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by: Tamia Wisoky


Marketplace > University of Florida > OTHER > FNR 4660 > NAT RES POLICYECON
Tamia Wisoky
GPA 3.8


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This 62 page Class Notes was uploaded by Tamia Wisoky on Friday September 18, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to FNR 4660 at University of Florida taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 35 views. For similar materials see /class/207000/fnr-4660-university-of-florida in OTHER at University of Florida.




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Date Created: 09/18/15
Welfare Economics amp the Role of the State Markets and Welfare Economics 0 Concepts related to perfect markets Consumer surplus producer surplus and societal welfare 0 Markets function well amp generate ef cient social outcomes only if we have I Perfect competition 2 Perfect information and foresight 3 No externalities 4 Well defined and enforceable property rights How are consumer and producers surplus related to societal welfare Consumer Surplus Producer Surplus Quantity Welfare Economics 0 De nitionThe study of how the allocation of resources affects economic wellbeing 0 First Principle Any competitive equilibrium leads to an ef cient allocation of resources 0 Second principle Any ef cient allocation can be sustainable through competitive equilibrium OAssumel large numbers of people 2 rational behavior and 3 perfect information 0 Support non intervention Let markets do the work Market Failures 0 De nition Cases where the invisible hand may not lead to the best of all possible outcomes The invisible hand is a concept introduced by Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations which states that in a competitive market self interest also leads to maximum social bene ts 0 Examples of market failures 0 Imperfect competition 0 Risk and uncertainty 0 Externalities 0 Common Pool Resources 0 Public Goods Government Intervention 0 Government intervention is needed to address market failures 0 Even if markets function well they do not ensure distributional equity 0 Government interventionthrough public policies is needed Imperfect Competition 0 Natural monopoly Monopon that arises because a single rm can supply a good or service to an entire market at a smaller cost than could 2 or more rms 0 Monopolies arise because of barriers to entry 0 Monopolies provide less output with fewer inputs than equivalent set of competitive rms 0 Marginal Cost the increase in total cost that arises from an extra unit of production Change in total costs change in quantity produced 0 Average Total Cost Total cost divided by the quantity produced 0 Marginal Revenue Change in total revenue from an additional unit sold Imperfect Competition 0 Monopoly 0 Firm sets the price 0 In competitive markets price is set MR MC assumed constant Firms have no control over it 0 Demand decreases 0 Average Total Cost decreases In marltetsATC is Ushaped 0 Marginal Cost increases 0 BUT in NATURAL monopoly MC is constant and usually small 0 What can be done about it 0 Antitrust laws 0 2 Regulation 0 3 Public Ownership m G 3 C G gt G a 39U C d m 4 V O U Imperfect Competition MC Marginal Cost ATCzAverage Total Cost MR Marginal Revenue ATC gt MC P3 Demand EQI Output produced Imperfect Competition 0 With Regulationthe government sets the price But which priceTo maximize total surplus usually set price at marginal cost 0 Problems with price MC 0 MC ltAC characteristic of a natural monopolyThus rm would lose money and fold 0 Some solutions imperfect subsidize the monopoly but requires taxes 0 Set the price equal to or higher than AC but created deadweight in total surplus 0 No incentives to reduce costs Risk and Uncertainty The invisible hand assumes 0 Perfect competition 0 Perfect information 0 No barriers to reallocation of resources 0 Risk and uncertainty represent a lack of perfect information 0 Producers and consumers need information to allocate resources efficiently 0 How does lack of asymmetric information affect resource allocation 0 How does the lack of perfect foresight influence resource allocation Risk and Uncertainty 0 Risks and uncertainties are unavoidable some economic decisions will be wrong The government has a role to play 0 Disaster events are unpredictable but events are not independent 0 Moral hazard Adverse selection Externalities 0 De nition cost or bene t resulting from an economic transaction that is borne or received by parties not directly involved in the transaction 0 Occur when markets are incomplete failing to take certain costs and bene ts into the price determination hence prices are wrong 0 Examples Fertilizer production generates pollution costing orange producers and consumers neg ext 2 Apple Bee producers pos ext These inef ciencies reduce social