Week 2 Notes - Comparative Politics
Week 2 Notes - Comparative Politics CPO 2002
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This 4 page Class Notes was uploaded by Jaime Blanco on Friday September 4, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to CPO 2002 at Florida State University taught by Quintin Beazer in Summer 2015. Since its upload, it has received 84 views. For similar materials see INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS in Political Science at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 09/04/15
Jaime Blanco StudySoup Recap Continuation of Chapter 2 and Intro Chapter 3 Main Ideas Implication of Theories involves falsificationapproach to test hypothesis from theories and the Comparative method which deals with necessary and sufficient conditions Our knowledge is our best bet today Theories and confirming evidence Approaches First comes the theoryconcept idea then the implicationspatterns deductive approach First comes the implicationpatterns then the theoryconcept or idea inductive approach What is the problem of this approach relies on affirming consequent The Use of comparative method Collect observations look for a cause State if is necessary or sufficient Necessary Y never happens unless X happens Effect in small circle Ex To get measlesm you have to be exposed by measles virusX Sufficient Y always happens if X happens If X then Y If no Y then no X Cause in the small circle EX If you are exposed to meals virusY you may get sick X but not necessarily Necessary and Sufficient Y only happens if and only if X occurs Juxtaposition of two circles EX To be thunderOO there is always have to be IightingM Jaime Blanco StudySoup Mills Method Comparative Method Method of Agreement vs Method of Difference Method of difference requires pheromone to be in place so that it does not agree with the condition Assumptions This casual process must be deterministic We have identified all of the possible causes and they work independently of each other Problem it is hard to know if we have ruled out all the possible causes Ideas for next week Chapter 3 What is Politics Politics involves the use of power or influence in the human behavior Power is involved whenever individuals cannot accomplish their goals without either trying to influence the behavior of others or trying to wrestle free from the influence of exerted forces Game Theory strategic situations in which choices of actors are dependent of each other The Gamesituation when individual39s ability to achieve goals depends on others choices is about the responses to changes in environment often negative It always ends in outcomes with payoffs Strategic form of game situations when choices are made simultaneously More info in the next chapter Extensive form of game situations when choices are made sequentially ex EVL Consist on choice nodespoints in which player must choose an action linked in sequence Game tree entire specification which contains all choice nodes that have branchesrepresents actions that can be taken at each choice node that can led to other branches or to a terminal node is when game endsoutcomes with varying payoffs Jaime Blanco SfudySoup Exit Voice and Loyalty ELV deals with power btw citizens and states The Game39s Resoonses Exit Acceptance of new environment alteration of behavior to achieve the best possible outcome given Voice Resistance Action in form of complaint protest lobby direct action to try to change the environment back Loyalty Acceptance and no change The game has as a background the state causing a negative change in the citizen s environment that resulted in the transfer of some benefit from the citizen to the state The responses depend on the consequences caused by the response of State and the response of citizens The initial node is the choice between exit voice or loyalty When citizen choose voice then the state has to respond to it Each outcome has payoffs that will weight actors decisions Values Exit payoff E citizen payoff I value of benefit taken from the citizen to the state Loyalty 0citizen payoff L state39s value from having loyalty Voice c cost of using voicedegree of repression will affect cost state will have to respond and the branches will continue To solve the game we identify what the playera rational decision maker believes is in her best interest Subgame perfect equilibrium is an important solution for extensive form of games Backwards induction is the process of reasoning backwards requires game to start at the end of the game tree and working our way back Given how the actors expect each other players to respond farther down the game Jaime Blame StudySoup
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