INTRODUCTION TO THEATRE
INTRODUCTION TO THEATRE T D 301
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This 1 page Class Notes was uploaded by Kristofer Corwin on Sunday September 6, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to T D 301 at University of Texas at Austin taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 20 views. For similar materials see /class/181769/t-d-301-university-of-texas-at-austin in Theatre and Dance at University of Texas at Austin.
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Date Created: 09/06/15
F Till i 39lquot F3 71 4 39 quot39r r Iquot Cl lquot L M l Umpter 10 Mind and Body in Early Modern Philosophy self is deriv d and consequently there is no such idea But farther what must become of all our par ticular perceptions upon this hypothesis All these at different and distinguishable and separable nm each other and may be separately consider d and may exist separately and have no deed of tiny thing to support their existence After what man ner therefore do they belong to self and how are they connected with it For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception at other of heat or cold light or shade love or hatred pain or pleasure I never can catch myself a any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception When my perceptions are remov d for any time as by sound sleep so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist And were all my per ceptions remov d by death and cou d I neither think nor feel nor see nor love nor hate after the dissolution of my body I shou d be entirely annihilated nor do I conceive what is farther req uisite to make me a perfect nonentity If anyone upon serious and unprejudic d re ection thinks he has a different notion of himself I must confess i call reason no longer with him All I can allow is that he may be in the right as well as I and that we are essentially different in this partic ular He may perhaps perceive something simple and continu d which he calls himself tho I am certain there is no such principle in me But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind I may venture to af rm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual ux and movement Our eyes can not turn in their sockets without varying our per ceptions Our thought is still more variable than our sight and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change nor is there any sin gle power of the soul which remains unalterably the same perhaps for one moment The mind is a kind of theatre Where several perceptions succes sively make their appearance pass re pass glide away and mingle in an in nite variety of postures 285 and situations There is properly no simplicity in it at one time nor identity in different what ever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented or of the materials of which it is compos d What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive percep tions and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro the whole course of our lives In order to answer this question we must distinguish betwixt personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves The rst is our present subject and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep and account for that identity which we attribute to plants and animals there being a great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or person We have a distinct idea of an object that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro a suppos dvari ation of time and this idea we call that of identity or sameness We have also a distinct idea of sev eral different objects existing in succession and CODl lCCtCCl together by a close relation and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of diversity as if there was no manner of rela tion among the objects But tho these two ideas of identity and a succession of related objects be in themselves perfectly distinct and even con trary yet tis certain that in our common way of thinking they are generally confounded with each other That action of the imagination by which we consider the uninterrupted and invari able object and that by which we re ect on the succession of related objects are almost the same to the feeling nor is there much more effort of thought requir d in the latter case than in the for mer The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one con tinu d object This resemblance is the cause of the