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by: Alicia Muir

PostelectionConflictManagementinNigeria.pdf HNRS 230 Paden

Marketplace > George Mason University > Honors Program > HNRS 230 Paden > PostelectionConflictManagementinNigeria pdf
Alicia Muir
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This was an outline for my final paper, which covered our second half of the semester discussing political, cultural, and electoral issues present day and moving forward in Nigeria.
Cross Cultural Perspectives Nigeria and China
Dr. Paden
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This 11 page Class Notes was uploaded by Alicia Muir on Wednesday August 3, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to HNRS 230 Paden at George Mason University taught by Dr. Paden in Fall 2016. Since its upload, it has received 7 views. For similar materials see Cross Cultural Perspectives Nigeria and China in Honors Program at George Mason University.


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Date Created: 08/03/16
I. Introduction A. The Challenges: Election Violence, Extremism, and Ethno Religious Crises 1. January 2011 election a) Dominant political party violated the rule that alternate presidents switch from a region from the north and then the region from the south b) Upcoming election of April 2011, southern Christian vs. northern Muslim c) Violence during this election 2. Supreme Court a) Boko Haram (1) Bombings on Christmas days to Christian churches near the capital city of Abuja and in the city of Jos in Nigeria’s Middle Belt (2) Confrontation between him and police in Yobe and Borno (3) Was condemned by leaders and the sultan for the bombings and called it “un-Islamic” b) Nigerian Supreme Court rejected the opposition party, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) because of the April 2011 elections 3. State of emergency a) Four northern states, terrorism of Boko Haram has been spreading b) Temporary closure of borders to decrease security challenges → war on terror c) Dec. 31, removal of fuel subsidies that lead to the doubling of prices of petroleum and demonstrations and riots d) Heavy presence of military in the north e) Security budget to take up almost one-fifth of the nation’s budget f) However,BokoHaramwasnotdeterred.Hethreatenedthe ChristiansintheNorthandgavethosewhowereoriginallyfromthe south,threedaystoreturn. B. Nigeria in the Larger Context 1. Challenges:​ trying to have a harmonious relationship between the Muslim world and the Western; ​NationalUnity 2. Population: One of the biggest countries that have half Muslim and half Christian a) Largest Sunni Muslim populations 3. One of the biggest oil and gas producer→ potential for problems 4. April 2011 elections, split Nigerians by religious, ethnic and regional lines that led to violence a) By May 2011, at least 800 people have died and thousands displaced b) Drifting towards regional politics c) Other countries in Africa experienced post election violence, usually over ethnic or regional lines C. Organization of this Monograph 1. Chapter 1: “examines the impact of the presidential election 2011 on conflict. It provides a brief overview of the Nigerian context and the lead up to the election; it describes international and official Nigerian responses to the election and examines post election issues and allegations; it discusses long-term consequences for elections and national unity and surveys conflict management in Nigeria; it assesses the aftermath to the election review process; and it distills lesson learned” (10) 2. Chapter 2: “deals with strategic responses to the Boko Haram extremist movement in northern Nigeria, including suggested policy reforms. It begins by looking at Boko Haram and human security in Borno, and then discusses a variety of potential reforms, including reforms of local government, of the role of traditional leaders of police services, of education, of national leadership, of military strategy, and of capacities for strategic planning” (10) 3. Chapter 3: “deals with the ethno religious crises in Plateau State. It examines the Plateau context; patterns of conflict from 1999 through 2011; Plateau governors and conflict mitigation in the same period; post election violence in Plateau State in April 2011 and beyond; and possibilities for conflict management in Plateau State” (10) II. Chapter 1: The Nigerian Presidential Election of 2011 and Its Aftermath A. The Nigerian Context 1. Nigeria outline a) 158-160 million people (1) More than 400 ethnolinguistic groups b) Seventh most populous country c) Major exporter of crude oil and natural gas 2. National Unity Problems