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Psychological Bulletin 2003 Vol 129 No 1 747118 Copyright 2003 by the Amencan Psychological Association Inc 00337290903s12 00 D01 10 10370033729091291 74 Cues to Deception Bella M DePaulo University of Virginia Brian E Malone University of Virginia James J Lindsay University of MissouriiColumbia Laura Muhlenbruck Kelly Charlton and University of MissouriiColumbia Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth The combined results of 1338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported Results show that in some ways liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers and they tell less compelling tales They also make a more negative impression and are more tense Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents However many behaviors showed no discernible links or only weak links to deceit Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions Do people behave in discerniny different ways when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth Practitioners and laypersons have been interested in this question for centuries Trovillo 1939 The scienti c search for behavioral cues to deception is also longstanding and has become especially vigorous in the past few decades In 1981 Zuckerman DePaulo and Rosenthal published the rst comprehensive metaanalysis of cues to deception Their search for all reports of the degree to which verbal and nonverbal cues occurred differentially during deceptive communications com pared with truthful ones produced 159 estimates of 19 behavioral cues to deception These estimates were from 36 independent samples Several subsequent reviews updated the Zuckerman et al 1981 metaanalysis B M DePaulo Stone amp Lassiter 1985a Bella M DePaulo and Brian E Malone Department of Psychology University of Virginia James J Lindsay Laura Muhlenbruck Kelly Charl ton and Harris Cooper Department of Psychology University ofMissou riiColumbia Bella M DePaulo is now a visiting professor at the Department of Psychology University of California Santa ara James J Lindsay is now at the Department of Psychology University of Minnesota Twin Cities Campus Kelly Charlton is now at the Department of Psychology University of North Carolina at Pembroke This article was reviewed and accepted under the editorial term of Nancy Eisenberg We thank Barry Schlenker for providing many insightful suggestions and Charlie Bond Tim Levine and Aldert Vrij for answering countless questions about their data and ideas Many others also responded to our inquiries about theoretical or empirical issues including Jack Brigham Mark deTurck Paul Ekrnan Tom Feeley Klaus Fiedler Howard Friedman Mark Frank Dacher Keltner Randy Koper Bob Krauss Steve McComack Maureen O Sullivan Ron Riggio Jonathon Schooler and June Tan ney Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bella M DePaulo Box 87 Summerland California 93067 Email depaulopsychucsbedu Zuckerman DePaulo amp Rosenthal 198639 Zuckerman amp Driver 1985 but the number of additional estimates was small Other reviews have been more comprehensive but not quantitative see Vrij 2000 for the most recent of these In the present review we summarize quantitatively the results of more than 1300 estimates of 158 cues to deception These estimates are from 120 indepen dent samples We de ne deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead others Falsehoods communicated by people who are mistaken or self deceived are not lies but literal truths designed to mislead are lies Although some scholars draw a distinction between deceiving and lying eg Bok 1978 we use the terms interchangeably As Zuckerman et al 1981 did in their review we limit our analysis to behaviors that can be discerned by human perceivers without the aid of any special equipment We also limit our review to studies of adults as the dynamics of deceiving may be markedly different in children eg Feldman DevinSheehan amp Allen 197839 Lewis Stanger amp Sullivan 198939 Shennum amp Bugental 1982 Predicting Cues to Deception Previous Approaches Ekman and Friesen 1969 In 1969 Ekrnan and Friesen published the rst in uential the oretical statement about cues to deception They described two broad categories of cues leakage cues and deception cues Leak age cues reveal what the liars are trying to hideitypically how they really feel Anticipating the selfpresentational perspective that would become important later Ekrnan and Friesen 1969 noted that the operation of display rules ie culturally and so cially determined norms for managing facial expressions of emo tions can result in leakage cues For example when deceivers try to squelch the facial expression of an emotion they are trying to conceal the resulting expressionia micro affect displayimay be briefer than it is ordinarily but the nature of the affect may still be identi able If instead the facial expression is so brief that the CUES TO DECEPTION 75 emotion cannot be discerned then the resulting micro affect dis play functions as a deception cue Deception cues indicate that deception may be occurring without indicating the nature of the information that is being concealed Almost all of the cues that have been reported in the literature are deception cues kman and Friesen 1969 described various conditions under which liars would be especially likely to succeed in their deception attempts eg perhaps by evidencing fewer or less obvious cues Their formulation was based on the psychology of both the liars and the targets of lies as they relate to each other For example they predicted that success is more likely when the salience of deception is asymmetrical such that the liars are focused on getting away with their lies while the issue of deception is not salient to the targets or that the liars are focusing primarily on deceiving while the targets are simultaneously trying to deceive and detect deceit Zuckerman et al 1981 Zuckerman et al 1981 began their formulation with the widely accepted premise that no one behavior or set of behaviors would ever be found that always occurs when people are lying and never occurs any other time Instead the argued the search should be for the kinds of thoughts feelings or psychological processes that are likely to occur more or less often when people are lying compared with when they are telling the truth and for the behav ioral cues that may be indicative of those states They then delin eated four factors that could be used to predict cues to deception generalized arousal the speci c affects experienced during decep tion cognitive aspects of deception and attempts to control be havior so as to maintain the deception A rousal Citing the research and theory available at the time on the psychophysiological detection of deception Zuckerman et al 1981 proposed that liars may experience greater undifferentiated arousal than truth tellers That arousal could be evidenced by liars greater pupil dilation increased blinking more frequent speech disturbances and higher pitch However Zuckerman et al 1981 also acknowledged that autonomic responses that seem character istic of deception may be explained by the speci c affects expe rienced while lying without invoking the notion of diffuse arousal Feelings While Lying To the extent that liars experience guilt about lying or fear of getting caught lying behaviors indicative of guilt and fear are shown more o en by liars than truth tellers Zuckerman et al 1981 suggested that liars might dget more than truth tellers and they may also sound more unpleasant They also suggested that guilt and anxiety could become apparent in liars distancing of themselves from their deceptive communications Drawing from Wiener and Mehrabian s 196839 see also Mehrabian 1972 ac count of the verbal and nonverbal cues indicative of distancing which they called nonimmediacy Zuckerman et al 1981 pre dicted that liars would communicate in more evasive and indirect ways than truth tellers and that they would maintain less eye contact with their interaction partners Cognitive Aspects of Deception Zuckerman et al 1981 conceptualized lying as a more cogni tively complex task than telling the truth Liars they claimed need to formulate communications that are intemally consistent and consistent with what others already know The greater cognitive challenges involved in lying relative to truth telling were pre dicted to result in longer response latencies more speech hesita tions greater pupil dilation and fewer illustrators hand move ments that accompany and illustrate speech Attempted Control of Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviors Liars attempts to control their behaviors so as to maintain their deception can paradoxically result in cues that instead betray it For example liars behaviors may seem less spontaneous than truth tellers Also liars inability to control all aspects of their behavior equally effectively could result in verbal and nonverbal discrepancies Ekman 19851992 Ekman 19851992 described two major categories of cues 39nking cues and feeling cues Liars who prepare their deceptions inadequately or who cannot keep their stories straight produce inconsistencies that betray their deceits Those who overprepare produce stories that seem rehearsed 1f liars need to think carefully about their lies as they tell them they may speak more slowly than truth tellers These are all thinking cues Ekman s 1985 1992 more important contribution however was his conceptualization of the role of emotions in deceiving By understanding the emotions that liars are experiencing Ekman argued it is possible to predict behaviors that 39stinguish liars from truth tellers For example the cues indicative of detection appre hension are fear cues These include higher pitch faster and louder speech pauses speech errors and indirect speech The greater the liars detection apprehension the more evident these fear cues should be For example liars should appear more fearful as the stakes become higher and the anticipated probability of success becomes lower Similarly liars who feel guiltier about their lies such as those w o are lying to people who trust them should show more behavioral indicators of guilt Ekman 1985 1992 noted that guilt cues have not been clearly determined but they could include cues to sadness such as lower pitch softer and slower speech and downward gazing Liars feelings about lying are not necessarily negative ones Ekman 19851992 suggested that liars sometimes experience duping delight which could include excitement about the chal lenge of lying or pride in succeeding at the lie This delight could become evident in cues to excitement such as higher pitch faster and louder speech and more use of illustrators The duping delight hypothesis has not yet been tested Ekman 1985 1992 pointed out that emotions become signi cant not only when liars feel apprehensive guilty or excited about their lies but also when liars are experiencing emotions that they are trying to hide or when they are faking emotions that they are not really experiencing The particular cues that signal lying de pend on the particular emotions that the liars are experiencing and 76 DEPAULO ET AL simulating For example people who are only pretending to be enjoying a lm would show fewer genuine enjoyment smiles and more feigned smiles than people who really are enjoying a lm These differences in smiling would not be predicted if the feelings that people really were experiencing or just pretending to experi ence were for example feelings of pain instead of enjoyment From this perspective cues to emotions that liars are trying to hide or to simulate cannot be combined across all studies in the liter ature Instead the relevant subset of studies must be selected eg only those in which liars are hiding or simulating enjoyment This is also a perspective that eschews the notion of undifferentiated arousal and instead argues for the study of speci c emotions Ekman Levenson amp Friesen 198339 Levenson Ekman amp Friesen 1990 Buller and Burgoon 1996 From a communications perspective Buller and Burgoon 1996 argued that to predict the behavior of deceivers it is important to consider not just individual psychological variables such as moti vations and emotions but also interpersonal communicative pro cesses Reiterating Ekman and Friesen s 1969 point about the importance of multiple roles Buller and Burgoon noted that when people are trying to deceive they are engaged in several tasks simultaneously They are attempting to convey their deceptive message and at the same time they are continually monitoring the target of their deception for signs of suspiciousness and then adapting their behavior accordingly Although these multiple de mands can prove challenging at rst compromising effectiveness at maintaining credibility these dif culties should typically dis sipate over time as participants acquire more feedback attempt further repairs and gain greater control over their performance Buller amp Burgoon 1996 p 220 They therefore predicted that deceivers in interactive contexts should display increasing imme diacy and involvement pleasantness composure uency and smooth turn taking over the course of the interaction Buller amp Burgoon 1996 p 220 They also noted that patterns ofbehavior vary with factors such as the deceivers expectations goals mo tivations and relationship with the targets and with the targets degree of suspiciousness so that there would be no one pro le of deceptive behaviors One of the moderator variables for which Buller and Burgoon 1996 made predictions is deceivers motivations A number of taxonomies of motivations for deceiving have been proposed eg Camden Motley amp Wilson 1984 B M DePaulo Kashy Kirk endol Wyer amp Epstein 199639 Hample 198039 Lippard 198839 Metts 198939 Turner Edgley amp Olmstead 1975 and some are quite complex For example Metts 1989 described four catego ries of motives partner focused teller focused relationship fo cused and issue focused and 15 subcategories Buller and Bur goon considered three motivations instrumental relational eg avoiding relationship problems and identity eg protecting the liar s image They pre 39cte that liars would experience more detection apprehension when motivated by selfinterest than by relational or identity goals As a result instrurnentally motivated liars exhibit more nonstrategic behaviors unintentional behaviors that Buller amp Burgoon 1996 have described as arousal cues Those liars were also predicted by Buller and Burgoon to engage in more strategic behaviors which are behaviors used in the pursuit of high level plans The Present Approach to Predicting Cues to Deception A SelfPresentational Perspective In 1992 B M DePaulo described a selfpresentational perspec tive for understanding nonverbal communication Her formulation was not speci c to the communication of deception In this sec tion we further articulate her perspective incorporating subse quent research and theory and specifying the implications of a selfpresentational perspective for the prediction of cues to decep tion e egin with a review of the incidence and nature of lying in everyday life and a comparison of the lies people typically tell in their lives with the lies studied in the research literature on deception Lies in Social Life Lying is a fact of everyday life Studies in which people kept daily diaries of all of their lies suggest that people tell an average of one or two lies a day B M DePaulo amp Kashy 199839 B M DePaulo Kashy et al 199639 Kashy amp DePaulo 199639 see also Camden et al 198439 Feldrnan Forrest amp Happ 200239 Hample 198039 Lippard 198839 Metts 198939 Turner et al 1975 People lie most frequently about their feelings their preferences and their attitudes and opinions Less often they lie about their actions plans and whereabouts Lies about achievements and failures are also commonplace Occasionally people tell lies in pursuit of material gain per sonal convenience or escape from punishment Much more com only however the rewards that liars seek are psychological ones They lie to make themselves appear more sophisticated or more virtuous than they think their true characteristics warrant They lie to protect themselves and sometimes others from disap proval and disagreements and from getting their feelings hurt The realm of lying then is one in which identities are claimed and impressions are managed It is not a world apart from nondeceptive discourse Truth tellers edit their selfpresentations too o en in pursuit of the same kinds of goals but in ways that stay within boundaries of honesty The presentations of liars are designed to rnislea There are only a few studies in which people have been asked how they feel about the lies they tell in their everyday lives B M DePaulo amp Kashy 199839 B M DePaulo Kashy et al 199639 Kashy amp DePaulo 1996 The results suggest that people regard their everyday lies as little lies of little consequence or regret They do not spend much time planning them or worrying about the possibility of getting caught Still everyday lies do leave a smudge Although people reported feeling only low levels of distress about their lies they did feel a bit more uncomfortable while telling their lies and directly afterwards than they had felt just before lying Also people described the social interactions in which lies were told as more super cial and less pleasant than the interactions in which no lies were told lnterspersed among these unremarkable lies in much smaller numbers are lies that people regard as serious Most of these lies are told to hide transgressions which can range from misdeeds such as cheating on tests to deep betrayals of intimacy and trust CUES TO DECEPTION 77 such as affairs B M DePaulo Ans eld Kirkendol amp Boden 2002 see also Jones amp Burdette 1993 McComack amp Levine 1990 Metts 1994 These lies especially if discovered can have serious implications for the liars identities and reputations Lies in Studies of Cues to Deception In the literature on cues to deception as in everyday life lies about personal feelings facts and attitudes are the most common place Participants in studies of deception might lie about their opinions on social issues for example or about their academic interests or musical preferences Sometimes emotions are elicited with video clips and participants try to hide their feelings or simulate entirely different ones The literature also includes lies about transgressions as in studies in which participants are in duced to cheat on a task and then lie about it There are a few studies Hall 1986 Horvath 1973 Horvath Jayne amp Buckley 1994 of lies about especially serious matters such as those told by suspects in criminal investigations and one study Koper amp Sahl man 2001 of the truthful and deceptive communications of peo ple whose lies were aired in the media eg Richard Nixon Pete Rose Susan Smith SelfPresentation in Truthful and Deceptive Communications The prevalence of selfpresentational themes in the kinds of lies that people most o en tell and in their reasons for telling them suggests the potential power of the selfpresentational perspective for predicting cuesto deception Following Schlenker 1982 2002 Schlenker amp Pontari 2000 we take a broad view of self presentation as people s attempts to control the impressions that are formed of them In selfpresenting people are behaving in ways that convey certain roles and personal qualities to others Pontari amp Schlenker 2000 p 1092 From this perspective all deceptive communications involve selfpresentationiso do all truthful communications Fundamental to the selfpresentational perspective is the as sumption based on our understanding 0 the nature of lying in everyday life that cues to deception ordinarily are quite weak There are however conditions un er which cues are more appar ent As we explain such moderators of the strength of deception cues can be predicted from the selfpresentational processes in volved in communicating truthfully and deceptively The Deception Discrepancy Lies vary markedly in the goals they serve and in the kinds of selfpresentations enacted to achieve those goals Yet this vast diversity of lies is united by a single identity claim the claim of honesty From the friend who feigns amusement in response to the joke that actually caused hurt feelings to the suspect who claims to have been practicing putts on the night of the murder liars succeed in their lies only if they seem to be sincere1 However this claim to honesty does not distinguish liars from truth tellers either Truth tellers fail in their social interaction goals just as readily as liars if e seem dishonest The important difference between the truth teller s claim to honesty and the liar s is that the liar s claim is illegitimate From this discrepancy between what liars claim and what they believe to be true we can predict likely cues to deceit Implications of the Deception Discrepancy Two implications of the deception discrepancy are most impor tant First deceptive selfpresentations are o en not as convinc 39 0 es Second social actors typically experience a greater sense of deliberateness when their perfor mances are deceptive when ey are honest These predictions are the starting point for our theoretical analyses There are also quali cations to the predictions and we describe those as well Deceptive SelfPresentations Are Not as Fully Embraced as Truthful Ones The most signi cant implication of the deception discrepancy is that social actors typically are unwilling or una e to embrace their false claims as convincingly as they embrace their tru ones cf Mehrabian 1972 Weiner amp Mehrabian 1968 Several factors undermine the conviction with which liars make their own cases First liars in knowingly making false claims may suffer moral qualms that do not plague truth tellers These qualms may account for the faint feelings of discomfort described by the tellers of everyday lies B M DePaulo Kashy et al 1996 Second even in the absence of any moral misgivings liars may not have the same personal investment in their claims as do truth tellers When social actors truthfully describe important aspects of them selves their emotional investment in their claims may be readily apparent B M DePaulo Epstein amp LeMay 1990 Furthermore those selfrelevant claims are backed by an accumulation of knowledge experience and wisdom that most liars can only imagine Markus 1977 Liars may offer fewer details not only because they have less familiarity with the domain they are de scribing but also to allow for fewer opportunities to be disproved vnj 2000 In sum compared with truth tellers many liars do not have the moral high ground the emotional investment or the evidentiary basis for staking their claims As a result liars relate their tales in a less compelling manner and they appear less forthcoming less pleasant and more tense Deceptive SelfPresenters Are Likely to Experience a Greater Sense of Deliberateness Than Truthful Ones Cues to deliberateness When attempting to convey impres sions they know to be false social actors are likely to experience a sense of deliberateness When instead people are behaving in ways they see as consistent with their attitudes beliefs emotions and selfimages they typically have the sense of just acting 1We could have described our theoretical formulation as impression management rather than selfpresentation Impression management in cludes attempts to control the impressions that are formed of others as well as impressions formed of oneself eg Schlenker 2002 We chose self presentation because of the central role in our formulation of the impres sion of sincerity conveyed by the actor Even when people are lying about the characteristics of another person the effectiveness ofthose lies depends on their own success at appearing sincere 7g