Current World Problems (GT
Current World Problems (GT POLS 131
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Study Guide Exam 2 POLS 131 Duncan Spring 2010 The exam will again consist of 50 multiplechoice questions worth 15 points each questions will be evenly divided between inclass and reading materials with some overlap BRING A PENCIL to the exam Meanwhile study the following All important terms found in Kelleher and Klein KK s introductory discussion of development and what it means KK s discussion of income disparities and the dispute over development strategies KK s discussion of the cycle of underdevelopment including contributing factors KK s arguments about the legacy of colonialism in underdeveloped countries KK s points on outside interventions KK s discussion of population growth particularly the demographic transition Points from KK and the lecture material on the specific variables impacting development and contributing to poverty The Namibia case especially the factors in general terms hindering development there The three development perspectives discussed in KK Chapter 5 including the focus major arguments explanations of poverty solutions advocated and criticisms of each how each sees the La Estrella case KK s points about subsidies Lecture material on modernization theory liberal economics dependency theory and participatory development variables emphasized major arguments solutions and strategies proposed The origins purposes activities and operations of the IMF and the World Bank criticisms of them which perspective they represent The origins purpose activities and criticisms of the GATT and the WTO which perspective is represented most recent developments Nontariff barriers to trade as discussed in class From the reserve reading by Gabriel Almond the general arguments about the possible relationships between capitalism and democracy Points from the Life and Debt video as instructed in class The UN Millenium Development Project and progress made toward the MDGs Jeff Sachs critique of liberal economicsfree trade focus in explaining poverty and prescription to eliminate extreme poverty Lecture points on the fair trade movement Good luck and happy studying Study Guide Exam 2 POLS 131 Duncan Spring 2010 The exam will again consist of 50 multiplechoice questions worth 15 points each questions will be evenly divided between inclass and reading materials with some overlap BRING A PENCIL to the exam Meanwhile study the following All important terms found in Kelleher and Klein KK s introductory discussion of development and what it means KK s discussion of income disparities and the dispute over development strategies KK s discussion of the cycle of underdevelopment including contributing factors KK s arguments about the legacy of colonialism in underdeveloped countries KK s points on outside interventions KK s discussion of population growth particularly the demographic transition Points from KK and the lecture material on the specific variables impacting development and contributing to poverty The Namibia case especially the factors in general terms hindering development there The three development perspectives discussed in KK Chapter 5 including the focus major arguments explanations of poverty solutions advocated and criticisms of each how each sees the La Estrella case KK s points about subsidies Lecture material on modernization theory liberal economics dependency theory and participatory development variables emphasized major arguments solutions and strategies proposed The origins purposes activities and operations of the IMF and the World Bank criticisms of them which perspective they represent The origins purpose activities and criticisms of the GATT and the WTO which perspective is represented most recent developments Nontariff barriers to trade as discussed in class From the reserve reading by Gabriel Almond the general arguments about the possible relationships between capitalism and democracy Points from the Life and Debt video as instructed in class The UN Millenium Development Project and progress made toward the MDGs Jeff Sachs critique of liberal economicsfree trade focus in explaining poverty and prescription to eliminate extreme poverty Lecture points on the fair trade movement Good luck and happy studying Study Guide Final Exam POLS 131 Spring 2010 The nal will consist of 84 multiplechoice questions each worth 15 points Bring a pencil The bulk of the exam will be 50 non cumulative questions testing you on just the material we ve covered since Exam 3 This includes Chapters 8 and 9 of Kelleher and Klein the reserve reading on Just War Theory and the Economist article also on reserve on nuclear proliferation It also includes all the lecture material on peace and war the Middle East etc Here are some guidelines on what to study for the non cumulative portion 0 All terms and de nitions from class and the text Points made in class about war in general including its standard justifications The points made by Kelleher and Klein about different ways of handling con ict and which method is most commonly used KK s discussion of power its definition and how it is exercised KK s discussion of the UN Security Council and its role including the issue of sovereignty What your text has to say about various war strategies guerilla wars terrorists and genocide Revisionist states status quo states and what they mean for the stability of specific regions of the world according to your text KK s description of the international rule of law KK s discussion of the two Persian Gulf wars especially how they differed from one another The three perspectives on peace and war presented in your text their general outlines which one is dominant and how each one perceives the war in Bosnia What does deterrence strategy involve as described in your text Lecture points about terrorism its definition and responses to it by the US and the UN Info from class on the 911 attacks bin Laden Al Qaeda and our war in Afghanistan including the latest update Lecture points on reasons for Arab resentment of the United States Information from the film on the IsraeliPalestinian con ict as instructed in class Lecture points on the IsraeliPalestinian con ict since 1991 including the most difficult ongoing issues and efforts by recent presidents Lecture notes on Just War theory including its history specific criteria and how it s been expressed by the UN From the Just War reserve reading the general outlines of the theory its approach to noncombatants and criticisms of the theory by skeptics Lecture points on the Iraq war including historical background primary justifications the Bush doctrine the most recent developments From the Economist reading Obama s actions with respect to the nuclear security issue If time permits Lecture notes on nuclear proliferation including the NPT the countries that possess nuclear weapons and the countries posing the most recent threat The cumulative part of the final will consist of 34 multiplechoice questions from your first three exams There will be 11 to 12 questions from each of the earlier tests they will be reproduced word for word in the final So get out your old tests and look them over to study for this part of the final Good luck The Environmental Case Translating Values into Policy Second Edition Judith A Layzer Massachusetts Institute of Technology f I l RESS CQ A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc Washington DC CQ Press 1255 22nd Street NW Suite 400 Washington DC 20037 Phone 2027291900tolIfree 1866427 7737 18664CQ PRESS Web wwwcqpresscom Copyright 2006 by CQ Press a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical including photocopy recording or any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher Cover design Kimberly Glyder Composition BMWW Maps drawn by Laris Karlie and International Mapping Associates The paper used in this publication exceeds the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences Pennanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials ANSI 239481992 Printed and bound in the United States of America 0908070605 12345 Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Layzer Judith A The environmental case translating values into policy 2 Judith A Layzer 2nd ed p cm Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 156802 8989 alk paper 1 Environmental policy United States ass studies I Title GE180L39 2006 363739056093 dc22 2005032698 CHAPTER 11 Climate Change The Challenges of International Environmental Policymaking he possibility that human activity is changing the earth s climate gained the spotlight in the United States in June 1988 when James Hansen a sci entist for the National Aeronautics and Space Agency testi ed before Con gress that he was ninetynine percent con denltl that quotthe greenhouse effect has been detected and it is changing our climate now 1 Shortly thereafter the United Nations established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC comprising 2000 leading experts from around the world to assess the extent and likely impacts of climate change Since 1990 the IPCC the most distinguished international group of scientists ever assembled to address a policy question has reported with increasing certainty that manmade emis sions of greenhouse gases are causing rapid and potentially damaging changes in the global climate Yet the United States has demonstrated little political will to deal with the problem The climate change case vividly con rms that political factors shape the relationship between science and policy Like the New England sheries described in chapter 10 the global climate is a commons so collective action problems hamper efforts to formulate policies to manage itueven in the face of scientific consensus Because both responsibility for and the impacts of cli mate change are diffuse individual nations have an incentive to free ride on the improvements made by others The obstacles to collective action are likely to be even more formidable in the international arena than they are within or across regions of the United States because no international institution can enforce binding decisions on sovereign nations Instead nations must cooper ate voluntarily a prospect that some political scientists nd improbable Traditionally scholars who study international relations have portrayed nations as unitary actors with a single goal survival According to this quotrealc ist perspective countries do not cooperate with one another unless it is in their selfinterest to do 50 Furthermore a nation s interest is self evident each wants to maintain its security and power relative to other countries Therefore quotthe potential for international cooperation is limited and international laws and institutions are likely to be fragile and impermanent 2 Extending this View neorealists contend that international cooperation may occur if a single state with a preponderance of power a 39hegemon is willing to use its resources to transform international relations3 By contrast liberal theorists and neoliberal institutionalists argue that nations are interdependent and that their common interests lead them to work together A third school of thought builds on the notion of interdependence and emphasizes the concept 278 Climate Change 279 of international regimes which consist of quotprinciples norms rules and deci sion making procedures around which participants39 expectations converge in a given issue area 4 International environmental scholars adopting the latter perspective have turned their attention to how and why such regimes develop and persist In particular they argue that a nation s selfinterest and therefore its willing ness to participate in an international process is not a given but must be dis covered Political scientist Helen Milner offers an important insight into this process noting that cooperation among nations is affected less by fears of other countries rela tive gains or cheating than it is by the domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors Cooperative agreements create winners and los ers domestically therefore they generate supporters and opponents The internal struggle between these groups