INTRO TO INTL REL
INTRO TO INTL REL INTL 3200
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This 14 page Class Notes was uploaded by Quentin Kiehn on Saturday September 12, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to INTL 3200 at University of Georgia taught by Berejikian in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 18 views. For similar materials see /class/202119/intl-3200-university-of-georgia in International Affairs at University of Georgia.
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Date Created: 09/12/15
Cassie Leonard 32120 1 1 o Issue 7 Effective Deterrence o Obama administration not trying to change Gadda s incentive structure but rather the advisors around him trying to separate the regime o interwar deterrence deterrence while already engaged in a battle in order to contain a particular kind of ght 0 US tries to contain enemy by showing acceptable types of warfare o sending signals to other side warning them what will happen if they do something you don t approve of o problem for US when your goal is something like a regime change on an individual decision making level it generates fear in Gadda o rational decision making shuts down cannot process information correctly 0 willing to absorb huge costs to get you over the fear 0 big shock now vs small shock in a year Game theorygt WHAT HAPPENS WHEN STATES ARE MAKING CHOICES SIMULTANEOUSLY o assumes rational calculation is done by states costs and bene ts o example MIRV one rocket with lots of bombs o Cooperation making decision not to deploy weapons 0 Defection deploying the new weapon BAD behavior o power is relative you can be more powerful but less secure o it doesn t matter what you do there is always a best strategy for both sides which is defectdefect 0 Individual states do what s good for itself PD Science Chicken A A 33 14 33 14 B I B 41 22 41 Best to Defect Only CBquot that changes insecure secure 3 security scale Prisoner s Dilemma Best to defect no matter what Incentive to cheat equilibriumdefect defect hard time ever cooperating in a PD DCgtCCgtDDgtCD Chicken ght over who will take Sally to prom Mutually assured destruction 00 death Element of information collecting information is important my best strategy depends on whatI think you will do look really big amp bad and scare your opponent exaggerate the importance of the issue cooperation swerving defection staying straight 33 would be if they both promised to swerve beforehand DCgtCCgtCDgtDD How do you win Grab the club lock the steering wheel and swallow the key Have no choice but to swerve have to be credible Necessary conditions for peace 1 CLEAR COMMUNICATION 2 MUTUAL CREDIBILITY a if people don t believe your threats they ll try to take advantage of you Countries will ght to keep their reputation If US deterrence doesn t work we US can t back down 3282011 Axelrod 7 how do you survive the PD Tit for Tat sta1ts off cooperating then if you defect the next time it defects doesn t cooperate again until you do I do whatever you did last time in the long run it accumulates more cooperation takes advantage of 33 but defends itself against 41 creates a strategy that is rm but fair strategy built on trust will never take advantage of you 3 components that give us the best chance for Conditional Cooperation 1 TitforTat 2 Good Information have to know what the other sides last play was 3 Shadow of the future a Must play many games b Unable to see the end i Games cast a shadow on the future ii Reward versus punishment Whats formed A stable cooperative relationship Chicken NEEDS Mutually Credible Deterrence Clear Communication PD NEEDS Shadow of the Future Good Information Conditionally Cooperative Strategies WW1 trench warfare informal norms developdon t attack during breakfast or lunch you can get out and clean trench good info I won t get shot at breakfast Simultaneously ghting and cooperating started killing commanders that were trying to violate the cooperation How did they get the war started again 0 Policy of rotating troops o shorter games 0 don t know what the other sides last move was Restructure games into many small ones solve one now and others in the future Trade looks like a PD game Prisoner Dilemma strategies for ME Bush 1 time PD Clinton 7 break into tiny negotiations Starts with prenegotiations Teeny tiny concessions really works because it starts a tit for tat game and states start trusting each other when do we meet build up enough goodwill over time left hardest thing until end Jerusalem Incentive to cooperate fell through however SHOULD VE sprinkled a little bit of Jerusalem through entire discussion instead of wait for it to be the last topic 33020 1 l Humanitarian use of force Conditions 1 Acute big crisis 2 Multilateral support 3 Force can be used effectively Cant x em all but you cant x the ones right infront of you doctor analogy Two Level Games domestic