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by: Quentin Kiehn


Quentin Kiehn
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This 12 page Class Notes was uploaded by Quentin Kiehn on Saturday September 12, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to INTL 3200 at University of Georgia taught by Stinnett in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 11 views. For similar materials see /class/202126/intl-3200-university-of-georgia in International Affairs at University of Georgia.

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Date Created: 09/12/15
INT L 3200 F inal Stud Guide Alliances the institutions that help their members cooperate militarily in the event of war Institutions that enhance member s power by pooling military responsibilities Enhance deterrence in the case of defensive alliances Alliance agreements set the terms of military cooperation Specify the conditions for joining a war Allocate the military burden May establish peacetime military cooperation and training Why do states form alliances 3 motivations 1 Balance of poweria situation in which the military capabilities of two states or groups of states are roughly equal Causes of the balance of power Premiseithe most stable system is one in which no country has the upper hand Individua1 states will form alliances against the most powerful state or coalition Through the actions of individual states a balance will emerge in the international system Balancing Europe 18151914 Prior to 18157Europe was united against Napoleonic France 1815 1 8227conce1t of Europe Collective security system 18221854 loose concert Crimean war 18541870 rise of Germany 18701949 emergence oftight alliances Britain France and Russia Germany and Austria 2 Balance of threat Altemate version of the balance of power States seek security so they are concerned with threatening states not powerful ones The degree to which a state is threatening depends on power intentions and geography Prediction is that states will balance against the most aggressive state not necessarily the most powerful 3 Bandwagoning a strategy in which states join forces with the stronger side in a con ict Dealing with a threatening state by allying with it rather than against it This is risky since it depends on the goodwill of an aggressive expansionist state Why bandwagon with an aggressor If you are a small state If you re in close geographic proximity to the aggressor Gain a share of the conquest Nuclear Proliferation 3 reasons for proliferation 1 Security nuc1ear deterrence norms help sometimes 2 Domestic politics executive might want prestige popularity diversionary interest groupsibureaucratic parochialism military scientists industry norms national pride symbol of modernism technologically 3 Modernism Intemational prestige symbol of national status Terrorismithe use or threatened use of violence against noncombatant targets by individuals or nonstate groups for political ends de ning terrorism why do terrorists target civilians why do groups resort to terrorism why do terrorists resort to suicide bombings Pr0blems of defining terrorism Ditferentiating it from the actions of state militaries Armies often kill civilians Some governments try to install terror Ditferentiating it from the actions nonstate actors in civil wars Similar tactics Similar objectives coercion Terr0rism as coercion Limits on Coercion Different motivations for terrorist attacks what can be gained by the group Halmarks of terrorism Politically motivated violence by nonstate actor Usually in the context of a struggle between a nonstate actor and a government Primarily directed at civilians Aim is to in uence an audience through coercion Terr0rism and bargaining failure Terrorism can be seen as a bargaining tactic in a dispute over some issue The IRA vs the United Kingdom over northern Ireland Tamil tigersvs sir Lankan government over Tamil independence Hamas and Islamic jihad vs Israel over Palestine Terrorists resort to violence due to the inability to reach a compromise Thus terrorism can be seen as coercion attempt to extract concessions by harming civilians Other motives for terrorist attacks Provocation Provoke aggression by the target government against the home population thereby mobilizing moderates against the target government Spoiling Spoil a peace agreement between moderates and the target government Outbidding Gain support among home population Collective Security Collective security organizationibroadbased institutions that promote peace and security among their membersithe League of Nations and the UN What is collective security Collective response to aggression by all states Collective security organizations Concert of Europe718 l 51852 League of nationsil9l9l939 United nationsil946 to present Unlike alliances collective security organizations promote peace among their own members United Nations Article 1 The purposes of the UN are Maintain intl peace and security Take effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to the peace Suppression of acts of aggression or other beaches of the peace UN collective security operations The UN Security Council is responsible for identifying threats to world peace and authorizing force to combat those threats Historic cases of collective security operations The Korean Waril950l953 The Iraqi invasion to Kuwaitil990l99l Recent caseiUNSC authorization to use force to protect Libyan civilians Why are successful collective security operations so rare Contributions to collective security are subject to a collective action problem Institutional limitsiit s hard to get the permanent 5 members of the security council to agree esp during the cold war Pubic Goods Intemational security is often a