welfare compared to situations without externalities 0 Link to collective action 0 Role of Coase theorem 0 Generated by the way in which property rights are assigned illustrated by Common Pool Resources Common Pool Resources Consumption Rivalry Individual Joint Ownership Individual Private Toll good E I d b l XC U a l 390 Joint Common Good Public Good 0 Common Good Common Pool Resources 0 Excludability Can someone be prevented from using it 0 Rivalry One person s use diminishes other people s use 0Tragedy of the Commons Debunked but still influences policy 0 No incentive to limit personal use of communal resource 0 Cost of additional resource use is shared while the bene ts are private 0 Lose twice by exercising restraint 0 not using resource as much as you could and as others are 0 resource is degraded anyway 0 Game theory explanation Game Theory 0 John Forbes Nash 0 Our game 0 Black 2pts for you 0 for the other 0 Red Opts for you 3 for the other Prisoners Dilemma Jv PrisonerA Confesses Refuses to Confess No cooperation with Cooperation with Prisoner B partner partner Confesses No cooperation with C5 partner Refuses to Confess Cooperation with partner 0 Dominant Strategy best strategy for a player regardless of strategy chosen by other players 39 Dominant outcome when both dominant strategies coincide 0 Is it pareto optimal l6 Back to CPR 0 Two underlying factors problematic in the management of Common Pool Resources 0 Open access 0 Lack of self regulation 0 Inability to cooperate 0 Prisoners dilemma shows how rational individual seeking their self interest cause collective harm 0 How do we get around open access amp prisoners dilemma Government Intervention Solutions De ne property rights for the resource Creating enforceable contracts Informal institutional arrangements Influence participants behavior 0 Incentives and penalties 0 Raise morale and altruism Facilitating repeated game situation Reduce the size of the game through decentralization Increasing transparency so that defections are made public Different kinds of goods Consumption Rivalry Individual Joint Ownership Individual Private Toll good E I d b l XC U a l 390 Joint Common Good Public Good 0 Excludability Can someone be prevented from using it 0 Rivalr One erson s use diminishes other eo Ie s use Y Public Goods 0 Jointness or Non rivalry 0 Good in question can be consumed by more than one at a level that is the same for all 0 Good in question can be supplied only as an indivisible lump 0 Dif cult to determine the socially optimal price and quantity 0 Nonexcludability 0 Suppliers have no ability to exclude people from consumption of the good 0 Undermines the ability of markets to regulate supply and demand for public goods 0 Creates incentive to hide individual preference to enjoy free rider problem Public Goods 0 Examples 0 Solutions 0 The free rider problem Income Distribution 0 Highly concentrated distribution undermines democratic process 0 Distributive justice principles 0 Firstjustice requires that everyone be guaranteed some minimum entitlement that allows to satisfy basic survival needs 0 Second if everyone possesses at least this minimum it could be considered that fairness is violated if wealth is distributed in a highly unequal manner 0 Practical problems of distributive justice principles 0 Minimum entitlement varies from society to society 0 Relative deprivation 0 Poverty is a relative rather than an absolute Welfare 39Welfare system public policy directed at poverty and the provision of a social safety net 39 Extent of redistribution varies IWeIfare State concept of government in which the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social wellbeing of its citizens I Equality of opportunity 39 Equitable distribution of wealth I Public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life Welfare and Income Distribution 0 ncomeAmount of economic resources received by an individual or a household during a set period of time WeathVaue of accumulated or inherited savings retained from income received in the past 0 Endowments Income wealth Parameters within which the invisible hand determines pareto optimal distribution 0 Pareto and fairness 0 Influence of initial endowments 0 Distribution Equality 0 Try to reduce inequality rather than pursue perfect equality Gini Coefficient 0 Lorenz curve data and graph 0 Gini calculation 0 Gini AAB 0 Perfect equalityA 0 Gini 0 0Total inequality B0 Gini l 0 Gini ex from the world 0 lowest Denmark 24 0 highest Namibia 74 0 Most of Europe 25 33 0 US 4l 0 Bosnia 26 Ethiopia 3 Pakistan 3 l 0 Limitations ofGini Percent 0 income m s o m N m 0 2 o 40 so so 00 Percent o1 population Compensation 0 Policies violate Pareto optimality 0 Compensation principle can be used to justify policies 0 Should actual compensation be paid to losers Kaldor argues that a