History of Foreign Policy II - January 29th Lecture
History of Foreign Policy II - January 29th Lecture HIST 3333
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This 17 page Class Notes was uploaded by Jasmine Lee on Monday February 16, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to HIST 3333 at George Washington University taught by Richard Thornton in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 20 views. For similar materials see American Foreign Policy Since WWII in History at George Washington University.
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Date Created: 02/16/15
February 24th and 26th Lecture Notes February 24th I write my lecture notes nearly word for word Soviets in Africa The Soviets continue their geopolitical drive in Africa moving from Angola to Ethiopia That would lead to an American supported war in Somalia and Ethiopia in which we would nd 15000 Cuban troops ghting on Ethiopia s side commanded by Russian generals But some people will say there was an independent Cuba in Africa but the Russians were leading them The Soviets try their strategy efforts from Angola to Somalia Which we will nd 15000 troops from Ethiopia s side So by the end of 1977 you have 15000 troops or close to 2 divisions of Cuban troops ghting in Somalia The US efforts under the pressure of this battle were to try to encourage an EgyptianIsraeli movement to a peace treaty quickly But you have to look at this in terms of a quotgiant sandwich Because on one hand you had a growing con ict with Somalia and Ethiopia which we were engaged in and on the other hand you had the deterioration of Shah s rule in Iran So it was imperative for the Carter Administration to bring about a treaty anchor in the Middle East so we could have a position there to in uence events By the end of 1977 our side is losing compared to the Russian side You have a beginning deterioration in Iran and you have an unsuccessful rst effort to bridge differences between Sadat and the new Israeli leader Began So things are not going well for the US At the same time we are trying to do in the Far East what we were doing in Europe We were trying to strengthen our Far East allies defense as well as prevent Japan from moving to the middle Between the US and the Soviets The question is how do you keep them from going to the middle US POV If the US wants d tente with the Russians then our allies want d tente with the Russians as well So this is why you cant have d tente but this is what the US was trying to do We were trying to go to the Russians but keep our allies from going to the middle From Japan39s case the way we tried to do it was drawing all our troops from South Korea We thought that if we withdrew remaining 40000 troops the Japanese would spend more money on defense and that would create more capital consumption This would equilibrate our economic relationship with Japan Carter is making his candidacy known that when he enters into office he pledged that he would bring all the US troops out of SKorea Look at Don Oberdorfer Washington Post 6121977 to read a brief history of Carter s campaign pledges Soviet Strategic Weapons Interruption The Soviet strategic weapons breakthrough throws a monkey wrench into the problem If the Soviet Union will have a rst strike capability against the US by 1980 and not by 1985 as they had assumed before and it s going to take 4 or 5 years to withdraw those troops from SKorea then the Soviets will see this as a golden opportunity before the US pulls the troops and while the Soviets are rising in power The Carter administration will decide they can39t take the troops out So what to do They still won the object is to still build Japanese forces but you can t do it by simply drawing forces from Korea Or can you During the prep phase from November to January when the Carter people were trying to put together a strategy what was not a part of the 15 strategic partnerships was China Brzezinski tells us this That the Chinese normalization would come last They had no intentions with moving quickly towards normalization with China because the Russians would be unhappy and that would be problematic The Strategic weapons discovery throws this plan out of the window Now the plan of Chinese assistance comes up In any war on the Korean peninsula China s role is critical on the other side Like in the Korean War So if you could move towards normalization you could be sure that the Russians could trigger a war on the Korean peninsula because SinoAmerican relations with preclude it So in the spring of 1967 Brzezinski argues for a strategic connection without normalization He says that we should talk to the Chinese and let them understand what we are worried about That we should promise them normalization down the road but in the meantime don t disrupt what is going on in the peninsula and not trigger a war Vance says no because the Russians will read this informal relation as a partnership against them This will disrupt d tente Read between the lines Vance s xation on d tente rst gave the Russians a veto card to American policy and they knew it The SALT signing was the card for geopolitical strategy But Vance said he wants the d tente rst and he is driving Carter So Vance is April 15th memorandum would establish policy It said that the US would go for full normalization of relations with China but does not say when This means a lengthy negotiating process not an informal relations as Brzezinski wanted Vance is arguing and planning he is saying he can get d tente with the Russians with the SALT ll before getting to normalization with China This is his calculation