INTERNATNL RELATIONS INR 2002
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This 4 page Class Notes was uploaded by Barney Schaden on Thursday September 17, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to INR 2002 at Florida State University taught by Mark Souva in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 22 views. For similar materials see /class/205408/inr-2002-florida-state-university in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 09/17/15
Ch2 Outline 0 v Interests What do actors want from Politics gt Interests what actors want to achieve through political action their preference over the outcomes that might result from their political choices I More specifically are the preferences of actors over the possible outcomes that might result from their political choices 0 Group interests at the individual and collective level are thrown into three categories O Power or security political actors are expected to require a degree of personal or collective security O Economic or material warfare political actors are assumed to desire a higher standard of living or quality of life O Ideological goals political actors may also desire moral religious or other goals including democracy gt Actors and Interests I Examples of states United states and Iraq I Examples of governments the Bush administration and the Hussein regime I Examples of group Shiite and Sunni religious groups in Iraq I Examples of International Organizations United Nation Security Council I Examples of Bureaucracies Department of Defense I Nongovernmental Organizations Red Cross I Actors The basic unit for the analysis of international politics I State A central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws rules and decisions within a specified territory I Sovereignty The expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their territorial boundaries I National Interests nterests attributed to the state itself usually security and power 0 Motivated by more specifically internal and external threats gt Interactions Why can t an Actor Always get what it wants I Interactions the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes 0 Refers to the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes I Actors make choices to further their interests I Strategic Interactions each actors strategy or plan of action depends on the anticipated strategy of others I Two assumptions in studying interactions 0 We assume that actors are purposive that they behave with the intention of producing a desired result 0 We assumes that actors adopt strategies to obtain desired outcomes given what they believe to be the interests and likely actions of others I Game theory used to study strategic interactions gt Cooperation and Bargaining Ch2 Outline I Cooperation an interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that makes at least one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off Both get some mutual gain I Bargaining An interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another One is better off than the other 0 Sometimes bargaining is sometimes called a ZERO SUM game because the gains for one side perfectly match the losses of the other Cooperation and Bargaining can fail for many reasons just because the benefits of certain actions might not be worth it War might be the best option gt When can actors cooperate I There are situations when the actors interests can cause them to DEFECT that is to adopt an uncooperative strategy that undermines the collective goal I Coordination A type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive to comply Collaboration A type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have incentives to not comply with any agreement I Public goods individually and socially desirable goods that are nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption such as national defense 0 Defined by two qualities Q If the good is provided to one person others cannot be excluded from enjoying it as well Q If one person coOnsumes or benefits from the public good this does not diminish the quantity available to others I Collective Action Problems Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts in anticipation that other will pay the cost of cooperation I Free ride to fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting from contributions of others 0 Numbers and Relative Sizes of Actors Q It is easier for smaller numbers to cooperate rather than larger 0 Iteration Linkage and Strategies of Reciprocal Punishment O Cooperation is more likely to occur when actors have opportunities to cooperate over times and across issues O Iteration Repeated interaction with the same partners O Linkage The linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue 0 Information O The availability of information affects the likelihood of cooperation Lack of information about the actions taken by another party cooperation may fail due to uncertainty and misperception gt Who wins and who loses in Bargaining o 00 Ch2 Outline I Power the ability of Actor A to get Actor B to do something that B would otherwise not do The ability to get the other side to make concessions and to avoid having to makes concessions oneself I Reversion outcomes the outcomes that occurs when no bargain is reached is often called this I In short bargaining power belongs top those actors most satisfied with or most willing to endure the reversion outcomes 0 Coercion The threat or imposition of costs on other actors in order to change their behavior Q Is the most obvious strategy for exercising power O The second is military sanctions 0 Outside Options the alternatives to bargaining with specific actors O The actor with the better outside option can use it leverage the threat to leave negotiations gt They have to have a credible exit strategy 0 Agenda Setting Power A first mover advantage that helps an actor to secure a more favorable bargain O Involves actions taken prior to or during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one party I In sum bother interests and interactions matter in politics Institutions Do rules matter in world politics gt V V Institutions sets of rules known and shared by the community that structure political interactions in specific ways I Examples of institutions United Nations IMF the World Trade Organization Institutions vary in their goals and rules but they generally serve to facilitate cooperation among their members How Do Institutions Affect Cooperation I Anarchy The absence of a central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws that bind all actors I The best way institutions force cooperation is through enforcement or the imposing of punishments on actors who fail to cooperate o Institutions on the international level generally lack the capacity to impose punishment on states I International institutions facilitate cooperation by making self enforcement easier through four methods 0 Setting Standards for Behavior O Clear Standards of Behavior reduce ambiguity and enhance cooperation Allows other to determine or not an actors is violating an agreement They still do not stop all disputes o Verifying Compliance Ch2 Outline O Institutions can judge compliance often providing ways to acquire information on compliance O Institutions protect the ability of countries to verify compliance independently Reducing the costs of Joint Decision Making O Institutions make it easier to make decisions collectively Example United Nations Resolving Disputes O Also facilitate cooperation by providing mechanism or resolving disputes I In sum institutions facilitates international cooperation in important ways gt Whom do Institutions Benefit I They makes states cooperate and therefore make all their member andor citizens better off gt Why Follow the Rules I If they have incentives to defect from rules and ignore institution only whenever they do not serve their interested I Actors comply for two reason Since many problems in international relations combine both cooperation and bargaining actors may agree to comply with rules for the cooperation they facilitate even though the outcome of those rules is biased against them Actors comply with institutions because they are already in place and cheaper to use even if they are biased than are the costs of creating bran new institution that might more fully reflect their interests The benefits of an established forum and set of rules for joint decision making are substantial Institutions are rules of the political game When the temptation to defect becomes too large or the fear of being taken advantage of grows too severe countries will violate the rules just as people in countries sometimes choose to violate the laws