SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY SOC 316
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Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 24 Lecture Notes Groups amp networks So far little attention paid to social structure people belong to a variety of groups Groups related to social order in complex ways 2 mechanisms by which group membership 9 social order Ties across groups Simmel Granovetter Gellner Ties within groups Tocqueville Hechter Friedman and Kanazawa Simmel ties across groups 9 social order Two patterns of group affiliation Concentric based on quotorganicquot criteria vs Juxtaposed Based on quotrationa quot criteria Simmel on group membership see page 296 Concentric group affiliation Based on quotorganicquot criteria Initial membership in a group determines membership in all other groups Example Australian aborigines Example medieval Europe Concentric groupformation 39 Individuals do belong to multiple groups BUT these groups are not in con ict competition Key point individuals treated as members of groups rather than as individuals Juxtaposed group formation Based on quotrationa quot criteria such as preference and interests our choice Initial social location family religion neighborhood does not determine group affiliations Juxtaposed groups 9 individuality quotThe larger the number of groups to which an individual belongs the more improbable is it that other persons will exhibit the same combination of groupaffiliationsquot 296 Concentric 9 conformity with initial group Juxtaposed 9 individuality 9 social heterogeneity Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 24 Lecture Notes Heterogeneity 9 crosscutting cleavages 9 social order Men can only belong to a large society through intermediate smaller groups Tight loyalties to smaller groups can be effective in strengthening a larger community if there are offsetting loyalties There is no society which does not contain such states of hostility between its component sections but provided they are redressed by other loyalties they may contribute to the peace of the whole Con icting loyalties and divisions of allegiance tend to inhibit the development of open quarrelling and the greater the division in one area of society the greater is likely to be the cohesion in a wider range of relationships Gluckman 1955 2425 Granovetter on weak ties The strength of a social tie is a function of amount of 39 Social ties are strong weak or absent Strong ties The stronger the tie between any two individuals in a social network the larger the proportion of the individuals in that network to whom they will both be tied 300 Strong ties produce no bridges A bridge is a line in a network which provides the only path between two points In a tight network everyone is strongly linked together and there are few if any bridges to other tight networks All bridges are weak ties 303 In large networks bridges in the sense of specific ties providing the only path between two points are rare The role ofweak ties 39 Removal of weak ties damages transmission probabilities more than removal of strong ties Implications for social order A community characterized by strong ties will be divided into a number of tightly organized cliques There will be few if any bridges between cliques by definition so Implications cont d Cliques strong group solidarity 9 social con ict at macro level social disorder Local mesolevel cohesion may coeXist with societal macrolevel fragmentation and disorder Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 24 Lecture Notes Implications last set honest Network analysis exploding in sociology Strong ties good for Emotional support amp therefore physical health Mobilization that requires small numbers but intense commitment high sacri ce Weak ties good for Obtaining access to resources including info jobs etc Productivity of work groups Community building anticrime efforts largescale mobilization perhaps even if costly due to benefits of accessing a group wheterogeneity of interest Getting a job why we re told to networ finding a partner Tomorrow Boat Gellner How is freedom of association an antidote to the eVils of equality Why is freedom of association necessary to democracy What kind of state would Tocque recommend Similar to Hobbes Smith According to Hechter et al why do we join groups What is the relationship between deViance of a group and global societallevel social order Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 8 Lecture Notes Critique of meaning theories Common language and concepts may be necessary to produce cooperation but are insufficient Social order via Values Values general amp relatively durable internal criteria for evaluation see p 92 Freud s Assumptions People try to maximize their happiness Sexuality fundamental human motivation Aggression man s instinctive nature Read pg 101 through dispute this assertion Freud Mechanism Infants want parent parent not always available This realization 9 distinction between self ego and the external world How does infant cope with parent s absence or disapproval Takes parent into self superego allowing internal parent to monitor hisher behavior SO requires containing human nature Society employs a variety of overt external methods to regulate sexuality and aggressiveness But these methods are largely unsuccessful Instead civilization depends renunciation of hedonistic instinct Freud s solution