DEPAULO ET AL naturally They are presenting certain roles and personal qualities to others and they expect to be seen as truthful but they do not ordinarily experience this as requiring any special effort or atten tion Our claim is not that people acting honestly never experience a sense of deliberateness Sometimes they do as for example when the thoughts or feelings they are trying to communicate are dif cult to express or when the stakes for a compelling perfo mance are high39 however the focus of their deliberateness is typically limited to the content of their performance and not its credibility Liars usually make an effort to seem credible39 truth tellers more often take their credibility for granted B M DePaulo LeMay amp Epstein 19912 Deliberate attempts to manage impressions including im res sions of credibility are attempts at selfregulation and self S selfregulatory busyness than those who are performing honestly Even when the attempted performance is the same eg conveying enthusiasm the selfregulatory demands may be greater for the liar Enthusiasm ows effortlessly from those who truly are expe riencing enthusiasm but fakers have to marshal theirs Liars can be preoccupied with the task of reminding themselves to act the part that truth tellers are not just roleplaying but living Other thoughts and feelings could also burden liars more than truth tellers Ekman 19851992 These include thoughts about whether the performance is succeeding feelings about this eg anxiety and feelings about the fabricated performance eg guilt or about discreditable past acts that the liar is trying to hide To the extent that liars are more preoccupied with these intru sive mental contents than are truth tellers their performance could suffer For example they could seem less involved and engaged in the interaction and any attempts at cordiality could seem strained People busy with selfregulatory tasks compared with those who are not so busy sometimes process concurrent information less deeply Gilbert amp Krull 198839 Gilbert Krull amp Pelharn 198839 Richards amp Gross 1999 and perform less well at subsequent selfregulatory tasks Baumeister Bratslavsky Muraven amp Tice 199839 Muraven Tice amp Baurneister 1998 One potential impli cation of this regulatory depletion may be that liars fail to notice some of the ways in which the targets of their lies are reacting cf Butterworth 1978 This is contrary to Buller amp Burgoon s 1996 assumption that liars monitor targets closely for feedback An other implication is that iars busyness could compromise their attempts to generate detailed responses of their own One likely response to the offending thoughts and feelings liars experience is to try to control them For example liars cantry not to think about their blemished past or the insincerity of their ongoing performance However attempts at thought suppression can back re resulting in even greater preoccupation with those thoughts Wegner 1994 Attempts to regulate emotional experi ences can also augment rather than dissipate the targeted feelings eg Wegner Erber amp Zanakos 1993 and increase physiological activation Gross 199839 Gross amp Levenson 199339 Richards amp Gross 1999 The primary target of liars efforts at selfregulation though is probably not their thoughts and feelings but their overt behaviors In theory liars could adopt the goal of trying to appear honest and sincere which in some instances could involve trying to behave in the generally positive and iendly way that they believe to be more characteristic of truth tellers than of liars Malone DePaulo Adams amp Cooper 2002 Especially con dent and skilled liars may do just that and succeed cf Roney Higgins amp Shah 1995 However it may be more commonplace for people who are mis leading others to adopt the defensive goal of tryi not to get caught eg Bell amp DePaulo 199639 B M DePaulo amp Bell 1996 Liars pursuing this strategy may try to avoid behaving in the ways that they think liars behave One risk to this strategy is that some of their beliefs about how liars behave may be wrong For exam ple social perceivers typically believe that liars cannot stay still39 they expect them to dget shi their posture and shake their legs Malone et al 200239 Vrij 2000 In trying to avoid these move ments either directly or as a result of the higher level goal of trying not to give anything away liars may appear to be holding back A sense of involvement and positive engagement would be lacking Deliberate attempts by liars at controlling expressive behaviors such as attempts to control thoughts and feelings can be the seeds of their own destruction eg B M DePaulo 199239 B M De Paulo amp Friedman 1998 One route to failure is to try to regulate expressive behaviors such as tone of voice that ma not be so amenable to willful control eg Scherer 1986 It is possible for example that people s attempts not to sound anxious woul res t in an even higher pitched and anxious sounding tone of voice than would have resulted if they had not deliberately tried to quiet the sounds of their insecurity Another path to selfbetrayal is to direct efforts at expressive control at the wrong level Vallacher amp Wegner 198739 Vallacher Wegner McMahan Cotter amp Larsen 1992 For example social actors who ordinarily convey convinc ing impressions of sincerity and friendliness may instead seem phony if they deliberately try to smile and nod 1n focusing on speci c behaviors they may be unwittingly breaking apart the components of the wellpracticed and established routine of acting friendly eg Kimble amp Perlmuter 1970 The process may be akin to what happens to experienced typists who try to focus on the location of each of the characters on the keyboard instead of typing in their usual unselfconscious way Finally if some behaviors are more controllable than others or if liars only try to control some behaviors and not others discrepancies could develop In sum we predicted that to the extent that liars more than truth tellers deliberately try to control their expressive behaviors thoughts and feelings their performances would be compromised They would seem less forthcoming less convincing less pleasant and more tense Moderators of the strength of cues to deliberateness As the motivation to tell a successful lie increases liars may redouble their deliberate efforts at selfregulation resulting in an even more debilitated performance B M DePaulo amp Kirkendol 198939 B M 2 Certain deceptive exchanges are so o en practiced that they too unfold in a way that feels effortless eg looking at the baby picture proffered by the proud parents and exclaiming that the bald wrinkled blob isjust adorable Lies told in these instances may be guided by what Bargh 1989 described as goaldependent automaticiry Although they may not feel like deliberate lies the critical intent to mislead is clearly present The atterer would feel morti ed if the parents realized he or she thought the baby was hideous It is in part because the sense of deliberateness is critical to people s sense of having lied that these exchanges are so o en unrec ognized as lies CUES TO DECEPTION 79 DePaulo Kirkendol Tang amp O Brien 198839 B M DePaulo Stone amp Lassiter 1985b see also BenShakhar amp Elaad in press We tested this proposed moderator of cues to deception by com paring the results of studies in which inducements were offered for success at deceit with studies in which no special attempts were made to motivate the participants As we have noted all along identityrelevant concerns are fundamental to deceptive and nondeceptive communications They appear even in the absence of any special motivational induction Such concerns can however be exacerbated by incentives that are linked speci cally to people s identities and images In the liter we are reviewing identityrelevant motivators include ones in which skill at deception was described as indicative of people s competence or of their prospects for success at their chosen ca eers Other identityrelevant motivators raised the self presentational stakes by informing participants that their perfor mances would be evaluated or scrutinized Compared with other kinds of incentives such as money or material rewards identity relevant incentives are more likely to exacerbate public self awareness increase rumination and undermine selfcon dence All of these factors can further disrupt performance e g Baumeis ter 199839 Carver amp Scheier 198139 B M DePaulo et al 199139 Wicklund 198239 Wine 197139 see also Gibbons 1990 Conse quently tellers of identityrelevant lies seem especially less forth coming less pleasant and more tense They also tell tales that seem less compelling sum our predictions were that cues to deception would be stronger and more numerous among people who have been moti vated to succeed in their selfpresentations than for those who have not been given any special incentive This predicted impairment would be even more evident when incentives are identity relevant than when they are not Qualifications There are two important quali cations to our discussion of the effects of deliberate attempts at selfregulation One is that an increase in selfregulatory demands does not always result in a decrement in performance When attempts at self regulation shi the focus of attention away from negative self relevant thoughts Pontari amp Schlenker 2000 or from the indi vidual components of the task Lewis amp Linder 1997 performance can improve The second is that the selfregulatory demands of lying do not always exceed those of telling the truth For example honest but insecure actors may be more preoccupied with thoughts of failure than deceptive but cocky ones In addition for most any social actor the telling of truths that impugn the truth teller s character or cause pain or harm to others may pose far greater selfregulatory challenges than the telling of lies about the same topics Finally it is important as always to bear in mind the nature of the lies that people tell in their everyday lives Most are little lies that are so o en practiced and told with such equanimity that the selfregulatory demands may be nearly indistinguishable from the demands of telling the truth Therefore we expected the conse quences of deliberate selfregulation that we have described to be generally weak and that stronger effects of attempted control would be evident in studies in which participants were motivated to get away with their lies particularly if the motivations were identity relevant The Formulation ofDeceptive and Nondeceptive Presentations The selfregulatory demands we have just described are those involved in executing the deceptive and nondeceptive perfor mances Earlier descriptions of deceptive communications focused primarily on the processes involved in formulating lies We con sider those next As we elaborate below we reject the argument that lies are necessarily more dif cult to construct than truths Still we predicted that lies would generally be shorter and less detailed than truths In doing so we drew from the literatures on the use of scripts as guides to storytelling the differences between accounts of events that have or have not been personally experienced and lay misconceptions about the nature of truthful communications Cues to the Formulation ofLies Previous formulations have typically maintained that it is more dif cult to lie than to tell the truth because telling lies involves the construction of new and neverexperienced tales whereas telling the truth is a simple matter of telling it like it is eg Buller amp Burgoon 199639 Miller amp Stiff 199339 Zuckerman et al 198139 but see McComack 1997 for an important exception We disagree with both assumptionsithat lies always need to be assembled and that truths can simply be removed from the box When the truth is hard to tell e g when it would hurt the other person s feelings then a careful piecing together of just the right parts in just the right way would be in order But even totally mundane and nonthreatening truths can be conveyed in a nearly in nite variety of shapes and sizes For example in response to the question How was your day on a day when nothing special happened the answer could be Fine a listing of the main events but what counts as amain event or a description of a part of the day Even in the latter instance there is no one selfevident truth As much work on impression management has indicated eg Schlenker 1980 1985 presentations are edited differently depending on identityrelevant cues such as the teller s relationship with the other person and the interaction goals Yet all of this editing can occur within the bounds of truthfulness ruths then are not o en prepackaged But lies can be A teenage girl who had permission to spend the night at a girlfriend s home but instead went camping with a boy iend may have no dif culty spinning a tale to tell to her parents the next morning For example she can easily access a script for what spending the night at a girlfriend s home typically involves Or she could relate her best iend s favorite story about an evening at the home of a girl iend Lies based on scripts or familiar stories are unlikely to be marked by the signs of mental effort described below that may characterize lies that are fabricated The teller of scripts and of fam39 iar stories may also be less likely to get tangled in contradic tions than the liar who makes up a new sto Even prepackaged lies however may be shorter and less de tailed tru ful answers Liars working from scripts may have only the basics of the scripted event in mind eg Smith 1998 and liars who have borrowed their stories have at hand only those details they were told and of those only the ones they remember All lies whether scripted borrowed or assembled anew could be shorter and less detailed than truthful accounts for another reason The truthful accounts are based on events that were actu so DEPAULO ET AL ally experienced whereas the lies are not The literature on reality monitoring eg Johnson amp Raye 1981 suggests ways in which memories of past experiences or perceptions ie memories based on external sources differ from memories of experiences that were imagined ie memories based on internal sources This perspec tive can be applied to the prediction of cues to deception only by extrapolation because reality monitoring describes processes of remembering whereas deception describes processes of relating Vrij 2000 In relating a story even a truthful one people o en fill in gaps and in other ways create a more coherent tale than their memories actually support Nonetheless deceptive accounts may differ from truthful ones in ways that weakly parallel the ways in which memories of imagined experiences differ from memories of externally based experiences If so then truthful accounts would be clearer more vivid and more realistic than deceptive ones and they would include more sensory information and contextual cues Deceptive accounts in contrast should be more likely to include references to cognitive processes such as thoughts and inferences made at the time of the event The conventional wisdom that lies are more dif cult to formu late than truths is most likely to be supported when liars make up new stories Lies that are fabricated mostly from scratch are likely to be shorter and more internally inconsistent than truths and to be preceded by longer latencies Signs of mental effort may also be evident These could include increases in pauses and speech dis turbances Berger Karol amp Jordan 198939 Butterworth amp Goldrnan Eisler 197939 Christenfeld 199439 Goldrnan Eisler 196839 Mahl 198739 Schachter Christenfeld Ravina amp Bilous 199139 Siegman 1987 more pupil dilation E H Hess amp Polt 196339 Kahneman 197339 Kahneman amp Beatty 196739 Kahneman Tursky Shapiro amp Crider 196939 Stanners Coulter Sweet amp Murphy 197939 Stem amp Dunham 1990 decreased blinking Bagley amp Manelis 197939 Holland amp Tarlow 1972 197539 Wallbott amp Scherer 1991 and decreased eye contact Fehr amp Exline 1987 People who are preoccupied wi the formulation of a complex lie may appear to be less involved and expressive as well as less forthcoming Unfortunately in the literature we are reviewing liars were almost never asked how they came up with their lies and truth tellers were not asked how they decided which version of the truth to relate eg a short version or a long one In the only study we know of in which liars were asked about the origins of their lies Malone Adams Anderson Ans eld amp DePaulo 1997 the most common answer was not any we have considered so far More than half the time liars said that they based their lies on experiences from their own lives altering critical details With this strategy liars may be just as adept as truth tellers at accessing a wealth of details including clear and vivid sensory details Still even the most informed and advantaged liars may make mistakes if they share common misconceptions of what truthful accounts really are like Vrij Edward amp Bull 2001 For example if liars believe that credible accounts are highly structured and coherent with few digressions or inessential details their accounts may be smoother and more pat than those of truth tellers The embedding of a story in its spatial and temporal context and the relating of the speci cs of the conversation may provide a richness to the accounts of truth tellers that liars do not even think to simulate Liars may also fail to appreciate that memory is fallible and reporting skills are imperfect even when people are telling the truth and that truth tellers who are not concerned about their credibility may not be defensive about admitting their uncertain ties Consequently truth tellers may express selfdoubts claim they do not remember things or spontaneously correct something they already said whereas liars would scrupulously avoid such admissions of imperfection The stories told by liars then would be too good to be true Liars can also fail if they know less than their targets do about the topic of the deceit The babysitter who claims to have taken the kids to the zoo and relates how excited they were to see the lion would be undone by the parent who knows that there are no lions at that zoo The man suspected of being a pedophile who points to his service as leader of his church s youth group may believe he is painting a picture of a pillar of the community whereas instead he has unwittingly described just the sort of volunteer work that is a favorite of known pedophiles Steller amp Kohnken 198939 Un deutsch 198939 Yuille amp Cutshall 19893 Moderators of Cues to the Formulation of Lies Factors that alter the cognitive load for liars are candidates for moderators of cognitive cues to deception We consider two such moderators in this review the opportunity to plan a presentation and the duration of that presentation Liars who have an opportunity to plan their dif cult lies relative to those who must formulate their lies on the spot may be able to generate more compelling presentations eg H D O Hair Cody amp McLaughlin 198139 Vrij 2000 Because they can do some of their thinking in advance their response latencies could be shorter and their answers longer However mistakes that follow om misconceptions about the nature of truthful responses would not be averted by planning and may even be exacerbated We think that in theory cues to deception could occur even for the simplest lies For example when just a yes or no answer is required a lie could be betrayed by a longer response latency in instances in which the truth comes to mind more readily and must be set aside and replaced by the lie Walczyk Roper amp Seeman in press However we believe that the cognitive urdens gener ally would be greater when a short answer would not suf ce and that cues to deception would therefore become clearer and more numerous as the duration of the response increases For example lies may be especially briefer than truths when people are expected to tell a story rather than to respond with just a few words Also 3 Statement Validity or Reality Analysis was developed initially by Undeutsch 1989 to assess the credibility of child witnesses in cases of alleged sexual abuse The overall assessment includes an evaluation ofthe characteristics and possible motives of the child witness It also includes a set of 19 criteria to be applied to transcripts of statements made by the witness Steller amp Kohnken 1989 This analysis of witness statements called CriteriaBased Content Analysis CBCA was subsequently applied to the analysis of statements made by adults in other kinds of criminal proceedings and in experimental research eg Yuille amp Cutshall 1989 All of the characteristics discussed in this section of our review from the excessive structure and coherence of accounts to the typical characteristics of criminals or crimes related by people who do not realize their signi cance are drawn from CBCA though some of the interpretations are our own The use of CBCA to analyze statements made by adults is contro versial eg Vrij 2000 CUES TO DECEPTION 81 liars who are experiencing affects and emotions that they are trying to hide may be more likely to show those feelings when they need to sustain their lies longer cf Ekman 19851992 The Role afIdent39z39tyRelevant Emotions in Deceptive and Nondeceptive Presentations People experience the unpleasant emotional state of guilt when they have done something wrong or believe that others may think that they have Baumeister Stillwell amp Heatherton 1994 Even more aversive is the feeling of shame that occurs when people fail to meet their own personal moral standards Keltner amp Buswell 199639 Tangney Miller Flicker amp Barlow 199639 see also Scheff 2001 Some lies especially serious ones are motivated by a desire to cover up a personal failing or a discreditable thought feeling or deed eg B M DePaulo Ans eld et al 2002 Yet those who tell the truth about their transgressions or failings may feel even greater guilt and shame than those whose shortcomings remain hidden by their lies If the behavior of truthful transgressors was compared with that of deceptive transgressors cues to these self conscious emotions would be more in evidence for the truth tellers if they distinguished them from the liars at all In most studies however including all of the studies of transgressions included in this review liars who had transgressed were compared wi th tellers who had not For those comparisons then we expected to nd that liars compared with truth tellers showed more shame and guilt cues There is no documented facial expression that is speci c to guilt39 therefore we expected to nd only more general cues to negativity and distress Keltner amp Buswell 199639 Keltner amp Harker 1998 Shame however does seem to have a characteristic demeanor that includes gaze aversion a closed posture and a tendency to withdraw Keltner amp Harker 1998 Lies about transgressions though are the exceptions both in everyday life and in the studies in this review The more common place lies cover truths that are not especially discrediting For example people may not feel that it is wrong to have an opinion that differs from someone else s or to hide their envy of a cowork er s success In most instances then we did not on the basis of the hidden information alone expect to nd more guilt cues in liars than in truth tellers By de nition though there is a sense in which all liars are candidates for experiencing guilt and shame as they all have done something that could be considered wrong They have intention ally misled someone Truth tellers have not It is important to note however that liars do not always feel badly about their lies and truth tellers do not always feel good about their honesty In fact liars o en claim that in telling their lies they have spared their targets