VZ pages 335-347
VZ pages 335-347 PHI4500
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Terrence Rodriguez II
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This 8 page Class Notes was uploaded by Bethaney Hall on Friday September 4, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PHI4500 at Florida State University taught by Randolph Clarke in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 44 views. For similar materials see Metaphysics in PHIL-Philosophy at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 09/04/15
Personal Identity VZ 335347 0 We are introduced with the problem of personal identity as the quotmindbody problem that personal identity is something other than just bodily identity 0 He mentions certain requirements that an account of theories about personal identity should consider Selfknowledge the knowledge we have of our inner selves that no one else has access to 0 That we have special concern for our future wellbeing Should be compatible with naturalist views our materialistic account of the mind nothing supernatural or spiritual we have no proof for o and with logical principles that govern notion of identity itself The Concept of ldentitv Logicians characterize identity as an quotequivalence relationquot the relation being transitive symmetrical and re exive equations in book page 335 o This conforms to quotif a is identical to b then what is true of a is true of b and converselyquot o Distinguishing between differences in identities 0 same as in previous readings on personal identity 0 the single identity of an entity requires absolute qualitative identity and can only hold between something and itself is one is transitive o the sameness of properties of an individual 0 A common view of identity is that it is not related to the change of composition 0 This view is used to help explain identity over time 0 Some believe identity over time to be linked by an quotoccurrence of a succession of momentary that are related to each otherquot or spatiotemporally continuous1 0 Can be thought of as quottemporal slicesquot part of an object that existed in time or of speci c parts the history of something s existence The Memory Theory reies in the sameness of consciousnessmemory o This theory can only seem logical if we are talking about quotmemory from the insidequot memories and experience we have in our mind 0 Example of the Prince and the Cobbler is used again seen in previous readings Objections and Revisions Some famous objections to Locke s theory He agrees that memory reveals past stages of someone but argues that quotconsciousness of personal identity presupposesquot it assumes there is personal identity without real proof 1 Connected by their relation in spacetime Objects Locke because this theory allows for someone quotto be and to not bequot 0 Ex A young boy experiences an event grows older to experience another event cannot remember the event as a young boy according to Locke the old man is not the same as the young boy because of loss of memory 0 Regarding Reid s objection o A revision to Locke s theory would have to include the potential to remember for example recalling a memory through hypnosis However Reid again objects this revision because he states that there can be cases where absolutely no memory can be retrieved 0 Another revision For one to have identity with a pastself it is not important that one remembers the experiences of that past self but that one have quotmemory continuityquot with that past self 0 This is focused less on the past memory itself and more on the individual in the past Butler s objection 0 Butler believes the idea of personal identity as memory to be circular We are given an example of the circulatory objection o A note is given rst that personal identity is not de nable in terms of memory but memory must be de ned in terms of personal identity quotA de nition of what it is for a person S to remember a particular event Equot 1 S is in a state which could be called an apparent memory 2 The content of that apparent memory matches in an appropriate way with the nature of the past event E 3 S is appropriately related to E at the tie of its occurrence But in this de nition of quotS remembering Equot 3 is using memory to de ne personal identity something we noted earlier can t happen in order to explain persona identity 3 invokes the notion of personal identity it s not explained We must revise 3 0 We could create 3 which states quotS s apparent memory was caused in an appropriate way by his experiencing E at the time of its occurrence However this revision cannot work either because it again invokes the notion of person identity 0 3 S s apparent memory was caused in an appropriate way by someone s experiencing E 0 With this we are not assuming one s identity 0 quotIn an appropriate wayquot is described as recalling a memory without say an individual placing that memory for you For example you physically cannot recall an event at all but someone remembers you telling him or her about it So this person tells the hypnotist who manipulates you into remembering This wouldn t be appropriate because it s not you remembering the event 0 Now what if there is an example where a person divides into two 0 We could then just revise Locke s theory to include is no in the chain of person stages personal identity cannot branch seen also in previous readings o This example of someone dividing into two also quothelps with the objection that memory 39from the inside can only be characterized as the sort of memory a person has of their own past so any attempt for explaining personal identity with it will be circularquot bottom page 343 0 We are no given a new term or quasimemory which is what remains of remembering an event if we delete the implication that what is remembered actually happened 0 But what if someone is diagnosed with quotphilosophical amnesiaquot where there is absolutely not way to retrieve past memories and this individual has no recollection of their past 0 It s stated that if this is so and there is some resemblance of personality left in the individual then the memory theory would have to be false Personal ldentitv as Psvcholodical Continuitv If this above scenario is true then we would have to consider rather than memory continuity which encompasses personality and characteristics of individuals rather than memories itself 0 Memory continuity is more general 0 Still using quotpersonstages terminology Two stages belong to the same person if and only if 0 They are connected by a series of stages such that each member of the series is directly connected psychologically to the immediately preceding member 0 No such series of stages which connects them branches at any point 0 Classroom Notes MemoryConnectedness A person at time tis to a person at some time earlier t just in case the person at t can remember himself or herself thinking or doing at t something that the person at t thought or did then 0 Memory Continuity o A person at time tis with a person at some earlier time t just in case the person at tand the person at t are end points of a sequence of personsattimes each later member of which is memory connected to the preceding member 0 A person is connected with a later person as long as they are memorycontinuous Is a relation that built on sequences of memory 39ancestral memory 1 The Brave Officer a Problem brought up by Reid that yields Locke s theory as a contradiction b A boy steals fruit and is ogged for it l he grows up to become an officer who performs a brave deed he is able to remember stealing the fruit l as an old man he is promoted to general is not able to remember i Applying Locke s theory it implies the old man is not identical to the young boy c Revised theory i We de ne personal identity instead on memory connectedness but with memorycontinuity which would then survive The Brave Of cer problem 2 Circulatorv Problem a Proposed by Butler where he believes Locke is de ning personal identity with personal identity i Locke s theory is uninformative on personal identity ii If Locke is describing memory as genuine memory then yes it would be circular because of course if we remember doing something ourselves we would be that same person b Revision to make theory not circular i Instead of using the notion of genuine memory we should use the notion of apparent memories with causal connections 1 An event happened this event made an impression l which then caused me to recall this event 2 a noncausal way of remembering would be if a hypnotist made me recall a memory 3 Branching a Regarding cases of duplication of an individual i One of these individuals cannot be the other b Revision personal identity requires if branching does occur then you do not have personal identity 4 Other Aspects of Psvcholodical Continuitv a teacher did not go over this in class
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