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BROWN U / OTHER / CLPS 0610 / What is the naming spurt?

What is the naming spurt?

What is the naming spurt?

Description

School: Brown University
Department: OTHER
Course: Children's Thinking: The Nature of Cognitive Development
Professor: David sobel
Term: Fall 2019
Tags: cognition and thinking
Cost: 50
Name: CLPS 610 Children's Thinking: The Nature of Cognitive Development, Final Study Guide
Description: This is the study guide for the final. I have provided some definitions, key topics, and experiments that will help answer the short-answer questions.
Uploaded: 12/07/2019
12 Pages 10 Views 15 Unlocks
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CLPS 610 Final Study Guide 


What is the naming spurt?



1) Whatis the naming spurt? When does it occur in children whose native language is English? What developmental milestones are related to the naming spurt? How do we know to make this conclusion and not another conclusion about general cognitive abilities?

a) Naming spurt: infants begin producing a large number of words; almost entirely “count nouns” (object names); increase in question-asking

b) English speaking infants → around 18 months

c) Other developments: Categorization/Sorting, fast mapping, conceptual/perceptual feature identifications

2) Whatis fast mapping? Do you think this phenomenon is specific to language development? Why or why not? We also discuss several other topics like blackboard odu

a) Fast mapping: quick learning of meanings of words that stick; children require only one exposure to learn new words/meanings


What is fast mapping?



b) Carey → yes, words are special; “Chromium tray” experiment; we must have a memory system specific to words

c) Markson & Bloom → no, this is not specific to words; replicated on novel facts (“the tool my uncle gave me”)

3) Which do you think influences children’s (older than 12 months) conceptual development more: perceptual or conceptual features of objects? Describe an experimentthat supports your position. a) Perceptual features → importance of shape

i) Landau et al. (1998): showed that 2-3 yr olds extend novel labels to size & texture changes, but not to shape changes; children must be using perceptual similarity for categorization b) Conceptual features → function of an object also important for categorization


What is the enrichment hypothesis in the development of folk biological knowledge?



i) Nelson (1974): gave a ball to 15-month-olds and showed them 9 other objects If you want to learn more check out non cumulative exam

(1) 3 bounced, were not balls

(2) 3 were perceptually similar but did not bounce

(3) 3 were not balls and did not bounce

ii) when children were asked to give the other ball, they picked the one that had a similar function → children are labeling “balls” based on their functionality If you want to learn more check out What longitudinal designs mean?

4) Describe one of Keil’s experiments on children’s understanding of essences. Whattypes of objects have essences? What age were the subjects? What were the stimuli? What were the findings? a) Discovery studies (6-year-olds)

i) Animals that look & act like horses, but scientist discover they are cows inside

(1) These animals are cows

ii) Objects that look like keys & open doors, but scientists find they’re made of pennies (1) This object is still a key

iii) Natural kinds change with discoveries but artifacts do not

b) Transformation studies (6-year-olds)

i) Raccoon painted to look like a skunk; give it the appearance/action of a skunk

(1) It is still a raccoon

ii) Coffeepot made to look like a birdfeeder

(1) now this object is a bird feeder

iii) Natural kinds are resistant to change; artifacts are not

c) Only natural/living things have essences; artifacts do not

5) Describe a study in which children’s folk biological concepts clearly develops from one age to another. If you want to learn more check out hrhm

a) Keil’s Transformation & Discovery studies (1989) → described in #4

b) Johnson & Carey (1998) Enrichment Battery study → described in #6

c) Laurendeau & Pinard (1962) Conceptual Change battery study → described in #6 d) Koocher (1974) Conceptual Change battery study → described in #6

6) Whatis the enrichment hypothesis in the development of folk biological knowledge? How does it contrast with the conceptual change hypothesis? Describe an example of a task that measures each. What are the results?

