Final Exam Study Guide ­­ 2018 

What are missile defenses?

Prof. Jane Cramer

PS 440/540

The final will last two hours, and it will take place in the classroom on Tuesday, June 12,  at 8:00 am. Bring 3 green exam books, please.

You will be asked six short answer questions, out of a choice of eight. You will write for  about 12 minutes on each of these questions.  (10% each = 60% of final exam.) Then you will be asked to answer two longer questions. You should write for 20 minutes  on each question. (20% each)

The short and long questions will either be exactly one of these questions or unasked quiz questions, a combination of some of these questions, or one of these questions re­framed.  If you carefully prepare these questions and any unasked quiz questions, you will be  ready for the final.

Potential long essays:

1.) At a family get together your uncle argues that the U.S. is vulnerable to the recent and  emerging Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups, including China’s new pursuit of missile  defense.  Your uncle asserts that the U.S. needs to build new and better nuclear missiles and  deploy a national missile defense. Use the arguments from the readings to explain your Uncle’s  best arguments, and any and all of the best counterarguments you could pose from the readings  against your Uncle’s arguments. 

What is a Organization Theory?

 I’ve listed many theories below, pick and choose what best suits your argument

2.) Are we facing the “End of MAD?” Are we in a new era of counterforce? Fully explain. Also why is this happening? Is it a good strategic choice for the U.S.? What is happening with the  security dilemma? What other choices does the United States have?

∙ Defense dominance is clear

o Nuclear weapons are good for holding territory, not good for offensive  attack

o Nuclear weapons provide a clear deterrent, as if another attacks, a state  with survivable nuclear forces can always punish an attack, is a universal  sobering effect If you want to learn more check out derivative uic

o How could nuclear weapons be used offensively

 Nuclear weapons have never been successfully used for offense in  offense in over 40 years of nuclear stalemate between hostile 

powers in the Cold War, almost 70 years of worldwide nuclear 

Where did the myths come from?

deterrence

 If we can defeat someone before they can strike back, we are 

tempted to strike first

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o Historically this has been clear, as the war could take place in an  afternoon, some in the US think this might be changing, so they are  building defense, and Type IV realism is present

∙ Missile defenses

o Key to deterrence is that you cannot defend against missiles, but trying to  build it as if we could

o What are missile defenses

 Countermeasures are to intercept the warhead with missiles

 Can be easily countered by the strikers, cheap and easy to do with  bomblets

 Only good for offense, as it allows for first strike capabilities We also discuss several other topics like qmb 3200

 Missiles in outer space like ICBMs are impossible to defend 

against, going thousands of miles per hour with infinite decoys, 

any country that can get an ICBM can get decoys to launch as well

o Will they work

 No, too easy to bypass

 Land based systems like THAAD have better chances, but are still  only good with medium range ballistic missiles 

 Makes first target for other countries the radar, as defense is reliant on it, soft targets

 Why build it at all, to go first you need total defense, which is 

impossible

 Building it for organizational reasons

o Why are they destabilizing

 States tempted to pre­empt defenses in a crisis If you want to learn more check out one advantage of using a metal plate over a woodblock for printmaking is that it
We also discuss several other topics like shell method pauls notes

 Can be used as a “Shield behind the sword” emboldening first 

strikes

3.) How is the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) possibly similar to the Schlieffen Plan? What  possible parallels are there? How is it different? Discuss. 

o The Schleffen plan

 Plan took form in 1905, taking into account factors such as Germany’s  diplomatic isolation, new technology, compensated for the fact that  German troops would be outnumbered 5­3

 Only plan for dealing with the French, distract them in Alsanc­Lorrane,  then outflank them through Belgium We also discuss several other topics like sloan siegrist umass

 Very offensively oriented, easy to anticipate that it wouldn’t work, but  administration was blinded by a plan that needed to work

 False optimism very present, had to win so they would, everything had to  break their way

Incentive to make a plan that works – organization theory this is what  militaries are hard wired to do

 Why it failed

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∙ Never enough German troops to achieve the encirclement of Paris ∙ Relied on speed and transportation, once train tracks were 

destroyed, couldn’t get to Paris 

∙ No alternatives and no turning back, any mistakes or delays would  make the plan fall apart

∙ Command giving orders based on outdated plans

∙ Dismissed Russia as a strong army after Russo­Japanese war

∙ Had problems with generals obeying commands

∙ Lack of alternatives and inflexibility doomed it from the start and  led to a two front war of attrition

∙ NPR

o Damage limitation is to quickly modify nuclear forces to  modify risk, essential to modify them if needed

o Reads much like retaliatory attack on whoever attacked  firsts

o Damage limitation could mean striking enemy nuclear  bases, not cities

o May want limited damage for themselves and allies, but  not for adversaries

o Opens door for possible bloody nose strategy 

o The NPR promises to in the long term pursue a modern nuclear armed sea launched cruise missile which “will provide a needed non­strategic  regional presence, an assured response capability, and an INF treaty  compliant response to Russia’s continuing treaty violation If you want to learn more check out isqs 2340

 Allies say this is not INF compliant

 Started this by getting rid of ABM treaty

o Wants to negotiate a reduction in Russian non­strategic nuclear weapons  and to return to compliance with the INF treaty

4.) What is the proposed Grand Strategy of ‘restraint”? What is the strategy of “deep  engagement”? What are the strongest arguments on each side? What are the weakest arguments?  Which strategy appears to be less war­causing (will prevent war better) according to theories of  war and the history you have learned in this class?  Evaluate this debate.

∙ Restraint 

o Deep engagement has done a lot of harm to US national  security, need to replace it with a strategy of restraint o Stick to protecting narrow national security interests o US has inherent security from being in North America, with  its only rivals being separated by oceans, but we have  acted with a profound sense of insecurity

o International reactions to the US will be increasingly  negative if we pursue the path of hegemony

o US allies do not help with defense, but trust in the US to  defend them, as they have drastically cut back their  

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militaries, while Us has to bear the burden of keeping the  peace, encourages allies to challenge other states (ex  Vietnam and China, Georgia and Russia, Israel and  

Palestine)

 Could be risky to abandon this, as if they ramp up  their militaries again, there is more potential for  

nuclear proliferation and rogue military states to rise  Perhaps a strategy of aligned NATO forces or  

strengthened UN forces could counteract this

o A more restrained strategy should include continued  pursuit of terrorists with carefully applied force, try to  prevent China from becoming a Eurasian hegemon (which  would be easy with Russia, India, and Japan nearby to  prevent this), and to try and stop the proliferation of nukes  with more diplomacy and less force

o In practice, this would have NATO as a political structure,  not a military one, would have a renegotiation of treaties  with Japan and other Asian countries, ensuring access but  not having troops there, reassessing commitments to the  Persian Gulf by preventing a Middle East hegemon while  not having troops on the ground, like it did before the 1st gulf war

 What if crazy states emerge out of this, such as a ME  hegemon in a country where they are hard to  

remove, unlike Saddam Hussein?

∙ Deep Engagement 

o Deep engagement reduces competition in key regions, acts as a check  against potential rivals, makes it easier for the US to gain cooperation  while battling global threats

o High levels of spending are not necessary to retain deep engagement,  budgets have just been inflated in the post­9/11 world

o No countries have formed anti­American alliances, so they are not trying  to balance against the US, no country has tried to match the US military  Many smaller countries in area most affected are, such as ME  regional powers

 Radicals emerge out of states where we have put dictators in place, they are anti­American and dangerous to us

o Only spend 4.5% of our GDP on defense, so we are not spending  ourselves into extinction

 May be true for GDP, but budget is a different story

o Temptation to intervene in larger wars would still exist if the US withdrew its troops from allies

o If the US were to remove troops from allies such as Japan, they could go  nuclear and threaten China, provoking a larger war, US needs to maintain  those forces to keep a potential Chinese hegemon in check as well

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o US helps with cooperation, as rest of the world is a lot more likely to  cooperate when the US is involved

∙ Restraint vs. Deep Engagement

o Can have restraint and go down to 1,000 nukes

o Deep Engagement is pretending you have a first strike possibility, build  more missile systems based on that

o Strategic stability comes out of the idea that MAD is here to stay in the  nuclear dominated world

o US is very secure and we should take advantage of that, but don’t go into  countries and tell them how to govern, is counterproductive and leads to  overextension, so you want restraint – Posen

 Consensus: Liberal hegemony deep engagement

∙ NATO expansion

o Expanded to the boarders of Russia, not good

∙ Enhance agreement with Japan

o Could provoke China if not done tactfully

∙ Protect the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf

o Not as much for us, but for the world

∙ Put China on the watchlist

o Not a democratic liberal ally, so cannot be full allies

with them

o Don’t want to provoke a rising great power to do 

this, narrow margin of error

∙ Stop proliferation and terrorism

o Sometimes forcefully, some want it without force, 

think force is counterproductive

 Problems

∙ Rescue failing states such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and 

Kosovo

o Might look like good projects, but should not do it 

with force

o Can create a war industry for constant warfare, 

private militaries to do these projects, is a mistake, 

wrong way to do nation building, sets up a military

industrial complex

o Doing more war than we did during the cold war, 

twice the war, as war is a bipartisan industry

∙ Contain rogues such as Iran, North Korea, and war in Iraq

o Spend a lot of money containing rogues that should 

be small problems

o Pretend that these are new harder projects with 

crazy leaders so we need to go first

∙ Undisclosed, unnecessary, bloody, counterproductive, 

costly, and wasteful

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o Threats are not real

o Spend a lot of soldiers doing it, kill a lot more 

people outside of our soldiers

o Provoke enemies by doing this

o Opportunity costs are not good, as we should be 

maintaining our power

 US acts with a profound sense of insecurity

∙ Think we can cause democracy in states that do not like us

 Adopting unnecessarily militarized and forward leaning policies  This provokes a predictable pushback

∙ Soft balancing

∙ Putin and China

o Fighting Identity

 Us officials believe they can transform the world though spreading  democracy, freedom of information, economic development, and  the judicious application of military power

 Posen – this is over­ambitious, unrealistic, and provokes a 

nationalist backlash from sovergn states, leaders do not like to be  puppets

o Friends without benefits

 NATO and Japan free­ride on the US

∙ They are rich enough to pay for their own security

 Security guarantees lead to moral hazards

∙ Taiwan

∙ Georgia

∙ Philippines and Vietnam

∙ Israeli haws

∙ These policies can be a slippery slope that leads to a lot of 

problems

o A nimbler strategy: restraint

 Three challenges

∙ Prevent a powerful rival from upending the balance of 

power

∙ Still need to fight terrorists

∙ Need to limit nuclear proliferation

 We are too reliant on force, need to use other tools in our kit

 Spend $598.5 billion in 2015 on military, $515.8 billion on 

everything else

 We account for about a third of the world’s military spending ∙ Deep engagement

o Liberal hegemony

o Tried and true

o Affordable

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 Argues in percentage terms, not $, as it is a lot more expensive to  everything else

o Keeping the peace has immeasurable benefits

 Might be done at less of a cost

4.) What is “Organization Theory” and what does it predict about military doctrines?  Does organization theory help to explain World War I? How? Does it help to explain the  pursuit of U.S. nuclear primacy today? How? And how do we know? What does this  theory predict about the future of China’s military if China fully decides to expand its  military now, as it appears to be doing? Discuss.

∙ Organization Theory 

o One of the most important theories in the study of war o Looks at where military doctrines come from 

o Militaries like offense, guiding the US military doctrine, true across time and space

o Leading theory with realism, we think this is a main cause  of war and trouble

o Rational actor model 

 Identify and define the problem 

 Identify goals and prioritize 

 Gather information 

 Identify alternative means 

 Analyze each possible alternatives 

 Choose the best alternative 

 Implement the decision 

 Monitor and evaluate 

 Terminate/alter/continue 

o True for most government decisions, many life decisions o Have to do this over and over again with every decision to  be rational

o Do states get so desperate that it is rational to lash out and start war?