from the greater distress that would have resulted had they told the truth B M DePaulo Kashy et al 1996 Guilt and shame are not the only emotions that have been hypothesized to betray liars Fear of being detected has also been described as responsible for cues to deception eg Ekman 1985 1992 We believed fear of detection would also vary importantly with factors such as the nature of the behavior that is covered by the lie Liars would fear detection when hiding behaviors such as transgressions which o en elicit punishment or disapproval But the more typical liars those who claim that their movie preferences match those of their dates or who conceal their pride in their own work would have little to fear from the discovery of that hidden information People may fear detection not only because of the nature of the behavior they are hiding but also because of the implications of being perceived as dishonest Schlenker Pontari amp Christopher 2001 The blemishes in perceived and selfperceived integrity that could result from a discovered deception depend on factors such as the justi ability of the deceit and are often quite minimal But even utterly trivial lies told in the spirit of kindness such as false reassurances about new and unbecoming hairstyles have identity implications if discovered For instance the purveyors of such kind lies may be less often trusted when honest feedback really is desired Across all of the lies in our data set we expected to nd weak cues to anxiety and negativity For example liars may look and sound more anxious than truth tellers Slivken amp Buss 1984 and speak less uently Kasl amp Mahl 196539 Mahl 1987 and in a higher pitch Kappas Hess amp Scherer 199139 Scherer 1986 They may also blink more Harrigan amp O Connell 1996 and their pupils may be more dilated Scott Wells Wood amp Morgan 196739 Simpson amp Molloy 197139 Stanners et al 1979 Relative to truth tellers liars may also make more negative statements and com plaints sound less pleasant and look less friendly and less attrac tive In a moderator analysis comparing lies about transgressions with other kinds of lies we expected to nd more pronounced distress cues in the lies about transgressions Convergent Perspectives on the Strength of Cues to Deceit Our selfpresentational perspective has led us to reject the view that lie telling is typically a complicated stressful guiltinducing process that produces clear and strong cues Instead we believe that most deceptive presentations are so routinely and competently executed that they leave only faint behavioral residues Fiedler and Walka 1993 offered a similar point of view They argued that ordinary people are so practiced so pro cient and so emotionally unfazed by the telling of untruths that they can be regarded as professional liars Therefore they also expected to nd mostly only weak links between verbal and nonverbal behaviors and the telling of lies Bond Kahler and Paolicelli 1985 arguing from an evolutionary perspective drew a similar conclusion Any bla tantly obvious cues to deceit they contended would have been recognized by human perceivers long ago evolution favors more exible deceivers Methodological Implications of the SelfPresentational Perspective Our selfpresentational perspective suggests that social actors try to convey particular impressions of themselves both w en lying and when telling the truth and that social perceivers rou tinely form impressions of others We have conceptualized the ways in which lies could differ from truths in terms of the different impressions that deceptive selfpresentations could convey For example we hypothesized that liars would seem more distant than truth tellers One way to assess differences in distancing is to code the many behaviors believed to be indicative of nonimmediacy such as the use of the passive rather than the active voice the use 82 DEPAULO ET AL of negations rather than assertions and looking away rather than maintaining eye contact This approach which is the usual one has the advantage that the behaviors of interest are clearly de ned and objectively measured However for many of the kinds of impres sions that social actors attempt to convey the full range of behav iors that contribute to the impression may b unknown For ex ample Wiener and Mehrabian 196839 Mehrabian 1972 have described a precise set of behaviors that they believed to be indicative of verbal and nonverbal immediacy and have reported some supportive data However others who have discussed im me 39acy and related constructs have included other cues eg Brown amp Levinson 198739 Fleming 199439 Fleming amp Rudman 199339 Holtgraves 198639 Searle 1975 This raises the possibility that social perceivers who can o en form valid impressions even from rather thin slices of social behavior eg ady amp Rosenthal 1992 can discriminate truths from lies by their sub jective impressions of the constructs of interest eg distancing just as well if not better than can objective coding systems cf B M DePaulo 199439 Malone amp DePaulo 2001 To test this possibility we used objective and subjective measurement as levels of a moderator variable in analyses of cues for which multiple independent estimates of both levels were available Summary of Predictions Predicted Cues The selfpresentational perspective predicts ve categories of cues to deception First liars are predicted to be less forthcoming than truth tellers The model predicts they will respond less and in less detail and they will seem to be holding back For example liars response latencies would be longer an indication of cogni tive complexity in the Zuckerman et al 1981 model and their speech would be slower a thinking cue in Ekman s 19851992 formulation Second the tales told by liars are predicted to be less compelling than those told by truth tellers Speci cally liars would seem to make less sense than truth tellers eg there would be more discrepancies in their accounts and they would seem less engaging less immediate more uncertain less uent and less active than truth tellers Zuckerman et a1 1981 predicted that discrepancies would occur as a result of attempted control and Ekman 19851992 regarded them as a thinking cue Less imme diacy more distancing was described as a possible cue to detec tion apprehension and guilt by Ekman 19851992 and Zucker man et al 1981 and it was regarded as a strategic behavior by Buller and Burgoon 1996 The selfpresentational perspective also predicts that liars will be less positive and pleasant than truth tellers as is also suggested by the description of cues to guilt and apprehensiveness put forth by Ekman 19851992 and Zuckerman et al 1981 The fourth prediction of the selfpresentational perspective is that liars will be more tense than truth tellers Some cues to tension such as higher pitch have sometimes been conceptualized as indicative of undif ferentiated arousal eg Zuckerman et al 1981 Finally the selfpresentational perspective alone predicts that liars will include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents in their stories than will truth tellers Predicted Moderators A number of perspectives including the selfpresentational one maintain that cues to deception when combined across all lies will be weak However several factors are predicted to moderate the strength of the cues From a selfpresentational point of view cues to negativity and tension should be stronger when lies are about transgressions than when they are not The selfpresentation formulation also maintains that cues will be clearer and more numerous when told under conditions of high motivation to suc ceed especially when the motivation is identity relevant Buller and Burgoon 1996 in contrast predicted stronger cues when the liars motives are instrumental They also predicted more pleas antness immediacy composure and uency with increasing interactivity The selfpresentation model predicts that for social actors who have an opportunity to plan their performances compared with those who do not response latency will be a less telling cue to deception Also as the duration of a response increases cues to deception will be more in evidence Finally the model predicts that cues assessed by subjective impressions will more powerfully discriminate truths from lies than the same cues assessed objectively A predicted moderator of cues to deception can be tested only if the moderator variable can be reliably coded from the information that is reported and if multiple estimates of the relevant cues are available for each of the levels of the moderator Some of the predictions generated by the perspectives we have reviewed could not be tested and that obstacle limited our ability to evaluate each of the perspectives comprehensively The selfpresentational per spective for example points to the potential importance of a number 0 moderators we could not test such as the communica tor s con dence and focus of attention and the emotional impli cations of the truths or lies for the targets of those messages The selfpresentational perspective as well as the formulations of Ekman 19851992 and Bquer and Burgoon 1996 all suggest that the liar s relationship with the target may be another important moderator of cues to deception see also Anderson DePaulo amp Ans eld 200239 Levine amp McComack 199239 Stiff Kim amp Ramesh 1992 However the number of studies in which the liars and targets were not strangers was too small to test this moderator Method Literature Search Procedures We used literature search procedures recommended by Cooper 1998 to retrieve relevant studies First we conducted computerbased searches of Psychological Abstracts PsycLlT and Dissertation Abstracts Interna tional through September of 1995 using the key words deception deceit lie and detection and combinations of those words Second we examined the reference lists from previous reviews B M DePaulo et al 1985a Zuckerman et al 1981 Zuckerman amp Driver 1985 Third we reviewed the reference lists from more than 300 articles on the communication of deception from Bella M DePaulo s personal les and the references lists from any new articles added as a result ofthe computer search Fourth we 1 quot r AH39PZPPr to 62 Liluim 39 39 sent I the communication of deception We also asked those scholars to continue to send us their papers in the coming years We repeated our computer search in October of 1999 No other reports were added a er that date CUES TO DECEPTION 83 Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion of Studies We included reports in which behavior while lying was compared with behavior while telling the truth Behaviors that were measured objectively as well as those based on others impressions eg impressions that the social actors seemed nervous or evasive were all included Physiological indices with no discernible behavioral manifestation eg galvanic skin response heart rate were not included nor were senders ie social actors reports of their own behaviors We excluded reports that were not in English and reports in which the senders were not adults ie under 17 years old We included data from adult senders in reports of children and adults ifwe could compute effect sizes separately for the subset of the data in which both the senders and the judges were adults We excluded reports in which senders roleplayed an imagined person in an imagined situation because we were concerned that the imaginary aspects ofthese paradigms could sever the connection between social actors and their self presentations that is important to our theoretical analysis ere several reports from which we could not extract use il data For example Yerkes and Berry 1909 reported one experiment based on just one sender and another based on two Studies comparing different kinds of lies without also comparing them with truths e di Battista amp Abraharns 1995 were not included Studies describing individual differ ences in cues to deception that did not also report overall differences een truths and lies eg Siegman amp Reynolds 1983 were also excluded A series of reports based on the same independent sample eg Buller Burgoon Buslig amp Roiger 1996 Study 2 were excluded as well For a detailed explanation see B M DePaulo Ansfield amp Bell 1996 Determining Independent Samples Our nal data set consisted of 120 independent samples from 116 reports see Table 1 Of those 120 samples in our review only 32 were included in the Zuckerman et al 1981 review4 Most often the behaviors of a particular sample of senders were de scribed in just repo F r example Bond et al 1985 coded 11 different cues from 34 different senders 39Ihe behaviors of those 34 senders were not described in any other report Therefore we considered the sample of senders from that study to be an independent sample Sometimes senders were divided into different subgroups eg men and women Jordanians and Americans senders who planned their messages and dif ferent senders who did not and cues to deception were reported separately for each of those subgroups In those instances we considered each of the subgroups to be an independent sample For example Bond Omar Mah moud and Bonser 1990 coded 10 different cues separately for the 60 Jordanian senders and the 60 American senders Therefore the Jordanian senders were one independent sample and the Americans were another from 90 senders and Hadjistavropoulos Craig Hadjistavropoulos and Poole 1996 coded two cues from the same 90 senders Therefore the samples described in those two reports were not independent In Table 1 the ave the same letter code in the column labeled Ind sample code Most samples listed in Table 1 have no letter code in that column all of those samples are independent samples All estimates of a particular cue were included in the analyses of that ately As we explain in more detail below multiple estimates ofthe same cue that came from the same independent sample were averaged before being entered into the analyses Cue De nitions Within the sample of studies 158 different behaviors or impressions which we call cues to deception were reported These are defined in Appendix A We categorized most ofthe 158 cues into the five categories that followed from our theoretical analysis To determine whether liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers we looked at cues indicative of the amount of their responding eg response length the level of detail and complexity of their responses and the degree to which they seemed to be holding back eg pressing lips Keltner Young Heerey Oemig amp Monarch 1998 To explore whether liars tell less compelling tales than truth tellers we examined cues indicating whether the presentations seemed to make sense eg plausibility whether they were engaging eg involving and whether the were immediate eg e e contact instead of distancing Selfpresentations that fell short on characteristics such as certainty uency or animation may also seem less compelling s we included those cues too In the third category we included cues indicating whether liars are less positive and pleasant than truth tellers and in the fourth we collected behaviors indicating whether liars are more tense than truth tellers Finally in the last category we determined whether deceptive selfpresentations included fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual con tentst an tru ul ones by examining cues such as spontaneous corrections and descriptions of superfluous details 39 we assigned a number from 1 to 158 to each cue Cue numbers are shown along with the cue names and definitions in Appendix A The last column of Table 1 lists all ofthe cues reported in each study and the number of estimates of eac a 5 Q Variables Coded From Each Report From each report we coded characteristics of the senders characteristics of the truths and lies publication statistics and methodological aspects of the studies see Table 2 In the category of sender characteristics we coded the population sampled eg students suspects in crimes patients in pain clinics people om the community the senders country an e rela tionship between the sender and the interviewer or target of the commu nications eg strangers acquaintances friends We also coded senders race or ethnicity and their precise ages but this information was rarely reported and therefore could not be analyzed To test our predictions about the links between senders motivations and cues to deception we determined whether senders had identityrelevant incentives instrumental incentives both kinds of incentives or no specia incentives Coded as identityrelevant were studies in which senders success was described as indicative of their competence at their chosen profession or re ective of their intelligence or other valued characteristics Also included were studies in which senders expected to be evaluated or scrutinized Studies in which senders were motivated by money or material re ards were coded as primarily instrumental Studies in which both incentives were offered to senders were classified separately T h quotquot f quot uration and whether senders had an opportunity to prepare If senders had an opportunity to prepare some but not all of their messages but behavioral ifferences were not reported separately we classified the study as having some prepared and some unprepared messages In other studies the mes sages were scripted For example senders may have been instructed to give a particular response in order to hold verbal cues constant so that investi gators could assess nonverbal characteristics of truths and lies more precisely We also coded the experimental paradigm used to elicit the truths and lies or the context in which they occurred In some studies senders lied or told the truth about their beliefs or opinions or about personal facts In others senders looked at videotapes films slides or pictures and described ext continues on page 4There were three unpublished reports describing results from four independent samples in the Zuckerman et al 1981 review that we were unable to retrieve for this review 84 Table 1 Summary of Studies Included in the MetaAnalysis DEPAULO ET AL No of No of Ind sample Report N effect sizes cues codea Motb TransC Msg Intd CuesE AlonsoQuecuty 1992 P np anned messages 11 5 5 0 0 001 005 037 076 085 ll 5 5 0 0 001 005 037 076 085 Anolli amp Ciceri 1997 31 36 12 0 0 L 1 001 8 004 2 010 6 032 2 039 2 063 2 094 2 097 2 110 2 112 2 113 2 140 4 Berrien amp Huntington 1943 32 1 1 2 1 155 Bond et al 1985 34 ll 11 2 0 l 003 022 027 035 038 044 045 046 052 058 068 Bond et al 1990 Jordanians 60 10 10 0 0 L l 001 027 037 038 045 046 052 058 Americans 60 10 10 0 0 L l 001 027 037 038 045 046 052 058 68 Bradley amp Janisse 19791980 60 1 1 0 0 L 1 Bradley amp Janisse 1981 192 1 1 2 1 065 Buller amp Aune 1987 130 17 15 0 0 l 016 018 026 027 028 044 2 053 054 2 055 064 067 068 069 105 119 Buller et al 1996 120 4 4 A 0 0 L l 021 022 023 0 Buller et al 1989 148 18 16 0 0 L l 001 2 009 017 018 027 2 034 037 040 044 055 058 067 068 069 111 119 Burgoon amp Buller 1994 20 4 4 A 0 0 l 026 053 054 061 Burgoon Buller A et al 1996 61 8 5 0 0 l 001 015 4 064 104 106 Burgoon Buller Floyd amp Grandpre 1996 lnteractants 18 ll 8 0 0 l 004 015 2 025 2 026 031 049 061 Observers 10 ll 8 0 0 l 004 015 2 025 2 026 031 049 061 115 2 Burgoon Buller Guerrero et al 1996 40 4 2 0 0 1 004 025 3 Burns amp Kintz 1976 20 2 l 0 l l Chiba 1985 16 4 2 0 0 L 1 033 2 066 2 Christensen 1980 12 6 3 0 0 1 016 2 049 2 061 2 Clofu 1974 16 l l 2 0 l 063 Cody et a1 1989 66 85 17 B 2 0 P 1 001 5 004 5 009 5 010 5 018 5 021 5 022 5 027 5 038 5 039 5 041 5 046 5 055 5 058 5 066 5 070 5 119 5 Cody et a1 1984 42 54 8 0 0 P 1 001 6 004 27 007 3 009 3 010 3 035 3 039 6 041 3 Cody amp O Hair 1983 Men 36 8 4 C1 0 0 1 009 2 018 2 048 2 069 2 Women 36 8 4 C2 0 0 1 009 2 018 2 048 2 069 2 Craig et a1 1991 120 28 13 0 0 L 1 033 2 056 2 0572 059 2 0602 0662 1294 1302 131 2 132 2 133 2 146 2 148 2 CutroW et al 1972 63 3 3 3 0 l 009 066 144 B M DePaulo et al 1992 32 2 2 l 0 0 015 051 B M DePaulo et al 1990 96 3 3 D l 0 l 001 004 016 B M DePaulo Jordan et al 1982 8 1 1 0 0 L 0 014 B M DePaulo et al 1983 32 2 2 l 0 l 061 091 B M DePaulo et al 1991 96 l 1 D 1 0 l 012 B M DePaulo ampRosenthal 1979a 40 1 1 E 0 0 L 0 014 B M DePaulo Rosenthal Green amp 40 4 3 E 0 0 L 0 014 2 061 090 Rosenkrantz 1982 B M DePaulo Rosenthal 40 16 11 E 0 0 L 0 006 2 010 2 022 023 024 2 035 nkrantz amp Green 1982 038 0523 096 136 137 P I DePaulo amp DePaulo 1989 l4 16 15 2 0 0 001 004 010 014 2 021 034 035 039 044 049 052 055 066 070 091 deTurck amp Miller 1985 Unaroused truth tellers 36 10 10 1 1 l 001 009 028 037 042 046 048 058 0 Aroused truth tellers 36 10 10 l l l 001 009 028 037 042 046 048 058 70 CUES TO DECEPTION 85 Table 1 con rmed No of No of Ind sample Report N effect sizes cues codea Motb TransC Msg Intd CuesE Dulaney 1982 20 20 10 0 1 1 001 2 004 007 3 009 019 6 020 3 022 024 042 139 Ekrnan ampFriesen 1972 21 3 3 F l 0 1 034 069 070 Ekrnan et al 1988 31 2 2 F 1 0 L 1 117118 Ekrnan et al 1976 16 1 1 F 1 0 1 034 Ekrnan et a1 1985 14 40 20 0 0 1 011 2 044 2 045 2 056 2 057 2 059 2 060 2 088 2 129 2 130 2 131 2 132 2 133 2 1462 1472 148 2 1492 1562 157 2 158 2 Ekrnan et al 1991 31 2 2 F l 0 L 1 063 Elliot 1979 62 4 4 2 0 L 1 012 049 050 115 Exline et al 1970 34 2 2 2 1 1 027 061 Feeley amp deTurck 1998 Unsanctioned liars 58 15 14 0 1 1 001 2 009 010 022 024 027 035 037 38 044 046 048 058 068 Sanctioned liars 68 15 14 0 l 1 001 2 009 010 022 024 027 035 037 038 044 046 048 058 068 Fiedler 1989 Study 1 23 l 1 0 0 1 012 64 1 1 0 0 012 Fiedler et al 1997 12 8 6 0 0 1 001 004 3 008 012 016 061 Fiedler amp Walka 1993 10 10 10 0 0 L 1 010 012 014 015 016 039 045 063 068 118 Finkelstein 1978 20 14 10 E 0 0 L 0 017 043 045 3 0462 047 2 051 0 8 064 067 0 Frank 1989 32 12 12 3 0 0 001 009 018 027 034 040 044 045 048 058 066 068 Gagnon 1975 Men 16 11 9 2 0 1 001 2 010 027 040 2 044 045 046 Women 16 11 9 2 0 1 001 2 010 027 040 2 044 045 046 Galin amp Thorn 1993 60 26 12 0 0 L 0 011 4 033 2 056 2 059 2 060 2 0662 1292 1302 1322 133 2 147 2 149 2 Goldstein 1923 10 2 1 2 0 1 009 2 Greene et a1 1985 39 45 15 0 0 P 1 001 3 009 3 018 3 027 3 034 3 044 3 045 3 046 3 048 3 055 3 058 3 067 3 068 3 069 3 119 3 Hadjistavropoulos amp Craig 1994 90 24 11 G 0 0 L 1 011 2 033 2 056 2 057 2 059 2 0602 066 2 1294 130 2 131 2 132 2 Hadjistavropoulos et al 1996 90 2 2 G 0 0 L 1 Hall 1986 80 3 3 3 1 1 010 032 063 Harrison et al 1978 72 2 2 0 0 L 1 001 009 Heilveil 1976 12 1 1 0 0 1 065 Heilveil amp Muehleman 1981 26 9 9 0 0 1 001 009 027 037 040 046 048 055 058 Heinrich amp Borkenau 1998 40 6 1 0 0 L 0 6 Hemsley 1977 20 13 10 0 1 008 009 027 2 029 042 043 044 058 2 066 068 2 HernandezFemaud amp AlonsoQuecuty 73 12 4 2 0 1 004 9 005 076 083 1977 U Hess 1989 35 5 4 H 0 0 0 011 2 057 117 132 U Hess amp Kleck 1990 Study 1 35 2 2 H 0 0 0 089 150 48 2 2 H 0 0 0 089 150 U Hess amp Kleck 1994 35 3 3 H 0 0 0 029 058 066 Hocking amp Leathers 1980 16 25 21 1 0 1 009 010 018 027 2 036 037 2 038 044 045 048 2 054 058 061 2 062 069 070 107 108 109 144 145 Horvath 1973 100 11 8 3 1 1 002 025 027 049 050 0523 061 2 121 table comm uex 86 Table 1 con rmed DEPAULO ET AL No of N effect sizes No of Ind sample ea cod Report cues Motb TransC Msg Intd CuesE Horvath 1978 60 1 1 0 0 1 062 Horvath 1979 32 1 1 2 0 L 1 062 Horvath et al 1994 60 6 4 3 1 1 025 050 064 3 090 Janisse amp Bradley 1980 64 1 1 0 0 L 1 065 Kennedy amp Coe 1994 19 10 8 0 0 1 027 056 058 064 066 120 122 3 129 Knapp et al 1974 38 32 23 2 0 L 1 001 3 002 003 004 007 018 020 2 021 2 022 2 023 024 2 027 2 0302 036 037 038 048 052 055 058070 1262 138 Kohnken et a1 1995 59 19 18 0 0 1 004 013 041 071 072 073 2 074 077 078 079 080 082 123 124 127 128 142 143 Koper amp Sahlman 2001 83 37 27 3 1 L 001 009 012 014 015 017 018 025 2 028 031 3 035 039 043 044 054 055 058 061 3 062 066 067 