CPO Last Unit
CPO Last Unit CPO 2002
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This 22 page Study Guide was uploaded by Sabrina Notetaker on Saturday December 5, 2015. The Study Guide belongs to CPO 2002 at Florida State University taught by Quintin Beazer in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 232 views. For similar materials see INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS in Political Science at Florida State University.
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CPO Study Guide: This contains all of the notes from class and the book. At the end there are also questions and answers from previous tests we have had. Enjoy! And good luck on this test! Chapter 13: Elections and Electoral Systems Classify Democracies elections are fundamental to all demo electoral system: set of laws that regulate electoral competition between candidates or parties or both Electoral formula: determines how votes are translated into seats district magnitude: # of seats allocated to each district o in single member districts DM=1 o This can range from 1 to 100+ in nationwide Multimember distinct means there are more than one representative elected from district Majoritarian electoral system: is one which the candidates/parties that receive the most votes win plurality: option that gets most votes Absolute majority: option that gets 50%+1 of votes qualified majority: most receive greater than 50% Unanimous: is the option that wins the support of all voters. Majoritarian Electoral geographic constituencies: are central to all majoritarian o determines the universe of the applicable majority MS are candidate centre o voters select individuals rather than parties High on identifiable. SMPD systems o single members district plurality (SMPD) system voters cast a single vote for a candidate in district o ex: UK, India, Canada, Nigeria, US Congress o refers to competition for one seat Advantages o straightforward o identifiable represent o candidates incentivized to appeal to median voter Disadvantage o absolute majority necessary o unrepresentative outcomes voters who favored another candidate out of luck o encourage strategic voting voter avoid “wasting” their vote Alternative Vote o is a system of preferential voting Preferential voting o Voters in single member districts rank order the candidate candidate who receives an absolute majority is elected Alternative Vote Advantages o Identifiable represent o Winner with absolute major o Voters preference ranking accounted for o incentivizes sincere voting o incentivizes the cultivation of broad base of support o increased legitimacy Alternative Vote Disadvantages o It's complicated o Requires alliterate voting population o can still result in disproportionate outcomes the 49/9% Majority runoff o candidatecentered systems in single member districts in which voters have single vote candidate with Majority Plurality TRs Two Round Majority Systems Advantage o winner obtains absolute majors o voters may coalesce around candidates between first and second round o Easy to implement insocieties with high literacy. Two Round Majority Systems Disadvantage o costly administration o disproportional o Condorcet winner not guaranteed o can trigger violence in divided societies Single nontransferable vote o SNTV voters cast a single candidate centered vote in a multimember district o Advantage multimember allow your minority representation multiparty representation from single district o Disadvantage favors incumbent and wellorganized parties few incentives to build broadbased coalitions incentive o Party Block Vote candidate centric systems in multimember districts all seats are allocated to the party that wins the majority 11/12 reviewed the pizza election chart A proportional electoral system (PR): allocates seats to parties in proportion to the vote share the parties win in the district (or the nation) o proportional translation of votes into seats Proportional representation systems differ in important ways: o the district magnitude o the use of electoral thresholds o the precise formula used to allocate seats to parties o the type of party list employed District magnitude: is critical for determining proportionality o the district magnitude is the number of representatives elected in a district o + the electoral threshold stipulates the minimum percentage of votes a party must win to gain a seat o legally imposed, formal threshold, or exists as a mathematical property of the electoral system (natural threshold) o high “barrier to entry” results in low levels of proportionality Electoral formulas: quotas and divisors o All pr systems employ quota or divisors to determine how many seats each party wins o The quota indicates the number of votes that guarantees the amount of seats given. The largest reminders method awards extra seats based on the largest leftover number of votes. The highest average remainder divides the number of votes by the number of automatic seats, with the remaining seats being allocated to those with the highest average remainder. This benefits small parties. In a closed party list, the candidates are ranked by the party and voters are not able to express a preference for a particular candidate Open party list voters indicate… Advantages of closed list PR: o easy to understand o promotes