Gov312L Week 3 Notes (Lecture 3 & 4)
Gov312L Week 3 Notes (Lecture 3 & 4) GOV 312L
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This 12 page Class Notes was uploaded by Katie Toepel on Thursday February 4, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to GOV 312L at University of Texas at Austin taught by Dr. Barany in Spring 2016. Since its upload, it has received 34 views. For similar materials see Issues and Policies in American Government in Political Science at University of Texas at Austin.
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Date Created: 02/04/16
America and the Cold War: Lecture 3 The Onset of the Cold War and the Falling of the Iron Curtain in Europe Monday, 2/1 ▯ Title slide: America and the Cold War, Lecture 3 ▯ ▯ Slide 2: U.S. Plans in Eastern Europe November 1944, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius gives policy speech after WWII of U.S. policy expectations in Eastern Europe o Free choice of political, social, and economic systems o Non-restrictive trade and communications policies i.e. freedom of speech, press, and media o freedom of access to U.S. philanthropic and educational organizations o protection of U.S. property o settlements of territorial issues only after the cessation of hostilities NONE of these came true ▯ ▯ Slide 3: Mutual Suspicions Russia is not interested in minor changes in Eastern Europe Installation of Muscovite communists in Poland elsewhere in Eastern Europe o Soviet install muscovite communists because they trust them they are communists who are from Eastern Europe and decided to join the Soviet Union o Other communists in Eastern Europe are underground – they are local/native people in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, etc., but are not part of the Soviet Union Polish government-in-exile: o Government fled to London for 5-6 years and lobbied for their country o Expected to come back and retake power after the war o Instead, they arrived back in Poland are taken to Siberia to die (in gulags) Stalin is suspicious of bona fide Anglo-American initiatives (i.e. invasion of the Balkans) The U.S./U.K. begins to recognize that Europe was becoming irrevocably divided ▯ ▯ Slide 4: Stalin’s Press “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” – axiom produces very odd bedfellows Stalin still gets great press in the U.S. until 1945 The U.S. is still very naïve about the Soviet Union o Appreciation of a war-time ally and the sacrifices Stalin made o Lack of understanding of how the war was actually fought by Stalin and his henchmen No regard for human life – many unnecessary causalities Killings were covered up with money – no press 40% of losses were unnecessary unlike the U.S., there is no “no man left behind” clause in the Soviet Union ▯ ▯ Slide 5: Enters Truman The “accidental president” from Missouri – sudden death of FDR Has a different background and outlook from FDR that was often underestimated Represented a much hard line vis-á-vis the Soviets but at this point he was unable to change the course of events o Everything was prearranged, except for the future dropping of nuclear weapons, which he could control Met Stalin at Potsdam, who understood the changes in Washington and exploits his military-strategic advantages U.S. now has nuclear weapons, which has a significant impact on relations with Moscow ▯ ▯ Slide 6: The Soviets Enter Eastern Europe The “liberators” – communists come to power in Eastern Europe o Didn’t discriminate against race or religion, which was refreshing Relentless pressure of the Red Army on population and politics Red Army transformed armies/communications tactics NKVD and subsidiaries: forerunner of the KGB (now the FSB) – domestic intelligence o Became the heads of army Communists institute: o Land reform o Liquidating landed gentry o Nationalization of banks and industries As a result, they have some support from the urban poor and impoverished peasants (the Proletariat) Communists crush all opposition and assume total control o Reform was the carrot, terror was the stick U.S.S.R. establishes totalitarian dictatorships along the lines of the Soviet examples o Everything is state owned ▯ ▯ Slide 7: Different Countries and Paths Communist capture of power is facilitated by: o the Great Depression o World War II o destruction of old political systems o weakened traditional ruling classes By 1946, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland are under a firm one-part Soviet-communist control Hungary is less crucial to Stalin, strategically – he lets the Hungarian communists sort themselves out until 1948 o Of course, the communist party gains little popular support o Political competition is eliminated by fraud and force Czechoslovakia expects to be a bridge between capitalism and communism – a Finnish model? – but no such luck ▯ ▯ Slide 8: Cold War Map of Eastern Europe, 1989 Soviet Union power over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (3 Baltic states), Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Goerge, Kaliningrad, and Russia of course o Broke in 1991 Strategically, the most important countries were: Poland, East Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania o Border states that could give access to the West Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were not allies of Soviet Russia ▯ ▯ Side note: “Slavic” countries are called so because their languages are from the