public opinion acts as a constraint leaders cannot do whatever they want especially if the public doesn t support it want to get reelected 3 assurnpnnns 1 ChefuquvemmEnt COG a nlnrnate densmn rnakrng a mh n Decxsmnm er eretnennekstnps 2 All nrepn puhmes nave tn be rati ed zppmved by nnrnesne aetnrs a Senate rati es rt nut senate rnaneneen by nnrnesne aetnrs n snrnenrnes puble upmmn rs ran eann e Even nundemucran states need apprnva1 nfnnrnesne aetnrs r Mrlrt p 1rnea1party agurbusmess nvxl semee a Needs tant apprnva1 nrwru 1nse pnwe when rnsntnnnns rernnve snppnrt leaders 1nse pnwer fnrerpn pnlrey a Dnrnestre ennstrants wnh fnragn nesranles Wm set set uf nnrnesneauy acceptable nntenrnes tn a fnrerpn pulmy prnmern Lup and were A 50 B Nu pnssrnrlrty fnrresnlnnnn Overlap ufwmrsets rs the neeessary Eundmun fur mtemanunal en nperatann e enrggeruneunreatuneless nrenrnle rtrs rSanctmns duesn t nn1y hurt the aggessurbut alsu the nnst ennntry z strateges fnr upemng Wmsets 1 Pull anuLher cuunmes Wmset upen by TARGEHNG NEUTRALS rlfyuu ean bnng m new aetnrs yuu ean rnanenee Lham change 7 cnrnrnernntnreyeleparts Bath salts duck parts Felt earnnnarn pasta cneese rAny srnau sanetrnn ean be ennngn tn nestrny a srnan enrnpany rntense pressnre rTzrgenngneutxals nnttn lmpuse ecunurmc pain but tn ereate pnlmeal pressure 2 m1 npen yuur uWn wmrset e funcuun rs tn aereet pnnlre upmmn ufObama39s speeen ms tn get anrnesne snppnrt fur the War wrtn Lrnya anary rfuncuun rxfwmsets e1nse we39ll have tn pnu nnt uf Lrnya ande penp1e wtu are Best example US Spy plane crash in China US apologizes China gives back soldiers both political leaders opened up their winsets so they can overlap 4 4 20 1 1 Final exam everything we ve talked about thus far that contributes to conflict Another kind of manipulation never used by the US until Obama Administration went to Europe and had open town hall meetings with citizens in an effort to try to get them to support the war in Afghanistan amp to get the government to spend stimulus trying to open up winsets by talking to the people themselves new tactic not sure if it did a lot War pattern of intemational behavior hegemonic wars theory of great power politics hegemon a state that has the preponderance of power US no single state is even close to its power and there is no way a global coalition could form and be more powerfu next state as a challenger is a regional power China hegemonic war great power con ict where a mature declining hegemon is challenged by a great rising power or coalition of powers the challenge is military but the goal is to take down the hegemon other states seek hegemonic status securest place to behegemon when a new state becomes hegemon they 0 create a favorable system to suit its interests 0 develop alliances historically no hegemon has survived 0 always overthrown o tinkers with the intl system and spends the rest of the time defending the system 0 other states enjoy the stability of the hegemon and don t have to pay the costs 0 hegemon acts as the global police force 0 no ONE war leads to the decline of the hegemon I all of the wars added up over time multiplier effect I smallest multiplier effect is military spending dilemma in doing whats good for the hegemon its historically doing what is leading to its own demise why would a rising power want to get in con ict with the hegemon o hegernonies create policies that aren t in the interests of other powers and step on toes out of war either a new hegemon arises or the old hegemon wins but its crippled needs time to recuperate 462011 International criminal court necessary to bring those who are guilty of war crimes First try to charge him at the Domestic level if doesn t happen then goes to INTL level ICC ex Ivory coast leader Gbagbo charged with war crimes Hegemonic theory Hegemon gets exhausted and becomes vulnerable burden borne almost exclusively by the hegemon brings rising states to challenge the hegemon ex at end of Cold War US had land forces in the Soviet Union China benefitted most from this stability shares 4000 miles of border with Russia without paying anything US gets more powerful objectively every year however other states catch u putting into military is the least effective place to put it less of a multiplier effect putting it into schools roads infrastructure benefits a lot more Realist argument American foreign policy has been effective in defending country and interests but has created enemies in the INTL system 2nd view point US is lucky enough to be the last hegemon with 2 characteristics that make it impossible to wage war o nuclear weapons 0 interdependence 0 we would destroy ourselves multipolar system o most likely going to occur says berejikian Cold war US and our allies versus USSR o Won but it was expensive and weakened the US 0 US started to sell bonds to pay for it no one wanted the Soviet Unions bonds China 0 coming