strong partisanship o a diversity of opinions will be represented disadvantages of closed list PR o weak connection between constituents and representative voters have no say in “who” takes office Open party list o voters can call ballot for individual candidates, rather than party lists o in an open list system, these party seats are allocated according to whichever party candidates win the most votes o Advantages proportionality higher identifiability because voters select candidates o Disadvantages diminished partisanship among voters and legislators Thought to be prone to corruption and vote buying, though it is not well supported empirically. Consequences of electoral system o the real world and our class Chapter 14: Political Parties o A political party includes those who hold office and those who help get them there. o Structure the political world o Recruit and socialize the political elite o Organize and mobilize masses o Provide a link between the rulers and the ruled o Democracies are distinguished Nonpartisan democracy no official political parties o Kuwait o US: Non Partisan judicial election Single party system only one party is legally allowed o China, Cuba One party dominant system multiple parties legally operate but only has realistic chance of winning o Pri, Mexico Two party system one of 2 mayor parties have realistic chance o US, Great Britain Multiparty systems more than 2 parties have realistic chance of winning We don’t count every party that exists to avoid “joke” parties o Counting parties o Effective # of parties o Weights me # of parties by their size (their proportion of votes or seats) This calculated as 1/∑vi^2 Effective ≠ of legislative parties Parties that win seats Calculated as 1/∑vi^2 Parties represent groups in societies o Urban rural o Secularclerical o Class o Postmaterialist o Ethnic and linguistic Politicized Cleavage o An attribute is a characteristic that qualifies an individual for membership in an identity category Can take different values Everyone has money An identity category is a social group to when individuals belong o Are socially constructed A country with uncorrelated attributes has reinforcing/coincidence cleavages Electoral rules can influence which cleavages become politicized Duvergers Theory o Social divisions are the primary driving force behind the formation of parties Electoral Institutions o Majority electoral system Mechanical effect o Refers to the way votes are translated into seats o In majority, mechanical effect discourages small parties Strategic Effect o Is how electoral rules influence the strategic voting behavior Strategic voting: means voting for your most preference candidate who has a realistic chance of winning The influence elites decisions to enter races & organize new parties Strategic entry refers to the decision about whether to enter the an electoral contest under the label of their most preferred party Duvergers law implies that combining single number district Chapter 15: Federalism in Structure A federal state constitutionally splits sovereignty between territorial levels so that governmental units share authority States that are not federal are known as unitary states o As of 2000, only 10% of the world’s countries were federal Federalism in Practice Decentralization: is the extent to which actual policymaking power lies with the central or regional governments in a country Devolution Devolution: a unitary state grants powers to sub national governments but retains the right to recall or reshape those powers o Different from federalism o Regional governments do not have a constitutional right to any of their powers Federalism in Practice Recall that it is possible to make a conceptual distinction between federalism in structure (federalism) and federalism in practice (decentralization) Whether a state is federal or unitary is ultimately a constitutional issue But whether a country is federal or unitary says very little about where policy is actually made ComingTogether Federalism Previously sovereign entities voluntarily pool together their resources and improve their collective security or achieve other economic goals HoldingTogether Federalism Sometimes, the central government may choose to decentralize power in order to reduce secessionist pressures Advantages of Federalism Congruence between policy and citizen preferences Increases government accountability Creates incentives for good government performance o Competition among states for citizens and investments Encourages policy experimentation Provides increased checks and balances Disadvantages of Federalism Duplication and the inefficient overlapping of potentially contradictory policies Collective action problems to create and implement policy Can create “race to the bottom” in levels of regulation, welfare, and trade barriers In asymmetric federalism, competition between states can also exacerbate preexisting inequalities Encourages blame shifting and credit claiming, thereby lowering government accountability Bicameralism A unicameral legislature: legislative deliberation occurs in a single assembly A bicameral legislature: legislative deliberation occurs in two distinct assemblies o About 41% of countries have bicameral Congruent bicameralism: two legislative chambers have similar political composition Incongruent bicameralism: