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UCR / Philosophy / Phi 001 / What may not be physically explainable?

What may not be physically explainable?

What may not be physically explainable?

Description

School: University of California Riverside
Department: Philosophy
Course: Introduction to Philosophy
Professor: Mark wrathall
Term: Spring 2019
Tags: philosophy
Cost: 25
Name: Intro to Philosophy week 4
Description: Here are week 4 notes
Uploaded: 04/30/2019
4 Pages 43 Views 3 Unlocks
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 The mind body problem is the question


What may not be physically explainable?



● Not a specific solution

● The problem:

○ How could a physical (material) entity have psychological (mental)properties Physicalism or materialism:

● Everything is physical (material)

● All mental properties are ultimately reduce a lot of physical properties ● compare: biological life is reducible to physical properties it can be entirely explain by them

Pros of monism:

-no interaction problem

-since there is only one kind of substance

-but it needs to explain how physical properties give rise to mental ones Three kinds of physicalism:

● Behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism


Could a mind be realized by a large bureaucracy that initiate seems functional role?



Behaviorism:

-There are no mental events in states, there are only regularities in external observable behavior ● To be in pain = when one is kicked one screams and jumps back

-We conceptualize these regularity and mental terms but there are really no mental states Identity theory

-A mental state of kind M is identical to bring state of kind B

● Pain( mental) is identical with the firing of C-fibers( brain)

The identity is contingent

● It is discovered empirically (compare: water= H2O)

Pros of identity theory

-No interaction problem

- no worry about existence of other minds


What are the 2 kinds of reduction>



-psychology is a natural science

Cons of identity theory

● Where is the subject of a character of experience?

● to primitive

● to local

Functional object

-A kind of object identified in terms of its function rather than its material composition Ex: Doorstop, doorstop is a heavy or fixed object with the function to keep the door open Functionalism Don't forget about the age old question of Why is it important to define the system and surroundings?

-Mental states are functional states

- they are constituted by their functional role

-ROLE: the casual relations the bear to

● sensory inputs

● behavioral Output

● other mental state (unlike behaviorism)

Functionalism pros

-No interaction problem : all physical casual relations

- multiple realizability

● mental states can be realized by Martians computers etc.

-preserves the autonomy of the psychological

Functionalism cons

-No complete functional specification of the mind is (yet?) available

-could A mind be realized by a large bureaucracy that initiate seems functional role? -what about the subjective character of experience?

Physicallist response

-The subjective experience is just one way of accessing certain fact

● A fact that can be fully known without accessing it experimentally

Mary’s room and physicalism

-Some philosophers: Mary’s case shows that physical is false

● Some mental properties are reducible to physical ones Don't forget about the age old question of What is the impact of the 19th amendment in the us?
We also discuss several other topics like What were the goals of president polk?

Consciousness and physicalism

-Philosophers agree that most of consciousness could be explained in physical terms such as the ability to

1. discriminate

2. integrate information

3. report mental states

4. focus attention etc.

What my not be physically explainable?

-Is only the phenomenal character of experience these so-called hard problem of consciousness

-It might be a hard problem

-But is it important if physicalism can explain everything else about consciousness including thought deliberation action and even motion then why should we be so concerned about a failure to account for phenomenal character of experience? Don't forget about the age old question of What are the elements of public disclosure of private facts?
If you want to learn more check out What is the main role of membrane proteins?
We also discuss several other topics like How does the large intestine absorb water?

Two kinds of reduction

1. Ontological reduction

a. Mental states are physical states they are not made of a different kind of substance 2. Conceptual reduction

a. All the concepts we need to understand minds are just the concepts of physics The greedy reductionist

-Accepts both ontological and concept sure reduction there are really no mental states -But physicalism needs to not be greedy

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