shapes the possibility and nature of international cooperative agreements5 From this perspective forging international agreements involves what polit ical scientist Robert Putnam has called a twolevel game in which policy makers try simultaneously to quotmaximize their own ability to satisfy do mestic pressures while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments 6 1 According to the twolevel game logic the way climate change is de ned domestically is a primary determinant of the U5 position on international agreements to address it As the preceding cases in this book have made clear environmentalists have had great success de ning problems in ways that enable them to challenge policies favoring development interests Enhancing their credibility have been highly reputable knowledge brokers experts who translate Scienti c explanations into political stories as well as the backing of authoritative scienti c assessments But conservative interests that oppose environmental regulation have not been passive they have responded by forming interest groups and funding experts and think tanks of their own As political scientists Darrell West and Burdett Loomis point out wellheeled interests have become adept at generating information and embedding it in narratives With their vast resources industry coalitions can pay top lobbyists to craft storylines and disseminate them among legislators their staffs and Opinion leaders They can also inundate the public with their messages via tel evision radio direct mail telemarketing and billboards In response to conservatives formidable climate change campaign envi ronmentalists have adopted some new tactics of their own One approach has been to press for state level policies to regulate carbon dioxide emissions and institute other climaterelated policies At one time such unilateral efforts by individual states to address an environmental problem partimlarly a transboundary problem such as climate change would be unthinkable In the 19605 few states had adopted strong measures to address air and water lend HIE HHS arms are 3 39 t Jinn illr 155 mt uni gut luster 280 Addressing Commons Problems pollution see chapter 2 and many observers theorized that left to their own devices states would engage in a racetowthebottom competing to attract dirty industries and the economic benefits they bring Environmentalists were also loath to ght on fty fronts rather than one and so preferred federal pol icymaking to action at the state level Since the late 1970s however states have greatly expanded their capacity to make and implement policy and a growing chorus of scholars insists that states ought to play a larger role in solving the next generation of environmental problems8 In addition to promoting statelevel action environmentalists have tried to persuade business leaders that mandatory federal greenhouse gas emissions limits are in their interest Some groups have adopted confrontational tactics Greenpeace and the Rainierest Action Network have used consumer boycotts and negative publicity campaigns to tarnish the reputations of big companies who oppose policies to curb global warming Environmentalists and religious groups have joined forces to submit shareholder resolutions demanding that corporations reveal their global warming liability But other groups such as Environmental Defense and the World Wildlife Fund have adopted a more conciliatory approach working collaboratively to promote the environmentally friendly image of businesses that agree to reduce their emissions voluntarily9 BACKGROUND Modern scienti c interest in climate change originated in the 19505 but more than a century earlier scientists had discoVered the quotgreenhouse effect by which the earth s atmosphere keeps the planet warm The process begins when the earth absorbs radiation from the sun in the form of visible light that energy is then redistributed by the atmosphere and the ocean and reradiated to space at a longer infrared wavelength Most of that thermal radiation in turn is absorbed by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere particularly water vapor carbon dioxide C02 methane chloro uorocarbons CFCs and ozone The absorbed energy is then reradiated both downwards and upwards The result is that the earth s surface loses less heat to space than it would in the absence of greenhouse gases and therefore stays warmer than it would otherwise see Figure 11 1 A series of discoveries in the nineteenth century laid the groundwork for subsequent investigations into the human impact on the climate In 1827 French scientist JeanBaptiste Fourier found that atmospheric gases help keep the climate warm by trapping thermal radiation in a fashion he likened to the role of glass in a greenhouse In 1860 a British scientist John Tyndall measured the absorption of infrared radiation by C02 and water vapor In 1896 Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius estimated that doubling CO2 concentrations would raise the average global temperature by 5 to 6 degrees Celsius American geal39 ogist T C Chambean warned independently that the fossil fuel combustion that accompanied industrialization could lead to an out tcontrol greenhouse effect In 1938 British meteorologist G D Callendar calculated the actua1 Climate Change 281 Figure 1 1 1 The Global Carbon Cycle 50 Atmgssp here j 0 v g 9th o 1 50 quot so 55 6 Kate 0 0 b a t Fossil fuels and Vegetation 610 cement production Soils and detritus 1580 L 2190 92 Intermediate and deep ocean 38100 Surface sediment 12quot quot 150 39 Source IPCC ed 1 T Houghton et 211 Climate Change 1994 New York Cambridge 1995 Note The numbers in boxes indicate the size of QC of each reservoir On each arrow is indicated the magnitude of the ux in GtC yr DOC dissolved organic carbon Warming due to C02 from burning fossil fuels using data gathered from 200 weather stations around the world Callendar s report was met with skepti Cism however the prevailing scienti c View during the first half of the twen tieth century was that climate remains constant experiencing only short term uctuations In the late 19505 scientists revisited the possibility that greenhouse gases might accumulate in the atmosphere and eventually cause a runaway green house effect In 1957 Roger Revelle and Hans Suess of the Scripps Institute of anography published a paper to that effect after they discovered that the 00921113 had not absorbed as much C02 as previously assumed Revelle and 511988 coined an expression that subsequently became a catchphrase of climate Change policy advocates they claimed that human beings were carrying out a unique quotlarge scale geophysical experiment 2 Prompted by these concerns 282 Addressing Commons Problems Figure 1 12 Manna Loa Annual Mean Carbon Dioxide 002 ppm 380 370 360 35039 34039 330 32039 31039 30039 290 280 I I l I u l I l l I 1955 1960 1955 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Sources Scripps Institution of Oceanography National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Note Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are expressed in parts per million ppm and reported in the 1999 510 manometn c mole fraction scale Missing values are denoted by 9999 In years where one monthly value is missing annual values were calculated by substituting a t value 4harmonics with gain factor and spline for that month and then averaging the twelve monthly values in 1957 Revelle s graduate student Charles David Keeling instituted routine measurements of C02 at the observatory in Manna Loa Hawaii By the early 19603 instruments at the observatory were detecting steady increases in C02 concentrations see Figure 112 In 1963 the Conservation Foundation issued a report entitled Implications of the Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmo sphere one of the rst to speculate on the possible consequences of this trend Shortly thereafter a group of White House science advisers led by Revelle coir cluded that a projected 25 percent increase in atmospheric C02 concentration5 could cause marked changes in the earth s climate with possiny deleterious conscquences for humans During the 19705 scientists debated whether changes in C02 concentrations were likely to produce global warming or global cooling but over time scien ti c opinion converged on the warming hypothesis In the United States the National Academy of Sciences NAB launched a Series of efforts to assess the scienti c understanding of CO2 and climate all of which warned about the potentially severe impacts of changes in the global climate A 1979 NAS 12130rt Climate Change 283 advised that a waitand see policy may mean waiting until it is too late to avoid signi cant climatic changes Also in 1979 the World Meteorological Organization which in 1974 had begun to examine the evidence convened an international conference on the topic in Geneva and launched the World Cli mate Programme15 The nal statement of the First World Climate Conference introduced the importance of factors besides greenhouse gas emissions and adopted a decidedly precautionary tone quotWe can say with some confidence that the burning of fossil fuels deforestation and changes of land use have increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and it appears plausible that C02 increases can contribute to a gradual warming of the lower atmosphere especially at high latitudes 1quot By the early 19805 scientists were becoming more outspoken about their concerns Delegates to a 1980 international climate conference in Villach Aus tria issued alarms about global warming and in 1983 the US Environmental Protection Agency EPA released a report suggesting that global temperature increases could strain environmental economic and political systems17 In 1985 scientists from twenty nine countries again met in Villach where they agreed that human activity was causing increases in atmospheric concentra tions of greenhouse gases and estimated that a doubling of atmospheric con centrations of C02 could lead to an increase in the global mean surface tem perature of 15 to 4 5 degrees Celsius Because such a temperature rise would be unprecedented in the period since the beginning of Holocene they encour aged policymakers to begin considering responses18 More scienti c consen sus that humans were altering the global climate emerged from two subse quent climate workshops in 1987 one in Villach and the other in Bellagio Italy THE CASE Despite their unusually urgent tone the periodic scienti c bulletins of the 1970s and 19805 generated little social or political response in the United States Instead a number of severe weather episodes combined with the activism of scienti c knowledge brokers brie y focused public attention on the issue of climate change That attention in turn generated political support for UN sponsored efforts to comprehend the phenomenon and its implica tions But the improving scienti c understanding that resulted did not trans late into Us policy rather it prompted the mobilization of powerful interests 0Pposed to international climate change policy Those interests used their r ESOILxrces to emphasize scienti c uncertainty and economic consequences and thereby undermine support for climate change policies among policymakers Iand the public In the hopes of defusing domestic opposition environmental ists have adopted a host of new tactics from publicly challenging businesses that have resisted climate change policies to promoting market based solu tions and encouraging companies to adopt climatefriendly practices Mean while impatient with the lack of a national response some states have begun to institute climate change policies of their own 284 Addressing Commons Problems Interna tonal Concern Leads to an Intergovernmental Panel James Hansen s testimony is widely credited with triggering media atten tion to climate change in the United States His highly publicized testimony asserted that humaninduced global warming was imminent and that the phe nomenon was suf ciently well understood that policymakers should act to address it His appearance in June 1988 also coincided with one of the hottest and driest summers on record in North America Hurricanes and other freak