New User Special Price Expires in

Let's log you in.

Sign in with Facebook


Don't have a StudySoup account? Create one here!


Create a StudySoup account

Be part of our community, it's free to join!

Sign up with Facebook


Create your account
By creating an account you agree to StudySoup's terms and conditions and privacy policy

Already have a StudySoup account? Login here

Geertz Notes

by: Clarissa Marie Fuller

Geertz Notes ANTH240

Clarissa Marie Fuller
Introduction to Archeology
Stefan Woehlke

Almost Ready


These notes were just uploaded, and will be ready to view shortly.

Purchase these notes here, or revisit this page.

Either way, we'll remind you when they're ready :)

Preview These Notes for FREE

Get a free preview of these Notes, just enter your email below.

Unlock Preview
Unlock Preview

Preview these materials now for free

Why put in your email? Get access to more of this material and other relevant free materials for your school

View Preview

About this Document

This is a reference of the Geertz reading that I annotated for the worksheet due on friday. The notes attatched to are in the week 2 notes
Introduction to Archeology
Stefan Woehlke
Study Guide
50 ?




Popular in Introduction to Archeology

Popular in anthropology, evolution, sphr

This 19 page Study Guide was uploaded by Clarissa Marie Fuller on Thursday September 10, 2015. The Study Guide belongs to ANTH240 at University of Maryland taught by Stefan Woehlke in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 73 views. For similar materials see Introduction to Archeology in anthropology, evolution, sphr at University of Maryland.


Reviews for Geertz Notes


Report this Material


What is Karma?


Karma is the currency of StudySoup.

You can buy or earn more Karma at anytime and redeem it for class notes, study guides, flashcards, and more!