∙ States are generally not rational 

o Incrementalism, states have a hard time going back on  other decisions, hard to stop cold turkey, many don’t agree with switch, true for almost all policy, switches slowly

o Organizational process model and organization theory,  organizational doctrines are pre-made decisions to solve  future problems

o Bureaucratic politics model, many actors bargain with  another for what they want

o Groupthink, when leaders come to a consensus and make  decisions

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o All exist, often simultaneously, but military doctrines are  almost always offensive, even when they should be  defensive, good reasons for it but can be defensive

∙ OPM and Organization Theory 

o Organizations behavior is substantially determined by  repertoire of contingency plans and routines of standard  operating procedures (SOPs), everyone knows their job and have to do it, designed and trained to works

o Problems are typically factored and parceled out to  subunits, really tricky when making war, as defense is  reactive, and it is tricky to react, offense is way easier to  deal with than defense, so much so that militaries almost  exclusively train for offense, militaries plan for the opening  battle but don’t plan for the end of the war

o Subunits have specific roles and missions designed to deal  with different aspects of the problems, but problems are  not often handled well once a military is attacked

o Coordination of subunits is difficult and sporadic, its very  hard to keep everyone on the same page in a large unit o A good example of this going wrong is the Cuban Missile  Crisis, had implausible deniability with organizational  process not getting a memo

∙ Organization theory 

o Organizations have institutional goals, and typically all  organizations want things that will make their military  better, so they want

 More missions – lets them pick and choose how to do things

 Greater autonomy from outside influence – they’re  the experts, don’t want politicians or civilians to tell  them what to do

 Greater influence in government –don’t want state  department to tell them what to do

 Greater capabilities – want the latest equipment 

 More resources and personnel 

 Maintain prestige 

 Control “task environments” 

o Bureaucratic Politics Model 

 Decision making involves “players with different  “stakes”

 Parochial interests shape participants’ goals – the  secretary of defense will advocate for bigger defense budgets typically

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 Decisions result from bargaining, compromise,  

logrolling, coalition building – people will bargain over

decisions, a political process, not a rational one

 Decisions determined by political process, not  

process

o Consequences of BPM 

 Domestic politics predominates over national and  

international interests

 Policies are fragmented – not finished much, never  followed through

 Few decisions are decisive or final – many change  

their minds over bargaining

 Decisions are nonrational and nonoptimal 

o Groupthink 

 Psychology bases, one of the most powerful things  for group decision making

 Loyalty to group is the most important objective 

 Members seek consensus and harmony 

 Personal doubts voluntarily suppressed 

 Dissent is seen as disloyalty 

 Nonconformists are excluded and driven out 

 Group sees policy as “moral” 

 “Hard-headed” towards those out of the group 

 Attitude is over optimistic – think everything will go  right even if there are obvious flaws

5.) Explain how the “Myths of Empire” led to the Pacific War.  Where did the “myths”  come from? Were these an important cause of the war? Does this theory point to  “manipulable causes”? Are there “Myths of Empire” apparent in U.S. foreign policy  debates today? For example, is North Korea a possible “paper tiger” or not? Discuss.  Bandwagoning

o To ally with the most powerful side or coalition to increase  security and  

o Bandwagon to enjoy the spoils of war 

o Ex: US and Britain in Iraq war 

o Implications 

 If states bandwagon often, the world is a very  

dangerous place

 States need to appear strong and threatening so others  will obey them

 Historically, states balance against threats, not power, but  what constitutes as a threat?

∙ Aggregate power 

∙ Geographic proximity 

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o More weary of a nearby power, not one that is half

the world away

∙ Offensive power 

o When states build up offensive power, start to be  

perceived as a threat

∙ Aggressive intentions 

o Hard to read, depends on doctrine, read intentions

into that often

 Intentions matter, not just capabilities 

 Paper Tiger

o The main opponent is seen as a main foe imposing an inescapable security threat, yet at the same time are too weak to impose countermeasures on  you

o Commonly seen in bloody nose strategies

 Big Stick

o Backing up negotiations with the treat of force to try and intimidate your  adversary

o Can make others fearful of a first strike

 Falling Dominoes

o Conquest adds to power, need gains of resources to survive

o Loss of one resource that was gained could mean the death of the empire 6.) Please explain three important theories of the causes of World War I—each theory  from a different “level of analysis”.  Explain what “level of analysis” each theory is from. Of these three theories, which has the most explanatory power?  Does it explain a lot of  wars or just WW I well?  Which theory is most manipulable (i.e. prescriptively rich)?   What prescriptions follow directly?  Overall, please also discuss what lessons are here  from these three theories relevant for avoiding possible war today.

 Individual: Hawkish biases

 State: Offense­Defense Balance

 System: Realism (Whichever type fits best)

 Can use any of the many theories I have listed below

7.) In what ways is the current crisis with North Korea similar to the Cuban Missile  crisis? In what ways is it different? Should we expect that both sides are “clear perceiving” or might either or both sides suffer from misperceptions? Discuss this  possibility specifically using possible specific examples to demonstrate you understand  this problem fully.

∙ Many think accidental nuclear war is in play, North Korea is a  “slow moving Cuban Missile Crisis”

∙ North Korea is paranoid that the US will take them out because  we have said we’d do so

∙ Kim Jong Un took over and is very vulnerable as a dictator, but  South Korea, Japan, and China want a soft landing, want him out  by the hand of his own people and system

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∙ China is key to negotiating about North Korea, have completely  different interests than us

∙ South Korea might want us to leave, as we might be provoking  war, they have a huge arsenal, but looks good to have us on  their team

∙ Deterrence situation taking place, where both countries can’t  defend themselves but could bomb each other to oblivion ∙ North Korea 

o Isolated, so feel they need to make a deal with us

o US wants to put missile defense near China, so this crisis is perfect to do  this

o Trump thinks missile defenses are 97% effective, so NK has to act as  though we do

o NK scared like Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis, think we are  determined for a regime change

o Can get an unwanted war over this, just as we almost did in the Cuban  Missile Crisis

o If Kim Jong Un thinks that he has to use or loose the nuclear weapons, he  will use it, no chance he’ll give them up as he is scared

o In the past other states have gotten nukes, we have left them alone and  have deterred them

o If we live in a world of threats and punishment, everyone will have nukes,  but if there are incentives to not have nukes, live in a world without  everyone having them

o Have to punish NK, but have to reward them for giving up nukes if they  do

o Real punishment is denying rewards, sanctions only allow countries to get  more desperate for nukes

o Working counterforce strategy would get them to give up their nukes, but  is very hard to get, but Trump administration is starting to believe they  have it

o NK does not know if our threats are credible, as some of our top advisors  are trying to plug a first strike bloody nose

∙ No one wants war, so why should we get it? 

o North Korea does not want a war because it knows it will  loose, end of the Kims

o China and South Korea don’t want a war, has many  geopolitical and economic implications, easy to hit Seoul  from the North

o Does the US want war? 

 North Korea is building weapons, we want to display  that we can stop them, so we have to do small  

attacks on  

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 North Korea cant be deterred if they build missiles  that will hit the US

o Big wars are rare, and inadvertent wars are less likely o Bad news: conditions for accidental war present 

 Lots of bluffing, bluster, and believed myths 

 Contradictory signaling 

 Poor lines of communication 

 Inexperienced leadership 

 Poor understanding of the adversary 

 Escalatory doctrine 

 Lack of constraints 

 Personalities of leaderships 

o Why would Kim fight if he knows he will loose? 

 Difference between general deterrence and crisis  stability

 If North Korea thinks attack is imminent, there is an  incentive to strike first

 North Korea is overmatched, “use them or loose  them” as they cant fight a big war

 Why would Kim think the US or South Korea would  attack

∙ We keep telling them we’re going to attack 

∙ South Korea policy of decapitation 

∙ US stealth flights neat the North Korean  

boarder

∙ Misperceptions 

∙ In security studies, perceptions of threats are highly manipulable, as  politicians make threats more dire than they are for many different  reasons, as powers overexpand and kill themselves, as they believe that  they are insecure and tell themselves lies about their security

∙ Great powers overexpand to far flung places, crash and burn in big wars ∙ If we can keep our heads on straight and follow the scientific method and  fact checking, but we often loose sight of it

∙ Have people thinking that threats are bigger than they are, manipulated  around elections, as domestic politics cause misperceptions

∙ Misperceptions are very common, but how dangerous are they? o A two sided problem, as it is dangerous to underestimate threats,  but also dangerous to overestimate threats

 If you overestimate threats, you will get unwanted wars

o False optimism causes war, and false pessimism causes war as well  There would not be a war if both sides did not think they 

could win

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 If you think war wont come, then you could leave yourself 

without an adequate defense

 How is a big threat easy to defeat?

o Is it more common to overestimate or underestimate threats

 Overestimate, people live in fear of security

 Rational: Have insufficient information, as you have to act 

on it

 Psychological explanations: Hawkish biases, leaders and 

publics make errors when processing information

 Domestic politics: propaganda and manipulation of 

information

8.) First, please fully explain why states sometimes, possibly often, need to adopt  offensive strategies for defensive reasons.  Adoption of these offensive strategies and  doctrines can end up provoking others unintentionally.  This is the well­known problem  of the security dilemma.  Alternatively, states have sometimes made the opposite error  and failed to adopt offensive strategies when they were necessary for defense, and this  created “windows of opportunities” for aggressors.  Carefully explain the historical  evidence of both of these types of problems presented in this class.  How could a state do  better than states did in the past and somehow KNOW when it is making a mistake?   What types of things can a state do to be clear­perceiving, or is this impossible?  Using  the historical evidence and theories as guides—is the U.S. clear­perceiving today?  Is it  adopting and pursuing “rational” security policies?  Give examples and explain.  See Security Dilemma below

9.) How safe is the world of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)?  How likely is it for  the conditions necessary for MAD to be peaceful to hold?  Which of the necessary  conditions are most problematic today? Why?  Should the US adopt policies aimed at  maintaining a peaceful MAD world?  If so, what policies?  If not, why not?  Are we stuck indefinitely trying to maintain a peaceful MAD world?  Should we try to escape it by  defending (BAD, USA) or disarming (MARNE)?  Why might a MAD world be  preferable to a world in which nuclear weapons never existed (PAST)?  After looking  carefully at the causes and devastation of WWI and WWII—is a MAD world preferable  or not?  Be very clear on what policies the U.S. should adopt and why. ∙ PAST 

o Pre-Atomic state 

o The world before 1945, as nuclear technology is absent  and unknown

∙ MAD 

o Mutually Assured Destruction 

o The leading powers have secure nuclear deterrents that  could annihilate an attackers society even after they suffer  from an all out surprise attack

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 Realists argue we are stuck here even without bombs, as it is easy to build  bombs

 A lot less wars than PAST, as states are more easily deterred and there are  fewer misperceptions surrounding war

o MAD embraced by many politicians and civilians as the most stable  nuclear world, have compatible military doctrines, but militaries kept  pursuing “first strike” capabilities

o Requirements for a stable MAD world

 States/leaders must be causalty­sensitive, not accept millions dead  Must not value conquest unduly

 Clear perceptions of surroundings (encircled?)

 Must be able to build large, secure arsenals that are robust and  secure

 Must not be able to use or transfer weapons anonymously  States must be deterrable, as they must adapt their  conduct to avoid repercussions of nuclear warfare  States need to be aware of the costs if they are to  avoid false optimism

∙ Dictators may be insensitive to their society’s  suffering and many not care about threats on  

them, can badly misperceive realities they face  Security for all?

