Week 5 Notes
Popular in U.S. Foreign Policy
Victoria De Almeida Tellechea-Rotta
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This 5 page Class Notes was uploaded by Victoria De Almeida Tellechea-Rotta on Thursday March 19, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PSC2446 at a university taught by Elizabeth Saunders in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 113 views.
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Date Created: 03/19/15
Week 5 223 225 223 The Origins and Evolution of the Cold War 0 Why strategies of containment plural The Origins of the Cold War 0 WWII US and Soviet Union are allies Wipe mind clean of everything you know happens in the Cold War 0 Have been ghting on the same side Once it becomes clear what happens the day after the war Some are concerned about this from the beginning Winston Churchill very concerned about the Russians taking over Eastern Europe Converging on Berlin East and West At the time not everyone in the US assumed the Cold War was inevitable Some thought they could cooperate get along Eisenhower declined the opportunity to go for Berlin rst Was ne with Soviets getting it Argued that it should be possible to work with Russia if we follow same pattern of allied unity Visited with Truman s approval Saw nothing in the future that would impede unity same man who becomes big Cold War player General feeling in Washington that maybe after the war Soviets can be brought into context Containment by integration Bring them into the club less likely to have con ict There had already been two world wars Not looking for another Postwar economic institutions rst players Stood from belief that political disorder of 1930 s was in part tied to economic problems and if you could have free trade and integrate world economies you could contain this whole sphere of interests countries could be directly integrated no need for war and political disorder that would lead to rise of radical political movements British and French kind of wanted to maintain their spheres of in uencecolonies Bretton Woords 1944 IMF and WB emerge intended to promote free markets but active management by governments to maintain domestic markets If you don t have these big shocks like depression and such forth there is less chance of political con ict Try and prevent another war from breaking out Soviets were offered admission to this system Get the Soviets to come in less likely to see direct con ict between West and USSR Intended to be a global system UN is also a part emerges a little later FDR s Great Dream Hope is that Soviets would have been a member of the club Start with a View that US can works with Soviets External factors were to blame for Soviets to fear 0 Doesn t go quite that way Truman take over somewhat of a shift in policy Containment by integration as quidpro quo Soviets don t wan t to be members of the club maybe see it as a more relationship of interests Shipments from German occupations loans and get Soviet political cooperation Assumptions assume Soviets care what the world thinks of them and assume Soviets need depend on things US can provide Participate in Bretton Woods don t join WB and IMF Still a sizable faction that believes that cooperation is possible There is confusion What to do next In a very confused environment look towards George F Kennan A mythical gure starts out in an ordinary job FSO Deputy Head of Mission in Moscow Cable for his views send back the long telegramquot Changes the course of American diplomacy Everyone wants to duplicate this feat after Cold War His views become basis of containment strategy 1 Demolishes the idea that Soviets are motivated by external threats Real problem is internal Russian problem and Marxist ideology which requires external threat Political force that with the US there can be no USSR Idea that the Soviets needed an international Boogey man to secure their own position Can t use carrots and sticks Need to depict US as terrible Good relations will only come about when Soviet system collapses Russians are basically good people but ruled by Soviet ideology that limits contacts with outside world 2 Stop trying to make nice No more concessions Accept what the Soviets had already taken Iron Curtain coming down Nothing you can do about that But you can stop them from going any further Scramble to counter communist in uence CIA gives other candidates cash against communists that can win in democracies 3 Patience and Firmness Build up US military strength to convince Soviets of their power Not enough military strength available at the time 1946 Republicans demobilize form 12 million men to 2 million men in wake of war Be ready for the long haul Kennan becomes a sought after gure In house think tank member Asked to outline vision of containment Had a very particular view of how it ought to unfold Vision 1 Skeptical of schemes to gure this out by international order and institutions We live in a world of diversity must deal with countries as they are Morgenthauesque