is internal the superego In the form of the conscience the superego puts into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other extraneous individuals civilization obtains mastery over the individual s aggressiveness by setting up an agency within him to watch over it like a garrison in a conquered city Freud SO exacts a price The price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 8 Lecture Notes Emile Durkheim 39 methodological contributions statistical analysis choosing hard cases for theory focus on emergent phenomena the groupsociety is unit of analysis 39 Emergence when outcome eXplicable only w grouplevel variables Suicide rates indicator of social disorder 39 Two emergent causes of suicide Social integration amp Social regulation Egoistic suicide Individualism 9 suicide Single people more individualistic than people with spouses amp kids amp Protestant v Catholic Social integration 9 low suicide conformity to norms social order Behavioral mechanism for egoistic suicide Our activity needs an object transcending it They cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love so as not to betray interests they put before their own The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply Altruistic suicide From too little individualism amp too much social integration which encourages people to sacrifice selves for group Individual life loses value Anomic suicide Explanation Crises inhibit social regulation Anomie erosion of values 9 suicide Behavioral mechanism We can t be happy unless needs in proportion to means Man s needs inherently limitless only moral force of society provides limit In Durkheim s words Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture Society determines rewards offered to each type of human activity 39 Social consensus on relative value of different jobs defines amp contains our aspirations A certain way of living is considered the upper limit to which a workman may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence and there is another limit below which he is not willingly permitted to fall unless he has seriously demeaned himself 39 Lack of regulation 9 misery 9 suicide Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 8 Lecture Notes Looking Ahead 39 For Thursday you might want to boat each of the readings on norms l ll4 I return comments on summary of cases Tues July 15 After dealing w my comments you can think about what theories best explain variation in 80 across your cases see next slide Your rst exam is on Thurs July 17 covering everything through power amp authority readings MC questions and a short essay or two Preview of 4 Remaining Theory Groups to help wpaper ideas Values amp Norms Are cultural phenomena that aid cooperation by prescribing and proscribing particular kind of behavior Today we covered values internal Thurs we cover norms external Power amp Authority Power theories explain that coercion is sometimes needed to produce social order Hobbes amp Engels on the state use of force to create order Authority entails obtaining voluntary compliance people obey bc they view leadership as legitimate Spontaneous Order Bottomup solutions to social order including how allowing people to follow own self interest yields the greatest good for society Groups amp Networks Society is composed of groups people have social ties These ties and group membership can increase or decrease social order Issues like interdependence the effects of strong versus weak ties how membership in groups socializes us etc Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 June 26 Lecture Notes The uses oftheory in science Theories say some facts more important than others spotlight not oodlight Lead to scienti c progress Theories Assume existence of a real world Have empirical implications Goal scienti c accuracy Social theories Explain collective rather than individual outcomes Are composed of causal relations amp causal mechanisms Causal relations Y is dependent on X if and only if by modifying X one can affect Y EX Durkheim s theory of suicide a higher degree of indiVidualism in a social group causes a higher rate of suicide in that group Causality A change in X causes a change in Y but a change in Y does not cause a change in X Correlation i causation This is why good theory is important Spurious Causality Independent and dependent variable affected by a third variable Ice cream consumption is a spurious cause of crime both caused by something else Theories are imperfect Theories simplify reality Theories especially social theories are necessarily incomplete Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 June 26 Lecture Notes How to choose between rival theories Empirical adequacy Testable amp falsi able Internal consistency Causal Mechanisms Operate at a lower level of analysis than the outcome under consideration Describe process by which X produces Y This often is unobservable or hard to observe The Mechanism Boat see below Caveat 39 Many theories fail to meet the ideal clearly speci ed causal mechanisms Behavioral assumptions They animate behavioral mechanisms thereby explaining how individual internal states lead to actions Behavioral assumptions assumptions about the predominant motivation of individuals MaX Weber 18641920 on orientations to action I Consequentialist Action Instrumental rationality zweckrationalitat can describe both ends goals and means methods Re Means Re