meteorological events around the world further enhanced the public 5 recep tivity to the idea that the climate was changing Although scientists were reluc tant to attribute the severe weather to global warming it provided an obvious hook for the media Two weeks after Hansen made his statement government of cials envi ronmentalists and industry representatives from fortyeight countries assem bled at a conference in Toronto to discuss the global security implications of climate change Adopting an alarming version of Revelle and Suess s phrase the Toronto Conference Statement concluded that quothumanity is conducting an unintended uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate con sequence could be second only to global nuclear war 9 The statement rec ommended that governments begin negotiating a global convention as a framework to protect the atmosphere20 It further recommended that govern ments agree to reduce global emissions of C02 to 20 percent below 1988 levels by 2005 and create a quotworld atmosphere fund from taxes on fossil fuel con sumption in industrial countries21 Shortly after the Toronto conference sev eral world leaders including Britain s prime minister Margaret Thatcher a former skeptic made statements about the need for a government response to climate change As the scienti c convergence grew the United Nations Environment Pro gramme and the World Meteorological Organization jointly sponsored the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to provide poli cymakers with a scienti c foundation for international negotiations The IPCC met for the rst time in November 1988 elected Swedish scientist Bert Bolin as its chair and formulated a threefold mandate to review the existing scienti c literature on climate change and report on the scienti c consensus Working Group I assess the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of climate change Working Group II and formulate response strategies Work ing Group III The Bush Administration Demurs Re ecting the heightened international attention in 1989 the governing council of the UN Environmental Programme and the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions calling on governments to prepare a framework conven tion on climate change as well as protocols spelling out concrete commit ments based on scienti c knowledge and taking into account the needs of Climate Change 285 developing countries In July 1989 the statement of the Group of Seven major industrial democracies annual summit called for quotthe early conclusion of an international convention to protect and conserve the global climate 23 Rather than lead the charge however the Bush administration refused to propose or support climate policies emphasizing instead the scienti c uncertainties sur rounding the issue To justify his position President George H W Bush relied heavily on a paper issued by the conservative George C Marshall Institute entitled quotSci enti c Perspectives on the Greenhouse Problem that downplayed the scien ti c consensus on climate change and concluded that it would be premature to impose policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions The president contin ued to tout the theme of scienti c uncertainty in his April 1990 opening speech to a seventeennation White House Conference on Science and Economics Research Related to Global Climate Change in which he said that before act ing quotwhat we need are facts 23 In lieu of policy proposals Bush called for fur ther scienti c investigation and a 60 percent increase in spending on research Hoping to pressure the administration fortynine Nobel Prize winners and 700 members of the NAS issued a public appeal saying quotthere is broad agree ment within the scienti c community that ampli cation of the Earth s natural greenhouse effect by the buildup of various gases introduced by human activ ity has the potential to produce dramatic changes in climate Only by tak ing action now can we insure that future generations will not be put at risk 24 The scientists petition did not have much impact on President Bush however Nor was he moved to act by the May 1990 presentation by the IPCC of its interim ndings based on the work of 170 scientists from twenty ve coun tries which concluded that 39 Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases C02 methane CFCs and nitrous oxides NOX For example worldwide humanmade emissions of C02 the main greenhouse gas increased from less than 100 million tons per year before the industrial revolution to 6 billion tons per year in 1990 As a result atmospheric concentrations of C02 rose from 280 parts per million ppm to more than 350 ppm and are continuing to climb The evidence from modeling studies observations and sensitivity analyses indicate that the sensitivity of the global mean surface temper ature to doubling C02 is unlikely to lie outside the 15 to 45 degrees Cel sms range There are many uncertainties in scientists predictions particularly with regard to the timing magnitude and regional patterns of climate change Global mean surface air temperature has increased by 03 to 06 degrees Celsius over the last 100 years The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models but it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability O O u L h39 stun 286 Addressing Commons Problems Thus the observed increase could be largely due to this nahrral variabil ity alternatively natural variability combined with other human factors could have offset a still lager humaninduced greenhouse warming O The unequivocal detection of the enhanced greenhouse effect from obser vations is not likely for a decade or more25 The IPCC calculated that an immediate 60 percent reduction in C02 emissions would be needed to halt its buildup in the atmosphere The H CC s Working Group II tried to forecast the consequences of climate change acknowledging that its predictions were highly uncertain and based on a number of simplifying assumptions Along with an increase in severe weather events and a higher incidence of infectious diseases among the most serious potential consequences of a rapid increase in global temperatures pro jected by the panel was a rise in global sea level of between four and twelve inches in the next fty years Even at the low end of such a rise coastal areas everywhere would be more vulnerable to flooding and some regions would be partially submerged The IPCC s tentative tone notwithstanding many European leaders responded with alacrity to its projections between May and December 1990 fourteen of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development s twentyfour member countries initiated policies to stabilize or reduce ends sions of greenhouse gases6 By contrast the United States continued to equiv ocate In August the American delegation clashed with other nations attend ing a meeting in Sweden to nalize the policymakers summary of the IPCC report because the Americans insisted on amendments emphasizing scienti c uncertainty and refused to establish any timetables or targets for the stabiliza tion of greenhouse gas emissions Their primary objective was to ensure that any actions taken would not curtail economic growth Despite US resistance however the nal conference statement reported that a clear scienti c consen sus had emerged on the extent of global warming expected during the twenty first century It added that if the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations was not stemmed the predicted climate change would place stress on natural and social systems unprecedented in the past 10000 years The January 1992 release of the Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scienti c Assessment precipitated another round of publicity for the scienti c consensus on climate change Between 1990 and 1992 scientists had begun to incorporate the cooling effects of stratospheric ozone depletion and aerosols airborne sul fur dioxide particles into their models resulting in a much greater consistency between those models and observed temperatures The supplement reaf rmed the conclusions of the 1990 report and added several new ndings among which was that the anomalously high global temperatures of the 19803 had continued into 1990 and 1991 the warmest years on record In hopes of making progress on the policy front the UN established the Intergovemmental Negotiating Committee to generate a convention in ad vance of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Climate Change 287 scheduled for June 1992 in Rio de Ianeim The committee met at five twoweek sessions between February 1991 and May 1992 during which the negotiators agreed on a process modeled after the one that produced the much acclaimed 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone layer they would rst establish a framework convention on the basic issues and then at a later date negotiate a protocol specifying the more concrete obligations of each country During this period however President Bush made it clear that he would boycott the Earth Summit if negotiators produced a climate conven tion containing speci c timetables 0139 goals The United States recalcitrance notwithstanding at the UN conference in Rio 154 governments signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change FCCC the primary goal of which is the quotstabilization of greenhouse gas con centrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro pogenic human interference with the climate system 28 The FCCC divided signatories into Annex I developed and Annex II transitional and develop ing nations in recognition that the former were responsible for the bulk of the world s greenhouse gases and created an obligation for Annex I nations to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 The FCCC speci ed that policies devised under the convention should achieve equity through quotcommon but differentiated responsibilities and pay special attention to disproportionately burdened developing nations such as small island states Most notably the FCCC stated that policies should be consistent with the quotprecautionary prin ciple which involves acting prudently in the absence of scienti c certainty The Bush administration signed the agreement reluctantly with the under standing that it intended to encourage but not mandate emissions reductions In October 1992 the US Senate rati ed the FCCC Hie Ciinton Administration Hopes for U Leadership Bloom and Fade With the inauguration of President Bill Clinton advocates of climate change policies were hopeful that the United States would take a more proac tive role in negotiations Bolstering these expectations Clinton announced his support for the FCCC and for CO emissions reductions After failing to get a national fossil fuel use tax through Congress however the president quickly retreated the 1993 White House Climate Change Action plan included about fty voluntary federal programs aimed at promoting energy conservation but did not address greenhouse gas emissions directly Still the administration projected that its plan would reduce emissions by about 109 million tons per year by soon enough to return them to their 1990 levels of 158 billion tons By the time government representatives gathered for the First Conference of the Parties COP 1 in Berlin in spring 1995 however it was clear the Clin ton administration s plan was failing to stem the tide of US C02 emissions which were in fact almost 5 percent above 1990 levels The reason was partly that any gains achieved under the plan were offset by the declining average fuel ef ciency of American cars thanks largely to the boom in sport utility m1 inn In at 3ng mm tinny quot39tm 288 Addressing Commons Problems vehicles and an increase in the number of miles driven In fact only Ger many and the United Kingdom were on target to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 Two factors in addition to the general failure of voluntary emissions controls lent urgency to the talks First in 1994 IPCC chairman Bert Bolin had suggested that even if all Annex I governments met their commit ments it would not be suf cient to achieve the FCCC objective of preventing dangerous human interference with the climate system30 Second