with Russia as well as with regard to weapons deployment in Europe movement towards an EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty He wants d tente before all of this Look at Vance s book and Brzezinski s book They lay out the arguments going on in the White House Carter did not have the government read over his material before he published his book because he was so angry that he lost the election He could have been put in jail for this but they didn t put him in jail So this means that there are some interesting quotnuggetsquot in his books Like Camp David and collapse in Iran He talks about things no one does So Vance s memorandum comes at a very interesting time in USChina relations USChina relations In Jan 1976 Joanlan died Mao instead of reminiscing in Deng s rise red Deng again and put his own men in power to succeed him later This was Hwa Guo Fong When he did that he split his coalition Mao has to hold his politburo together to achieve his agenda but when he names Fong as a premier that splits his coalition Then that creates the Gang of Four under Mao s wife Jiang Qing When did the gang of four rise The point is that Mao s coalition is deteriorating From mid 1976 on Mao is out of there and then he will die in September Then there will be a succession struggle between Fong with his group and the minister of defense Deng who has been purged So the immediate outcome was a basic agreement and that was naming Fong as the of cial that was Mao s wish Fong agreed to appoint Deng to power later That means that the succession was not settled and Deng tries at it again unless Fong can deliver on a major policy issue That would be relations with the US So as Carter is coming into of ce Fong talks about how the US should have a good relations Fong also says that they are not worried about Taiwan So that turns out to be one of the factors that drove Brzezinski to say that we can have normalization with China and carry out their strategy in South Korea But Vance blocks it His memorandum blocks it The pressure is still on because the Soviets are moving and we don t want to get caught with our Korean pants down So Vance agrees to take a trip to China in August and Carter says quotlet s see if we can nail this down let go for early normalization that Brzezinski is talking aboutquot So his trip is scheduled in August but the Chines decide that since the US has not responded to Fong overtures he has no choice but to bring Deng back So at the next Plenary Conference his power was restored He is still deputy and is in the position to block things Just as the Chinese deliberately hold their conference it concludes just as Vance is getting there The Carter admin must have realized that the Chinese made a position to not move towards relations with the US There are a lot of disagreements in literature Mike Oxenberg in the NSC wrote an article about it in Foreign Affairs fall 1982 Oxenberg went with Vance on the trip Deng immediately said he did not want normalization with the US Ironically Deng and Vance did not want early normalization with China Deng did not want this because it would bene t Fong his rival Vance did not want this because it will disrupt relations with Soviets When the Vance got to present his proposal he did the same thing as Kissinger If you remember when Kissinger offered Mao the reverse liaison proposal This would take would take our embassy out of Taiwan and switch the office that was in Beijing in Taiwan Deng wanted the US to break relations with Taiwan completely He wanted no formal US presences in Taiwan So Deng said that he would move towards relations with the US if the US would get out of Taiwan China has been arguing that Taiwan was a part of China since 1949 and only since 1949 because it was never a part of China No mainland Chinese regime as ever control Taiwan No Chinese regime has controlled Taiwan There was a Mongolia and Manchuria regime that they tried but not Taiwan Look at quot3 minute Chinese Historyquot video online It shows the region and regime changes and you ll see where Taiwan ts The US position quotwe will be to do all these things Deng s proposal but you must do two things with usquot 0 1 Peaceful settlement of the issue in Taiwan 0 2 Agree to let us send Taiwan arms The upshot of this trip there is not going to be any normalization in short term and therefore there will not be withdraw from SKorea and no hedge on Japanese economic growth So the strategy going in on strengthening Japanese forces and budget fails Even the idea of having the Chinese come in and protect that strategy fails This fails because Vance wants d tente with the Russians and he doesn t want anything to compromise with it Thornton worked in Air Force Intelligence and went back later as a reserve intelligence agent What the Carter administration will tell you is that there was a sudden discovery of two or three Korean divisions and that discovery made it impossible for the US to withdraw troops from Korea This was a lie Another intelligence agent told Thornton that the US knew those troops were there the whole time This was a story made up to justify the US change in policy You can look at his book on Carter Years Russia By the end of the year there is another threat The Russians are participating in a dress rehearsal for Vietnam s invasion of Cambodia to complete the strategy of a big Vietnam So by the end of 1977 the Russians are trying to put pressure on China again by building a con ict in South East Asia by using their united Vietnam against Cambodia and deter China away from relations with the US So they will start increasing pressure around