∙ MAD embraced by many politicians and civilians as the  most stable, compatible military doctrines, militaries kept 

pursuing first strike capabilities because they were 

supposed to win

 Requirements for a stable MAD world

∙ States/leaders must be causualty sensitive

∙ Must not value conquest unduly

o If you think you need something or you will die, 

you will go for it

∙ Clear perceptions of surroundings encircled?

o Do you think you are encircled, do you think you 

are going to be killed in your sleep

∙ Must not be able to use or transfer weapons anonymously o Fear after fall of the USSR

∙ Must be able to build large, secure arsenals (robust and  secure)

 Emerges despite our best efforts, is defense dominant

∙ MAD resisted because each side wanted the ability to 

threaten to successfully attack the other, as with a viable 

threats comes coercive power and dominance OR to do 

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“damage limitation” to have threats to protect allies and 

yourself

 Why is MAD robust?

∙ Robust in type III realism, but might not be robust in 

misperceptions

∙ Needs to be a very real, very scary threat of annihilati 

∙ MARNE 

o Mankind Absolutely Rejects Nuclear Explosives 

o All powers have dismantled their nuclear capabilities,  nuclear technology is absent but known

 Many think this is unattainable

 Reject deterrence, can go to zero and still have deterrence

 Not possible for Van Evra, as people can build bombs quickly ∙ BAD 

o Both Are Defended 

o States maintain nuclear forces but also have defenses that  can protect their populations, so no major power could  inflict large damage on another society

 Reagan’s dream, build a lot of defense and have it work, “Star Wars”  world, want nukes to become obsolete

 Can you defend yourself? Most say no, as you can smuggle bombs or  build missiles that can fly under radars

 Can’t defend our big boarders, so can’t do this

 Small arsenals with some defense makes counterforce possible, so hard to  achieve

 If both are defended, why do you have to build anything

 Unstable because one side could be defended and one may not be  defended

∙ WORSE 

o Winning Only Requires Striking Early 

o States maintain nuclear forces, but these forces are  susceptible to surprise attacks, so as a result the first side  to attack can achieve victory

 How we were in the 50s and early 60s, pre­Cuban missile crisis  On a hair trigger to not loose

 Kim Jong Un scared because he might want t go first to get his punch in  before he’s dead

 Got us to the Cuban missile crisis

∙ USA 

 Unilateral Superiority – American

 The end of MAD, rejecting MAD

 USA tries to build a working defense and a highly accurate and reliable  offense 

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 Just like WWI where you are stuck in a world where going first does not  work

 Kissinger enshrined not doing this, as he said absolute security for one  power means absolute insecurity for other powers

 Could backfire, as others would be scared of us and build more bombs

ALL Potential Quiz Questions 2018

Note: Due to many of the readings not being discussed in class and Professor Cramer  stating questions that have been discussed in class will be asked, I do not have notes for  many of the readings that were not discussed. I will include the notes I do have so  knowledge from readings not discussed can be used to help explain other concepts

*Discussed in class

**Already been asked on a quiz and discussed in class

In Red: Related to Question above

Week 1:

**1.) Please carefully describe one "hawkish bias" that is proposed to be important for  foreign policy making, and possibly war. Can you describe how this bias could lead to  war? Do you think this is in some way a "manipulable" cause of war? Discuss.

o Use the term hawkish to describe leaders who tend to be  suspicious, hostile, and aggressive in foreign affairs and who do  not tend to trust other leaders and rely on diplomacy, tend to see threats as more dire

o Makes leaders feel they have more control than they actually do,  they have a positive illusion that makes them believe they can  win any fight they want to

∙ What is a hawk 

o Someone who might be a bit more suspicious of others  interests on an international stage

∙ What is a bias 

o When you have a bias, you will consistently commit errors  in one direction or another

∙ How might these biases influence foreign policy decision making?

o Need to connect people’s biases to outcomes in  

international relations and war

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∙ Hawkish biases 

o Positive Illusions 

 Parties tend to be overconfident in their abilities, that you are more capable than you are

 If you think the war is going to be over by the fall,  you are likely overconfident

o FAE 

 People make these kinds of errors all the time, bias  we can find across time, space, and ideologies

 Tend to explain other’s behavior as due to personal  disposition or situations

 Can attribute it to the person or the biases that you  might hold, discount roles of other factors

 Tendency to blame people and to not be sympathetic to the situation one might be in

 If we expect a certain type of actions, our expectatios are attributed to disposition

 If something doesn’t fit with preconceived notions of  what should happen, we tend to attribute it to  

situation rater than disposition

 Builds on the feelings about the subject 

∙ If we like a person, we attribute good behavior  

to disposition, bad behavior to a situation

∙ Reverse is true for an adversary 

 Attributions  situational 

 Attributions  disposition  Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) (May lead to this)

 FAE ignores the influence of situation on behavior  and emphasizing personality traits alone

o Illusion of transparency 

 Actors tend to believe that everyone knows what  they are thinking, when others may see you  

differently

 You think everyone knows your thought process,  leading to misunderstandings and hostility

 Presumptions about how well someone knows  

another persons intentions

 Ex: Iraq war 

o Endowment effect/loss aversion/prospect theory 

 Deals with the notion that losses loom larger than  gains

 People tend to worry about loosing something more  than having something, put value on gaining x or  

giving up x instead of having or not having it

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 Once people have something, they value it much  

more and wont give it up as easily

 Loosing $100 hurts more than the pleasure from  

gaining $100

 Status quo bias 

∙ People will choose to keep something they  

already have rather than trader for something  

of equal or only marginally greater value

∙ “The devil you know is better than the devil  

you don’t”

o Risk seeking in losses 

 Most people would choose a small chance that you  can avoid a slightly bigger loss than certainly facing  

a slightly smaller loss, but at the same time, most  

would choose a sure smaller gain than a larger gain  

with a slim possibility of no gain

 Most leaders will choose to fight if there is a small  

chance of escape over surrendering because of this

o Pseudo-certainty 

 Involves multi-stage decisions 

 If there is certainty once the decision gets to a  

second or third stage, most people will choose the  

certain one, even if there are less gains associated  

with it

 If there is only one stage with the same chance of  

gains, most people will choose the smaller chance at  

the bigger gain instead, showing how the stages  

affect these decisions

o Reactive devaluation 

∙ These are hypotheses, want to know how these biases might  contribute to war, there are thousands of variables to contribute,  need to be careful about applying these

*2.) What does Jervis argue­­are beliefs powerful and autonomous causes of behavior or  are they ex post rationalizations for behavior? Explain the difference.

o Beliefs are powerful and autonomous, the attitudes towards  beliefs are expressed in such a way that they need an underlying factor, have the power to convince us that what we are doing is  something completely different from what we are actually doing,  have the capacity for self-deception, makes beliefs filled with  puzzles and ironies

*3.) Name and explain some difficult even sometimes intractable problems about  studying beliefs.

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o Beliefs convey inner states of beings with outside realities, can  urge others to follow them, and have a strong element of  commitment and faith

o Beliefs can be inconsistent, making them difficult to analyze  o Beliefs can form from a multitude of different reasons, need to  understand the environments they come out of and how we  become attached to them

o Beliefs need to be strong so reality does not lead them away  from them

∙ Jervis goes from cold cognitive biases to beliefs, individuals seem wedded to their beliefs, but beliefs could be anything, these  beliefs determine decisions later

∙ Problem with beliefs is that they are hot and motivated instead of cold and cognitive, are influenced by emotions, can be unaware  of the impact, can be half-conscious

∙ Most people that are guided by their beliefs, but are individual  and unpredictable, very hard to show its connected to war, can  be a mess

o With beliefs, people come up with justifications when they apply  them

**4.) In 1980 the idea of cosmic extinction of the dinosaurs 64.98 million years ago was  proposed by Dr. Walter Alvarez, a geologist at the University of California at Berkeley.  He and his colleagues had found unusually large amounts of the rare metal iridium in  sediments laid down at about the time the dinosaurs died out. What happened to  Alvarez’s hypothesis on the cause of the extinction of the dinosaurs? How does this type  of scientific hypothesis testing and theory building parallel the study of war? Fully  explain and discuss.

o There was a lot of debate over the dinosaur’s extinction before  Alvarez’s proposal, and when his was proposed it wasn’t taken  very seriously

o Later more evidence was found and the hypothesis was  repeatedly tested, moving it from a hypothesis to a theory,  making us almost certain that an asteroid at least had a big part  in the extinction of the dinosaurs

o Can test hypothesis with wars when they arise like how the  asteroid hypothesis was tested, need to find evidence  

5.) How was American manhood connected to war in the late 1800's? Discuss.  In other  words­­how was American “manhood” a national security issue in the late 1800’s? To be  clear: briefly describe how “gender convictions” define the contours of U.S. political  culture at that time, strongly impacting U.S. foreign policy.

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o War was treated as an embodiment of manhood and honor at the end of the 1800s, honor was necessary for the male identity o Cuban fights for independence were seen as chivalrous acts, as  they were fighting off Spanish colonizers who were compared to  rapists

o Rhetoric of manhood was used to draw America into the Spanish  American war, many were concerned that if America didn’t go to  war, the country and its leaders would be “soft”, wanted to fight  “savages” in order to restore domestic virtue

6.) Discuss the difference between defensive uses of coercive diplomacy and offensive  uses of coercive diplomacy. Where does deterrence fit? Why does Alexander George  make these distinctions?

o Defensive: effort to persuade an opponent to stop/undue actions  they have already embarked on and to cease aggression  o Offensive: effort to persuade a victim to give up something of  value without putting up resistance, also referred to as a  “blackmail strategy”

o Makes these distinctions because it is useful to distinguish in  order to not have an encompassing term, as he wants to  emphasize a more flexible type of diplomacy, and offensive is not flexible, while defensive can have noncoercive persuasion and  coercive threats embedded in it

o Defensive: effort to persuade an opponent to stop/undue actions  they have already embarked on and to cease aggression  o Offensive: effort to persuade a victim to give up something of  value without putting up resistance, also referred to as a  “blackmail strategy”

o Makes these distinctions because it is useful to distinguish in  order to not have an encompassing term, as he wants to  emphasize a more flexible type of diplomacy, and offensive is not flexible, while defensive can have noncoercive persuasion and  coercive threats embedded in it

7.) What is the difference between an ultimatum and a tacit ultimatum? 

o Full fledged ultimatum includes a demand on the opponent, a  time limit/sense of urgency for compliance, a threat of  punishment for noncompliance that is credible and helps sway an opponent to compliance

o Tacit ultimatums can either leave out a time limit but keep the  sense of urgency or not set forth a specific punishment while still

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credibly portraying that you can and will punish for  

noncompliance

Week 2:

*1) Barry Posen writes: "Most soldiers and many civilians are intuitively attracted to the  offense as somehow the stronger form of war. ..." He goes on to argue that Clausewitz  has been misconstrued as an "apostle of the offensive." He asks; "what accounts for such  systematic misinterpretation [of Clausewitz]?" He argues that "Organization Theory"  explains this preference for the offense. Explain Posen's version of Organization theory  and how/why it predicts a preference for offensive strategies.

**(Quiz Phrasing) Dr Barry Posen explains many reasons why military organizations  prefer Offensive Military Doctrines over defensive or deterrent doctrines.  Across many  states and centuries we see this general tendency is true.  Why?

∙ Militaries prefer offensive doctrines, as they reduce uncertainty  by engaging in their own standard scenarios, can catch enemies  off guard, can engage in punishment warfare and try to break  enemy’s will, help increase organizational size and wealth,  enhances military autonomy, can be favorable with geography  (but can also backfire when geography is underestimated,  treacherous terrain)

∙ War is a political instrument, but specialization between soldiers  and statesmen and soldier’s tendency to seek independence  from civilian affairs make it so soldiers wont go out of their way  to reconcile state policy, military organizations often become  reluctant to share information with civilians, and the priorities set by the military are key in integration to political instruments

∙ Most propositions about military innovation are negative because of the institutionalization process, doctrinal innovation provides  more uncertainty, it is rarely spurred by new technology, and it  can be caused by another state’s combat experience, direct  combat experience, failure on the battlefield, or civilian  intervention

*2.) What is "Balance­of­Power" theory and what does it predict for military doctrines?  Why?