out of war with the USSR dictated how we would handle china 0 Couldn t afford another war so we integrated china into economy o although China will continue to grow in power hopefully our interdependence with them with make it unrealistic to wage a war Realist argue that the hegemon will go down in ames and the optimist will say it will continue on orever 4 8 201 l 7 breakout Economic Structuralism 1 deals with the division between rst and third world countries 2 3rd world is at a massive disadvantage 3 whats driving this capitalism rst world countries specialize in one industry that just feeds into rst world countries fallen out of favor linked to Marxism don t really have a solution Western countries dismiss it doesn t explain peripheral successes Asian tigers Structuralism concerned with power distribution 1 US 2 China 3 Russia Etc Economic structuralism concerned with position in Capitalism Marx A Have B Have nots history of hegemons 1900 s US 1800 s Britain UK late 1700 s France 1600 s1700 s UK 1400 s1600 s Spain WWI allies UK Russia France Serbs US Italy axis Germany Austria Even though UK won got weaker and US surpassed UK because of it 4 1 120 1 1 decision making o assumes actors are rational o not how we make decisions however Non book bonus material most likely choice A 100 8000 Expected Value EV 8000 to choose this is to not maximize pro ts OR 85 10000 Expected Value EV 8500 rational choice 15 0 B 100 8000 EV8000 to choose this is to not maximize pro ts OR 85 10000 EV 8500 15 0 0 people don t like gambles or risks o when presented with good outcomes tend to be risk adverse o but in the domain of losses you re more likely to gamble wildlyrisk acceptant o Gains frame risk adverse o Loss frame risk acceptant o the framing effect or Prospect theory 0 Casino example many people chase the loss to get back to where they started this is what Casinos want you to do o North Korea o the scariermore powerful you are the easier to get deterrence o key to peace in game of chickenmutually credible deterrence threats o Even if this more aggressive policy will leave you worse 01f you brain is still wired to do them anyways 0 When NK feels weakthreatened they become most aggressivedangerous start taking gambles o what you need for successful deterrence is o not only credible deterrence threats but also two states in a gains frame will act more rationally 0 will be satis ed with the status quo o stable o likely to stay where they are even if they don t think the threats are credible even with credible deterrence in a loss frame a state will gamble if not happy Support a gains frame Removing a loss frame Key to deterrence 2nd part is to reward states for doing good right now policy is perceived as weak need to deliver sticks punishment and carrots rewards 0 US is making NK s status quo go down not good 0 trying to make them destroy nuc s without giving them the promise we won t attack is dumb o need to give them incentives to comply and rewards when they do o same with Gadda if all outcomes are bad he will continue to gamble o need to give him and his sons a way out 0 McCain was about to lose so picked a wildcard running mate Palin o advisors told him he was crazy Politics Battle over framing Status Quo A Good Risk Averse when times are goodsecure generally pick the incumbent B Bad Risk Acceptant when status quo is bad will gamble with other person o Deterrence credible threat and gains frame o Humans have a built in aversion to unfairness 0 strong negative reaction to unfairness 0 ex 500 split between you and the class 0 400 for me 100 for you o class will never comply even if it makes them better off o saying its unfair is an emotional response lt this is what you have to overcome Israel Egypt Peace Accords we will give both sides money Buy the peace by overcoming fairness issue Cheaper more effective way to get what you want 4132011 if you smoke your not guaranteed death from lung cancer However if you add more risks coal mining you increase your chances of getting it o same with war if you increase your risks you increase likelihood of going to war 0 risk factors 0 example relationships with states o the more you have the more likely you ll go to war o no one cause for war many factors contribute o oldest argument of war awed human being something in humans is violent 0 not all issues are resolved in war many times they are still lingering and may lead to tension or another war o three things that increase reason for con ict o new states go to war more often than old states o need to develop reputation of deterrence o ex regime change represents different threats to neighbors do our old treaties still stand 0 developing countries rapid changes of economic growth 0 high growth rates leads to instabilitypolitical turmoil o usually spends wealth on weapons con ict can ensue o changes of relative position o creates instability want