China The trigger point for them comes in Feb 1978 when the China holds their 5th national people s congress They decided on a state apparatus and everybody thought Deng would become the president of China Except Thornton he visited China in 1977 when all this was happening He did not get posts nor did any of his allies get any post Another defense minister and his people got all the post So Deng was squeezed out What that meant to the Russians was that their only hopes of improvement on a SinoSoviet relations was gone They then decide to embark on a military build up around China 0 They set up a theater military headquarters they deployed divisions along the northern islands ofJapan and start carrying out raids on Chinese borders Then they provide advisors for North Vietnam to carry their attack So the Russians are building this nutcracker on the Chinese hoping to convince them to go to the Soviet side instead of come to the US 0 So by spring of 1978 things begin to crumble for the US The Russians are on the march Iran is crumbling there is no progress in IsraeliEgyptian peace treaty talks and the Ethiopians have defeated the Somalis Wherever you look the Russians are on the march and the US is on the defense 0 However Vance insists on d tente rst So in the spring of 1978 Carter has to make some big decisions We will see these decisions on Thursday February 24th Over arching all of the past events we discussed was the SALT negotiation progress The question is whether or not the US s strategy of d tente being turned inside out in a way that the Russians were using us and use our strategy for their purposes The question was Were the Russians engaged in a strategy aimed at overturning the global order and aimed at us the grand strategy Or were they simply picking off targets of opportunity that were not in any sense connected Brzezinski would argue the grand strategy Vance argued that they were just picking out opportunities So Carter decide to split the difference and say that the Russians were not engaged in a grand strategy against the US but at the same time he needed to strengthen the US and the US positions that were coming under attack around the world The upshot of this debate early in 1978 was that the US would decide to quotride the whirlwindquot We were not going to contest the Russians directly they are going to let the Russian offensive grow and hope that they could use it as leverage in achieving their own objectives Like persuading Europeans to deploy a counterattack SS20 persuading Sadat to go forward with a peace treaty with the Israelis persuading the Saudis to see the Russians threat as greater than the Zionist threat ad persuading the Chinese that they had to enter into normalization relations with the US to get our support against the Russians and Vietnamese Riding The Whirlwind o This was a risky strategy for sure but that is what they decided to do The upshot was hope of slowing down the SALT talks and drop all mention of d tente while trying to build up our forces so we would not get put at a disadvantage So on March 17 Carter gave a big speech about how the Russian missile program was doing stating that the US was not concerned and that the Russians would never be able to get superiority over us But most of it was just talk because the US was deteriorating The Russians were interested in disrupting US superiority A similar decline in power Vance s idea was based on the argument that if you are inoffensive to your main enemy he wont be your enemy That s why Vance tripped up because he was doing this with the Russians This was a terrible mistake that was made by many before 0 Peace is never a function of military imbalance it s only possible through by a military balance So reducing one s power is the wrong way to go but that is what the Carter administration was doing Brief History of Russian Fronts From 5363 Afghanistan was under the rule by Mohammed Daoud Khan Then in 1963 during the Kennedy Administration King Zahir came to power he gave Afghanistan In 1963 1973 this seemed to work 5363 this seemed to work but then Daoud came back in power A silent coup brought Zahir out He went to the Mediterranean to retire It looked like the Russians had themselves a strong anchor between Pakistan and Iran But between 73 78 the US supported the Shah of Iran in his efforts to win over Daoud Pakistan was thrown in and India was brought in They began to train Afghan soldiers In 1977 Daoud felt con dent enough that he began to close out the Afghan communists The Russians told him he couldn t do that because they wanted to keep their people in Afghanistan and Daoud said quotNo we are moving them outquot It looked like the US was going to succeed in indirect return of Afghanistan to the West By the spring of 1078 Daoud had changed his mind He was coming over to the West and the Shah of Iran was going to build railroad for him so they could have access to the Persian Gulf It all seemed promising until April of 1978 In April of 1978 the Communist Party of Afghanistan carried the quotSaur Revolutionquot on the 7th of April This revolution took Daoud out and brought the Russians back in The Saur Revolution restored power to Abdul Qadir Dagarwal and communist party leaders This was a big blow to Carter s policies Vance argued that the Russians were not involved That this was a local overthrown by leftist military This was the truth but he had to keep denying that the Russians were there in other to go forward with d tente We see this later in Nicaragua Vance would never call anyone in Nicaragua communists they would all just be called leftists Like today you can