∙ In terms of offense, defense, and deterrents 

o Predicts heterogeneity, as offensive doctrines will be  preferred by expansionist states, states predicting high  collateral damage from war, states that have a waning  

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power position, states that face several adversaries, states  that are geographically encircled, states without allies, and states with widely distributed security dependencies, can  engage in preventative war and exploit this power for  diplomacy this way

o States with far flung security dependencies and small  states tend to prefer deterrent doctrines, as their  

capabilities and supports may not allow for any other  doctrine and may provide military stability

o Coalition warfare and status quo states is can lead  to/prefers defensive doctrines, permits a pace of warfare,  can use geography and tech to your advantage  

*3.) John Owen explains what the "Democratic Peace" is, and proposes a theoretical  explanation for this quantitative finding of "peace among Democracies." What is the  "Democratic Peace"? Are democracies more peaceful than non­democracies?

∙ Democratic Peace theory states that democracies promote  peace, as they do not fight against one another

∙ Pathway of liberal democratic peace: 

∙ Democratic Peace: Liberal states will trust other states they  consider liberal and mistrust states they consider illiberal, and  when they see a state becoming liberal they expect to have  peaceful relations with it, leading to them to ally with other  liberal states as they claim they share the same worldview and  means for achieving that worldview, and these assessments of  foreign states will not change during crises unless the institutions of a foreign state changes, meaning its institutions will pursue  peaceful resolutions if the crisis is with another liberal state and  will pursue war if the crisis is with an illiberal state, as statesmen  will still follow liberal policies

∙ “Zone of Peace” 

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o Concept that democratic states haven’t fought 

o Democracies tend to not get into conflicts with each other ∙ Development and war 

o Developing states tend to have more conflict than states  that are fully developed

∙ Democratic peace 

o Democracies seldom (if ever) go to war against each other o “Closest thing to an empirical law in the study of  international relations” – Levy

o “Democracies don’t attack each other” – President Clinton o Should the US “spread” democracy to promote peace ∙ Three attacks on proposition 

o How do we define democracy? How do we define war?  o Are wars so rare that an absence of war is unsurprising?  Number is small enough that random chance could  account for this

 Could be just as likely that states whose names start  with K don’t go to war

o No convincing theoretical foundation? No known causal  mechanism

∙ Structural and normative theories 

o Structural 

 Institutions constraints within democracies make  them more peaceful, as people say no blood and  

treasure for war

 Not enough, assumes civilians don’t want war 

 Democratic institutions can exist in non-democratic  states

o Normative 

 Idea or “norms” of democratic states make them  more peaceful – it is unjust and or imprudent to fight, practice compromise within their own boarders

 Criticism that this would also apply to conflicts with  non-democracies if this were true

∙ Statistical correlations 

o Both have weak statistical support 

o Owen uses process tracing 

 Looked at the mechanics through detailed case  

studies

o If this theory is true, then what else should be happening  Id it were all about institutions, we would see  

institutions always having a pacifying effect  

regardless of who the state was in conflict with

o Process tracing of a dozen cases revealed many problems 23

 Democratic structures nearly as likely to drive states  to war as to restrain them as cabinets, legislatures,  

and publics were often more belligerent than the  

government heads

 Normative theory neglected to take perceptions into  account, did actors at the time perceive the other  

state to be a liberal democracy even if coded so  

today

∙ Full explanation for democratic peace 

o Neither structures or norms by themselves explains  democratic peace, but the two in tandem can be a  

powerful force

o Some of the cases suggest such a synergy, but only when  perceptions are taken into account

o Liberalism is a powerful “second force”, prodding  

democracies toward peace with each other and toward war with non-democracies

∙ Illiberal democracies and perceptions 

o Athenians were democratic, but not liberal, as they valued  heroism and conquest over self preservation and well  being

**4.) According to Owen, how exactly does liberalism produce a democratic peace?  What are structural theories for the democratic peace, and what are normative theories for the democratic peace?

∙ Argues that liberal ideals cause liberal democracies to align with  one another and tend away from war with each other while  simultaneously prodding them into war with illiberal states

∙ Liberalism wants freedom, which is best produced in times of  peace, so liberals tend to shy away from war, must recognize  other states as democratic for this to work

∙ Liberal ideals contribute to a separation based on ideologies  between nations, states distinguished according to their regime  type, more tolerant of its own kind than other systems and  opposes war with other liberal states, since they believe they  know the intentions of other liberal democracies, illiberal states  are viewed as unpredictable and dangerous because of this

*5.) What is the importance of perceptions for the democratic peace, according to Owen?

∙ Liberal democracies must perceive other states to be liberal  democracies in order to trust them and align with them, must  consider a foreign state a liberal democracy

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∙ Ex: After WWI, both France and Germany had liberal  constitutions, but since France did not see Germany as able to  achieve a liberal democracy, they did not trust Germany and  went to war with them later

*6.) How does Layne argue that the Democratic Peace is a Myth? List and explain his  best arguments.

∙ Focuses on the theory’s causal logic and uses empirical  evidence, focuses both on DPT and Realism to see which is more  robust, uses cases of democratic powers nearly going to war

∙ If democratic peace was driven by public opinion, democracies  would not go to war with any state, not just fellow democracies,  this isn’t an inhibitor of war but also not usually a cause

∙ Checks and balances cant explain it either because it is not  exclusive to democracy, even though it is associated with it ∙ For democratic peace theory to hold up in near misses, the public must not want to go to war, policy elites should refrain from  making military threats, and democracies should accommodate  each other in crises

**7.) What case studies do Owen and Layne both examine? What evidence about these  cases is most convincing?

∙ US – Britain 1861 

o Owen 

 Lincoln backed down to British ultimatums because  the Union was already fighting for its life

 British public was unsympathetic to cause of  

restoring the Union, but were sympathetic to the  

abolition of slavery, so when emancipation  

proclamation was issued, the British flipped from the  

Confederate side to the Union side, as they believed  

the Union had liberal ends to their means in the war,  

and public opinion made British intervention  

impossible

o Layne 

 British public overcome with war fervor during the  

crisis and the government used many military threats

and ultimatums against the Union, believed the  

Union would only give into threats of force

 Britain saw their interests at stake, so they were firm  in their threats, giving the Union little breathing  

room, and they also shipped many troops to Canada  

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in preparation of war, as they believed war would  

result in the utter destruction of North America

 Many Americans saw British neutrality as a  

recognition of Confederate independence and were  

angry at Britain because of it

 US only submitted to British demands because they  could not afford a simultaneous war and because  

France supported Britain’s demands, as war would  

almost certainly mean the end of the Union, securing

the South’s independence

Week 3: Realism and the Security Dilemma:

**1.) What are the four types of realism? Explain each and crucial differences between  them.

∙ Realism argues that international politics is shaped by states  pursuit of power and by the (perceived) distribution of power ∙ Type 1 Realism –system level theory 

o Classical Realism 

 States seek power as a prime goal for reasons rooted in human nature and scarcity

∙ States fight over resources to survive, as there  

aren’t enough for everyone  

∙ After WWII, Hans Morgenthau describes human

nature as nasty in a post-Hitler world

 Locates causes of war largely in the power drive and  in situations where states enjoy greater or lesser  

privilege than their power could justify

∙ Sometimes seek power for power’s sake, never

enough power so you are never fully secure

∙ Type II Realism 

o Neorealism or Structural realism 

 Posits that states seek security as a prime goal for  reasons rooted in the anarchic nature of the  

international system

∙ No police force, overall government, best is the

UN where there is no army, can set up rules for

states

∙ UN has a lot of rule, but a lot of realists argue  

that the great powers only have to abide by  

them when they want to

 Located causes of war in the “gross structure of  

international power

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∙ Type II A 

o Bipolar international systems are more  

stable than multipolar system

o Two great powers, or superpowers,  

dominate the system

o Ex: Cold War 

∙ Type II B 

o Multipolar international systems are more

stable than bipolar systems

o Three or more great powers jockey for  

power and allies through a combination  

of international and external balancing

∙ Not a manipulable world, many argue that this  

doesn’t matter, but contexts within the  

systems matter, not as useful anymore

∙ Internal balancing 

o Build up power, especially military  

capability within a state

o Depends on a states capabilities, security 

∙ External balancing 

o Increase power through alliances 

∙ Type III Realism 

o Fine grained structural realism 

o Based on the idea that states seek security, and once they  have security, they could go with the status quo or  

aggression

o Locates the causes of war in a fine grained structure of  power

 Offense-defense balance 

∙ Does offense or defense have the advantage? 

∙ Deterrence differentiates from this, defend  

yourself through punishment, whoever strikes  

first will be punished

 Size of first move advantages 

∙ Can a first move win the war? 

∙ If so, war is much more likely 

 Size and frequency of power fluctuations 

∙ If power fluctuates frequently, then people  

overestimate their first strike situations

∙ Also have to be weary of tech breakthroughs  

like this

 Cumulativity of resources 

∙ Will you gain a lot of resources that make you a

lot more powerful?

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o Power depends on your technology, geography, resources,  and doctrine

 Can you distinguish 

∙ Offensive power from defensive power 

∙ First strike from retaliation 

∙ Rising power vs waning power 

∙ Cumulativity of resources 

∙ Type IV Realism 

o Misperceived fine grain structural realism 

o Main cause of war is the misperceptions of the fine grain  complex

 States exaggerate offense 

∙ Even today, we think we can do a bloody nose  

strategy and have a quick war

∙ WWI: Schleffen plan to take out France, felt  

they desperately needed a plan and told  

themselves they have a good plan, even  

though it was not a good plan, just tailored to  

leaders beliefs that they needed to go to war

 States see big first move advantages 

∙ People think they can win the war with a quick  

move, when this is seen as more possible, war  

happens

 States misperceive power fluctuations 

∙ States think they might be killed if they did not  

attack first or go to war

 States misperceive cumulativity of resources 

∙ States think they are in dire need of resources  

when they don’t need them as much

*2.) Is war more likely when conquest is easy? Explain at least three of the hypotheses  Van Evera offers for arguing how war is more likely when conquest is easy, i.e.  explaining the power of offense­defense theory.

∙ War is far more likely when conquest is easy and there is a  perception of offensive dominance, raises the same dangers  even without the reality

∙ Hypotheses 

o Opportunistic expansion 

 When conquest is easy aggression is more alluring,  as there is less fear of reprisal as states win more  

wars more decisively, leaving victims with less of a  

capability for retaliation

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 States are still deterred from attacking if another  state’s defense is strong

o Defensive expansion 

 States with less secure boarders will seek expansion  if conquest is easy and seek wide territories to  bolster their security, often trying to weaken the  strength of neighboring states in the process

o Fierce resistance to expansion by other states  States resist the expansion of other states if  conquest is easy, might try to pre-emptively attack  aggressive states if they have the abilities to

o Moving first is more rewarding 

 The incentive to strike first provides larger rewards  and less dangers, so a surprise strike shifts the focus  of the war to the attacker’s advantage

 States often grow trigger happy to deny their  opponent the same chance to strike first

o Windows are larger and more dangerous 

 States are more likely to engage in preventative war  to keep down states on the rise, as with the use of  force rising states can be overrun with greater ease

 This makes all international change dangerous if  conquest is easy, as any tip of the scales can make  states think about preventative war

o Faits accomplis are more common and more dangerous  When conquest is easy states are more likely to  adopt “done deal” fait accomplis tactics, as states  move to war thinking victory is the only possibility,  often overestimating their chances and planning  these wars in secret, raising the risk for flawed  policies

 The state cannot retreat from these wars without  losing face, and often stay in these wars because  they promised spoils, and loosing can spell leader’s  doom

o States negotiate less and reach fewer agreements  States have less faith in agreements when conquest  is easy, as they bargain harder and are less likely to  concede, resulting in fewer disputes being settled  Is also hard to verify compliance with agreements if  offense is dominant, as smaller violations can have  bigger security implications and the offensive state  tends to be more secretive

o Secrecy is more common and more dangerous 29

 An information advantage and secretive policies  

have greater advantages for offensive states when  

conquest is easy, and disadvantages are more  

dangerous, making states compete for information

 Can lead to opponents to underestimate the other’s  capabilities and cause false optimism among  

attackers and delays to other state’s military  

buildups

o More intense arms racing 

 States have more incentives to build larger forces  

when the offense is strong, so arms races heat up

 Many bullet points to why on the reading that I’m not writing here

o Offense grows even stronger 

 States grow more offensive equipment when the  

offense is stronger, building it up even further and  

causing more offensive dominance

 Alliances grow more offensive characteristics and  

adopt purely offensive military doctrines, making  

allies feel freer to go to war

*3.) What is the “Security Dilemma” and when is cooperation most possible under the  security dilemma? Discuss as thoroughly as possible.

