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PSC 1003 Intro to International Affairs Week 3 Notes

by: Caroline Jok

PSC 1003 Intro to International Affairs Week 3 Notes PSC 1003

Marketplace > George Washington University > Political Science > PSC 1003 > PSC 1003 Intro to International Affairs Week 3 Notes
Caroline Jok
GPA 3.8
Introduction to International Politics
Farrell, H

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Prof. Henry Farrell GWU PSC 1003 Intro to International Affairs Week 3 Notes Realism Security Dilemma
Introduction to International Politics
Farrell, H
Class Notes
Realism, notes, Security, Security Dilemma, political science, Affairs, IR, International, Introduction, week 3
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This 5 page Class Notes was uploaded by Caroline Jok on Friday September 18, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PSC 1003 at George Washington University taught by Farrell, H in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 91 views. For similar materials see Introduction to International Politics in Political Science at George Washington University.

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Date Created: 09/18/15
15 September 2015 Intro to International Affairs This week s topic Realism Offense Defense Balance Combos Distinguishable and which side has the advantage Defense amp Offense are not distinguishable Advantage Offense Arms races are intense expansion is easy war is frequent EX china w submarines Advantage Defense Arms races are mild expansion is dif cult war is infrequent low motivation to behave aggressively Defense amp offense are distinguishable Advantage Offense Qualitative arms control is feasible and valuable but risky Signaling is feasible and valuable but risky Offensive behavior has many advantages but is risky Advantage Defense Qualitative arms control feasible but less valuable because security is high signaling is feasible but less valuable Who has the advantage In a world where it is easy to attack others offense has advantage it is a much less secure world In a world where defense has the advantage expect a much calmer world The WORST state of the world Offense and Defense are not distinguishable and offense has the advantage There is a lot of motivation for opportunistic attacks and you don t know whether your neighbor is behaving offensively or defensively War is relatively frequent and common The BEST state of the world Offense amp defense can be distinguished from amp defense has the advantage Taken for granted that people are peaceful and want to use treaties and negotiations even without treaties states see no advantage in an offensive behavior Game of thrones time Lots and lots of castles these castles have a profound defensive advantage world where defense has the advantage Not a lot of offensive purposes to castles Cannon Offensive advantage and the attack becomes more valuable than the defense Negative Consequences of the security dilemma Often when OffenseDefense are not distinguishable Higher incentives to engage in preemptive war if you think that your neighbor has bad intentions may want to stop him or her before it is too late gt Do you attack before your neighbor before they get too strong May sometimes be a good idea May also provoke mistakes gt Maybe they had no negative intentions security dilemma may make it more likely that wars happen more or less by accident Theory ofpropensity to war May also make peace less likely Disagree about how prevalent the security dilemma is Defensive realist believe that this is crucial to understand the world Other realist argue for an existential version of the security dilemma that there will always be security dilemma situations because all countries are paranoid Argument Stance Nuclear weapons are a defensive rather than an offensive technology gt Nuclear weapons devalue real estate Using them offensively would not be in anyone s best interest and thus are not in anyone s best interest gt No one will deploy them unless they are under attackthe existence of country is under threat gt Thus Defensive advantage currently N 0 one wants to attack because of Nuclear weapons and MAD gt This is true only as long as there are no real capabilities to surmount a sneak attack utilizing Nuclear weapons thus we have the nuclear peace time period gt Surprise Nuclear attack would only works as long as your adversary doesn t have second strike capability gt US and russia have removed Nuclear weapons defense so that they are both mutually vulnerable Bargaining account of war War is based from Incentive and miscommunication OR New argument War Starts from basic preassumption that war is politics by other means Clausewitz One starts a war because one wants to get something out of it Territory change in policy reparations Others will defend against war if they think that the benefits outweigh the costs Doesn t mean that they necessarily think that they will wind Thus war becomes a type of bargaining what are the Opportunity Costs What is the Marginal Gain Interesting Implications War should only happen if fully rationally it