which is fairly vague but allows the EU to take action against states which it feels is obtaining nuclear technology in bad faith. It also forbids states from selling weapons to states when it appears that the sale of these weapons represents a clear threat to the safety of innocent populations.
(8,6) Compare how the EU has dealt with three major instances of potential nuclear proliferation: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
Iraq: During the invasion, two groups appeared. One group was actively involved in the war in Iraq, and the other was actively opposed. The EU policy in this period was heavily affected by the atlantic factor (meaning NATO).
Iran: Carrot and stick approach to negotiations, the EU and other involved players would promise benefits or some sort, as well as sticks (sanctions and the threat of an invasion) to pressure Iran to negotiate in good faith with the 3+3.
N.K.: The EU endorses sanctions against N.K., but otherwise is a minor player in these discussions as there is no common policy towards proliferation due to cleavages between different camps within the EU.
(8,7) What characterizes the EU’s approach to fighting terrorism (identify the four strands mentioned by K and D, p. 153). What tools does the EU use to implement these strands and how do you assess their effectiveness?
The EU focuses on: prevention (of terror attacks), protection (of civilians), pursuit (of terrorist networks), and response (managing consequences). The EU policy is made to compliment national policy, as protection of civilian populations is the purpose of the state. All of the EU approaches are internal solutions, and say nothing about acting outside of their
‘borders’ or power projection (presumably because they have no power to project, not because that don’t want to).
Week 9: March 15, 16: The transatlantic relationship: Russian apprehensions
Readings: Tsygankov, Ch. 56 (pp. 135204)
Russia’s national security strategy for 2016 in 9 key points, RT (Russian News Agency) https://www.rt.com/news/327608russianationalsecuritystrategy/
Russia’s changing political relationship with the U.S. (honeymoon, then new tension; terrorism as a shared challenged; the reset button)
The changing balance of economic power between Europe, the US, and Russia
The Trump presidency: unclear impacts
(9,1) Describe the main idea of Putin’ strategy of pragmatic cooperation with the west. What did he want to gain by cooperation with the west and what does it mean to say that it was a ‘pragmatic’ approach? In what ways did Russia westernizers and statist/civilisationists criticize it?
(9,2) Tsygankov argues that Russia viewed the US as pursuing a ‘regime change strategy’. What does he mean by this and what are some examples? Do you agree that the US was pursuing a ‘regime change strategy’?
(9,3) In Tsygankov’s view what was the distinction about Euroeast civilization, in Putin’s view, compared to EU Europe? (pp. 1834). In your view, how fundamental and important are these difference as obstacles to cooperation?
(9,6) How did the terrorist attacks of 9/11 affect USRussian relations? How lasting were these effects?
(9,7) What were the main changes in Russian foreign policy once Putin came to power in late 1999? How did his approach differ from Primakov’s ‘great power balancing’ approach?
(9,8) Tsygankov argues that during the early 2000s ‘Russia continued to differ from Western counterparts in its evaluation of national interest and security threats” (p. 149), but was more interested in cooperation in terms of economic modernization. What were the differences with the West in terms of security assessments?
(9,9) Why did Russia support Western efforts in Afghanistan but not the American policy toward Iraq?
(9,10) On p. 168, Tysgankov compares Putin to Gorbachev? What did the strategies of these two leaders share and where did they differ?
(9,11) What were the main security threats perceived by Russian leaders in 2004 and the period after that?
(9,12) When and why did Putin shift from a strategy of ‘pragmatic cooperation’ to one of ‘great power assertiveness’? How did the strategies differ? In what ways did Russia westernizers and statist/civilizationists criticize ‘great power assertiveness’?
(9,13) How does Tsygankov assess Russian public reaction to Putin’s policies and approaches over time?
(9,14) According to Tsygankov, what were the main areas of tension between Russia and the US from 2004 or so? (pp. 19192)
(9,15) How did Putin handle the Russian identity issue in the period covered by these chapters?
Week 10: March 22, 23: The Changing World Order: Europe’s and Russia’s relations with China and other BRICs
Readings: Tsygankov, pp. 219221 & Keukeleire and Delreux, pp. 283294 Main themes:
China as a rising power
– implications for Europe and Russia Russia’s relations with China and the BRICS – economic and political Europe’s relations with China and the BRICS
– economic and political
China as an alternative partner to the EU for Russia?