Date Created: 09/10/15
UMC Doc Del Form TransactionNumber 942738 lllllllllllllllllH Transaction Date 624l2015 52717 PM Call iii39i 223 Location MMC f ie Sheiv sg mass 3 Redeem tit sacmm Article Information Journal Title Theories of the Mind Bin R01M12829T07 Barcode31430023557715 Volume Issue Montleear 1962Pages title page tofc 713 740 Article Author Jordan M Scher SEND VIA ODYSSEY 1 Scan as TIFF or PDF Available Scanner 2 Use Send via Odyssey button when sending Article Title The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind Special Instructions 1m llllllllll Notice This material may be protected by Copyright Law Title 17 US Code jHEonlEs THE MIND f I iited by Jordan M pher W quotE mm lt 39 39n pkrul s l I i a N N I l E l 14 quot if 9w York The Free Press 0 Glencoe w f g ol a s 39 ondon Macmillan New York 332 xvi Contributors ANATOL BAPOPORT Mental Health Research Institute University of Michigan IRVIN ROCK Professor of Psychology Yeshiva University CLAIRE and W M S RUSSELL Department of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy University College London England JORDAN M SCHER MD Assistant Professor Department of Neurology and Psychiatry Northwestern University Editor Journal of Existential Psychiatry Director Chicago Psychiatric Foundation and Chicago Ontoanalytic Institute CHARLES SHACASS MD Professor of Psychiatry State University College of Medicine and Psychopathic Hospital State University of Iowa JAMES C TAYLOR Senior Lecturer in Psychology University of Capetown Capetown South Africa HENRY B VEATCH Professor of Philosophy Indiana University JOSEPH WOLPE MD Professor of Neurology and Psychiatry University of Virginia School of Medicine iCONTENTS Preface Contributors PART ONE Mind as Brain Basic Considerations of Physiology Biochemistry 7 Behavior Cortex and Mind PERCIVAL BAILEY MD Ethology Comparative Biodynarnics and Psychoanalytic Research JULES H MASSEBMAN MD The Concept of Mind in the Framework of Genetics JOHN D RAINER NLD Some Speculations on the Psychophysiology of Mind E BOY JOHN Explorations in the Psychophysiology of Ailect CHARLES SHAGASS MD EmotiOnal Aspects of Mind Clinical and Neurophysiological Analyses HAROLD E HIMWICH MA One Aspect of Mind A BRADFORD JUDD MD and MILTON GREENBLA I T MD xvii m i xiii 15 65 80 122 145 181 xviii Contents Material Aspects of Mental Disease RALPH W GERARD MD The Biology of the Prejudiced Mind HOWARD LIDDELL MD Mind as Function of Neural Organization JAMES c TAYLOR and JOSEPH WOLFE MD PART TWO Mind as Participation De nitions Humane Psychiatric 1 Cybernetic Toward a De nition of Mind HAROLD KELMAN MD An Essay on Mind ANATOL RAPOPORT What is Mind Objective and Subjective Aspects in Cybernetics w R035 ASHBY MD DPIvI 39 What and Where in the World Are They HENRY B VEATCH A Transactional Inquiry Concerning Mind HADLEY CANTRIL Mind as Participation JORDAN M SCHER MD The Mind s Involvement in Objects An Essay in Idealist Epistemology C A CAMPBELL A Temporalistic View of Personal Mind PETER A BERTOCCI Some Thoughts on the Mind EUGEN KAHN MD Mind as Memory and Creative Love CHARLES HARTSHORNE Mind and Mechanical Models ERROL E HARRIS The MindBody Problem or Could an Android Feel Pain IRVING JOHN GOOD Mind as an Organismic Integration DONALD D GLAD 189 203 218 0 pk C 314 330 490 519 39 E 464 Contents PART THREE Mind as Method Of Elephants d7 M an Raw Materials for a De nition of Mind CLAIRE RUSSELL and W M s RUSSELL MindBody Not a Pseudo Problem HERBERT FEIGL Concerning the MindBody Problem EDWARD W BABANKIN Probability Processes in Psychoanalytic Psychiatry J B CHASSAN The Method of Introspection PETER MC KELLAR A Neglected Aspect of the Problem of Recall The Holiding Function IBVIN ROCK Mind A Descriptive Operational De nition MILTON v KLINE The Contribution of John B Watson GUSTAV BERGMANN Common Sense Knowledge of Social Structures The Documentary Method of Interpretation HAROLD GABFINKEL The Growth of Culture and the Evolution Of Mind CLIFFORD GEEBTZ Subject Index Name Index xix 535 572 582 598 619 645 661 674 I 689 713 741 746 7153 Mind as Method quot ological events This has been demonstrated on many occasions Thus far the choice has been made at the cost of either neglecting the prop erties that make events sociological ones or bv using documentary work to deal with the soft parts i The choice has to do with the question of the conditions under which literal observation and documentary work necessarily occur This in volves the formulation of and solution to the problem of sociological evidence in terms that permit a descriptive solution Undoubtedly sci enti c sociplogy is a fact but in Felix Kaufmann s sense of fact ie 39 in terms 0 a set of procedural rules that actuall overn the use of quot sociologists recommended methods and asserted iidithgs as grounds of The GrOWth 0f CUltUIe further inference and inquiries The problem of evidence consists of the tasks of making this fact intelligible and the Evolution of Mind The statement thermindis its own place as theorists might con strue it is not true for the mind is not even a metaphorical place On the contrart the chessboard the platform the scholar39s desk the judge s bench the lorrydriver s seat the studio and the football eld are among its places These are where people work and play stupidly or intelligently Mind is not the name of another person working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played and it is not the name of another tool with which work is done or another appliance with which games are played GILBERT RYLE 391 In the intellectual history of the behavioral sciences the concept of has played a curious double role Those who have regarded the development of such sciences as involving a rectilinear extension of the L methods of physical science into the realm of the organic have used it as quota devil word the referent of which was all those methods and theOries idwhich failed to measure up to a rather heroic ideal of objectivism 39Z I am indebted to Lloyd A Fallers Dell Hymes David Schneider and Sherwood L Washburn for valuable critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper 713 714 Mind as Method Terms such as insight understanding conceptual thinking image idea feeling re ection fantasy etc have been stigmatized as mentalistic ie contaminated with the subjectivity of consciousness Scheerer 1959 and the appeal to them castigated as a lamentable failure of sci enti c nerve But those who have on the contrary regarded the move from a physical to an organic and most especially to a human subject matter as implying farreaching revisions in theoretical approach and research procedure have tended to use mind as a cautionary concept one intended more to point to defects in understanding than to repair them more to stress the limits of positive science than to extend them but intuitively valid expression to their settled conviction that human experience has important dimensions of order which physical theory and mm passe psychological and social theOries modeled on physical theory omits to consider Sherrington s 1953 p 161 image of naked mind all that counts in life Desire zest truth love knowledge values going in our spatial world more ghostly than a ghost serves as an epitome of this position as Pavlov s reported Kubie 1954 prac tice of levying nes on any of his students who so much as uttered mentalistic words in his laboratory does of the opposite In fact with some exceptions the term mind has not functioned as a scienti c concept at all but as a rhetorical device even when its use has been fOrbidden More exactly it has acted to communicate and sometimes exploit a fear rather than to de ne a process a fear of sub jectivism on the one hand and of mechanism on the other Even when fully aware of the nature of anthropomorphic subjectivism and its dan gers Clark Hull warns us solemnly 1943 the most careful and experienced thinker is likely to nd himself a victim to its seductions and urges as a prophylaxis the strategy of viewing all behavior as if it were produced by a dog an albino rat or safest of all a robot While for the Opposition Gordon Allport 1947 professes to see a threat to human dignity in such an approach complaining that the models we have been following lack the long range orientation which is the essence of morality overplay those features of human behavior that are peripheral signal oriented or genetic and to underplay those features that are central futureoriented or symbolic In the face of such contradictory descrip tions of the specter that is haunting the study of man it is small wonder that a recent group of psychologists torn between their wish to present a c0nvincing analysis of the directional aspects of human behavior and to meet scienti c canons of objectivity found themselves tempted by the rather desperate strategem of referring to themselves as subjective behaviorists Miller et 12 1960 an addiction to machines rats or infants leads us to 39Histandard and indispensable practice in English both natural and sci and culture Geertz Growth of Culture 715 1 So far as the concept of mind is concerned this state of affairs is xtremely unfortunate because an extraordinarily useful notion and one r which there is no precise equivalent save perhaps the archaism psyche is turned into a Shibboleth It is even more unfortunate be mause the fears which have so crippled the term are largely baseless the dying echoes of the great mock civil war between materialism and 39ff39 fdualism generated by the Newtonian TGVOIUtiOn Mechanism S Ryle 1211949 has said is a ho e because the feaiLefiHests on the assump l ffthat itis somehow contradictmyto say tthfr fj39 is governed by mechanical laws and mora principles as though a gol For such thinkers its main function has been to give a vaguely de ned 1 cannot at once confOrm to the laws of ballistics obey the rules of got gland play with elegance But subjectivism is a bogey too for the fear of fit rests on the equally peculiar assumption that because I cannot know 39What you dreamed of last night thought of while memorizing a string pf nonsense syllables or feel about the doctrine of infant damnation aimless you choose to tell me that any theorizing I may do about the 39 role such mental facts play in your behavior must be based on a false i anthropornorphic analogy from what I know or think I know about falthe role they play in mine Lashley s 1958 tart comment that meta J lphysicians and theologians have spent so many years weaving fairy tales about mind that they have come to believe one another s phan 39 tasies is inaccurate only in that it neglects to note that a great many behavioral scientists have been engaged in the same sort of collective Ei autism One of the most frequently suggested methods for rehabilitating mind 1 as a useful scienti c concept is to transform it into a verb or participle fig Mind is minding the reaction of an organism as a whole as a coherent gum a view which releases us from the verbal bondage of a sterile and paralyzing metaphysics and sets us free to sow and reap in a eld illquotWhat will bear fruit White 1949 pp 52 54 But this Cure involves falling in with the school bench story that a noun is a word that names a person place or thing which was not true in the rst place The use of nouns as dispositional terms ie words denoting capacities and pro pensities rather than entities or activities Byle 1949 is actually a enti c If mind is to go faith hope and charity will have to go with it as well as cause force and gravitation and motive role Mind is minding may be all right science is sciencing White 1949 at least bearable but superego is superegoing is a little wkward But even more important although it is true that part of the 0g of confusion which has arisen around the concept of mind is a azresult of a false analogy with nouns which do name persons places or 1 fthings it mainly springs from much deeper sources than the merely 716 Mind as Method Geertz Growth of Culture 717 linguistic Consequently making it into a verb is no real protection at all against a sterile and paralyzing metaphysics Like mechanists sub jectivists are men of in nite resource and an occult activity may simply be substituted for an occult entity as in the case for example of intro SPeCtmg 39 i t 39 39 39 fh39ouse again because it did result from such a capability no matter how From the screntl c pomt of View to identify mind With behavror 90mde Such judgments being empirical may be Wrong a man may the reaction of the organism as a whole is to render it as uselessly jhave really tripped when we thought he was only Clowning or a pig redundant 33 t0 ld ntify it With an entity more ghOStly than a ghOSt39 39 Ileally been cooked when we thought it merely burned But the point Thenotion that it IS more defen31ble to transform a reality into another I S that when we attribute mind to an organism we are talking aqu reality than to transform it into an unreality is not correct a rabbit dis geither the organism s actions nor its products per se but abcmtl appears 1 as completely When he is magically Changed into a horse apach andiits proneness its dispositim perform certain kinds 0 as he does when he is changed into a centaur Mind is a term denoting fictions and produce certain kinds of products a capacity and a Emma When mind meets a classof skills propensities capacities tendencies habits it refers in fi ess we of course infer from the fact that he does sometimes perform an organism Dewey phrase 1934 to an aCtiVe and eager baCkground WhiCh hes 1 Pitch actions and produce such products There is nothing extramundane anltttilrlgf fggggm 39 a OU Wait and engages Whatever Comes its Way39 And as web it IS Halther an about this it merely indicates that a language lacking dispositional terms action nor a thing bUt an Organized SyStem 0f diSPOSitionS WhiCh nds inWOIIlCl make the scienti c description and analysis of human behavior stxtraordinarily dif cult and severely cripple its conceptual development 39 o in the same way that a language such as the Arapesh Mead nd in actions or the workings of his mind but if a clown trips on purpose We Which you must enumerate by saying one two two and one one dog ie four one dog and one one dog and two one dog and two and one two dogs quot shunting so troublesome that people nd it such an effort to go beyond 5 two dogs and two dogs and two dogs ie twentyfour that they 1 refer to all larger quantities as a lot i Further within such a general conceptual framework it is possible f to discuss the biological psychological sociological and cultural deter minants of man s mental life concurrently without making any reduc causes but for being an exercise of skill Now a skill is not an act It is there llhnist hypotheses at all This is because