two legislative chambers differ in their political composition Depends on different electoral mechanisms between the two chambers Congruence or Incongruence Lower chambers are very similar across countries o Directly elected o Represent all citizens equally Upper chambers have more variety: o Filled by heredity, appointment, indirect and direct elections o NOT intended to represent equally Often meant to represent geographic subunits In almost all countries, members of the lower legislative chamber are supposed to represent all citizens equally However, this is rarely the case for members of the upper legislative chamber By far the most common role for the upper chamber is to represent the citizens of sub national geographic units This is always the case in federal countries but is also the case in some unitary countries Malapportionment Citizens are often distributed unequally across the different sub national geographic units Malapportionment occurs when the distribution of political representation between constituencies is not based on the size of each constituency’s population In a malapportioned system, the votes of some citizens weigh more than the votes of others Bicameralism Symmetric bicameralism: two chambers have equal or near equal constitutional power Asymmetric bicameralism: two chambers have unequal constitutional power Constitutionalism A constitution provides the formal source of state authority o Establishes the structure, procedures, powers, and duties of government institutions o More recent constitutions also contain a list of guaranteed rights Constitutional codification o As of 2007 – only three countries – Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom had an unmodified constitution Constitutional review is the authority to invalidate acts of government for violation of constitutional rules o Can be exercised by constitutional courts – special tribunals that are not part of the judicial system When conducted by ordinary judges, it is commonly referred to as judicial review Type of Constitutional Review Abstract constitutional review: involves the constitutional review of legislation in the absence of a concrete legal case Concrete constitutional review: involves the constitutional review of legislation with respect to a specific legal case Timing of Constitutional Review A priori constitutional review occurs before a law is formally enacted A posteriori constitutional review occurs only after a law is formally enacted Veto Player Theory Veto Player theory: offers a way to think about political institutions in a consistent way across countries A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change in the political status quo o An institutional veto player is generated by a country’s constitution o A partisan veto player is an actor or party that is powerful by virtue of their position or involvement in politics Veto player theory indicates that countries in which there are many veto players with conflicting policy preferences are likely to be characterized by: o Greater policy stability o Smaller policy shift o Less variation in the size of policy shifts o Weaker agendasetting powers We can characterize the “preferred to” of each actor with respect to the status qua using indifference curves Indifference curves show the range of policy that an actor would either “prefer to” the SQ or would be indifferent Veto player theory shows that an increase in the number of veto players can only shrink the size of the win set; it never increases the size of the win set Federalism, bicameralism, and constitutionalism can be reconceptualized in terms of veto player theory Countries with these types of institutions should be characterized by: o Policy stability o Small policy shifts o Little variation in the size of policy shifts o Weak agenda setter powers Chapter 16: Institutional TradeOffs In practice, constitutions are responding to this tradeoffs in two ways: 1. Concrete Power – Majoritarian Model 2. Dispense Power Majoritarian Systems Typically few parties (~2) Party selected by a majority of voters in a majority of districts are then given complete control over policy Voters observe outcomes and decide whether to retain or replace the government party A two party system means that only one of the two major parties hold the majority o This leads to single party majority government o In the case of parliamentary systems, this means the same party controls both the executive and legislative branches of government Majoritarian systems enhance mandates and government identifiable. o A mandate is a policy that the government is both authorized and obligated to carry out once in office o Government identifiable. refers to the extent to which voters can identify what government alternatives they are voting for at election time Retrospective voting enhances accountability and clarity of responsibility o Accountability is the extent to which voters are able to reward or punish parties for their behavior in office o Clarity of responsibility is the extent to which voters can identify exactly who it is that is responsible for the policies Majoritarian institutional arrangements increase accountability, identifiable., and government mandates o Prospective and Retrospective voting o Majoritarian electoral rules o Two party systems o Single Party governments