in the spring and fall of 1994 negotiators had met ve times to lay the groundwork for the upcoming COP and each time the group was Split by divisions between developed and developing nations Negotiators at COP 1 were therefore faced with two questions whether Annex I countries should adopt binding emissions reductions and whether enussions reductions obligations should be extended to Annex 11 countries The parties ultimately agreed on the Berlin Mandate which speci ed that any legal instrument that resulted from formal negotiations scheduled to take place in Kyoto Japan would impose emissions reductions only on Annex I coun tries the 134 developing nations including China India and Mexico would be exempt They did not however resolve the issue of binding enussions reductions The United States pressed for a quotjoint implementation mechanism that would allow industrialized countries to earn credit if they nanced emis sions reductions in developing countries where presumably they could be made more cheaply The parties ultimately agreed to a modest version of such a mechanism but more important committed themselves to a schedule for adopting a protocol at COP 3 to be held in Kyoto in December 1997 In August 1995 the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate began convening to establish the emissions targets for industrialized nations in advance of the 1997 Kyoto meeting In December in the midst of these meetings the IPCC produced its Second Assessment Report Since 1990 the IPCC had dramatically improved its climate models and was willing to make projections with greater con dence it concluded that quotthe balance of the evidence suggests that there is a discernible human in uence on global climate 3 But the scientists downv graded their estimates of the magnitude of global warming projecting that the mean global temperature would increase between 1 and 35 degrees Celsius 2 6 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100 and most believed it would be in the lower half of that range The IPCC forecast however that global mean sea level would rise between six inches and three feet and that changes in spatial and temporal precipitation patterns would occur Finally the WCC concluded that a 60 percent to 80 percent reduction in C02 emissions would be necessary just to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases32 Defining the Climate Change Problem in the United States In the United States the 1995 IPCC report set the stage for a monumental battle to de ne the climate change problem and thereby determine the U5 position in advance of the impending Kyoto meeting Scientists had gotten Climate Change 289 the problem onto the public agenda and environmentalists eagerly adopted a simpli ed version of the scienti c story Their most powerful weapon was the vocal support of prominent scientists and highly visible consensus panels But the story science furnished was not particularly compelling the villains were ordinary Americans with their wasteful lifestyles the victims were small island nations and rather than any imminent crisis the effects were at least a generation away Furthermore powerful opponents led by the oil and coal industries retaliated with a well nanced lobbying campaign in the form of a fourpronged attack they argued that models of climate change were highly uncertain that a warmer earth would not be so bad particularly for the United States that imposing policies to avert climate change would cripple the Amer ican economy and that imposing emissions limits on industrialized nations without holding developing countries to similar targets would unfairly dis advantage the United States Both sides launched allout public relations cam paigns well aware that whoever succeeded in de ning the problem was likely to dictate the solun on Environmentalists Use Scientists Warnings Among the earliest and most powerful proponents of policies to address climate change were members of the scienti c community that studied the global climate Throughout the 1980s scienti c consensus reports indicating that global warming was real and a seri ous problem were accompanied by recommendations that the international community formulate policies before the effects became irreversible Proponents of acting immediately portrayed such action as an quotinsurance policy against the potentially devastating and irreversible impacts of global warmingquot 33 Environmentalists enthusiastically seized on these scienti c warnings to advance their overarching goal of limiting human impact on the natural envi ronment As early as 1984 Environmental Defense s senior scientist Michael Oppenheimer had written an oped piece for the New York Times featuring the evocative language that environmentalists are so adept at employing With unusual unanimity scientists testi ed at a recent Senate hearing that using the atmosphere as a garbage dump is about to catch up with us on a global scale Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels combustion and other greenhouse gases are throwing a blanket over the Earth The sea level will rise as land ice melts and the oceans expand Beaches will erode while wetlands will largely disappear Imagine life in a sweltering smoggy New York without Long Island s beaches and you have glimpsed the world left to future generaticms 4 For environmentalists climate change conveniently linked a host of concerns from deforestation to air pollution and implicated industrial nations demand for growth and luxury r Opponents Challenge the Scienti c Consensus In the early 19905 a group of utility and coal companies created the Information Council on the Environment 1931 am v1 IHBR39 rump lmitl no u 1 5 gm HIMquot um put a ill ill me u Mrquot Hat um not 41 m4 meil at 1mm 290 Addressng Commons Problems to promote arguments critical of climate change theory The council ultimately disbanded when environmentalists exposed some of its unsavory tactics to the media but its goal of creating public confusion about climate change had already been accomplished More enduring was the Global Climate Coalition GCC which spun off from the National Association of Manufacturers in 1989 The GCC had ftyfour industry and trade association members primarily from the coal oil and automobile industries and Spent heavily on its anti climate change campaign35 Opponents of climate change policies promoted the view that global warm ing if it was occurring at all was not the serious problem that hysterical sci entists and environmentalists made it out to be To support these views they cited a handful of outspoken scienti c skeptics who challenged the IPCC esti mates of both the likelihood and the consequences of climate change Among the most prominent of these skeptics were Pat Michaela assistant professor of climatology at the University of Virginia S Fred Singer professor of environ mental science at the University of Virginia Robert Bolling a geographer at the University of Arizona and Richard Lindzen an atmospheric physicist at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Although few in number skeptics took advantage of the media s adherence to the journalistic norm of presenting quotboth sides of an issue regardless of the relative merits of each side s argu ment Further magnifying skeptics impact opponents invested heavily in dis seminating their views nancing the publication and distribution of books magazines pamphlets and press releases to undermine the credibility of cli mate change theories among the public The skeptics primary argument was that scientists had only a rudimentary understanding of the feedbacks in the climate system For example they noted that early climate models contained only crude estimates of the effects of the ocean yet ocean circulation is coupled with atmospheric circulation in a com plex and critical way Furthermore skeptics highlighted the potential impact of aerosols small particles and clouds on climate change They argued that the magnitude of observed warming to date was modest compared to the large natural variability of the system And they pointed out that scientists predictions were based on theories and general circulation models GCMS that are dif cult to confirm36 In addition to emphasizing scienti c uncertainty some skeptics accused environmentalists of using science to achieve political ends scaremongering to promote radical solutions to a problem for whose existence there was lit tle evidence They charged that environmentalists messages were invariably apocalyptic that the media published such stories to sell newspapers and tele vision time and that the resulting publicity abetted environmental groups fundraising efforts7 According to the skeptics warnings about climate change were part of a larger coordinated effort to establish international controls over industrial processes and business operations 33 Climate change skeptics also went after the IPCC and its members directly In 1994 Frederick Seitz director of the conservative Marshall Institute and for Climate Change 291 mer president of the National Academy of Sciences attacked the authors of the IPCC scienti c summaries contending that they had distorted the views of participating scientists and created the impression of a consensus where none existed Defenders of the summary responded that the process of writing it was cautious and consensual that participants agreed to the summaries at ple nary meetings and that none had expressed subsequent dissatisfaction with the nal product In May 1996 opponents launched personal attacks on two eminent scientists Benjamin Santer a climate modeler at the Lawrence Liver more Laboratory and Tom Wigley a senior scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research Seitz accused Santer of deleting references to scienti c uncertainty from the 1995 IPCC report The Wall Street Journal and New York Times published this allegation although neither paper con rmed its veracity with any of the participants in the process In fact not one IPCC scientist con rmed the charges against Santer and fortytwo signed a letter to the Wall Street Iournal in his defense Finally some skeptics advanced the notion that climate change would be bene cial Economist Thomas Gale Moore the predominant exponent of this theme pointed out that service industries could prosper as equally in a warm climate with air conditioning as a cold one with central heating In fact Moore argued higher temperatures combined with more C02 in the atmo sphere would enhance plant and crop growth thereby providing more food for the burgeoning global population40 In the early 19905 Western Fuels a coal industry lobbying organization spent 250000 on a video entitled The Green ing of Planet Earth which argued that global warming would improve the lot of the human race and the United States in particular Western Fuels also founded an organization called the Greening Earth Society to promote this perspective Opponents Shift the Focus to Costs In addition to de ning Climate science as highly uncertain and ambiguous opponents of climate change policies highlighted the costs of adopting policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions Such policies they argued would be exorbitant and lead to quotworldwide reces sion rising unemployment civil disturbances and increased tension between nations as accusations of cheating and violations of international treaties in amed passions 41 Taking precautionary action wrote one journalist in Forbes could quotspell the end of the American dream for us and the world 42 The GCC s 13 million advertising campaign in advance of the Kyoto meeting in 1997 warned television viewers that strict reductions in greenhouse gases would have catastrophic economic consequences endangering the lifestyle of every American Gasoline would shoot up by fty cents or more a gallon heating and electricity bills would soar while higher energy costs would raise the price of almost everything Americans buy The livelihood of thousands of coal miners autoworkers and others employed in energyrelated elds was on the line43 1 l 1 Elm 292 Addressing Commons Problems Those hoping to prevent the imposition of greenhouse gas emissions lim its seized