Global Environment PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh
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This 6 page Class Notes was uploaded by Erica Kugler on Tuesday April 21, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PSC 204- Dr. Chyzh at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa taught by Dr. Chyzh in Spring2015. Since its upload, it has received 296 views. For similar materials see International Relations in Political Science at University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa.
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Date Created: 04/21/15
The Global Environment 0 Reality humans are changing the environment 0 Earth s temperature is increasing gt melting ice caps rising sea levels more deserts 0 Because of this reality some initiatives have been taken by the global community to combat negative environmental changes 0 Kyoto Protocol I Dealt with C02 emissions and the greenhouse effect I US and developing states are not on board I Success of initiative mixed 0 Montreal Protocol I Dealt with protecting the ozone layer by phasing out CFCs I US on board I successful 0 CLRTAP I Dealt with acid rain I US on board I Successful 0 Reasons why some are successful while others are failures 0 US on board or not on board 0 Immediacy of the environmental threat 0 How controversial is the topic of the initiative 0 of actors involved I Fewer the of actors contributing to the problem easier to get them to stop Why Are Good Intentions Not Good Enough o It is difficult to coordinate a large number of individuals and states gt collective action problem 0 People generally avoid incurring costs or changing their behavior to reduce pollution 0 People free ride on the efforts of others 0 Free ride ppl want a clean environment but do not want to change their behavior 0 Ultimate outcome is Pareto suboptimal inferior for society because states cannot reach regulation agreements and little change in their behavior occurs 0 Prisoner s Dilemma wincentive to defect defect don t change adverse behavior I Why do states defect rather to cooperate and change their behavior 0 The action by one state has little effect on the overall environment so if a state knows that other states are not going to change their behavior why would that state change its behavior when the result is going to be negligible on the environment 0 Would need many states acting cooperatively and changing their behavior for any real effect on the environment to occur 0 Reality to an individual state s actions having littlemarginal effect on the situation leads it to defect I When many states think this way then everyone defects and no change occurs Collective Action and the Environment 0 Free riding and problem of collective action occur because our choices produce externalities o Externality decision creates costsbenefits for actors other than the decisionmaker I Positive externality too little of the good is produced underproduction I Negative externality too much of the good is produced overproduction o 4 types of goods based on their excludability and how rivalrous they are 0 Public good nonexcludable nonrivalrous 0 Common pool resources nonexcludable rivalrous 0 Club goods excludable nonrivalrous 0 Private goods excludable rivalrous 0 Public good 2 key components nonexcludable nonrival in consumption 0 Nonexcludable goods available to one actor can t be kept from other actors o Nonrival in consumption consumption of a good doesn t diminish its quantity availability for others 0 quotglobal commons global environment is available for use by everyone I common term used to describe something that is available to everyone I Ex English commons was pasture land that all farmers could use for free was a common pool resource Overfarming led to bad soilland so the government started making people pay to farm on that land became a club good I Ex Emissions Trading Scheme 0 Companies are given a set credit value for pollution levels 0 Credit can be bought or sold depending on that companies pollution levels relative to its given credit value I High polluters buy credit usually developed states I Low polluters sell credit usually developing states I Sell credit allows developing countries to earn money for future investment I It is more beneficial for companies in developed states to bought credit than to try to reduce their pollution levels because doing the latter would require a change in the companies operation which would cost money and lessen their profit 0 Many environmental issues are common pool resources 0 Common pool resources are nonexcludable but are rival in consumption I Overexploitation actors overuse a resource is a side effect 0 Sum of actors actions may deplete an entire resource gt ex whaling Solving Collective Action Problems 0 Beneficial factors to help solve collective action problems o Smaller group of actors gt easier to coordinate wless actors I Larger of actors less cooperation so no solutions to the problem are made which means they are more likely to free ride on each other I Smaller of actors cooperation is easier and solutions to the problem can be made so less free riding occurs 0 Iteration and linkage I Iteration cooperation based on repeated action 0 Repeated action becomes a norm for the actor I Linkage ties different issues together to ensure cooperation I Using iteration andor linkage allows contributors to solves environmental problems to impose a punishment such as wtihholding future cooperation on noncontributors 0 Goal is to incentivize noncontributors to contribute 0 Bundle public goods with private goods gt result joint product I If an actor needswants a private good then bundling that good with a public good will ensure that the public good is produced I Efforts to gain the private good give off the private good as a byproduct I Ex rainforest public good and ecotourism private good 0 Presence of a privileged group I Privileged group small of actors who benefit from a public good and work together to undertake the cost of providing the good 0 They increase the probability that a public good will be provided Domestic Winners and Losers 0 Environmental policy zerosum bargaining situation gt presence of winners and losers 0 Winners public future generations 0 Losers industries that produce negative