Introduction To International Relations
Introduction To International Relations POL 13000
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This 2 page Class Notes was uploaded by Margie Kozey on Saturday September 19, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to POL 13000 at Purdue University taught by Natasha Duncan in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 78 views. For similar materials see /class/208142/pol-13000-purdue-university in Political Science at Purdue University.
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Date Created: 09/19/15
POL130 Fall 2010 Final Exam Review Sheet Final Thursday December 16 1020 am 1220 pm Matthews 210 Of ce Hours during Finals Week Monday December 13 111245 Sinh Beering 2233 Tuesday December 14 2500 Professor Simonelli Beering 2224 Wednesday December 15 11100 Phil Beering 2235 1300 Prof Simonelli Beering 2224 and 3500 Sinh Beering 2233 Practice Problems Sample problems and answer key related to Fearon s bargaining model are posted on Blackboard I do not anticipate going through these problems in class on Thursday If you are unable to solve them you need to attend of ce hours The nal exam will cover the following material Deterrence amp Terrorism Chapter 6 General deterrence Extended deterrence Immediate deterrence Credibility in deterrence Massive Retaliation Mutual Assured Destruction Survivability second strike capability ABM Treaty Flexible Response Evaluating deterrence Terrorism Characteristics of terrorism Reluctant terrorists vs true believers Preventing terrorism Terrorism as a commitment problem Alliances Chapter 7 Mutual defense agreements Neutralitynonaggression agreements Consultation agreements Collective security arrangements Purposes of alliances Structural theories amp alliances Securityautonomy tradeoff theory Alliance reliability Bargaining and War War as expost inef cient 5 Rationalist explanations for war Fearon s bargaining model Issue indivisibility Incentives to misrepresent Commitment problems Other Strategic Theories of War Gambling for resurrection hypothesis Arms race hypotheses Scapegoat hypothesis Democratic Peace Chapter 9 Empirical support for the democratic peace Immanuel Kant amp Perpetual Peace Liberalism liberal democracies Normative argument Institutional constraints argument Maoz and Russett propositions Additional research and empirical ndings of the democratic peace literature Domestic InstitutionsThe Selectorate Theory Chapters 9amp10 Selectorate Winning coalition Disenfranchised Different types of regimes monarchies military juntas authoritarian states rigged autocracies modern democracies and how they can be differentiated according to the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate Private goodsPublic goods Allocation of resources and incentives for allocation based on the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate Loyalty norm Selectorate theory implications for economic policy trade policy effectiveness of sanctions foreign aid allocation interventions nationbuilding kleptocracy and corruption Selectorate theory and the democratic peace explanation and novel hypotheses