on a 1990 study by the Bush administration s Council of Economic Advisers that estimated the cost of cutting carbon emissions by 20 percent by the year 2100 at between 800 billion and 36 trillion The report concluded that until there was a solid scienti c understanding of climate change there is no justi cation for imposing major costs on the economy in order to slow the growth of greenhouse gas emissions 4 Opponents claimed that even a noregrets policy in which nations adopt such practices as conserving energy and increasing reliance on energyef cient vehicles and public transit would be nothing more than a quot rst expensive and ineffectual step down the road to programs that will cripple one of the most vital foundations of modern civilization our energy supplies 45 The environmental Alliance to SaVe Energy responded with an analysis showing that US carbon emissions could be cut by 25 percent by 2005 and by 70 percent by 2030 at a net savings of 23 trillion over forty years46 The 1991 NAS report Policy Implications of Global Warming concurred arguing that the United States could reduce its greenhouse gas emissions between 10 percent and 40 percent of 1990 levels at low cost or even net savings if the proper policies were implemented And a 1992 study by William Cline of the Institute for International Economics suggested that quotsocial benefit cost ratios are favorable for an aggressive program of international abatement 47 Cline pointed out that opponents of climate change policies failed to take into account the possibility of costeffective energy ef ciency measures and tech nological innovation But the opponents of climate change policies dismissed efforts to rebut their arguments and were adept at disseminating their competing perspective At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 the executive director of the GCC maintained that some of the proposals under consideration could cost the United States 95 billion and 5 30000 jobs48 The Coalition for Vehicle Choice nanced by the US auto industry and related groups spent years trying to convince small business labor and local civic groups throughout the United States that the treaty would be quotbad for America In October 1997 immediately prior to the Kyoto meeting the group ran an ad to that effect in the Washington Postifea39 hiring the endorsement of 1300 groups49 Opponents Raise the Equity Issue The national media initially furthered environmentalists cause by publicizing Hansen s 1988 congressional testi mony More important the media linked scientists climate change predictions to the heat droughts and freak weather events of 1988 thereby generating public alarm But coverage of the science featured con ict among dueling sci entists a reflection of the effort by those supporting the status quo to reframe the debate Moreover by the early 19905 coverage of political debates and competing economic forecasts had begun to displace coverage of science50 To cement their advantage climate change policy opponents took a third tack they began attacking the approach embodied in the Kyoto Protocol Climate Change 293 framing it as inequitablemaking the protocol and not climate change the problem They insisted it would be unfair for developing countries to escape commitments to greenhouse gas emissions reductions because in the future they were likely to be the major emitters while the industrialized nations share of emissions would decline They pointed out that several large devel oping countries including China India Mexico and South Korea were already producing 44 percent of global fossil fuel emissions and were likely to surpass the emissions levels of the developed countries between 2020 and 2030 In addition said critics developing countries were responsible for much of the deforestation and other landuse practices that had eliminated carbon sinks The developing nations and many environmentalists responded that the United States with only 4 percent of the world s population generated 25 per cent of the world s greenhouse gas emissions and that industrialized nations were responsible for 70 percent of the human made greenhouse gases cur rently in the atmosphere Moreover they noted that developing nations were likely to suffer the most serious consequences of climate change but were least wellpositioned nancially or technologically to mitigate adapt to or recover from those impacts Dr Mark Mwandosya of Tanzania chairman of the devel oping country caucus at Kyoto pointed out quotVery many of us are struggling to attain a decent standard of living for our peoples and yet we are constantly told that we must share in the effort to reduce emissions so that industrialized countries can continue to enjoy the bene ts of their wasteful life style 52 The Kyoto Protocol As the Kyoto meeting drew near the battle to shape the US position inten sified In hopes of creating support for US leadership in June 1997 more than 2500 American scientists endorsed the Scientists Statement on Clairol Climatic Disruption The statement claimed that further accumulation of greenhouse gases commits the earth irreversibly to further global climatic change and consequent ecological economic and social disruption The risks associated with such changes justify preventive action through reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases It is time for the United States as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases to demonstrate leadership in a global effort53 After receiving the statement President Clinton told a special session of the UN General Assembly that the science of climate change is clear and com pelling and he promised to bring to the Kyoto conference a strong Ameri can commitment to realistic and binding limits that will signi cantly reduce our emissions of greenhouse gasesquot 5 The following month Clinton launched an effort to convince the public that climate change was real by holding a con ference of experts and a series of wellpublicized regional panels Imus 294 Addressing Commons Problems The admixustration s international credibility was dubious however given that in 1996 alone US emissions of greenhouse gases grew 34 percent and by 1997 were about 74 percent greater than they had been in 199055 At this rate of growth US greenhouse gas emissions promised to be an embarrassing 13 percent above 1990 levels by 200055 Further hampering the administration s ability to negotiate was the unanimous 950 passage by the Us Senate on June 12 1997 of a nonbinding resolution the Byrd Hagel amendment that it would not give its advice and consent to any agreement that did not require developing countries to reduce their emissions or that would result in quotserious harm to the economy of the United States Concerned about building domes tic support for the treaty Clinton began emphasizing the importance of coop eration by China and other developing nations At the seventh Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate meeting in Bonn in October US negotiators pressed the other parties to commit both developing and industrialized nations to emissions reductions After meeting resistance in Bonn the United States again raised the equity issue at the eighth and nal Berlin Mandate session which coincided with the third COP in Kyoto Nearly 6000 UN delegates from more than 160 countries attended the tenday conference that opened on December 1 1997 In addi tion 3600 representatives of environmental and industry groups and nearly 3500 reporters poured into Kyoto Leading the sixtymember US delegation Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstadt began by taking a hard line to appease domestic critics We want an agreement he said quotbut we are not going to Kyoto for an agreement at any cost 57 Undaunted the German and British ministers proposed substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from their 1990 levels by 2010 Germany proposed a 15 percent cut the United Kingdom a 20 percent cut Meanwhile the latest computer models were pro jecting that greenhouse gas emissions would have to be lowered by 70 percent to prevent global warming58 By the fourth day of the Kyoto meeting a New York Times editorial declared that a quotnear miracle would be required to salvage an agreement The thorni est issue remained the degree to which developing countries would have to control their emissions Led by the Chinese delegation the developing coun tries adamantly resisted US pressure 50 in a lastditch effort to facilitate international agreement without provoking a domestic backlash President Clinton dispatched Vice President Al Gore to give the American delegates more exibility On Monday December 8 Gore told members of the confer ence that the president would allow the US delegation to offer euussions reductions beyond those originally proposed 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 in return for opening the door in Kyoto to language requiring emissions reductions by developing countries COP chairman Raul Estrada proposed a compromise that would allow developing countries to reduce emissions vol untarily and give Annex I nations the option of accepting differentiated emis sions reductions commitments for 2008 2012 In the negotiations that fol lowed the Chinese led a bloc of developing nations the 677 that vigorously Climate Change 295 opposed the compromise The resulting protocol which emerged just as the meeting was closing embodied the United States worst case scenario it went beyond the original target for Us reductions but provided no mechanism for making developing countries reduce their emissions The nal version of the Kyoto Protocol required the European Union to reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases by 8 percent below 1990 levels by 2012 It set the US emissions reduction target at 7 percent Japan s at 6 percent and twentyone other industrialized nations at 52 percent The protocol gave Annex I nations ve options for meeting their obligations 1 establish policies to lower national emissions 2 enhance carbon sinks such as forests 3 take advantage of emissionstrading opportunities once the system is developed 4 engage in joint implementation which allows Annex I parties to earn credit for projects that lower emissions in other Annex I countries and 5 employ quotClean Development Mechanisms through which developed countries trans fer energyef ciency technology to developing countries In addition the pro tocol allowed developing countries to quotopt in to emissions controls but did not impose mandatory emissions reductions Although delegates did not back a US proposal that industrial nations be allowed to trade quotemissions quotas they did agree to consider such mechanisms in 1998 Opponents of climate change policies were appalled by the agreement In a press conference before leaving Kyoto Sen Chuck Hagel R Neb coauthor of the ByrdHagel Amendment VOWed that there was quotno way if the president signs this that the vote in the United States Senate will even be close We will kill this bill 59 Promoting the Kyoto Protocol Back Home Recognizing that he lacked Senate support President Clinton decided not to submit the protocol for rati cation but instead proposed a veyear 63 bil lion package of tax breaks and research spending in pursuit of the protocol s emissions reductions goals measures that most experts regarded as too mod est to have much impact on America s 500 billion fossil fuelbased economy By executive order Clinton also directed the federal government the world s largest energy consumer to reduce petroleum use in federally owned cars to 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2005 and reduce greenhouse gases from fed eral buildings by 30 percent by 2010 At the same time the administration con tinued its campaign to persuade the public that the science underpinning the protocol was valid Even as the Clinton administration struggled to generate public support for Climate change policies opponents geared up for the Senate rati cation battle Recognizing the political potency of the scienti c consensus generated by the IPCC by early spring 1998 a highpowered group including the American Petroleum Institute Chevron and Exxon had