a capacity for something or a fore neither a witnessable nor an unwitnessable act To recognize that a per proneness to do something not being an entity or a performance is formance is an exerCise Of a is indeed to appreciate in the Of a not reduction In case Kyle s I could factor which could not be separately recorded by a camera But the reason say no doubt incorrectly that his tumbling was reducible to a Chain of why the skill exercised in a performance cannot be separately recorded by a thanditioned reflexes but I could not say that his skill was so reducible because by his skill I only mean to say that he can tumble For the sum can tumble it is possible if simplistic to write this organism unrecorded Just as the habit of talking loudly is not itself loud or quiet since ffian preduce the described re ex Seriesli but it is FOSSibIe to get the Trican out of the sentence only by replacing it with is able to has the 1Capacity to etc which is not a reduction but merely an immaterial shift from a verbal to an adjectival or nounal form All one can do in the ixthe analysis of skills is to show the way in which they are or are not dependent upon various factors such as nervous system complexity ju39ri39epressed desires to exhibit the existence of social institutions such as A Similar argument applies to Objects W3 WOUld 110 refer save in 5 tircuses or the presence of a cultural tradition of mimicking clumsiness gf0r the purposes of satire Once dispositional predicates are admitted its manifestation in some actions and some things As Ryle has pointed out if a clumsy man trips accidentally we do not regard it proper to his do feel it prOper to say this The cleverness of the clown may be exhibited in his tripping and tumbling He trips and tumbles just as clumsy people do except that he trips and tumbles on purpose and after much rehearsal and at the golden moment and where the children can see him and so as not to hurt himself The spectators applaud his skill at seeming clumsy but what they applaud is not some extra hidden performance executed in his head It is his visible performance that they admire but they admire it not for being an effect of any hidden internal camera is not that it is an occult or ghostly happening but that it is not a happening at all It is a disposition or complex of dispositions and a disposi tion is a factor of the wrong logical type to be seen or unseen recorded or it is not the sort of term of which loud or quiet can be predicated or just as a susceptibility to headaches is for the same reason not itself unendur able 0r endurable so the skills tastes and bents which are exeLcjseiin overt or internal operations are not themselves overt or internal witnessable or unwitnessable Ryle 1949 p 33 metaphorical way to the legendary burned pig the Chinese produced by etc cripples mathematical development by making anymore Ilx igiimw 43 m F ghm Lg mm mm M m at r 11 i 39 718 Mind as Method into scienti c description they are not eliminated by shifts in the level of description employed And with the recognition of this fact a whole range of pseudo problems false issues and unrealistic fears can simply be set aside In perhaps no area of inquiry is such an avoidance of manufactured paradoxes more useful than that of the study of mental evolution Burdened in the past by almost all the classic anthropological fallacies ethnocentrism an overconcern with human uniqueness imaginatively reconstructed history a superorganic concept of culture a priori stages of evolutionary change the whole search for the origins of human men legitimate question are not invalidated by misconceived answers So far ages of a dispositional answer to the question What is mind is that it permits us to reopen a classic issue without reviving classic controversres mind both iffadequate have been current The rst is the thesis that the sort of human thought processes Freud 1900 1911 called pri mary substitution reversal condensation etc are phylogenetically prior to those he called secondai y directed logically ordered reason ing etc Within the con nes of anthropology this thesis has been based on the assumption that it is possible simply to identify patterns of col ture and modes of thought L vyBriihl 1923 On such an assumption groups of peeple lacking the cultural resources of modern science which 39 postulates that the dggglgpment of the capacity for acquiring culture was have been at least in certain contexts so effectively employed in direc tive reasoning in the West are considered ipso facto to lack the very capacity for intellection these resources serve as though the con nement of the Arapesh to combinations of one ossils to complete it eg Arieti 19591 1 In addition this proposition has been supported as Hallowell 1939 has pointed out by an uncritical application of Haeckel s now rejected law of recapitu ges were used as evidence of the that primary processes Hartmann 1989 and Hartmann Kris and Lowenstein 1946 lGeertz Growth of Culture 719 It was in reaction to this tissue of errors that the second view of liuman mental evolution arose namely that not only is the existence of H e human mind in essentially its modern form a prerequisite for the 39 Cquisition of culture but the growth of culture in itself has been with iut any signi cance for mental evolution The bird gave up a pair of walking limbs to acquire wings It added a new culty by transforming part of an old one The airplane on the contrary gave men a new faculty without diminishing or even impairing any of those hey had previously possessed It led to no visible bodily changes no altera tions of mental ca aci Kroeber 1948 5 tality has tended to fall into disrepute or at any rate to be neglected p ty p But legitimate questions and how man came to have his mind 15 a 1But in tum this argumentimp es two corollaries one of which the d I3iloctrine of the psychic unityof mankindquothasfotind ncreasing empirical as anthropology IS concerned at least one of the most important a van gSubstantia on sa thmpol icaliremhae proceededhut the other sf which the191731931P9i rthefryibf th aea afance 0 7 Cu tum has f39h39econje in leasingly remoteThe doctrine of the psychic unity of man 39kind ibid p 573 whiCh39 so far as I am aware is today not seriously JQuestioned by any reputable anthropologist is but the direct contra dictory of the primitive mentality argument it asserts that there are no quot ssentia1 differences in the fundamental nature of the thought process among the various living races of man If the existence of a modern type of mind is held to be prerequisite to the acquisition of culture the uni tersal possession of culture by all contemporary human groups of course 39inakes of the psychic unity doctrine a simple tautology but whether genuinely tautological or not it is a proposition for whose empirical Validity the ethnographic and psychological evidence is altogether over 39iivhelming Kluckhohn 1953 As fOr the critical point theory of the appearance of culture it a sudden allornone type of occurrence in My ogeny of the pri 39 inates Kroeber 1948 pp 7172 At some speci c moment in the new two and dog were a result g39nrecoverable history of hominidization a portentous but in genic or rather than a cause of their lack of mathematical facility If one then i atomlf l terms Prorably qlilteImm fahorgamC 31391711131103 tooh 13133165 adds to this argument the invalid empirical generalization that tribal fesgma dX 1 Codrtifia Strucml lfv 1 an 3131123 t isetpalenvtsi 13951 peoples employ whatever meager culture resources they do have for 0t in 1351033 h000n nil39lnlcat egtf601earn and it39teacf i 0 gencmditze intellection less frequently less persistently and less circumspectly than if romd edef 33953 21 31 1593 I 61 111g 1 a3 11 0st was dsqr IS do Western peoples the proposition that primary process thinking pro 9 and bleltewih 3 3amp3 t etiate39 11111 ICE 1 avpzith ins eeds secondary process thinking phylogenetically needs only the nal 1lter an gm ed aCCUI mIIJa 1011 et 1 CL n O S to Him I istake of viewing tribal peoples as primitive forms of humanity living a u re was or an 01108 0H1 S 011 1 5 0W 0 urse so a g w tion in which presumed parallels in the thought of children psychotics and sav phylogenetic priority of autism For suggestions are not even ontogenetically prior to secondary ones see 720 Mind as Method wholly independently of the further organic evolution of man The whole process of the creation of modern man s capacity for producing and using culture his most distinctive mental attribute is conceptual ized as one of a marginal quantitative change giving rise to a radical qualitative difference as when water reduced degree by degree without any loss of uidity suddenly freezes at 0 C ibid or when a taxing plane gains suf cient speed to launch itself into ight White 1949 p 33 But we are talking of neither water nor airplanes and the question is can the sharp line between enculturated man and nonenculturated non mant at this View implies in hi to be drawn 0139 if we mu have anal39 ght but qualitatively metastatic change of the freezing of water sort ogies would not a moreihistorical one such as the unbroken gradual 2fNot only has it now become misleading to employotheo appointment to tank image for theoappearance of man but i it is equallydoubtful TIWhether we shouldiany longer talkiinterms of the appearance of culture ance of man as if he had suddenly been promoted from colonel to Viticulture toqialong within m a113 ha d S ddb wigaped Eng egistehceo quot39H aileweIIJ19597s Haiioweu 1960 39 i rise of modern out of medieval England be more apti39NVithin the physical branch of anthropology the doubt that one can talk about the appear brigadier general and had a date of rank Howells 1950 has grown with increasing rapidity as the Australopithecene fossils of South Africa have come to be placed more and more in the hominid line These fossils than a half million years ago show a striking mosaic of primitive and advanced morphological characteristics in which the most outstanding features are a pelvis and leg formation strikingly similar to that of modern man and a cranial capacity hardly larger than that of living apes Although the initial tendency was to regard this conjunction of a man like bipedal locomotive system and an apelike brain as indicating development separate from both hominids and pongids Hooton 1949 clusion that the rst hominids were smallbrained newly bipedal proto direction of large brains and modi ed skeletons of the same form 2 Its unlikely freed from locomotion manufactured tools Oakley 1957 Leakey 1960 that and probably hunted small animals Washburn and Howell 1960 But i could have the Australian aborigine or possessed language in the modern sense of been this the term with 500 cubic centimeters of brain isouonolikely Hallowell smart This 1960 e Australo ithec in odd sort eanyinthe eVOIUtIOnary 2 By minoid is meant the superfamily of animals living and extinct to Change which both man and the pongid apes gorilla orang chimpanzee and gibbon belongs but not the apes Geertz Growth of Culture 721 f man who evidently was capable of acquiring some elements of cul r emsimple toolmaking sporadic hunting and perhaps some system hf communication more advanced than that of contemporary apes and ss advanced than that of true speech but not others a state of affairs hich casts fairly serious doubt on the viability of the critical point eoryt fact as the Home sapienslrbrain is about three times as large that fothe Austral opithecenesi the greater part if human cortical expansionhas fqllW precelled the beginning of culture Wash iburn 1959 a rather inexplicable circumstance if the capacity for cul re is considered to have been the unitary Outcome of a quantitatively As paradoxis a sign of antecedent error the fact that one of its giporollaries seems to be valid while the other does not suggest that the Dart 1957 Whieh date from the lower PleiStOCehe Peried 0f more iiihesis which holds mental evolution and cultural accumulation to be two separate processes the rst having been essentially completed iiibefore the second began is itself incorrect And if this is the case it becomes necessary to nd some way in which we can rid ourselves of Which a thesis without at the same time undermining the doctrine of psychic unity in whose absence we should have to consign most of his iglory anthropology and sociology to the scrap heap and begin over again that the Australopithecenes represented an aberrant and illfated line of jwl39th a psychosomatic goootio interpretation of man and his varieties iiKroeber 1948 p 573 We need to be able both to deny any signi cant pp 281 88 the contemporary Consensus fellows Howells 1950 con39 i i39elationship between group cultural achievement and innate mental ihpacity in the present and to af rm such a relationship in the past australopith hominoids and that what we have always meant by man 5ng represents later forms Of this group With secondary adaptations in the what may appear to be a simple technical trick but is actually an important methodological reorientation the choice of a more nely NOW these more or 1335 erect smallhreihed hominidsa their hands 39Egigraduated time scale in terms of which to discriminate the stages of Z 39fvolutionary change which have produced Homo sapiens out of an Eocene 39iijrotohominoid Whether one sees the appearance of the capacity for hominids that they could have had a developed culture comparable to that of say ottlture as a more or less abrupt instantaneous occurrence 0 a slowly igfinoving continuous deveIOpment obviously depends at least in part on the size of the elementary units in one s time scale for a geologist measur by eons the whole evolution of the primates may look like an ifilndi ferentiated qualitative burst In fact the argument against the The means by which to accomplish this oddly twoheaded task lies if39i39britical point theory might be more precisely phrased in terms of a com belong and by hominid the family of an m 315 living and extinct to which man L39Plaint that it derives from an inappropriate chmce of tlme soale a time t teale whose basal intervals are too large for a re ned analysrs of recent Culture and tnam development cantbe considered synonymous duetothefact thatthey followed different evolutionary j pauerns Wr txk f m W W Jmkman quot 39 mans9 39u l il39usaFo39mfA7 9L e Awmzn n 722 Mind as Method evolutionary history in the same way as a biologist foolish enough to study human maturation with decades as his interval would see adult hood as a sudden transformation of childhood and miss adolescence altogether A good example of such a cavalier approach to temporal considera tions is im licit in what i u u 39 n in support 0 t e ineren ce