a) Ethno religious (1) 80 million Muslims (2) Half of the overall population in Nigeria is Christian b) Basic Guidelines for the Presidency (1) Maximum 2 terms for four years each while switching off between a northerner and southerner (2) The vice president should be chosen that is from the opposite region than the running presidential candidate (3) Presidential candidate must have 25% of the votes in two thirds of the thirty six state (4) If neither candidate reaches the 25% requirement in two thirds of the states, then the two top candidates run and the presidency goes to the candidate that has the most votes 3. Elections a) 1999-2007, vice president was a northern Muslim b) 2007-2010, vp was southern Christian c) Four major parties: (1) PDP (2) CPC (a) Broad northern base (3) Action Congress Nigeria (ACN) (4) All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) (5) All have strong regional basis d) April 2011 was a test to see if Nigeria could stick to the regional rotation policy e) When the official results of the presidential elections were announced, non religious violence started in the North (1) Parts of CPC did not accept the results (2) FCT challenged the results f) 2011 Results (1) Jonathan was the winner → Christian (2) Southern states voted for Jonathan (3) Twelve states in the far north voted for Buhari (4) Results showed that the population favored the PDP presidential candidate B. LeadUptotheElection(confusing) 1. The elections were postponed further through the month of April because of the overseas ballots 2. Regional balance issues a) PDP “the political and financial powers of incumbency predominated” (19) b) CPC “personality of Buhari was central and may have inhibited the CPC’s capacity to form a coalition with other regional and/or minor parties, especially as the PDP was making deals with some of the smaller parties” (19) c) ACN “in the southwest was dominated by the personality of former governor Bola Tinubu, who could make deals, even to the point of selecting the presidential candidate” (19) (1) Accused by CPC that Tinubu made a deal with Jonathan to suppress vote in the Southwest C. International and Official Nigerian Responses to the Election 1. International observers thought the election went smoothly 2. Nigerian government accepted the results while they heard complaints, “presidential commission to investigate post election violence” (21) 3. Panel was set up for the pre-election violence and a post violence in the north 4. International and domestic observers had more access in urban areas while in the rural areas, there was rigging that was going on → then payments would be made to the people for their votes and paid opposite party observers so that they would agree to the results 5. South Kaduna a) At least 500 killed, mostly Muslims (1) For ethnic cleansing (2) Total number of since the election was 800 (a) From Nov. 2011-April 2011, at least 165 killed (b) Since 1999, at least 15,000 have been killed in election or ethno/religious violence but no accountability D. Post election Issues and Allegations 1. Buhari would not accept Jonathan until there was forensic analysis on 11 states 2. Jonathan seemed to have suspicious results regarding the percentage of votes that he got in the southern states 3. Allegations a) Pre-election b) Election day (1) Vote buying, rigging (2) Security guards were sent to different areas, did not know their areas→ therefore, did patrolled passively (3) Project 2011 Swift Count, the numbers that were pulled for the samples→ overreliance, either that it was known to poll authorities in advance (4) Printing extra ballots c) Post election E. Long-Term Consequences: Elections and National Unity? 1. Christian/southerner vs Northerner/Muslim a) Seems that many of the positions in government are filled with Christians, such as head of judiciary, National Security Advisor, Chief of Army, SSS Director, Senate President F. Conflict Management in Nigeria 1. CPC a) Made up of Nigerians that were excluded from the money that was being generated by the oil companies b) Focused on education, jobs, inclusion 2. Impossible to build a coalition because winner take all outcome instead of a second round of voting 3. PDP a) Primaries came down to who had more money to buy votes 4. International role a) United States role, more of a cheerleader for Jonathan → impressed when Jonathan was “acting president” when he visited the United States G. Aftermath of the Election Review Process 1. Buhari mentioned that if the judiciary system was compromised than there Nigeria would be finished, wanted to stabilize the nation’s democratic system 2. Judiciary