a) Enrichment hypothesis: child has knowledge of empirical generalizations (e.g., rules); development is simply the development of more complex generalizations; child acquires new categories but not a new classification system; development is linear with age and reflects exposure to information (more information → faster/more learning)

b) Conceptual change hypothesis: some information is learned through accretion (enrichment) but other knowledge is represented through conceptual structures that change; development is the acquisition of more complex generalizations and a NEW category system If you want to learn more check out What is appointments clause?

c) Johnson & Carey (1998) Enrichment Battery (w/ Williams Syndrome subjects)

i) Animal Lexicon Task → name as many animals as you can

(1) older children able to name more animals, WS subjects did not differ from

age-matched subjects

ii) Body part/ biological process attribution → does a ___ have a ___?(tree, heart)

(1) Older children attribute biological processes to plants, younger children do not

d) Laurendeau & Pinard (1962) Animism Interview (Conceptual Change battery)

i) What does it mean to be alive? Give examples. Are these things alive?(gave children a list of living & nonliving things)

ii) Results

(1) 3-year-olds describe living in terms of behavior (moving)

(2) 5 & 6-year-olds start to use biological processes (breathing, hearts, growing, not

dead)

(3) Not until ~10 that children recognize living thing as a category separate from animals (4) WS subjects used non-biological principles to determine if something is alive/dead e) Koocher (1974) Death Interview (Conceptual Change battery)

i) What does it mean to die? Give examples.; What happens to things when they die? What causes a person to die?; Can you bring a dead person back to life?

ii) Results

(1) 3-year-olds → “not alive”

(2) 5 & 6-yr-olds begin to use biological processes in answers (don’t breathe/pump

blood) If you want to learn more check out What provides the energy for contraction?

(3) 10-yr-olds understand plants can die

(4) WS similar to younger children; impaired in this battery task

7) What does conceptual change mean? Using any experiment discussed in class or the readings, demonstrate how a particular concept changes.

a) Described above in #6.

8) Whatis a role oftemporal priority in causal perception or reasoning? Describe an experimentthat suggests preschoolers prioritize temporal priority over other cues to causality. a) Temporal priority: causes occur before their effects

b) Bullock & Gelman (1979) → Jack-in-the-box studies (3 ,4, 5-year-olds)

i) Temporal Priority: Ball went into A → jack-in-the-box pops up → ball goes into B; which caused the jack to pop up? Children choose A

ii) Spatial priority: introduced a gap between Ball A box and the Jack. Jack is still connected to the Ball B box. Timings remained the same. Children still choose A

9) What’s the difference between a correlation and a causal relation? Describe an experimentthat suggests two events can be correlated, but other information is required to make a causal judgment.

a) Correlation: association between two events that tend to occur together

b) Causal relation: one event (cause) results in the occurrence of another event (effect); without the first event the second will not happen

c) Gopnik et al. (2001) Blicket Detector (3 & 4-year-olds)

i) Object A lights up blicket, Object B only lights it up when placed with Object A. Based on association, they should both be labeled blickets because they make the machine light up. Have to realize that Object B’s association is only present dependent on Object A.

ii) Control: Object A always lights it up; Object B lights it up only the 2nd & 3rd time (by itself), now more children say Object B is a blicket

10)Describe an experimentthat suggests scientific reasoning is difficultfor children. If causal reasoning is so easy, why is science so hard?

a) Schauble (1990); 9-to-11-year-olds

i) Racecar computer game → make the fastest car by changing 5 features

ii) Given 8 sessions in which they could create different models to learn the associations of what made the car go faster

iii) Children could not figure out how to control the variables → varied more than one feature each trial; made improper conclusions based on prior beliefs

b) Confirmation bias; performance of invalid experiments, they are not aware that they are engaging in scientific reasoning; engaging in something vs observing it/being told (explicit vs implicit mechanism) → we are better at implicit, when we are walked through something as opposed to figuring it out on our own