t call anyone a Jihadist but they are Jihadist Within days after the overthrow the Afghan communists were not just involved the Russians were involved in Afghan affairs in 1978 They were taking over military and training duties The Saur Revolution brought the Carter admin back to its senses They knew they needed to strengthen their defenses so they reopen the beginning of talks about normalization with China So this Afghan coup convinces Carter that he has to normalize relations with China and move forward with the peace treaty with Israel and Egypt lsraelLeba non The Syrians were attacking Israel borders So the Syrians move into the North East area of Lebanon and the Israelis move into another area in Lebanon driving out pieces of the region for security purposes The lsraelis would put one of their guys in control of what they called quotFree Lebanonquot The Syrians were taking position in the valley because they were planning to put missiles there China So Brzezinski was sent to Beijing and meets with Fong and they work out the basic terms of their deals Remember The Chinese wanted the US get out of Taiwan completely The US wanted the Chinese to say publicly that they would pursue a peaceful settlement with Taiwan and allow the US to send arms to Taiwan In those meetings Fong says we can have one or the other Either a peaceful agreement but no arms deal or an arms deal and no public peaceful settlement Brzezinski declines to answer it has to be both However they do agree to begin a normalize process that would begin in june Carter is taking the steps to counter the grand strategy by the Russians Vance is not happy When Brzezinski comes back in Spring he creates a furor because while he was in Beijing he took a trip to the Great Wall When he got there he grabbed an AK from a Chinese guard and said to Deng he would race him and the one who wins gets to ght the Russians Of course this was all over the news Vance was furious and told Carter that they could not play the China card against the Russians that we need to deal with the Russians with the talks SALT d tente etc Carter says okay So from a few months span Carter goes from seeking d tente to not seeking d tente and back and forth Now Vance is back in power again Vance tells Brzezinski that he is not allowed to talk in public unless if he says so There is tension between them With Vance again in charge he puts SALT ll forward as the main objective and he puts all the other talks on hold He decides that they were going to slow down the talks with the Egyptians and Israeli through the contexts of PRM38 This was a study about arms control and geopolitics positions Vance and Brzezinski are very consistent in what they can do it just depends on who is running the show at the time You have an administration where different people are running the show and Carter doesn t know what he wants Vance tells Carter that he needs to give a big speech about what they are going to do Carter agrees Vance and Brzezinski give Carter their speeches of course they represent each one s strategic view Carter takes them and tries to stitch them together He gives a speech at the naval academy in June which is a question to the Russians quotDo you want confrontation or cooperationquot That doesn t go well and the press core hammers him Yemen This event brings about another change in Carter s attitude The event that occurs in Yemen between the South and the No h What we saw in Afghan was a Soviet engineered coup to interrupt a swift in Afghan position to the Afghan side We will see the same thing in Yemen lt s complicated because we are dealing with more parts Yemen was divided into two states 0 People s Democratic Republic In South Yemen in Aden under lsmail 0 Yemen Arab Republic In North Yemen ran by Ahmad alGhashmi In the mid19705 remember Egypt had a lot of troops in South Yemen including Soviets the North was very proWest and proSaudi regime The Saudis were trying to bring about the uni cation of Yemen by working through North Yemen The US was supporting the Saudis in this effort It seemed like it was working but then the battle between Ethiopia and Somalia irrupted The status of the Yemenis changed again because South Yemen was a storage and forward outpost for the Russians who were using this area to send supplies to Ethiopia So as the Russians were getting involved in the EthiopianSomali War their reliance on South Yemen increased So they put more resources in South Yemen to support their larger effort So it looked like a Saudi effort to win over South Yemen to the North was going to fail but the same thing began to happen in Yemen that happened in Afghanistan In 19771978 the Saudis redoubled their efforts AlGhashmi got together with All and it looked like they were going to affect the effort If they succeeded they would disrupt the Soviet shipping point to Ethiopia But it looked like things were going our way The US sent someone to meet with Ali on the 28th ofJune but on the 24th a dramatic event occurs 0 Ali sent a messenger to AlGhashmi in North Yemen and he didn t know that the messenger was a suicide bomber So Ali sends the document with the messenger but when the messenger opens the bag at AlGhashmi s of ce it explodes and they all die There are some reports about All nding out about it and tries to call the messengerbomber back When this happened Ismail went into action against Ali So they have a brief shoot out in the next few days In this shoot out everyone was involved instead of the US The Cubans and Russians are in support of lsmail and the Chinese in support of Ali Cuban planes are attacking the palace Russians ships