in kindn ather in degree view of human cultureilthequotcbmsdni of man with his closest living relatives the pongids and particularly the chimpanzee Man can talk can symbolize can acquire culture this argument goes but the chimpanzee and by extension all less endowed animals can not Therefore man is unique in this regard and insofar as mentality is concerned we are confronted by a series of leaps not an ascending con tinuum White 1960 but the artument is v r uuo 39 over 00 s e ac 1a atioug tie pongi s may e man s cosest relatives close is an elastic term and given a realistic time scale from the evolutionary point of view they are really not so close at all the last common ancestor being at the very least an upper Pliocene and at the very most an upper Oligocene ape and phyletic differentiation hav ing proceeded with everincreasing rapidity since that time Spuhler 1959 The fact that chimpanzees do not talk is both interesting and important but to draw from that fact the conclusion that speech is an all ornothingatall phenomenon is to collapse anywhere from one to 39 forty million years into a single instant of time and lose the whole pre sapiens hominid line as surely as our biologist lost adolescence Inter speci c comparison of living animals is if handled with care a legitimate and in fact indispensable device for deducing general evolutionary trends but in the same way that the wave length of light limits the degree of re nement in quantum level physical measurements so the fact that the closest living relatives of man are at best pretty farremoved cousins not ancestors limits the degree of re nement in the measure of evolutionary change in the hominoid line when one con nes oneself entirely to contrasts between extant forms3 If on the contrary we spread hominid phylogeny out along a more appropriate time scale training our attention on what seems to have happened in the human line since the radiation of the hominoids and in particular since the emergence of Australopithecus in the lower Plels tocene a subtler analysis of the evolutionary growth of mind is made possible Most crucially it then becomes apparent that n o tquoto r il was y39cu l t ural accumulation under way well before organic development 3 For a general discussion of the dangers involved in an uncritical use of com parisons among contemporaneous forms to generate historical hypotheses see Simp son 1950 Geertz Growth of Culture 723 iEeasedr bntrthat such accnnilletibn ya thi nal stages bf that d v lbpgnb Though it is apparently true enough that the invention of the airplane led to no visible bodily Ifchanges no alterations of innate mental capacity this was not neces sarily the case for the pebble tool or the crude chopper in whose wake TZSeems to have come not only more erect stature reduced dentition and more thumbdominated hand but the expansion of the human brain its present size Washburn 1959 Because tool manufacture puts a premium on manual skill and fOresight its introduction must have acted to shift selection pressures so as to favor the rapid growth of the fore brain as in all likelihood did the advances in social organization Bar tholomew and Birdsell 1953 communication Hayes and Hayes 1955 and moral regulation Hallowell 1959 which there is reason to believe also occurred during this period of overlap between cultural and bio 39 logical change Nor were such nervous system changes merely quanti jftative alterations in the interconnections among neurons and their man quotgt3Iner of functioning may have been of even greater importance than the ifSimple increase in their number Spuhler 1959 Bullock 1958 Details quotaside however and the bulk of them remain to be determinedw the liipoint is that the innate generic constitution of modern man what used jffin a simpler clay to be called human nature imnow appears to be both cultural andiaibiiqlogical product in that Eg o ti 4 loitlii k of muriofmourjtructureiasiareisnltiof culture thanito it link ofimen anatomically ilrike ourselves slowly adiscoveringCitli l I l A I ire with asiiiaaagna an inTate l arid formations and yegejtaitigjfhaisllgongibeen recognized rorbe riodiiii iwliich conditions were rideaL for the ef cient evolutionaryidevelopmentiofimanrEmiliani 1960 now it39seemsalso it0 have been a period in which a cultural environment increasingly supplemented the natural environment in the selection process so as to lurther accelerate the rate of hominid evolution to an unprecedented speed Spuhler 1959 Leakey 1960 The Ice Age appears not to have been merely a time of receding brow ridges and shrinking jaws but a iime in which were forged nearly all those characteristics of man s existence which are most graphically human his thoroughly encephe lated nervous system his incest taboobased social structure and his Capacity to create and use 5 mbols The fac 39 39 39 L 39 o umani y emerge toget ier in complex interaction with one 5i another rather than serially as for so long supposed is if it is a fact of exceptional importance in the interpretation of human mentality be ypause it suggests that man s nervous system does not merely enable him to acquire culture it positively demands that he do so if it is going to yiiliely payemcaiaeein wk k p t i 724 Mind as Method and extend organically based capacities logically and genetically prior to it Bidney 1953 Chap 3 it would seem to be ingredient to those capac ities themselves A cultureless human being would probably turn out to be not an intrinsically talented though unful lled ape but a wholly mindless and consequently unworkable monstrosity Like the cabbage and extrasomatic phenomena seems to have been of crucial signi cance urmg e w o e of the primate advance That any living or extinct rowed sense of an ordered system of meaning and symbols in terms of which individuals de ne their world express their feelings and make their judgments Geertz 1957 is of course extremely doubtful But that apes and monkeys are such throughandthrough social creatures as to be unable to achieve emotional maturity in isolation Harlow 1959 to acquire a great many of their most important performance capacities longer be a taUtOIOSY but it iS still a fact through imitative learning ibid Nissen 1955 and to develop distinc tive intraspeci cally variable collective social traditions which are transmitted as a nonbiological heritage from generation to generation DeVore nd is now well established As DeVore ibid remarks in E summary of the available material Primates literally have a socral brain Thus well before it was in uenced by cultural forces as such 1 the evolution of what eventually developed into the human nervous sys I 7 arc Pribram 1960 The conventional picture of a sensory impulse making its way through a maze of synapses to a motor nerve culmina 39 tion is coming to be revised a quarter century after its most illustrious tem was positively shaped by social ones5 On the other hand however a denial of a simple independence of sociocultural and biological processes in prehomo sapiens man does not imply a rejection of the doctrine of psychic unity because phyleflc aspects of the behavior of a sparrow or a sheep dog much less that of a man Sherrington 1953 p 170 Sherrington s solution was a spectral i39 mind to pull things together as Hull s 1943 was a no less mysterious automatic switchboard but today the stress is upon a more veri able differentiation within the hominid line effectively ceased with the termi nal Pleistocene spread of Homo sapiens over nearly the whole world and the extinction of whatever other Home species may have been in exist ence at that time Thus although some minor evolutionary changes have 5 no doubt occurred since the rise of modern man all living peoples form part of a single polytypical species and as such vary anatomically and 2 physiologically within a very narrow range Montague 1950 The combination of weakened mechanisms of reproductive isolation an 4 As for wolf children and other feral fantasies see Lorenz nd 5 Some subprimate mammals also follow a de nitely social mode of life Thomp son 1958 so that this whole process probably predates primates altogetlier39The social behavior of some birds Lorenz 1952 and insects Emerson 1958 13 of less immediate relevance however because these orders are tangential to the human deveIOpmental line Geertz Growth of Culture 725 function at an Rather than culture acting only to supplement develop extended period of individual sexual immaturity and the accumulation of culture to the point where its importance as an adaptive factor iiialmost wholly dominated its role as a selective one produced such an extreme deceleration of the hominid rate of evolution that the develop ment of any signi cant variation in innate mental capacity among human subgroups seems to have been precluded With the unequivocal triumph it so much resembles the Homo sapiens brain having arisen within 0f Homo sapiens and the Cessation 0f the 31301350115 the link between the framework of human culture would not be viable outside of it4 gfganitiaCUIWT31 Clhangelvffss if 110 SiVered title gl39leatlydweakene 39 39 W en somatic mce a ime organic evo u ion in t e uman ine as s owe to a we In fact ns type39Of rempmcauy creatwe relatlonsmp bet e43 33ICarter 1953 while the growth of culture has continued to proceed 39 with ever increasing rapidity It is therefore unnecessary to postulate infrahominid primates can be said to possess true culture in the nar either a diSCOIT HUOUSa dj erence39i 39ldnd Pattern 0f 1111113311 BVOIUtiOD 39 or a nonselective role for culture during all phases of hominid develop ment in order to preserve the empirically established generalization that as far as their inborn capacity to learn maintain transmit and trans form culture is concerned different groups of Homo sapiens must be regarded as equally competent Mead 1958 Psychic unity may no 3 One of the more encouraging if strangely delayed developments in the behavioral sciences is the current attempt of physiological psychology to arouse itself from its long enthrallment with the wonders of the re ex proponent pointed out that it was inadequate to explain the integrative construct the concept of rhythmic spontaneous centrally proceed ring pattern of nervous activity upon which peripheral stimulus con gurations are superimposed and out of which authoritative effector commands emerge Advancing under the banner of an active organism and supported by the closed circuit anatomizing of Cayal and de No 1943 this new persuasion emphasizes the way in which the ongoing processes both of the brain and subordinate neuronal aggregatesselect precepts Bruner 1958 x experiences Gerard 1960 and order i responses LaShleY 1951 So as to produce a delicately modulated pat 39 f tern of behavior 39 725 Reread Mind as Method the working of the central nervous system is a hierarchic affair in which functions at the higher levels do not deal directly with the ultimate structural units such as neurons or motor units but operate by activating lower patterns that have their own relatively autonomous structural unity The same is true for the sensory input which does not project itself down to the last final path of motor neurons but operates by affecting distorting and somehow modifying the preexisting preformed patterns of central coordina tion which in turn then confer their distortions upon the lower patterns of eifection and so on The nal output is then the outcome of this hierarchical passing down of distortions and modifications of intrinsically performed pat terns of excitation which are in no way replicas of the input The structure of the input does not produce the structure of the output but merely modi es intrinsic nervous activities that have a structural organization of their own Weiss 1951 Further development of this theory of an autonomously excited hierarchically organized central nervous system not only promises to make the brisk competence of Sherrington s sheep dog as it collects its scattered from the hillside less of a physiological7my terybut7it valuable in providing neurological un der pinning fftlmomplEx of sldllsiand pe es wEh consti the Vl t uriit lj itidjjmbility to follow a logic proof or a tendency to become lustered when called upon to speak demand more than a reflex arc conditioned or otherwise to support them biologically And as Hebb has pointed out the very notion of higher and lower evolutionary levels of mentality seems in itself to imply a comparable gradation in degree of central nervous system autonomy I hope I do not shock biological scientist by saying that one feature of the phylogenetic deveIOpment is an increasing evidence of what is known in some circles as free will in lny77S77thk3n day lsoreferred to asthe Harvard Law which asserts that lanylwellirained lgtigi rill dt s h u nn well pleies A more scholarly formulation is that the higheranimalis less stimulusboundBitin7action is leiss fullcontrolled byiafferentinput 39t l efore less predictableifrom animalisputhErez ef role of ideational activity is recognizable in the animal s ability to hold a variety of stimulations for some time before acting on them and in the phenomenon of purposive behavior There is more autonomous activity in the higher brain and more selectivity as to which afferent activity will be integrated with the stream of thought the dominant ongoing activity in control of behavior Traditionally we say that the subject is interested in this part of the environmentL npt interested in that in these terms777the hi her ani il l s a dgrjaifitjyiof interestsiandthei er st Toff j Tthgnomepgphlyszapggeateigpartgnjshayior which mea s a great 7171113351 dictabiliityiasitgwihat stimailns willbe respgntieditoiantl as to the form of the 1 1954 references omitted tli i mzirnrrialsi Tifg 7 particiila 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 thepjimatesandhofninitls is evidei tljj aitherijess clear con troversialgihoweliren iii On the one hand Gerard has argued that the These overall evolutionary trends increasing ability to focus atten tion delay response vary interest sustain purpose and in general deal positively with the complexities of present stimulation culminate 7 quotin man to make of him the most active of active organisms as well as the most unpredictable The extreme intricacy exibility and compre hensiveness of what Kluckhohn and Murray 1948 have aptly called regnant processes in the human brain the processes which make these abilities physically possibleware but the outcome of a de nable phylo genetic development which is traceable back at least to the coelenterates Bullock 1958 Though the lack a central nervous concentration a 0 r e various par 5 0 1e anima opera e in re awe independence each possessing its own set of