06810410521191344153 Krauss 1981 High arousal face to face 8 11 11 11 1 0 L 1 001 009 027 031 042 046 051 061 086 089 093 High arousal intercom 8 11 11 12 1 0 L 0 001 009 027 031 042 046 051 061 086 089 093 LoW arousal face to face 8 11 11 13 0 0 L 1 001 009 027 031 042 046 051 061 086 089 093 LoW arousal intercom 8 11 11 14 0 0 L 0 001 009 027 031 042 046 051 061 086 089 093 Kraut 1978 5 9 9 1 0 L 1 001 004 009 012 014 040 044 058 0 Kraut amp Poe 1980 62 14 14 2 1 1 001 003 008 009 018 025 028 031 035 044 058 061 064 068 Kuiken 1981 48 1 1 0 0 0 9 Kurasawa 1988 8 1 1 0 0 L 0 092 Landry ampBrigharn 1992 12 14 13 0 0 L 0 004 013 072 073 074 075 076 077 2 078 079 080 082 083 Manaugh et al 1970 80 2 2 0 0 1 006 09 Marston 1920 10 1 1 0 0 1 009 Matarazzo et al 1970 Discuss college major 60 4 4 0 0 1 006 009 027 119 Discuss living situation 60 4 4 0 0 1 006 009 027 119 McClintock amp Hunt 1975 20 5 5 0 0 1 018 027 044 058 070 Mehrabian 1971 Study 1 Men reward 14 11 10 2 0 0 001 010 026 035 044 046 048 2 054 055 064 Men punishment 14 11 10 1 0 0 001 010 026 035 044 046 048 2 054 055 064 Women reward 14 11 10 2 0 0 001 010 026 035 044 046 048 2 054 055 064 Women punishment 14 11 10 1 0 0 001 010 026 035 044 046 048 2 054 055 064 Study 2 Men 24 10 9 2 0 0 001 010 026 029 046 048 2 054 0 Women 24 10 9 2 0 0 001 010 026 029 046 048 2 054 055 064 Study 3 32 13 12 2 1 1 001 002 010 026 032 044 046 048 2 054 055 064 070 Miller et a1 1983 32 10 10 3 0 P 1 001 007 009 029 036 037 038 046 048 070 Motley 1974 20 3 3 0 0 1 001 032 063 D O Hair amp Cody 1987 P Men 21 2 1 2 0 1 062 2 Women 26 2 1 2 0 1 062 2 D O Hair et al 1990 P Men 36 2 1 B1 2 0 1 062 2 Women 25 2 1 B2 2 0 1 062 2 CUES TO DECEPTION 87 Table 1 con rmed No of No of Ind sample Report N effect sizes cues codea Motb TransC Msg Intd CuesE H D O Hair et a1 1981 72 22 11 c 0 0 P 1 001 2 009 2 0182 027 2 0342 044 2 048 2 055 2 058 2 069 2 070 2 Pennebaker amp Chew 1985 20 2 2 0 0 1 029 089 Porter amp Yuille 1996 60 18 18 2 1 1 001 004 007 008 013 022 030 038 071 072 073 078 079 080 081 083 103 141 Potamkin 1982 Heroin addicts 10 6 6 2 0 1 018 044 048 070 151 152 Nonaddicts 10 6 6 2 0 L 1 018 044 048 070 151 152 Riggio amp Friedman 1983 63 12 ll 0 0 0 010 027 029 035 038 044 045 046 048 058 068 2 Ruby amp Brigham 1998 12 16 15 0 0 0 001 004 013 071 072 073 074 075 076 077 2 078 079 080 081 083 Rybold 1994 34 4 4 3 0 1 001 010 035 039 Sayenga 1983 14 24 16 2 0 1 001 2 004 2 0063 009 2 0102 020 022 032 2 036 037 038041 052 0622 063 102 Scherer et al 1985 15 2 2 F l 0 L 1 053 062 Schneider amp Kintz 1977 Men 14 2 2 0 0 1 048 154 Women 16 2 2 0 0 1 048 154 Sitton amp Griffin 1981 28 1 1 0 0 1 027 Sporer 1997 40 22 17 0 0 0 001 2 004 005 006 013 071 076 3 077 2 078 079 080 082 083 2 087 098 099 100 Stiff amp Miller 1986 40 19 16 2 1 1 001 2 004 009 012 022 023 024 037 040 044 046 048 058 066 068 4 Streeter et al 1977 High arousal face to face 8 1 1 11 1 0 L 1 063 High arousal intercom 8 1 1 12 1 0 L 0 063 Low arousal face to face 8 1 1 I3 0 0 L 1 063 ousal interco 8 1 1 I4 0 0 L 0 063 ToddMancillas amp Kilber 1979 37 ll 9 2 0 1 001 3 002 004 007 020 021 022 023 052 Vrij 1993 20 1 1 J 2 1 L 1 046 Vrij 1995 64 11 11 J 2 1 L 1 018 028 035 038 044 045 048 058 068 095 114 Vrij et al 1997 56 1 1 0 1 L 1 114 Vrij amp Heaven 1999 40 6 4 0 0 1 004 030 035 2 038 2 Vrij et al 1996 91 3 l l 1 L 1 043 3 Vrij amp Winkel 19901991 92 ll 10 0 l L 1 010 027 035 038 044 045 046 058 070 094 Vrij amp Winkel 1993 64 1 1 J 2 1 L 1 1 Wagner amp Pease 1976 49 1 1 0 0 0 019 Weiler amp Weinstein 1972 64 13 8 2 0 1 004 2 008 016 027 031 116 4 123 135 Zapamiuk et al 1995 40 18 16 0 0 1 004 013 071 072 073 074 075 077 2 078 079 080 081 2 082 083 124 12 Zuckerman et a1 1979 60 6 5 0 0 L 0 016 031 2 053 054 063 Zuckerman et al 1982 59 1 1 K 0 0 L 0 014 Zuckerman et al 1984 59 1 1 K 0 0 L 0 084 Note N number of senders Ind independent Mot motivation of the senders Trans transgression Msg message Int interactivity P compared cues to deception for planned messages with cues to deception for unplanned messages L length duration of the messages was reported 3 Samples with the same letter code report data from the same senders that is they are not independent All samples without a letter code are independent samples bMotivation of the senders 0 none 1 identityrelevant 2 instrumental 3 identityrelevant and instrumental Transgression 0 lie is not about a transgression 1 lie is about a transgression d Interactivity 0 no interaction between sender and target 1 interaction 8 Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article The number in parentheses indicates the number of estimates of that cue if more than one The cue names corresponding to the cue numbers are shown in Appendix A 88 Table 2 Summary of Study Characteristics DEPAULO ET AL Characteristic k Characteristic k Senders Truths and lies continued Population sampled Paradigm continued Students 101 Person descriptions 7 Suspects 3 Simulated job interview 6 Community members and students 3 Described personal experiences 5 Patients in a pain clinic 2 Naturalistic 4 Community members 2 Responded to personality items 3 Immigrants to United States 2 Reactions to pain 3 Salespersons and customers 1 Other paradigms 7 Travelers in an ai 1 Unable to determine from report 1 Shoppers in a shopping center 1 Lies were about transgressions Heroin addicts and nonaddicts 1 No 99 Publicly exposed liars 1 Yes 21 Unable to determine from report 2 Country Publication statistics United States 88 Canada 9 Year of report Germany 7 Before 1970 3 England 4 197071979 34 Spain 3 198071989 46 awn 2 720 37 Immigrants to United States 2 Source Of Smdy Jordan 1 al 96 Italy 1 Dissertation thesis 10 omania 1 4 The Netherlands and England 1 Unp39ibhshed paper 3 The Netherlands and Surinarn 1 Mumple Sources 7 Re aponsehri between sender and interv1ewer or target 103 Memodological aspects Acqu mances 2 Sample size no of senders Acquarntances or friends and strangers 2 520 41 Friquot 5 1 21759 43 Intimatesfriends and strangers 1 60192 35 N0 merV ewer 9 Experimental design unable 1quot detemlme from W or 2 W39 insender senders told truths and lies 78 Mm vm o for 611ng Successml 1 65 Betweensenders senders told truths or lies 42 N0 58 In betweensenders designs no of liars Identity relevant 13 Fewer man 20 15 Instrumental I 31 2032 16 Identity and instrumental 8 More man 32 11 In betweensenders designs no of truth tellers Truths and lies Fewer man 20 15 Length ofmessages 20732 13 Under 20 s 14 More than 32 14 20760 S 14 No of messages communicated by each sender More than 60 s 8 1 21 Unable to determine from report 84 59 Message preparation More m 4 40 N0 prepam ion 44 Degree of interaction between sender and interv1ewer or target Messages were prepared 43 N0 mt Ta 12 Some prepared some unprepared 18 Pan memmo 83 Messages were scri te 7 Fully memc we 8 Unable to determine from report 8 0 else 12 Paradigm Unable to de mine from report 4 Described attitudes or facts 44 Reliability of measurement of cuesa Described lms slides or pictures 16 Under 3970 36 Cheating 8 70779 43b Mock crime 8 398073989 251b Card test or guilty knowledge test 8 3990 13900 23gb Unable to determine from report 769 Includes correlational measures as well as percentage of agreement divided by 100 b Number of estimates not number of independent estimates CUES TO DECEPTION 89 what they were seeing truthfully or deceptively In cheating paradigms senders were or were not induced to c eat and then lie about it Mock crime paradigms included ones in which some of the senders were instructed to steal money or to hide supposed contraband on their persons and to then lie to interviewers about their crime Some paradigms involved card tests in whic the senders chose a particular card and answered no when asked if they had that card and guilty knowledge tests in which senders who did or did not know critical information such as information about a crime were asked about that information most of these were modeled a er tests o en used in polygraph testing In persondescription paradigms senders described other people eg people they liked and people they disliked honestly and dishonestly Some paradigms were simulations of job interviews typically in those paradigms senders who were or were not qualified for ajob tried to convince an interviewer that they were quali ed In other paradigms participants described personal experiences eg times during which they acted especially independently or dependently trau matic experiences that did or did not actually happen to them Naturalistic paradigms were defined as ones in which the senders were not instruc ed to tell truths or lies but instead did so of their own accord These included interrogations of suspects later determined to have been lying or telling the truth Hall 1986 Horvath 1973 Horvath Jayne amp Buckley 1994 and a study Koper amp Sahlman 2001 of people who made public statements later exposed as lies In another paradigm senders indicated their responses to a series of items on a personality scale then later lied or told the truth about their answers to those items In a nal category senders who really were or were not experiencing pain sometimes expressed their pain freely ther times masked their pain or feigned pain that they were not experiencing A few other paradigms used in fewer than three independent samples were assigned to a miscellaneous category We recoded the paradigms into two categories to test our prediction that lies about transgressions would produce clearer cues than lies that were not about transgressions The lies about mock crimes or real crimes cheating and other 39 39 quot mm re inn the others as lies that were not about transgressions The two publication statistics that we coded were the year of the report and the source of the report eg journal article dissertation thesis In some instances the same data were reported in two places typically a dissertation and a journal article in those cases we coded the more accessible report ie the journal artic e The methodological aspects of the studies that we coded included the sample size and the design of the study The design was coded as within senders if each sender told both truths and lies or between senders if each sender told either truths or lies This determination was based on the messages that were included in the analyses of the behavioral cues For example if senders told both truths and lies but the cues to deception were assessed fromjust one truth or one lie told by each sender the design was coded as between senders For each betweensenders study we coded the number of liars and the number of truth tellers For all studies we coded the total number of messages communicated by each sender also coded the degree of interaction between the sender and the interviewer or target person Fully interactive paradigms were ones in w 39 nders and interviewers interacted freely with no scripts In partially interactive paradigms the senders and interviewers interacted but the interviewers behavior was typically constrained usually by a prede termined set of questions they were instructed to ask In noninteractive adigms an interviewer or target person was present in the room but di not interact with the sender In still other paradigms the senders told truths and lies usually into a tape recorder with no one else present We categorized each cue as having been either objectively or subjec tively assessed Behaviors that could be precisely defined and measured o en in units such as counts and durations were coded as objectively assessed Cues were coded as subjectively assessed when they were based on observers impressions Behavioral cues were usually coded from videotapes audiotapes or transcripts ofthe truths and lies If reliabilities of the measures of the cues were reported percentages or correlations we recorded them We attempted to compute the effect size for each cue in each study To this end we indicated whether the effect sizes were a ones that could be precisely calculated which we call known e ecm b ones for which only the direction of the effect was known or c effects that were simply reported as not significant and for which we were unable to discern the direction Coding decisions were initially made by James J Lindsay Laura Muhlenbruck and Kelly Charlton who had participated in stande train 39ng procedures discussion of definitions practice coding discussion of disagreements before beginning their tas Each person co ed two thirds of the studies Therefore each study was coded by two people and discrepancies were resolved in conference For objective variables such as the year and the source of the report the percentage of disagreements was close to zero The percenta e ran ed as hi h as 12 for more subjective decisions such as the initial categorization of paradigms into more than 12 different categories However agreement on the two levels of the paradigm 39 that were used in the moderator analysis transgressions vs no transgressions was again nearly perfect Bella M DePaulo also indepen dently coded all study characteristics and any remaining discrepanc39es were resolved in consultation with Brian E Malone who was no involved 39 of the previous codin A metaanalysis of accuracy at detecting deception Bond amp DePaulo 2002 included some ofthe same studies that are in this review Some of the same study characteristics were coded for that review in the same manner as for this one Final decisions about each characteristic were compared across reviews There were no discrepancies MelaAnalytic Techniques E ecl Size Estimate The effect size computed for each behavioral difference was 01 defined as the mean for the deceptive condition ie the lies minus the mean for the truth il condition ie the truths divided by the mean ofthe stande deviations for the truths and the lies Cohen 1988 Positive ds therefore indicate that the behavior occurred more often during lies than truths whereas negative ds indicate that the behavior occurred less often during lies than truths In cases in which means and stande deviations were not provided but other relevant statistics were eg rs Xzs ts or Fs with 1 df or in which corrections were necessary because ofthe use ofwithinsender designs ie the same senders told both truths and lies we used other methods to compute ds eg Hedges amp Becker 1986 Rosenthal 1991 With just a few exceptions we computed effect sizes for every compar ison of truths and lies reported in every study For example if the length of deceptive messages relative to truth il ones was measured in terms of number ofwords and number of seconds we computed both ds If the same senders conveyed different kinds of messages eg ones in which they tried to simulate different emotions and ones in which they tried to mask the emotions they were feeling and separate ds were reported for each we computed both sets of ds We excluded a few comparisons in cases in which the behavior described was uninterpretable outside of the context of the specific study and in which an effect size could be computed but the direction of the effect was impossible to determine Also if preliminary data for a particular cue were reported in one source and more complete data on the same cue were reported subsequently we included on 90 DEPAULO ET AL 396 were set to zero and 155 were assigned the values of 001 Twenty seven 2 of the effect sizes ds were greater than 150 and were windsorized to 150 Estimates of Central Tendency The most fundamental issue addressed by this review is the extent to which each cue is associated with deceit To estimate the magnitude of the effect size for each cue we averaged within cues and within independent samples For example within a particular independent sample all estimates of response length were averaged As a result each independent sample could contribute to the analyses no more than one estimate of any given cue Table 1 shows the number of effect sizes computed for each report and the number of cues assessed in each report If the number of effect sizes is greater than the number of cues then there was more than one estimate of at least one of the cues The mean dfor each cue within each independent sample wasweighted to take into account the number of senders in the sample5 Sample sizes ranged from 5 to 192 M 4173 SD 3193 and are shown in the second column of Table 1 Because larger samples provide more reliable estimates of effect sizes than do smaller ones larger studies were weighted more heavily in the analyses For withinsender designs we weighted each effect size by the reciprocal of its variance For betweensenders designs we computed the weight from the formula 2n1 r12 r11r122n1 n92 n1 M2 012 A mean d is significant if the confidence interval does not include zero To determine whether the variation in effect sizes for each cue was greater than that expected by chance across independent samples we computed the homogeneity statistic Q which is distributed as chisquare with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent samples k minus 1 Thep level associated with the Q statistic describes the likelihood that the observed variance in effect sizes was generated by sampling error alone Hedges amp Olkin 1985 Moderator Analyses We have described several factors that have been predicted to moderate the size of the cues to deception whether an incentive was provided for success the type of incentive that was provided identity relevant or instrumental whether the messages were planned or unplanned the du ration of the messages whether the lies were about transgressions and whether the context was interactive All of the moderator variables except planning were ones that could be examined only on a betweenstudies basis For example it was usually the case that in any given study all of the senders who lied were lying about a transgression or they were all lying about something other than a transgression Conclusions based on those analyses eg that the senders apparent tension is a stronger cue to lies mnm 39 to lies that are not mum 39 are open to alternative interpretations Any way that the studies differed other than the presence or absence of atransgression could explain the transgression differences Stronger inferences can be drawn when the levels of the moderator variable occur within the same study Seven independent samples indi cated in Table 1 included a manipulation of whether senders messages were planned or unplanned6 For each cue reported in each of these studies we computed a d for the difference in effect sizes between the unplanned and planned messages We then combined these ds in the same manner as we had in our previous analyses Of the remaining moderator variables all except one the duration of the message were categorical variables For the categorical moderator vari ables we calculated fixedeffect models using the general linear model regression program of the Statistical Analysis System SAS Institute 85 The model provides a betweenlevels sum of squares QB that can be interpreted as a chisquare testing whether the moderator ariable is a significant predictor of differences in effect sizes A test of the homoge neity 0 effect sizes within each level QW is also provided For the continuous moderator variable the duration of the messages we also used the general linear model leaving duration in its continuous form and tested for homogeneity Hedges amp Olkin 1985 A significant QB indicates that duration did moderate the size of the effect and the direction of the unstandardized beta b weight indicates the direction of the moderation Results Description of the Literature Characteristics of the Senders As indicated in Table 2 the senders in most of the studies were students from the United States who were strangers to the inter viewer or target of their communications In 52 of the 120 inde pendent samples incentives for success were provided to the senders Characteristics of the Truths and Lies The duration ofthe messages was 1 min or less for 28 ofthe 36 samples for which that information was reported The number of samples in which senders were given time to prepare their com munications was about the same as the number in which they were not given any preparation time In 44 of the 120 samples senders told truths and lies about their attitudes or personal facts In 16 others they looked at lms slides or pictures and described them honestly or dishonestly All other paradigms were used in fewer than 9 samples In 21 of the samples senders told lies about transgressions Publication Statistics and Methodological Aspects were published before 1970 Most reports were Journal artrc In 84 of the samples there were fewer than 60 senders The samples included a mean of224 male senders SD 246 and a mean of192 female senders SD 192 In 25 samples all ofthe senders were men and in 15 samples all were women In 16 samples the sex of the senders was not reported Withinsender designs in which senders told truths and lies were nearly twice as common as betweensenders designs in which senders told truths or lies In the betweensenders designs the number of liars was typically the same as the number of truth tellers Senders usually communicated between one and four messages Table 2 also shows that only 3 of the 120 independent samples 39 les 5 Only weighted mean ds are reported and all estimates of a given cue are included in each mean A table of all 1338 individual effect sizes is available from Bella M DePaulo The table includes the weights for each effect size and information about the independence of each estimate The table also indicates whether each estimate was a known effect ie the magnitude could be determined precisely or if only the direction of the effect or its nonsignificance was reported Therefore the information in that table can be used to calculate weighted effect sizes for each cue that include only the known estimates or to compute unweighted means that include all effect sizes or only the precisely estimated ones 6We did not include studies in which planning was confounded with another variable eg Anolli amp Ciceri 1997 CUES TO DECEPTION In most studies there was some interaction between the sender and the interviewer or target In 24 of the 120 samples there was no interaction or there was no one else present when the senders were telling their truths or lies When e reliability of the measurement was reported the reliability was usually high see Table 2 Ofthe 1338 estimates of the 158 cues to deception 273 20 were based on the subjective impressions of untrained raters MetaAnalysis of the Literature Overview We first present the combined effect sizes for each individual cue to deception The individual cues to deception are grouped by our ve sets of predictions Cues suggesting that liars may be less forthcoming than truth tellers are shown in Table 339 cues suggest ing that liars may tell less compelling tales than truth tellers are shown in Table 4 cues suggesting that liars communicate in a less positive and more tense way are shown inTables 5 and 6 respec tively39 and cues suggesting that liars tell tales that are too good to be true are s own in Table 7 Any given cue is included in Tables 377 only if there are at least three independent estimates of it at least two of which could be calculated precisely as opposed to estimates of just the direction of the effect or reports that the effect was not signi cant All other cues are reported in Appendix B Five of the 88 cues that met the criteria for inclusion in the tables but did not t convincingly into any particular table are also included in Appendix B brow raise lip stretch eyes closed lips apart and jaw drop The placement of cues into the ve different categories was to some extent arbitrary For example because bli ing may be indicative of anxiety or arousal we included