Week 15: War in the Middle East
Week 15: War in the Middle East HIST 2051-001
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This 9 page Class Notes was uploaded by Amy Brogan on Thursday April 21, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to HIST 2051-001 at University of Cincinnati taught by James Streckfuss in Spring 2016. Since its upload, it has received 13 views. For similar materials see American Military History in History at University of Cincinnati.
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Date Created: 04/21/16
Streckfuss Amy Brogan April 19, 2016 Week 15: War in the Middle East The Gulf War Phase 1 The GroundOffensive Plan o Iraqi republicguarddeployed in the Gulf, we moved our flanks from the rear and cut lines of communication and retreat Situation, February26, 1991 o Iraqisgetting boxed closer and closer to the gulf February27, 1991 Leading the Way – BarryMcCaffrey o 1979 – BN CDR, 2-30 IN, 3dID th o 1984 – BDECDR, 3dBDE, 9 ID (Motorized) o 1986 – Assistant Commandant, USA Infantry School o 1990 –CG, 24 ID Stormin’ Norman –madea big name for himself as chief architect for the operation, which was very successful Dessert Storm – The Results o Kuwait liberated o Evicted Saddam Hussain from Kuwait, hurt his standing in his home country Saddam’s military power curtailed Saddam’s political power limited o Casualties inCombat: US: 190 KIA, 600 WIA Iraq: 20,000 KIA, 50,000 WIA or EPW o Was ita decisive victory? o Why didn’t wego all the way to Baghdad? Schwarzkopf’s Dilemma – War Termination:We had eight world powers behind us to take Iraq out of Kuwait, but not to invade Iraq. Only the USand UK would have gone into Baghdad as the coalition would have fallen apart. The Arabs would have not gone along with it because it would have been a serious power shift, and then they questioned the ability of the US to sop with Iraq and not turning guns on other Arabiancountries. We would have been stuck there and paying 100% of the cost. Korea: pushed communists back over the 38 parallel, but when we followed them China came inand the war changed. It was long and bloody and ended in the same place where it started. “LuckyWar” Excerpts o “Finally, the GulfWar demonstrated again that prewar investment in people, training, and good equipment pays off in blood saved on the battlefield.” o Richard Swain – Lucky War, p.343 “AmericanWay ofWar?” o “The ‘American way of war’ used to mean overwhelming the enemy with mass production. But DS represents a shift away from massconscript forces towarda professional elite that knows how to use high-tech weapons on a fast changing battlefield… The combat reservists who were sent off to learn desert warfare at Ft. Irwin never graduated to the front. The rigor of even simulatedmodern combat was toogreat for weekend soldiers.” - Newsweek, 11 March1991 o Mentions more or less the same idea that strategic bombing advocates were preaching in the ‘20s. Elite bombers chosen over hundreds and thousands of soldiers. Lucky War: The Third Army inDessert Storm – Richard Swain o “Far more worrying is the idea that has taken hold in the late twentieth century that one can make war without suffering losses from enemy actions or fratricide… In planning Operation Desert Storm, minimalizing alliedand civilian casualties was the highest priority.” o Had we lost our gut in terms of casualties? Loss of taste for big action, plotting allthe way back to the CivilWar. Not entering WWI till late in the war, and years intoWWII before an air war until we had to send ground soldiers. Russians lost 26 million people, we lost just over 40,000. Last 10 years or so, we take every casualty to heart and very seriously. 4,000 casualties in IraqiWar considereda big number in public opinion. Honing the New Professional Army o The Breakup of the Soviet Bloc and Soviet Power How big? What purpose/missions? What Structure?What equipment? o The Peace Dividend: Political Expectation: Public’s imagination of what we can dowith the money not being spent on war efforts (after paying off a mortgage, consider ourselves rich, but on a bigger scale) Public expected something now that the ColdWar was over 1989: USArmy ActiveComponent – 772,000/16 Divisions 1994: USArmy ActiveComponent – 529,000/8 Divisions 20%reduction in US Army Budget o Contingencies of 1990’s – Aberrations? “The US Army fights the nation’swars. We don’t do or shouldn’t do Stability operations, MOOTWs – whatever you want to call them – and never have. That stuff is done by the Marines and Special Forces. They train for those missions. Let those guys do it. Let us fight and win the wars.” Militaryoperations other than war – national disaster (Hurricane Katrina, Houston under water) o TraditionalWars (Since revolution) War: American Revolution, CivilWar, WWI, WWII Limited War:War of1812, Spanish-AmericanWar, Korean War, Vietnam War, Desert Storm, enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom o Non-conventional MilitaryOperations Barbary Pirates, Mormon War, Second Seminole War, IndianWars, Reconstruction, Boxer Rebellion, Philippines, Intervention in Haiti/Nicaragua/ Mexico, Intervention in Soviet Russia, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Balkans Maintaining the Momentum – “Nomore Task-Force Smiths!” o Task-force Smiths – deployed before they were fully trained, led by poorly trained officers, and were thus decimated. Notgoing to happen anymore o Expeditionary Capabilities - Stryker Stryker – armored fighting vehicle – 8 wheels’ behemoth Idea: structure training to makea supremelywell-equipped force for operation freedom o Digital Networks o Precision Weapons o Roles of ARNG and USAR o Preparation for the Army’s role inOIF andOEF OIF:Operation Iraqi Freedom OEF:Operation Enduring Freedom Counterinsurgency – Today’sWar o John Lewis Gattis, Prediction “The Long Peace” – wemightmiss the Cold war because it had definition and we knew who was involved, vs. today where we have a faceless