sensory neural and motor f elements these humble jelly sh sea anemones and the like nevertheless show a surprising degree of intrinsic modulation of nervous activity a strong stimulus received in the daytime may be followed by locomotion quot during the following night certain corals experimentally subjected to excessivestimulation luminesce for several minutes afterward with a i 7 spontaneous frenzy which suggests beserking and regularized stimula quot tion may lead through some still obscure form of memory to a coordi nation of activity in different muscles and to a patterned recurrence of activity over time ibid In the higher invertebrates crustaceans etc a multiple pathways graded synaptic potentials and triggered responses all appear permitting precise pacemaker control of internal functions as in the lobster heart ibid while with the arrival of the lower verte brates both peripheral sensory and effector elements and neuronal con duction between them ie the celebrated re ex arc are essentially perfected Gerard 1960 And nally the bulk of the fundamental innovations in the design of nervous circuitsie closed loops the super position of higher level 100ps on lower ones etc probably were accom plished with the arrival of the mammals nd at which time at least the basic differentiations of the forebrain were also achieved Pribram 1958 In functional terms the whole process seems to be one of a relatively steady expansion and diversi cation of endogenous nervous activity and the consequent increasing centralization of what were pre viously more isolated independently acting partprocesses What scriptine ral evolution has Take p lme duri fhe phyteuc changes have been almost entirely quantitative a growth in the sheer number of neurons as reflected in the rapid expansion of the brain size The further gains in capacity seen most strikingly in the primate line and g assiagjheiaavaaa r wiEWKmerhamewummsm nu quot39 39rr7 1 728 Mind as Method culminating in man are due to simple increase in numbers rather than to improvement in units or patterns The increasing brain size parallels richer performance even for particular regions and functions eg tongue motor area and speech is a commonplace see Spuhler 1959 how this operates is less clear Sheer increase in number without secondary speci cation which does also occur might seem unable to generate new capacities but only to intensify old ones but this is not the case In the brain an increase in the anatomical neurone population raises the limit on the physiological neurone reserve and so allows greater variety 0 se ec on and greatemchmof analy sis and combination expressed in modi able and insightful behavior 1960 see also 1959 But Bullock though agreeing that the nervous systems of the higher animals and man show no important differences in terms of known neurOphysiological mechanisms or architecture sharply questions this point of view and argues that there is a pressing need to search for yet undiscovered parameters of nervous functioning emergent levels of physiological relations between neurons in masses to account for the subtleties of behavior in advanced organisms Though we cannot point to fundamentally new elements in the neuronal mechanisms of the higher centers still it is difficult to assume that their greatly enlarged accomplishments are solely attributable to the great increase in numbers and interconnections between them unless this in itself brings on new properties and mechanisms Many apparently assume as a rst approxima tion that the main factor in increasing behavioral complexity in evolution is the number of neurons even invoking a kind of critical mass which permits new levels of behavior but it seems clear that the number of neurones correlates with behavioral complexity so poorly as to explain little unless we add as the really essential part that certain kinds of neurons not now defin able orw what is the same thingwcertain kinds of newer pmperties of con sequences or neuronal architecture are the important substratum of advance I do not believe that our present physiology of neurons extrapolated can account for behavior The main factor in evolutionary advance is not just numbers of cells and connections Our hope lies in theme parameters of neuronal systems 1960 To an outsider perhaps the most striking aspect of this controversy is the degree to which both parties seem somewhat uneasy and vaguely dissatis ed with the unalloyed versions of their own argument the degree to which it seems not to be entirely plausible even to themselves On the one side there is an admission that the precise nature of the relation between brain size and behavioral complexity is indeed unclear and some sotto voce reservations about secondary specification on the other a frank puzzlement concerning the apparent absence of novel Geertz Growth of Culture 729 mechanisms in advanced nervous systems and a hopeful murmuring about emergent properties There is actually something of an agree ment that the attribution of the secular increase in mammalian mental capacity solely and simply to a gross increase in neuron population taxes credulity The difference is that in one case doubts are quieted by a stress on the fact that a parallelism between increasing brain size and richer iperformance does anyhow obtain while on the other doubts are accentuated by a stress on the fact that something seems to be missing to make this parallelism satisfactorily explicable This issue may eventually be clari ed as Gerard 1959 suggests by advances in work with computer circuits where performance does im 39 prove with a simple multiplication of identical units or as Bullock 1960 suggests by further re nements in the analysis of chemical differences between nerve cells But it is even more likely that the main 39 avenue to its resolution lies in the abandonment of the wholly nativistic conceptualization of nervous functioning in the higher mammals which L seems to be implicit in both these approaches The synchronic emergence in primates of an expanded forebrain developed forms of social organiza tion and at least after Australopithecenes got their hands on tools institutionalized patterns of culture indicates that the standard pro 39 cedure of treating biological social and cultural parameters serially 39 the rst being taken as primary to the second and the second to the thirdmis illadvised On the contrary these socalled levels should be seen as reciprocally interrelated and considered conjointly Parsons 1959 And if this is done the sort of novel properties we will search for within the central nervous system to serve as a physical basis for the striking development of autonomous elds of recurrent neural excitation in primates generally and in man particularly will differ radically from i 39 the sort of properties we would seek were we to regard those elds as logically and genetically prior to society and culture and therefore 5 requiring a full determination in terms of intrinsic physiological para meters alone Perhaps we have been asking too much of neurons or if i not too much at least the wrong things In fact so far as man is concerned one of the most striking character istics of his central nervous system is the relative incompleteness with which acting within the con nes of autogenous parameters alone it is able to specify behavior By and large the lower an animal the more it mu to respond to a threatening stimulus with an intrinsically con nected series of pT39er ormed activities which taken together comprise a f 39 comparatively stereotyped which is not to say unlearned flight or ght response Lorenz 1952 Man s intrinsic response to such a stimu lus tends to consist however of a diffuse variably intense fear or r rage excitability accompanied by few if any automatically preset 730 Mind as Method wellde ned behavioral sequences Hebb and Thompson 19546 Like a frightened animal a frightened man may run hide bluster dissemble placate or desperate with panic attack but in his case the precise pat terning of such overt acts is guided predominantly by cultural rather than genetic templates In the always diagnostic area of sex where con trol of behavior proceeds phylogenetically from gonadal to pituitary to central nervous system prepotency a similar evolutionary trend away from xed activity sequences toward generalized arousal and increas ing exibility and modi ability of sexual patterns is apparent Beach 1958 cf 1947 a trend of which the justly famous cultural variation in the sexual practices of man Ford and Beach 1951 would seem to represent a logical extensionquot Thus in apparent paradox an increasing autonomy hierarchical complexity and regnancy of ongoing central nervous system activity seem to go hand in hand with a less fully detailed determination of such activity by the structure of the central nervous system inrand ofitselfyieu intrinsically All of which periodcf l 7 I O focilt dhha ge functional Self su ilieng From this standpoint the accepted View that mental functioning is essentially an intracerebral process which can only be secondarily as sisted or ampli ed by the various arti cial devices which that process has enabled man to invent appears to be quite wrong On the contrary 6 The uncritical use of thequot term instinct so as to confuse three separate but not unrelated contraststhat between behavior patterns which rest on learning and those which do not that between behavior patterns which are innate ie an out come of genetically programed physical processes and those which are not ie withmorerepaintd ielgmeasiiasear renamemama ma y tu rn Oiit t oconsiStofitheappearance ofquotp rOpertieswhich pnjzef the pferftg pahcicapacity of the centrialinerig S mibutil39eduge its r parative evidence long tpriortoispeeehynot con itional unit Hebb 1954 But though Ceertz Growth of Culture a fully speci ed adaptively suf cient de nition of regnant neural proc esses in terms of intrinsic parameters being impossible the human brain is thoroughly dependent upon cultural resources for its very operation and those resources are consequently not adjuncts to but constituents of mental activity In fact thinking as an overt public act involving the purposeful manipulation of objective materials is probably fundamental to human beings and thinking as a covert private act and without re source to such materials a derived though not unuseful capability As the observation of how school children learn to calculate shows adding numbers in your head is actually a more sophisticated mental accom plishment than adding them with a paper and pencil through an arrange 39 fashion one s fin ers and toes ary ac nevemen an 13968 111g 0 one quot self the latter ability having only arisen as a matter of fact in the Middle Ages Ryle 1949 p 27 And a similar point about speech has 39 Often been made except in our less naive moments we are all like Forester s little old lady we don t know what we think until we see what we say It has sometimes been argued against this last ppinLthat f the 65mg 7 8quotquotquot l39l39asthean aphasia clearlyiinakes true enough in itself this does not undermine the general position taken here namely that human culture is an ingredient not supplementary to human thoughtufor several reasons First the fact that subhuman animals learn to reason with sometimes startling effectiveness without learning to speak Harlow 1958 does not prove that men can do so any more than the fact that a rat can copulate without the mediation of imitative 3 learning or practice proves that a chimpanzee can do so Second as phasics are people who have learned to speak and to interiorize speech and then lost or more usually partially lost the former capacity notSpeeCh 18 DOT people who have never learned to speak at all Goldstein 1959 ThirddeVelop d tlirlough and most important speech in the speci c sense of vocalized talk is farCUlturea It cam be an outcome of extragenetically programed physical processes and that between be havior patterns which are in exible stereotyped and thOSe which are exible vari able has led to an incorrect assumption that to say a behavior pattern is innate is to say that no learning is necessary for its performance and that it is in exible in its expression Beach 1955 Pribram 1958 Here the term intrinsic as against ex trinsic is used to characterize behavior which on comparative grounds seems to rest largely or at least preponderantly on innate dispositions independently of questions of learning or exibility as such 397 But again this general trend appears already well established in the subhuman primates Some male chimpanzees have to learn to copulate It has been noted that sexually mature but inexperienced males placed with the receptive female show signs of marked sexual excitement but the resulting attempts to accomplish copula tion are usually unsuccessful The naive male appears incapable of carrying out his part of the mating act and it has been suggested that a great deal of practice and learning is essential to biologically effective coition in this species Adult male rodents which have been reared in isolation copulate normally the rst time they are offered an estrous femalequot Beach 1947 For some vivid descriptions of generalized fear and rage in chimpanzees see Hebb and Thompson 1954 from being the sole public instrumentality available to individuals pro jected into a preexisting cultural milieu Such phenomena as Helen Keller 1931 learning to think through a combination of the manipula tion of such cultural objects as mugs and water taps and the purposeful patterning by Miss Sullivan of tactile sensations on her hand or a prespeech child developing the concept of ordinal number through the setting up of two parallel lines of matched blocks Lashley 1949 demonstrate that what is essential is the existence of an overt symbol system of any sort8 For man in particular to conceive of thinking as 8 It is perhaps advisable also to point out explicitly that the View that humans normally learn to talk intelligently aloud and with others before they learn to talk 732 Mind as Method essentially a private process is to overlook almost completely what people actually do when they go about reasoning Imaginal thinking is neither more nor less than constructing an image of the environment running the model faster than the environment and pre dicting that the environment will behave as the model does The rst step in the solution of a problem consists in the contraction of a model or image of the relevant features of the environment These models can be constructed from many things including parts of the organic tissue of the body and by man paper and pencil or actual artifacts Once a model has been constructed it can be manipulated under various hypothetical