∙ In the anarchic international system, many states are very self  aware and concerned about the actions of other states, may fear  other states will become dissatisfied with the status quo and  defect and may try to protect their possessions by seeking to  control resources outside of their territory, and while taking  action to provide for their own security, states can make other  states less secure

∙ States can 

o Cooperate in disarment 

o Maintain a high level of arms while other states are  disarmed

o Participate in an arms race while having a high risk of war o Be disarmed while others are armed 

∙ States are most immediately concerned by potential direct  attacks, often seek to control or neutralize borders

∙ Central point is that the increase in one state’s security is a  decrease to other state’s security

*4.) Be sure you can fill in and explain a security dilemma chart.

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∙ Jervis: The central theme of international relations is tragedy, not evil. The desire for self-preservation leads to competition for  security. Even though states often share common interests, the  structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about a  mutually desired situation

∙ We fight people because we fear what they might do to us, what  they are up to

∙ Under certain conditions (often, bout only sometimes), an  increase in one states security decreases the security of  others

∙ Why a dilemma? 

o When this is true, even status quo powers attempting to  gain security can end up in a spiral of militarization,  

making those powers less secure over time

∙ Two crucial variables 

o Can defensive weapons be distinguished from offensive  weapons?

o Does the defense or the offense have the advantage? 

∙ If the offense is not distinguishable, a security dilemma is unavoidable, but if it is, you can avoid it but aggression is possible

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If defense has the advantage, there could be a dilemma, but the possibility is still there for compatibility

5.) Discuss “Force and Anarchy.” In international relations—what is anarchy and how is  force especially integral to foreign policy because of anarchy? Explain what is meant by  “the peaceful use of military power is akin to a gravitational field among large objects in  space.”

6.) What is meant by the argument that “force is fungible” in international relations?  Discuss what Robert Art argues is the conventional view versus his view.

∙ Force is integral to the crafting of states because international  politics are anarchic

∙ Wealth, Political skill, and military force are fungible on the  international stage because

o Wealth is easy to convert into money, so you can buy  whatever you need

o Political skill can operate in different policy realms, can sell  free trade agreements, wars, alliances, etc

o Military force is integral to politics, so it is fungible since its presence can cause actors to rethink their strategies,  greater amounts of it can increase this fungibility, can  produce effects outside of the military domain

∙ Military force can be fungible in two ways 

o Spill over effects 

 Military power encounters military power, and the  

encounter has significant consequences for  

nonmilitary matters, force is used against force and  

creates a political shock wave

o Linkage politics 

 Military power is deliberately linked to a nonmilitary  issue with the purpose of strengthening a states  

bargaining position, force is linked with another  

issue, as states are always trying to make the best  

deals for themselves

*7.) According to Jervis (~ p.62), decision makers beliefs about nuclear weapons are very important. Jervis argues: "If most American spokesmen were to take the position that a  secure second­strike capability was sufficient and that increments over that (short of a  first­strike capability) would only be a waste of money .... Although the Russians stress  war­fighting ability... [this type of argument could be countered ....] by an American  assertion that this is nonsense." What is Jervis arguing? Fully explain and discuss.

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∙ The perceptions of other nations effect the conflict, and those  can be impacted by policies and statements, and the belief that  you have nuclear superiority is an important bargaining chip

∙ With beliefs, neither side can have limited nuclear options unless it is confident that the other accepts the rules of the game ∙ As long as states believe that all that they need is second strike  capabilities, then the differentiation between offensive and  defensive forces allows each side to increase its security without  menacing the other, and removes the incentives for status quo  powers to engage in arms races

8.) According to Betts­­what is the "Lost Logic of Deterrence"? How is the U.S. doing  too much deterrence with Russia? How is the U.S. not relying on deterrence enough with  Iran? How is the U.S. practicing "ambivalent deterrence" with China?  What are the  dangers and what are the solutions? Why does Washington finesse the issues?

Week 4: Myths of Empire & Misperceptions:

*1.) There are three possible sources of state misperceptions: opacity, psychological  sources, and domestic politics. Describe each of these possible sources, giving examples  of each, as much as you can.

o Opacity

 International system is opaque

 Don’t know what other states are up to, don’t know how many bombs  North Korea has

 Cant know everything going on in another states

o Capabilities of others are uncertain

 Tech changes

∙ Does our missile defense work?

 Doctrines are often secret

∙ Don’t want to provoke something and pretend, need to prepare 

for every possibility

 Readiness is difficult to measure

∙ Try to catch the other side before they are ready, is why first 

strikes are so important

∙ Are your offensive capabilities ready? Can you wipe it out

 Will is impossible to measure

∙ Is the other side going to kill you or are they ready to cave

∙ Racism and nationalism often cloud judgment

∙ Many attacks have happened in the modern age as others 

thought powers did not want to get into a fight when they 

ended up getting into the fight

o Intentions of others are uncertain

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 Secrecy is often necessary

∙ Need to keep your best plans secret

 States often do not know their intentions

∙ Are states bluffing?

∙ Do other leaders want to wipe us out?

 States cannot know their future intentions

o Worst case analysis is deemed necessary, as planning for it aggravates the  security dilemma

o Diplomacy is very difficult

 Hard to do with a lot of secrecy and mistrust, cant know first offer and  final offers

∙ Psychology

o Appeal of psychology

 Regular patterns of error found in labs

 Insufficient info does not explain systematic error

o Bad Social Science?

 Borrowing half a theory? Misapplying an individual level theory to a  group problem?

o Motivational theories

 Psychology of emotions, clearly relevant, no systematic predictions  Any leader in a crisis can have emotional problems that could cause  war

∙ Domestic Politics

o Many theories – which are the best?

o Five leading theories – all lead to the exaggeration of threats

 Militarism

∙ When a society becomes more militarized, war becomes much  more likely

∙ Militaries are large organizations

∙ Organization theory describes common behaviors of all 

organizations

∙ Militaries are subject to same pathologies as all organizations,  maybe even more so

∙ War can be a first resort, not a last resort, as great powers and  insecure states become militarized

∙ What perceptions to militaries purvey

o Others are hostile, often have no check on this, but 

often allies think you are overreacting

o Threats and force work, don’t see it as much now, but 

saw it a lot historically, before WWI

o War is cheap, easy, beneficial, its fun to join the 

military

∙ What states are prone to militarism

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o Big states, insecure states, states, whose militaries form  a separate society

o All big states do this

∙ What forces counter militarism

o Outside experts

o Academia

o Peace groups

o Politicians

o All weak counters, should be some in political parties  Nationalism

∙ Caused by civilian elites pumping up the country, often teams  up with militarism

∙ Nationalist myths often exaggerate external threats

o French better than British, vice versa, etc, cheering for  the home team

o Very manipulable, went away in Europe after WWII o Civilian lead, but militaries still use it

∙ Where does nationalism come from

∙ States and societies are organizations too

o Want to maximize size and wealth

o Want to conserve essence, autonomy, control, task 

environments, prestige

∙ Nationalism in education

o “Value infusion”

o Self glorifying, self­whitewashing, other­maligning 

myths

o In Europe, check each other’s textbooks so they don’t  think they are better than one another, so this is not a 

problem

∙ Nationalism in politics

o Vote for me because I’m the most patriotic (who cares  what else I stand for)

o Pay taxes, join the army, because you are a lucky 

member of the greatest, most special club on earth

o Has lead to civil wars in the past

∙ Nationalism leads to “non­self evaluation”

o Powerful politicians prefer not to be criticized, can call  critics “unpatriotic

o Punish whistleblowers – expunge evaluators 

 Parochial interests/logrolling

∙ Instead of a whole society being militarized, have bureocracies  with special interests that can favor imperialism and war, as  they can agree on a plan

 Oversell

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∙ Leaders are incentivized to overexaggerate threats to pass their 

policies

 Electoral politics

∙ Full of war talk and hawkish talk

∙ Fears of foreign threats often used to win elections

∙ Diversions from other issues

∙ Fear is often very partisan

∙ Height of public fear coincides with elections, not events

∙ Politicians join with the military

*2.)What is the imperial myth of “bandwagons”? Fully explain, and give examples that  you explain.

 See in NK question

*3.) What is the imperial myth of “paper tiger enemies”? Fully explain, and give  examples that you explain.

 See in NK question

*4.)What is the imperial myth of “big stick diplomacy”? Fully explain, and give  examples that you explain.

∙ See in NK question

*5.) What is the imperial myth of “Falling dominoes”? Fully explain, and give examples  that you explain.

∙ See in NK question

**6.) Snyder argues: "Great powers in the industrial age have shown a striking proclivity  for self­inflicted wounds. Highly advanced societies with a great deal to lose have  sacrificed their blood and treasure, sometimes risking the survival of their states, as a  consequence of their overly aggressive foreign policies." Snyder goes on to explain this  tendency toward "overexpansion." What is his argument? Describe it as fully and  precisely as you can.

*7.) Jervis offers a list of "Hypotheses on Misperception." Explain two of his hypotheses  and how states may be prone to these misperceptions.

 See in NK question

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8.) Can you match up a Jervis "hypothesis" of misperception with a Snyder "myth of  empire" and explain how these authors offer competing explanations for the same state  misperception?

∙ See in NK question

Week 5: World War I:

1,) What does Mombauer argue were the long term causes of World War One, and what  were the short term causes?

∙ Long term 

o Germany’s “Place in the sun” 

 Germany wanted colonies to confirm its status as a  world power and to reflect its economic strength

 Germany challenged many neighbors because of  

this, causing those neighbors to form defensive  

alliances, such as the Franco-Russian alliance, which  

made Germany feel encircled

 Powerful navy seen as a prerequisite to this, so they  challenged British naval superiority, spurring naval  

race between the two

o Competing alliances 

 Triple Alliance 

∙ Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy 

 Entente Cordiale 

∙ Britain, France, and Russia 

∙ Triple Entente stood in sharp contrast to Triple  

Alliance

∙ Britain joined because of the German challenge

to their naval superiority, making them feel  

threatened  

 Any conflict between these two alliances stood to  

embroil Europe

o Deteriorating Anglo-German relations 

 Naval arms race that Germany refused to stop 

 German unwillingness to compromise led to British  belief that they wanted permission to attack France  

and Russia

∙ Short term 

o Moroccan Crisis 

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 In the wake of the Russo-Japanese war, where Russia  lost and was seen as a waning power

 Germany testing the strength of the Triple Entente  alliance, wanted the world to know that they could  

not be passed over when making important colonial  

decisions, wanted a diplomatic victory and to prevent

the consolidation of Entente power

 German tactics didn’t work, rest of Europe now sees  them as an aggressive bully

o Balkan Crisis 

 Frequent crises in the Balkans before 1914 

 Russia saw itself as the guardian of the rebellious  

Slavic states against the waning Austria-Hungarians

 Germany pledged unconditional support to Austria Hungary

 Serbia doubled in size, posing a greater threat to  

Austria-Hungary

*2.) What was the "cult of the offensive" before World War I and what caused it?