policy change satis es Pareto criterion if it produces enough bene ts to compensate the losers while still leaving the winners better off even if no compensation is actually made Public Choice amp Political Economy Public Choice and Political Economy Rational vs irrational leaders Uncovering true preferences and aggregating conflicting preferences Government failures Public Choice Economics deals with the dif culties in ascertaining the true preferences of citizens who may have incentives not to reveal their desires in order to free ride on a public good Theory of second best 0 IF rhere are no marke r Failures we ge r rhe rs r bes r or Pare ro op rimum si rua rion Will correc ring a marke r Failure increase social welFare Do we ge r rhe second bes r by correc ring a marke r Failure The rheory oF rhe second bes r shows rha r rhe answer ro rhe above ques rion may Lo r be yes Will correc ring one marke r Failure lead ro ano rher marke r Failure Wha r are he examples ro suppor r rhe rheory oF second bes r Theory of second best and its implications 0 The heory of second besf provides a prescrip rion for inoc on and arnrnuni on For ihose who prefer less governmenf infervenfion o S glifz Nobel laureo re and some ofher economis rs perceives fhoi l he governmen r has responsibili ry 0 provide cer roin public goods x morkel Failures and Fur rher socieiol welfare 7 Governmenf actions are jus ed wifhoul39 worrying abouf fhe l39heory of second besf The political setting and public policy a Public choice economics begins ro freaf polificians and bureaucra rs as ralianal and applies economic hinking to explain lheir behavior Polificians maximize ufili ry from their selfinleres r and realizafian of policies lhaf serve public a r large 0 Some limes sa sfying local inleresls or serving locals may reduce general social welfare Pork barrel palilics In the public secfar bureaucnafs seek ro increase fheir power and maximize budge ts buf nof ef ciency a In priva re seclor principalagenf problems are abound slakeholders wanf higher pro ls while managers wan r peaceful clima re in lhe company lhrough higher wages and bonuses S Public choice amp political economy Voting rules a How do we oggregoie public preferences lo make policy decisions 7 Simple majority referendum and poli cal elecfions u J 1 i r quotY 7 Unanimily Decisions faken by rhe WTO 0 Each party can ve ro Meefs slric r Parefo cri rerion 0 Less pmclical Public choice a political economy Voting rules Problems wi rh majoriiy amp democralic decision making 7 Simple majorily Tyranny of lhe majorily 7 Super majoril39y Tyranny of the minoril39y 7 Cycling series of voling and no de nilive oul39come 7 Logrolling frading of voles 0 Good bad and ugly aboul Iogrolling 7 Does nol consider intensify of vo rer preferences 0 Log rolling is one way lo overcome Borda procedure is anolher way lo overcome 7 Public choice 8 political economy The median voter O Whnl is lha medianvalor lhoorem Possible polifical posifions fall on a confinuum be rween far lef r and far righl about an issue say wildlife conserva rion Each vo rer will have a preference for one of he posifions on his confinuum Show how fwo polifical parfies have an incen rive ro move as close lo rhe median as possible on a confinuurn 7 Candidaies who lake extreme posifions may never win if vo rer preferences are disfribu red according fo bellquot curve PublIc cholce amp polltlcal economy The medlan voter 39 Irnpllcatlons of the median voter theorem 7 There will be llttle dIFFerence between political partles say republicans and democrats on many Issues 7 Proves the superlorlty of twoparty democrades by providing contlnulty oF pollces 7 Provides rnotlvatlon For entry of thlrdparty candidates 39 What happens IF a thlrdparty enter Into the race 7 Depending on the dlstrlbutlon of voter preferences lncentve For parties to move to the center decreases Public choice 8 political economy The median voter o Implica rions of rhe medianvo rer rheorem 7There will be lii rle difference befween poli rical par ries say republicans and democra rs on many issues 7 Proves ihe superiori ry of iwopar ry democracies by providing confinui ry of policies 7 Provides mo riva rion For en rry of ihirdpar ry candida res o Wha r happens if a rhirdpar ry en rer inio fhe race 7 Depending on he dis rribu rion of vo rer preferences incen rive For par ries io move ro rhe cen rer decreases 0 When do you vote PBSCgtO P is the probability that you will by voting materially affect the outcome of the election B is the bene t that you receive from the success of your preferred party 5 is you personal satisfaction of participation in the election and C is the cost of voting Indifference may occur when all parties promote the same policy or due to positive apathy however if S C gt 0 you will still vote Alienation may occur because of