conditions and constraints The organism is then able to observe the outcome of these manipulations and to project them onto the environment so that prediction is possible Accord ing to this view an aeronautical engineer is thinking when he manipulates a model of a new airplane in a wind tunnel The motorist is thinking when he runs his nger over a line on a map the nger serving as a model of the relevant aspects of the automobile the map as a model of the road External models of this kind are often used in thinking about complex environments Images used in covert thinking depend upon the availability of the physico chemical events of the organism which must be used to form models Galenter and Gerstenhaber 1956 It is a further implication of this view of re ective thought as con sisting not of happenings in the head but of a matching of the states and processes of symbolic models against the states and processes of the wider world that it is stimulus de cit which initiates mental activity and stimulus discovery which terminates it Deutsch 1953 The motorist running his nger over a road map is doing so because he lacks informa tion about how to get where he is going and he will cease doing so when he has acquired that information The engineer performs his experiments in the wind tunnel in order to nd out how his model air plane behaves under various arti cially produced aerodynamic condi tions and he will quit performing it if and when he indeed nds out A man searching for a coin in his pocket does so because he lacks a coin in hand and he stops searching when he gets hold of one ibid or of course when he comes to the conclusion that the whole project is bootless because it happens that there is no coin in his pocket or that it is uneconomical because the effort involved is such that the search costs more than it comes to Motivational problems which involve another sense of because aside directive reasoning begins in puzzle ment and ends in either the abandonment of inquiry or the resolution of puzzlement The function of reflective thought is to transform a to themselves in silence does not involve either a motor theory of thought or an argument that all covert mentation takes place in terms of imagined words see Whorf 1956 pp 66 if Geertz Growth of Culture 733 situation in which there is experienced obscurity of some sort into a situation that is clear coherent settled harmonious Dewey 1939 In sum human intellection in the speci c sense of directive reason ing depends upon the manipulation of certain kinds of cultural resources 39 in such a manner as to produce discover select environmental stimuli j 39 needed for whatever purpose by the organism it is a search for infor mation And this search is the more pressing because of the high degree of generality of the information intrinsically available to the organism from genetic sources The lower an animal the less it needs to nd out in detail from the environment prior to behavioral performance 39 birds need not build wind tunnels to test aerodynamic principles before learning to y those they already know The uniqueness of man I 7 has often been expressed in terms of how much and how many differ ent sorts of things he is capable of learning Although monkeys pigeons It and even octopuses may now and then disconcert us with the rather human things they prove capable of learning to do Pribram 1958 5 in a general way this is true enough But it is of perhaps even more fun damental theoretical importance to stress how much and how many quot things man has to learn That fetalized domesticated and gener ally unhardy as he is man would be a physically unviable animal independently of culture has often been pointed out eg La Barre 1954 that he would be mentally unviable as well has been rather less frequently noted but see Dewey 1917 Hallowell 1953 All this is no less true for the affective side of human thought than it is for the intellective In a series of books and papers Hebb 1946 1949 1954 Hebb and Thompson 1954 has developed the intriguing theory that the human nervous system and to a correspondingly lesser extent that of lower animals demands a relatively continuOus stream of optimally existing environmental stimuli as a precondition to competent performance On the one hand man s brain is not like a calculating quot machine operated by an electric motor which can lie idle without input for inde nite periods instead it must be kept warmed up and working by a constantly varied input during the waking period at least if it is to function effectively 1954 On the other hand given the tremendous intrinsic emotional susceptibility of man such input cannot be too intense too varied too disturbing because then emotional collapse and a complete breakdown of the thought process ensue Both boredom and hysteria are enemies of reason Solomon et 11 1957 Chapman at 01 1958 Thus as man is the most emotional as well as the most rational animalquot Hebb and Thompson 1954 a very careful cultural control of frightening euraging suggestive etc stimuliwthrough taboos homo E i g r i i f t E ii Wigwam 734 Mind as Method genization of behavior rapid rationalization of strange stimuli in terms of familiar concepts etc is necessary to prevent continual affec tive instability a constant oscillation between the extremes of passion But as man cannot perform efficiently in the39absence of a fairly high degree of reasonably persistent emotional activation cultural mecha nisms assuring the ready availability of the continually varying sort of sensory experience which can sustain such activities are equally essen tial Institutionalized regulations against the open display of corpses outside of welldefined contexts funerals etc protect a peculiarly highstrung animal against the fears aroused by death and bodily des truction watching or participating in automobile races not all of which take place at tracks deliciously stimulates the same fears Prize ghting arouses hostile feelings a rmly institutionalized interpersonal aifability moderates them Erotic impulses are titilated by a series of deviOus artifices of which there is evidently no end but they are kept from running riot by an insistence on the private performance of explicitly sexual activities But contrary to what these rather simplistic examples suggest the achievement of a workable wellordered clearly articulated emotional life in man is not a simple matter of ingenious instrumental control a kind of clever hydraulic engineering of affect Rather it is a matter of giving speci c explicit determinate form to the general diffuse ongoing ow of bodily sensation of imposing upon the continual shifts in sen tence towhich we are inherently subject a recognizable meaningful order so that we may not only feel but know what we feel and act accordingly It is mental activity that chie y determines the way a person meets his surrounding world Pure sensation mow pain now pleasure would have no unity and would change the receptivity of the body for future pains and pleasures only in rudimentary ways It is sensation remembered and antici pated feared or sought or even imagined and eschewed that is important in human life It is perception molded by imagination that gives us the out ward world that we know And it is the continuity of thought that system atizes our emotional reactions into attitudes with distinct feeling tones and sets a certain scope for the individual s passions In other words by virtue of our thought and imagination we have not only feelings but a life of feel ing Langer 1953 p 372 italics original In this context our mental task shifts from a gathering of information about the pattern of events in the external world per se toward a determining of the affective significance the emotional import of that pattern of events We are concerned not with solving problems but with clarifying feelings Nevertheless the existence of cultural resources Geertz Growth of Culture 735 of an adequate system of public symbols is just as essential to this sort of process as it is to that of directive reasoning And therefore the de velopment maintenance and dissolution of moods attitudes senti iments etc which are feelings in the sense of states or conditions not sensations or motives Ryle 1949 Chap I M constitute no more a basically private activity in human beings than does directive think 1 ing The use of a road map enables us to make our way from San Francisco to New York with precision the reading of Kafka s novels enables us to form a distinct and well de ned attitude toward modern bureaucracy We acquire the ability to design flying planes in wind 39 tunnels we develop the capacity to feel true awe in church A child counts on his ngers before he counts in his head he feels love on 39 his skin before he feels it in his heart Not 39only ideas but emotions too are cultural artifacts in man9 Given the lack of speci city of intrinsic affect in man the attainment j of an optimal flow of stimulation to his nervous system is a much more complicated operation than a prudent steering between the extremes of too much and too little Rather it involves a very delicate qualitative regulation of what comes in through the sensory apparatus a matter 39 here again more of an active seeking for required stimuli than a mere 39 watchful waiting for them N eurologically this regulation is achieved by efferent impulses from the central nervous system which modify recep tor activity Granit 1955 Psychologically the sense process may be phrased in39terms of the attitudinal control of perception Bruner and Postman 1947 But the point is that in man neither regnant elds nor 39 mental sets can be formed with sufficient precision in the absence of guidance from symbolic models of emotion In order to make up our minds we must know how we feel about things and to know how we feel about things we need the public images of sentiment which only 3 ritual myth and art can provide 4 The term mind refers to a certain set of dispositions of an organism The ability to count is a mental characteristic so is chronic cheerful ness so also though it has not been possible to discuss the problem of motivation here is greed The problem of the evolution of mind is 9 The kind of cultural symbols which serve the intellective and affective sides of human mentality tend to differ Langer 1949 Chap 4discursive language experimental routines mathematics etc on the one hand myth ritual and art on the other But this contrast should not be drawn too sharply mathematics has its affective uses poetry its intellectual and the difference in any case is only functional not substantial 39 2 2 239squot quot wwe39 quot 735 Mind as Method therefore neither a false issue generated by a misconceived metaphysic nor one of discovering at which point in the history of life an invisible anima was superadded to organic material It is a matter of tracing the development of certain sorts of abilities capacities tendencies and propensities in organisms and delineating the factors or types of factors upon which the existence of such characteristics depends Recent research in anthropology suggests that the prevailing view that the mental dispositions of man are genetically prior to culture and that his actual capabmthe amplm39extension Mesa proexistent dispositions by cultural means is incorrect10 The apparent fact that the nal stages of the biological evolution of man occurred after the initial stages of the growth of culture implies that basic pure or unconditioned human nature in the sense of the innate constitution of man is so functionally incomplete as to be un workable Tools hunting family organization and later art religion and science molded man somatically and they are therefore neces sary not merely to his survival but to his existential realization It is true that without men there would be no cultural forms but it is also true that without cultural forms there would be no men The application of this revised view of human evolution leads to the hypothesis that cultural resources are ingredient not accessory to human thought As one moves from lower to higher animals phylo genetically behavior is characterized by increasing active unpredict ability with reference to present stimuli a trend apparently supported physiologically by an increasing complexity and regnancy of centrally proceeding patterns of nervous activity Up to the level of the lower mammals at least the major part of this growth of autonomous central elds can be accounted for in terms of the development of novel neural mechanisms But in the higher mammals such novel mechanisms have as yet not been found Although conceivably mere increase in numbers of neurons may in itself prove able fully to account for the florescence of mental capacity in man the fact that the large human brain and human culture emerged synchronically not serially indicates that the most recent developments in the evolution of nervous structure com 10 In using such variably employed terms as mind and culture the decision of how far down the phylogenetic ladder to extend them Le how broadly to de ne themis in great part but a matter of custom policy and taste Here perhaps some what inconsistently but in line with what seems to be common usage opposite choices have been made for mind and culture mind has been de ned broadly to include the learned capacities of monkeys to communicate or rats to solve Tmazes culture has been de ned narrowly to include only posttoolmaking symbolic patterns For an argument that culture should be de ned as a learned pattern of the meaning of signals and signs and extended through the whole world of living organisms see Parsons 1959 Ceertz 0 Growth of Culture 737 sist in the appearance of mechanisms which both permit the main tenance of more complex regnant elds and make the full determina 39 tion of these elds in terms of intrinsic innate parameters increasingly f impossible The human nervous system relies inescapably on the acces sibility of public symbolic structures to build up its own autonomous ongoing pattern of activity This in turn implies that human thinking is primarily an overt act conducted in terms of the objective materials of the common culture and only secondarily a private matter In the sense both of directive reasoning and the formulation of sentiment as well as the integration of these into motives man s mental processes indeed take place at the l 7 scholar s desk or the football eld in the studio or lorrydriver s seat 39 on the platform the chessboard or the judge s bench Isolationist I claims for the closed system substantiality of culture White 1949 social organization RadcliffeBrown 1957 individual behavior Skin ner 1938 or nervous physiology Lashley 1958 to the contrary not withstanding