Slavic family of languages There used to be some Slavic brotherhood in the Middle Ages HOWEVER, Romania, Hungary, Albania, and the 3 Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are not Slavic Slide 9: Czechoslovakia Only state with some democratic legacies, but eventually becomes communist Some pro-communist and pro-Soviet sentiment First elections in 1946: communists get 38% They were essentially democratic until a political coup in 1948 by pro-Soviet forces Thomas Masaryk “fell out of the window” of his office in Prague’s Hradcany Castle Czechoslovakia becomes a communist state ▯ ▯ Slide 10: Yugoslavia (and Albania) Tito = Yugo’s partisan general, wanted to stay independent from the U.S.S.R. Communists dominate by the end of the war “the” different case: the Soviets were never there physically o the Soviets did not liberate Yugoslavia or Albania, so no Russian troops were ever on the ground there was still a hard-line Stalinist type of regime until 1948, but not the kind that the Soviets wanted ▯ ▯ Slide 11: Soviet Plans for Eastern European Economies Lend-lease agreement was abruptly terminated (as a result of a bureaucratic mix-up) – this reinforced Stalin’s suspicions of U.S. Most Eastern European countries were in desperate need, but Moscow didn’t let them accept the credits and war surplus stocks offered by the U.S., or the join economic assistance plan U.S. protests the reorientation of the Eastern European trade to Soviet Union Czechs ask for a loan, then drop the request due to Soviet pressure o August 1946, Paris Economic Conference: Czechs enthusiastically applaud Soviet diatribes Stalin uses East European economies for the purposes of Soviet economy recovery o Afterwards, he establishes centrally-planned economies entirely dependent upon Soviet raw materials, heavy machinery, etc. First case where the imperial center is not extremely developed – “like Burkina Faso with permafrost” ▯ ▯ Slide 12: Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1946 Relations continue to deteriorate Stalin continues to point out the ineluctable conflict between communism and capitalism Realizations of Soviet nuclear espionage in operations in Canada Problems in the middle east and far east o Soviet is reluctant to evacuate Iran March 1946 opinion polls: Americans disapprove of Soviet policy and think the Administration is being soft on communism U.S. Policy becomes more firm Members of Administration suggest that the best policy option is to confine Soviet influence to Eastern Europe Truman administration concedes that the EE has slipped irretrievably into the “Soviet Sphere of Influence” Europe is now viewed as a divided entity ▯ ▯ Slide 13: Churchill’s Fulton Speech Former British prime minister Winston Churchill popularized the Iron Curtain phrase in his “Sinews of Peace” address on March 5, 1946, at the Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia: all these famous cities and populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, are all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet Influence, but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow” note: after its fall, a section of the Berlin Wall was transported to and erected at Westminster College ▯ Title slide: Lecture 4 ▯ ▯ Slide 2: Alternatives to Containment February 21, 1947: UK acknowledges its exhaustion o No power left to protect U.S. interests in Europe Previously, the U.S. had two war-time options: o Isolationism – staying out of it o Preventative war – exploiting our nuclear monopoly This option was never seriously considered because it is contrary to U.S. tradition Isolationism, however, no longer possible: America must get involved o Non-use of force means the continuation of conflict ▯ ▯ Slide 3: Containment: The U.S. Response George F. Kennan (1904-2005) head of State Department’s new Policy Planning Staff (appointed by George C. Marshall) Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history He was originally a Russian specialist and a diplomat there and in the Baltic states (in the 1930s) o He actually spoke Russian, and previously had a position in the U.S. Soviet embassy ▯ ▯ Slide 4: The “X” Article The most important article in the Cold War Appeared in the July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine Basic objectives of the U.S. foreign policy: o Protect security of nation o Advance the welfare of the people U.S. understood that their national interests were best served not by trying to restructure the international order, but by trying to maintain the equilibrium within it so that NO one country could dominate Kennan’s particularistic approach: only worry about the countries that are hostile AND capable of posing a threat to U.S. national interest o There is only one such country: The Soviet Union ▯ ▯ Slide 5: Background Soviet post-war expansion into Eastern Europe + attempts at Greece, Turkey, and Iran o Eastern Europe is long gone, including all American influence and money there The U.S. also needed to support the U.K., who were traditional guardians of American interests Truman Doctrine of March 1947: “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure” o Economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece shortly follows ▯ ▯ Slide 6: New Positions Soviet role in Eastern Europe provokes the U.S. and leads to the crystallization of new policy positions: 1. Keep troops in Europe (Churchill) 2. Only mutual trust