Week 7 PS205 Professor Lars Skalnes
Week 7 PS205 Professor Lars Skalnes PS205, CRN 26418
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This 12 page Class Notes was uploaded by Kathryn Sternberger on Friday February 20, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PS205, CRN 26418 at University of Oregon taught by Lars Skalnes in Winter2015. Since its upload, it has received 127 views. For similar materials see Inro. to International Relations in Political Science at University of Oregon.
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Date Created: 02/20/15
Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 2 16 15 Happy President s Day everyone The League of Nations Collective security pursued through the League of Nations created after WWI in response to the tragedies was supposed to be a solution to war 0 Countries required to pool their military power A threat to one is a threat to all in that sense it is similar to NATO Align against the most threatening power Protection through preponderance of power The US did not sign the League of Nations Woodrow Wilson did but it was never approved by the Senate In the League all members had veto o This was an issue 0 Who has veto power in NATO I The 5 of the 15 security council China Britain US France and Russia O O O O The Failure of the League Lack of participation limited its power Countries proved unwilling to pool their military Unamity was a big problem aggressors had veto power Not every threat is equally serious cf British and French response to Italian and German aggression Germany was too big for it s neighbors to feel secure If neighbors allied together Germany was too small to feel secure Versailles Treaty tried to weaken Germany German response in 1920 s was a seesaw policy play east and west off against each other Germany s Response in the 1930 s Left the league of nations in 1933 year Hitler came to power Marched into the demilitarization Rhineland in 1936 o Rhineland under the Versailles Peace Treaty was to remain demilitarized the Germans broke this Annexed Austria in 1938 Annexed Sudetenland in 193 8 Military strategy Strengthen position in east eliminate adversary in west then turn east to finish off Russia Germany sits in the middle of Europe Lots of borders Perfect area for attack How do we fight a war on multiple fronts I We don t similar to the Shliefen plan 0000 Explaining the response to German aggression Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 Problem why now balancing until the very end Possible explanations 0 Britain s strategic overextension and appeasement o Defensive advantages and buckpassing o Ideology Haas article assigned I Ideological differences between potential alliance partners prevented alliance from forming Britain s strategic overextension problem Strategic overextension 0 Global commitments and a weakened economic base I Increase in US and Japanese navies are a serious threat I A strong economy necessary in a naval arms race I Too many commitments to support this global empire they were trying to maintain I They were left considerably less powerful after WWI than they were before Could not simultaneously defend against a Japanese attack in the Pacific and a German attack in Europe What might be a solution to the problem 0 Just let the East go Let the empire go I What they did after 1945 I Shows blatant weakness 0 Once a war in Europe starts the Japanese is going to seize their chance 0 Try to pin the other great powers against each other I Probably not going to work 0 You could get help I In the pacific The US I In the Haas article he ignores the pacific element of the situation Appeasement A policy of granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace Churchill s definition An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last Highpoint of this policy The Munich Conference in September 1938 0 France Italy Great Britain Germany 0 Discussing Hitler s demand for Sudetenland I believe it is Peace for our time o Chamberlain gave Hitler what he wanted 0 Hoping for peace Explaining Appeasement Could Chamberlain have acted otherwise or was he naive and cowardly Three schools of thought Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 0 Traditional view until 1960 s Chamberlain s personal limitations explain his actions at Munich I His personality I Individual level argument 0 Revisionist school Britain s strategic situation constraints explains Chamberlain s actions I Kinds of constraints the faced I Appeasement was demanded by the situation at hand I No wiggle room 0 Counterrevisionist school Constraints yes but Chamberlain was not very skilled I Played cards poorly I Could have done a better job I Both constraints and individual characteristics matter Revisionist view of Appeasement Agrees with Chamberlain s own assessment of the situation he faced at Munich 0 He felt like a man called on to play poker with a gangster with no cards in his hand Any other policy pursued at Munich by Chamberlain would have been an astonishing almost inexplicable divergence from the norm Emphasis on military economic and political constraints Strategic and Military Constraints Need to keep commonwealth united in a war 0 Commonwealth New Zealand Canada and others 0 War with Germany of Sudetenland would split commonwealth Strategic assessment before Munich o A struggle with Germany would encourage Italy and Japan to attack