IAFF 1005, Week 4
IAFF 1005, Week 4 IAFF 1005
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This 13 page Class Notes was uploaded by Samantha Notetaker on Wednesday September 28, 2016. The Class Notes belongs to IAFF 1005 at George Washington University taught by Brown, M in Fall 2016. Since its upload, it has received 3 views. For similar materials see Introduction to International Affairs: A Washington Perspective in International Affairs at George Washington University.
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Date Created: 09/28/16
9.19.2016 Emergence of the Modern State System o Eurocentric focus Because the modern state emerged in Europe o 1600s: The Rise and Fall of Empires Near East: Ottoman and Persian empires were strong China: Ming dynasty replaced by Qing dynasty Japan: Tokugawa shogunate established South Asia: Mughal empire; Taj Mahal built Africa: Songhai empire conquered (1500s) Americas: Incan empire conquered (1500s); European colonization expanded o Europe and the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ 1648 Treaties of Westphalia ended wars of religion/hegemony Ended the Thirty Years War in Central Europe Ended the Eighty Years War between Spain and Dutch Republic An “order-building” juncture (Ikenberry) o Beginning of the Modern State System Stable borders Sovereignty: state are recognized to have legal/political authority within their borders; and, therefore, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within their borders Non-interference in state’s internal affair Rivalry, Revolution Reordering o 1652: 1 naval war between Britain & the Dutch; Naval rivalry continues in 1660s-1670s o 1700s: British-French rivalry intensifies o 1789-1799: French Revolution Ideological/political threat to other monarchies Nationalism enhances military mobilization France declares war on Austria (1792); Britain declares war on France (1793); others join in o 1799-1815: Napoleonic Wars (France vs. several coalitions) o 1815 : Congress of Vienna Another ‘order-building’ juncture 1815-1894: Relatively Peaceful o Has been called the “Epoch of Peace” in Europe No general war involving all of the great powers o Multipolar system: 5-6 great powers Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Russia (and later, Italy) France was re-integrated into great-power relations Approximately equal in power (Britain ruled the seas) Diplomacy, multilateral summits helped to manage conflicts Fluid alliances maintained an overall “balance of power” and great-power stability 1815-1914: But Not Entirely Peaceful o Revolutions in Austria, Denmark, France, Herman states, Hungary, Italian states, Netherlands (1848) o Crimean War (1853-56) Russia vs. Ottoman Empire, Britain, France; localized o Wars of German Unification Vs. Denmark (1864); Austria (1866); France (1870-71) German unification (1871) o War of Italian Unification (1870) o Russian Invasion of Ottoman lands in Europe Congress of Berlin (1878); redistribution of Ottoman holdings o Wars of Colonial Conquest throughout the 1800s The “Scramble for Africa,” the “Great Game” in Asia Changes in the System o Rise of Germany Unification + population + industrialization = power Growing power: a growing concern to others Mutual fears: Germany felt encircled/threatened Greater Ambitions: Europe, Africa and the seas o Emergence of two rigid, opposed alliances Triple Alliance: Germany, Austria, Italy (formed in 1879-1882) Triple Entente- France-Russia (1894), Britain-France (1904) + Russia (1907) Changes within States o Rise of Nationalism Belligerent, xenophobic nationalism Pan-Slavism in Eastern Europe; seen by Ottoman Empire and Austro Hungarian empire as a threat o Economic-political unrest (especially in Germany) External actions distract attention from internal problems o Military planners and military planning The “cult of the offensive” Politically influential, offensive-minded European militaries Belief in the advantage of mobilizing/striking first Belief in the imperative of mobilizing/striking first Mounting Tensions o Arms racing Anglo-German naval arms race; Tripitz Plan (1898-1912) Defense spending increased in several countries o Crisis and flashpoints 1904-05: Russo-Japanese War; Russia defeated 1905: First Russian Revolution 1905-06: French-German confrontation in Morocco 1908: Austria annexes Bosnia Herzegovina 1911: Morocco again (Agadir crisis) st 1912: 1 Balkan War (Ottoman defeat) 1913: 2 ndBalkan War (Bulgarian defeat) Summer of 1914 June 28- Assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo July 5- Germany back Austria; the “blank-check” July 23- Austria sends unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia; Serbia seeks Russia’s support July 28- Austria declares war on Serbia; Russia starts to mobilize July 30- Russia and Austria order general mobilization August 1- Germany declares war on Russia; France mobilizes August 3- Germany declares war on France August 4- German troops enter Belgium; Britain declares war on Germany August 6- Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia Explaining the Start of the War: System-Level Factors Rise of German power; Germany’s fear of Russia’s potential o Produced incentives for preventative war Decline