Ends Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 June 26 Lecture Notes 11 Nonconsequentialist action Action occurs regardless of its consequences for the individual s welfare 3 types nonconsequentialist action Value rationality Wertrational Affectual Traditional Prevalence of action orientations An empirical question Weber thought that instrumental action should always be presumed rst Why do behavioral assumptions matter for explaining social order If people have instrumentally rational ends they may subvert social order If people are valuerational they may tend to uphold the social order Moving forward Tuesday we cover Problem of Social Order Sections C amp 3 Start Meaning theories Sections D amp 4 While reading for tomorrow you may wish to consider these questions What are the two components of social order Describe the level of social order in Montegrano Is it high or low Explain your answer Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 June 26 Lecture Notes Causal Mechanisms M acro level came Macro level Outcome r Transformational Sltuatlonal mechanisms mechanisms Individual I ndzvzdual Internal states action BehaV10ral mechanisms Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 22 Lecture Notes Recap Power Theories 2 ways out of Hobbesian dilemma Reject rational egoism assumption Reject idea that rational egoism war Hayek 2 sources of order I Taxis quotmade ordersquot I Produced by human design I Kosmos quotspontaneous ordersquot I Orderly structures produced by interaction of many people but not by human design SOs require normative rules quotFor a spontaneous order to be bene cial people must also observe some conventional rules that is rules which do not simply follow from their desires and their insight into relations of cause and effect but which are normative and tell them what they ought to or ought not to doquot 2quotd full l p 230 Kosmos Taxis 0 Complex 0 Simple 0 Not limited to what our 0 Complexity limited by our minds can master cognitive capacity 0 Abstract 0 Concrete 0 Perception requires mental 0 we can perceive it reconstruction o No particular purpose 0 Serves makers purpose Rules differ in each type I Rules in Taxis Are for performance of assigned tasks I Rules in Kosmos Provide abstract order content not known or foreseen Are independent of purpose Affect a large but indeterminate number Schelling Critical Mass Phenom I Group up and answer these questions I Define CMPs I What are his examples at least 3 I Give your own examples at least 3 I Discuss where CMPs belong on the boat Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 22 Lecture Notes Schelling s residential segregation kosmos I Shows very mild preference for living wpeople like oneself and no desire to live in segregated neighborhood 9segregation Advantage of spontaneous order I Makes it possible for individuals to cooperate on basis of information no one person can ever possess Adam Smith 1723 1790 From Mandeville s The Fable ofthe Bees or Private Vices Public Bene ts see pg 217 Smith s principal behavioral assumption I Man has almost advantages p 258 Implications of this assumption l Man s selfinterest 9a propensity to truck barter and exchange one thing for another I This propensity critical for social order I Social order produced in societies having institutions that foster economic development thus increasing wealth Why econ development 9 social order I Bc a rising tide lifts all boats I Whatever improves the circumstances of the greater part of mankind can never be regarded an inconveniency to the whole No society can surely be ourishing and happy of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable A paradox Hobbes vs Smith I Hobbes and Smith both start from same assumption rational egoism Zerosum vs positivesum I For Hobbes social interaction zerosum I For Smith social interaction positivesum I In a positivesum game resources are expanding specialization 9 greater production I Moreover exchange 9 individual welfare l Both parties to an exchange better off afterward The division of labor I Responsible for gains from specialization I the key to economic development 7 and hence social order Origins of division of labor DoL l Slight differences in natural talents or circumstances leads to comparative advantage I Comparative advantage 9 specialization 9 productivity 9 wealth 9 social order Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 22 Lecture Notes Specialization 9 exchange With DoL people no longer produce all things they what to consume Specialization can only occur w some mechanism for exchange DoL spontaneous order SO I Man s interest in exchange leads him quotto promote an end SO which was no part of his intentionsquot The market SO In doing what is best for themselves people are led as if by an quotinvisible handquot to promote economic welfare of all I Prices source of decentralized information that can yield predictable perhaps cooperative outcomes without centralized planning l Pro t motive encourages efficient production I Price system also guides quantity Policy Implications of Smith s Theory I Economic growth 7 and hence social order 7 is best assured by promoting free as against regulated markets 7 eg laissezfaire I The doctrine known as liberalism holds that I Collusion between producers is socially harmful I Tariffs and other govemmentimposed barriers to trade are socially harmful I Government policies that encourage monopolies