system should be “the guardian of fairness and justice” (33) 3. Results from the Court of Appeals showed that they considered the elections results valid a) Buhari, miscarriage of justice 4. Announced from the post-election violence panel that “thousands” have been killed in Kaduna State a) Houses destroyed b) Injured H. Lessons Learned 1. Police force, how they overreacted or underreacted could be a reason for the level of violence 2. Transparency and legitimacy of judicial process 3. Suggestions a) Strong leaders to repair the social damage and the conflict b) International leaders must exercise judicial restraint during the appeal process c) Voting on grounds of religion, barely any crossover III. Chapter 2: Strategic Responses to the Boko Haram Extremist Movement A. “This chapter focuses on the dilemma of responses by the Nigerian state to Boko Haram” (41) “this chapter argues that the major issues to be resolved is the apparent disconnect between grassroots citizens and the Nigerian state in the northeast and elsewhere in the north” (44) B. Boko Haram/the movement for Sunnah and Jihad M ​ ajorthreattoNationalUnity 1. Drive by shootings and bombings, predominantly in the northeast states 2. Disconnect between the state and local law enforcement 3. Destruction of Christian churches and cleanses in rural areas 4. Different government reactions a) Local calls and negotiations of killing by the police 5. Counterattacks by police and military 6. Other targets a) Police b) Military c) Banks d) Churches e) Individuals 7. “Boko Haram announced that it regarded all existing politics as illegitimate and might target any and all political party headquarters and any homes with partisan posters” (43) → would kill all Christians in the north if they did not migrate to the south 8. Thoughtreform,reprogrammingthosewhohavebeencapturedandmilitary crackdown 9. No coordinated response because of the different institutions on various levels, think tanks, civil society organizations, academic entities 10. Looking at long or short term policies 11. Focusing on culprits rather the the causes 12. Suggestions for confronting Boko Haram a) See page 45 for list C. Boko Haram and Human Security in Borno 1. Boko Haram, symbolism for ““Western Education Is Forbidden” [...] Islamic culture will not tolerate its marginalization by Western culture” (46) a) However followers do not reject the technology b) The movement of Boko Haram focused on trying to force Islamic principles because of key symbols (1) Prohibition of alcohol (a) Most of the targets for bombings and drive by shootings were at places that let the non Muslim public consume alcohol (2) Rejection of secular state (a) Upset that there was many Christian leaders in higher up positions (b) Police were mostly non muslim (3) Enforcement of shari’a law c) Goals: (1) IslamizeNigeria (2) OrsetupaseparateIslamicState d) REREADPAGES48-50 D. Reforming Local Government 1. Three tier federal system a) 36 states b) Over 700 local governments c) IT IDENTIFIES THE BOUNDARIES OF WHAT EACH TIER CAN DO, makes it harder to change boundaries over political and demographic circumstances 2. Does not depend on local taxes but depends on the oil revenue for a major source of funding for the three tier governments→ gives more power to the states and not the local governments E. Reforming the Role of Traditional Leaders 1. emirs and chiefs would be appointed for life so they still had connections with their local community 2. “Need to be clarified, strengthened, and officially recognized by the state especially in light of the generational changes that have allowed distinguished professionals to take on these lifetime appointments.” (72) F. Reforming Police Services 1. Three different legal systems a) National crime and civil code b) Shari’a law for northern states c) Traditional civil codes for indigenous cultures 2. The police enforce the national crime and civil code but not the other two; instead it is filled by other forces 3. Most police were federalized a) Many of the police deployed would be stationed in a place where they did not know the local language and therefore could not help the communities effectively 4. NOSTATEorLOCALPOLICE 5. “Current constitution requirement of a federal monopoly of police service will be hard to change, given the difficulties of amending the Constitution. Yet, through judicial review and/or executive order some accommodation to the needs of local government needs to be made. The rotational system of officers should be reviewed to ensure more links with grassroots communities” (72) 6. Hibash clarified, can only act on Muslim community 7. Be allowed