of the Ottoman empire o Produced a power vacuum in Southeastern Europe Intensification of colonial competition o Produced confrontations outside of Europe Increased rigidity of European Alliances o Reduced options for conflict management System was predisposed to conflict, but war was not inevitable o Many crises/assassinations did not lead to all-out war Be wary of “no-fault history” Explaining the Start of the War: State Level Factors Rise of nationalism: In great powers; in Balkans; Pan-Slavism Fearful powers: Fear of national/dynastic/imperial decline Aggressive powers: Germany, European colonial actions Germany: Great ambitions + fear of encirclement Austria-Hungary: Fear of imperial decline; especially in the Balkans Russia: Fear of dynastic decline, rise of Pan-Slavism France: Bitter memories of Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) Entente: Discounted Germany’s fears of encirclement Explaining the Start of the War: Sub-State Factors War plans were offensive-oriented: “cult of the offensive” o European militaries emphasized the offense: striking first Due to misperceptions about military technology Due to tradition; desires for simple plans, more forces War plans were rigid o Plans depended on rapid mobilization: sending troops via trains to front lines o Plans were hard to reverse: “go/no go” decisions War plans generated first-strike, preemptive incentives o The “reciprocal fear of surprise attack”- Schelling Explaining the Start of the War: Individual-Level Diplomatic/strategic mistakes o Germany’s blank check to Austria Over commitment o Austria’s unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia o Germany’s invasion of Belgium o Turned a local conflict into a great-power war Leadership failures o Misperceptions and wishful thinking: Saw the desirable as probable; believed that a war would be short o Military leaders: wrong, inflexible, incompetent o Civilian leaders: weak, inflexible, incompetent “The Great Disaster” “Human flesh stood against killing machines”- Kershaw o Artillery, machine guns, mortars, grenades, flamethrowers o Plus poison gas, aerial bombardment, submarines o “A war of industrialized man slaughter” 1914: Collapse of the offensives (in West, by early Sept. 1914) 1915: “Badly-planned disasters”- Robson 1916: “Well-planned disasters” 1917: The balance tips; Russia out; United States in 1918: US troops finally arrive (May); German positions/morale start to crack; Armistice signed (November 11th) Explaining the Duration of the War Alliances had balanced capabilities Military leaders believed that victory was possible o Continued faith in the offense (durability of belief systems) Political leaders were determined to win o Sunk costs could only be justified by victory o Most saw themselves as defenders/victims; determined to fight until the other side surrendered o Some leaders worried about dynastic collapse An epic failure of leadership o Leaders failed to learn/adapt/compromise o Why? Stubbornness, arrogance, callousness Consequences of the War Human consequences o Killed: 8 million soldiers, 6-7 million civilians o Wounded: More than 20 million Economic consequences o Staggering; protests and turmoil in many countries Political consequences o End of Russian Monarchy- civil war, USSR o End of German monarchy- Weimar Republic o End of Austro-Hungarian empire- new states o End of Ottoman empire- new states Why This is Relevant Today System Level o Great-power transitions can be volatile; fears of declining power o Wars can start in the absence of a pathological aggressor o Wars can be started by over-reactions, escalation dynamics o Alliances can create entanglements and flashpoints State and sub-state level o Domestic politics: can shape foreign policy decisions o Nationalism: Generates big problems; very hard to control o Bureaucracies: Have their own agendas; their plans can drive decisions and predetermine actions Individual level o Leadership matters- especially in a crisis o Leaders have to be far-sighted, analytical, careful, calm 9/21/2016 Consequences of Peace: The Framework Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points (Jan. 1918) o Guiding principles for a new world order o Borders and states by “lines of nationality” o A “general association of nations” Treaty of Versailles (June 1919) o The agreement League of Nations (Jan. 1920) o The institution for implementation Washington Naval Limitation Treaty (Feb. 1922) o The arms control piece o US-UK-Japan-France-Italy (ratio 5-5-3-1.75-1.75) Consequences of Peace: Europe Germany o Versailles verdict: Germany’s “war guilt” and punishment German territory to France, Poland German financial reparations to France, Belgium, Britain German military disbanded o Impact on German economy and politics; bitter resentment Creation of new states o Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Baltics o Principle: National self-determination; conflict prevention o Practice: Problematic borders and ethnic groups; Potential for future conflicts Consequences of Peace: Africa Germany’s colonies re-assigned o League of Nations Mandates o Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda-Burundi) to Belgium o Southwest (Namibia), East (Tanzania), West (Cameroon, Togo) Italian Aggression o Ethiopia (1934-36) o League of Nations failed to stop Consequences of Peace: Middle East War-time commitments o 3 sets of contradictory commitments o McMahon-Hussein correspondence (1915-16); Arab independence o Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916); British-French areas of control o Balfour Declaration (1917); a Jewish national home League of Nations Mandates o Ottoman territories partitioned and assigned to Britain/France o Here, too: problematic borders and ethnic groupings; Potential for future conflicts o Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine Turkey: a new republic Collective Security and the League of Nations Theory: Collective Security o An alternative to the balance-of-power system o Coalitions of states would work together to stop aggressors, preserve order, and provide security o A legal/organizational framework would legitimize and institutionalize this process Practice: League of Nations o Provided the legal/organizational mechanism for action o Collective action problems: national interests vary, political will is often lacking, free riders are common o Capability problems: weak economies, weak militaries, limited power- projection capabilities (long distances) Collective Security in Action Collective action depended on state actors Most Europeans o Were horrified by the carnage of 1914-18; reluctant to take steps that might lead to another war o Germany not treated as an equal: penalties and reparations United States o U.S. Senate: refused to join the league o U.S. estrangement from Europe in the 1920s, 1930s Another “order-building” juncture o The new system worked reasonably well in the 1920s o Security challenges were minor and manageable o Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928): renounced war as a policy instrument o The new world order lasted about a decade o League failed in Manchuria (1931), Ethiopia (1935), then Europe Origins of War in Europe A divided continent o USSR in turmoil; Stalin consolidated power in 1929 o Germany resentful; in dire economic straits in the 1920s o France felt swindled by Germany’s reparations o Britain concerned about colonies and navies Divided Nations o Due to ethnic complexities & Versailles border decisions Limited capacities for conflict management o A weak mechanism (League) & a missing balancer (U.S.) An economic collapse o A stock market crash (1929)… and then it got worse Fascism Goals: Order, national unity, national rejuvenation Leadership: Strong, authoritarian, totalitarian, all-powerful Politics: One-party rule; repression; martial law Society: Intense emphasis on ethnic and racially-based nationalism, national purity, national unity Economics: State-controlled mixed economy to advance national goals; self- sufficiency; protectionism Violence: Often glorified Against: Multi-party democracy; communism Rise of Fascism in Europe Italy o Shifted to the Entente (winning side) during WWI o After the war: Economic collapse, political chaos Mussolini o “His… style of oratory, staccato, and repetitive was superb. His attitudes were highly theatrical, his opinions were contradictory, his facts were often wrong, and his attacks were frequently malicious and misdirected; but his words were so dramatic… his vigorous repetitive gestures so extraordinarily effective, that he rarely failed to impose his mood.” o 1922: Mussolini and his fasci di combattimento (fighting bands; militias) seized power Germany o 1920s: Weakness of Weimar Republic (economic, political) o 1929: Crash/Depression compounded the problems Rise of the Nazi Party o 1930: Nazis win 18% of the vote: 2 nd largest party o 1932: Nazis win 37% of the vote: largest party o 1933: Hitler appointed Chancellor (Jan. 30); Reichstag Fire (Feb. 27); Emergency decree (Feb. 28); Dachau concentration camp (March 22) Explaining the Rise of Fascism Economic factors: Crisis, loss, hopelessness Political factors: Weak opposition, division, chaos Ethnic factors: Ethnic-religious-racial divisions, ethnic grievances Social attitudes: Sense of victimhood, betrayal, injustices, grievances Be careful about “no-fault history” Fascism requires fascist: Leaders and followers Origins of the War in Europe Hitler’s goals: Irredentism and Expansion o Postwar borders: many Germans lived outside of Germany o Generated irredentism; a stated desire for lebensraum (a ‘living space’ for Germans) o Helped to legitimize expansionist aims and actions Hitler’s tactics: Incrementalism and Intimidation o Took small steps (“salami tactics”) o Always claimed to have legitimate reasons & limited aims o Wanted to avoid strong reactions, if possible o Escalated rhetoric, as needed o Built up military force 1933: Hitler withdrew from the League of Nations 1935: Remilitarization: announced plans to expand army and air force 1936: Remilitarization of the Rhineland; Signed pacts with Italy and Japan; Supported fascists in Spanish Civil War 1938: Annexation of Austria; Annexation of Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia (Munich Meeting) 1939: Annexation of the rest of Czechoslovakia (March); Non-aggression pact with USSR (August); Invasion of Poland (September) 1940: Invasion of