commonplace in Europe during Smith s lifetime are socially harmful The minimal state Smith argues for nightwatchman state I Protects citizens against violence theft and fraud enforces contracts etc I Provides public goods infrastructureeduc I Not a strong interventionist state Smith summary Unlike Hobbes social interaction viewed as a positive sum game Questions about Smith s theory Distributional issues I Does rising tide lift all boats ExchangeDoL assume private property rights I If private property rights can only be produced by the state then we re back in Hobbes box Hayek Cooperation also requires norms depends on both spontaneous and planned orders I Smith s is a rosy view of DoL contra Marx Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 22 Lecture Notes A more truly spontaneous order Axelrodmore ambitious SO theory I no normative or institutional eg state prerequisites I interaction of rational egoists alone 9 SO I theory rests on concept of equilibrium Equilibrium in social science Equilibrium stable often selfreinforcing outcome Equilibria can be I Cooperative provide optimal welfare to participants many social norms Noncooperative provide suboptimal welfare Hobbesian state of nature Represented by the Prisoner s Dilemma PD Prisoner s Dilemma Structure 2 players designated I Row I Column I They have 2 choices I Cooperate I Defect I Each must choose simultaneously without knowing what the other will do PD Payoffs l Pays to defect if you think partner will cooperate 5gt3 and if you think partner will defect lgt0 I Best move for you is defect same for other player I Note specific numbers don t matter except to indicate which strategy is most beneficial So if players are rational egoists both defect getting 1 each Had they both cooperated they d get 3 each Mutual defectionsubopt equilibrium PD Lesson Represents noncooperative equilibrium no matter what the other does defection produces a higher individual payoff than cooperation I What s the dilemma I If both players defect both do worse than if they had cooperated 2 sources of suboptimal outcomes The PD s structure payoffs specifies actors are rational egoists I Without this assumption highest payoff would be for cooperation regardless of what other player chooses making cooperative equilibrium much easier to attain Coordination I If game 22 coordination equilibria even altruists can fail to cooperate Solution conventions I Selfenforcing bc no incentive to violate N Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 22 Lecture Notes I But bargaining required when resources at stake Invisiblehand solutions to PD The iterated PD I Axelrod s The Evolution of C ooperation An inde nite of 2person PD games winning strategy TitforTat always cooperate on lSt round defect only after other player has defected Cooperation based on reciprocity I Mechanism mutual retaliation l The quotshadow of the futurequot is important enough to make this reciprocity stable Live amp Let Live trench warfare in WW1 small units amp immobility mimics 2person iterated PD Additions to model truce made mutual cooperation strategy more valuable to both sides I d trust amp moral consideration for opponents welfare p 280 Critique of Axelrod Theoretical I Axelrod s spontaneous order solutions assume inde nitely repeating interaction w same partners Empirical I Many theorists argue most social situations are not PDs but assurance games where the problem is uncertainty about partner s compliance rather than motivation to freeride cheat Empirical Critique of Smith Polanyi I historically govt l regs quickly follow free market I free market 9 social ecological amp other distortions and disruptions so state must step in to regulate production and exchange For Thursday For Simmel make a twocolumn comparison of concentric vs juxtaposed group formation What timeplace is each characteristic of Describe how groups and identity are organized Describe the type of social order in each For Granovetter reading be able to make the case for why strong or fixed ties don t always lead to social order Or how and when can weak or uid social ties produce social order Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 15 Lecture Notes Hobbes s Leviathan Quintessential problematization of SO Microlevel assumptions 0 Rational e goism All men roughly equal in body and mind which produces equality of hope in the attaining of our ends All men seek to avoid death and injury amp have restless desire for power the object of mans desire is not to enjoy once oncely and for one instant of time but to assure for ever the way of His future desire And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only to the procuring but also the assuring of a contented life Man will not be content with moderate power because He cannot assure the power and means to live without the acquisition of more 3 causes of con ict Competition Di idence distrustantipathy Glory These conditions produce a constant struggle for power over others State of nature war of all against all in which men use all means incl force amp fraud to attain ends quotAnd therefore if any two men desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy they become enemies and in the way to their End endeavor to destroy or subdue one another 171quot Consequences of quotstate of naturequot Drive for power and selfpreservation justifies any means necessary People insecure live in a constant fear of injury and