11)Narratives clearly help preschoolers remember information, but what about children younger than age 2? Describe an experiment where something thatlooks like a narrative structure helps children this young remember a sequence of information. Why should this information facilitate memory?

a) Scripted Action experiments (Mandler, 1984; Bauer & Shore, 1987); 17-month-olds i) Infants remember a sequence of events if it is encoded in a script

(1) “Teddy baths” → shirt off, put in tub, wash front, dry

ii) Number of events in a sequence that infants can remember increases with age

b) Bauer & Mandler (1989) 16 & 20-month-olds

i) Presented infants with sequences of action to remember (asked immediately or after a 2 week delay)

(1) Novel causal, familiar causal, novel arbitrary

ii) Immediate condition → more infants remembered novel causal than novel arbitrary iii) 2 week delay → 20mo. Remembered familiar & novel causal; 16mo. Remembered familiar causal

12)Several researchers argue thatthere are “foundational domains” of knowledge that children develop: physics, biology, and psychology. How could you test whether children recognize knowledge in these domains is independent or related?

a) All of the domains have a representation of causal structure at their center

b) Test children understanding of causality in these domains

13)Describe three ways a chair is differentfrom a thought about a chair. Describe an experimentthat demonstrates how children interpret mental entities as differentfrom objects. a) Behavioral-sensory evidence (touch/see), public existence (everyone sees it), consistent existence (it will still be there if you leave)

b) Wellman & Estes (1986); 3 & 4-year-olds

i) Told children one boy has a cookie and another boy is thinking about a cookie

ii) Who can touch, see, eat the cookie?

(1) Behavioral-sensory evidence

iii) Whose mother can see the cookie?

(1) Public existence

iv) If they go out to play, who will still have a cookie?

(1) consistent existence

v) 75% of 3yr-olds correct; basically all 4yr-olds correct

c) Estes et al. (1989); 3 & 5-yr-olds

i) examined children’s knowledge of physical transformations

ii) 3 conditions: imagine a cup, a visible real cup, or a hidden real cup

iii) Asked about non-physical transformations: can you turn it upside-down without moving your hands?

iv) 75% 3yr-olds correct, basically all 5yr-olds correct

14)When do children develop a concept of another’s desires? Does that emerge atthe same time as their recognition ofthe relation between desire and action? Support your answer with empirical evidence.

a) Between 14-18 months, no they develop separately

b) Repacholi & Gopnik (1997) Broccoli-Goldfish study; 14 & 18-months

i) Infants given a choice to eat from either bowl, most choose crackers

ii) Experimenter tries both and prefers the broccoli

iii) Asked to give the experimenter one

(1) 14mo → give them the cracker

(2) 18mo → give them the broccoli

c) Wellman & Woolley (1990); 2 yr-olds

i) Presented toddlers with a character who wants something and either: found it, found nothing, found another thing

ii) Asked them if the character was happy or sad → children said only happy in 1st cond iii) Asked if they should keep searching → children said yes for 2nd & 3rd condition iv) Understand desires and whether they are fulfilled

v) At age 2, children recognize actions are intentional contingent on desire

d) Schult (2002); 3-4-&-5-yr-olds

i) Introduced to a target game → one target had a prize behind it, children stated which one they wanted to aim at and fired

ii) Either hit what they wanted to hit or not; got the prize or didn’t

(1) Right all along: Intention fulfilled & desire fulfilled

(2) Wrong originally: Intention fulfilled & desire unfulfilled

(3) Happy accident: Intention unfulfilled & desire fulfilled

(4) Wrong all along: Intention unfulfilled & desire unfulfilled

iii) Asked which one they were trying to hit

iv) 5-yr-olds answer correctly, 4-yr-olds answer mostly correct but do a little worse on the happy accident (say they were trying to hit that all along), 3-yr-olds fail “happy accident” & perform poorly when desire was unfulfilled

v) Recognition of the relation between desire & action develops between 3-4/5

15)What does it mean to say that children come to recognize thatthe mind is representational? Provide a piece of empirical evidence that demonstrates when children develop this understanding.

