International Politics Week 5 of Notes
International Politics Week 5 of Notes PSC 1003
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This 4 page Class Notes was uploaded by Jaimee Kidd on Wednesday February 17, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to PSC 1003 at George Washington University taught by Talmadge in Spring 2016. Since its upload, it has received 17 views. For similar materials see Introduction to International Politics in Political Science at George Washington University.
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Date Created: 02/17/16
The Rise of Germany & The Path to World War I Explaining WWI Is it just the result of power shifts? (changes in the international system, rise of Germany) OR is it the result of German domestic pathologies? OR both? Europe During Bismarckian Realpolitik End of concert, restraint Return of raison d’etat Wars of Prussian unification Complex but fluid alliances Domestic Politics After the Concert o Role of public opinion, organized economic interests o Legitimacy through nationalism? o Professional standing armies, rather than just citizen armies Due to more forms of warfare that needed more experience to be operated o Railroads with economic implications as well as military due to an increased ability to mobilize o Ambiguity of modern weapons Machine guns, mobile artillery, etc. Even though technology is there people didn’t quite know their implications yet, were they good for defense of offense? Prussian Preeminence o Capitalizes on these changes o Not only militarily powerful, but politically powerful o Exploitation of military technology, mastery of logistics o Industrial development, especially railroads o Customs unions Method of protectionism on outside products Creating nationalization on an economic basis Bismarck’s Alliance Strategy o End Holy AlliancePrussia, Austria Hungary, and Russia o New theory of alliances All politics boil down to this one formula: In a world of five powers try to be one of three (on the stronger side that is) o Form a defensive alliance with Austria (1879), Italy If you get attacked we will help, not if you start a war with Russia though, then we will stay neutral Incentive to not start wars o Reinsurance Treaty Neutralizes Russia (1887) Russia and Germany promise to stay neutral if a war started with a third country UNLESS Russia or Germany start the war Don’t have to get into a twofront war so long as they don’t start the war o Isolation of France Europe After Bismarck (18901914) Shifts in German Policy o Simplification of alliancesAustria Hungary and emperor Franz Josef Aggressive Moves Overseas o Trying to thwart other states’ colonial ambitions especially Russia Heightened Naval Armaments Program o Britain is an island nation that has always had strong navy so this kind of pissed them off and concerned them o Britain reaches out to France and Russia to form the Triple Entente as a response Germany Fears Rising Russia o “War is unavoidable and the sooner the better” war is only going to get worse as they get stronger should fight while we are at the peak o “The future belongs to Russia, which is growing and growing and is becoming an increasing nightmare to us” The Military Doomsday Machine o Autonomous military staff planning Developing military plans in isolation from leadership o Emphasis on rapid mobilization in war o Increasingly the start of war was when the first troops mobilized, race to mobilization As soon as you think war is happening you mobilize which kind of works against diplomacy o Belief in superiority of offense Not only morally superior but militarily feasible when technology didn’t allow for this as much o Leads to Schlieffen Plan Effort to cope with the possibility of fighting a two front war Plan hinges on assumption that because Russia was going to be slow to mobilize, rather than fighting in both places at the same time, Germany would deal with France first with the confidence that they could defeat them quickly o Plan to go around the forces they built around German border o This is a problem because they would have to go through countries that they didn’t plan to fight, guarantees Britain will enter the war seeing this as a threat The July Crisis, 1914 o Archduke assassinated by Serbian terrorist Austria is angry and wants to respond, but knows Russia will step in Germany fuels the fire and issues a blank check o June 28: Assassination o July 6: German “blank check” whatever you think the appropriate response is we will back you up, Germany o July23: Austrian Ultimatum o July 25: Austria rejects Serbian reply; both mobilize o July 38: Austria War on Serbia o July 30: (In response) Russia fully mobilizes (important to note that they were fully mobilized) o Aug 1: Germany War on Russia; France, Germany mobilizes o Aug 2: Germans demand entry to Belgium o Aug 3: Germany War on France o Aug 4: Germans enter Belgium (because the low countries suggest that Germany is within striking distance of UK); UK War on Germany o Aug 5: France Attacks AL; AHWar on Russia o Schlieffen Plan actually bogs down speed of war and of taking territory, machine guns aren’t good for taking territory but caused trenches Causal Explanation in International Politics Necessary v Sufficient Conditions o Wrong turn was necessary but not sufficient in causing war o A (Cause) B (Effect) o When we say A was necessary and sufficient for B to happen we are saying: B could not have happened without A AND B was guaranteed to happen with A Application to WWI o Were systematic factors alone both necessary and sufficient to cause war o OR were other factors necessary and/or sufficient Applying the Theories o Images st 1 Bismarck v Bill o Changes in policy o Change in theory Cognitive Bias o Belief that war would be quick 2 Civilmilitary relations Nationalism, war fever Class struggles rd 3 Hegemonic war Preventative War Security dilemma o The Security Dilemma Even rational security seekers end up in war Means by which state increases its security deceases the security of others 2 variables: offensedefense advantage and distinguishability
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