already planned a multimillion dollar campaign to undermine that consensus Aimed primarin at the public the plan was to recruit a cadre of skeptical scientists and train them to convey 296 Addressing Commons Probiems their views persuasively to science writers editors columnists and news paper correspondents60 Some tactics adopted by opponents raised eyebrows for example Frederick Seitz circulated among thousands of scientists a peti tion against climate change policies accompanied by a letter on stationery designed to resemble National Academy of Sciences letterhead The academy quickly disavowed the letter which claimed to report on a scienti c study con cluding that C02 emissions did not pose a climatic threatm In response to industry 5 anticlimate change campaign environmentalists undertook some new tactics of their own They approached businesses directly and tried to persuade them to reduce their emissions voluntarily to save money improve their environmental credentials and gain a seat at the table when the inevitable regulations were enacted In May 1998 for example the Pew Charitable Trusts established the Pew Center for Global Climate Change funded by a 5 million annual grant from the foundation and administered by Eileen Claussen former deputy assistant secretary of state for environmental affairs One of the center s objectives is to bolster the credibility of climate change science To this end in an ad published in the New York Times the cen ter s members including American Electric Power US Generating Com pany Maytag Whirlpool 3M Toyota Sunoco United Technologies Boeing and Lockheed Martin publicly accepted the views of mostscientists that enough was known about the environmental impact of climate change to take steps to address the consequences and they pledged to reduce their own emissions of greenhouse gases62 By the fall of 1998 twenty major US com panies including three electric power companies and two oil companies had joined the Pew Center In October international oil companies Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum both of which had defected from the Global Cli mate Coalition also committed themselves to substantial voluntary reduc tions in their emissions Proponents of climate change policies also began publicizing a set of Clin ton administration studies that downplayed the costs of cutting C02 emis sions A report by the Department of Energy buttressed environmentalists position that the United States could reduce its fuel use by making fairly sim ple and inexpensive changes that would have little impact on the economy63 A 1997 analysis by the Interlaboratory Working Group a consortium of US national labs also concluded that large lowcost energy savings were possible in the United States Finally a 1998 report from Clinton s Council of Ecov nomic Advisers reiterated the N AS claim that if policies were designed cor rectly the effects on energy prices and the costs to the United States of meet ing the Kyoto Protocol emissions targets could be extremely modest5 In response to this avalanche of information suggesting climate change policies would be affordable the industrysponsored Electric Power Research Institute 7 commissioned its own economic studies concluding that agriculture forestry and outdoor recreation quotare all projected to bene t from a slightly warmer wetter COzenriched world 66 Climate Change 297 While factions in the United States sparred over the costs and bene ts of implementing the Kyoto Protocol scientists were debating whether the treaty would slow global warming even if its obligations were ful lled In an analysis published in Science in January 1998 former IPCC chair Bert Bolin predicted that the C02 level in the atmosphere would climb to 382 parts per million from 370 by 2010 even if countries strictly ful lled their Kyoto com mitments Bolin noted that the Kyoto reductions would be quotan important rst stepquot but would be far from what is required to reach the goal of stabilizing the concentration of C02 in the atmospherequot 67 The Hague 2000 This was the domestic context in which international talks to resolve out standing issues from Kyoto resumed at the fourth COP in Buenos Aires Argentina which began in early November 1998 Hoping to facilitate consen sus there the Clinton administration had worked assiduously to forge bilat eral agreements with developing countries on voluntarily limiting their C02 emissions By the time negotiations got under way however only Argentina had agreed to join Annex I voluntarily and thereby accept emissions reduc tions obligations Thereafter Kazakhstan and Bolivia announced their will ingness to do the same In addition on November 12 the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol adding its name to the more than 150 signatories only one of which Romania had actually rati ed the treaty Nevertheless little of substance was accomplished at the Buenos Aires meeting At the close of COP 4 the role of developing nations and the status of international emissions trading were still unresolved In a promising advance on emissions trading the 377 was no longer monolithic China and India were leading the faction opposed to emissions limits on developing countries but African and Latin American countries were showing interest in making emis sions reductions in exchange for aid The second point was stickier Us nego tiators were tenacious about emissions trading because they thought it might defuse domestic opposition but Europeans and many developing nations objected that the United States was trying to buy its way out of reducing its own emissions As of cials around the globe struggled to nd solutions everyone could agree on the scienti c evidence continued to pour in In March 1999 a study published in Nature concluded that the growing season in the northern tem perate zone from the subArctic to the Mediterranean region had lengthened by about eleven days since 1970 The authors attributed the shift to a rise in daily temperatures caused by the general warming of the climate Their find ings were consistent with a series of studies reported in 1996 and 1997 that detected early spring and a longer growing season in the northern hemi sphere Moreover the effects of climate change were becoming increasingly visible and dramatic in December scientists reported that 1999 had joined 298 Addressing Commons Problems 1998 as one of the two warmest years on record The following summer eye witness reports of open water from melting ice at the North Pole made head lines A scientist at the Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Wash ington con rmed that polar ice thickness had decreased from an average of 102 feet in the 19605 and 19705 to 59 feet in the 19905 Nor was the decrease an isolated phenomenon it was widespread in the central Arctic Ocean and most pronounced in the eastern Arctic Such ndings con rmed climate model predictions that the Arctic would be among the rst regions to respond to a global warming trend69 Although the in ux of worrisome scienti c reports lent urgency to the di mate change talks COP 6 in the Hague in November 2000 foundered once again The Hague conference was supposed to be the nal meeting to establish greenhousc gas emissions reduction policies and efforts to translate vague commitments into speci c practices promised to be contentious Prior to the meeting the Clinton administration again made its precautionary View of the problem clear testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations and Energy and Natural Resources Committees in September 2000 Frank Loy undersecretary for global affairs argued that As policymakers we must base our decisions on the best scienti c evidence available But we would fail in our duty to safeguard the health and well being of our citizens and the environment they cherish if we waited to act until the details of the climate system have been fully understood The sci ence tells us that this would be a recipe for disaster for we will only fully con rm the predictions of climate science when we experience them at which point it will be too late Instead we should ask quotAre the risks great enough to justify taldng action When it comes to the challenge of climate change the answer is an emphatic quotyesquot 70 At the same time to placate its critics the administration continued to embrace the language of economic growth ef ciency costeffectiveness and the pri macy of markets US negotiators left for the Hague determined to obtain unlimited use of emissionstrading mechanisms and credit for landuse prace tices included in the agreement I Although negotiators initially were hopeful after eleven exhausting days of bargaining among the 170 countries in attendance US insistence that it be permitted to meet its greenhouse gas reduction obligations with forest and agricultural land management rather than C02 emissions reductions proved to be an insurmountable hurdle Critics were dubious about relying on forests to curb C02 pointing out that research suggested the role of forests and soils in sequestering 30 2 was not straightforward1 Through the nal night and into the early morning environmental groups helped the European delegation analyze a variety of formulas for calculating carbon equivalents attributable to forest protection At 300 am a small cadre of British American and Euro pean diplomats shook hands on a deal the following day however the com plex formula turned out to be unacceptable to many in the European Union Climate Change 299 Iurgen Tritin the German environment minister explained that his country39s opposition to forest credits was deeply rooted in his nation s values and derived from a sense that the United States and its collaborators were trying to get something for nothingquot2 Observers were struck by the irony that previous talks had stumbled because of irreconcilable differences between developing and developed nations or between environmentalists and industry but the Hague negotia tions fell apart primarily because of a schism within the environmental move ment itself While mainstream American environmental groups as well as many climate change scientists supported the businessfriendly US solutions of emissions trading and forest conservation credits hard liners such as Greenpeace backed the German position quotWe39re better off with no deal than a bad deal argued Bill Hare of Greenpeace moments after the negotiations ended The hardline groups equated compromise with corruption and abdi cation to business interests but ironically found themselves allied with most of the business community in opposition to any treaty For more moderate en ronmentalists however the failure to reach agreement at the Hague was partiallarly worrisome in light of the upcoming US election Michael Oppen heimer of Environmental Defense warned presciently that if George W Bush became president it would only become more dif cult for American and European negotiators to nd common ground The Bush Presidency In early 2001 a series of reports detailed the latest scienti c understanding of the magnitude and likely impacts of climate change and the overall tone was one of foreboding In January a new FCC assessment con rmed that the global temperature had risen 1 degree Fahrenheit in the twentieth century blamed part of that increase on fossil fuel combustion and cautioned that it represented the most rapid change in ten millennia The IPCC suggested that earlier climate change estimates may have been conservative and that the earth39s climate could warm by as much as 105 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the twenty rst century74 Then in February the IPCC released a report entitled quotClimate Change 2001 Impacts Adaptations and Vulnerability Summarizing the work of 700 experts the Locopage document concluded ominously that quotprojected dimate changes during the zlst century have the potential to lead to future large scale and possible irreversible changes in Earth systemsquot with quotcontinental and global consequencesquot Among the likely outcomes were more quotfreakquot weather conditions such as cyclones oods and droughts massive displacement of population in the most affected areas