PUBLIC GOOD Public goods are defined by two characteristics They are NONEXCLUDABLE Everyone can enjoy them even those who do not contribute Pure public goods are NONRIVAL Use by one actor does not exclude the good for another actor International security as public goods Humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping Civil con icts cause refugees and ethnic violence to spill across borders Efforts to end con ict one country benefits surrounding countries Responses to international terror groups Terror groups are often mobile so an effective response requires states to act collectively If terror groups target the country in which they reside fighting them is a PRIVATE GOOD If they target other countries fighting them is a PUBLIC GOOD because neighboring countries bene t Collective security and the collective action problem Collective action problemiobstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts in anticipation that others will pay the costs of cooperation A collective action problem often arises from collective security because Contributing to collective security operations is costly The benefits of collective security operations are nonexcludable These factors combine to create an incentive to freeride by individual countries Free ridingito fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting from the contributions of others Too much freeriding results in the under provision of the public good ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Hold states accountable Release information Give specific instructions Peacekeeping Halmarks of UN peacekeeping operations Get the consent of the belligerents Wait until the fighting has stopped and a ceasefire is in effect Stay neutralino troops from P5 countries Command by the secretary general Peacekeeping are lightly armed High profile peacekeeping failures Rwanda 199con ict between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups 800000 people killed including 75 of the tutsi population After 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed Western countries withdrew their peacekeepers Other failuresiBosnia Somalia Darfur The puzzle of UN peacekeeping Given the limitations of peacekeeping and the perceived failures what good is peacekeeping Successful peacekeeping operations receive less publicity than failures Peacekeepers helped EL Salvador recover from a 12 year civil war Othersicyprus isreal and Egypt Haiti Problems with ceasefires A cease re agreement has a big compliance problemithere is an incentive to cheat They can break down because of Deliberate aggression F ear that the other side is about to attack Accidents Accurate information about compliance with the agreement is critical Peacekeeping and ceasefires UN peacekeeping missions support ceasefires though observation and interposition Observation provides information about compliance preventing accidents from undermining the ceasefire Interposition changes the benefits of consciously breaking the ceasefire Peacekeeping are a tripwire They also help attract international attention to the con ict Does peacekeeping keep the peace Since 1936 the UN has undertaken 61 peacekeeping missions Research shows that ceasefires are 85 less likely to collapse if peacekeepers are present Final controversyiis this because peacekeeping works or because peacekeepers are deployed to easy situations Collective Action Problems and the Environment Envir0nment and public goods Public goodiindividually and socially desirable goods that are not excludable and nonrival in consumption EXtemalitiesicosts or benefits for stakeholders other than the actor undertaking an action When an eXtemality exists the decisionmaker does not bear all the costs or reap all the gains from his or her action Many types of global environmental protection are public goods Two characteristics of public goods Nonrivali one person s consumption does not diminish another s Nonexcluable Everyone can enjoy them even those who do not contribute Global public goods Air pollution Air is nonexcludable fit ows national borders Ozone layer Stops ultraviolet solar radiation Protection of the oceans The oceans are nonexcludable to any nation with a coastline Negative externalities public bads EXtemalityiconsequences of an action that are paid for by someone other than the actor taking the action Negative eXtemalityipollutants that damage global public goods Examples SOZ emissions acid rain C029global wa1ming CFCs9damage to the ozone layer Oil spills and oil pollutions from tankers Common pool resourcesigoods that are available to everyone such as open ocean sheries it is difficult to exclude anyone from using the common pool but one user s consumption reduces the amount available for others Questionihow are commonpool resources different from public goods They are NONEXCLUDABLE but RIVAL in consumption Tragedy of the commonsiover consumption of common pool resources Examples The commonsipublic pasture for grazing Results in degradation of the grass Fish stocks Overfishing will cause the collapse ofa species Rivers and other sources of freshwater that cross national borders Consumption by one state reduces the amount available to others The Collective Action Problem Reducing pollution and limiting the consumption of common pool resources are generally costly Combined with nonexcludability this creates an incentive to freeride on the effort of other states Similar situations The prisoner s dilemma and collective security Factors affecting the severity of collective action problems Group size Small number of actors make coordination easier Time frame shadow of the future The more current or visible the problem is the greater the political motivation to act Solutions Issuelinkageilink r