it in the tense category see Appendix A However decreased blinking can also be suggestive of greater cognitive effort therefore we could have placed it elsewhere Rate of speaking is another example We 91 included that cue under forthcoming because people who are speaking slowly may seem to be holding back However faster speech can also be indicative of confidence C E Kimble amp Seidel 1991 thus we could have included it under compelling certainty instead 1 a e 8 we have arranged the 88 cues the ones based on at least three estimates into four sections by the crossing of the size of the combined effect larger or smaller and the number of independent estimates contributing to that effect more or fewer We also present a stem and leaf display of the 88 combined effect sizes in Table 9 The results of our analyses of the factors that might moderate the magnitude of the differences between liars and truth tellers are presented in subsequent tables Individual Cues to Deception Are liars less forthcoming than truth tellers Table 3 shows the results of the cues indicating whether liars were less forthcom ing than truth tellers We examined whether liars had less to say whether what they did say was less detailed and less complex and whether they seemed to be holding back We had more independent estimates of the length of the re sponses k 49 of any other cue but we found just a tiny and nonsigni cant effect in the predicted direction d 7003 When amount of responding was operationalized in terms of the percentage of the talking time taken up by the social actor com pared with the actor s partner then liars did take up less of that time than did truth tellers d 7035 The entire interaction tended to terminate nonsigni cantly sooner when 1 person was lying than when both were telling the truth d 7020 Our prediction that liars would provide fewer details than would truth tellers was clearly supported d 7030 Extrapolating om reality monitoring theory we also predicted that there would be less sensory information in deceptive accounts than in truthful ones There was a nonsigni cant trend in that direction d 7017 The nding that liars pressed their lips more than truth Table 3 Are Liars Less Forthcoming Than Tmth Tellers Cue N k1 k2 d CI Q Amount of responding 001 Response length 1812 49 26 003 009 003 921 002 Talking time 207 4 3 i035quot 54 016 81 003 Length of inter ction 134 3 2 7020 7041 002 07 Detailed complex responses 004 D 39 883 24 16 030 038 021 762 005 Sensory information RM 135 4 3 7017 7039 006 132 006 Cognitive complexity 294 6 3 7007 7023 010 09 007 Unique words 229 6 3 7010 7026 006 62 Holding back 008 Blocks access to information 218 5 4 010 7013 033 198 009 Respons eri 1330 32 20 002 006 0 1124 010 Rate of speaking 806 23 14 007 003 016 217 011 Presses lips 199 4 3 016quot 001 030 309 Note Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type indicates statist39cal significance N total number of partici ants i the stu ies k1 total number 1 independent effect size s s number of ds that 0 es CI 95 i interval Q 7 omogeneity statistic signi cance indicates rejection ofthe null hypothesis ofhomogeneity of ds g RM reality monitorin lt 05 n o uld be timated precisely conf39dence 92 DEPAULO ET AL Table 4 Do Liars Tell Less Compelling Tales Than Truth Tellers Cue N k1 k2 d CI Q Makes Sense 012 Plausibility 395 9 6 023 036 011 131 013 Logical structure 223 6 6 025 046 004 215 014 Discrepant ambivalent 243 7 3 034quot 020 048 143 Engaging 015 Involved expressive overall 214 6 4 008 006 022 233 016 Verbal and vocal involvement 384 7 3 021 034 008 58 017 Facial expressiveness 251 3 2 012 005 029 96 018 Illustrators 839 16 10 014 024 0 04 23 9 Imme iate 019 Verbal immediacy all categories 117 3 2 031 050 0 13 24 020 Verbal immediacy t poral 109 4 3 0 15 004 0 34 2 3 021 General39zl 275 5 3 010 008 028 02 Selfreferences 595 12 9 0 03 015 009 301 023 Mutual and group references 275 5 4 0 14 031 0 02 4 4 024 Other references 264 6 5 16 001 0 33 025 Verbal and vocal immediacy impressions 373 7 4 0 55 070 0 41 26 3 026 Nonverbal im iacy 414 11 3 0 07 021 0 07 6 9 027 Eye contact 1491 32 17 0 01 006 0 08 41 1 028 Gaze aversion 411 6 4 0 03 011 016 029 Eye shi 218 7 3 011 0 03 025 438 Uncertain 030 Tentative constructions 138 3 3 016 037 005 125 031 Verbal and vocal uncertainty impressions 329 10 4 030quot 017 0 43 11 0 032 Amplitude loudness 177 5 3 005 026 0 15 033 Chin raise 286 4 4 025quot 012 0 37 31 9 034 Shru 321 6 3 004 013 0 21 3 3 Fluent 035 Nonah speech disturbances 750 17 12 000 009 009 605 036 Word and phrase repetitions 100 4 4 021quot 002 041 05 037 Silent aus 655 15 11 001 0 09 011 185 038 Filled pauses 805 16 14 000 0 08 0 08 22 2 039 Mixed pa 280 7 3 003 011 017 3 6 040 Mixed disturbances ah plus nonah 283 7 5 0 04 014 0 23 7 0 041 Ritualized speech 181 4 3 020 006 047 23 042 Miscellaneous dysfluencies 144 8 5 0 17 004 0 38 13 9 Active 043 Body animation activity 214 4 4 011 003 025 117 044 Posture shi s 1214 29 16 005 003 012 141 045 Head movements undifferentiated 536 14 8 002 012 008 94 046 Hand movements 951 29 11 000 008 008 280 m 52 3 3 017 054 020 35 048 Foot or leg movements 857 28 21 009 018 000 205 Note Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type indicates statistical significance N total number of partici ts i t stu ies k1 total number 0 independent effect si ds number of ds that could be estimated precisely CI 95 c nfidence interval Q homogeneity statistic significance indicates rejection ofthe null hypothesis of homogeneity ofds p lt 05 tellers did d 016 was the only cue in the holding back truthful ones we asked whether the lies seemed to make less sense subcategory that was statistically reliable than the truths and whether they were told in a less engaging and In sum the most reliable indicator in terms of the size of the less immediate manner We also asked whether liars seemed more effect and the number of independent estimates that liars may uncertain or less uent than truth tellers and whether they seemed have been less forthcoming than tru tellers was the relatively less active or animated The results are shown in Ta e smaller number of details they provided in their accounts The By all three of the indicators the lies made less sense than the directions of the cues inTable 3 tell a consistent story All except 1 truths They were less plausible d 7023 less likely to be of the 11 cues rate of speaking was in the predicted direction structured in a logical sensible way d 7025 and more likely indicating that liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers though to be intemally discrepant or to convey ambivalence d 034 usually nonsigni cantly so For the four cues to the engagingness of the message the results Are deceptive accounts less compelling than mathfixl ones To of two were as predicted Liars seemed less involved verbally and determine whether deceptive accounts were less compelling than vocally in their selfpresentations than did truth tellers d CUES TO DECEPTION 93 Table 5 Are Liars Less Positive and Pleasant Than Truth Tellers Cue N k1 k2 d CI Q 049 Friendly pleasant overall 216 6 3 7016 7036 005 113 050 Cooperative overall 222 3 3 066 7093 7038 112 051 Attractive overall 84 6 3 7006 7027 016 31 052 Negative statements and complaints 397 9 6 021quot 009 032 215 053 Vocal lea 325 4 2 011 028 005 14 054 Facial pleasantness 635 13 6 012 7022 7002 251 055 Head nods 752 16 3 001 009 011 15 056 Brow lowering 303 5 4 004 7008 016 90 057 259 4 3 002 011 015 381 058 Smiling undifferentiated 1313 27 16 000 7007 007 183 059 Lip comer pull AU 2 284 4 3 000 012 012 19 060 Eye muscles AU 6 not during positive emotions 284 4 4 7001 7013 011 36 Note Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type indicates statistical significance N total number of partici ants in t e studies k1 total number 0 independent effect sizes d f ds that c 39 confidence s number in erval Q 7 omogeneity statistic signific P 7021 They also displayed fewer of the gestures used to illustrate speech d 7014 The set of immediacy cues includes three composite measures and a number of individual immediacy measures The individual cues were the ones described by Mehrabian 1972 that were reported separately in several studies or other cues that seemed to capture the immediacy construct eg Fleming 1994 The com posite measures were verbal immediacy all categories verbal and vocal immediacy and nonverbal immediacy The verbal immedi acy composite is an index consisting of all of the linguistic cate gories described by Wiener and Mehrabian 1968 They are all verbal constructions eg active vs passive voice af rmatives vs negations that are typically coded from transcripts The verbal and vocal immediacy measure is based on raters overall impressions of the degree to which the social actors seemed direct relevant clear and personal The nonverbal immediacy measure includes the set of nonverbal cues described by Mehrabian 1972 as indices ould be estimated precisely CI 11 o 95 t ance indicates rejection of e nu hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes AU facial action unit as categorized by Ekman amp Friesen 1978 lt 05 of immediacy eg interpersonal proximity leaning and facing toward the other person The verbal composite and the verbal and nonverbal composite both indicated that liars were less immediate than truth tellers d 7031 and 7055 respectively Liars used more linguistic con structions that seemed to distance themselves from their listeners or from the contents of their presentations and they sounded more evasive unclear and impersonal The nonverbal composite was only weakly nonsigni cantly suggestive of the same conclusion d 7007 The results of other individual indices of immediacy were inconsistent and unimpressive It is notable that none of the mea sures of looking behavior supported the widespread belief that liars do not look their targets in the eye The 32 independent estimates of eye contact produced a combined effect that was almost exactly zero d 001 and the Q statistic indicatedthat the 32 estimates were homogeneous in size The estimates of gaze aversion were Table 6 Are Liars More Tense Than Truth Tellers Cue N k1 k2 d CI Q 061 Nervous tense overall 571 16 12 027quot 016 038 373 062 Vocal tension 328 10 8 026quot 013 039 254 063 Frequency pitch 294 12 11 021quot 008 034 312 064 Relaxed pos re 488 13 3 002 014 010 196 065 Pupil dilation 328 4 4 039quot 021 056 1 1 066 Blinking 850 17 13 007 001 014 544 067 Object fidgeting 420 5 2 012 026 003 40 068 Selffidgetin 991 18 10 001 009 008 195 069 Facial fidgeting 44 7 4 008 009 0 25 77 070 Fidgeting undifferentiated 495 14 10 016quot 003 028 282 are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type a Note Cue numbers indicates statistical significance N totl independent effect si e s h number of partici n ould be estimated precisely CI 95 s number of ds that c 00 interval Q omogeneity statistic significance indicates rejection ofthe null hypothesis of homogeneity ofds p lt 05 ants i e stu ies k1 total number confidence Table 7 DEPAULO ET AL Do Lies Include Fewer Ordinary Imperfections and Unusual Contents Than Truths Cue N k1 Ir2 d CI Q 071 Unstructured productions 211 5 4 7006 7027 015 248 072 Spontaneous c tions 183 5 5 029 7056 7002 38 073 Admitted l fmemo 183 5 5 042 070 015 187 074 Selfdo 123 4 3 010 042 021 51 075 Selfdeprecatron 64 3 3 021 7019 061 09 076 Contextual beddi 6 6 021 041 000 215 077 V a and nonverbal 39nteractions 163 5 4 7003 7025 019 86 078 Unexpected complications 223 6 5 004 7016 024 22 079 Unusual et ils 223 6 5 016 036 005 95 080 Superfluous details 223 6 5 7001 7021 019 110 081 Related external associations 112 3 3 035quot 002 067 21 082 other s mental state 151 4 4 022 7002 046 72 083 Subjective mental state 237 6 6 002 7018 022 81 ers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type h d Note Cue numb indicates statistical signi cance All oft sis 39 1 39 CI 9 o rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity of s p lt 05 equally unimpressive d 003 Estimates of eye shifts produced just a nonsigni cant trend d 011 The one cue that was consistent with our prediction that liars would seem less certain than truth tellers was verbal and vocal uncertainty as measured by subjective impressions liars did sound more uncertain than truth tellers d 030 One other behavior unexpectedly produced results in the opposite direction More 0 e an truth tellers liars raised their chins d 025 In studies of facial expressions in con ict situations a 39 ular facial constellation called a plus face has been identi ed Zivin 1982 It consists of a raised chin direct eye contact and medially raised brows People who show this plus face during con ict situations are more likely to prevail than those who do not show it or who show a minus face consisting of a lowered chin averted eyes and pinched brows Zivin 1982 That research suggests that raising the chin could be a sign of certainty Mahl and his colleagues eg Kasl amp Mahl 196539 Mahl 1987 have suggested that the large variety of disturbances that occur in spontaneous speech can be classi ed into two functionally distinct categories nonah disturbances which indicate state anxiety Mahl 1987 and the commonplace lled pauses such as ah um and er which occur especially often when the available options for what to say or how to say it are many and complex Berger Karol amp Jordan 198939 Christenfeld 1994 Schachter et al 1991 Ofthe nonah disturbances the most frequently occur ring are sentence changes in which the speaker interrupts the ow of a sentence to change its form or content and super uous repetitions of words or phrases The other nonah 39sturbances are stutters omissions of words or parts of words sentences that are not completed slips of the tongue and intruding incoherent sounds Most studies reported a composite that included all nonah disturbances or one that included nonahs as well as ahs When individual disturbances were reported separately we preserved the distinctions In the uency subcategory we also included silent e cues in this quotD a a l 9 E i E lt is E Q E a m a 3 10 ot n er 50 con dence interval Q d table were code using the CriteriaBased Content es s 2 numberof sthatc u omogeneity statistic signi cance indicates pauses mixed pauses silent plus lled for studies in which the two were not reported separately ritualized speech eg you know Well I mean and miscellaneous dys uencies which were sets of dys uencies that were not based on particular systems such as Mahl s 1987 Results of the uency indices suggest that speech disturbances have little predictive power as cues to deceit The categories of 39sturbances reported most often nonah disturbances lled pauses and silent pauses produced combined effect sizes of 000 000 and 001 respectively Only one type of speech disturbance the repetition of words and phrases produced a sta tistically reliable effect d 021 Under the subcategory of active we included all movements except those de ned as expressive ie illustrators were included in the subcategory of engaging cues and those believed to be indicative of nervousness ie forms of dgeting included in the There were nearly 30 independent estimates of posture shi s d 005 hand movements d 000 and foot or leg movements d 7009 but we found little relationship with deceit for these or any of the other movements In sum there were three ways in which liars told less compelling tales than did truth tellers Their stories made less sense and they told those stories in less engaging and less immediate ways Cues based on subjective impressions of verbal and vocal cues typically rated from audiotapes were most often consistent with predic tions Speci cally liars sounded less involved less immediate an more uncertain than did truth tellers Are liars less positive and pleasant than truth tellers All of the cues that assessed pleasantness in a global way produced results in the predicted direction although some of the effects were small and nonsigni cant see Table 5 A small number of esti mates k 3 indicated that liars were less cooperative than truth tellers d 7066 Liars also made more negative statements and complaints d 021 and their faces were less pleasant d 7 12 CUES TO DECEPTION 95 Table 8 Cues With Larger and Smaller E ea Sizes Based on Larger and Smaller Numbers of Estimates Larger effect size d gt l020l d k Smaller effect size d S l020l k Larger no of estimates k gt 5 025 Verbal and vocal immediacy impressions 7055 7 042 Miscellaneous dys uencies 8 014 Discrepant ambivalent 034 7 070 Fidgeting undifferentiated 14 004 Details 7030 24 9 Friendly pleasant 6 031 Verbal and vocal uncertainty impressions 030 10 24 Other references 6 061 Nervous tense overall 027 16 079 Unusual details 6 062 Vocal tension 026 10 018 Illustrat 16 013 Logical structure 7025 6 054 Facial pleasantness 13 012 Plausibility 023 9 029 E h39 7 063 Frequency pitch 021 12 007 Unique words 6 052 Negative statements and complaints 021 9 048 Foot or leg movements 28 016 Verbal and vocal involvement 7021 7 069 Facial fidgeting 7 076 Contextual embedding 7021 6 015 Involved expressive overall 6 010 Rate of speaking 23 066 Blin ing 17 026 Nonverbal immediacy 11 006 Cognitive complexity 6 051 Attractive 6 044 Posture shifts 29 040 Mixed disturbances ah plus nonah 7 034 S s 6 078 Unexpected complications 6 001 Response leng 49 022 Selfreferences 12 039 Mixed pauses 7 028 Gaze aversion 6 009 Response latency 32 045 Head movements undifferentiated 14 064 Relaxed posture 13 083 Subjective mental state 6 027 Eye contact 32 068 Selffidgeting 18 055 Hea no 16 037 Silent pauses 15 080 Super uous details 6 046 Hand movements 29 058 Smiling undifferentiated 27 5 Nonah speech disturbances 17 038 Filled pauses 16 050 Cooperative overall 073 Admitted lack of memory 065 Pupil dilation 002 Talking time 081 Related external associations 019 Verbal immediacy all categories 072 Spontaneous corrections 033 Chin raise 082 Another s mental state 036 Word and phrase repetitions 075 Selfdeprecation Smaller no of estimates k S 5 wbbbmwwbbmw 041 Ritualized speech 003 Length of interaction 005 Sensory information lips 030 Tentative constructions 020 Verbal immediacy temporal 017 Facial expressiveness 043 Body animation activity 053 Vocal p ea 008 Blocks access to information 021 Generalizing terms 074 Selfdoubt 132 Lips apart AU 25 071 Unstructured productions 131 Eyes clos 032 Amplitude loudness 056 Brow lowering 130 Lip stretch AU 20 077 Descriptions of verbal and nonverbal interactions 057 Sneers 129 Brow raise AU 1 Eye muscles AU 6 not during positive emotions 133 Jaw drop AU 26 059 Lip corner pull AU 12 Jmbmbmbmmwmmbmmbbwmmbwbwbwb Note AU facial action unit as categorized by Ekman amp Friesen 1978 p lt 05 96 DEPAULO ET AL Table 9 Stem and LeafPlot ofCombined Ej ect Sizes for Individual Cues to Deception Stem Leaf 06 6 06 05 5 05 04 04 2 03 559 03 0014 02 02 0011111123 01 5666666777 01 000011122244 00 5566677778889 00 0000001111111222223333344444 Note Included are the 88 cues for which at least three independent effect size estimates were available at least two of which could be computed precisely Each of the more speci c cues to positivity or negativity eg head nods brow lowering sneers produced combined effects very close to zero The most notable nding was that the 27 estimates of smiling produced a combined effect size of exactly zero The measures of smiling in those studies did not distinguish among different types of smiles Ekman 19851992 argued that for smiling to predict deceptiveness smiles expressing genuinely pos itive affect distinguished by the cheek raise facial action unit 6 AU39 as categorized by Ekman amp Friesen 1978 produced by movements 0 e muscles around the outside corner of the eye must be coded separately from feigned smiles Because our review contained only two estimates of genuine smiling and two of feigned smiling the results are reported in Appendix B with the other cues for which the number of estimates was limited The combined effects tend to support Ekman s position When only pretending to be experiencing genuinely positive affect people were less likely to show genuine smiles d 7070 and more likely to show feigned ones d 031 There were no differences in the occurrence of the cheek raise for liars versus truth tellers in studies in which the participants were not experiencing or faking positive emotions d 7001 eg studies of the expression and concealment of pain Also as predicted by Ekman the easily produced lip corner pull AU 12 did not distinguish truths from lies either again producing a combined effect size of exactly zero Are liars more tense than truth tellers Except for two types of dgeting the results of every cue to tension were in the predicted direction though again some were quite small and non signi cant see Table 6 Liars were more nervous and tense overall than truth tellers d 027 They were more vocally tense d 026 and spoke in a higher pitch d 021 Liars also had more dilated pupils d 039 In studies in which different kinds of dgeting were not differ entiated liars dgeted more than truth tellers d 016 However the effect was smaller for facial dgeting eg rubbing one s face playing with one s hair39 d 008 and the results were in the opposite direction for object dgeting eg tapping a pencil twisting a paper clip39 d 7012 and self dgeting eg scratch ing39 d 7001 The best summary ofthese data is that there is no clear relationship between dgeting and lying Do lies include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual con tents than do truths The people who made spontaneous correc tions while telling their stories were more likely to be telling truths than lies d 029 This is consistent with our prediction that liars would avoid behaviors they mistakenly construe as under mining the convincingness of their lies see Table 7 Liars also seemed to avoid another admission of imperfection that tru tellers acknowledge an inability to remember something d 7042 There were also indications that liars stuck too closely to the key elements of the story they were fabricating For example like good novelists truth tellers sometimes describe the settings of their stories liars were somewhat less likely to do this d 7021 for contextual embedding and they provided nonsigni cantly fewer unusual details d 7016 However liars did mention events or relationships peripheral to the key event d 035 for related external associations more o en than truth tellers did Summary of individual cues to deception The most compel ling results in this review are the ones based on relatively large numbers of estimates that produced the biggest combined effects In Table 8 the 88 cues are arrangedinto four sections according to the number of independent estimates and the size of the combined effects On the top half of the table are the cues for which six or more independent estimates were available These were the 50 cues that were above the median in the number of estimates on which they were based see also Field 2001 On the bottom half are the 38 cues for which just three four or ve estimates were available In the rst column are the 23 cues with combined effect sizes larger than 10201 In the second column are the 65 effect sizes equal to 10201 or smaller The value of10201 was selected based on Cohen s 1988 heuristic that effect sizes d of 10201 are small effects Within each section cues with the biggest effect sizes are listed rst39 within cues with the same effect sizes those based on a larger number of estimates k are listed rst Twelve cues are in the larger d and k section These cues were based on at least six independent estimates and produced com bined effects greater than 10201 Half of these cues were from the compelling category including all three of the cues in the subcat e ory makes sense The effects