∙ Defensive military tech should have made WWI Europe a model  of stability, but offensive military doctrines defied this and made  Europe spiral into war, huge advantage to entrenched defenses

∙ Offense was encouraged because it was believed that conqering  could solve institutional problems in the government, offense  helped the military preserve its autonomy

∙ War was caused by the erroneous belief that a disarming first  blow is feasible and necessary to ensure the attacker’s stability ∙ Offensive plans cause states adopting them to be vulnerable and fearful, Germany left this way with the Schleiffen Plan ∙ Belief that war would solve political problems that diplomats  could not solve

∙ Schleiffen Plan rested on a window of opportunity for Germany  where they had an opening to attack, knew the pitfalls for it but  sold it to work under the right circumstances, needed it due to  organizational interests

∙ Germans wanted a major victory and did not care if it came  through diplomacy, a continental war, or anything in between,  making war a lot more likely

∙ Doctrines became unhinged from strategic realities due to the  heavily offensive tenants in it that could only work in specific  situations

∙ Everyone who launched the war thought they could win, and were all out of  power by the end of it, all monarchies gone

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∙ A lot of leaders did not imagine what would happen, how close could you get,  misperceptions of when war would be launched

∙ Next generations in Britain and France determined not to go to war again after it

**3.) What was the War Council of 8 December 1912? What happened? What is the  controversy over this "evidence"?

o German expansion – how expansionist was Germany?

 They believed in big stick ideas, Germany created different crises, being  tough made you win stuff – risk theory

 Based on idea that Germany was expansionist, but people believed they  were being encircled by vicious Russia and France, although they did not  ally until they saw Germany being expansionist, encirclement was a  German myth – Fisher theory

 Wanted pan­Germanism, thought you couldn’t survive if you didn’t  expand

 Many assumed it was going on until Immanuel Guice proved it with the  War council Document of December 8th 1912

∙ Bargain between the Navy and the Army

∙ Navy wants more time to deal with Britain

∙ Army wants to attack while France and Russia are relatively weak ∙ Force the July crisis when the opportunity presented itself

∙ Wanted to make a power out of middle Europa, wanted huge 

colonies in Africa, talked about it as Germany’s destiny, talked like

this into the war

∙ Now a lot of people blame Germany for the war because of this

**4.) Explain what happened in the "July Crisis" of 1914? Who went first? Who had the  "last clear chance" to prevent war?

∙ Franz Ferdinand assassinated on June 28th 1914 

∙ Many desperately trying to avoid war until the last second ∙ Austria-Hungary saw it as a good excuse to go to war with  Serbia, but many today saw German influence at play there, as  the Germans were happy to risk a larger European crisis, gave  Austria-Hungary a blank check for war, resulting in an ultimatum  on Serbia that was deliberately unacceptable, with non  compliance leading to war, but Serbia accepted on all but one  point, making Austria’s refusal suspicious

∙ The Germans only tried to restrain the Austrians once it would be clear that Britain would be involved in any European conflict,  resulting in Austria-Hungary declaring war, resulting in a German invasion of Belgium, and Britain declaring war on Germany ∙ Three Images of the July Crisis

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o The July Crisis was inadvertent – no one wanted war

 Not as likely if we open up German archives, popular before that o The July Crisis was engineered by Germany – Germany sought a  diplomatic crisis victory, or a limited smashing of Serbia by Austria, but  no wider war

 Quick victory to gain more power and influence

o The July Crisis and the War were engineered – Germany sought and  desired both

 Many leaders believed war was inevitable in Germany, attack now  before Russia gets too strong

 All countries had interlocking offensive war plans

 Look for evidence for this in the Fisher school, Britain screws up  this scenario

 What were German desires? Did they want a continental war? Did  they want World War and to take on Britain too?

 German leaders saying it would be a summer war since they had a  big army to fight two sides with

*5.) What is “fine­grained structural Realism” (Type III) and then what is Type IV  Realism? After fully explaining these, briefly discuss them in relation to World War I as  much as you can.

∙ See Realism above

∙ WWI 

o Type III 

 Germany seeked security and had it as a rising  

power, but was aggressive and seeked even more  

security

 Defense had the advantage 

 Every state had a first move plan, with Schleffen Plan and Plan 17 being examples

 Power fluctuating, as powers like Germany rising and  powers like Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary  

waning

 Germany had the best tech, million man armies that  they were willing to go to war with

o Type IV 

 Everyone thought offense was the best strategy  

when all of the new tech such as railroads and  

machine guns were defensive

 Schleffen Plan and Plan 17 were inflexible bloody  

nose plans that leaders thought could win the war in  

one strike, even though they could not, states saw  

big first move advantages due to cult of the offensive

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 Germans feared being encircled, so they were very  willing to go to war while France and Russia were  

weakened, even though the two countries weren’t a  huge threat to them

 Germany felt it needed a “place in the sun” and to  have colonies to be respected as a great power, or  

they would die from encirclement, so they were very  aggressive and willing to go to war

∙ What can we learn from this? What could we have changed and manipulated o Multipolar structure of power

 How this structures war

 Locks you into non­manipulable causes, cannot manipulate so  many powers

 German tested Russia over Serbia, did not think they would side  with Serbia

 Germany thought Britain would be neutral, did not want to 

encourage war but was still loyal to Belgium

 Diplomatically places a lot of weight on the last immediate causes  and the July crisis, as long as they structure

 Not all multipolar systems are this unstable, but all sides believed  in offense in this age

o Fine grained structure of power (type III) and misperceptions (IV)  Offensive dominance

∙ All countries saw the world as dominated by the offense

∙ Why?

o In age of trains, machine guns, and trenches

o No one outside the military thought this was true, 

not enough civilian oversight

o Leaders knew offense wouldn’t happen, so they 

thought the other side would back off if things got 

too aggressive

 Windows

∙ Germany sees a “window of opportunity” against Russia 

and France, which feels it is rapidly closing

o When a window is closing, people get desperate and

are willing to take a chance

∙ Germany sees a window in the July crisis of Britain 

possibly being neutral because Russia mobilized first

o

∙ Russia saw a window of gaining Balkan territory

 First move advantages

∙ All countries fear the possibility of others gaining a first 

mobilization advantage, so none want to loose it

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o Factor in offense dominance

o Sometimes true, often misperceived

 Culmulativity of resources

∙ All countries see resources as highly cumulative, the 

relatively small loss/gain of Serbia seen as critical to both 

alliances, as the loss/gain of resources over time is seen as 

highly determinative of survival

∙ Can cause launches on warnings

 False optimism

∙ All sides believed the war would be short and glorious

∙ Foreseeable outcome outside of the military

∙ Dyadic interactions (IV)

o Security dilemma

 Germany’s encirclement perceived

 Russia’s view of Germany

o Spiral/Deterrence

 Germany believed in big stick, gains through crises, led to self encirclement, tons of distrust

 If Germany had appeases the Entente, would France and Russia  have taken advantage of them?

 Did Britain fail to deter Germany

∙ State Level (III)

∙ States were somewhere between democracy and authoritarian, were led by  illegitimate elites, leading to 

o Militarism

 Lack of real civilian control since late 1800s

 Militaries unchecked and out of control, no one understood their  plans

o Hyper­nationalism

 States completely infected with hyper nationalism, nationalist  myths are pervasive

o Led to cult of the offensive, leading to the war

o State wide misperceptions were ubiquitous and profound, blinding states  and making them believe they were superior

o Economic interdependence: Did it cause or almost stop the war, a test of  the theory

∙ Government decision making (II)

o Civil military relations so far askew that states are not rational o Organization theory helps explain the militarism and nationalism that  characterize the state

∙ The Individual (I)

o Bungled diplomacy due to personality types, could leaders have made  fewer errors? Many people think so, but is it just a symptom of offense 

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dominance. This argument places more weight on the July Crisis – the  immediate causes of the war over the root causes

*6.) What events of the July Crisis were most important for the outbreak of the war?

o June 28 ­ August 4 1914, immediate causes of WWI

o Who had the last clear chance to cause peace

o No one thought they were going to war even as the events unfolded o Why did actors cause the war? What beliefs made them go to war? Were they  fearful? Were they expansionist? Were they both? Were they expecting to cause a war?

o The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

 Ferdinand was a pacifist, one of the last chance diplomat for peace  Trying to keep peace in the Balkans

 Gets assassinated by the Black Hand group of Serbia, which may have  been backed by the Serbian government

 The perfect crisis for Germany, could smash Serbia and bolster Austria Hungary without bringing Britain in

o Germany gives the Austrians a blank check to go to war, give them justification to go to war with Serbia, but Austria hesitates but are pushed into it by Germany,  seen as good for their alliance

o Germans thought Russians would not get involved in Serbia, as they did not want  war now, but the Czar said they wouldn’t sit by if Serbia was attacked o Most evidence thought the British wouldn’t have intervened in a Serbian war, but  they would have in Belgium

o Army wanted a continental war, Kaiser did not, preferred outcome was a crisis  victory, not clear on whether they wanted a war, but next preferred outcome was a continental war, then to stop the crisis before Britain was involved

o Army prevailed in a confrontation at the end of July

o Austrian Ultimatum

July 23rd 

∙ Vienna sends an ultimatum to Serbia with a 2 day deadline that is  designed to be impossible to accept

∙ Plan when it was not fully expected was to smash the Serbians, but not to annex, did not want more slavs in the empire

July 25th 

∙ Serbia carefully worded a reply that accepted all the demands 

except Austrian supervision, and mobilized the army because they 

knew war was likely

 Austria mobilized promptly, all mobilize in response, leaders don’t  understand that mobilization meant war

 Russia ordered preliminary mobilization on July 25th before the deadline,  never been fully explained, but they knew war was coming, knew 

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Germany was pressing for war, knew they wanted to smash Serbia, but  were unaware that mobilization meant war

 France also began pre­mobilization on July 25th, bit were undetected even  by July 28th 

 Germany could have called in off on the short window of July 25th­30th  British propose mediation in this time frame, but was timed for too late, a  week or two later

 Germany trying to convince Britain that since Russia mobilized first, so  they had to react

 Germany pushed Austria forward, as Moltke sabotaged peace efforts in  Germany by, but Wilhelm and Czar Nicholas thought they could arrange  to stop the crisis as late as August 1st, Moltke told Austria to mobilize and  go to war

 Two different interpretations – Moltke wanted to keep the peace but  thought they needed to mobilize, Moltke saw Russian and French 

mobilization as a chance to go to war

If Germany really wanted to prevent war, they should have backed off  when Russia was mobilizing

*7.) Explain one of the historical controversies surrounding a key event of the July crisis  and how the interpretation of that event determines our understanding of the war.

o Other causes

 British dithering

∙ If Britain sent clear signs to the Germans that war was not ok, they  could have prevented it, but wanted to be an offshore balancing

 Russian mobilization

∙ Had the conviction that war was inevitable since they thought 

Germany was upset with Russian mobilization, had false reports 

that German mobilization had begun, needed to mobilize first to 

keep up with the Germans

 Belief in secret mobilization, as they believed Germany could do this, as  Britain would not take France and Russia’s side if they went first

*8.) Describe the mismatch between military strategy and diplomacy in Germany. Were  German civilian leaders hell­bent on overturning the continental balance of power? Or  were the civilian leaders most interested in calculated­risk and brinksmanship? Discuss as much as you can.

o Social Structure and domestic politics

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 Oligarchies feared upheaval

∙ Disparity great between rich vs poor, Marxism very popular in 

them, revolutionary fervor on the streets, so they needed to rely on 

their militaries more, militaries get to do what they want

∙ Elites who ran the military very disconnected, did not know what  their guns did

∙ This is especially present in Germany and Austria­Hungary

 Militarism everywhere – why?