a) Understanding that the world can represent something in a way that is not consistent with the real world (pretending, imagining, false beliefs, different desires, etc.)

b) Wellman & Estes (1986) Imaginary Cookie study (described in #13)

c) Estes et al. (1989) Imaginary Cup study (described in #13)

d) Seems to develop between age 3-5

16)Whatis the difference between Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective taking? When does each one develop? Describe an experiment at each level (you must describe 2 experiments to answer this question).

a) Level 1: representing whether an object is visible to another person

i) children were shown screen with a different picture on each side, child sits on one side & experimenter on the other, child shown both sides then the screen is put up

ii) Asked what they saw and what the experimenter saw

(1) 2.5-yr-olds get this right

b) Level 2: representing that an object can be seen differently from 2 perspectives

i) Flavell (et al., 1979) Turtle Task

(1) Shown picture of a turtle, asked whether they see it upside down or right side up,

then asked how the experimenter sitting across from them sees it

(2) 3.5 yr-olds still fail with training → success emerges at 4

ii) Flavell et al., (1981) Screen Task

(1) Red car shown through a green screen so that it looks black to the person on one side and red to the person on the other side

(2) Success again emerges at 4

17)When do children recognize thatintentional action is based on the actor’s beliefs abouttheir actions? Use empirical evidence to support your answer. Why might success on this task emerge earlier than success on a standard false belieftask?

a) Between age 3 and 4/5

b) Moses (1993); 3-4-&-5-yr-olds

i) Showed videos of an actor whose unfulfilled intention depended on a FB

ii) Actor poured milk into cereal, container had dirt

iii) Was the actor trying to put dirt in their cereal?

iv) By age 3, children recognize that intending an action involves a particular belief state about that action

v) They recognize actions are intentional contingent on beliefs and desires

c) Why might it emerge earlier than success on FB? → this is an explanation task not belief task, this task does not involve a lot of inhibitory control while FB does, there is no conflict with reality 18)What does it mean for a mental state to be recursive? When does this understanding develop? Use empirical evidence to support your answer.

a) Mental state is about itself (e.g., beliefs can be about beliefs)

b) Belief is recursive → thinking about thinking about thinking etc. (think about other people thinking)

c) Perner & Wimmer (1985) Second-order FB task

i) John and Mary at park and ice cream man comes, he says he will be at the park all day. Mary wants some, so she goes home to get money. Ice cream man tells John he is going to the school instead. While ice cream man is driving he meets Mary who was walking back, tells her he will be at the school. They both go to the school. John goes to Mary’s house, mom says she went to buy ice cream. Where will he look?

ii) Child must represent what John thinks about Mary, contrast with reality

(1) Children succeed around age 7

iii) Understanding belief develops @ 4; understanding it is recursive around 7-8

19)Why is it necessary to study children’s knowledge of false belief instead oftheir knowledge oftrue belief in order to gain insightinto their understanding of mental representation? Whatis another mental state or process that relates to understanding belief? Why and how?

a) FB measures children’s understanding of the representational nature of belief; what they know about another person’s beliefs

i) True belief → same as reality; how the world truly is; responding based on the actual state of the world as opposed to any kind of mental state

ii) FB → is about representation; understanding others have different mental states; ability to represent the world in a way inconsistent with reality

b) Executive function/control → have to inhibit one representation of the world (one that is true) for another representation of the world (one that is false); have to resist the urge to say one response in favor of another one (that is incorrect with the real world)

20)Describe an experimentthat suggests young children understand mental representation in pretense and use that understanding to scaffold their understanding of belief. a) Series of correlational studies on 3.5-year-olds

b) Lillard (2002) Free Play

i) Kids constrained to playing within a square, only have blocks, many start pretending (objects substitution & representation) using blocks to represent other things (cars);

ii) Children who engaged in pretend play during this time were more likely to pass the FB task c) Ashington & Jenkins (1995); Quality of Pretense

i) Asked children to engage in a set of pretense acts; those who engaged in object

representation more likely to pass the FB task

d) Taylor & Carlson

i) Imaginary companion → more likely to pass FB

ii) Constant engagement in pretense → more likely to pass FB

e) Children using the extent to which they engage in acts of pretense to scaffold their understanding of FB