(10,1) K and D identify five areas where a ‘conceptual gap’ exists between the EU and China. Discuss one or two of these. Do you see any room for compromise? Do similar conceptual gaps exist between China and Russia, in your view?
I: Concept of sovereignty; Noninterference policy vs international responsibility. II: Human rights; Group rights vs Indv. rights
III: Democracy; Pluralism vs Universalism
IV: Global governance; Multipolarity and multilateralism vs unipolar hegemony. V: Strategic partnership; Short/medium vs long scale.
(10,2) What opportunities and challenges does China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ approach offer to both the EU and Russia?
(10,3) In his discussion of ‘Prospects’, Spranger identifies four Russian concerns about its relationship with China. Discuss one or two of these, and consider what avenues Russia might have to address these concerns, if any. To what degree might these issues undermine the longterm viability of cooperation?
(10,4) K and D argue that the EU’s underlying strategy in relation to China, based on what they call ‘unilateral socialization’, ‘has little chance of success’ (p. 284). What do they mean by ‘unilateral socialization’ and why do they see it as faulty? Do you agree?
(10,5) K and D conclude that China’s power has risen relative to that of the EU over the most recent decade. Considering the various kinds of power (military, normative or soft power, economic power), assess this conclusion. How do you think the EU should respond to this situation?
(10,6) What have been some of specific differences in position that have been obstacles to the EU and China concluding a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement?
(10,7) K and D identify five areas where a ‘conceptual gap’ exists between the EU and China. What are these and do you see any room for compromise? Do similar conceptual gaps exist between China and Russia, in your view?
(10,8) What are the main goals of Russia’s ‘China Pivot’? What specific initiatives has Russia taken? Do they really represent a ‘integral part of major paradigm shift with much greater implications’ as Spranger suggests? Or would you see this pivot, in part, as a tactical move by Russia to gain concessions from the West?
(10,9) Spranger argues that Russia’s relationship with China replicate several features of its relations with Europe. What are these, specificially, and how might these features create problems or risks for Russia as it seeks to intensify relations with China?
(10,10) In his discussion of ‘Prospects’, Spranger identifies four Russian concerns about its relationship with China. Discuss each of these, and consider what avenues Russia might have to address these concerns, if any. To what degree might these issues undermine the longterm viability of cooperation?
(10,11) The EU has identified 10 countries as strategic partners. Which countries? K and D argue that the selection of partners reflects an inability of the EU member states to reach agreement on which partners are really important. Do you agree with K and D that the instrument of strategic partnerships has not used effectively by the EU? Discuss.
Week 11: March 29, 30: The Middle East and foreign policy hot spots: EU and Russian responses
Readings: Allison, R. (2013), “Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis,” International Affairs, Vol. 89(4), pp. 795823 (ON))
K & D, pp. 247256 Tsygankov, pp. 221222
Geopolitical dilemmas facing Europe and Russia in the Middle East Russian interests and responses European interests and responses
Syria as a case study
(11,1) K and D state “…the support in EU member states for Turkish membership has waned, the pace of reform within Turkey has slowed, and Turkey has gradually redefined its position and
identity as a regional power in the wider Middle East and Mediterranean than as future EU member state.” What reasons do they provide to explain these changes within the EU and Turkey?
Tensions surrounding the membership of Cyprus in the European Union. Cyprus is divided between and area that Turkey invaded in 1974 and the European Union member in the south. Northern Cyprus claims independence but it has limited recognition. This conflict is a significant area of tension between Greece and Turkey. There is falling public support for Turkey becoming a member. Erdogan’s authoritarian shift
makes the countries implementation of the Copenhagen criteria less likely.
Turkey’s Europeanness is also a point of contention. Geographically it has a debatable claim to being european since most of its landmass is in Asia along with its population. Culturally, Turkey is in many ways not similar to its European neighbors being more closely associated to the Middle East. K and D say that Turkey’s close relationship to the Middle East could help broaden the foreign policy of the EU and foster in a more inclusive union.
(11,2) Assess K and D’s view that Islamism is a power challenging dominant power structures. What do they mean by the term ‘Islamism’? In what sense does Islamism, as they define it, present a challenge to the EU and how has the EU responded? Does it present a similar challenge to Russia?