quot on the 39 to r quot on 39 issues Economic sanctions or economic rewards Privileged groupleadershiphegemony Lead state or group pays a larger share of costs and takes charge of enforcement Domestic Politics and the Environment Interest groups and preferences Poitical organizing as a collective action problem Role of the future and time horizons Hierarchy of needsimore industrial bare most of the costs because they are responsible International Law Sources of intl lawitreaties and conventions Binding on signatory states only with a few exceptions Treated as the highest law of the land in signatory countries once they are ratified Treaties are binding on successor governments and successor states Second source custom For conduct to be a customary law it has to be A repreated practice over a long period of time By a majority of states Without major inconsistencies Customary law is binding on all states Sta1ting in the 20Lh century many customary obligations were codified in formal conventions When a custom is written into a treaty that custom is binding on states that aren t parties Examples of customary law Law governing the oceans and navigation Diplomatic immunity The laws of war Jus ad bellumiwhen it is permitted to go to war Jus in belloihow war is to be conducted Other sources of international law General legal principles Exiself0defense prohibition of murder prohibition of slavery and piracy Preemptory norm ius cogens fundamental norm that cant be overturned by a treaty Judicial decisions Can guide interpretation of law when its unclear Scholarly opinion Institutions that adjudicate international law Domestic courts Interlational courts of justice Specialized organizational courts EUieurpoean court of justice WT07dispute settlement mechanism Intemational criminal tribunals Nuremburg ICTY and ICTR Compliance with international law There is no international court system to enforce it It must be selfenforced by states It is often violation with impunity Realityimost states obey international law most 0 the time We only pay attention to rare high profile violations war genocide ethnic cleansing Enforcement of international law is rare because violations are rare Even if enforcement is imperfect law still matters Why obey international law To maintain an orderly system What does this mean hintiwe ve already talked a lot about this motive Positive reciprocity States benefit When other states obey international law Comply in order to maintain the legitimacy or a treaty or custom Sanctions States can punish other states for violating IL negative reciprocity Two categories of sanctions Retorsionilawful acts that punish violations of IL Exampleidenial of foreign aid Reprisalsiacts against a violator that are normally illegal but are made legal due to the proginal violation of law Exampleitrade sanctions for violating WTO obligations Problem with sanctionsicollective action Other motives Reputation States want to keep a reputation for being reliable Habit Observation becomes routine for a govemmentbureaucracy Domestic politics Domestic interest groups push governments to uphold international obligations Customary laws of warithe just war doctrine Origins in ancient Greek and Roman tradition Developed by Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages the peace of God Systematically written down by Hugo Grotius in the l7Lh century Jus ad bellum laws of war When and how war is to be started When it is permitted In selfdefense or To assist other states in selfdefense but ghting an aggressor and Only as a last resort War is to be declared PUBLICLY by a LIGITIMATE AUTHORITY Jus ad Bello laws in war laws in war ihow war should be conducted discriminationinoncombatants are to be protected proportionalityiforce should only be a strong as need to win and should end once the war aims have been achieved Jus in hello treaties geveva conventions 18647treatment of battle eld causalities l9067eXtended the principles from the rst convention to apply also to war at sea l9297treatment of prisoners of war l9497treatment of civilians during wartime International Criminal Court What crimes does the ICC prosecute Genocide Crimes against humanity War crime Under what conditions does the ICC depend on Is it good for other countries for us to join the ICC What is Kissenger s views It would be used as a political weapon Roths objections Wedgewood concerns for the ICC we need military force Globalization Increasing interconnection of national economies with each other economic interdepen dence Loosening of national barriers to access of three primary markets 7 The product market international trade The capital market intemational investment The labor market international migration Other Critical Meanings of Globalization that we are not focusing on The spread of capitalism Corporate Globalization The spread of global threats to ecology and health climate change and disease Trade and Trade Policy Trade policy pr0trecti0nism the imposition of barriers to restrict imports Commonly used protectionists devices includeitariffs quantitative restrictions quotas and other nontariff barriers free trade trade barrier any government limitation on the international exchange of goods Tariffs quantatice restrictions quotas import licenses requirements that governments buy only domestically produced goods and health and safety standards that discriminate against foreign goods A state s trade policy can alternate along a spectrum of being open to imports free trade to being closed protection Tariffs taxes set at the border Nontariff barriers health environment and safetesy regulations 7 Quantitative restrictions 7 Subsidies they help domestic rms at the expense of foreign rms and taxpayers Age of Colonialism 