death No industry education trade culture The life of man is Solitary Poore nasty brutish and short Hobbes defense of his motivational assumptions p 173 Summary of problem of social order Rational egoism 9 competition amp war Assumption resources zerosum Fear of death and desire for quotcommodious livingquot 9 demand for social order Men must transfer their 39g y to a v Lg with I 39J on use offorce Critique 39 What guarantees this beneficial outcome Hobbes posits a Third Law of Nature Is this conclusion logically consistent with its premises Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 15 Lecture Notes Engels on the state 39 Engels like Hobbes views state as necessary for social order but sees different role State creates social order by regulating con ict between competing classes Assumptions 39 Historical materialism remember Marx reading productive activities determine consciousness 39 Classes de ned by their relation to the means of production How state produces social order By and large the state represents interests of the ruling class Mechanism coercion ideology amp religion Critique of Coercive Power Theories of Social Order Rational egoism undoes Hobbes social order For Engels if state is the executive committee of the ruling class why doesn t lower class revolt Norms arguably play hidden role for both theories COERCION enormously expensive solution authority Weber Authority amp Social Order Legitimacy 9 Voluntary Compliance 39 people must have an interest in obeying so leaders cultivate belief in legitimacy Weber on legitimate orders LOs 39 LO type of social order that is based upon legitimacy 39 LOs must attain staff amp subject compliance 3 ideal types of social order Patrimonial Traditional I Rests on the belief in the sanctity of traditions and the legitimacy of the rulers selected thereby RationalLegal Bureaucratic I Rests on belief in legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated in authority under such rules to issue commands Charismatic I Rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctity heroism or exemplary character of an individual person Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 15 Lecture Notes Charismatic order No fixed rules Leaders make own rules often said to come from HP Not dependent on continuous source of income Wealth not pursued in a methodical manner Followers not materially compensated but often share in the donations leader receives leader must provide sustenance for followers Basis value rationality Patrimonial order Rests on sanctity of ageold rulespractices Motivational basis Personal loyalty Recruitment in Patrimonial Order People recruited to staff either via Traditional ties of loyalty Voluntarily Staff compensated By living from lord s table land for services appropriation of rent fees or taxes RationalLegal Order Based on rule of law Abstract rules applied to all specified cases Office holders also subject to laws Obedience owed to order not individual Business conducted accd g to formal rules Hierarchy Duties delimited technical qualifications by exam experience can t buy offices staffpaid fixed salary Characteristics of bureaucracy Career bureaucrats Officials accountable to superiors Codification amp Routinization Rights of individuals protected Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 15 Lecture Notes The rationale of bureaucracy bottom l p 189 Trend toward Rationality 39 Bureaucracy prevails because it is the most efficient means of administration Advantages of bureaucracy 39 Takes advantage of the division of labor 39 Individual accountability 39 Contributes to social leveling 39 High stability Disadvantages of bureaucracy 39 Concentrates power in hands of few 39 Slow to adapt to environmental changes 39 Discourages individualism creativity and risktaking A key question 39 If bureaucracy so efficient why not found everywhere amp always 39 Answer bureaucracy has preconditions not met until modern era Why Patrimonialism Persists 39 Instrumentally rational leader without modern technology will find patrimonialism superior for recruiting motivating monitoring staff Willis Learning to Labour Lessons from Willis 39 Legitimacy needed for cooperation but not predictability School authorities not seen as legitimate yet students behave in a predictable way Lads counterculture ironically serves to reproduce existing class structure ONEHOUR MIDTERM ON THURSDAY BRING SCANTRON 25 MC QUESTIONS AND TWO SHORT ESSAYS Soc 316Erin Powers Summer 08 July 29 Lecture Notes Gellner Denies Hobbesian Dilemma The paradox is this it is precisely anarchy which engenders trust and social cohesion It is effective government which destroys trust 310 Gellner relies on Khaldun s sociology of Arab societies Arid territories unable to sustain agricultural cultivation Livestock moveable unlike agricultural crops amp therefore easily stolen This demand leads individuals quotto gang up in a group which in effect hangs up a notice saying anyone who commits an act of aggression against any one of us must expect retaliation from us all and not only will the aggressor himself be likely to suffer retaliation but his entire group and all its members will be equally liablequot 3Id 11 p 311 This principle leads to a system of strong selfpolicing tribal groups that defend themselves by threatening to retaliate indiscriminately against the individual members of any aggressor group It provides an