for those three cues indicate that selfpresentations that seem discrepant illogically structured or implausible are more likely to be deceptive than truthful Verbal and vocal immediacy from the immediacy subcategory tops the list Verbal and vocal uncertainty from the subcategory uncer tain is in this section as is verbal and vocal involvement a cue in the subcategory engaging The larger d and k section also includes one of the cues in the forthcoming category details and one from the positive pleas ant category negative statements and complaints There are also three cues from the tense category overall tension vocal tension and pitch and one from the category of ordinary imperfections and unusual details contextual embedding In the larger d and smaller k section of Table 8 are cues that produced relatively bigger effects but were based on smaller numbers of estimates For example a handful of estimates suggest that liars were less cooperative than truth tellers were less likely to admit that they did not remember something and had more dilated pupils CUES TO DECEPTION 97 Some ofthe cues in the smaller d and larger k section ofTable 8 are noteworthy because the very tiny cumulative ds were based on large numbers of estimates For example response length re sponse latenc and eye contact were all based on more than 30 independent estimates but they produced cumulative effect sizes ofjust 7003 002 and 001 respectively Table 9 is a stem and leaf display of the absolute values of the 88 effect sizes The median effect size is just 10101 Only two ofthe effect sizes meet Cohen s 1988 criterion of 10501 for large effects Moderators of Cues to Deception In Tables 377 in which we present the combined results of the estimates of individual cues to deception we included cues only if they were based on at least three effect sizes at least two of which were precise estimates In our moderator analyses we needed to use a more stringent criterion to have a suf cient number of estimates at each level of the moderator variables We began by considering all cues for which we had at least 10 precise estimates Eighteen cues met that criterion response length details response latency rate of speaking illustrators eye contact nonah speech disturbances silent pauses lled pauses posture shi s hand movements foot or leg movements smiling undifferentiated nervous pitch blinking self dgeting and dgeting undifferen tiated Our initial analyses that combined across all estimates as reported in Tables 377 indicated that for some of these cues the estimates were homogeneous Because our predictions were theo retically driven we proceeded to test the moderator variables for all 18 of the cues Four of the cues for which the estimates were homogeneousiillustrators posture shi s smiling undifferenti ated and hand movementsiproduced no signi cant effects in any of our moderator analyses indicating that the size effects was also homogeneous across levels of the moderators For the moderator analyses we report three homogeneity statistics for each moderator The QT statistic indicates the variability among all of the estimates of the cue included in the analysis The QB statistic indicates betweengroups variation Signi cant betvveen groups ef fects indicate that the size of the effects differed across the levels of the moderator The QW statistic indicates variability within each level 0 the moderator variable39 a signi cant value indicates additional variability that has not been explained Motivation to succeed at lying We predicted that cues to deception would be stronger in studies in which the social actors were motivated to get away with their lies than in studies in which no special incentives were provided Table 10 shows the effect sizes for each cue for those two kinds of studies Patterns of eye contact differed signi cantly between the motivated senders and the senders with no special motivation When social actors were motivated to succeed they made signi cantly less eye contact when lying than when telling the truth d 7015 When no special incentive was provided to social actors they made nonsig ni cantly more eye contact when lying d 009 Two of the uency cues nonah disturbances and lled pauses varied with the motivation moderator In studies in which no special incentive was provided there was a small positive effect for both cues deceptive selfpresentations were nonsigni cantly more likely to include nonah disturbances d 013 and lled pauses d 009 than truthful ones However when incentives were provided this effect reversed and deceptive self presentations included nonsigni cantly fewer nonah speech dis turbances d 7010 and lled pauses d 7013 than truthful ones Several cues to tension also discriminated cues to deception under the two motivational conditions Social actors were more tense overall when lying compared with when telling the truth and this effect was signi cant only when they were motivated to succeed d 035 vs 015 Also it was only in the incentive condition that lies were communicated in more highly pitched voices than were truths d 059 vs 7002 Differences in the magnitude of the effects absolute values for studies in which social actors were or were not motivated to succeed are also telling For studies in which there was no special incentive for succeeding cues to deception were generally weak Overall the size of the effects increased somewhat when some incentive was provided Identityrelevant motivations to succeed We had predicted that across all of the estimates in our data set we would nd that liars responses would be shorter than those of truth tellers would be preceded by a longer response latency and would include more silent pauses None of these predictions was supported in the overall analyses However all of these predictions were signi cantly more strongly supported under conditions of identity relevant motivation than under nomotivation conditions see Ta ble 11 Within the identityrelevant condition the effect sizes were nearly signi cant for response length d 7023 and silent pauses d 038 but not signi cant for response latency d 036 In the identityrelevant condition the voice pitch of liars was signi cantly higher than that of truth tellers the effect size was signi cant d 067 and it differed signi cantly from the effect size in the nomotivation condition d 7002 Liars in the identityrelevant condition also made signi cantly fewer foot or leg movements than truth tellers d 7028 however the size of the effect was not signi cantly different when compared with the nomotivation condition d 7002 Instrumental motivations Table 11 also shows cues to decep tion for studies in which the incentives were primarily instrumental eg nancial Only two cues differed signi cantly in size be tween the studies that provided no incentives to the social actors and those that provided instrumental incentives Nonah distur bances d 7017 and lled pauses d 7014 occurred nonsigni cantly less o en in the speech of the liars than of the truth tellers in the studies that provided instrumental incentives In the studies in which no incentives were provided the speech of liars included somewhat more nonah disturbances d 013 and lled pauses d 009 than the speech oftruth tellers Within the instrumentalmotivation condition there were no effect sizes that differed signi cantly from chance Identityrelevant versus instrumental motivations The self presentational perspective predicts stronger effects when incen tives are identity relevant than when they are instrumental Results also shown in Table 11 indicate that the responses of liars tended to be even shorter than those of truth tellers when the social actors were motivated by identityrelevant incentives than when they were instrumentally motivated d 7023 vs 7005 for the difference between conditions p 06 Response latencies were signi cantly longer d 036 vs 7001 and there were some 009 7033 053 Qw k 113 3 98 DEPAULO ET AL Table 10 Cues to Deception When Incentives for Success Were or Were Not Provided Condition Cue No motivation Motivation QT df QE 1 001 Response length d cr 7003 7015 009 7003 7014 008 921 48 00 QW k 596 21 325 28 009 Response latency d CI 004 7017 026 000 7022 022 1124 32 03 QW k 501 18 620 15 010 Rate of speaking d CI 010 7004 025 004 7010 017 217 22 05 QW k 87 8 125 15 027 Eye contact d CI 009 7001 019 0157029 7001 411 31 90 QW k 133 20 188 12 035 Nonah disturbances d CI 013 7015 041 7010 7034 014 605 16 63 QW k 246 7 297 10 037 Silent pauses d cr 7002 7018 015 006 7016 029 185 14 05 QW k 71 8 108 7 038 Filled pauses d CI 009 7003 022 7013 7028 002 222 15 65 QW k 83 8 74 8 048 Foot or leg movements cr 7002 7015 011 0137022 7003 204 27 14 QW k 50 9 140 19 061 Nervous tense c 015 7015 044 035 011 058 373 15 30 QW k 108 8 234 8 063 Frequency pitch d cr 7002 7023 020 059 031 088 312 11 186 QW k 29 6 97 6 066 Blinking d CI 005 7014 025 009 7019 036 544 16 05 QW k 239 9 303 8 068 Selffidgeting d CI 008 7003 018 7012 7025 001 195 17 55 QW k 101 11 39 7 070 Fidgeting undifferentiated d CI 282 13 03 018 7008 043 166 11 of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type Note Cue numbers are indicates statistical significance The Q stat1 e h o esis of homogeneity of effect sizes ds homogeneity among all estimates for a particu ar cue stics are homogeneity statistics significance indicates rejection of herefore bigger s ind39 39 n e 1cate less homogeneity QT 0 freedom QB homogeneity between the 95 confidence interval QW homogeneity of ds within are CI the level of the moderator k number of independent estimates p lt 05 what more silent pauses d 038 vs 7003 for the difference between conditions p 07 There were no cues that were signi cantly or nearly signi cantly stronger in the instrumental motivation condition Unplanned and planned presentations Seven independent samples described in eight reports included a manipulation of whether the senders messages were unplanned or planned Results for 33 speci c cues were reported by the authors However there were only two cues response length and response latency that met our criterion of being based on at least three independent estimates at least two of which were estimated precisely Table 12 shows the results for those cues as well as several others that met a less stringent criterion At least two independent estimates were available and at least one was estimated precisely Those results should be interpreted with caution We computed the effect sizes in Table 12 by subtracting the effect size for the planned messages from the effect size from the unplanned messages Therefore more positive effect sizes indicate that the relationship of the cue to deception was more positive for the unplanned messages than for the planned messages As predicted the combined effect for response latency was statistically reliable d 020 When social actors did not plan their messages there was a longer latency between the end of the question and the beginning of their answer when they were lying Table 11 Cues to Deception Under Conditions of No Motivation IdentityRelevant Motivation and Instrumental Motivation Condition Instrumental Cue No motivation NM Identityrelevant IR IN NM vs IR NM vs IN IR vs IN 001 Response length d c1 70037017011 7023 7048 002 70057021012 596 21 50 8 120 16 QTdf 69528 71636 20523 49 01 36 004 7015 024 036 7011 084 7001 7043 040 502 18 101 6 28 5 QTdf 64923 53222 17110 46 02 42 010 7005 026 006 7028 040 7003 7022 017 87 8 03 3 100 10 QTdf 9010 20017 10512 01 13 02 009 001 017 7019 7050 012 7008 7025 009 133 20 12 3 103 7 QT df 168 22 268 26 119 9 23 32 03 013 7017 043 7017 7053 018 246 7 168 6 QT df 492 12 80 002016013 0387001077 70037036031 71 8 18 3 44 3 QT df 135 10 115 10 98 5 46 00 35 009 7004 023 7014 7032 004 83 8 62 6 QT df 209 13 64 7002 7014 011 028 7051 7006 7009 7022 003 50 9 26 5 90 12 Q W 108 13 146 20 133 16 32 06 17 015 7015 044 7002 7035 031 108 8 33 4 QT W 152 11 12 7002 7015 011 067quot 043 092 29 6 00 3 QT df 170 8 141 005 7011 022 005 7050 039 239 9 03 3 Q W 242 11 00 008 7003 019 7009 7027 009 101 11 13 4 QT df 138 14 24 009 7043 061 011 7043 065 033 7012 078 113 3 06 4 106 6 Q W 119 6 238 8 128 9 00 19 16 o Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type indicates statistical signi cance The Q statistics are homogeneity statistics signi cance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes ds Therefore bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity QT homogeneity among all estimates for a particular cue df degree of freedom QB homogeneity between the two levels of the moderator being compared CI 95 con dence interval QW homogeneity of ds Within the level of the moderator k number of independent estimates p lt 05 100 DEPAULO ET AL Table 12 Cues to Deception Di erences Between Unplanned and Planned Communications Cue k1 k2 d CI Q 001 Response length 6 3 007 7006 020 63 009 Response latency 4 1 020quot 007 034 8 7 018 Illustrators 3 1 003 018 011 0 4 027 Eye contact 3 1 7009 7023 0 06 08 037 Silent pauses 2 2 057 000 114 101 055 Head nods 3 1 011 025 004 31 058 Smiling 3 1 007 008 022 12 070 Fidgetin 3 2 003 019 014 16 undifferentiated Note Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type indicates statistical significance Effect sizes ds were computed by subtracting the d for planned messages from the d for unplanned messages Therefore more positive ds indicate that the behavior was more positively associated with deception for the unplanned messages than for the planned ones k1 total number ofds k2 number of ds that could be estimated precisely CI 95 confidence interval Q homogeneity statistic significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity of ds therefore bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity p lt 05 than when they were telling the truth but when the senders planned their messages they began responding relatively more quickly when lying than when telling the truth There were also somewhat more silent pauses in the deceptive presentations than the truthful ones when those presentations were not planned than when they were planned d 057 p 05 Duration of the presentations We predicted that if social actors needed to sustain their presentations for greater lengths of time cues to deception would be clearer and more numerous We used the mean duration of the messages in each study as an approximation of the degree to which social actors needed to sustain their presentations over time Because duration is a con tinuous variable there are no separate groups Instead a signi cant QB statistic indicates that the effect sizes were not homogeneous ie the moderator was signi cant and the unstandardized beta indicates the direction of the effect There were three cues for which at least eight independent estimates were available response length QB k 13 39 response latency QB 61 k 8 and pitch QB 66 k 8 for all three QB indicated that the effect sizes were not homogeneous across message lengths This means that all three cues varied signi cantly with the duration of the presentations When presentations were sustained for greater amounts of time deceptive responses were especially shorter than truthful ones b 70008 and they were preceded by a longer latency b 0034 Lies relative to truths were also s oken in an especially higher pitched voice when the presentations lasted longer b 0002 Communications that were or were not about transgressions We expected to nd stronger cues to negativity and tension in studies in which social actors lied about transgressions than in those in which the lies were not about transgressions As shown in Table 13 this was an important moderator of cues to deception When the lie was about a transgression compared with when it was not liars took longer to begin responding than did truth tellers d 027 vs 7001 Once they started talking they talked signi cantly faster than truth tellers d 032 vs 001 They also seemed more tense overall d 051 vs 009 and they blinked more d 038 vs 001 A trend suggested that they tended to avoid eye contact more d 7013 vs 004p 07 There were also some cues suggestive of inhibition People lying about trans gressions made fewer foot or leg movements d 7024 vs 7004 and they dgeted less d 7014 vs 007 for self dgeting d 7016 vs 024 for undifferentiated dgeting Once again the effect for nonah disturbances was contrary to expecta tions Lies about transgressions included fewer such disturbances than truths the lies that were not about transgressions included relatively more of them d 7024 vs 017 Within the trans gression condition the effect sizes for response latency rate of speaking nonah disturbances foot or 1e movements tension blinking and self dgeting all differed signi cantly or nearly so from zero Within the notransgression condition only the effect for undifferentiated dgeting differed from zero Overall differences in the magnitude of the cues to deception for lies about transgressions compared with lies about other topics are also noteworthy For 11 of the 12 cues the absolute value of the effect was bigger for the lies about transgressions than for the other lies In some instances however the direction of the effect was contrary to predictions eg nonah disturbances dgetin Interactivity uller dicts greater pleasantness uency composure involvement and immediacy with increasingly interactive contexts Effect sizes differed signi cantly for interactive paradigms relative to nonin teractive ones for three cues details QB 441 pitch QB 821 and blinking QB 1315 Liars offered signi cantly fewer details than truth tellers in interactive contexts d 7033 95 con dence interval CI 7051 7015 k 20 for noninteractive cone s the effect was negligible d 7006 C 7 39k 4 This result does not seem consistent with Buller and Burgoon s predictions Liars in interactive contexts spoke in a signi cantly higher pitched voice than did truth tellers d 03539 CI 007 06439 k 9 for noninteractive contexts there was a very small effect in the opposite direction d 7006 CI 7045 03339 k 3 In that pitch typically rises with stress this result is inconsistent with the prediction that liars would show ore omposure with increasing interactivity Finally liars in noninteractive contexts blinked signi cantly more than truth tell ers d 39 0 3 056 k 4 in interactive contexts there was little difference d 7006 CI 7021 08039 k 2 In that blinking can be a sign of tension this result is consistent with predictions Cues measured objectively and subjectively To test our pre diction that cues based on subjective impressions would more powerfully discriminate truths from lies than cues measured ob jectively we searched the data set for cues that were assessed subjectively and objectively and that had at least three estimates per assessment type Five cues that met the criterion are shown in Table 14 In addition we compared the verbal immediacy com posite Cue 019 which is based on the objective CUES TO DECEPTION 101 Table 13 Cues to Deception When Senders Did and Did Not Commit a T ransgression Condition Cue No transgression Transgression QT df QE 1 001 Response length d CI 7002 7011 008 7008 7025 010 921 48 07 QW k 746 38 167 11 009 Response latency d CI 7007 7024 011 027 7002 055 1124 31 137 QW k 674 24 313 8 010 Rate of speaking d CI 001 7008 010 032 013 052 217 22 66 QW k 87 18 64 5 027 Eye contact d CI 004 7005 014 7013 7033 007 411 31 33 QW k 244 26 133 6 035 Nonah disturbances d CI 017 7004 038 7024 7049 001 605 16 197 QW k 65 11 343 6 037 Silent pauses d CI 7001 7015 014 010 7024 043 185 14 05 QW k 118 10 62 5 038 Filled pauses d CI 001 7013 014 7003 7026 021 222 15 01 QW k 95 11 126 5 048 Foot or leg movements d CI 7004 7012 004 024 7038 7009 204 27 38 QW k 114 21 52 7 061 Nervous tense d CI 009 7011 029 051 028 075 373 15 139 QW k 152 12 82 4 066 Blinking d CI 001 7014 016 038 003 073 544 16 122 QW k 405 13 17 4 068 Selffidgeting d CI 007 7003 017 7014 7028 7000 195 17 57 Qw k 12 55 6 070 Fidgeting undifferentiated d CI 282 13 61 024 002 046 Qw k 181 10 7016 7058 027 41 4 are of the cues described in the current article as indexed 39n Appendix A Bold type Note Cue numbers indicates statistical significanc The Q st e h o esis o homogeneity of effect sizes ds 1 at1stics are homogeneity statistics significance indicates rejection of Therefore bigger Qs indic 39 homogeneity among all estimates for a particu ar cue f de r e f o 95 confidence interval QW homogeneity of ds within ate less homogeneity QT 0 freedom QB ho ogeneity between the are CI the level of the moderator k number of independent estimates p lt 05 fully than did objective measures of immediacy d 7055 vs showed somewhat less eye contact than truth tellers d 7028 there was virtually no difference when eye contact was measured objectively d 004 Similarly subjective impressions of facial pleasantness indicated that liars were signi cantly less facially pleasant than truth tellers d 7020 but this did not occur when facial pleasantness was measured objectively d 007 Discussion Previous perspectives on cues to deception have pointed to the predictive value of factors such as the feelings of guilt or appre hensiveness that people may have about lying the cognitive chal lenges involved in lying and the attempts people make to control their verbal and nonverbal behaviors eg Ekman 19851992 Ekman amp Friesen 196939 Zuckerman et al 1981 Unlike past formulations our selfpresentational perspective is grounded in psychology s growing understanding of the nature of lying in everyday life Lying we now know is a fact of daily life and not an extraordinary event Lies like truths are o en told in the pursuit of identityrelevant goals People frequently lie to make themselves or sometimes others look better or feel better they try to appear to be the kind of person they only wish they could truthfully claim to be B M DePaulo Kashy et al 1996 Now that we have recognized the pedestrian nature of most lie telling in people s lives the factors underscored by others assume their rightful place 102 DEPAULO ET AL Table I4 Cues to Deception Based on Objective and Subjective Measures Measurement Cue Objective Subjective QT df QE 1 004 Details d CI 027 7050 7004 032 7058 7007 762 23 03 QW k 349 14 410 10 019 Verbal immediacy with 025 Verbal vocal immediacy d CI 7031 7073 010 055 7088 7023 287 8 39 QW k 24 3 263 7 026 Nonverbal immediacy d CI 7008 7026 011 7007 7028 014 69 10 00 QW k 22 7 46 4 027 Eye contact d CI 004 7005 012 7028 7058 002 411 31 51 QW k 300 27 59 5 054 Facial pleasantness d CI 007 7018 033 020 7037 7003 251 12 67 QW k 23 8 161 5 064 Relaxed posture d CI 196 12 02 7000 7024 024 Qw k 00 9 7005 7033 023 195 4 e of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A Bold type Note Cue numbers ar indicates statistical signi canc The Q st the h o esis o homogeneity of effect sizes ds at1stics are homogeneity statistics significance indicates rejection of Therefore bigger Qs ind39 39 homogeneity among all estimates for a part1cu ar cue f e o 95 1cate less homogeneity QT 0 freedom QB ho ogeneity between the confidence interval QW homogeneity of ds within are CI the level of the moderator k number of independent est1mates p lt 05 Previous Perspectives on Cues to Deception Feelings While Lying In that the behaviors or feelings that people try to hide with their lies are usually only mildly discrediting feelings of guilt should be mild as well Similarly for most lies the sanctions attendant on getting caught are minimal thus liars should ordinarily seem only slightly more apprehensive than truth tellers Perhaps these faint feelings of guilt and apprehensiveness account for the twinge of discomfort reported by the tellers of everyday lies We believe that the discomfort is also born of the one identityrelevant implication that is common to all liars They are willing to make claims they believe to be untrue Two predictions follow