1492 1815 Period of European colonial expansion The world gets smaller Circumnavigation of the globe 7 European colonialism Period of mercantilist economic policy Pax Britannia 1815 1913 Period of rapid expansion of international trade especially 18701913 Britain was a leading state at the time this was the height of the British Empire Britain was also an advocate of free trade policies Trade was supported by a system of intemational nance based on a gold standard Transportation became very cheap due to steam ships and railroads Inter War Years 1914 1945 The globalization of the 19th century is undone by World War I The world economy takes a second hit from the Great Depression Countries tried to boost domestic employment during the depression by protecting their own economies BeggarthyNeighbor Third hit World War II Bretton Woods Era 1945 1991 Postwar international economic system was designed at the 1944 allied conference in Bretton Woods NH Three institutions 7 IBRDWorld Bank Reconstruction and development IMF Stable international nance 7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT International Trade Current Age 1991 Present Collapse of communist regimes 19891991 bring the former communist states into the Bretton Woods system In 1995 the GATT is replaced by the World Trade Organization Technological developments promote further integration particularly electronic communications Number of regional trade organizations grows Trade Interests The Ricardian Theory of Comparative Advantage Basics of comparative advantage Each state should specialize in what it does best and trade for what it does not produce What a country does best is the industry in which it has a COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE A state has a comparative advantage in an industry if it is better at producing that product than other products The comparison in comparative advantage is BETWEEN IDUSTRIES not between countries The model 2 countries A and B 2 goods shoes and computers 1 input into production labor country A has an ABSOLUTE ADANTAGE in both products Country B has a COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE in shoes Country A has an COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE in computers ProductiVity of Laborinumber of goods one worker produces in a day computers Shoes Country 2 40 a Country 1 30 b Comparative advantage in the model CA can be illustrated using the price computers in terms of shoes Number of shoes it takes to buy one computer A 40 220 Computer costs buys 20 shoes B 30 130 Computer costs buys 30 shoes Starting pointiAutarky Autarkyino trade Each country can only consume what it makes Each country has 100 units of labor to allocate between industries computers shoes Country a 50 workers 50 workers 2100 402000 Country b 50 workers 50 workers l50 301500 World 150 computers 3500 shoes production Production under free trade The shoe industry in country A declines due to competition with shoes imported from country b 30 workers shift to the computer sector The country b the computer sector collapses 50 workers move to the shoe industry computers shoes Country a 80 2160 20 40800 Country b 010 100303000 World 160 computers 3800 shoes production SurplusilO Surplus7300 shoes Consumption under free trade state a can export 60 computers in exchange for 1500 shoes from state b these exports are at a price of 25 shoes per computer 150060 which is a better exchange for both countries than they were getting under autarky in state a under autarky selling a computer got you 20 shoes in state b under autarky buying a computer costs 30 shoes Summary of the Ricardian theory the effect of free trade on a country s wealth is always a net positive gains come in the form of lower process and access to a wider variety of goods the bene ts of trade come from IMPORTS the distribution of the gains from trade is uneven the bene ts are spread out among consumers the costs are highly concentrated in industries that have a comparative disadvantage intemational trade is about competitiveness between rms not between countries modi cations to ricardian theoryiheckscherphlin RT only considers one factor of production LABOR but there are others Capital Landiagricultural land Human capitaliskilled labor Industries use these factors in different proportions Countries will have a comparative advantage based on their relative endowments of factors Trade Interests nmes l quot and Puzzle lilf the economic consequences of free trade are a net positive why do we ever see trade protection Answeripolitics of course More speci cally interestgroup politics Interest groups that favor trade barriers protectionists often have advantages organizing and lobbing compared to the general public Basis of trade interest groups Sometimes preferences for trade policy are determined by social class labor capital and land When factors can be moved between industries HO amp SS models Sometimes interest groups are based on speci c industriesithose with a comparative advantage versus those without When factors of production are xed to speci c industries RicardoViner model Examples oftrade ghts based on class l939h century germanyiiron and rye late 19th century USithe progressive coalition and The Wizard of Oz Britain in the midl9Lh centuryithe repeal of the corn laws Trade and interests groupsiricardian model Interest groups in the Ricardoviner model are based around speci c industries Industries with a comparative disadvantage oppose trade openness because they must compete with inports Industries with a comparative advantage would favor openness in order to export their products to other countries Domestic interactionsilobbying for trade policy as a collective action problem