o Unitary systems o Unified governments Consensus System Institutions are designed to maximize the representation of all views found in society and to make sure that decisions reflect consideration of minority views The system aims to reflect the preferences of as many voters as possible Legislators represent the interests of the full spectrum of voters and vote on issues the way “citizens themselves would have voted” Institutions maximize the representation of all views in society o Proportional representation electoral rule o Multipartism o Coalition governments o Federal systems o Bicameralism Evaluating Democracies We can also evaluate democracies by the policies they produce o Fiscal policy and economic redistribution o Democratic Survival The Effect of Institutions on Fiscal Policy Fiscal policy is the management of tax and government spending to accomplish government goals o The “size of the government” or extent to which government redistributes wealth among citizens via state services and social programs Inequality and Redistribution It is assumed that all voters with below average income will favor redistributive tax systems Thus, we might expect tax policies to depend on how many voters have below average incomes MeltzerRichard model of redistribution Income inequality produces systems where the median earner (voter?) is poorer than the average earner The greater the income inequality, the greater the enthusiasm for redistributive taxation Globally, there is little correlation between income inequality and fiscal activity o But participation does matter! Franzese (2002) finds that the link between inequality and fiscal policy is strongest where voter participation is high (that is, where the median voters is most like the median earner) Partisan Model of Fiscal Policy The partisan model of fiscal policy argues we should see changes in fiscal policy based on party control of the government o Assumes that leftist parties are proredistribution Countries with frequent leftwing experience large increases in revenues/GDP Electoral Systems and Redistribution A common pool resource problem exists when actors can consume commonly held resource and pay only a share of its cost. As a result, they consume more of the resource than is socially optimal Proportional Representation and Redistribution A common pool resource problem exists when actors can consume some commonly held resource and pay only a share of its cost. As a result, they consume more of the resource than is socially optimal Under SMPD, legislators could have an incentive to maximize government spending in their own districts, regardless of strain on national budget Under PR, minister shave incentive to spend on their own constituencies’ interests, even to the detriment of the country’s overall fiscal health The Effect of Institutions on Ethnic Conflict Can institutions encourage democratic consolidation in these ethnically divided countries? o Electoral system’s strategic impact o Consociationalism o Federalism Ethnic conflict is rare, ethnic cooperation is common The direct effect of ethnic heterogeneity on civil war is controversial Institutional Impact in Ethnically Diverse Societies If ethnic identity if malleable, then institutions will determine the extent to which politics is organized along ethnic lines “Ethnic head counting” and Ethnic outbidding (Chandra 2004): o Ethnicity and identity categories strategically activated o Leaders will activate ethnicity if doing so makes sense within the electoral rules in place o Ethnically diverse societies are expected to have ethnicspecific parties in PR and catchall parties in majoritarian systems Consociationalism is a form of government that emphasizes power sharing through guaranteed group representation o Interest groups are formally represented in legislature, committee, the governmental cabinet, or divided executive posts o Have roots in religiously divided societies such as the Netherlands and Lebanon th (Early 20 C.) Other institutions may encourage members of ethnic groups to form alliances with members of other ethnic groups Example: The alternative vote moderates inflammatory rhetoric since candidates’ electoral success depends on the transfer of second preferences Federalism is thought to mitigate ethnic conflict by: o Bringing the government closer to the people, o Increasing opportunities to participate in government, and o Dampen secessionist demands Belgium, Canada, India, Spain, and Switzerland On the other hand, federalism can also: o Reinforce regionallybased ethnic identities o Provide access to resources that ethnic leaders can use to pressure the state o Facilitate ethnic groups at the subnational level to discriminate against other regional minorities Presidential Regimes Presidents are thought to: Provide a check on the power of the parliament Be responsible to the entire nation Perils of Presidentialism? th For the second half of the 20 century, a majority of presidential countries were non democracies Latin American dictatorships, civil wars, or hegemonic party control Postcolonial conflict across subSaharan Africa Soviet control of Eastern Europe and Central Asia Five main criticisms of presidentialism: o Concentration of power o Inexperienced leaders o Difficulty in making policy quickly o Difficulty in locating responsibility o