from this analysis First cues to nega tivity and tension will generally be weak However when liars have reason to feel especially guilty about their lies or apprehen sive about the consequences of them as when they are lying about transgressions then those cues should be stronger Consistent with predictions we did nd some of the expected cues in our analyses that combined across all studies For example liars made more negative statements than did truth tellers and they appeared more tense When we looked separately at the lies that were and were not about transgressions we found that the cues to lies about transgressions were more plentiful and more robust than the cues to deception for any level of any of the other moderators we examined In contrast lies that were not about transgressions were barely discrirninable from the truths The selfpresentational perspective accords importance not only to the feelings that liars experience more routinely than do truth tellers but also to the feelings that truth tellers genuinely experi ence and that liars can only try to fake When social actors are truthfully presenting aspects of themselves that are especially important to them they have an emotional investment that is not easily simulated by those who only pretend to have such personal qualities They also have the support of a lifetime of experiences were less compelling For example liars provided fewer details di truth tellers In contrast truth tellers sounded more in volved more certain more direct and more personal Arousal Pupil dilation and pitch did function as cues to deception and could be regarded as supportive of the hypothesized importance of generalized arousal However we believe that it is theoretically and empirically more precise and defensible to interpret these cues as indicative of particular attentional or informationprocessing activities or of speci c affective experiences eg Cacioppo Petty amp Tassinary I989 Ekman et al 198339 Neiss 198839 Sparks amp Greene 1992 Cognitive Complexities Several theoretical statements share the assumption that lie telling is more cognitively challenging than telling the truth e g Buller amp Burgoon 1996 Zuckerman et al 1981 From our CUES TO DECEPTION 103 selfpresentational perspective we instead agree with McCornack 1997 in questioning that assumption Because lie telling is so routinely practiced it may generally be only slightly more chal lenging than telling the truth In the overall analyses combining all estimates of a given cue we found some indications that liars may have been more preoc cupied and more cognitively taxed than truth tellers The level of involvement in their words and in their voices which does not quite measure up to that of truth tellers is one such possibility So too is the impression of uncertainty that they convey The dis crepancies in their selfpresentations may also be telling Some of the expected cues such as the longer response latencies the shorter responses and the more hesitant responses did not emerge in the analyses that combined results across all studies However moderator analyses s ow that as we had predicted these cues were more revealing when the selfpresentations may have been more challenging to generate When social actors could not plan their presentations compared with when they could the response latencies of deceivers were greater than those of truth tellers and their presentations tended to include more silent pauses When presentations were sustained for greater lengths of time liars latencies to respond were again greater than those of truth tellers and their responses were briefer and spoken in a higher pitch Attempted Control From our selfpresentational perspective liars are attempting to control not just their behaviors eg Zuckerrnan et al 1981 but also their thoughts and feelings Truth tellers attempt these forms of selfregulation as well but liars efforts are experienced as more deliberate Deliberate selfregulatory efforts may be especially li ely to usurp men al resources leaving liars more preoccupied than truth tellers Liars tales therefore seem less compelling and less forthcoming Because so many of the little lies that people tell require scant selfregulatory effort the resulting cues generally are weak However when selfregulatory efforts intensify as when social actors are highly motivated especially by identityrelevant goals to get away with their lies then cues intensify too Consistent with our formulation is our nding that motivated liars compared with less motivated ones had even higher pitched voices than truth tellers and they seemed even more tense and inhibited When the motivation was one that linked success at deceit to identity and selfpresentational concerns cues became clearer still When social actors saw their success as re ective of important aspects of themselves compared with when there were no particular incentives their lies were betrayed by the time it took them to begin their deceptive responses relative to their truthful ones the relative brevity of those responses the silent hesitations within them and the higher pitch in which they were spoken Incentives that were not selfrelevant resulted in cues to deception that differed less markedly from the cues that occurred when no special incentive was in place Interactivity In Buller and Burgoon s 1996 interpersonal model of decep tion the central theoretical construct is the degree of interaction between the liar and the target of the lies The model predicts greater involvement and immediacy with greater interactivity but our review found that liars in interactive contexts relative to noninteractive ones provided fewer details than did truth tellers Eye contact a nonverbal immediacy cue did not differentially predict deception in interactive versus noninteractive contexts Buller and Burgoon s model predicts greater composure with greater interaction but we found that higher pitchian indicator of lack of composureiwas a cue to deception in interactive contexts only Blinking was a more powerful cue to deception in noninter active contexts Other cues to composure such as nervousness and dgeting did not vary with the interactivity of the context Their model predicts greater uency with increasing interaction but our analysis indicates interactivity was not a signi cant moderator of any of the cues to uency nonah speech disturbances silent pauses lled pauses We think Buller and Burgoon s 1996 interactivity predictions failed because their construct is theoretically imprecise B M DePaulo Ans eld amp Bell 1996 Totally noninteractive contexts eg leaving a lie on a target person s voicemail dif er om totally interactive ones eg unscripted facetoface interactions in many important ways One is the mere presence of the other person even apart from any interaction with that erson That presence has the potential to affect selfawareness awareness of the potential impact of the lie on that person the salience of selfpresentational goals and feelings of accountability e g Schlenker 200239 Schlenker Britt Pennington Murphy amp Doherty 199439 Wicklund 1982 Interactive exchanges entangle participants in multiple roles and tasks B ler amp Burgoon 199639 Ekman amp Friesen 1969 which can be cognitively challenging However to the extent that interactive exchanges are the more familiar mode of communication participants may nd them less challenging than noninteractive communications From a conver sational analysis perspective the signi cance of interactive pro cesses may lie in the interpretive frame they provide eg Brown amp Levinson 198739 Grice 198939 Jacobs Brashers amp Dawson 199639 McCornack 1992 For example whether a person has provided too little too much unclear or irrelevant information in response to an inquiry is more readily assessed within the context of the conversation than apart from it To Buller and Burgoon what was especially important about interaction is the o ortunity it affords the participants to evaluate the effectiveness of their attempts eg the liars can determine whether their targets seem suspicious and adjust their behavior accordingly Some of the ways in which interactive contexts differ om noninteractive ones may be inconsistent with each other in their implications for cues to deception Clarity should follow not om Buller and Burgoon s 1996 approach of enumerating variables that moderate the effects of interactivity but from looking sepa rately at the important component processes An example of this approach is Levine and McCornack s 1996 2002 analysis of the probing effect which is the counterintuitive nding that com municators who are probed by their targets are perceived as more honest than those who are not probed The initial explanation for this effect was behavioral adaptation Probed communicators rec ognized the skepticism of their targets and adapted their behavior to appear more truthful eg Buller amp Burgoon 199639 Stiff amp Miller 1986 However when Levine and McCornack 2002 manipulated the presence of probes in videotaped interviews in which the communicators behavior was held constant ruling out 104 DEPAULO ET AL the behavioral adaptation explanation the probing effect still occurred The SelfPresentational Perspective on Cues to Deception Ordinary Imperfections and Unusual Contents Only the selfpresentational perspective predicts that lies are characterized by fewer ordinary imper ec 39ons an unusual con tents than truths Drawing from research and theory on credibility assessment eg Yuille 1989 we suggested that liars try to anticipate the kinds of communications that targets would nd credible and that in doing so fall prey to their own misconceptions about the nature of truth telling Some of our results were consis tent with that prediction People who spontaneously corrected themselves and who admitted that they could not remember ev erything about the story they were relating were more likely to be telling the truth than to be lying It was also truth tellers who were somewhat more likely to tell stories richer in contextual embed ding and unusual details The Looks and Sounds ofDeceit Are Faint We found evidence for all ve of the categories of cues we predicted Deceptive presentations relative to truthful ones were in some ways less forthcoming less compelling more negative more tense and suspiciously bereft of ordinary imperfections and unusual details Fundamental to the selfpresentational perspective is the prediction that these cues would be weak In fact they were The median effect size of the 88 cues was just l010l Only 3 of these cues had effect sizes greater than l040l Results of the moderator analyses suggest that pronouncements about the faintness of the signs of deceit are both understated and exaggerated Lies told by social actors who have no special mo tivation to succeed in their presentations and lies that are not about transgressions leave almost no discernible cues Even some of the cues that did seem promising in the results combined across all estimatesifor example cues to tension and to pitchilost a bit of their luster for W 39 that 39 and that were not driven by any particular incentives These nearly cueless lies most closely resemble the deceptive presentations of self in everyday life However when social actors were using their lies to hide matters that could spoil their identities such as when they were lying about transgressions and when their success at lying was linked to important aspects of their selfconcepts then cues to deception were no longer quite so faint were not ahmn When Will Cues to Deception Be Clearer Using our selfpresentational perspective we were able to pre dict some important moderators of the strength of cues to decep tion In this section we consider ve other ways in which the results of our overall analyses may have underestimated the po tential for verbal and nonverbal cues to separate truths from lies First perhaps effect sizes for cues to deception would be more impressive if they were computed separately for the different emotions that senders may be trying to conceal or to convey Ekman 19851992 There were not enough relevant studies available to test this possibility adequately in the present review Second in this review as in most of the studies in the literature we tested the predictive power of each behavioral cue individually However the degree to which lies can be discriminated from truths could potentially be improved if combinations of cues were con sidered eg Ekman O Sullivan Friesen amp Scherer 199139 Vrij Edward Roberts amp Bull 2000 Third if the replicability of a set of cues within a particular context can be established the impli cations could be important even if the particular cues could not be generalized to different contexts For example behavioral cues believed to be indicative of deceit in the context of polygraph testing e g Reid amp Arthur 1953 or criminal interrogations e g Macdonald amp Michaud 1987 are worth establishing even if some of them occur infrequently outside of those contexts Fourth it is possible that particular individuals telegraph their lies in idiosyn cratic yet highly reliable ways Vrij amp Mann 2001 that are not captured by our metaanalytic approach Finally our results sug gest that truths and lies may be discriminated more powerfully by using subjective measures rather than objective ones However detailed coding systems that are carefully validated and used to test theoretically based predictions may enable more precise discrim inations than untrained observers could achieve with their subjec tive impressions eg Ekman amp Friesen 197839 Scherer 1982 When Truths and Lies Switch Sides It is important to emphasize that there are exceptions to the predictions we derived from the selfpresentational perspective There are times when people more readily embrace their deceptive presentations than their truthful ones For example a man who has long fantasized about being a war hero and has claimed repeatedly to have been one may eventually make that false claim more convincingly than he can describe his actual waryear experiences teaching in his homeland which was at peace There are also times w en truthful presentations are enacted with a greater sense of deliberateness than are deceptive ones Selfincriminating tru s are examples ofthis cf Kraut 1978 When the tables are turned the cues are too it is the truth tellers who seem less forthcoming more tense and more negative and it is they who tell stories that sound less compelling The behaviors we have described as cues to deception then may be more accurately described as cues to the h othesized processes eg attempts to regulate thoughts feelings and behav iors and to psychological states eg investment in and famil iarity with the attempted performance Experimental research that directly tests the role of these processes in producing the predicted cues remains to be done Cues to Truths to Personalities and to Situations Our use of the term cues to deception could suggest that we are describing the ways that liars behave but in fact we are describing the ways in which liars act differently than truth tellers Experi mental manipulations and individual differences can be linked to cues to deception by their implications for the behavior of liars or truth tellers or both For example in a study in which participants were selected because they saw themselves as very independent B M DePaulo et al 1991 the truthful life stories they told that showcased their independence were more responsive to the exper imental manipulations than were the life stories that were fa rica ed CUES TO DECEPTION 105 Caution is also in order in interpreting the moderators of cues to deception For example when we say that eye contact is a cue to deception when senders are motivated to get away with their lies but not when they are not motivated we are not necessarily claiming that liars more o en avoid eye contact when they have an incentive to succeed than when they do not though they may Instead we are saying that the degree to which liars avoid eye contact more than truth tellers do is greater when they are moti vated to succeed than when they are not The cues we describe in our analyses of motivation as a moderator are not cues to motiva tion that is a different question they are cues to deception under different levels of motivation For example people telling lies in high stakes circumstances eg while on trial for murder may be expected to seem more nervous than people telling comparable lies when the stakes are lower eg in traf c court But truth tellers may also seem more nervous in the high stakes setting Nervousness would only be a cue to deception in the murder trial if liars feel even more nervous than truth tellers It would be a stronger cue to deception in the murder trial than in traf c court only if the degree to which liars are more nervous than truth tellers is greater in the murder trial than in traf c court To make these important distinctions clearer in future research we suggest investigators adopt a reporting style that has rarely been used in the deception literature Mean levels of the cues should be reported separately for truths and lies at each level of the experimental manipulations and for each of the individual differ ence categories Results could then be analyzed in the familiar factorial That would clearly indicate for example whether people seem more nervous when the stakes are high than when they are low regardless of whether they are lying or telling the truth39 whe ey are more nervous when lying when telling the truth regardless of the stakes and whether the degree to which they are more nervous when lying than when telling the truth is greater when the stakes are high than when they are low The implications for our understanding of individual differences are also important For example we claimed above that liars make an effort to seem credible whereas truth tellers take their credibility for granted This may seem readily countered by the familiar nding from the social anxiety literature indicating that socially anxious people rarely take anything positive about themselves for granted eg B M DePaulo Kenny Hoover 39 198739 Leary amp Kowalski 199539 Schlenker amp Leary 1982 but that is a maineffect nding about the ways in which socially anxious people differ from socially secure people If socially anxious people do indeed feel insecure about the credibility of their truths but they feel even more insecure about the credibility of their lies then the predictions we outlined should apply to them as well as to others When Confounded Designs Are of Practical Signi cance All of the studies of transgressions were marred by a confound The people who lied were only those who committed a transgres sion and the people who told truths were only those who did not It is not clear then whether any of the resulting cues were cues to deception at all They may have been cues to the transgression From a scienti c stance we have no unambiguous data from these studies about the ways that lies differ from truths However when considered from an applied perspective these studies may tell practitioners exactly what they want to know We do not wish to minimize the frequency or signi cance of false confessions Kas sin 1997 but ordinarily credibility is not much at issue when people admit to discrediting acts Of greater interest are the ways in which truthful denials canbe distinguished from deceptive ones Blurring the Line Between Truths and Lies In the studies we reviewed the line between truths and lies was drawn clearly There were good methodological reasons for this To distinguish the characteristics of lies from those of truths it is of course necessary to rst distinguish lies from truths However outside of the lab the line between them is o en blurred The selfpresentational perspective underscores the similarities between truths and lies Telling the whole truth and nothing but the truth is rarely possible or desirable All selfpresentations are edited The question is one of whether the editing crosses the line from the honest highlighting of aspects of identity that are most relevant in the ongoing situation to a dishonest attempt to mislead This suggests that truthful and deceptive selfpresentations may be construed more aptly as aligned along a continuum rather than sorted into clear and distinct categories But there may be cate gorical aspects as well For exam e B R Schlenker 1982 distinguished among selfpresentations that t within people s private latitudes of acceptance neutrality or rejection cf Sherif amp Hovland 1961 Selfpresentations that are well within the bound aries of the latitude of acceptance are clearly truths These presen tations capture attitudes feelings and personal qualities that peo ple unambiguously accept as their own Selfpresentations that are a the cusp of the latitude of acceptance just barely pass as truths Selfpresentations that are well within people s private latitudes of rejection are clearly lies The most elusive statements are those falling in the latitude of neutrality the editing of these self statements slips beyond the bounds of honesty but stops just short of the brink of deceit One implication of this conceptualization is that the effect sizes we reported for cues to deception though generally small may actually be overestimates of the true differ ences between truths and lies in everyday life McComack 1997 In the studies we reviewed the truths and lies were typically well within the bounds of acceptance and rejection In many naturalistic situations they are not De nitional dilemmas also arise in situations in which neither truths nor lies are entirely satisfying to people trying to decide what to say Bavelas Black Chovil and Mullett 1990a 1990b have described many of these intriguing predicaments in which people may prefer not to lie but dislike the alternative of telling a hurtful or costly truth For example what do people say when an acquaintance asks their opinion of a class presentation that was poorly organized and badly delivered Bavelas et al s 1990a 1990b answer was that they equivocate They make themselves unclear39 they refrain from answering the question directly an avoid stating their true opinions Yet Bavelas et al 1990a 1990b argued that equivocal answers are truthful When participants in those studies read the responses to the classmate they rated the responses as closer to the truthful end of the scale labeled as presentation was poorly organized and badly delivered than closer to the deceptive end labeled as well organized and well delivered This criterion of truthfulness bypasses the question of 106 DEPAULO ET AL intentionality The perceivers of selfpresentations have the full authority to make the judgments that determine what counts as deceptive We are not yet ready to hand over that authority to the perceiv ers De nitional issues aside though we think that studies of social actors responses to communicative dilemmas such as the ones described by Bavelas et al 1990a 1990b are important for another reason They point to some of the ways in which people s selfpresentational strategies can be more imaginative and their goals more complex than much of the current literature on cues to deception might suggest In a pair of studies B M DePaulo and Bell 1996 created the kind of dilemma that Bavelas et al 1990a 1990b described Students chose their favorite and least favorite paintings from ones on display in the room an then each interacted with an artist who claimed that the student s least favorite painting was one of her own When students were asked what they thought of that painting they amassed misleading evidence ie they mentioned aspects of the painting they really did like while neglecting to note all of the aspects they disliked and they