Political organization in support of trade protection like any lobbying effort is costly It takes time and money There is a temptation among interest groups to freeride or not join the lobbying effort Political in uence will go to those groups that can best overcome this problem of freeriding Advantages of protectionist industries in lobbying Those harmed by trade liberalization have very strong preferences giving them a stronger motivation to organize Small number compared to the general public make collective organization easier Industries that are harmed tend to be geographically concentrated making coordinated action easier to achieve Domestic interactions and protectionilogrolling 44 A Protectionists have an advantage over free traders in lobbying for protectionist trade policy Legislators representing many different protectionist industries can form legislative bargains logrolls to produce high tariffs Exampleithe US smoothhawley tariff of 1930 Puzzle Zihow is it possible that trade liberalization is ever enacted given the political advantages of protectionists Compensation of those harmed by free trade Domestic political institutions that represent broader constituencies Intemational agreements Trade and domestic institutions Trade liberalization has stronger support from politicians that represent broader segments of a population Why Because the benefits of international trade tend to be spread out Example Democratic states tend to be more open to trade than nondemocracies Us president tends to favor trade liberalization more than congress Unilateral tariffs vs international agreements States can make trade policy through several different mechanisms Domestic lawsismoothawley tariff Intemational agreementsiNAFTA EECEU When tariff cuts are made through international agreements they tend to be supported by a broader set of interest groups Interest groups and trade agreements Protectionists favor higher tariffs and OPPOSE free trade agreements What type of industries would favor low tariffs and SUPPORT trade agreements Importersieconomic sectors that consume imports will favor lower tariffs Exportersiexport oriented firms that have a comparative advantage don39t care about domestic tariffs but they want to lower foreign tariffs Agreements and reciprocity Trade agreements formalize the process of reciprocity in trade policyitariffs in one state are reduced in response to reductions in another Examples RTAA71934 EEC71960 NAFTA71994 Trade agreements and domestic interactions When tariffs are set through domestic laws the fight is between protectionists and importers A trade agreement will receive the support of both importers and exporters Together the political efforts of importers and exporters can counteract the efforts of protectionists Trade Interactions and Institutions functions of intl trade agreements they expand the domestic political coalition supporting free trade by giving exporters a stake in the process they formalize reciprocity by exchanging tariff cuts between the signatories general agreement on tariffs and trade GATT multinational trade agreement founded in 1947 as part of the Bretton Woods System it has been repeatedly revised and updated in a series of negotiations known as rounds most recent roundiUruguay 1994 Failed roundiseattle 1999 Current roundiDoha 2001 Membership also grows over time Currently 153 parties member countries Principles of GATT Reciprocal trade liberalization Gradual move to freer trade through reciprocal cuts in barriers Sets maximum tariffs Nondiscromination of members Most favored nationitreat all members the same National treatmentitreat all products the same Stabilityitransparent rules based trade Permitted exceptions to the nondiscrimination principle Regional trade integration NAFTA EU Banning imports of unsafe products Administrative protectionitemporary protection in certain circumstances Safeguardsitemporary protection to deal with unexpectedsurge of imports Antidumping measuresipunishment of dumping exports sold at a loss predatory pricing Problems with the GATT During the Uruguay Round talks it became clear that there were some problems with the GATT structure Large membership made negotiations hard to manage GATT had very weak procedures for resolving trade disputes and addressing violations Trade disputes Even when trade between two states is covered by an agreement there is still the problem of cheating on that agreement Cheating occurs when states raise protectionist measures against each other Examples beggar thy neighbor policies during the 1930s Japanese auto exports to the US in the 1980s US tariffs on steel 2002 Domestic interests and trade disputes The political incentives behind these disputes resemble the prisoner s dilemma Why Because of the in uence of domestic interest groups Importers want lower domestic tariffs Protectionists want higher domestic tariffs Exporters want lower forgeign tariffs Cheating on a trade agreement will allow a government to make two of these three groups happy Addressing interests and trade disputesiintemational institutions Intemational trade institutions can help minimize trade disputes by Formalizing reciprocity Clarifying standards of behavior Which trade measures are legitimate exceptions and which are cheating Facilitating negotiated settlement of disputes Verifying compliance Streamlinging the punishment of defectors The World Trade Organization Created in 1994 by the Uruguay Round Formal international organization that oversees the GATT Two primary functions It is a negotiating forum for the creating of international trade law It provides a legal process for the adjudication and resolution of disputes over GATT law


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