greater risk of diseases like malaria and extinction of entire Species as their habitat disappeared Over time the report warned global Warming was also likely to cause large reductions in the Greenland and West Antarctic icc sheets and a substantial slowing of the circulation of warm water in the North Atlantic Finally changes in rainfall patterns due to climate 300 Addressing Commons Problems change combined with patterns of population growth would likely lead to enormous pressure on water supplies5 At conferences and in journals researchers continued to document climate change effects that were already observable At a meeting in San Francisco in February scientists attributed the recently noted melting of equatorial glaciers in Africa and Peru to global warming Scientists offered other evidence as well thawing permafrost delayed freezing earlier breakup dates of river and lake ice and longer growing seasons at mid to high latitudes76 And a study reported in Nature suggested yet another potential impact droughts caused by global warming could prompt northern soils to release C02 into the air speed ing up changes in the climate77 Despite mounting concern among scientists the election of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney both former oilmen dimmed hopes for US leadership on a climate change agreement Bush took of ce saying that more research on climate change was needed before any policies were undertaken and in March 2001 he vowed not to seek C02 emissions reductions thereby reneging on a campaign pledge to do so He outlined his view in a letter to four prominent Republican senators At a time when California has already experienced energy shortages and other Western states are worried about price and availability of energy this p Summer we must be very careful not to take actions that could harm con sumers This is especially true given the incomplete state of scienti c knowl edge of the causes of and solutions to global climate change and the lack of commercially available technologies for removing and storing carbon dioxide Although justi ed as a response to an energy crisis Bush supporters attrib uted his change of heart to a lastminute lobbying campaign by congressional Republicans and top industry leaders As if to put an exclamation point on the president 5 position the adminis tration s 2002 budget proposal cut spending on energy ef ciency programs by 15 percent9 Moreover Bush39s energy plan released in May 2001 emphasized loosening environmental regulations and developing new fossil fuel supplies After meeting with the president in early April and failing to change his mind about the Kyoto Protocol European leaders announced their intention to move forward with the treaty even Without American leadership According to the European Union s environmental commissioner Margot Wallstrom quotOther countries were reacting very strongly against the US 50 The administration39s position perplexed not only foreign leaders but other members of his own party many of whom had solid environmental records Furthermore public opinion polls revealed substantial public support for action on global warming a January 2001 Gallup poll found that 40 percent of Americans worried about global warming quota great deal up five points since 1989 and much higher than the level of concern reported 27 percent in 199781 A July 2001 New York limesXCBS News Poll found that 72 percent of the public Climate Change 301 believed it was necessary to take immediate steps to counter global warm ing and more than half thought the United States should abide by the Kyoto accord82 Recognizing his political vulnerability Bush commissioned an expert panel convened by the NAS National Research Council that could either legitimate his view or provide cover for a reversal on the issue The panel which com prised eleven prominent almospheric scientists including Richard Lindzen quotreaf rmed the mainstream scienti c View that the earth s atmosphere was getting warmer and that human activity was largely responsible 33 Although the president subsequently conceded the scienti c point he continued to in ame Europeans by opposing the Kyoto Protocol and rejecting mandatory emissions limits Bush s resistance notwithstanding in November 2001 negotiators repre senting 178 countries hammered out the details of the Kyoto Protocol and many large industrial countries said they intended to ratify the agreement Although it was only a first step environmentalists were pleased quotThe parties have reached complete agreement on what 5 an infraction how you decide a case and what are the penalties said David Doniger of the Natural Resources Defense Council quotThat s as good as it gets in international relations 84 Fur thermore to the surprise of many observers the European Union agreed to institute trading mechanisms for greenhouse gases a move they hoped would gain the support of Canada Japan and Russia In hopes of appeasing his increasingly voluble critics in February 2002 Bush announced a domestic plan that relied on 46 billion in tax credits over five years to encourage businesses to take Voluntary measures that would reduce the quotcarbon intensity the ratio of greenhouse gases to gross domestic product of the economy by 18 percent over ten years In announcing the plan the president made it clear that economic growth was his primary concern in part because a thriving economy would provide the resources to invest in clean technologies Eileen Claussen pointed out that the administration s car bon intensity targets were consistent with the trend the nation was already on and therefore represented little improvement In fact if the US economy grew at 3 percent a year during that period as predicted total greenhouse gas emissions would rise At the same time Myron Ebell of the Competitive Enterprise Institute warned that the administration s acknowledgement of cli mate change as a problem started the nation down a dark path toward mandatory emissions reductions85 39 Climate Change Science Solidi es For the next few years as international negotiations over ratifying the Kyoto Protocol proceeded climate science continued to evolve Even as scien tists investigated new aspects of the climate system they grew more con dent in their belief that humancaused greenhouse gas emissions were causing global warming Supporting evidence continued to mount for example the u 1 quot3quot quot e 1 C 39i quotrim 302 Addressing Commons Problems warmest year on record since the 1860s was 1998 followed by 2002 2003 and 2004 according to the UN World Meteorological Association 5 An August 2004 update of federal climate research featured new computer simulations in which the rise in global temperamres since 1970 could be explained only by human influences primarily rising emissions of greenhouse gases87 The fol lowing year researchers found the source of an error in satellite readings of atmospheric temperature trends that skeptics had used to dispute the global warming hypothesis once corrected temperatures in the tropics became con sistent with climate change models predictions Moreover scientists could find no credible evidence to support skeptics alternative hypothesis that solar variation rather than human activity could explain the observed warming88 The impacts of rising temperatures continued to manifest themselves more quickly than scientists had anticipated particularly in the polar regions where nonlinear processes were causing ice to melt more rapidly than expected For example in February 2002 a 125osquaremile section of the Antarctic Penin sula s Larscn B ice shelf began splintering and within a month it was gone Studies of marine algae found in core sediment suggested that the Larsen 8 had been intact since it formed more than 10000 years ago Apparently ice was owing into the sea faster than scientists had expected loss of coastal ice shelves was accelerating the ow of inland glaciers in addition water from summertime ponds percolating through cracks to the base was acting as a lubricant facilitating the slide of glacial ice over the earth below89 The Arctic was showing the effects of global warming as well In Septem ber 2003 researchers reported that the largest ice shelf in the Arctic had shat tered and a massive freshwater lake behind it had drained away90 Then in fall 2004 a comprehensive fouryear study of Arctic warming con rmed that the buildup of greenhouse gases was contributing to profound environmental changes in the region including sharp retreats of glaciers and sea ice and thawing 0f permafrost This rapid melting combined with increasing precipi tation exacerbated scientists fears about the impact of additional fresh water on the ocean current that transports heat to the North Atlantic According to scientist Wallace Broecker of Columbia University 5 LamontDoherty Earth Observatory if that global conveyor belt which is driven by cold salty water that sinks to the bottom and ows south shuts down the climate at northern latitudes may shift abruptly rather than gradually91 39 Scientists also continued to document fasterthanexpected impacts of glw bal warming on species and biodiversity According to two studies reported in Nature in January 2003 global warming was forcing species around the world to move into new ranges or alter their habits in ways that could disrupt ecosys tems Such large changes in response to a mere 1 degree temperature increase disturbed some researchers quotIt s really pretty frightening to think what we might see in the next 100 years said Dr Terry Root a Stanford ecologist and lead author of one of the studies92 A January 2004 article in Nature predicted that rising global temperatures could cause the extinction of one quarter of the world s plant and animal species93 Climate Change 303 In addition to detecting the consequences of global warming scientists were refining their understanding of the interactions between carbon sources and sinks For example a study published in Nature in March 2004 suggested that changes in the Amazon rainforest appeared to make it less capable of absorbing C02 than once believed The study revealed that trees were growing and dying at faster rates than twenty years earlier and scientists attributed this change to rising C02 levels Similarly a study published in Nature in September 2004 described an experiment that con rmed the hypothesis that presumed carbon sinks such as the Arctic tundra may actually generate net C02 increases as higher temperatures lead to more decomposition and leaching in the soil the combination of which produces more C02 than new plants take up94 While media coverage of these scienti c ndings helped buttress the pre cautionary arguments of environmentalists scientists tried to enhance their impact by publicizing the high level of agreement and concern in the scienti c community In October 2003 1000 scientists around the country signed a quotstate of climate science letter af rming the claims of the FCC and the National Research Council that anthropogenic climate change driven by emissions of greenhouse gases was already underway and was likely respon sible for most of the observed warming of the past fifty years and that they expected the earth to warm 25 degrees to 105 degrees Fahrenheit over the course of the twenty first century depending on future emissions levels and climate sensitivity Adding to the chorus in late December 2003 the presti gious American Geophysical Union followed the American Meteorological Society in adopting the of cial position that humancaused greenhouse gas emissions were causing global wamiing In an effort to persuade the public that US citizens would be victims not bene ciaries of global warming some activist scientists also undertook a campaign to portray its local impacts For example in fall 2004 the Union of Concerned Scientists released a cityby city analysis for California that included dire forecasts for San Francisco and other major metropolitan areas The group conducted similar analyses for other regions such as the Great Lakes as well Science published a study in October 2004 suggesting that a warmer climate could exacerbate the severity and duration of western droughts95 And