progress in the scienti c analysis of the human mind f39demands a joint attack from virtually all of the behavioral sciences in which the ndings of each will force continual theoretical reassess 39 ments upon all of the others REFERENCES Allport G W 1947 Scienti c models and human morals Psychol Rev 54182 192 Arieti S 1959 Schizophrenia The manifest symptomatology the psychodynamics and formal mechanismsquot in American Handbook of Psychiatry ed by S Arieti Basic Books New York Vol 1 pp 455 484 Bartholomew G A and Birdsell J B 1953 Ecology and the protohominidsquot Am Anthropologist 55481498 Beach F A 1947 Evolutionary changes in the physiological control of mating behavior in mammalsquot Psychol 8613 54293815 1955 quotThe descent of instinctquot Psychol Rev 62401410 1958 Evolutionary aspects of psycho endocrinology in Culture and Be havior ed by A Roe and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven pp 81102 Bidney D 1953 Theoretical Anthropology Columbia University Press New York Bruner I S 1958 Neural mechanisms in perception in The Brain and Human Behavior ed by H Solomon et al Williams and Wilkins Baltimore pp 118 143 and Postman L 1947 quotEmotional selectivity in perception and reaction J Personality 166977 Bullock T H 1958 Evolution of neurophysiological mechanisms in Behavior and Evolution ed by A Roe and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven pp 165177 738 Mind as Method Carter G S 1953 The theory of evolution and the evolution of man in Anthro pology Today ed by A L Kroeber University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 327342 Chapman L F 1958 Highest integrative functions of man during stress in The Brain and Human Behavior ed by H Solomon et 11 Williams and Wilkins Baltimore pp 491534 Clark W E LeCros 1950 History of the Primates British Museum London Dart R A 1959 Adventures with the Missing Link IIarpers New York Deutsch J A 1953 A new type of behavior theory Brit J Psychol 44304817 DeVore B 1 nd Primate Behavior and Social Evolution unpublished MS Dewey J 1917 The need for a social psychology Psychol Rev 24266277 1934 Art as Experience Minton Balch and Co New York 1939 Intelligence and the M odern World ed by J Ratner Modern Library New York Emerson A E 1952 The evolution of behavior among social insects in The Evolution of Behavior ed by A Boo and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven pp 311355 Emiliani C 1960 Dating human evolution in The Evolution of Man ed by S Tax University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 5766 Ford C S and Beach F A 1951 Patterns of Sexual Behavior Harpers New York Freud S 1900 The interpretation of dreams translated in The Basic W39ritings of Sigmund Freud ed by A A Brill Modern Library New York 1938 pp 179 548 1911 Formulations regarding two principles in mental functioning in Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud Hogarth Press London 1946 Vol IV pp 1327 Galenter E and Gerstenhaber M 1956 On thought the extrinsic theory Psychol Rev 63218 227 Geertz C 1957 Ritual and social change a Javanese example Am Anthropol ogist 593254 Gerard R W 1959 Brains and behavior in The Evolution of Man s Capacity for Culture ed by J Spuhler Wayne State University Press Detroit pp 1420 1960 Becoming the residue of change in The Evolution of Man ed by STax University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 255268 Goldstein K 1959 Functional disturbances in brain damage in American Hand book of Psychiatry ed by S Arieti Basic Books New York Vol 2 pp 770 794 Granit R 1955 ReceptOrs and Sensory Perception Yale University Press New Haven Hallowell A 1 1939 The recapitulation theory and culture reprinted in Culture and Experience by A I Hallowell University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia pp 1431 1953 Culture personality and society in Anthropology Today ed A L Kroeber University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 597620 1959 Behavioral evolution and the emergence of the self in Evolution and Anthropology A Centennial Appraisal ed by B J Meggers Anthropologi cal Society of Washington DC pp 3660 1960 Self society and culture in phylogenetic perspective in The Evolu tion of Man ed by S Tax University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 309372 Harlow H 1958 The evolution of learning in The Evolution of Behavior ed by A Roe and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven pp 269290 1959 Basic social capacity of primates in The Evolution of Man s Capacity for Culture ed by J Spuhler Wayne State University Press Detroit pp 4052 Geertz Growth of Culture 739 Hartmann 11 1939 Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation translated and abridged in Organization and Pathology of Thought ed by D Rappaport Columbia University Press New York 1951 pp 362396 Kris E and Lowenstein 11 1946 Comments on the formation of psychic structure in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child Vol II pp 11 38 International Universities Press New York Hayes K J and Hayes C 1955 The cultural capacity ofthe chimpanzee in The NonHuman Primates and Human Evolution ed by J Gavan W39ayne State University Press Detroit pp 110126 39Hebb D 0 1946 Emotion in man and animal An analysis of the intuitive process of recognition Psychol Rev 5388106 1949 The Organization of Behavior John Wiley New York 1954 The problem of consciousness and introspection in Brain Mechanics and Consciousness ed by E Adrian et al Blackwell s Oxford pp 402417 and Thompson V 11 1954 The social signi cance of animal studies in Handbook of Psychology AddisonWesley Press Reading Mass 1313 532561 Hooton E 1949 Up from the Ape revised edition Macmillan Co New York Howells W W 1950 Concluding remarks of the chairman in Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 1579 86 Hull C L 1943 Principles of Behavior D AppletonCentury New York Keller H 1931 The Story of My Life Doubleday Doran New York Kluckhohn C 1953 Universal categories of culture in Anthropology Today ed by A L Kroeber University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 507523 and Murray H eds 1948 Personality in Nature Society and Culture Knopf New York Kroeber A L 1948 Anthropology Harcourt Brace New York Kubie L S 1954 Psychiatric and psychoanalytic considerations of the problem of consciousness in Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness ed by E Adrian et al Blackwell s Oxford pp 444467 La Barre W 1954 The Human Animal University of Chicago Chicago Langer S 1949 Philosophy in a New Key New American Library Mentor New York 1953 Feeling and Form Scribners New York Lashley K S 1949 Persistent problems in the evolution of mind Quart Rev 242842 1951 The problem of serial order in behavior in Cerebral Mechanisms and Behavior ed by L Jeffress John Wiley New York pp 112 136 1958 Cerebral organization and behavior in The Brain and Human Behavior ed by H Solomon et al Williams and Wilkins Baltimore Leakey L S B 1960 The origin of thequot genus homo in The Evolution of Man ed by S Tax University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 17 32 L vy Bruhl L 1923 Primitive M entalitr Allen and Unwin London Lorenz K 1952 King Solomon s Hing Methuen and Co London nd Comment in Discussions on Child Development 195 96 ed by J Tanner and B Inhelder International Universities Press New York Mead M 1958 Cultural determinants of behavior in Culture and Behavior ed by A Roe and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven nd Comment in Discussions on Child Devel0pment 1480503 ed by J Tanner and B Inhelder International Universities Press New York Miller G A Calanter E 11 and Pribram K H 1960 Plans and the Structure of Behavior New York 740 Mind as Method Montagu M F A 1950 A consideration of the concept of race in Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 15815334 Nissen H W 1955 Problems of mental evolution in the primates in The Non Human Primates and Human Evolution ed by J Gavan Wayne State Uni versity Press Detroit pp 99109 N6 L de 1943 Cerebral cortex architecture in The Physiology of the Nervous System ed by J F Fulton Oxford New York Oakley K 1957 Tools makyth man Antiquity 31199209 Parsons T An approach to psychological theory in terms of the theory of action in Psychology A Study of a Science ed by S Koch McGrawHill New York 13612 711 Pribram K H 1958 Comparative neurology and the evolution of behaviorquot in Behavior and Evolution ed by A Roe and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven pp 140164 1960 A review of theory in physiological psychology Ann Rev Psychol RadcliffeBrown A R 1957 A Natural Science of Society The Free Press of Glen coe New York Ryle G 1949 The Concept of Mind Barnes and Noble New York Scheerer M 1954 Cognitive theory in Handbook of Social Psychology Addison Wesley Press Reading Mass Sherrington C 1953 Man on His Nature 2nd edition Deubleday Anchor New York 39 Simpson 3 1950 Some principles of historical biology bearing on human organ isms in Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 15 5566 Skinner B F 1938 The Behavior of Organisms AppletonCentury New York Solomon R et al 1957 Sensory deprivation a review Am J Psychiat 114357 363 Spuhler J M 1959 Somatic paths to culture in The Evolution of Man s Capac ity for Culture ed by J M Spuhler Wayne State University Detroit pp 113 Thompson W R 1958 Social behavior in Behavior and Evolution ed by A Roe and G Simpson Yale University Press New Haven pp 291309 Washburn S L 1959 Speculations on the interrelations of tools and biological evolution in The Evolution of Man s Capacity for Culture ed by J M Spuhler Wayne State University Detroit pp 2131 and Howell F C 1960 Human evolution and culture in The Evolution of Man ed by S Tax University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 3358 Weiss P 1951 Comment on Dr Lashley s paperquot in Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior ed by L A Jeffress John Wiley New York pp 140142 White L A 1949 The Science of Culture Grove Press Evergreen New York 1960 Four stages in the evolution of minding in The Evolution of Man ed by 8 Tax University of Chicago Press Chicago pp 239253 Wharf B 1 1956 Language Thought and Behavior ed by J B Carroll John Wiley New York SUBJECT INDEX Academy of Psychoanalysis 15 Actions see Life Activation 8794 128 Active organism 725 7 Activity afferent 726 operational 670 Acts see Events Adaptation 1921 30 323 68 307 Adequacy 51931 passim Adolescence 534 Affect 122 663 670 7335 de nition of 1234 at 130 motor aspects of 12831 reactiv ity CNS in 13240 see also Emotion Feel ing Aggression 16 267 34 633 Agitation 14650 Agnosias 218 23640 Alienation 3556 3604 365 36673 American Psychoanalytic Association 49 Central FactGathering Committee of 556 Androids 490514 Animals 2633 passim birds employment of pat terns by 457 drugs effecting behavior of 161 77 passim Animalsituation 426 30 4378 Anthropological view of evolution of mind 71837 Anthropomorphism 48 425 437 469 Antidepressants see Drugs Anxiety 37 122 125 126 2345 61011 drugs effecting 16177 passim in sedation threshold tests 1327 passim in stress tests 128 32 Aperturel psychology see Psychology Approach responses see Responses Art 26 5616 passim Association areascortex 6 99 185 6467 free 12 in learning and memory 64559 passim restructured under hypnosis 66773 passim see also Dissociation Attention 81 82 183 54169 passim Automate see Machines Autonomic nervous system 123 152 156 72635 passr39m see also Central nervous system Awareness 80117 passim 31829 passlm 333 342 3 41719 441 6 52231 passim 542 662 66439 brain mechanisms in 15161 and pure lu cidity 252 266 of self 802 31013 486 489 see also Cognition Perception Bedeulung referent denotatum 577 Behavior 312 1621 31 34 51 73 123 125 130 1857 192202 passim 23340 2803 334 337 339 42 3512 368 474 488 491 548 575 662 66473 passlm 6802 690712 passim 730 adaptive 80117 passim constancies continuities in determining 3478 con trolled by intelligcnce 54256 passim and cybernetics 30513 and drugs 14650 1615 16670 17677 effects of the genotype upon 708 passim 182 184 meaning of Rapaport 2845 as observability of mind 4535 as physical correlate of mind 15161 passim prejudice in 20317 passlm quotregulatoryquot 282 subtleties of in advanced organisms 72537 passim see also Conditioning Genet ics Learning Physiology Purpose Responses Behaviorism theories of 29 21821 321 4 466 8 576 577 580 595 67688 passim meta physics of Watson 6802 neobehaviorism 574 subjective school of 71416 Belief 378 6051 61617 6623 666 see also Motivation Values Bible The 249 260 Biochemistry 68 125 1812 465 in behavioral responses 67 and endocrinology 579 hor monal factors in 10 and molecular morphol ogy in mental diseases 1946 and neuroendo crines 1823 and neurohormones 160 165 70 1726 and noradrenaline 160 1 1667 171 1726 and serotonin 1601 1667 171 1726 and stress 12831 see also Neuro chemistry Biodynamics 17 3046 Biogenic amines of brain 1601 Biological spacequot 5656 Biosocial conditions see Social psychiatry Blood pressure 12930 Body size and shape see Images Boolian drive 568 Brain see Central nervous system cerebral cortex Neurophysiology Reticular formationsystem Sensorimotor reactions Brainwashing 625 Buddhism 9 447 497 see also Zen Buddhism Causality 24369 passlm 600 Cellassembly theory 50311 Central nervous system 74 82 84 5 86117 pas slm 15161 1817 4234 686 as active organ ism 72535 passim and Babinski response 6645 develOpment related to culmral accumu lation 7205 passlm and disturbed emotions 128 41 passim in uence of drugs on 1327 passion 14650 16177 passim 663 and learn ing process 2204 pattern structure molecu lar cellular cle 191202 passim see also Autonomic nervous system Biochemistry Ce rebral cortex Limbic system Neurochemistry Neurophysiology Physiology Reticular forma tionsystem Sensorimotor reactions Cerebral cortex receptor organ projection cor tex association cortex 49 30117 passim 4234 503 540 542 6467 effect of drugs on 16177 passim 663 and emotions 15161 171 and isocortex 5 1011 mind as function of 663 Pribram s quotintentionalquot 187 541 725 size of related to culture 720 7278 and subcortical structures 1837 possim see also Autonomic nervous system Central nervous system Limbic system Neurochcmistry Neu rophysiology Physiology Reticular formation system Sensorimotor reactions Children 534 756 186 66473 passim Choice commonsense situations of 689712 passmi Classical Freudian metapsychology 59 Closed circuit anatomizing 725 727 Coding system brain 11617 Cognition 398402 668 and consciousness 4849 idealist s theory of 37797 and selfcon sciousness 40819 see also Awareness Per ception Coincidence 11517 210 Collaboration in animals 34 5 quotCommon culture 68990 quotCommonsense knowledge of social structuresquot 690712 741 2 Ag 2