could help (Henry Wallace, Commerce Secretary) 3. Policy of firmness and patience Don’t give in or give up ▯ ▯ Slide 7: Kennan on the Soviet Union Kennan presents the basis of what was to become the basis of new American Foreign Policy He recognizes the hostile character of the Soviet regime, and focuses on the communist outlook on world affairs Main principles: o Soviet hostility is a constant factor and will continue until the capitalist world is destroyed o Stress on the internal nature of Soviet power i.e. the purges, cyclical rejuvenation of party zeal, etc. o Realization that the Soviets don’t have an ideological compulsion to accomplish their objectives quickly Rather, Soviets focus on a gradual increase in trend and acreage in their power ▯ ▯ Slide 8: Kennan’s Original Containment Articulated and implemented in 1947-1949 Position: “long term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment” à calls for intelligent, long-range policies Idea: to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won at the end of World War II Kennan insists: Soviet foreign policy bore little relationship to what the West did or did not do à the USSR’s party-line was not based on any objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia’s borders o i.e. The Soviet Union will continue to lie; the U.S. can’t trust what they say, only what they do ▯ ▯ Slide 9: Departures from Past Policies A policy of patience and firmness 1. No concealment of disagreements with the Russians 2. No more concessions to the U.S.S.R. – no more benefit of the doubt 3. U.S. military strength will be reconstituted, and requests from the Allies for military and economic aid will be favorable considered 4. Negotiations with the Soviets will continue, but only for the purpose of registering Moscow’s acceptance of U.S. positions Trying to see what the Russians think ▯ ▯ Slide 10: Kennan’s Particularism Kennan objected to the notion that the U.S. had to resist communism wherever it appeared – focus only where it would be harmful to the U.S. Ultimate goal: NOT a division of the world to Soviet and American spheres, but the emergence of independent centers of power in Europe and Asia This plan is not immediately accepted – still some skepticism ▯ ▯ Slide 11: The Implementation of Containment: Stage 1 Restore balance of power left unstable by defeats of Germany and Japan and the expansion of the USSR to Eastern Europe American objective: not to dominate power centers itself but to ensure that NO ONE else did either Anti-communism in American politics: mobilizes congressional and public support for the policy of containment Specifics: Marshall Plan and the encouragement of economic development in Europe and Japan ▯ ▯ Slide 12: The Implementation of Containment: Stage 2 Bring about the fragmentation of the international communist movement o support Yugoslavia, encourage Sino-Soviet rift The Russian Break with Yugoslavia o Yugoslavia has a highly personalistic Stalinist-type model o Before the break, Tito tolerates Communist intrusions but by 1948, Soviet meddling becomes very intrusive – Tito will not stand for it o Tito and Yugoslav Leadership protest but in vain o open break between Moscow and Belgrade – no longer have diplomatic relations o they are threatened with invasion, but these threats are empty – Yugo is extremely hard to penetrate due to its mountainous terrain After the break: Yugoslavia gradually alters domestic and foreign policies, moving closer to a market economy 1948-1953: Yugo drifts away from the Soviet sphere, and develops alternative model of socialist development o “user-friendly” communism o more developmental and pragmatic, not ideological and restrictive o alternate model ticks off the Soviets – they would almost prefer them to be democratic o beneficiary of U.S. and West European economic and military aid ▯ ▯ Slide 13: The Implementation of Containment, Stage 3 Trying to bring about changes in the Soviet conception of international relations Convince Soviet leaders that their interests could be better served by learning to live in a diverse world Establish NATO (1949) Creation of an independent West German state o Germany was divided, like Korea o 4 zones of occupation belonging to U.S., U.K., France, and Soviet Union o the western parts join together and become independent from the east o The West becomes the Federal Republic of Germany o The East becomes the Democratic Republic of Germany Berlin also has 4 zones of occupation (U.S., France, U.K., U.S.S.R.) Retaining our forces in Japan Building a hydrogen bomb, which the Soviets almost have also, through espionage ▯ ▯ Slide 14: Kennan’s Influence Diminishes by late 1949 Why? – because American domestic policy changes (due to paranoia created by McCarthy) Truman and his advisers could not accept his assumptions that: a. Danger of war was remote b. Negotiations, if in the interests of both sides, could be productive c. Diplomacy should be flexible basic flaws in Kennan’s strategy: o he sought to achieve its objectives through psychological means, by instilling self-confidence (not just in nations directly threatened by Soviet expansion but in the U.S. also) what Kennan failed to take into consideration: o chance that insistence on rational distinctions might induce irrational fears thereby undermining self-confidence o a.k.a. irrational fears had by the public ▯ ▯ ▯ ▯ ▯
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