British interests 0 Britain faced not a limited European war but a world war A war with Germany in Europe would leave Britain defenseless against Japan in the Far East Could not stop from seizing the Sudetenland 0 Britain and France inferior both on land and in the air 0 NOT inferior in the air at the time but they believed they were Political Constraints lntemational 0 Us isolationism I US would have been very important in a war of attrition against Germany and in a war with Japan Domestic 0 British public opinion strongly pacif1st 0 Wanted to avoid war at all cost Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 o Appeasement had public support Britain s Weak Hand Britain cannot rely on US military assistance in the event of war The commonwealth was divided on the Czech question In a European war japan might seize the opportunity for expansion in the Far East The British military had argued that Britain was illprepared for a major confrontation British public opinion Implication Chamberlain s personality does not matter any leader would have acted in the same way including Churchill Counterrevisionist View of Appeasement A weak hand but played it pretty badly a more skillful diplomat would have overcome the constraints Constraints might explain why Britain placed such a high value on avoiding war Could have chosen deterrence o It basically is a threat 0 If you attack me I am going to retaliate o Relies on retaliation o The promise of retaliation has to be credible This is not the same as explaining appeasement 0 Does not explain the particular strategy why not deterrence instead of appeasement I Without military power to retaliate deterrence isn t going to work I It is not clear that they had that power The tradition of appeasement explains the particular choice of strategy I Long tradition of appeasement I Reason gt Economy dependent on peace gt Trade would break down in war US isolationism Strategic immunity 0 Two oceans made it invulnerable to attack 0 Big domestic market made it economically independent I Not reliant on international economy Domestic politics 0 Senate doesn t want to get involved in another European war 0 European problem not our problem Multipolarity and buckpassing States prone to pass the buck on balancing in multipolar system Why buckpassing in the 1930 s but not before WWI Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 o 1914 great powers adhered to unconditional alliances chainganging I Tight alliances o 193 81939 great powers tried to pass the buck Basic structure of the international system remains the same multipolarity but two different strategies chainganging and buckpassing Basic power structure can t explain why certain behaviors are being adopted OffenseDefense Balance Perception of the relative strength of offense and defense differed in two cases 0 1914 belief that offense had the advantage I WWI the defense had the advantage I The perception however was that offensive had the advantage 0 1939 belief that defense had the advantage Perceived defensive advantage and buckpassing Soviet union 0 Advantages of the defense led to the belief that France and Great Britain could hold out for a very long time even without soviet support 0 France 0 Need to bring Great Britain in and then rely on defensive advantages to defeat Britain 0 Belief in French defense meant that Britain was willing to commit only a small expeditionary force Constructivist Explanations Hass article Ideological distances drive alliance formation in the 1930 s 0 Between fascism and democracy between fascism and communism and between communism and democracy 0 Essential argument countries with similar identities perceive each other as threatening and countries with dissimilar beliefs as more threatening A constructivist explanation because of the emphasis on leaders ideological beliefs and identities Leaders with divergent identities tend to think of each other as threatening Ideology and Appeasement In both Britain and France conservatives favored an alliance with Italy The left in both countries favored alliance with Soviet Union 0 Unable to agree concluded no alliance o Appeasement is the only option Ideology and Soviet Behavior From 1933 to 199 the soviets tried to balance against Germany the most threatening power defensive realists gt This behavior is difficult to explain from the point of view of Haas Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 But from 1939 to 1941 they ignored the balance of power 0 Soviets said to Germany you go after Poland and don t worry about Russian involvement 0 They believed that Germany would attack in the west and the power the soviet union could sit on the sidelines while the other powers weakened themselves 0 The soviets did not distinguish between fascism and democracy which made it easy for them to change alliances 0 They expected Britain to join Germany in attacking the soviet Union 0 What s Haas problem with this this I Countries with vastly different ideologies coming to agreements I Argues that Soviets make no distinction between fascism and democracy Saw them all as capitalist countries So they will change alliances whenever advantageous I Stalin expected the British to join the Germans in an attack on the Soviet Union The Consequences of World War 11 There are two obvious superpowers US and Soviet Union The American Response Goes way beyond Greece and Turkey Truman Doctrine