∙ Got to go into schools to teach Germans to grow up to be good 

soldiers, required service, universities had to repeat the truths the 

military wanted

∙ Dangerous to argue that offense is easy, surprise is essential, must  be highly secretive

∙ Surprise offense the way to win despite defensive tech

∙ Germans believe waiving big sticks would make the other side 

fold, created crises to get their way, got their way 3 times before 

WWI\

∙ Believed they needed colonies for their “place in the sun

∙ Told soldiers war would be fun, to be a man you have to prove 

yourself in war, would be a short summer war or else everyone 

would be dead, needed a bloody nose strategy where the enemy 

was deterred against hitting them back

 Nationalism was virulent – infectious, malignant, and poisonous, why? ∙ History lessons were fiction

∙ Military spread nationalist myths in schools through college

∙ Lack of a two sided history

∙ The more nationalist Germany became, the more nationalist France and other powers became, copied Germany

 Lack of independent scholarship

∙ Professors were propagandists for the state or they were fired and  sent away, lost jobs and respect

Week 6: World War II:

*1.)In what ways was “Clio deceived”? (Holger Herwig)  Explain some details.

∙ Germans used “patriotic self-censorship” after WWI to obscure  the origins of it and to make them look like the chief victims of it, purveyed false propaganda starting at its earliest in 1914  concerning the war to make them look more favorable

∙ This censorship exerted a powerful influence to make German  actions leading up to WWI more favorable outside Germany and  even more powerfully inside Germany

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∙ Did this by suppressing scholars, promoting pro-German lessons  up to the collegian level, and underwriting and exporting mass  propaganda

∙ Ideologies promoted by this self censorship gave roots the Nazi  ideology in Germany

∙ German government sought to hide its war guilt, used  publications from Russia to make their position less  incriminating, show that the entente had been preparing for war  with Germany for a long time and to show how Germany could  have felt encircled and that they conducted a “defensive war  against Tsarism”

∙ Government got four scholars who believed in it to sign off on it,  giving their version of history more credibility, but all did it for  patriotic reasons

∙ Were combating allied charged that they had war guilt by trying  to prove that other powers were being aggressive or that they  were simply reacting to external forces, could not pay loans  unless they denied war guilt

∙ Documents published often removed any damaging sections or  sentences, as they could have hurt Germany’s position on the  war or their standings with neutrals, many critical documents  referring to the July crisis were either unpublished, returned to  perpetrators as “private papers” or destroyed

∙ Die Grosse Politik was the think tank that published papers to  make their view favorable, made sure Germany could be  perceived as the victim of Allied aggression, wanted to make  sure the propaganda “would never die”

∙ Government set aside 1 million marks for propaganda 200,000  for international distribution of it, making their view of the war  available en masse, and internally censoring any dissenters

∙ Tons of propagandist literature flooded German schools at all  levels, promoting their view of the history leading up to WWI, as  scholars that promoted other views both inside and outside of  Germany were silenced

∙ ADV promoted things such as organized talks and seminars at  high schools and colleges on the topic of war guilt in order to  instill their vision of history into young minds

∙ Scholars suggested that no single nation was responsible for  WWI, as instead they promoted the idea that Europe get caught  in an “Entanglement of circumstances”  

∙ Scholars also started making the argument that Germany was  defeated in the war due to socialist revolution plans within  Germany, as they were “stabbed in the back” by them and that  the army would have been able to continue the war without them

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∙ Many attempts were made to revise memoirs of WWI to reflect  propaganda, as memoirs of Moltke and other prominent hawks in the Kaiser’s war department were censored or rewritten to reflect the encirclement theory

∙ By undermining the charges of war guilt, Germans felt they could make Versailles less harsh, as that is what happened in the end  while serving national interests

*2.)Where did “Nazism” come from?  Was it the same as Italian  fascism?  Discuss Nazism­­ origins and nature.

∙ German ideas and national policies

o Germans practiced creative history in Weimar era, as German scholars  told and believed lies about

 The origins of WWI (Germany was encircled)

 The causes and responsibility for Germany’s defeat (The Jews and  the socialists did it, not blaming haws who led Germany to defeat 

and then promoted a stab­in­the­back­legend)

 The harshness of the peace (Versailles was Draconian)

 Moral Drawn by Germany (We need a bigger empire to be safe  from our rapacious neighbors)

 Move by the hawks to take power back in Germany by making 

things worse and blaming it on the Weimar Republic

 Germans believed they should have won, continuation of the ideas  of the first world war

o Germans first embraced Nazi like ideas in the 20s, then the Nazis  themselves in the 30s

∙ German Ideas

o Germany is insecure

 Germany can be strangled by cutting off food imports

o An empire is the answer

 Germany needs more territory to be autarkic

o Offense is easy

 Bandwagoning will happen

 Contempt for the Soviet Union

 Invention of the Blitzkrieg

∙ Italy

o Mussolini invented fascism, as his government believed in fake ideas of  how his military worked

 Believed in a gross overestimate of Italian strength

∙ Will prove their strength through conflict

∙ Did not have the same industrial potential as Germany

 Overestimated the value of empire

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∙ Italy would be great if they had colonies, went after 

Ethiopia

 False images of the past 

∙ Believed they won WWI for the Entente and were cheated 

out of their fair share of she spoils, people believed it

 Mussolini was living in a fantasy and the world could see it

3.)What is Blitzkrieg? ­­be very specific­­explain it.  Was it easily adopted? What role did  Manstein play?

∙ Believed it was suicidal to launch a plan that did not ensure  victory, came out of OKH plans that had an Army group B attack  Belgium and an Army group B attack from the south to cover  their flank, wanted deep strategical penetration

∙ Blitzkrieg added large armored panzer units to this, gave Army  group A panzer units

∙ Manstein was the main author of the blitzkrieg proposal Army  group A came up with, which would be used in the attack on the  west

∙ Was not easy to convince much of German army brass that Army group A’s plan was good, but after a plane crash in Belgium with  OKH plans, Manstein was able to convince OKH officers of his  plan, as they adopted the blitzkrieg

∙ Blitzkrieg would have Army group B attack through Belgium,  meeting allied forces that would expect them, then have Army  Group A go through the Ardennes to hit the Allies weak point and flank them, pinning Allied forces against the North Sea

∙ Even after approval of the plan, a small number of senior officers  questioned whether armored forces alone were enough to pierce  the Allied front, as they favored coordination with infantry  divisions

∙ Deterrence was no longer attainable after the adoption of the  blitzkrieg, as the German army believed their victory would be  quick and decisive, abandoning limited aims strategies

4.) Explain Hitler’s “aims”?  Were they clear?  What historical controversies are there about  Hitler's aims?

∙ Mearshimer – wants to have German hegemony in Europe ∙ Found in Mein Kampf, wanted to rule the world and create a  Middle European empire for the German people to live in

5.)The “Hitler Thesis”—that Hitler caused WW II in Europe—has been quite popular.  Name and explain two other contending explanations mentioned in your reading of important causes of  WWII in Europe.

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∙ “Clio deceived thesis” 

∙ “Harshness of Versailles Thesis” - Marks 

6.) Generalissimo of the Allied Armies in France in 1918, Marshal Foch, said of the Treaty of  Versailles, "This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years." How was World War II the  second part of a Thirty Years War?

∙ History was deceived – Clio deceived

o Can just fix our history books and change a lot of this

o Argued that the Germany was really untouched, France turned into rubble, still rebuilding by the time of WWII, but Kaiser resigned and fled, as the  government was re­established as a democracy (the Weimar Republic),  who lost a lot of power in the 20’s

o Ideas that WWI were not defeated, when they start coming back into  power, they change the history books and cleanse their guilt from the  archives, invite western scholars to study these cleansed archives, give  propaganda to their people and he rest of the world

o Illusions replaced reality in Europe’s memory of the first world war 7.) What causes of World War II are opposite of World War I?

∙ Everywhere except Germany, a cult of the defensive emerged, national elites  assumed the offense would be difficult and just result in another stalemate like  WWI

∙ How the storm gathered

o Withdrawal of US, Britain, and the USSR from central European affairs o Germany rose quickly between 1929 and 1938, put 29% of national  income into military, where other countries put in around 5%

o Other countries not in the mood to fight in the wake of WWI, the great  depression

o Hitler wins without war

 Re­militarizes the Rhineland (March 7, 1936)

 Anschluss (union) with Austria (March 11, 1938)

 Sudetenland (Western German speaking Czechoslovakia) (Sept 30  1938)

∙ Czechs did not want this, as all of their defenses were there,

so simultaneously disarmed them

 The rump of Czech state disappears (March 14­15 1939)

∙ Moment where he violates appeasement

 Memel in Lithuania

∙ German success breeds success

o Germans fell more firmly behind Hitler as he succeeded

o Growth of German power happens through increased resources

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o Hitler destroys the credibility of the allies, as people think Britain and  France aren’t going to do anything

∙ Causes?

o International system level

 Type II focused on multipolar systems being unclear, buck 

passing, no one wanted to pay the price of stopping Hitler and 

other aggressors, no one wants to stand up to him

 Offense/Defense theory: The world is dangerous when offense has  the advantage, west did not understand this

 US isolationist was huge, did not know it would get involved until  Pearl Harbor

 Type III says world is dangerous when offense has the advantage  and others don’t appreciate it

 Type IV says that the world misperceived offensive power after  WWII and by not understanding tanks

 Offense was advantageous because others could not/would not  prepare for, Hitler believed in offense and bandwagoning, 

resources were cumulative, believed in windows, as they had a 

fleeting edge, successfully exploited first move advantages, caught  many countries not expecting an invasion, successfully used 

secrecy of plans, biggest reason it worked was because Britain and  France saw defense to be dominant

o Dyadic level

 Deterrence failure

∙ West failed to militarize and counter Hitler

o State level

 Authoritarian regimes are dangerous, secretive, and have 

diversionary wars

 Democracies are naturally too defensive, so have to constantly  make sure they have some militarization

 Germany was a noticeably troubled state, was hype­militarized and believed war was good, should be able to identify and counter this o Government decision making

 Democracies too week in decision making to deter, too politically  divided

 May have, but may have just believed in defensive too much,  believed too much in the power of the defense

o Individual level

 Many people want to blame Hitler

∙ Was key to it, but ideas preceded him and Germany was 

ripe for his ideology

 German character 

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 Germany launched two World Wars, cant be trusted, not prevalent  after Cold War, they are now peacemakers in Europe

Week 7: The Pacific War:

**1.) Was the Japanese decision to attack in 1941 as reckless as it now seems, or can it be regarded as the taking of a justifiable risk in the circumstances in which it was made?

∙ Japan preparing for war at least a decade before Pearl Harbor, wanted war if the  European situation made it feasible and advantageous

∙ Before military government took over with Tojo in 1940, many cabinet leaders in  Japan favored cautious or pacifist foreign policies, extremists able to strengthen  their positions under him

∙ Freezing of Japanese assets and the oil embargo in 1941 made it so any form of  negotiation with the US was impossible, did not want to concede to the US ∙ Some expansionists felt that premature conflict with European powers before  Russian and British defeat would leave it so a turning war tide could result in a  loss of the Japanese empire built up by now

∙ Calculated that with a surprise attack on the US held Pearl Harbor and the  Phillipines, they could achieve conquest of the Dutch East Indies, which was  coveted for oil but too close to the Phillipines, considered more reasonable and  honorable than submitting to sanctions, thought the US would be too preoccupied  with Europe to turn its full attention to Japan, first few months of war made this  seem like the case for them, as victory came easily

∙ Japan overexpanded in the war past the feasible defense perimeter, jeprodizing  areas already captured with economic advantages, did not realize they were in  total war until 1943

2.) Did the European War open a "window of opportunity" for Japan? Explain.

∙ Yes, Japan felt that with the European war, the world powers would be too busy  in their own war to deal with Japanese conquest

∙ Were right, as before the war broke out, only chastised Japan for actions such as  the taking of Manchuria and the rape of Nanking

∙ When France fell and England was on the defensive, Japan saw a window of  opportunity, made a number of aggressive moves into French Indochina and the  Dutch East Indies, as they knew colonial powers couldn’t defend them

∙ Japanese only conquered much of its empire after unexpected Nazi victories in  Europe

3.) The Japanese Army had convinced the Japanese people of some views of the  democratic states that helped lead to war­­discuss these views. 