incentive for groups to police their own members so as not to provoke retaliation Implications for social order 39This would seem to support the view that strong groups weaken social order because they lead to intergroup con ict particularly if selfpolicing breaks down But intergroup relations complex To forestall a situation in which one powerful tribe becomes able to in ict unacceptable costs on others tribal loyalties and coalitions must be impermanent In such a system groups are far from eternal enemies Rather they have continually changing connections to each other This is partly because people can switch groups quottreasonquot is acceptable It helps maintain equilibrium through realignment See bottom 11 pg 312 Note that transparency is required in this system City 9 Lack of cohesiontrust 39City folk lack cohesion and trust and by the very fact that they are urban accept governmental authority They are atomized by their economic specialisms and political dependence They need peace to pursue their trade and they accept oppression as the price ofpeace 3 14 15 Intragroup ties 9 social order Tocque argues against European fear that equality 9 individualism rational egoism amp social disorder 39Freedom of association highly restricted in aristocracies Soc 3l6Erin Powers Summer 08 July 29 Lecture Notes quotEquality places men beside one another without a common bond to hold them Despotism raises barriers between them and separates them It disposes them not to think of those like themselves and for them it makes a sort of public virtue of indifference When citizens are forced to be occupied with public alTairs they are necessarily drawn from the midst of their individual interests and from time to time torn away from the site of themselvesquot 317 How does freedom amp equality 9 social order quotThe Americans have combated the individualism to which equality gives birth with freedom and they have defeated it The legislators of America did not believe that to cure a malady so natural to the social body in democratic times and so fatal it was enough to accord to the nation as a whole a representation of itself they thought that in addition it was fitting to give political life to each portion of the territory in order to multiply infinitely the occasions for citizens to act together and to make them feel every day that they depend on one anotherquot 318 In democracies 39To obtain political support each person must help neighbors Role of associations in combating individualism 39In aristocratic societies individual nobles can accomplish great things because they can call on the aid of their dependents In democratic societies where all are roughly equal and weak men must work together to achieve common goals 321 quot The more that government puts itself in place of associations the more particular persons losing the idea of associating with each other will need it to come to their aid these are causes and effects that generate each other without rest 322 Citizens learn to submit their will to that of all the others and to subordinate their particular efforts to the common action 325 Tocqueville s conclusion It is within political associations that Americans of all conditions of all minds and of all ages get the general taste for association daily and familiarize themselves with its use There they see each other in great number speak to each other understand each other and in common become animated for all sorts of undertakings Afterwards they carry into civil life the notions they have acquired and make them serve a thousand uses 327 Soc 316Erin Powers Summer 08 July 29 Lecture Notes How solidary groups 9 social order 39Hechter Friedman and Kanazawa based on Hechter s theory of group solidarity 1987 Efficiency of Mnnitun39n Visibility of members Efficiency of Sn nin Dependence of members antral Capacity Probability I compliance Extensivenem Extent of 39 nonnative The Theory of Group Solidarity 39Addresses two questions Under what conditions do groups form Under what conditions are groups more or less solidary Group formation 39People form groups only for a net bene t 39Principal bene t of groups pooling of individuallyheld resources 39People form groups to attain excludable goods that they can t ef ciently obtain on own Group production 39Members must comply with rules assuring production of joint goods 39Compliance with rules costly Members have incentive to free ride 39Complianceprincipal cost of group formation 39Freeriding reduces goods produced can lead to group dissolution Solidarity increases with 39dependence on group for goods varies with value amp availability of collective good 39social control varies with monitoring and sanctioning of group Soc 316Erin Powers Summer 08 July 29 Lecture Notes Hechter Friedman amp Kanazawa 39In heterogeneous societies internalized norms should create deviance amp social disorder 39Key group functionenforce norms social control 39State tolerates deviant groups unless they threaten its power or unless they impose negative eXtemalities on a group wresources to resist Hechter et al Conclusions members of groups produce local order to satisfy own private ends Once produced local order contributes to global social order Order in heterogeneous societies I d by existence of numerous but small solidary groups unable to threaten state Social order I d by freedom of association especially at margins of society Best way to produce global