21)Describe two empirical examples suggesting that young children do not understand the representational nature of pretending.

a) Lillard (1998) Moe study; 4-year-olds

i) Moe is from the land of the trolls, does not know what a kangaroo is. He is jumping up and down. Is he pretending to be a kangaroo?

ii) Only 35% of children pass

iii) Giving them a reason as to why he is jumping (floor is hot) does not improve their performance

b) Lillard (1996) Box method

i) Categorize different actions into Mind, Body, or Both boxes

ii) Only 40% put “pretend” in the Mind or Both boxes; majority put it in the body box c) Lillard & Sobel follow up study (2002); 4-year-olds

i) Asked, “Do you need a brain to pretend?”

ii) Only 35% said yes

22)Whatis the difference between recognition and recall memory? Do these two processes develop atthe same time or do these two processes develop at differenttimes? Use empirical evidence to support your answer (hint, you might have to present more than one experiment.)

a) Recognition memory: recognize an event is familiar; you have seen it before; easier than recall (~2 months)

i) Habituation studies use this → recognizing they’ve seen this event before

ii) Rovee-Collier (1987) Mobile Experiment

(1) 2-month-olds learn the association and remember for a day; range of delay increases with age

b) Recall memory: recalling an exact event; recalling information from nothing; involves symbolic representation bc they must know what they are recalling (~9 months)

i) Meltzoff (1985) Delayed Imitation; 14-month-olds (Recall memory)

(1) Infants shown a novel event sequence that produces a novel causal event

(2) Experimenter hits panel with forehead & it lights up; infant does not touch panel

(3) Bring back infant 24 hrs later → they will hit the panel with their foreheads

(4) Meltzoff 1998 → some evidence infants as young as 9mo. will do this

ii) Mandler (1984) → Scripted Action study (refer to #11)

23)Describe an experimentthat suggests that how adults talk to children influences children’s developing memory abilities.

a) Repetitive: same questions asked repeatedly, switching topics frequently

b) Elaborative: elaborates on child’s partial recall, asks questions that flush out child’s knowledge, more depths of the conversation

c) Reese et al. (1995), Repetitive vs Elaborative narratives

i) 40- and 46-month-olds (young & old 3-yr-olds) examined to determine maternal style (elaborative/repetitive)

ii) Tested 18- and 24 months later for memories of events the moms talked about

iii) Mothers asked to talk about a particular event (not routine)

iv) Children with repetitive style mothers tend to recall fewer events when tested 1.5-2 years later

v) The more a parent scaffolds, the more those memories are encoded & recollected in memory

24)Whatis interviewer bias? Describe two examples of how adults can influence children’s recall of episodic events. Make sure that you include how each ofthese examples affect children’s memory using experimental evidence.

a) Interview bias: biased interviewers let their own hypotheses influence their questions; looking for confirmatory evidence and ignoring disconfirming evidence; ask questions consistent with their hypothesis; not challenging children’s statements; seeking to confirm beliefs

b) Peterson & Bell (1996) Specific vs. Open-ended Questions; ages 2-13

i) Interviewed children after visit to emergency room; first asked open-ended questions then specific ones

ii) Children were more accurate at answering open-ended questions than specific questions about the event

c) Bruck et al. (1995) Repeating Misinformation; 6-year-olds

i) If children are repeatedly told about a fictional event, they can remember these events later as actually happening

ii) Interviewed 6-year-olds four times about a short they got from a male doctor

iii) Used female pronouns half of the time; by the 4th interview children reported the gender of the doctor was female

iv) When interview is held in a neutral, non-leading manner, children provide accurate reports 25)Whatis infant amnesia? Describe a reason why it might occur.