Difficulty in making comprehensive Most of these criticisms are not unique to presidential systems! Presidential regimes – Stability? The essence of parliamentary is mutual dependence o Government must maintain the confidence of a legislative majority o Government can dissolve the legislature and call for new elections The essence of presidentialism is mutual independence o Both president and legislature has independent and fixed electoral mandate, independent source of legitimacy Theorize that dependence = compromise and independence = antagonism conflict Stephen and Skatch (1993) compared the regime stability, coup frequency and regime performance of 75 countries between 1973 and 1989 o Control for economic development, so looked at only nonNorth American and Western European States But, some presidential regimes are stable o Colombia, Costa Rica, US, Venezuela o What makes these successful presidential regimes? These presidential regimes have a small number of legislative parties Two party presidential regimes have success rates similar to parliamentary regimes Presidentialism only creates adverse effects for regime survival when the number of legislative parties is high When the number of parties is very low, presidentialism has no effect on regime survival Summary 1. Majoritarian and consensus democracies represent the interests of voters in different ways 2. Electoral laws influence both who is chosen to rule and how they are likely to wield that power – at least with respect to redistributive fiscal policy 3. Constitutional elements such as electoral laws and federalism are likely to affect the probability of ethnic conflict Electoral laws and the decision about whether to adopt presidentialism or parliamenarism are likely to strongly influence the survival of new democracies Here are the quizzes with the answers: Reading Quiz 21: Chapter 13 part 2 1. Take a look at Table 13.19 on page 601, suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Hare quota with largest remainders. How many automatic seats does the Ap win? Answer: 5 2. Take a look at table 13.19 on 60, Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Hare quota with largest remainders. How many remainder seats does the KrF win Answer: 1 3. Take a look at Table 13.19 on page 601. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Hare quota with largest remainders. How many remainder seats does the Ap win Answer: 0 4. Take a look at Table 13.19 on page 601. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Hare quota with largest remainders. How many total seats does the Ap win Answer: 5 5. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Hare quota with largest remainders How many total seats does the H win? Answer: 4 6. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Droop quota with largest remainders How many automatic seats does the V win? Answer: 1 7. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Droop quota with largest remainders How many remainder seats does the V win? Answer: 1 8. Suppose the 17 seats Olso were allocated using Hare quota with largest remainders How many automatic seats does the SP win? Answer: 0 9. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Hare quota with largest remainders What is the Hare quota? 18,166.71 10. Take a look at Table 13.19 on page 602. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Droop quota with largest remainders. How many total seats does the V win? Answer: 2 11. Take a look at Table 13.20 on page 602. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the SainteLague divisor method. How many seats does the H win? Answer: 3 12. Table 13.20 on page 602. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the d’Hondt divisor method. How many seats does the Ap win? Answer: 6 13. Table 31.20 on page 602. Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the d’Hondt divisor method. How many seats does the H win? Answer: 4 14. Table 13.20 on page 602 . Suppose the 17 seats in Olso were allocated using the Sainte Lague divisor method. How many seats does the Ap win? Answer: 6 Reading Quiz 22: Chapter 14 1. When electoral systems are disproportional, the mechanical effect punishes large parties and rewards small parties Answer: False 2. In first past the post majoritarian systems, third parties can successfully win representation in the national legislature if their supporters are _________ Answer: Geographically concentrated 3. Imagine you’re part of an environmentalist group seeking to influence policy making. You and your environmentalist friends are considering starting or entering a party in the hopes of securing representation in the national legislature Assume you live in the United States, where legislators are elected in single member districts first past the post electoral rules. To maximize the likelihood that you will win influence in the legislature, which of the following strategies would you implement? - Answer: join the democratic or republican party 4. Imagine you’re part of an environmentalist group seeking to influence policy making. You and your environmentalist friends are considering starting or entering a party in the hopes of securing representation in the national legislature. Assume you live in the Mexico, where legislators are elected via proportional representation with a low threshold for legislative