externalities on the environment because they are faced with regulations which hurts their production ability and thus profits 0 Diffuse costs are costs that are distributed over a long period of time I Ex not passing regulation environment will gradually get worse and worse 0 quotdirtyquot industries enhances profits by not paying the full costs of production and imposing negative externalities on others 0 Industries that produce goods that harm the environment have interests in less strict environmental laws 0 Environmental laws may reduce the competitiveness of domestic industries 0 Environment laws would raise the cost of production for domestic industries which means they would have to raise their prices making foreign goods more attractive o Lax environmental laws on the other hand benefit domestic industries lower cost of production lower prices more product sold and consumers spend less money 0 Balance of power favors entrenched interests o Entrenched interests existing industries that pressure the govt for loose regulations 0 Groups that lose from stricter environmental regulations are small in number I Small in number overcome collective action problem able to lobby the govt for laxed regulations shows that these minority groups are politically powerful 0 Firms who accept stricter regulations may seek to quotlevel the playing field by seeking stricter regulations on foreign firms I Often times the biggest violators will become the most prominent advocates 0 Ex companies that pollute a lot a are faced with regulations usually become the biggest advocates for the imposition of regulations on companies in other coutries 0 Some industries like oil companies have real employees and stockholders whose livelihoods depend on that industry I Those industries have an incentive to lobby the govt for less regulation Should Poor Countries Pay the Costs of Preserving the Future Environment 0 Since 1950 70 of C02 emissions released by rich states in Europe N America US 23 0 Future source of new pollutants will come from developing countries ex China 0 Why Developing countries will go through industrialization so pollution will increase 0 Cleaner production is costly and would slow developing states economic growth 0 Why developing states continue developing despite negative environmental effects I They can t afford the high tech machinery that would reduce pollution I They don t care gt interested in economic development not the environment I Double standards gt if current developed countries were allowed to pollute when they developed why can t we the developing states do the same What gives developed states the right to dictate environmental policies on us Bargaining Over the Future Environment 0 Different policy solutions for protecting the environment create gainslosses for different groups 0 Results in either conflict or compromise 0 Political conflict over environmental protection who should bear the cost 0 The more states care about the future environment the more intense the political fight will be 0 Ronald Coase gt economist who said taxpayers should pay the cost of env protection I Taxpayer money is used to subsidize dirty industries gt offset cost of production that industries would incur if they change their behavior 0 No way of representing future generations in present decision 0 Can try to do what is the perceived best option that will benefit future generations Environmental Protection Index 0 EP measures the effectiveness of a country s environmental policies relative to its GDP 0 High EP good environmental policies 0 Low EPI bad environmental policies 0 Findings GDP and EPI value are directly correlated as one goes up so does the other one 0 countries with high GDPs rich states have good environmental policiesgt high EPI value 0 countries with low GDPs poor states have bad environmental policies gt low EPI value How Can Institutions Promote International Environmental Cooperation 0 Most international institutions are enforced through national legislation and policy 0 States are limited to voluntary cooperation on global environmental issues b there is no higher authority that can force states into compliance and cooperation 0 International institutions help facilitate compliance among states by several ways 0 setting standards verifying compliance reduce cost of action resolve disputes facilitate decisionmaking 0000 Setting Standards and Verifying Compliance 0 International environmental institutions establish standards of behavior for states to follow 0 States negotiate and agree on general principles known as quotframeworkquot 0 After a framework agreement stricter regulations are put in place 0 Framework soft law 0 Stricter regulations hard law 0 Complete bans are easier to verify than simple restrictions bans are most successful regulation 0 Clear rules banning CFCs allowed institutions to crack down on their sale and use 0 Environmental TANs play role of quotfire alarm and call attention to governments who violate agreements International Environmental Institutions Facilitating DecisionMaking 0 International environmental institutions help facilitate decisionmaking between states 0 Some institutions serve primarily as a forum for ongoing negotiations 0 Initial frameworks help to create larger agreements and protocols o Frameworks lead to consensus decisionmaking which leads to agreements I Agreements usually have optinoptout options regarding obligations 0 These institutions help facilitate cooperation by creating special international publicprivate partnerships on the environment Resolving Disputes International environmental agreements lack dispute resolution abilities o The agreements themselves do not contain clauses about how to resolve disputes between states 0 Dispute resolution is left up to the states Montreal Protocol to Vienna Convention was first agreement to use a noncompliance system 0 Goal was to facilitate compliance not enforce it Kyoto Protocol has Compliance Committee wfacilitative branch and enforcement branch 0 Facilitative branch gt gives advice to the states on ways to implement the Protocol 0 Enforcement branch gt regulates states to see if they re meeting Protocol requirements Countries in dispute are referred to mediation or the International Court ofJustice
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