Buy Material

Are you sure you want to buy this material for

50 Karma

Buy Material

BOOM! Enjoy Your Free Notes!

We've added these Notes to your profile, click here to view them now.


You're already Subscribed!

Looks like you've already subscribed to StudySoup, you won't need to purchase another subscription to get this material. To access this material simply click 'View Full Document'

Why people love StudySoup

Bentley McCaw University of Florida

"I was shooting for a perfect 4.0 GPA this semester. Having StudySoup as a study aid was critical to helping me achieve my goal...and I nailed it!"

Jennifer McGill UCSF Med School

"Selling my MCAT study guides and notes has been a great source of side revenue while I'm in school. Some months I'm making over $500! Plus, it makes me happy knowing that I'm helping future med students with their MCAT."

Jim McGreen Ohio University

"Knowing I can count on the Elite Notetaker in my class allows me to focus on what the professor is saying instead of just scribbling notes the whole time and falling behind."

Parker Thompson 500 Startups

"It's a great way for students to improve their educational experience and it seemed like a product that everybody wants, so all the people participating are winning."

Become an Elite Notetaker and start selling your notes online!

Refund Policy


All subscriptions to StudySoup are paid in full at the time of subscribing. To change your credit card information or to cancel your subscription, go to "Edit Settings". All credit card information will be available there. If you should decide to cancel your subscription, it will continue to be valid until the next payment period, as all payments for the current period were made in advance. For special circumstances, please email


StudySoup has more than 1 million course-specific study resources to help students study smarter. If you’re having trouble finding what you’re looking for, our customer support team can help you find what you need! Feel free to contact them here:

Recurring Subscriptions: If you have canceled your recurring subscription on the day of renewal and have not downloaded any documents, you may request a refund by submitting an email to

Satisfaction Guarantee: If you’re not satisfied with your subscription, you can contact us for further help. Contact must be made within 3 business days of your subscription purchase and your refund request will be subject for review.

Please Note: Refunds can never be provided more than 30 days after the initial purchase date regardless of your activity on the site.