investigations on the police 8. Police accountability and training G. ReformingEducation 1. “Western education” does not have to be taught in English 2. It is not incompatible with religious or cultural values 3. Teacher training→ monitor education impact 4. Suggestion that they combine the learning of Christians and Islamic students together so that they can understand the foundation of each 5. “Strengthen teacher training institutions and encourage the enhancement of the quality of primary and secondary school teachers. Allow local-language instruction at the primary level. Assess the issue of religious knowledge classes, given current sharp disjunction between the Koranic schools and the primary schools. Explore ways of introducing Western knowledge into the ilmi and Koranic schools, recognizing that some international aid funders are restricted, at present, from assisting in this endeavor. Recognize that primary education can have short term consequences, even at the symbolic political level, but its real impact is long term” (72-3) H. Reforming National Leadership Functions 1. “The capacity for conflict prevention, mediation, settlement, and resolution should be central to leadership functions and protocol. While much of this capacity depends on personal style, there are mechanisms that should be encouraged in the emerging political culture of Nigeria, especially those of symbol management to avoid antagonisms and encourage a common sense of political destiny The informal role of retired national leaders-”the wise men”-- should be strengthened in terms of advising the upcoming generations of technocrats, who may be less familiar with the lessons (both good and bad) learned from the first fifty years of Nigerian political experience. The role of opposition leaders such as Buhari is especially important in this process” (73) I. Reforming Military Strategy 1. “Asses the role of the military in domestic security situations, especially when the current rotational system often puts officers from different parts of the country into local situations that they may not have the cultural sensitivity to manage. Change the culture of the military in domestic matters to more of a local reserve guard capacity, so that they heavy hand of the federal government does not appear at every juncture. Simply pouring more money into the current structure may not solve the challenges” (73) J. Reforming Capacities for Strategic Planning and Lessons Learned 1. “The need for an integrated, medium- or long-term approach is especially evident in the Boko Haram case. NIPSS would be one candidate for developing a think tank approach to the complex issues of grassroots disaffection and even secession. NIPSS would also provide a venue for midlevel military and security officers to be sensitized to professional conflict resolution approaches” (73) IV. Chapter 3: Ethno Religious Crises in Plateau State A. Plateau Context 1. History a) “Remote from the Islamic reform movements of the nineteenth century” (75) b) “Large numbers of minority ethnolinguistic groups, with no one group predominating” (75) c) Missionaries settled in the plateau, which developed into mission schools and hospitals but then during the military periods, states took over the schools and the leadership of the schools were given to indigenous church fathers d) Mining industry drew in workers from all parts of the north then started to attract Muslims, traders e) Problems (1) Settlers vs indigenes (2) Christian vs Muslim f) Many ethnolinguistic groups (1) Farming (2) pastoralist→ Muslim (3) farmers→ Christian (4) Causing problems in later years because their relationship had tension (a) Because of religious g) REREADPAGES78-79 B. Patterns of Conflict: 1999-2011 1. Ethnoreligious violence a) May 2004, over 1,000 people killed in Yelwa (1) Massacres from both sides (a) “Revenge killings in Kano of Christians by Muslims” (80) (b) “Attacks by youth groups in Muslim and Christian neighborhoods” (81) plus religious places (c) A new governor is appointed for temporary replacement (d) 250,000 people were displaced b) 2008, problems over the nominees and the results of the election (1) 800 killed c) 2010 (1) “Dispute over reconstruction of a home destroyed by clashes in 2008 leads to violence” (81) (2) Up to 500 killed in January over the course of 4 days. Many villages and homes destroyed (3) 80 killed in car bombs, more die from more attacks C. Plateau State Governors and Conflict Mitigation 1999-2011 1. 