a) Infant Amnesia: inability of adults to retrieve episodic memories before the age of (usually) 2-4 b) Children might have a different method of storage than adults

i) New organization related to narrative & language

c) Narrative might be a more complex method of organization

i) Children develop a new representation for their memories

26)Whatinsights to cognitive development can be gained by studying atypical developmentin general and William’s syndrome in particular? Describe an experimentthat supports your answer. a) Testing which hypothesis is correct: Enrichment/Accretion vs Conceptual Change b) For supporting evidence → refer to #6

27)Why does the quality of pretend play matter for the development oftheory of mind? Use empirical evidence that supports your answer.

a) Object substitution: substituting one object to represent another (stick for toothbrush) i) There is still an object

b) Object representation: representing an object that is not really there (invisible)

i) Helpful towards the development of ToM and passing FB tasks

c) Engagement in pretense scaffolds an understanding of FB

d) For supporting evidence → refer to #20

28)Whatis the scale-modeltask? What can be done to make the scale-modeltask easier? Use empirical evidence to support your answer.

a) Deloache (1987) Scale Model Task; 30-&-36-month-old (2.5-3 yr olds)

i) Children introduced to a model of a room; correspondence between objects and the model are pointed out

ii) Mini toy is hidden in the model and child is allowed to search for it in the large room iii) 30-month-olds fail, 36-month olds succeed

iv) In order to succeed → child must represent the model as a symbol rather than object b) Deloache (2000) replicated scale model task using simpler model

i) Exp. 1: used 4 objects in space rather than a whole model; believed a simpler model will reduce the interpretation as an object and increase interpretation as a symbol

(1) Same results → still too much like objects

ii) Exp. 2: scale model is displayed behind a glass window; same procedure

(1) This time 30-month olds succeed but 24-month-olds fail

(2) Children viewed it more as a symbol than object

iii) Exp. 3: increased the object salience by allowing children to play with model beforehand (1) This time 36-month olds ALSO failed

c) Dual representation hypothesis: children must develop an understanding that an object is an object but it can also be a symbol of a spatial location

d) Easier tasks: showing pictures, “shrinking the room” (described in #29), glass model, reducing object salience

29)Whatis the shrinking room experiment? What was it designed to show and what did itfind?

a) Deloache et al. (1997); 30-and-36-month-olds

i) Replication of the scale model task, except this time a “shrinking machine” enlarged the scale model in order to reduce the “dual-representation” problem

ii) The model = the room → scale model is gone and the room is enlarged

iii) This time 30-month-olds ALSO succeed

b) Reducing object salience helps children represent it as a symbol

30)Whatis the “acting-as-if” hypothesis with regards to children’s understanding of pretending? Describe two different experiments (that could be performed by the same person)that support this approach. What does this hypothesis mean for the child’s developing theory of mind?

a) Acting-as-if: children do not understand pretense as an activity that involves mental representation. Instead, they understand pretense as simply “acting-as-if”. They focus on the behavioral component of representation in pretense.

b) Lillard (1993) Moe Task → described in #21

c) Lillard (1996) Box Method → described in #21

d) Sobel & Lillard (2002) Follow up → described in #21

e) 4-year-old children struggle to understand the relation between pretense and other mental states 31)Whatis the Dimension Change Card Sort(DCCS)? Describe its procedure and main findings with preschoolers. What conclusions can be drawn using this task?

a) DCCS: card sorting game in which children are told to sort cards according to one perceptual feature (color) and then asked to sort the same cards based on another perceptual feature (shape) b) Frye, Zelazo, Palfai (1995)

i) Introduced children to cards of different colors and shapes

ii) Gave them a rule on how to categorize the cards

(1) First categorize them by color

(2) Then categorize them by shape

iii) Purpose: can the child ignore the old rule and attend to a new one?