negative apathy 0 Tyranny of the majority 0 Tyranny of the minority Undermine the 0 Rent seeking social optimum Hard to determine policy preferences in the best interests of society Arrow s Impossibility Theorem 0 Transitivity x 8 0 Unrestricted Domain Intransitive relationships prevent social optimum An example of lntransitivity or cycling Pol icy Who is in favor There is no clear policy choice unless we AzYoung pay no taxes Young Retired disregard the preference of one group eg B Midlife pay no taxes Midlife Young Young but Unrestricted Domain saus we cannot do that and that we have to consider C retired pay no taxes Retired Midlife all possible prefernce orderings 0 Pareto Principle 0 Non dictatorship 0 Independence of irrelevant 4 alternatives Arrow s Impossibility Theorem Transitivity Unrestricted Domain Pareto Principle Non dictatorship Independence of irrelevant alternatives Arrows demonstrated that in fact it is impossible for all ve conditions to hold simultaneouslyThus it appears actually impossible to reach a truly democratic decision that satis es everyone However if we relax these conditions and just eliminate the requirement of at least one then democratic decisions that are socially optimal can be reached Sen s Liberalism Lewd Both read the book v v v v Lewd reads v v Prude reads v v v Neither read v Sen s Liberalism 0 Nosy preferences One individual s preference with respect to the preference of another individual 0 There are situations where people should only be concerned about themselves and in which case the pareto principle should not be a guiding criteria 0 Sen s new axiom is that each individual is decisive over hisher own choices and cannot influence the decision of the other Public choice amp political economy Conclusions 0 Markets fail to provide social optimum so collective action through government is needed 0 There is no guarantee that social optimum can be ensured through government or political decision action 0 Stiglitz s 2001 Nobel Laureate four explanations for the inability to realize Pareto optimum through political decision making 7 Dif cult for governments to make credible commitments 7 Imperfect information and unstable coalitions 7 Effects of political rivalry 7 Uncertainty about the true consequences of an action 8 Social welfare and the possibility of democratic decision making 0 Do we arrive a r social opfimum hrough democra ric decision making 0 Si ric1L affenfion 0 he Parefo principle mal lead lo inacfion 0 Role of e rhics Judicial Applications ofthe Endangered Species Act Introduction 0 ESA has been challenged in the courts and its interpretation has shaped its application over the years Evolution from an early focus on individual species and speci c projects to a more ecosystem approach ie multiple species and habitats 2 aspects of the debate over ESA application 0 scope of the takings of listed species section 9 constitutional limits of ESA regulation of private property without just compensation Some terms The Ninth Circuit Court to appeal decisions of district courts May be followed by Supreme Court involvement To enjoinzTo legally prohibit or forbid someone from carrying out a speci c act Injunction A court order that orders a party to do or refrain from doing a certain act or acts RemandWhen an appellate court sends an appealed case back to the trial court for further action the case is said to be remanded Statutory Framework 0 Section 4 0 Process to list and delist endangered and threatened species 0 Process to list critical habitats 0 Section 7 0 All actions by federal government that may impact listed species on federal and private lands must be reviewed 0 Action defined as all activities or programs of any kind authorized funded or carried out in whole or in part by federal agencies in the US or upon the high seas 0 Section 9 0 Take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States or upon the high seas Take is defined as to harass harm pursue hunt shoot wound kill trap capture or collect or to attempt to engage in any such conducfi Can section 9 be applied to habitat modifications TVA vs Hill the Tellico Dam controversy First ESA case to go to Supreme Court Example of a single species speci c project focus of ESA application I978 Supreme court stops the construction of a nearly completed dam in Tennessee on the grounds that it would threaten the endangered snail darter Precipitated the creation of the God Squad God Squad backs up Supreme Court Congress bypasses Supreme Court and authorizes the completion of the Dam in I979 Individual Species Focus Cabinet Mountains Wilderness Scotchman s peak Grizzly Bears vs Peterson 0 Proposed exploratory drilling in Cabinet Mountains Montana 0 FWS concluded the drilling could jeopardize Grizzly Bears but included mitigating alternative measuresThus USFS concluded the drilling