“Lacking statehood and neig neither an international organization, institution nor a regime” It is multifaceted and lacks a clearly defined center or leadership. Islamism is the belief that islam provides answers to the political, economic social, moral and identity question of muslim societies and states. Islamism is a reaction against western ideology of liberalism and secularism
Both Russia and the Europe have a similar percentage of muslims living within their borders and since Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world its influence and politics and society will only grow. Islamism wants to reassert religious dominance over politics.
The lack of a central leadership means that policies are very hard to be enacted effectvily since their is no center of islam and it overlaps over every aspect of society. Eu has largely ignored the influence of islam since its foreign policy tools have no effect on it.
Foreign influence of Islam: Mohammed, Mecca, Media, Money, Migration.
(11,3) What dilemmas did the Arab Spring uprisings in countries like Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt create for the EU? Do you think the EU could have responded more effectively?
Intervene in the domestic affairs of another country? But also promote democracy? Europe did not have a strong reaction towards the Arab spring since it did not have unified consensus from its member states.
(11,4) What explains Russia’s developing skepticism about the Arab spring? How has the Russian position differed from that of West and how has it played out in relation to Libya and Syria? Consider the various explanations for the Russian position offered by the authors and assess their strength.
Week 12: April 5, 6: Global Issues: Climate change and the Arctic: European and Russian responses
Readings: States Recognise the EU as a Legitimate Stakeholder?” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 6 (2), pp. 89110, http://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/97
Sergunin, A. and Konyshev, V. (2014), “Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard and Soft Power?” The Polar Journal, Vol. 4(1), pp. 6987
The priority of the issue in the foreign policy agenda Policies and approaches Relation to international initiatives
Hossain, K. (2015), “EU Engagement in the Arctic: Do the Policy Responses from the Arctic
(12,1) The EU has pushed for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, but so far this has not been approved. Given the mandate of the Arctic Council (see Hossain, p. 93), do you think that the EU should be given permanent observer status in the Arctic Council? Explain your view. Why has it not occurred thus far?
(12,2) Sergunin and Konyshev argue that: “in contrast to the internationally widespread stereotype of Russia as a hard power in the Arctic, there are serious grounds to believe that in the foreseeable future Moscow will pursue quite pragmatic and responsible policies in the region” (p. 86). Assess this judgment and the evidence to support it or refute it.
(12,3) Hossain sees significant opportunities for cooperation between Canada and the EU in relation to the Arctic. Discuss the balance of opportunities for cooperation and tensions over the Arctic between the two actors.
(12,4) What are key Russian interests in the Arctic? Which policies has Russia used to promote these interests? To what extent and in what arenas do they bring Russia into conflict with (a) the US; (b) Canada; and (c) the EU?
(12,5) What are key EU interests in the Arctic? Which policies has the EU used to promote these interests? To what extent and in what arenas do they bring the EU into conflict or coordination with (a) Russia and (b) Canada?
(12,6) Why does the EU have an interest in the Arctic, rather than just relying on member states to deal with the issue?
(12,7) Should the Arctic be demilitarized? Why or why not?
(12,8) Why would some nonArctic states (such as Germany, UK, Poland, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, and others) be given permanent observer status (POS) in the Arctic Council?
(12,9) To what extent should the ‘Arctic five’ [Arctic coastal states – US, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark (through Greenland)] or the Arctic states (the Arctiv 5 + Finland, Iceland, Sweden) extend participation in governance of the Arctic to other states or actors? Why or why not?
(week7) European Neighbourhood Policy: Launched in 2004 as the EU’s platform for international relations with Eastern European, Caucasian and Middle Eastern countries. Based on Article 8 of the TEU that aims to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries for the purpose of prosperity and cooperation.
Endogenous Support (p. 253): Refers to one of the conditions needed for successful structural reform. In the context of the course this refers to the EU conditions imposed on neighbourhood members (specifically the adjustments they need to make) in order to obtain monetary or political support. Endogenous support is internal support for policies, which must exist independent of the EU and its policy making in order for these adjustments to be successful, and is referred to in discussions about the successful or unsuccessful nature of the ENP. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs): Areas which provide for the dismantling of trade barriers and aim for regulatory convergence in shared areas between the EU and Neighbours.