for states to get back on top being a new state being a developing country with economic growth and a change in relative position are all risk factors 0 cultural reasons why wars occur o norms of modern societies o media saturated societies o numbness to war because of the millions of violent images we see o numbness causes a loosening of winsets o feminist critique using wars to resolve disputes is the males way of doing things 0 ex of ghts after carded offenses in soccer games o men resolved by ghting o women resolved by getting more cards 0 counterargument women in power are just as likely to go to war as men are argument to that women need to act like men to get in power because of norms o 10 years of women voting 5x less likely a state will go to war o more integrated women are in politicaleconomic structure the less likely the state will use violence o hegemon is excluded from these characteristics unique case 0 economic arguments as to why war occurs 0 economic structure of states 0 Marxists believe capitalism is an incentive for violence o produced too many goods so fought wars with states so that they d buy them o also prompted colonization for resources o not so helpful of a theory anymore no longer applies o typically we nd that trade interdependence decreases con ict o liberal view 0 democracies less likely to engage in war false 0 what is true is that democracies usually don t engage in war with each other democratic peace theory o logic therefore we have to promote democracy ex 2nd Iraq war o failed democratic transitions most violent times in history o especially in multiethnic states o people go back to ethnic groups and elect a leader problem is that every ethnic group does this 0 when people don t get what they want a second round of elites from each group are elected and are more radical than the rst won t back down o violence ensues 0 support for democracy can work but it takes a long sustained commitment and if it doesn t work can leave a state worse off than it was 4 1820 1 1 International Political Econom o What countries and governments ought to do and what they actually do are different o why politics 0 Economists 0 think that governments should only produce materials they produce most ef ciently o view the world in a sense that every state is unique and special and each state has a comparative advantage in something o positive sum game o argue that you don t have to take a portion of some one else s pie instead the pie as a whole gets bigger 0 Factor endowments the stuff we need to produce goods and services o land labor and capital o differ from country to country allows some countries to produce some goods more effectively than others o Land raw resources oil warm water ports 0 easier to obtain in some states than others o ex oil in Saudi Arabia easier to get than in Russia Russia s ground is frozen extra expenses o Saudi Arabia beef however is more expensive because its so hot tarp antibacterial bath 0 Labor make up of the people o are they educated healthy politically active well trained o norm in US you move to where the job is o in other places if you wake up without a job you re unemployed o cultural norms can change o ex maybe a law is changed that allows children to work 0 Capital stuff you use to make stuff 0 physical machinery o plow versus john deer equipment o technological differences o nancial how money is put to work in an economy o In US money is put into stock market money is put into ef cient businesses and not inef cient ones 0 other countries do it with large investment banks Production Possibility antiu m BP 1600 400 135 531600 300 200 chips Boring Professor BP 400 beer 150 chips Brilliant Student BS 150 beer 400 chips 11 ratio of beer to chips BP trades 200 beers 1600400 4006 pack costs us 4006 pack sell to BS for 4506 pack 450 X 200 900 BS trades 100 chips 1600400400bag costs us 400bag sell to BP for 450bag 450 x 100 450 END result BP 200 beer 100 chips 450 900 made 450 spent BS 200 beer 300 chips 4202011 0 governments ought to remove barriers to trade and establish a free market comparative advantage will ensue a will create wealth b will create complex interdependence which will lead to peace bum Pm m 1 am pm and just impon 33 14 41 22 1 pm 2nd Xe Izade Jam import Fuurreasunswedun39tduxt 1 stlucahve effectmushmpurtzntand 64mm th a are Spulmcaluppushun e us mcuuntxy e JubswuuldbelusLcumpamesshutduwn tfurpmtechun a cumpamesluuktutheguvanmm e eeenemes f ex OalmdgE O39egunplyvmudcumpzny NAFFAremmedtxadebzmers andnuWUS 1 gets Weed 39nm Canadabecanse us cheaper penple uf Oalmdgn ubless H m DPn mm huusmg industry x newcunsntuems ax faxmung Lhanew trade p e uhcy 11 sets up mule between me mslucatedmdustxy andthenewcunsutuents Z Pnsuner39s Dilemma a meenuve m defect and put up trade bzmas b uunmes mum pmte than u mdusmes and make uthers upen up hens e bestuutcume nnnd vxdual gate de 31 3 