a pledge to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures 0 One Explanation I He had to oversell the threat to get Congress to support it From aid of Greece and Turkey to support of all peoples Marshall plan economic assistance would be made available to all the countries of Europe 0 It is a foreign aid program made available to European countries to form strong alliances 0 Designed to get the European countries up and running economically 0 Also to undermine support for communist countries in European countries 0 Support for communism is essentially driven by economic situations 0 Marshall is the Secretary of State at the time Towards the Cold War The Soviet Union extending in uence un Eastern Europe 0 Poland 1947 Czechoslovakia 1948 fall to communism North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949 NATO 0 An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all NATO was the entangling alliance the US had avoided for almost 200 years 0 Ending the long history avoiding alliances An empire by invitation Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 o Europeans invited Americans i Cold War Origins Realism Systemiclevel explanation o The Cold War was a consequence of the security dilemma 0 Competition to ll a power vacuum in central Europe 0 Hitler predicted that With the defear of the Reich there will remain in the world only two Great Powers capable of confronting eachother the United States and Soviet Russia The laws of both history and geography will compel these tow Powers to a trial of strength Ect o The cold war had to happen Cold War Origins Constructivist Great ideological distance between the US and Soviets driving con ict and making them enemies Communist ideology inspired soviet aggression and a worldwide conspiracy to overthrow capitalism The US sought to encourage anticommunism and democracy worldwide Leaders with divergent identities will see each other as threatening Cold War Origins Liberalism Failure of international institutions 0 United Nations was another failed attempt at collective security 0 No common interests no PD game institution argument only really applies when interests are in common Low levels of economic interdependence 0 Low interference low chance of cooperation A democracy confronting an authoritariantotalitarian regime o Therefor democratic peace theory doesn t apply here Polarity and Balancing Connection to balance of power theory 0 Waltz Balances are more likely to occur in bipolar systems Waltz bipolar systems are more stable absence of great power war because balancing is likelier Multipolar systems miscalculations of relative power and of opponent s resolve are likelier 0 You are more likely to be wrong about how powerful the other powers are 0 You are more likely to be wrong about opponents resolve 0 You are more likely to be wrong about alliance intention power and resolve 0 Failure of comprehension Multipolar systems freeriding Bipolar systems failure of will Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 0 Balance by internal balancing 0 External balancing alliances don t play much of a role 0 Failure to take measures necessary in order to counteract the other power s arsenal he doesn t think this failure of will is likely Multipolar system failure of will and failure of comprehension What is wrong with that argument 0 How do you explain NATO and the Soviet Union s alliance The Cold War Period of intense rivalry but stops short of war 0 Preparation for a war that never came Competition between the two superpowers was 0 Competition not only militaristically but also with ideas and values I When criticized soviet civil issues they pointed to our issues with African Americans in the South I Brown vs Board of Education greatest victory of the Cold War 0 Intensive Covered nearly all aspects of the two countries life 0 Extensive covered nearly all parts of the globe An inherent paradox everything is vital yet noting is vital 0 Because in the end you have to rely on yourself Nuclear Weapons and Stability Nuclear weapons an alternative explanation of stability Two competing explanations bipolarity and nuclear weapons 0 How do we distinguish between these two possible explanations I You could say they had no reason to use nuclear weapons because of the bipolarity thing I Is it really bipolarity or is it nuclear weapons Idea could argue that nuclear weapons created the bipolarity in the system It is bipolar because they had nuclear weapons Very possible that it s true but how do I know Do study throughout history to look at other cases of bipolarity other cases of nuclear weapons That would be the strategy but there is only ONE instance of bipolarity and only ONE era of nuclear weapons which is the current one So today there is no real way to know Deterrence Deterrence prevents attack by threatening retaliation To work the threat must be credible 0 Premium on showing resolve o If 1 attack you with nuclear weapons why would you retaliate What would you gain You would already be devastated o If you attack the US homeland we will retaliate okay credible Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 o If you attack France we will retaliate why would someone believe that threat Would you believe that the US would attack Moscow because Soviets attacked France leading to an attack on Washington DC would they really do that Is the threat to use nuclear weapons committing