order is facilitate production of local solidarity Critique 39Costs and benefits to defining solidarity in behavioral rather than a ective terms 39Is Hechter s theory of group solidarity and the Hechter et al piece better situated in the section on power and authority For Thursday 39Bring brief very concise 2part outline of your paper S 12 page 39Part One Cases amp measures of social order 39Part Two Identify which theory group you are using to explain the variation in social order across your cases meaning normsvalues powerauthority spontaneous order groupsnetworks Identify the specific theorists from the group that applies 39You will trade with a partner in class and hand it in at the end of the class period counts as a quiz Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 1 Lecture Notes What is social order I Dependent variable Y macrolevel outcome for this course The problem of social order I Why doesn t our world resemble The Road Warrior Why is social life mostly so predictable l Why do people behave in prosocial ways Two concepts of social order I Order as predictability amp as cooperation Consequences of disorder I Insecurity constant fear of injurydeath l Investment curtailed because of uncertainty Disorder from lack of predictability l Lack of information to predict others actions I Or too much information overwhelming Montegrano So Italy around 1950 l Describe the level of social order Ban eld s hypothesis Maximize the material short run advantage of the nuclear family assume that all others will do likewise p83 Montegrano political activity is feeble 0 Political parties are weak amp Political cynicism is extreme Montegrano collective needs unmet 0 Because so little collective action most collective needs unmet in Montegrano o Amoral familism Example of cooperative order Societal amp nongovemmental responses to 911 and to a lesser extent Katrina Order via meaning 0 Cooperation requires common knowledge amp communication Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 1 Lecture Notes Common knowledge Facilitates predictabililty and cooperation Common language Language offers a means of describing objects and feelings However common language is an insufficient cause of social order Marx 0n the determinants of common meaning Marx a historical materialist Men differ from animals in that they produce their means of life What individuals are corresponds with what they produce and how they produce it Marx amp Durkheim Origin of Ideas Marx s Materialism Durkheim Durkheim Elementary F arms 0fReligi0us Life Two different theories a theory of knowledge not in reader a theory of religion for tomorrow Durkheim s theory of knowledge Concepts are collective representations operating within social forms The conceptual order is related to the social order concepts are determined by social forms Durkheim s theory of knowledge cont d The classification of things reproduces the classification of men Common concepts are required for social order For Tomorrow Boat Durkheim s theory on origin of religion What do the pieces by Fleck amp Goffman have to do with meaning 39Is there a difference in meaning by geographic region in the US If yes how did it originate What are the consequences for social order Soc 3 16 Erin Powers Summer 08 July 3 Lecture Notes Durkheim on Ritual Rituals are the actions that are performed in relation to sacred things Without knowing a religion s beliefs its rituals are incomprehensible Rituals symbolic more than instrumental amp indicate existence of common values D s theory ofreligion Religion involves sacred things sacred vs profane Social density 9 Collect Efferv 9 religious beliefs and sentiments 9 social order Religion represents society amp social relations to intellect Primitive religion offers explanations in terms of myths lst full l p 55 Durkheim functions of religion for social order Strengthens bonds attaching the individual to society By expressing society s common values helps promote SO Social order impossible without some kind of religion Fleck on scientific facts Durkheim religious amp political concepts have social roots but scientific concepts universal Fleck scientific concepts also socially constructed Research findings only become scientific facts via extended social negotiation In addition to Fleck s cases eg cause of syphilis what are contemporary examples Mead Generalized Other Unity of quotselfquot comes from membership in social groups We know who we are only by taking the role of the other Social life is like a game in which we all play designated roles Social order The game of social life For Mead self is irreducibly social We cannot be ourselves unless we are also members in whom there is a community of attitudes which control the attitudes of all Selves can only exist in de nite relationships to other selves Examples baseball amp your own Read 151 full 39n p69 I Analogous to how you all and I act in this classroom I Think of the different roles you play are they constructed independently or in reference to others Order via meaning Mechanisms Situational Social and physical environment affects meaning Behavioral Shared meaning 9 individuals coordinate their behavior Transformational Coordinated individual behaviors aggregate to produce social order For Tuesday Summary of Cases Due hard copy I suggest you boat then comparecontrast Durkheim amp Freud
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