POLI 150 Notes Week 3: 9/6/16-9/8/16
POLI 150 Notes Week 3: 9/6/16-9/8/16 POLI 150
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This 4 page Class Notes was uploaded by Hadley Ashford on Thursday September 8, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to POLI 150 at University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill taught by Menevis Cilizoglu in Fall 2016. Since its upload, it has received 31 views. For similar materials see International Relations in Political Science at University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill.
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Date Created: 09/08/16
POLI 150 Notes 9/6/16-9/8/16 9/6/16 - Current event presentation 1: US and China have both ratified treaty to reduce carbon emissions o Set targets to lower emissions for each country o But no legally binding contract to meet them o Example of liberalism perspective in success of international institutions and cooperation o Incentive to break agreement because increasing emissions can increase economic output o Targets laid out in Paris Agreements o China may be willing to move forward with environmental policy because ratified first (signaling) o US will probably not comply if they think China will not because want to stay economically competitive with China - Current event presentation 2: Obama cancels plans to meet with President Duerte of Philippines because of some rude public remarks on behalf of Duerte o Philippines has historically bad drug trade o Duerte declared war on drugs after his election Basically calls for vigilante shoot to kill policy Now almost 2,000 dead o Obama wanted to confront Duerte at meeting of Southeast Asian Leaders o Related to concept of US as benign hegemon: benign hegemons only exist when other countries are okay with the order, but looks like Philippines is not okay with it o Related to concept of role that international institutions play in IR: Human Rights Watch asked International Narcotics Control Board and UN Office on Drugs and Crime to speak out against Filipino policy o Discussion: Do remarks against US discredit it as a benign hegemon and what effect might that have on future US-Filipino relations? It adds toward the discredit of US as benign hegemon, but doesn’t completely disqualify it because a larger coalition against US hegemonic rule would have to form Related to David and Goliath reading: benefits Filipino president to publicly not support US, but still actually likes the things that the US does for them - Prisoner’s Dilemma: o Shadow of the future: actions are immediately public and will set precedent, shadow can last a long time Another consideration in making decisions o Usually ends in defect-defect when stakes are high o Ended mostly in cooperate-cooperate because stakes with chocolate were low o When communication introduced- depends on credibility/trust whether or not cooperation will happen o Iteration: countries must engage in many agreements with same countries and other countries so must consider how actions will affect those other relations o Rationality: each individual’s rational preferences combine to form a collectively sub- optimal outcome Solution usually ends up in mutual defection (under game conditions, always defection, but can change with introduction of other variables) o Key features of original game: 1. Strategic interaction: base decisions on expectations of another’s actions 2. Cooperation difficult even though common interests present 3. No communication, no monitoring (can’t see what other is actually doing), no punishment for defection (defection isn’t costly), or enforcement of cooperation a. No trust because of these variables 4. Short-term outcomes- decisions won’t affect future decisions (no iteration/shadow of future) o To increase cooperation: Can encourage/incentivize cooperation Or discourage/punish defection Depends on situation/actors which one will be more effective o Real life example: Cold War arms race USSR: Not Build Build US: Not Build 3,3 1,4 Build 4,1 2,2 Row player gets first number, column player gets second number Equilibrium in (C,C) and (D,D) outcomes, but better option is (C,C) because use less resources/money 9/8/16 - Current event presentation #1: o IS loses control of Turkish border o Turkish government against Kurdish groups in Syria o Related to game theory o Discussion: Does Turkey have incentive to lie about driving IS out of border? Yes because showing progress against IS may give other countries incentive to help o Discussion: How should US deal with possible conflict between Turkey and YPG (both US allies)? Best/most obvious solution: US mediates conflict to keep both allies If mediation fails, US would have to choose which ally to support (probably Turkey) US could also implement issue linkage to encourage cooperation o Syrian government (Shia) + Russia vs. Syrian rebels (Sunni) + US + Turkey + YPG (Kurds) Has civil war component ISIS taking advantage of unrest- recruiting people and taking territory - Current event presentation #2: failed attempts at cooperation b/w Russia and US – Obama says “gaps of trust” are preventing cooperation o Related to new “Where is the Love” music video by the Black Eyed Peas Shows that ending terrorism should be common global goal o Related to theme of cooperation o Discussion questions: Why are US-Russia relations so bad? Putin is stubborn world leader Russia is allies with Syria and Iran and US is against them, so US and Russia have very different interests Do you think the music video is effective in increasing public action/support? May increase donations to cause, but isn’t the most effective method - The fact that two strong powers are backing opposing sides is prolonging the conflict - Constraining effects of international organizations: o Regulation of state behavior o Make countries do things they wouldn’t otherwise do o Accountability: provide legal liability o Enforcement: punishment for non-compliance or reward compliance Some international organizations have court system to try those who don’t follow agreements o Reputation: shadow of the future/iteration, not a one-shot interaction like prisoner’s dilemma Country’s actions will affect their future relations o Information: reduced uncertainty and cheating Must be credible information o Ex. IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) created NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty): limits nuclear weapons, holds states accountable by taking soil samples (information) and punish those who are found to not comply Actors’ beliefs about credibility of information provided affects their interactions o Help actors move from defect-defect to comply-comply in prisoner’s dilemma game o Reciprocity: institutions help both actors cooperate (reciprocal interactions) Isn’t helpful if only one actor complies o Reduction of transaction costs: already established rules/norms, no need to spend money/resources to create new foundation each time Facilitates communication between actors o Can resolve conflicts as third party Mediation: facilitate communication/information Conciliation Arbitration - Constituting effects of international organizations: turn states into things they wouldn’t otherwise be o Encourage compliance by creating new interests/desire to cooperate o Don’t just regulate actions, shape them o Idea of socialization Ex. UK not as socialized in EU as other members (didn’t use same currency, didn’t agree to all agreements)- less feeling of inclusion less incentive to cooperate o Promote different ideals in member countries: Democratization Economic liberalization Encourage peaceful conflict-management o Increases compliance by changing views/norms and creating type of comradery between members - Why are some institutions more capable at promoting cooperation than others? Institutional structure o Membership: inclusive vs. exclusive Easier to cooperate in exclusive groups (smaller scale) because more alike/have similar interests Inclusive groups have more collective action problems o Decision-making procedures: dynamics of weighted voting and veto power Easier to make decisions/cooperate with veto power groups because less actors responsible for making decisions (less have to agree) But depends on relationship between veto countries (must have similar interests) Weighted voting combats free-riding by rewarding contributions More member state contributions o Scope: narrow vs. broad set of issues Easier to cooperate on focused issues instead of broad (like better environment) o Monitoring/enforcement: extent of ability to punish/reward - International organizations benefit both powerful and weak states o Most use bargaining, which makes many rules created benefit powerful over weak
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