could be done in such a way that would not jeopardize the bear population 0 This opinion was unsuccessfully challenged in circuit court by environmental groups Thomas vs Peterson 0 USFS did not conduct a biological assessment to determine if road construction in Nez Perce National Forest would affect Rocky Mountains GrayWolf 0 9th circuit court ruled that this constituted an ESA violation and rejected USFS request to conclude that the project would not threaten the wolf FWS has the mandate to make such a conclusion 0 Road building project was stopped until compliance with ESA Habitat Conservation Focus USFS s s harmed red cockaded woodpecker violated section 7 due to lack of mitigating procedures 0 violated section 9 signi cant habitat modi cation resulted in severe decline in woodpecker population argued as a taking District court required USFS to reconsult with FWS Multiple cases related to the Northern Spotted Owl and logging in the Paci c Northwest Invoked section 4 to sort species listing and critical habitat designation 0 Invoked section 7 for consultation process on regional management plans Habitat Conservation Focus 0 Paci c Rivers Council vsThomas 0 Habitat conservation application of ESA detailed through litigation over effects of various NRM strategies on Snake River Salmon 0 Section 7 violation over lack of consultation between USFS and NMFS in management plans development resulting in the prohibition of further timber range or road building projects 0 Original district court upheld and expanded to current projects by the Circuit Court until ESA compliance by USFS 0 Case in Oregon established precedent for a similar case in Idaho 0 Numerous operations threatened to shut down led to very quick response by USFS to comply Sweet Home 0 Babbitt vs Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon 0 Origins rooted in two court cases about the Palila bird in Hawaii 0 l98 harm defined by FWS as quotHarm39 in the de nition of take39 in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife Such act may include signi cant habitat modi cation or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by signi cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns including breeding feeding or shelteringquot 0 Can significant habitat modification on private property that actually kills or injures wildlife by signi cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns constitute quotharmquot for purposes of the ESA Lumber industry challenged the 98 Harm de nition 0 DC circuit court ruled that the FWS de nition of harm was invalid I994 0 US Supreme Court reversed the DC circuit court rule and gave reason to the FWS I995 Sweet Home 0 Second and last case to have gone to the Supreme Court 0 Legal implications 0 Upheld FWS interpretation of section 9 applying the prohibition on taking listed species to signi cant habitat modi cation activities on non federal land 0 Reflected the switch in the administration to a more ecosystem interpretation and application 0 Likely to increase demands to revise or even eliminate provisions of the Act that prohibit signi cant habitat modi cation resulting in death or injury of endangered species on private property 0 the most controversial aspect of the Endangered Species Act is its power to take private property through extensive regulation of land use 0 What is a take of a listed species 0 Section 9 Taking as a matter of intensity of the links between habitat altering activities and harm to species 0 Sierra Club vsYeutter 0 Severe decline in the wood pecker population over ten years resulting from USFS signi cant habitat modi cation was suf cient to establish harm even aged timber mgt issue 0 USFS challenged over road building s impact on Grizzly Bears but behavioral effects were insuf cient in the absence of animal injuries or deaths 0 Morrill vs Lujan Section 9 taking could not be established without demonstrating a link between habitat modi cation and iniuries to Perdido Key beach mouse 0 Must show signi cant impairement of a species breeding or feeding habits AND that habitat degradation prevents recovery 0 Forest Conservation Council vs Rosboro Lumber Co 0 Placed the responsibility of demonstrating some certainty of risk on the plaintiff 0 Future iniury is actionable under ESA upheld again in injunction against logging on private property in Marbled Murrelet vs Babbitt Constitutional Takings Principles 0 Fifth amendment nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation ESA usually tries to address this issue maximum 20 loss in private lands unless compensated fair market value compensation etc 0 Two tests applied applied by the Supreme Court to determine if a taking should be compensated lPenn Central Transportation Covs City of NewYork 3 parts a character of the governmental action b its economic impact c