suicide credible Credibility of extended deterrence deterring attacks on allies particularly difficult o The extended threat is claiming to commit suicide of our own people 0 Would the Soviets really believe that we would be willing to risk New York or Washington DC American lives for the sake of Berlin that is already devastated from nuclear attack Extended Deterrence in Europe Soviet conventional superiority to be nulli ed by threat of nuclear retaliation o Soviets had more tanks and more army and at landscape 0 Relied on tactical nuclear weapons Problem ls such a threat credible o Deterring a Soviet conventional attack meant risking a Soviet nuclear attack on American cities Many thought this was not credible If not credible soviets would not be deterred The Chicken Game Useful in modeling nuclear con icts The choices are straight or swerve Rebel without a cause 0 James Dean s image of being a little loco may have been helpful because the opponent might believe that he isn t going to jump out of the car before going off the cliff What is the equilibrium outcome 0 Swerving cooperation Defect going straight DC is better than CC CC is better than CD CD is better than DD The predicted outcome is that one person will swerve and the other will go straight why I The real world game nuclear arms race is not just played once because you face retaliation I Two equilibriums 1 State A straight State B swerve 2 State B swerve State B straight I Indeterminate outcome can t tell who is going to swerve I Have to go outside the game to find out who is going to swerve it is all about credibility OOOOO Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 I In the Ukraine current the Russians are going to straight and we are swerving I Could you explain the Cuban Missile Crisis with this game The outcome Russia moved nukes out of Cuba we instituted a naval blockade the moved up to the line and turned around and went back they went up to the line and went back that is swerving Cuban Missile Crisis contributed to the popularity of this gmne Signaling Resolve 0 Types Separation of types drink beer or eat quiche How we signal if I am a beer drinker of a quiche eater 0 Cheap talk will not work 0 Costly signals have to take actions that are too costly for the quiche eater I Which is the US under Obama do we stand down or hold rm We stand down Costly signals make threats more credible o Tripwires in the case of a Soviet attack it inevitably involves the US in that war it is what makes the extended threat credible Interventions and Credibility Why intervene in Korea 0 Not strategically signi cant 0 Credibility of US commitments at stake o Costly signal that strengthened credibility of US commitments elsewhere Western Europe 0 It is advantage to show that we are willing to go to war for something that is not strategically signi cant The concern with credibility implied that there were very few really local con icts during the Cold War why everything is vital It is vital because it has to do with our credibility to our commitments Adds credibility to our threat to defend Europe You are willing to take actions that don t look rational a little wacko You could argue the same with the war in Vietnam 0 Has no strategic signi cance Use that willingness to go to war in places like that shows imagine what will we do in places where it is strategically signi cance The problem we lose we pull out and we leave our allies Weakened credibility Sudan Hassan said the US could not sustain a con ict in the middle east Shows we are in the end quiche eaters O 0000 End of the Cold War Realism Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205 Soviet Union unable to keep up in the arms race 0 Their economy was too weak Why the Cold war ended peacefully the Soviet Union is a challenger that never really catches up to the US Power Transition Theory different kind of realist argument A dyadic view of structure 0 Critical is the gap in power between the hegemon and the challenger 0 Peace is associated by dominance of one power over everyone else 0 China is a potential challenger once they catch up is when there is danger Underlying Logic Why challenge dissatisfaction with the order created by the hegemon As long as the hegemon retains its superiority no point in challenging You need power to mount a challenge which is why war occurs when there is a balance of power Dynamic theory underlying mechanism of change is differential rates of economic growth 0 O O O O 0 Why does the challenger catch up If it maintains a higher rate of growth over time How long would it take for China to catch up at current growth rate We could calculate this but don t have the numbers China is growing at about 10 per year we have grown at about 3 7 differential there don t know the gap in GDP How does this theory explain the 19th Century 0 Time of British dominance until the end of the 19th century when Germany caught up Eras are characters differently People look at the same reality and describe the situation in very different ways How do we measure power Because power can be de ned in so many different ways we can disagree on how to describe the power dynamic of the world If you look at military power US dominant unipolar If you look at economic power if you treat European Union as one state then we have a Unipolar system Week 7 Lecture Notes P5205
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