implied that they liked the painting by emphasizing how much they disliked other paint ings in the room that were painted by other artists without stating directly that they liked the painting in question B M DePaulo and Bell 1996 posited a defensibility postulate to account for these ploys The students were trying to communicate in ways that could be defended as truthful e g they really did like the aspects of the paintings they mentioned and they really did dislike the other artists work but that would also mislead the artist about their true opinions These strategies are not captured by any of the objectively measured cues we reviewed Yet they provide hints about what people are trying to accomplish in these challenging situations that are perhaps more telling than what can be learned by counting behaviors such as foot movements and speech disturbances Laboratory Lies The studies we reviewed included lies told by criminal suspects and people in the news but in most of the studies college students told truths and lies in laboratory experiments One common cri tique of such studies eg Miller amp Stiff 1993 is that the participants typically are not highly motivated to get away with their lies In many of these studies there were neither rewards for successful lies nor sanctions for unsuccessful ones Moreover the participants often told their truths and lies because they were instructed to do so as part of the experimental procedures they did not freely choose to lie or to tell the truth A related critique Miller amp Stiff 1993 is that in many studies the degree of interaction between the social actor and another person was minimal39 some times participants told their truths and lies with little or no feed back or skepticism from any other person Al ough these critiques are often cast as attacks on the ecolog ical validity of studies of deception as such they may be largely wrong The critiqued characteristics of studies of deception may in fact aptly capture the nature of the vast majority of lies B M DePaulo Ans eld amp Bell 199639 B M DePaulo Kashy et al 1996 The everyday lies that people tell are rarely consequential In many instances they are essentially obligatory The guest who is treated to an extensively prepared but unpalatable dinner rarely feels free to say truthfully that the food was disgusting The students whose latenight partying has interfered with the timely completion of their takehome exams tell lies to the course instruc tor just as readily as if they had been explicitly instructed to do so Furthermore the little lies of everyday life rarely trigger an ex tended discourse The host or hostess nods in appreciation and the course instructor waits for the students to depart before rolling his or her eyes One way that truths and lies told in the laboratory really may fail to re ect the dynamics of selfpresentation outside of the lab is that people may be more selfconscious about their truthful presenta tions than they are ordinarily If this is so then the feeling of deliberateness that we have underscored in our analysis may separate truths from lies less de nitively in the lab In this respect e effect sizes of the cues to deception we have reported may underestimate the true magnitude of the effects Discriminating Cues to Deception From Cues to Other Processes and States We have combined the results of more than 1300 estimates of the relationship between behaviors and deceit39 therefore we can name with some con dence some of the cues to deceit But the behaviors that are indicative of deception can be indicative of other states and processes as well In fact we used a consideration of such states and processes to generate predictions about the kinds of behaviors we might expect to be indicative of deceit However the issue of discriminant validity still looms large For example is it possible to distinguish the anxiety that is sometimes associated with lying from the fear of being unfairly accused of lying eg Bond amp Fahey 1987 or even from anxiety that has no necessary connection to deceit eg nervousness about public speaking shyness distress about a personal prob em Lying s 39 results in verbal and nonverbal inconsistencies but so does genu ine ambivalence B M DePaulo amp Rosenthal 1979a 1979b Can the two be differentiated Some attempts have been made to begin to address these kinds of issues e g deTurck amp Miller 1985 and we expect to see some progress in the future However we also expect most future reports to end with the same cautionary note we issue here Behavioral cues that are discernible by human perceiv ers are associated with deceit only probabilistically To establish de nitively that someone is lying further evidence is needed References References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in the metaanalysis AlonsoQuecuty M 1992 Deception detection and reality monitoring swer to an old question In F Losel D Bender amp T Bliesener Eds Psychology and law International perspectives pp 328 7332 New York de Gruyter Arnbady N amp Rosenthal R 1992 Thin slices ofexpressive behavior as predictors of interpersonal consequences A metaanalysis Psychologi cal Bulletin 111 2567274 Anderson D E DePaulo B M amp Ans eld M E 2002 The devel opment of deception detection skill A longitudinal study of same sex friends Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 5367545 Anolli L amp Ciceri R 1997 The voice of deception Vocal strategies of naive and able liars Journal ofNonverbal Behavior 21 2597284 CUES TO DECEPTION 107 Bagley J amp Manelis L 1979 Effect of awareness on an indicator of cognitive load Perce tual and Motor Skills 49 5917594 Bargh J A 1989 Conditional automaticity Varieties of automatic in uence in social perception and cognition In J Uleman amp J A Bargh Eds Unintended thought pp 3751 New York Guilford Press Baumeister R F 1998 The self In D T Gilbert S T Fiske amp G Lindzey Eds Handbook of social psychology 4th ed Vol 1 pp 6807740 Boston McGrawHill Baumeister R F Bratslavsky E Muraven M amp Tice D M 1998 Ego depletion Is the active self a limited resource Journal ofPerson l39ty and Social Psychology 74 125271265 Baumeister R F Stillwell A M amp Heatherton T F 1994 Guilt An interpersonal approach Psychological Bulletin 115 2437267 avelas J B Black A C ovil N amp Mullett J 1990a Equivocal communication Newbury Park CA Sage Bavelas J B Black A Chovil N amp Mullett J 1990b Truths lies and equivocations The effects of con icting goals on discourse Journal of Language and Social Psychology 9 1357161 Bell K L amp DePaulo B M 1996 Liking and lying Basic andApplied Social Psychology 18 2437266 BenShakhar G amp Elaad E in press The validity of psychophysiolog l d A meta B ical detection of deception with the Guilty Know e ge Test analytic study Journal of Applied Psychology Ber C R Karol S H amp Jordan J 1989 When a lot of knowledge is a dangerous thing The debilitating effects of plan com plexity on verbal uency Human Communication Research 16 917 119 Berrien F amp Huntington G H 1943 An exploratory study of pupillary responses during deception Journal of Experimental Psychol ogy 32 4437449 Bok S 1978 Lying Moral choice in public and private li e New York P th an eon Bond C F Jr amp DePaulo B M 2002 Accuracy and truth bias in the detection of deception A metaanalytic review Manuscript in paration Bond C F Jr amp Fahey W E 1987 False suspicion and the misper ception of deceit British Journal ofSocial Psychology 26 41746 Bond C F J K e K N amp Paolicelli L M 1985 The miscom munication of deception An adaptive perspective Journal of Experi mental Social Psychology 21 3317345 Bond C F Jr Omar A Mahmoud A amp Bonser R N 1990 Lie detection across cultures Journal ofNonverbal Behavior 14 189 7204 Bradley M T amp Janisse M P 19791980 Pupil size and lie detection The effect of certainty on detection Psychology A Quarterly Journal of Human Behavior 16 33739 Bradley M T amp Janisse M P 1981 Accuracy demonstrations threat and the detection of deception Cardiovascular electrodermal and pu pillary measures Psychophysiology 18 3077315 BrownP ampLevinson S 1987 Politeness Some universals in language usage New York Cambridge University Press Buller D B amp Aune R K 1987 Nonverbal cues to deception among intimates friends and strangers Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 11 2697290 Buller D B amp Burgoon J K 1996 Interpersonal deception theory Communication Theory 3 2037242 Buller D B oon J K Buslig A amp Roiger J 1996 Testing interpersonal deception theory The language of interpersonal deception Communication Theory 6 2687289 Buller D B Comstock J Aune R K amp Strzyzewski K D 1989 39 I l A L l Burgoon J K Buller D B Afi W White C amp Buslig A 1996 May The role of immediac n deceptive interpersonal interactions Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communica tion Association Chicago IL Burgoon J K Buller D B Floyd K amp Grandpre J 1996 Deceptive realities Sender receiver and observer perspectives in deceptive con versations Communication Research 23 7247748 Burgoon J K Buller D B Guerrero L K A fi W A amp Feldrnan M 1996 Interpersonal deception XII Information management dimensions underlying deceptive and truth il messages Communication 0 769 Bums J A amp Kintz B L 1976 Eye contact while lying during an interview Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 877 89 Butterworth B 1978 Maxims for studying conversations Semiotica 24 177339 Butterworth B amp GoldrnanEisler F 1979 Recent studies on cognitive rhythm In A W Siegman amp S Feldstein Eds Ofspeech and time Temporal patterns in interpersonal contexts pp 2117224 Hillsdale NJ Erlbaum Cacioppo J T Petty R E amp Tassinary L G 1989 Social psycho physiology A new look In L Berkowitz Ed Advances in e47erimen tal social psychology Vol 22 pp 39791 San Diego CA Academic Press Camden C Motley M T amp Wilson A 1984 White lies in interper sonal communication A taxonomy and preliminary investigation of social motivations Western Journal of Speech Communication 48 30 7 25 Carver C S amp Scheier M F 1981 Attention and selfregulation A controltheory approach to human behavior New York Springer ag er Chiba H 1985 Analysis of controlling facial expression when experi encing negative affect on an anatomical basis Journal ofHuman De velopment 2 22729 Christenfeld N J S 1994 Options and ums Journal ofLanguage and Social Psy hology 13 1927199 Christensen D 1980 Decoding of intended versus unintended nonver messages as a function of social s 39 anxiety Unpublished doctoral dissertation University of Connecticut Storrs Ciofu I 1974 Audiospectral analysis in lie detection Archiv fur Psy chologie 126 1707180 C y M J Lee W S amp Chao E Y 1989 Telling lies Correlates of deception among Chinese In J P Forgas amp J M Innes Eds Recent advances in social psychology An international perspective pp 3597 368 Amsterdam NorthHolland Cody M J Marston P J amp Foster M 1984 Deception Paralinguis tic and verbal leakage In R N Bostrom amp B H Westley Eds Communication yearbook 8 pp 4647490 Beverly Hills CA Sage Cod J amp O Hair H D 1983 Nonverbal communication and deception Differences in deception cues due to gen er and communi cator dominance ommunication Monographs 50 175 Cohen J 1988 Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences Rev ed Hillsdale NJ Erlbaum Cooper H 1998 Synthesizing research A guide for literature reviews 3rd ed Beverly Hills CA Sage Crai K D H amp Patrick C J 1991 Genuine suppressed and faked facial behavior during exacerbation of chronic low back pain Pain 46 6 7172 Cutrow R J Parks A Lucas N amp Thomas K 1972 The objective use of multiple physiological indices in the detection of deception 39 39 39 39 9 5787588 The effect ofprobing on Behavior 13 1557170 Burgoon J K amp Buller D B 1994 Interpersonal deception III Effects of deceit on perceived communication and nonverbal behavior dynamics Journal ofNonverbal Behavior 18 1557184 DePaulo B M 1992 Nonverbal behavior and selfpresentation Psycho logical Bulletin 111 2037243 DePaulo B M 1994 Spotting lies Can humans do better Current Directions in Psychological Science 3 837 86 108 DEPAULO ET AL DePaulo B M Ansfield M E amp Bell K L 1996 Theories about deception and paradigms for studying it A critical appraisal of Buller and Burgoon s interpersonal deception theory and research Communi cation Theory 3 2977310 DePaulo B M Ansfield M E Kirkendol S E amp Boden J M 2002 Serious lies Manuscript submitted for publication DePaulo B M amp Bell K L 1996 Truth and investment Lies are told to those who care Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 71 7037716 DePaulo B M Blank A L Swain G W amp Hairfield J G 1992 Expressiveness and expressive control Personality and Social Psychol DePaulo B M Epstein J A amp LeMay C S 1990 Responses of the socially anxious to the prospect of interpersonal evaluation Journal of Personality 58 6237640 DePaulo B M amp Friedman H S 1998 Nonverbal communication In D Gilbert S T Fiske amp G Lindzey Eds Handbook of social psychology 4th ed Vol 2 pp 3740 New York Random Ho DePaulo B M Irvine A amp Laser P S 1982 Age changes in the detection of deception Child Development 53 7017709 DePaulo B M amp Kashy D A 1998 Everyday lies in close and casual relationships Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 63779 DePaulo B M Kash D A Kirkendol S E Wyer M M amp Epstein J A 1996 Lying in everyday life Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70 9797995 DePaulo B M Kenny D A Hoover C Webb W amp Oliver P 1987 Accuracy of person perception Do people know what kinds of impres sions they convey Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52 3037315 DePaulo B M amp Kirkendol S E 1989 The motivational impairment effect in the communication of deception In J C Yuille Ed Credi bility assessment pp 51770 Dordrecht the Netherlands Kluwer Academic DePaulo B M Kirkendol S E Tang J amp O Brien T P 1988 The motivational impairment effect in the communication of deception Replications and extensions Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 12 1777 2 2 0 DePaulo B M Lanier K amp Davis T 1983 Detecting the deceit of the motivated liar Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45 109671103 DePaulo B M LeMay C S amp Epstein J A 1991 Effects of importance of success and expectations for success on effectiveness at deceiving Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17 14724 DePaulo B M ampRosenthal R 1979a Ambivalence discrepancy and deception in nonverbal communication In R Rosenthal Ed Skill in onverbal communication pp 204 7248 Cambridge MA Oelge schlager Gunn amp Hain DePaulo B M amp Rosenthal R 1979b Telling lies Journal ofPerson ality and Social Psychology 37 171371722 DePaulo B M Rosenthal R Green C R amp Rosenkrantz J 1982 Diagnosing deceptive and mixed messages from verbal and nonverbal cues Journal ofExper39imental Social Psychology 18 4337446 DePaulo B M Rosenthal R Rosenkrantz J amp Green C R 1982 Actual and perceived cues to deception A closer look at speech Basic and Applied Social Psychology 3 2917312 DePaulo B M S n I amp Lassiter G D 1985a Deceiving and detecting deceit In B R Schlenker Ed The selfand social lie pp 3237370 New York McGrawHill DePaulo B M Stone J I amp Lassiter G D 1985b Telling ingratiating lies Effects of target sex and target attractiveness on ver and non verbal deceptive success Journal of Personality and Social Psychol ogy 48 119171203 DePaulo P J amp DePaulo B M 1989 Can attempted deception by salespersons and customers be detected through nonverbal behavioral cues Journal oprplied Social Psychology 19 155271577 deTurck M A amp Miller G R 1985 Deception and arousal Isolating the behavioral correlates of deception Human Communication Re search 12 7 01 di Battista P amp Abrahams M 1995 The role of relational information in the production of deceptive messages Communication Reports 8 12 7 27 Dulaney E F Jr 1982 Changes in language behavior as a inction of veracity Human Communication Research 9 75782 Ekman P 1992 Telling lies New York Norton Original work pub lished 1985 Ekman P amp Friesen W V 1969 Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception Psychiatry 32 887106 E Friesen W V 1972 Hand movements Journal of Communication 22 3537374 Ekman P amp Friesen W V 1978 Thefacial action coding system Palo Alto CA Consulting Psychologists Press Ekman P Friesen W V amp O Sullivan M 1988 Smiles while lying Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 4147420 Ekman P Friesen W V amp Scherer K R 1976 Body mo ement and voice pitch in deceptive interactions Semiotica 16 2 7 7 Ekman P Friesen W V amp Simons R C 1985 Is the startle reaction an emotion Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 41 7 1426 kman P Levenson R W amp Friesen W V 1983 September 16 Autonomic nervous system activity distinguishes among emotions Sci ence 22 120871210 Ekman P O Sullivan M Friesen W V amp Scherer K R 1991 Face voice and body in detecting deceit Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 15 1257135 Elliott G L 1979 Some effects of deception and level of self monitoring on planning and reacting to a selfpresentation Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 128271292 Exline R V Thibaut J Hickey C B amp Gumpert P 1970 Visual interaction in relation to Machiavellianism and an unethical act In R Christie amp F Geis Eds Studiesin Machiavellianism pp 53775 New York Academic Press Feeley T H amp deTurck M A 1998 The behavioral correlates of sanctioned and unsanctioned deceptive communication Journal ofNon verbal Behavior 22 1897204 Fehr B J amp Exline R V 1987 Social visual interaction Conceptual and literature review In A W Siegman el stein Eds Nonver bal behavior and communication 2nd ed pp 2257326 Hillsdale NJ Erlbaum Feldman R S DevinSheehan L amp Allen V L 1978 Nonverbal cues as indicants of verbal dissembling American Educational Research Journal 15 2177231 Feldman R S Forrest J A amp Happ B R 2002 Selfpresentation and verbal deception Do selfpresenters lie more Basic and Applied Social Psychology 24 1637170 Field A P 2001 Metaanalysis of correlation coefficients A Monte Carlo comparison of fixed and randomeffects methods Psychological Methods 6 1617180 Fiedler K 1989 Suggestion and credibility Lie detection based on contentrelated cues In V A Gheorghiu P Netter H J Eysenck amp R Rosenthal Eds Suggestion and suggestibility pp 3237335 New York SpringerVerlag Fiedler K Schmid J Kurzenhauser S amp Schroter V 1997 Lie detection as an attribution process The anchoring e ect revisited Unpublished manuscript Fiedler K amp Walka I 1993 Training lie detectors to use nonverbal cues instead of global heuristics Human Communication Research 20 1997223 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Advances in experimental social psychology 23 249 7303 Gilbert D T ampKrull D S 1988 Seeing less and knowing more The benefits of perceptual ignorance Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 1 0 Gilbert D T Krull D S amp Pelham B W 1988 Of thoughts unspo ken Social inference and the selfregulation of behavior Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55 6857 694 3quot F196 39 quot 39 39 I 39 splint1n mu speech New York Academic Press Goldstein E R 1923 Reaction times and the consciousness of decep tion American Journal ofPsychology 34 5627581 Greene J O O Hair H D Cody M J ampYen C 1985 Planning and control of behavior during deception Human Communication Re search 11 3357364 Grice P 1989 Studies in the way ofwords Cambridge MA Harvard University Press Gross J J 1998 Antecedent and responsefocused emotion regulation Divergent consequences for experience expression and physiology Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 224 7237 Gross J J amp Levenson R W 1993 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55768 Hess E H ampPolt J M 1963 March 13 Pupil size in relation to mental activity during simple problemsolving Science 140 11907 192 Hess U 1989 On the dynamics of emotional facial expression Un published doctoral dissertation Dartmouth College Hanover NH Hess U amp Kleck R E 1990 Differentiating emotion elicited and deliberate emotional facial expressions European Journal of Social Psychology 20 3697385 Kleck R E 1994 The cues decoders use in attempting to differentiate emotionelicited and posed facial expressions European Journal ofSocial Psychology 24 3677381 Hocking J E amp Leathers D G 1980 Nonverbal indicators of decep tion A new theoretical perspective Communication Monographs 47 131 Holland M K amp Tarlow G 1972 Blinking and mental load Psycho logical Reports 31 1197127 Holland M K amp Tarlow G 1975 Blinking and thinking Psycholog ical Reports 41 4037406 Holtgraves T 1986 Language structure in social interaction Perceptions of irect and indirect speech acts and interactants who use them Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 3057 14 Horvath F S 1973 Verbal and nonverbal clues to truth and deception during polygraph examinations Journal of Police Science and Admin istration 1 1387152 Horvath F 1978 An experimental comparison of the psychological stress evaluator and the galvanic skin response in detection of deception Journal oprplied Psychology 63 33873 4 Horvath F 1979 Effect of different motivational instructions on de tection of deception with the psychological stress evaluator and the galvanic skin response Journal oprplied Psychology 64 3237330 Horvath F Ja e B amp Buckley J 1994 Differentiation of truth sl and deceptive criminal suspects in behavior analysis interviews Journal ofForensic Sciences 39 7937807 Jacobs S Brashers D amp Dawson J 1996 Truth and deception Communication Monographs 63 9871 3 Janisse M P amp Bradley M T 1980 Deception information and the pupillary response Perceptual and Motor Skills 50 7487750 Johnson M K amp Raye C L 1981 Reality monitoring Psychological Bulletin 88 67785 Jones W H amp Burdette M P 1993 Betrayal in close relationships In A L Weber amp J Harvey Eds Perspectives on close relationships pp 1714 New York Allyn amp Bacon Kahneman D 1973 Attention and e on Englewood Cliffs NJ PrenticeHall ahne an D amp Beatty J 1967 Pupillary responses in a pitch discrimination task Perception and Psychop ysics 7105 Kahneman D Tursky B Shapiro D amp Crider A 1969 Pupill 11o DEPAULO ET AL Kashy D A amp DePaulo B M 1996 Who lies Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 70 103771051 Kasl S V amp Mahl G F 1965 The relationship of disturbances and hesitations in spontaneous speech to anxiety Journal of Personality and So 39al Psyc ogy 1 4257433 Kassin S M 1997 The psychology of confession evidence American Psychologist 52 2217233 K 1 er D amp Buswell B N 1996 Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment shame and guilt A study of recalled antecedents and facial expressions of emotions Cognition amp Emotion 10 1557171 Keltn D amp Harker L A 1998 Forms and inctions ofthe nonverbal signal of shame In P Gilbert amp B Andrews Eds Interpersonal approaches to shame pp 78798 Oxford England Oxford University Press Keltner D Young R C Heerey E A Oemig C amp Monarch N D 1998 Teasing in hierarchical and intimate relations Journal ofPer sonality and Social Psychology 75 123171247 Kennedy J amp Coe W C 1994 Nonverbal signs of deception during posthypnotic amnesia A brief communication International Journ of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 42 137 Kimble C E amp Seidel S D 1991 Vocal signs of confidence Journal ofNonverbal Behavior 15 997105 Kimble amp Perlmuter L C 1970 The problem of volition Psychological Review 77 3617384 Knapp M L Hart R P amp Dennis H S 1974 An exploration of deception as a communication construct Human Communication Re search I 15729 Kohnken G Schimossek E Aschermann E amp Hofer E 1995 The cognitive interview an e assessment of the credibility of adults statements 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