its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations 2Agins vsTiburon 2 parts does it substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land 0 Favored more recently 0 A taking may depend on the degree of governmental action restricting land use 0 permit conditions mitigation requirements permit denial 0 Two seminal taking cases a Lucas and b Dolan Lucas vs South Carolina Coastal Council 0 South Carolina Beachfront Management Act prohibited housing development of a portion of the shoreline 0 State court determined that this Act deprived Mr Lucas of all economically viable use of his private land I992 0 heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm 0 Have to determine if previous state law regulated the activity through analysis of 0 degree of harm to public lands and resources or adjacent private property posed by the proposed development 0 social value of the proposed action 0 relative ease of mitigating measures Dolan vs City ofTigard Dolan wanted to redevelop her property located within a flood plain 0 City ofTigard required her to dedicate a portion of it for a storm drain improvements and b recreational greenway Is this a taking 0 Supreme Court overturned previous court decisions and ruled that 0 Storm drain improvement was legitimate state interest and the exaction deemed appropriate 0 however the city failed to properly explain the relationship between the greenway and floodplain issues 0 thus greenway constituted a compensable taking Constitutional Takings and the ESA Christy vs Hodel Christy s sheep herd was attacked by grizzly bears and he killed a bear in response 0 Christy was ned under the ESA 0 Christy sued the government seeking compensation for the taking of his sheep arguing that the ESA protection of the grizzly bears made the government accountable for his loss 0 Court denied the takings claim making the government unanswerable for the actions of the bears 0 United States vs Kepler 0 Kepler violated ESA by transporting a leopard from Florida to Kentucky The animal was seized Kepler claimed the ESA deprived him of the use of his property 0 Circuit court rejected his claim on the basis that the animals could have been sold within Florida or with appropriate authorizations 0 These cases involved individual animals rather than land use rights which the courts seem to have been more favorable to l5 Wetland permitting and takings 0 Wetland regulations mirrors ESA 0 in land use restrictions 0 biological opinion process ESA section 7 0 incidental taking permit process ESA section l0 0 Loveladies Harbor Inc vs United States 0 The costs of the government obligations to protect a wetland public bene t should be shared by all rather than by the affected property owner 0 Compensation granted 26 million US 0 Florida Rock Industries vs United States 0 A limestone mining operation was denied a wetland permit 0 Trial court ruled a taking but overturned by federal circuit court and sent back to the trial court 0 Some but not total reduction in property market value must pass through Penn Central or Agins tests l6 Relevant ESA sections for taking claims 0 Section 9 through direct prohibition of habitat related activities 0 Section 7 0 If federal permit is required for private action For ex 0 Water irrigation restrictions under federal reclamation have forced private mining operators to close roads or develop special habitats 0 wetland lling on private property could be required by one legislation and denied by ESA 0 Consultation and mitigation measures have limits they must be reasonable economically and technologically feasible and within the mandate of the agency 0 Section l0 through incidental take permit requirements and accompanying mitigating measures 0 Situations in which ESA completely deprives a private owner of all economically viable land use or physically invades private property are unlikely thus limiting 5th amendment takings within ESA s scope 0 Dolan precedent suggest more speci c inquiries to link mitigation to land use impacts I7 Conclusion 0 Evolution of ESA application from single species to ecosystem 0 What constitutes a prohibited taking section 9 The Sweet Home case applied the taking prohibition to habitat modification 0 Speci cally what are the standard of proofs required to establish that such a taking has occured or that it will 0 Details of the taking definition are refined through various court cases 0 How do ESA regulations affect private property and compensation principles 0 While conflicts between ESA and other interests remain the Act has inherent limits and the courts have also illustrated the limits of government regulations eg Dolan Instances in which ESA regulations of habitat modifying activities on private land may lead to a compensable taking are rare l8


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