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∙ Long debate over whether or not to go to war with the US before the attack on  Pearl Harbor, many wanted to avoid war if avoiding it was possible, but Tojo  convinced many that war was inevitable and that they should strike first and  cripple the US, considered a desperate but necessary option after the oil embargo

∙ War seen as an option that would likely end in failure, but considered the best  alternative to giving into US demands

∙ Mutual failure of deterrence 

o US sought to end Japanese expansion without a war in the Pacific o Japan wanted to expand into the Southeast Pacific without American and  European intervention

4.) Describe and discuss the internal security laws instituted in Japan that helped to cause  the Pacific War. How did the government institute education for national conformity?  How was militarism taught in the schools? Discuss.

o State level

 Japan becomes a military led authoritarian state

∙ Extreme militarism

o Know this is problematic and war­like

o Authoritarian led dictators became militarized, 

military had direct access to the emperor

o Society was militarized, war and hypernationalism 

taught as good things in schools

o Japan at war for a long time because of this, 

soldiers could not go home, as they were forced 

culturally and physically, punished with death if 

they went home

∙ Hyper nationalism – total mobilization

**5.) What "Myths of empire" are relevant to the Pacific War? Explain. (Was the  imperial myth of cumulative gains an important cause of the Pacific War? Discuss.)  Paper tiger: Japan thought they could easily win against the US, despite seeing  them as a sleeping giant 

 Domino theory: Japan saw gains and losses as cumulative, as a loss of one thing  would be the loss of its empire 

 Bandwagoning: Aligning with emerging German power for strategic gains 

**6.) Can the spiral model explain the origins of the Pacific War? Step­by­step, apply the model. Is this satisfying? How would Saburo Ienaga argue that this explanation  places too much emphasis on diplomacy?

o Dyadic level

 A double deterrence failure

∙ Spiraled into war due to this

∙ Did economic interdependence lead to war

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∙ Japan does not want war with the US

o Japan wants to avoid war, but sees two options

 Cooperate with the US and Britain to be a 3rd rate power

∙ Refusing to let Japan be a great power in the East

 Fight to gain territory, probably won’t win, but maybe keep 

empire

∙ Take it quickly, them make it too difficult to take back, 

will cut a deal instead

o Why does Japan only see two options

 US offering to keep Manchuria, nothing else, go back to Japan  Where Sagan and Ienaga disagree

 Japan’s oil problem

∙ Trades almost all of its oil with the US, but a lot of oil in 

the British controlled Dutch East Indies, don’t want Japan 

to own it, but took all of their best forces back to Europe to

deal with Hitler, Japanese know this, fleeting window of 

opportunity

∙ Need to take the US owned Philippines or go around them

∙ See a chance to expand and hold

∙ Slipknot tightens

o US and Japan on a collision course

 US knows Japan wants to expand south and capture resources  US maneuvers to deter Japan

∙ Weak sanctions, angered Japan, made them get desperate 

with a chance to get around it

∙ Made Japan very determined and desperate to become 

autarkic, strengthened nationalist right wing, build stronger

military to do so

 Japan moves to French Indochina as soon as Hitler goes into  France, easy jumping off point to the Dutch East Indies

o US increases pressure

 US freezes Japanese assets

∙ Doesn’t stop Japan, but makes them angrier

∙ FDR goes out of DC on diplomatic business, leaves Dean 

Acheson in charge, begins oil embargo,  

 Japan’s war clock starts ticking

∙ Embargo started Japan’s war clock ticking, as they had 

limited oil reserves and would not have enough oil to 

maintain their military and their economy, need even more

oil to still conquer 

∙ They know that we know that they have a clock, much 

tighter than the US estimate

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∙ US is massive in production of power compared to Japan 

huge, a sleeping giant, not being touched, but could 

mobilize

∙ In less than two years after Pearl Harbor, US had 8x the 

spending power production of power, knew they could do 

that if they had to, Japan did not think we could do this, 

thought they could wipe out the Pacific fleet and delay it 

by a decade

∙ Japan goes to war

o US proposes four points

 Wants Japan to give up empire

o Us thinks Japan is bluffing

 A lot of infighting in Japan

 Misunderstands Japanese war plans, could have known

 Discounted idea that Japan would not settle, arrogant and ignored  internal politics

 FDR not focused on Japan, thought he had more time than he did o Konoe resigns, Tojo takes over

 No real negotiation with Tojo, war was coming with military 

leader, but US still thinks it can do diplomacy

 Civilian to military government

o Japan attacks Pearl Harbor – Why?

 Japanese military fully in charge thought they could damage US  forces

 Japan also attacks Dutch East Indies, have huge opportunity, 

offensive advantage perceived at the moment

 World responds to the attack

∙ Britain is relieved, as the US is now with them

∙ US rallies for war

∙ Germany declares war on the US

∙ Ienaga

o Japan a crazy state, could not be reasoned with, so no failure of deterrence since deterrence was not possible

Weeks 8 and 9: The Cold War and the Nuclear Era:  

1.) Explain MAD among Deterrable States­­what are the pacifying effects of MAD  beyond raising the costs of war?

∙ A MAD world with deterrable states is profoundly peaceful,  eliminates many causes of past wars

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∙ States are sensitive to costs, clearly perceive other states  interests and intentions, value conquest less than others value  independence

∙ Use of nukes had very certain results, lowering false optimism, as capacity cannot be misconstrued

∙ First move advantages largely vanish, have little or no reward  under MAD, as surprise largely vanishes too

∙ Windows of opportunity disappear, as rising powers can be  deterred and waning powers still have nukes

∙ Cumulativity of resources is largely reduced, as less can be done  with pre-nuclear forces, with buffer spaces being nonexistent and military bases not being able to do as much, makes less sense to fight for bases and territory

∙ Gives defense a huge advantage, making conquest among great  powers almost impossible

**2.) What are the six alternate worlds Van Evera discusses: PAST, MAD, MARNE,  BAD, WORSE, USA? (Re­written like this: Among the six alternate worlds Van Evera  discusses: PAST, MAD, MARNE, BAD, WORSE, USA—please fully explain MAD,  BAD and USA. Please explain these worlds and which of these worlds have been  pursued by U.S. nuclear policies in the past or currently, which are possible, which is  most desirable and why… discuss fully.)

∙ See alternate world question above 

3.) What are the conditions necessary for MAD to hold? List and explain.  See alternate world question

4.) Explain at least two of the newer historical findings about the Cuban Missile Crisis, for  example, what was the origin of the "Turkish Missile Trade"? What else? If possible, can you  explain how this history exemplifies a necessary condition for deterrence to hold? Discuss.

5.) What is the "lost" logic of Deterrence? What are the problems with "ambivalent" deterrence?  What should be done?

**6.) Betts writes: " . . . rather than planning to deter a prospective Iranian nuclear arsenal, the  United States and Israel have preferred preventive war."  Explain what Betts is arguing about  US policy toward Iran. What should be done? (Re­worded like this: Betts writes in 2013,  before the Iran Nuclear Deal (signed 2015): " . . . rather than planning to deter a prospective  Iranian nuclear arsenal, the United States and Israel have preferred preventive war."  Explain  what Betts is saying about US policy toward Iran. What does he think should be done toward  Iran? Why?)

7.) What are "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities"? Discuss.

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∙ Many think if one nuke goes off, many will, but no one sees any  gain in retaliation, as it will only lead to more retaliation ∙ Deterrence does not rely on destroying cities, depends on what  one can do, can do as much or as little damage as we want

8.) According to Waltz, what deters? How much is enough? Discuss.

∙ Nuclear weapons deter, as the line between defense and  deterrence blurs with them

∙ Many believe deterrence is hard to achieve, as massive  retaliation against a first strike must be present, must be willing  to destroy most of another country, countries don’t want to  attack when their destruction is at risk and cant get an  advantage by striking first

∙ Contemplating war with nukes makes it so you contemplate  annihilation instead of victory, making it much harder to go to  war

**9.) According to Waltz, why do nuclear weapons dominate strategy?

∙ Presence dominates strategy, as they eliminate strategy by  stripping conventional forces of most of their functions ∙ Nuclear war cannot be sustained, so eliminates strategy o Cold war was long and vast, ended in the 60s because we built so many nukes that no one could win if we fought

o Now debate is if we can really reject MAD and if missile defense would work o Organizations come in and build things because they were tasked to even if they  can’t win, dates back to the 80s when Reagan tried to reject détente

o Have a ridiculous argument about how we can have damage limitation o MAD is where nukes are determined to dominate strategy

∙ Cant use nukes for offense, so you restrict “freedom of action” and you can’t  “police the world,” can’t tell little states what to do once they have nukes, so  states that feel threatened go nuclear, don’t want them to go nuclear because more states with nukes = more terrorists who cannot be deterred when they had nukes

Week 10: The Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear Modernization and Grand Strategy:

1.) Compare the Nuclear Posture Review and the Schelling piece on "A World Without  Nuclear Weapons?" Both pieces argue that US nuclear weapons are aimed at maintaining "strategic stability"­­are they discussing the same thing? What is this?

∙ NPR 

o The US faces a more diverse and dynamic world nuclear  state than ever before

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o Us nuclear capabilities make valuable deterrence factors to nuclear and non-nuclear strategies

o Nukes deter nuclear attacks, provide assurance to  

partners, allows for the achievement of US goals if  

deterrence fails, and allows the US to forgo an uncertain  future

o Need to replace and maintain nuclear triad in order to  maintain nuclear arsenal, current arsenal is aged and is  underfunded

o Want to enhance deterrence with non-nuclear capabilities  such as missile defense

o Prime objective of keeping nukes out of terrorist hands o Will not test nukes unless it is necessary to ensure the  safety and effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal

o The US wishes to remain in an arms control agenda to  promote the safety of it and its allies

∙ Schelling 

o Why should we expect a world without nukes to be safer  than one with some nukes? Drastic reductions make sense, but would we loose deterrence with nukes?

o If there were no nukes but knowledge of building nukes, a  country could build many in weeks

o Even with much fewer nukes (less than 100), if a major war was on the verge of breaking out, an opponent would  immediately target nuclear bases, demand the  

demobilization of nuclear bases with threats of their own  attacks, or attack with nukes to gain a first strike  

advantage and try to get the other side to surrender  

immediately, and deterrence would be lost

o A world without nukes would have nations have a hair  trigger mobilization plan where nukes would be rebuilt o Taboo of nukes has been powerful to this point, should not  abandon nukes where the world would just race to  

reassemble them to get an advantage

∙ They are both discussing why nukes are necessary in the modern world, as deterrence provides valuable strategic assets

2.) In the NPR it says: "The United States would only consider the employment of  nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United  States, its allies, and partners.Nevertheless, if deterrence fails, the United States will  strive to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible and on the best  achievable terms for the United States, allies, and partners. U.S. nuclear policy for 

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decades has consistently included this objective of limiting damage if deterrence fails."  What is the US "damage limitation" strategy? Is it deterrence? Explain.

 See NPR Question

3.) Does Schelling think a world without nuclear weapons is desirable? Explain his  reasoning.

∙ It is not desirable, as the technology to create nuclear weapons  will still exist, and it will only take states a short amount of time  to create nukes if war is on the horizon

∙ Deterrence has proven to lead to peace, as the taboo around  nuclear weapons will likely prevent them from being used, MAD  works, so why abandon it for a world that will likely be less stable with great power war all over the place

4.) What is Posen's proposed grand strategy of restraint? What are its main features?  What parts are most risky or contentious? Is it isolationist?

 See restraint/deep engagement question

5.) What is a grand strategy of "deep engagement"? What are its best features? What are  its biggest problems? Is it imperialistic?

 See restraint/deep engagement question

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