iv) Findings

(1) 3-year-olds struggle shifting tasks → use 1st rule

(2) 4-year-olds show intermediate levels of performance

(3) 5-year-olds have little trouble shifting, perform well

c) Executive control/inhibitory control develops between 3-5

32)Onishi and Baillargeon suggestthatinfants have an early comprehension oftheory of mind. On this view, why do children not pass standard measures of false belief (like unexpected contents) until age 4?

a) Language → too complicated, children don’t understand

b) Inhibitory control not developed yet → child needs to inhibit reality state in favor of a belief state 33)Whatis the difference between elaborative and repetitive styles of conservation? What does this difference mean for children’s memory development?

a) Elaborative: elaborates on child’s partial recall, asks questions that flush out child’s knowledge, more depths of the conversation, parent scaffolds most of the way

b) Repetitive: same questions asked repeatedly, switching topics frequently

c) Children with elaborative style mothers encode the memories more and can remember them better after a long delay

34)Onishi and Baillargeon suggestthatinfants have an early comprehension oftheory of mind. If you rejectthis view and believe thatthe development between ages 3-4, observed in the results of

standard measures of false belief (like unexpected contents), indicate the emergence of a theory of mind, how do you explain Onishi and Baillargeon’s data? Thatis, what do their data show? a) This is up to interpretation.

35)What are the Theory of Mind scales? What do they tell us aboutthe way in which theory of mind develops?

a) ToM scales: set of profressive tasks that indicate linear developmental trajectory

i) Diverse Desires

ii) Diverse Beliefs

iii) Knowledge Access

iv) False Belief

v) Real-Apparent Emotion

b) Children’s understanding of ToM develops in a linear progression, the 5 scales show the different points of this progression

36)Whatis the broccoli-goldfish experiment? How do these data fitinto the Wellman and Liu’s theory of mind scales?

a) Experiment described in #14.

b) This experiment measures children’s understanding of diverse desires

i) Understand that they prefer the crackers but the experimenter prefers the broccoli 37)Whatis the shape bias? Provide a piece of empirical evidence in favor of it. Discuss the merits of this theory and its limitations.

a) Shape bias: the way in which children make judgments is most notably influenced by the shape of an object

b) Landau et al. (1998); 2-3-year-olds

i) Showed that 2-3-year-olds extend novel label to size and texture changes but nt shape changes

ii) Children introduced to 2 new shapes with new labels

(1) Changed the size → still extended the labels to the new shapes

(2) Changed the texture (material they’re made of) → still extended label

(3) Changed the shape → the more deviance from the original shape, the less children extended the label to the new object

iii) Children use perceptual similarity (in particular, shape); important feature for

categorization

38)Carlson and Moses (2001) found thatthere is a significant relationship between children’s performance on inhibitory control measures and their performance on standard, explicitfalse belieftasks. This correlation holds true even if you control for age. Why do you think this correlation mightindicate a causal relation? Why mightit be a spurious association? (i.e., not a causal relation?)

a) This is up to interpretation. Some possibilities:

i) IC allows children to inhibit a real representation of the world for one that is not consistent with reality; being able to do this will help children respond more accurately on FB tasks ii) Conflict tasks more related to ToM development → one answer is in conflict with another way in which they want to respond

iii) There are some recall studies that FB is understood earlier (Onishi & Baillargeon); other studies show they understand diverse desires (broccolo-goldfish) earlier than their IC development → so this causal relationship might not truly exist