Belgium, Netherlands, France (May); Battle of Britain (July- October) 1941: Invasion of USSR (June) Nazi Germany’s aggression o Unlike WWI, a determined, expansionist aggressor Allied Failures (Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland) o Intelligence failures: Belief systems and wishful thinking o Deterrence failures: Timing: better to deter early; becomes more difficult Will: in key states, multilaterally, if allies are needed Capabilities: to take effective action Credibility: timing + will + capabilities + communication o Strategic failures: Lessons of WWI were over-learned/mis-applied Worries about the dangers of over-commitment Belief that the defense dominates (difficult to protect distant lands) Belief that war is a horror that must be avoided The Holocaust The “systemic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators”- U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Unique o In its goals, scope, bureaucratic organization o In its human consequences Genocide doesn’t ‘happen’ on its own o It is not a spontaneous eruption of mass hostility/insanity o It is intentional: conceived, planned and implemented Why do the leaders lead? o True believers: racists and bigots o Opportunists: A scapegoat for national problems; a lever for political manipulation; a rationale for/mechanism for totalitarian rule Why do the followers follow? o Conditions: economic/political trauma, deprivation o Motivations: Revenge, greed, fear; narratives are shaped/amplified by leaders De-humanization of “the other” o People characterized as animals, vermin, insects, diseases o A key element; a marker of bad intent Origins of War in Asia Strategic setting o Like Europe: 1 rising, aggressive power o Unlike Europe: no strong, nearby powers; China was weak; USSR was weak; US/Europe powers were far away 1930s o US/European powers weakened by the Depression o Power vacuum in East/Southeast Asia China o 1900-01: Boxer Rebellion; increase in foreign troops o 1911-12: Overthrown of Manchu/Qing dynasty; Establishment of Republic under Sun Yat-sen; Weak government, turmoil, war-lordism o 1921: Communist Party founded o 1927: Civil war Japan o A rising power, with rising nationalism and militarism o An aggressive, expansionist power o 1894-94: Sino-Japanese War; Japanese victory o 1894: Japanese invasion of Taiwan o 1904-05: Russo Japanese War; Japanese victory o 1910: Annexation of Korea o 1920s: Build-up of naval capabilities o 1931: Invasion of Manchuria o 1937: Full scale invasion of China o 1938: Declares “a new order in East Asia” o Historical grievances (unequal treatment in the 1850s) o Need for resources (oil from Dutch East Indies) o Fear of containment/encirclement, cut off from oil o Military influence dominated decision-making (weak democratic institutions; little internal opposition) Crisis and War July 1940: US partial embargo of oil/iron to Japan; Beginning of economic strangulation July 1941: Japan annexes French Indo-China; US/UK/Dutch impose full embargo on Japan (freeze Japanese assets); Japan imported 80% of its fuel from the US (Navy would run out of oil in 12-18 months) December 1941: Japanese attack on US forces at Pearl Harbor Sub-State Complications United States (July 1941) o FDR wanted oil embargo to be modulated o Hard-liners in government cut off all oil exports United States (November 1941) o Secretary of State issued harsh ultimatum to Japan without FDR’s approval Japan (November-December 1941) o Imperial Navy’s plan to attack US forces at Pearl Harbor “was never raised at the highest levels of the Tokyo government.” The Navy made its own war plans. (Sagan) Deterrence Lessons Conventional Wisdom o Japan’s leaders were irrational (“stark, raving mad”) o Or: Japan’s leaders mistakenly thought they would win We know now o Japan’s leaders believed that US victory was almost inevitable o However, doing nothing would have led to certain collapse o Japan had a window of opportunity to act o Japan attacked out of desperation, not optimism Lessons o Leaders must monitor/control subordinates, especially in crises o Leaders who have no viable alternative are hard to deter 1945 US incendiary attacks (March-July) o On 6 Japanese cities (including Tokyo, Osaka) o 105 sq. mi. in 6 cities burned o 220,000 people killed; 380,000 injured US Atomic Attacks (August 6 and 9) o Hiroshima 66,000-80,000 killed immediately; 80,000-100,000 injured o Nagasaki 40,000-45,000 killed immediately; 50,000-60,000 injured o Truman- “I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt it should be used” Outcomes and Lessons Genocide Convention o Adopted by UN General Assembly in 1948 o Entered into force in 1951 o Currently, ratified/accepted by 147 member-states There are multiple paths to war o WWI: miscalculations and over-reactions o WWII: aggression and under-reactions (Europe); aggression and power vacuum (Asia) o Have to distinguish between misunderstood adversaries and true aggressors o Different problems require different strategies/actions o Be careful about learning a single set of lessons (1914, Munich) and applying them indiscriminately Why This is Relevant Authoritarianism and fascism Militarism and military aggression Genocide Deterrence and crisis management