ashore were bombing the palace It was important to the Russians and they were willing to spend money to keep South Yemen under their control lsmail won they put Ali against a wall and shot him with a ring quad US Response to Soviet Missiles Advancement When this happens Carter s administration gets together and gures out what they would do They would reverse their strategic positions They would put SALT on hold and try to strengthen their position It39s not just the Yemeni events that bring this change it s also the test of the Soviet missiles programs The test took place in the fall of 1977 and by summer 1978 it s clear that the Soviet missiles will be much more accurate then anyone had expected at this stage in the game The way it works is that you can target missile silos more directly People don t matter As your missiles get more accurate you can target silos more directly Your missiles against my silos my missiles against your silos people don t matter So your response is to secure the silos so that the missiles can t destroy them You could put more concrete over them or stronger concrete There are many options But the Carter Administration becomes aware that the Soviets missiles are so accurate that they could destroy the toughest silos So they need to change the approach by making the missiles mobile So the US put the missiles on trains planes etc The US and the Russians do this to make themselves less vulnerable That s why submarine based missiles are the least vulnerable So Carter slows down the SALT talks again We will tell the Russians that we are going mobile So the Russians say they are going mobile too Nothing goes anywhere in the nego a ons In the summer of 1978 the Carter administration starts to acquire land in the SouthWest US hundred s of thousands of acres of land Their idea of mobility is to build a racetrack but it wasn t a race track It was an underground tunnel and the missiles would go along this long track There would be open spaces where missiles could stop and re So this was a MAP Mobile Aim Point Procedure This was a stupid idea for many basic reasons o If they built it it would consume all the water in the SouthWest US There would have been a drought in this area long before the drought now However the only answer was to go mobile which is what the Carter administration was going to do By having reversed the policy again the China negotiations are on again and the negotiations for the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty is on again Carter decides that the US states was going to become more directly involve in these negotiations So he decides to call a meeting at Camp David in Frederick MD Summit from the 5th to the 17th of September Camp David A very narrow peace between the Egypt and Israel was available since the fall of 1977 but the US advised Egypt not to take that deal because it amounted to a separate peace And Sadat s position was not only to get Sinai and Gaza back which were basic terms of the peace treaty he also wanted to be the Arab peace maker and be able to say he put the Palestinian question on a track to a solution He wanted to make sure he could deliver on the Palestinian issues and deliver on the Israeli issue of Sinai Menachem Begin of Israel who came to power in 1977 simply offered a straight peace deal on Sinai It was called the quotfig leafquot on the Palestinian question We advised Sadat not to do that This was another way we rode the whirlwind and this would slow down the negotiations Carters decide to go ahead and lets get stuff done Bill Quand wrote about it He was there as an NSA guy Carter also has good information about it in his memoirs On the rst day they sit down and Sadat presents his plans on a Palestinian selfgoverning systems as well as the Egyptian peace treaty Begin says quoteven if we reach a peace treaty I m not going to take the settlements out of Sinaiquot The lsraelis are building settlements in the West Bank and Sinai For Begin to say that the Israelis were not going to take the settlements out was the deal breaker At that moment rst day Sept 5th Sadat says quotWe are over and we are going homequot Carter tries to get it under control and get Sadat to stay So there have been no negotiations yet and there has already been a crisis So Carter gets his people together and they decide to change their plan The plan will now be to not allow Sadat and Begin to negotiate with each other Instead the US would negotiate between them from then on A draft treaty with blank spots We take a draft treaty to the Egyptians and lsraelis separately and have them ll in blank spots and then talk it out separately This was accidental how it occurred because most treaties in negotiations today occur like this Began wants nothing to do with this treaty and he will try and sabotage it as much as he can The key points were settlements in Sinai settlements in West Bank and Jerusalem After hard bargaining between the Egyptians and lsraelis Carter did a lot of the bargaining he was pretty good at this he got Began to agree to bring the question of removing the Sinai settlements before the Knesset That s an advance The questions ofJerusalem they set aside Everyone knows they would not be able to resolve this issue The DOS states that Jerusalem was lsraeli conquered territory UN Resolution 242 says that Israeli has to withdraw their settlements but they didn t That s why the DOS says that Jerusalem is conquered territory Began has a problem with this and says quotAbsolutely not We can t incorporate something that would make lsrael look back The Six Day War gave us the right to change bordersquot Carter