Use balance of power manage interest Will not bring total peace accept that there will be war sometimes pg 27 of Gaddis 2 Prioritize interests Big complaint about Morgenthau not saying what national interest was Kennan lists national interests Certain areas of the world that should be the focus of defense priorities US Soviet Union GB GermanyCentral Europe Japan Concern is that these places may fall into hostile hands Combination of industrialmilitary capability and hostility threat One s already been lost Notice China is not on this list Korea and Vietnam Hot wars in the latter two Not on Kennan s list 3 US should work on restoring balance of power restore European power Marshall Plan comes into play 13 billion dollars in direct aid 10 of total US government expenditures If you want them to take you seriously build military forces in Europe 4 Exploit tensions within the Communist blocks Yugoslavia and Teitosim Took a while to gure Chinese separating from Soviets but things you can do to try and peel its own allies away from it 5 Nuclear war would be catastrophic But be Americans show our system is better and Kennan believed the Soviet system would collapse but would be long range fencing match People of the world would eventually decide Greece and Turkey Soviets have to pull out of it Truman Doctrine in 1947 gives aid to these countries Call to resist Soviet eXpansion anywhere Kennan in favor in part because of the periphery of vital centers that he talked about He says that we can t give money to all these people Allow some places to go communist In Kennan s view you prioritize and defend and you don t defend others Strongpoint defense Kennan objective strongly to NATO Collective security org attack on one member attack on all Felt that it was going to lengthen the Cold War and militarize it 1959 Warsaw Pact response Kennan also had concern about the Marshall Plan cementing the lines of the Cold War Originally offered to USSR to not make it instrumental to Cold War Kennan was not for anything that was going to institutionalize and harden the battle lines in Europe Show how bureaucratic politics can take an idea and take it off in a very different direction Every time there was a Soviet victory psychological blow to US 1949 Loss of China huge political backlash Perception of weakness is damaging to morale Feeling that you have to do something in the face of these losses Sticking to Kennan s list takes a lot of political guts Strikes when iron is hot growing feeling in Washington of insecurity Build domestic support for US military buildup some people have actually seen conspiracy between NSC68 and Korean War Did Dean Acheson incur the Korean War Dean Acheson did make a speech to the National Press Club put up a map and said here is East Asia Line of demarcation Interests on one side of line we will defend Essentially said if they invaded South of Korea its not going to matter 225 0 NSC68 Defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat anywhere Thesis Cold War can be thought of as a yoyo between peripheral and strongpoint defense at least until Reagan 0 Not an accident when you look at the pattern democratic tend to go to the peripheral symmetrical and republicans for strongpoint asymmetrical Eisenhower scal conservative return to strongpoint Speeches every gun made every warship is a theft from people who need food clothes Concerned that spending might alter exactly what it was trying to defend 0 How to achieve strongpoint defense but allow opposition to believe that USSR won t nibble away at things that aren t are your list 0 Dulles amp Eisenhower known for the reliance of Nuclear weapons Massive retaliation Mutually assured destructions Assure other side knows your capabilities in order to avoid attack 0 What makes threats credible O Dulles amp Eisenhower Keep other side guessing Instead of Truman approach match with equal reaction keep them guessing about how much you are going to respond They know you are going to respond but they don t know how Nuke or diplomatic protest If they re not sure less likely to cross that line Cultivate an air of unpredictability Notion of being slightly unpredictable Threat to leave something to chance 0 Quemoy and Matsu O Threatens to use nuclear weapons to defend Mao backed down then 0 Eisenhower economical way defending against Soviet eXpansion But it was dangerous and was debatable to be perceived as weak O O Covert operations was also cheap Nuclear driven version of strongpoint defense Johnson amp Kennedy back to peripheral 0 Flexible response Kennedy Communists preying on poverty and economical antidevelopment had to help state develop so they wouldn t be driven into the arms of the Soviets Hot war in Vietnam perception was that you could not allow small country to go communist Nixon back to strongpoint O Him and Kissinger all about balance of power Power should be evenly distributed Reagan picks neither Lets go of de tente O TRANSCEND communism
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