Nature ufeumparanve advantage 2 when the pnce ufa guud uctuates a cuuntrymxgqt chuuse sLa mhty uver ef ciency 3 4 dawn e creates mummy 4 Strateg Hutechun a dual usetenhnulugy a export a truck transmissions can be used in tanks b need to be careful who you send to b import a certain things you don t want to import as well submarines b trying to protect goods you View as important in the future 0 comparative advantage does not argue each country will be equally as rich argues that it will maximize each countries potential for wealth o not all comparative advantages are equal o market values Shaq more than Berej ikian o will be much less off in born in a poor country 4252011 0 3 Mechanisms states use to deal with protectionist measures 1 tariff tax on imported goods o purpose is NOT to create money for the government o primary purpose is to protect domestic producers o one of the simplest and oldest forms of protection o less predominant because you can t hide them 0 post WWII 0 pressure for protectionism because of recessions o demands to protect jobs 0 turned several countries from recession to depression 0 also gave rise to rulers like Mussolini who told people he d provide for them and thrived on this political instability o trade rounds getting together every 510 years and dealing with protectionismtrade barriers in pieces and not all at once o have lowered tariffs progressively since WWII o planned obsolesce building a good that will wear out so it will have to be replaced 0 great if there is no competition 0 ex Chevy Chevette 0 Japan came out with the Honda Civic which was much more reliable and had 30miles gal o caused American automobile industry to ask for quotas 2 Quota sets a limit on the number of imports o in ates the price of imported cars too because the good is kind of rare o makes US look bad because we advocate free trade 0 voluntary export restriction form of a quota larger country asks smaller country to limit exports to US pressure have to comply 3 NonTariff Barrier NTB to trade o things like using your own domestic laws to limit imports o environmental safety laws consumer product safety o ex French VCR s 0 french gov t wanted to protect electronic sector made it extremely hard for Japan to sell electronics kept sending product back saying it wasn t safe o takes forever to get it certi ed by then France has come out with new technology that made Japanese VCR s obsolete o way harder to regulate o WTO created in part to deal with NTB o dispute resolution mechanism o court processlegal proceeding where a panel of trade export judges sit and hear evidence o at end panel makes decision o ex Venezuela vs US o if Venezuela wins US has to comply to ruling and open up market if they don t Venezuela can impose economic sanctions would target neutrals 0 most favored nation state o rule that you have to treat every state as if it is your most favorite state in respect to trade o designed to reduce protectionism o crucial as to why US complies with WTO 42720 1 l 0 US as a hegemon 0 has more comparative advantages than anyone else o has greatest interest in free tra e o has to be the police force o Section 301 of trade act o required US to do a survey of all countries and see who was doing unfair trade o if they didn t open up markets US by law had to impose sanctions o abolished in 1995 0 US had more sanctions on countries than all the other countries combined o US gives incentives for opening up markets 0 ex US allowing a country Pacific Rim to slowly open their industry over a certain amount of time 1015 years while US opens theirs immediately o Paci c Rim countries can build up domestic industries and not have competition right away o carrots vs sticks leuering them in o With the WTO o US now has shared enforcement of the free trade system o costs of policing are now shared by the INTL community 0 US complies with the WTO because the net bene ts gt net costs 0 Globalization o global system that is more powerful than individual states o many people blame this for outcomes than may not be related o INTL institutions pass judgments on domestic affairs causing state policies to change o WTO took on tuna case US wanted other countries to use dolphin safe nets WTO said it was a NTB US had to have separate agreements without WTO o clash of global system and state sovereignty NAFTA o removes barriers between US Mexico and Canada o investments if you set up a factory in a country the country can t take it from you o ex Toxic Waste Dump in Mexico o American buys it and says he ll clean it up39 doesn t 0 Mexican gov t takes it from him 0 went to NAFTA and he s awarded millions from the Mexican gov t o Mexico still had to deal with dump o ex Chemical in CA that is contaminating women s breast milk o Canada sues because they produce the chemical and say US can t stop production
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