says quotIf you say that then there is no basis for negotiationsquot Begin says quotThat s the way it isquot Carter says quotOkay we ll put Resolution 242 in the appendix it wont be a part of the treatyquot Even though the treat is supposed to be based on Resolution 242 it will not be But the sticking point was the settlements in the West Bank We wanted the Israelis to say they would build no more settlements in the West Bank as long as the negotiations were going on The lsraelis did not agree because the negotiations could be dragged out for years So the best that Begin could give was a 3month hold on the building of settlements Carter on the 15th of September tells his staff to start making failure plans Carters plan is to give a big speech announce that the summit has failed and blame the Israelis Someone in the US delegation told the Israelis so they tried to preempt and spook Sadat into backing out rst So they tell Sadat that they are not signing anything Sadat tells Vance to bring the helicopter because he was leaving Vance calls Carter about this and Carter panics and tells Sadat that he will get blamed if he leaves To wait and the Israelis will get blamed Sadat agrees He avoids disaster but it s not over The only concrete outcome for Camp David was the settlement question They agree about the selfgoverning system in the West Bank which is not really a selfgoverning authority The key question was would the Israel stop building settlements in the West Bank Carter knows that Begin is only willing to provide a 3month hold on the settlement building So he says to Begin quot Give me a letter saying what your position is and deliver it on the 17thquot Carter wants to nesse the disagreement So on Sunday 17th evening this is the day they would announce that they would go forward with the peace treaty and a Palestinian framework So Carter tells him to send the framework after the ceremony Once they had the ceremony they would slip the letter in there and no one would be wise to understand what happened This is Carter s plan Carter goes to Sadat and says quotIt is agreed The Israelis are not going to build settlements and we have a deal on the treaty So let s go to Washington and sign it allquot That is the real story of Camp David summit Carter Carter nessed an agreement with the Israelis they sat down and signed it all but the treaty would not emerge until March The only reason there wouldn t be a treaty was because the US would cave into Israel big time in March We ll get there in a later lecture Iran By mid 1978 riots are starting By August of 1978 there were massacres in Tehran and movie theaters It s starting to get really bad There is a certain amount of anxiety in the Carters Administration over the peace treaty because of what s happening in Iran We are backing out of Iran because we don t want to be offensive to Russia by having an ally on their border It s all starting to fall apart The rst NSA meeting that anyone knows about in regards to Iran doesn t occur until Tehran is in ames USChina Normalization At the same time Carter says they needed to get moving on China but they need to have leverage on China The negotiations have been going on and there is a treaty Carter wants to give them what they want but the Chinese must meet our demands on the arms sells and public peaceful settlement of Taiwan The leverage Carter uses on China was in regards to Vietnam The Vietnamese with Russia s help were preparing to invade Cambodia The Chinese were preparing to invade Vietnam they deployed troops on the border So what is the leverage The invasion would put a threat on China s border So the leverage is that the Chinese wants the US to deter the Russians during the invasion The US would use this as leverage to get an agreement from the Chinese So as the negotiations get closer to the end there is also a turnover in the Chinese leadership Deng Xiaoping is going to put Fung in a box and Deng will be the guy who negotiates the terms of normalization with US representatives He tries to play hardball on Dec 12th and states that there will be no arms sells and no statement of peaceful agreement It looks like it will all go up in smoke at the last minute Brzezinski says to Deng that they could raise these issues later after the treaty Deng was bluffing because he needed this treaty and he needed the US to deter the Russians He expects we will do this but he is going to be wrong about that Deng needed the US to deter Russia to succeed in invading Vietnam so we were going to use this against him as leverage So Deng agrees to normalization In the mean time Carter announces this on the 5th of December Vance is aghast Carter sent Vance to the Middle East to talk to the Israelis about going forward on the peace treaty He promised Vance that they would not announce anything until he got back Because Vance is still trying to get the SALT treaty rst Everything relies on SALT coming rst So he rushes back home and Carter says that they had to go forward with the plans of normalization sooner than he promised him So Vance s whole strategy is turned inside out and he is not happy So now SALT would come last So we get normalized relations with China The Chinese attacks Vietnam Everything is going according to plan When Deng asked the US to deter the Russians Carter says quotWe can t do thatquot The Chinese are stuck and they immediately pull out This is just the scope of the US side of these events There are different angles to look at like the Russian side the Chinese side etc He will go over it again and more in depth next week
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