viability. To maximize the likelihood that you will win influence in the legislature, which of the following strategies would you implement? - Answer: Start own party 5. Consider a distribution of attributes in a hypothetical Los Angeles community that is divided along language and racial lines. If someone is an English speaker, to which racial group would you guess they belong? - Answer: Difficult to tell 6. Consider a distribution in a hypothetical Los Angeles community that is divided along language and racial lines. If someone is a Latino, which language would you guess they speak? - Answer: difficult to tell 7. Consider a distribution of attributes in a hypothetical Los Angeles community that is divided along language and racial lines. If someone is an Asian, which language would you guess they speak? - Answer: It is difficult to tell 8. Based on your answers to the previous questions, how would you characterize the districts’ attributes? - Answer: These attributes are crosscutting 9. Assume that in order to win access to elected office in our hypothetical LA district that a candidate must win 50% of the vote. Let’s also assume that political entrepreneurs will try to mobilize voters along either racial or linguistic lines. If this is the case, which of the following identity categories could be activated to win the election? In other words, which of the identity categories form minimal winning coalitions? - Answer: English speakers form a winning coalition 10. According to the logic of minimal winning coalitions, which of coalition would be most likely to occur? - Answer: Latinos Reading Quiz: Institutional Veto Players II 1. Look at Figure 15.13 on page 735 of the textbook. Draw indifference curves for each veto player with respect to the status quo. Shade in the win set. Now look at figure 15.14 on page 736. Draw indifference curves for each veto player with respect to the status quo and shade in the win set Is the win set in figure 15.14 smaller than the win set in figure 1513? - Answer: Smaller 2. A decrease in the size of the win set leads to: - All the above: o Greater policy stability o Smaller changes in policy o Less variation in policy change o Less agenda setting power o Only greater policy stability and smaller policy change 3. Read the introduction to question 7 on pages 736737 about the unanimity core In figure 15.15 choose a policy position in the triangle and label it the SQ. Now draw indifference curves for each veto player with respect to the SQ. Is there a win set? - Answer: No 4. Read the introduction to question 7 on pages 736737 about the unanimity core In figure 15.15 choose a policy position outside the triangle and label it the SQ. Now draw indifference curves for each veto player with respect to the SQ. Is there a win set? - Answer: Yes 5. What would happen to the size of the unanimity core if the ideal points of the veto players were further apart? - Answer: It gets bigger 6. What is the relationship between the size of the unanimity core and policy stability - Answer: Policy becomes more stable as the unanimity core gets bigger 7. Look at question 8 on page 738 of the textbook Draw the unanimity core for Figure 15.16. Consider Judge J1. If she interprets the statutes so that the new policy is exactly at her ideal point, will the legislative veto players are able to overturn it and move it somewhere else? - Answer: No 8. Where should judge J1 set policy? - Answer: J1 9. Now consider judge J2. If she interprets the statutes so that the new policy is exactly at her ideal point, will the legislative veto players are able to overturn it and move it somewhere else? - Answer: Yes 10. What do you think would happen to the agendasetting power of the judges if the ideal points of the legislative veto players were further apart? - Answer: The closest point in the unanimity core to J2 11. What do you think would happen to the agendasetting power of the judges if the ideal points of the legislative veto players were further apart - Answer: It would increase 12. Based on your answer to the previous question, do you think that we should expect to see more judicial activism in federal and bicameral countries or in unitary and unicameral ones? - Answer: Federal and bicameral 13. Copy of Consider figure 15.16 on page 738 of your text book and carefully read the setup of the game. Draw the unanimity core. Which of the following is true about the unanimity core in this game? - Answer: J1’s ideal point is located in the unanimity core 14. Consider figure 15.16 on page 738 of your textbook and carefully read the setup of the game. First consider Judge 1. If she interprets a statute that moves policy directly to her ideal point, would you expect that policy to be overturned by the legislators? - Answer: No 15. Consider figure 15.16 on page 738 of your textbook and carefully read the setup of the game. Now consider Judge 2. Where should she set policy to avoid being overturned by the legislators? - Answer: On the boundary of the unanimity core 16. Consider figure 15.16 on page 738 of your textbook and carefully read the setup of the game. What would happen to the agenda setting power of judges if the ideal points of the legislators were farther apart? - Answer: The agenda setting power of judges would increase
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