shouldn t a a peaceful solution is impossible b someone is making a mistake i war is costly ii it would be cheaper to reach an agreement without war iii Athenian argument to Melians 1V So when might we expect a war to occur Where actors will systematically make mistakes States may want to let other know how powerful their armed forces are to deter other from attacking But some military assets depend on other side not knowing about their existence cybersecurity This and other kinds of information gaps may lead to war War is here in part a process of nding out how strong the other side is Where you can t reach a bargain Ofet reaching a bargain requires divisibility I want x you want y and we can reach a bargain somewhere in between But sometimes states or other actors may ght over things that are indiVisible status of the city of Jerusalem in the ght between Israel and Palestinians Hard to gure out rational bargains without completely changing states of game Hence war is more likely Where you can t trust the other party Sometimes actors cannot make deals that will stick if I am going to become much more powerful it may be hard for you to trust me when I am powerful enough I can simply tear up the deal Hence you may be better off damaging me before I get too powerful A little bit like preemptive strikes in the security dilemma 17 September 2015 Intro to International Affairs This week s topic Realism Continuation from last 15092015 Ukraine and the Security Dilemma How does security dilemma affect Ukraine Explains part of Russia s motivation NATORussia standoff In Cold War Russia USSR had a clear zone of in uence 12 other buffer states as did US Western Europe the two jockeyed with each other for power One possible explanation of current situation rooted in security dilemma Ukraine becoming Westernized would have made Russia less secure perhaps NATO expansion Hence Russia decides to do everything it can to stop this from happening FLIP SIDE could be damaging Russia they took a gamble in Ukraine and have made themselves less secure and other states trust them less Mistakes but over intentions not military power Indivisibility hard to create a truly autonomous Ukraine belonging neither to the West nor the East Should we support Ukraine being a genuinely neutral state Lack of Trustworthiness Each time Russia destabilizes the Ukraine it destabilizes Ukrainian politics gt it makes it easier for Russia to make further territorial gains Hence hard for both sides to reach any lasting agreement Russia may be structurally hard to trust Realism Older tradition goes back to Thucydides Hobbes Machiavelli Only interested in the Great powers But modern version starts with Kenneth Waltz Tries to construct a scienti c theory of international politics modeled off of economics Starts from assumption that international structure war key to theory States Create a system that traps them It is an analogy to market place Laws of supplydemand replaced by tendencies towards distrust and selfreliance Key assumptions states are rational care rst and foremost about survival nd themselves in a situation of anarchy The system constrains their choices Implications of Realism I States rely on Self Help states cannot rely on others for their security problems of interdependence again no world government to bail them out Hence will turn to self help where possible to guarantee their own survival reliance on own resources no specialization Implications of Realism 11 m explains everything In an anarchic world power explains nearly everything power military resources States military power explains most outcomes see Athens position in Melian Dialogue Great powers are the crucial actors others do as they must Implications of Realism 111 m States are Key actors in world politics Noone else has substantial military resources until now ISIL Things that happen beneath the level of the state are unimportant for any true theory of international politics Leaders wishes don t really matter Ghandi s decisions would be the same as obama s etc they have little to no choice Leaders choices are fundamentally made for the situation of their country and the situation they nd themselves in All states behave in the same way Type of state doesn t matter ie Democracy dictatorship etc Realism and Motivations Different avors of realism disagree about states motivations All states want to survive but Waltzian Realism In a dangerous world states just want to defend themselves You can t trust others intentions starts from Waltz What we have been discussing Sees fundamental problem as distrust Impossible to be sure about other states true intentions Says that states will care about relative gains not absolute gains Something very different from standard economics But some stability to the system through balancing Do not like win win deals where others do well because states are worried about relative gains being used against them O ensive realism in a dangerous world states want to achieve hegemony cynical TO BE CONTINUED Motivational Realism In a world where some states are dangerous


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