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POL 1080 9.13.16

by: Melanie Basinger

POL 1080 9.13.16 POL 1080

Melanie Basinger

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Class notes from 9.13.16
Introduction to International Relations
Ivan Ivanov
Class Notes
international relations, prisoner's dilemma, Security Dilemma
25 ?




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This 2 page Class Notes was uploaded by Melanie Basinger on Wednesday September 14, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to POL 1080 at University of Cincinnati taught by Ivan Ivanov in Fall 2016. Since its upload, it has received 5 views. For similar materials see Introduction to International Relations in Political Science at University of Cincinnati.

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Date Created: 09/14/16
Introduction to International Relations 9.13.16 1. Anarchy: the absence of an overarching authority above the territorial state which the state is obliged to obey a. United Nations and the United Nations Security Council i. UN is the only one that can decide on war and peace 2. Self – help a. Sovereignty b. There is no international 911 Security Dilemma  To feel safer, acquire weaponry o The benign intent is to feel safer. Also a rational action/thought o Country A decides to acquire weapons to feel safe, Country B then feels threatened and decides to match the weaponry Country A has. Country A feels threatened and the cycle continues.  Even though the intent was benign it leads to an irrational action/thought  Scholars argue… o You can distinguish between types of weapons  Offensive vs defensive weaponry o Make agreements and cooperate  Regulate weaponry (arms reduction, rules, procedures, regulations)  Ex: Princess Diana lead the movement to ban land mines because they were too deadly o Build Trust between countries International Institutions  International Courts and Tribunals o Important for the systemic level of analysis o International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are two examples Individual State International Systems Foreig Systemic n Policy 1. Power Pessimistic Principle, unitary actors Distribution of power Relati (Realists) Rational, possess power Join capabilities ve to Never certain about what other Alliances, coalitions other countries might do (Will the UN step Anarchic government states in?) More Centers of power (Balance of Power) – can decrease the amount of trust between countries Want more power Geography can help or impede the gain of power Asymmetric warfare, hegemony 2. Institutio optimistic Geopolitics Intergovernmental ns “soft” power (education) Institutions (Neo – Democratic Peace Theory Independent Liberalism) +autonomous actors 3. Ideas Constructivists Prisoners Dilemma Igor and Rogi  Cannot communicate with each other  Options: 1. Igor fesses and Rogi stays silent – most preferred, Rogi goes free 2. Both are silent 3. Both fess up 4. Igor stays silent and Rogi fesses – least preferred, most jail time for Rogi  Both usually tend to fess up o Why?  Cannot share information with each other, depends on the sentencing  Realists: assume the worst – case scenarios  Liberalism: trust? “shadow of the future” – the probability that they will meet up and do whatever got them arrested again  Nuclear weapons can force states to cooperate


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