36 governors, “key intermediaries with the federal government on matters of internal security, police, and military interventions” (82) 2. Plateau state under the state of emergency, removed governor, Joshua Dariye, and put a presidential appointee, Jonah Jang, to replace the former governor a) Dariye, accountant, businessman→ interests in banking and real estate (1) Impeached because he was accused of money laundering (2) Born a christian (3) Up for debate where he used his position in favor of the Christian side b) Jang, military background (1) Saw Muslims as trying to impose shari’a law (2) Plunder the country for themselves 3. 26 governors elected in 2011 4. Main focus was settlers and indigenous a) “Ownership of land” to the indigenous at the expense of the settlers b) Became national issue 5. Are governors part of the problem? D. Post election Violence in Plateau State: April 2011 and Beyond 1. April 2011, Jonathan won 74 percent of the presidential vote → post election violence 2. Post election violence, Boko Haram, and continuing legacy of violence a) Increase in Plateau state “between settled farmers and Fulani herders” (89) 3. Sultan a) Nigeria is for everybody and not exclusive to Christian and Muslims 4. Jang removed the military→ over involved, picking sides 5. REREADPAGES92-96 E. Possibilities for Conflict Management in Plateau State 1. How does the situation in Plateau State relate to theory and practice of conflict management elsewhere? 2. What are the specific conflict issues in Plateau State? 3. What are the root causes? (e.g. identity symbolisms, human secuirty issues, structural/constitutional issues) of the conflict in Plateau State? 4. What are the roles of the military and security forces? 5. What are the roles of the international community? 6. How can transhumance herder protections be strengthened? 7. What is the role of identity politics? 8. How are federal envoys being dispatched to try to resolve the Plateau State crisis? 9. What is the role of leadership, especially the role of state government? 10. How do the Plateau State conflicts impact national unity issues and strategic capabilities? F. Theory and Practice of Conflict Management 1. “Study of values and identities and analysis of the structural conditions that impact the genesis of and possible solution to a given conflict” (97) also studying the narratives G. The Specific Issues Fueling Conflict 1. Looking at structural tensions between federal, state, local (1) Constitutional problems (2) Police pros and cons for them being on a federal level (3) Potential abuse from the governors to local level representation (4) Whether or not a conflict is at which level in government b) Security provision c) Indigenous and settler conflicts d) Political representations, local level e) Herder-farmer tensions H. The Root Causes of the Conflict 1. Identity and issues of security a) There are 54 ethnic groups within the Plateau b) Positive development is that there is diversity such as Muslim-Berom and Christian-Hausa c) In the region Christians see that Muslims are the enemy, common points need to be drawn instead of highlighting the differences d) Securities (1) Right to life, property, freedom from fears of gov and social groups (a) Police, military become part of the problem than the solution I. The Role of the Military and Security Forces 1. Training of police and military for domestic disputes J. The Role of the International Community 1. Right to Protect but also there is an increase tendency to “hold national and local leaders accountable for crimes against humanity” (100) K. The Need for Transhumance Herder Protections 1. Herders are key contributor to national food security (101) 2. Should have protection for the herders, educational and health services 3. Promote relationships between farmers and herders 4. International communities could use satellites to come up with a migrating trail and grazing areas for herders L. The Impact of Identity Politics 1. Most of the challenges are between ethnolinguistic farming villages a) Whether or not they are seen as indigenous b) Problems on all levels of the government M. The Potential Role of Federal Envoys 1. Effective mediation 2. Levels of distrust in Nigeria of religious and regional interests 3. Try to achieve balance by having the same numbers of Muslim and Christians on the board a) “Three distinguished Muslim leaders and three distinguished Christian leaders, each of whom has shown his willingness to work across the religious divide” ( 104) N. Leadership and the Role of State Governors 1. Influence and background play a role and can be helpful in these times, look at p. 105 O. National Unity Issues 1. “Tackle some of the larger issues that drive destabilizing conflict” (106)


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