enemy and stateless enemy (ISIS, Al-Quaeda), we are involved in a game ofglobal whack-a-mole that just keeps going Names keep changing: The Lord’sResistance Army, IRA, Counterinsurgency, guerrilla, CaucasusEmirate, Anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, Al-Quaeda, Insurgency, Taliban, Muslim Brotherhood, Insurrection, ISIS o The Army is geared toward conventional warfare Force on force Capture the territory Laws of war See the enemy, kill the enemy, go home o Our current enemy is not conventional. We must adjust our method and attitude toward conflict Not fair! Capture the hearts andminds Laws of War? Recognize the enemy, separate the enemy, befriend the enemy, handaround for a long time Designed army to conquer and occupy territory, doesn’t necessarily get job done anymore o What canwe learn from insurgents? - Ho Chi Minh Endurance and commitment key to victory o Lesson? Insurgent wins if he does not lose The counterinsurgent loses if he does not win o COIN Prior to Deployment Educate yourself! AO specific knowledge Language, Culture: Easiest way into the government: know how to speak Arabic Religion History Social Strata – who has“wasta”? o Wasta:Arabic: clout, who you know COINgeneral theories and principles Coin General theories and principles o FM 3-24 /Petraeus o David Kilcullen – Australian – Three pillars o Liddell-Hart – military historian and analyst o Galula – French – Four “laws” for counterinsurgency Not anything new, American revolution had these things at work (Patriots, Loyalists, fence-sitters) 1. The aim of the war is togoing the support of the population rather than control of territory 2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority 3. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party 4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventual strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area byarea, using pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighboring area o von Creveld – technology andwar writer, pessimistic view that all effort to deal with insurgency has failed o Zambernardi –“the impossible trilemma” Force protection Distinction between enemy combatants and noncombatants He physical elimination of insurgents T.E. Lawrence – 7 pillars of Wisdom, 27 Articles for dealing with Arabs o 1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you pleasewith yourself and them. o 2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf andBedu. Get to know their families, clansand tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hillsand roads. Do allthis by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Bea little stiff at first. o 3. Inmatters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency's sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive of your joint plans. o 4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward;but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Alwaysapprove them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are inaccord with your own opinion. When youattain this point, hold him to it, keep a tightgrip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure. o 5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantlyand unobtrusively as you can. Live with him, that atmeal timesand at audiences youmay be naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits togive adviceare not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the Sherif, it will do the Arab cause muchharm. o 6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to avoidgoing behind or beyond the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given them on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you altogether destroy your own. o 7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this wayyou hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif, with respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, andabove the rest. Precedence is a seriousmatter among the Arabs, and youmust attain it. o 8. Your ideal position is when youare present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you areassociated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sherifs are above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form theonly principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled alwayswith a Sherif's, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When the moment comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow suit. present but not notices, part of the wallpaper, part of fabric of situation o 9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as the natural aristocracy of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousiesmake it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position, and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money wouldbe insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf. o 10. Callyour Sherif 'Sidi' in publicand in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh'Abu Annad', 'Akhu Alia' or some similar by-name. o 11. The foreigner andChristian isnot a popular person inArabia. However friendlyand informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in front of you like a banner and hide your ownmind and person. If you succeed, you will have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show. o 12. Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it every day. A dryirony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personaland not too broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than themost violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour. Do not causea laugh ata Sherif except among Sherifs. o 13. Never layhands on anArab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but whatyou have really done is to build a wall between you and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the less you lose your temper thegreater your advantage. Also then you will not gomad yourself. important right now, letting the local do something (even if incorrectly) is important in the long run o 14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have the patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your adviceand do what you wish, but they do not meanyou or anyone else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill. o 15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabsdo it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical workwill not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. o 16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only asa cow to milk. o 17. Wear anArab headcloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably toBritish obstinacy of dictation) is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick head cloth forms a good protection against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in public. Vietnam – snipers ona fish and rice diet before they were deployed because mat-eaters had a scent that a Vietcong fighter could pick up before seeing them. Become part of the culture, eat the same diet o 18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearlyknown that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arabkit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerousand difficult. They make no specialallowances for you when you dress like them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like anactor in a foreign theatre, playing a partday and night for months, without rest, and for ananxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangenessand speak naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character: while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physicallyand mentally, in the comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught. o 19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, andappear at ease in them. Dress like a Sherif, if they agree to it. o 20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the European to beat the Arabs at their owngame, for we have stronger motives for our action, and putmore heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have takenan immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreignand half-understood language, the savage food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacyand quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months onend, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the climate, and the Turks, that this roadshould not be chosen without serious thought. o 21. Religious discussions willbe frequent. Say what you like about your ownside, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you mayscore heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu, Islam is soall-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervour, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and intenseas to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as mucha part of nature to them as is sleep or food. o 22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly andas quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them moreabout some parts of the business than we willever know. In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too 'set' to learn to handle the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don't attempt unusual things, unless they appealto the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility givesyou the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don't take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, aregreat shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win. Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likelyyou are to have the Turkscold, for they lack initiativeand expect you to. Don't play for safety. o 23. The open reason that Bedu giveyou for action or inactionmay be true, but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case. o 24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trainedmen and tribesmen. You will get workout of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures. In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language, are hopeless with Bedu. Theyare narrowminded in tactics, unable to adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollen- headed to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough togive any) would bemore readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are much more objectionable than poor strangers. o 25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It isas difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, mayappear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally. WWI – French circulated a memo to their troops to not be too familiar with their African troops because Americanswere still segregated/prejudice and wouldn’t understand the sentiment. o 26. Be as careful of your servantsas of yourself. If you wanta sophisticated one you will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabswill cook rice andmake coffee for you, and leave you if required to do unmanly worklike cleaning boots or washing. They are onlyreally possible if you are inArab kit. A slave brought up in the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, takewith you an Ageyli or two when yougo up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels. o 27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting studyof them. Keep always onyour guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companionsall the time: hear all that passes, search out what isgoing on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknessesandkeep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interestsand no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it Actions while patrolling o Every time you patrol, learnand recordas much information asyou can Names Sunni or Shiite How long have they lived in the house? What do you do for a living?
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