Eastern Partnership: The EaP was created in 2009 for the purpose of deepening relations with: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. The EaP didn’t actually change the structural relationship between the countries and the EU, and there are doubts about the actual value of the partnership.
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): The ENI provides financial backing for activities of the ENP, specifically in areas such as: Eastern Europe, Caucasia and the Mediterranean. Focused on promoting the implementation of the European Action Plans. 2008 RussianGeorgian War: The war started when two breakaway regions of Georgia Abkhazia and South Ossetia proclaimed independence from Georgia. Russia moves unarmed
troops into Abkhazia under the pretense of “railroad reconstruction”. Georgia counters by moving troops to S. Ossetia, Russia moves troops to the border and begins airstrikes in S.O. EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia: Established in September 2008, the mission began as EU oversight of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. The mandate of the mission includes the normalisation and stabilisation of the situation in Georgia.
Primakov: Pushed for multilateralism to counter US hegemony on the international political stage. Put pressure on NATO in instances where NATO was intervening in affairs (ie Iraq, Yugoslavia, etc), aimed to negotiate peace between parties involved. Fathered the “triangle counterbalance” (Rus’, India, China) to counter the US, though ultimately it never came to fruition. Well known for his greatpower balancing policies and push for multilateral action. Eurasia (as a concept):
Great Power Balancing: Primakov’s policy: see Primakov or Week 7, Question 10. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): The CIS aims to organise the military and strategic organisation of postsoviet states, particularly in central asia. Its other important goal was to create a common economic market for members to trade within, though the only real advantage to this market was access to Russian oil and gas. With the main purpose of its creation being to create a ‘civilised divorce’ after the collapse of the SU, the CIS has largely lost its importance in the eyes of members.
Eurasian Economic Union:
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP):
The organized and agreed upon Foreign policy of the European Union, deals with diplomatic activities of the EU, political aspects of the EU with other Countries and Regions
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): A facet of the European Union’s Common foreign and Security Policy focusing on Crisis Management through civilian or military missions abroad, Carried out by member states.
European External Action Service (EEAS):
Is the Diplomatic service of the EU, deals with things such as EU enlargement, trade policy, development cooperation, humanitarian aid, sanctions and international agreements.
Peacebuilding: Examples of EU peace building?
The attempts to stabilize regions such as Ukraine with the Minsk I and II
carried out by the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Instrument for Stability (IfS):
African Peace Facility (APF):
2013 Arms Trade Treaty:
St. Malo Declaration: pg 172 K & D.
Berlin Plus arrangements:
Civilian dimension of CSDP:
Security sector reform:
(10) Beijing Consensus (K and D, p. 287):
One Belt, One Road:
(12) Arctic Council (AC):
Northern Sea Route (NSR):
UN Convention on Law of the SEA (UNCLOS):
Barents Sea treaty (Russia/Norway):
EU Seal Ban Regulation:
endogenius support (inside) eu has implemented policy in post soviet countries + middle east. do these countries support eu’s policy
chinese and eu. readings. eu is dealing with china in the same way it deals with other countries unilateral
doesnt consult china for what (third party wants).
implementing their values and norms (conditionality)
both countries consulting
Russia increasing presence in the arctic so does other parties. (tit for tat policy in the arctic) depends on the relations with the west.
who started that? no one US Russia
european neighbourhood instruments
comes from the european neighbourhood policy 2004
instruments are what is implemented in practice.
funding , knowledge.
Berlin plus arrangment
what are the rules with nato. eu defence policy and how it runs alongside nato. crisis management
European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) (wk 7): goal of Harmonizing border control in Transnistria “contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through confidence building measures and a monitoring presence at the Transnistrian segment of the MoldovaUkraine border”
barren sea treaty fish stocks, resource allocation
The SarkozyMedvedev plan:
1. Immed iate abandonment of violence
2. Stop any active combat
3. Free flow of humanitarian aid
4. Militar y forces of Georgia to retreat to their regular locations
5. Militar y forces of Russia to retreat to their locations as of August 8.
6. Interna tional guarantees for peace and security in S. Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Signed by all parties involved in 1416 Aug. 2008
Thank you all.