39)Some research suggests thatinfants’ understanding of social norms aboutfairness are innate. Others suggestthatthere are developmental differences in understanding social norms regarding fairness. Which account do you favor and why? Support your answer with empirical evidence. a) Innate support → Schmidt & Sommerville (2011) Early Biases; 15-month-olds

i) Infants watched an experimenter give a distribution to 2 adults that is either fair or unfair ii) They looked longer at the unfair event

iii) When the same distributions were repeated in the baseline condition (the 2 adults were not there, no one was receiving these distributions) → infants looked equally at both

b) Innate support → Sloane et al. (2012); 20-month-olds

i) Children watched 2 actors be told to do something by a 3rd person

ii) Either one person does it alone or both do it together; then they are rewarded either equally or unequally (in favor of the one who did the task alone)

iii) Toddlers looked longer at the unfair distribution when both actors worked together to accomplish the task

iv) They did not discriminate between distributions when only one actor worked to accomplish the task → did not understand that it is fair for the actor that did the task to get rewarded more; their was no bias towards fairness in this condition

c) Developmental differences support → Inequity Game (described in #41)

d) Developmental differences support → Smith et al. (2013); 3-8-year-olds

i) Asked children about how they should divide a set of resources between themselves and another person

ii) Then asked whether they would accept an unfair distribution that benefits them iii) Results: as children develop between 3-8, they are less likely to accept unfair distributions that benefit them even though they agree distributions should be fair since age 3

40)Some research suggests thatinfants’ understanding of social norms aboutfairness are innate. Others suggestthatthere are developmental differences in understanding social norms regarding fairness. How can you explain these two competing ideas? Use empirical evidence to support your answer.

a) Refer to #39.

41)Whatis the advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion? Describe an experimentthat demonstrates their developmentaltrajectories in a U.S. sample.

a) Advantageous inequity: I get more than the other person

i) Children only start rejecting it around age 7

ii) Aversion → try to avoid receiving more than others

b) Disadvantageous inequity: the other person gets more than me

i) Almost always rejected by all ages

ii) Aversion → try to avoid other people receiving more

c) Blake & McAuliffe (2011) The Inequity Game; 3 & 8-yr-olds

i) Children paired up with a partner, then given distributions which they can accept (so they & their partners get the resources) or reject (so no one gets the resources)

ii) Fair distributions almost always accepter (50-50)

iii) Unfair distributions

(1) Disadvantageous → other person got more (always rejected)

(2) Advantageous → the child got more (accepted up until ~7)

42)Blake and colleagues found that advantageous inequity aversion has different developmental trajectories across different samples. Why mightthis be?

a) Different cultures have different values, norms, customs, etc.

b) Up to interpretation.

43)Describe the basic paradigm for social learning described by Koenig & Harris (2005). What ages were tested and how did they investigate children’s selective word learning. Then describe a manipulation to this paradigm thatlooks at another factor that might be relevantto the study of epistemic trust.

a) Introduced 3-&-4-year olds to accurate & inaccurate speakers → who do preschoolers trust? b) 2 puppets

i) Accurate: labeled familiar objects correctly

ii) Inaccurate: labeled familiar objects incorrectly

c) Test: Novel object was brought out → two puppets say a name for it

i) The child trust the label given by the accurate puppet

d) Children use language to communicate trust; we have to learn language by trusting others e) Kinzler et al. (2011) study (described in #45) shows social group is also important

44)Why is social learning importantfor cognitive development? How mightthe lessons from social learning influence the study of another topic we have covered in the class?

a) We learn a lot from other people → language, social norms, religion, conventions, morality, etc. b) Social learning helps language development

i) Studies showing children trust accurate people when labeling novel objects

45)Which is more importantfor social learning: judgments about epistemic competence or judgments aboutthe social relationships you have with the informants? Justify your answer with an experiment.

a) Epistemic competence: knowledge, thoughts, and beliefs

b) Emotional: personal attachments/relationships with others

c) Epistemic competence > judgements about social relationships

d) Kinzler et al. (2011); 5-year-olds

i) Rely on speakers of native language in native accent > nonnative accent in neutral condition

ii) Kinzler et al. (2013) Replication of experiment; this time the non-native accent speaker was accurate while the native accent speaker was not

(1) 4-and-5-year-olds trusted the accurate non-native speaker over the inaccurate

native speaker

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