an EPAcommissioned study released in February 2005 con duded that by the end of the twenty rst century global warming could raise sea levels enough that a heavy storm would send ood waters into Boston s downtown waterfront the nancial district and much of the Back Flay96 OUTCOMES The accumulating scienti c evidence made little impression on the Bush administration which continued to argue that the unsubstantiated threat of global warming did not warrant action that would cripple the economy In lune 2002 the White House sent a climate report to the UN that acknoWledged the role of fossil fuel burning in global warming but did not propose any major 304 Addressng Commons Problems changes in US policy Some vocal Republicans in Congress backed the admin istration s view and in August 2003 efforts by Sen John McCain R Ariz and Sen Joseph Lieberman D Conn to force a vote on their bill to limit green house gas emissions S 139 the Climate Stewardship Act prompted a furious resumption of the climate change debate Representing the views of skeptics Sen James lnhofe R Okla gave a two hour speech in which he said quotWith all of the hysteria all of the fear all of the phony science could it be that man made global warming is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people It sure sounds like it 97 The Senate ultimately defeated the McCain Lieberman bill by a vote of 55 to 43 A second effort in June 2005 failed by an even larger margin 6038 US negotiators continued to impede international action as well at the COP 10 meeting in December 2004 the US delegation blocked efforts to undertake anything beyond limited informal talks on ways to slow down global warming In justifying the US position delegation leader Paula Dobriansky said quotScience tells us that we cannot say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming and therefore what level must be avoided 98 Despite continued obstruction by the US government in mudFebruary 2005 the Kyoto Protocol went into effect thanks to Russia s rati cation late in 2004 Europe began implementing a capand trade system to meet its com mitment to reduce C02 emissions 8 percent below 1990 levels by 2012 Fur thermore even though the federal government refused to budge on the issue a host of states were acting to address climate change By 2005 twentyeight states had plans to reduce their net greenhouse gas emissions California Min nesota Oregon New Jersey Washington Wisconsin and the New England states had launched initiatives to curb their C02 output Other states includ ing Texas and Colorado had established requirements that utilities achieve a certain percentage of their portfolio using renewable energy sources measures that although not framed as climate change policies promised sub stantial reductions in C02 emissions Georgia Nebraska North Dakota and Wyoming were investigating methods for sequestering carbon in agricultural soils by promoting notill farming methods Other state programs included fuel ef ciency mandates for state eets and tax credits for energy conservation and the purchase of fuelef cient vehicles99 Local governments were getting on the bandwagon as well in February 2005 Seattle mayor Greg Nickels announced a campaign to get US cities to adopt the terms of the Kyoto Pro tocol Nickels aims to recruit 140 cities to equal the 140 countries that have signed the treaty100 Adding to the pressure on the federal government many businesses were coming out in support of mandatory greenhouse gas emissions reductions An August 2004 Business Week cover story reported that quotconsensus is growing even among businesspeople that they must act fast to combat climate change and many companies are now preparing for a carbonconstrained world 1 Companies were setting greenhouse gas reduction targets improv ing energy ef ciency increasing the production and use of renewable energy Climate Change 305 improving waste management investing in carbon sequestration technolo gies and developing energysaving products102 Furthermore according to Michael Northrop cochair 0f the Climate Group a coalition of companies and governments set up to share stories about the bene ts of acting on climate change quotIt s impossible to nd a company that has acted and found no bene ts 103 DuPont boasted that it had cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 65 per cent since 1990 saving hundreds of millions of dollars in the process Alcoa was aiming to cut its emissions by one quarter by 2010 General Motors was investing millions to develop hydrogenpowered cars that do not emit C02 and General Electric was anticipating a growing market for wind power and more energyef cient appliances BP developed an internal carbontrading strategy that prompted a companywide search to find the lowestcost reduc tions the result was a 10 percent reduction in emissions at a savings of 650 million over three years Similmly N ew York utility Consolidated Edison had saved 5 million by xing natural gas leaks104 Meanwhile scientists admonitions were becoming even more urgent Atmospheric carbon concentrations continued to rise In 2004 they reached 379 ppm the highest level ever recorded US greenhouse gas emissions also went up The Energy Information Administration reported in January 2004 that US CO2 emissions increased by 07 percent in 2003 down from a 1 per cent annual rate of increase since 1990 Although total emissions in 2003 were only slightly higher than they had been in 2000 they were 134 percent higher than in 1990 Furthermore three countries China India and the United States were planning to build 850 new coal red plants which together would pump up to ve times as much C02 into the atmosphere as Kyoto plans to reduce105 At the same time it was beginning to appear that limiting global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius and thereby avoiding the worst conse quences of climate change would entail preventing atmospheric concentra tions of C02 from reaching 450 ppm not 550 ppm as policymakers had hoped According to a study by Swiss scientist Malte Meinschausen released in Feb ruary 2005 450 ppm is the level at which there is just a fty fty chance that the global average temperature rise will not exceed 2 degrees Celsius Attain ing a 450 ppm concentration would require reducing the world s greenhouse gas emissions to between 30 percent and 50 percent of 1990 levels by 2050 And as Norwegian scientist Steffen Kallbekken points out delays in cutting back those emissions will make meeting targets more dif cult as much deeper yearly cuts will be required CONCLUSIONS Domestic opposition has hampered efforts to build the groundswell of sup port necessary to force American national leaders to pursue climate change policies Opposing greenhouse gas reductions is a powerful coalition of oil and coal producers and fossil fuel dependent industries that have deep pock ets and strong longstanding ties to elected of cials This coalition has lobbied 1 I Hrt w a of if ii quotrial E ugn 306 Addressing Commons Problems intensely to ensure that members of Congress and the administration are aware of their position They have also undertaken a costly public relations campaign in which they wield a dire threat economic collapse As they de ne the problem the certain economic costs of acting vastly outweigh the highly uncertain and potentially negligible risks of inaction The extensive efforts by opponents of climate change policies to undermine the credibility of main stream scientists and elevate the views of conservative economists illuminate the importance of problem de nition in American politics not only in bring ing about policy change but in preventing it At the same time proponents of climate change policies are at a disadvan tage not just because they have fewer resources but also because they have a dif cult case to make The climate system is complex and uncertain the vil lains of the climate change story are ordinary Americans and any crisis asso ciated with climate change is likely to occur in the politically distant future Recogning their situation proponents of climate change policies have adopted new approaches They have lobbied at the state level where the fos sil fuelbased coalition is less entrenched They have also tried to disrupt alliances among economic interests in the United States in a variety of ways some of them confrontational and others more conciliatory They have used boycotts and shareholder resolutions to raise CEOs concern about their cor porate image In addition they have formed partnerships with businesses to encourage voluntary greenhouse gas emissions reductions Abetting their efforts is a growing chorus of scientists who have become unusually vocal As Princeton economist Robert Socolow observes the experts who do ice core research or work with climate models are going out of their way to say Wake up This is not a good thing to be doing 7 For business the motives for reducing emissions voluntarily and support ing mandatory emissions limits are varied Scientists growing certainty makes emissions limits appear inevitable and savvy executives such as BP s John Browne recognize that acting early enhances their reputation and may get them a seat at the table when regulations are designed Furthermore state level policies raise concems among industries about diverse regulations and create an incentive to press for uniform national C02 rules Similarly for multinationals implementation of the Kyoto Protocol means they will face carbon constraints in other countries so regulatory harmonization makes sense As a result a growing number of prominent businesspeople have come out in favor of federal greenhouse gas limits For example in early December 2004 James Rogers CEO of the electric utility Cinergy Corp announced his support for the goals of the McCainLieberman bill which would force major industrial sectors to cut their greenhouse gas emissions to 2000 levels by 2010 And in early February 2005 a Shell Oil economist told senators that climate change is a quotwild card that could shape energy markets and governance worldwide so it would be prudent to take steps to reduce C02 emissions sooner rather than later108 H l 1quot 1991 9 Climate Change 30 QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER Why has the United States resisted efforts to forge international agree ments on C02 emissions reduction policies and why is the European Union39s position so different 0 What do you think the prospects are for a shift in the U8 position on policies to prevent or mitigate the damage from climate change and why 9 Should Americans be concerned about the pace at which the us gov ernment is responding to this issue Or is a goslow approach preferable Notes Statement of Dr James Hansen Director NASA Goddard Institute for Space Stud ies Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources US Senate tooth Cong rst sess on the Green house Effect and Global Climate Change Part 2 June 23 1988 Norman Vig Introduction in The Global Enoironnzent Institutions low and Pol icy ed Norman Vig and Regina S Axelrod Washington DC CQ Press 1999 Ian H Rowlands quotClassical Theories of International Relations in International Relations and Global Climate Change ed Urs Luterbacher and Detlef Sprinz Cam bridge MIT Press 4355 Stephen Krasner quoted in Vig quotIntroductionquot 4 Helen Milner Interests Institutions and Information Domestic Politics and Interna tional Relations Princeton Princeton University Fress 1997 91o Robert D Putnam quotDiplomacy and Domestic Politics The Logic of TwoLevel Games International Organization 42 Summer 1988 434 Darrell M West and Burdett A Loomis The Sound of Money How Political Interests Get What They Want New York Norton 1999 See for example Dewitt John Civic Environmentalism Alternatives to Regulation in States and Communities Washington DC CQ Press 1994 Daniel A Mazrnanian and Michael E Kraft Toward Sustainable Communities Transition and Transformation in Environmental Policy Cambridge MIT Press 1999 Judith A Layzer quotDeep Freeze How Business has Shaped the Legislative Debate on Climate Changequot in Business and Environmental Policy ed Michael E Kraft and Sheldon Kamieniecki Cambridge MIT Press forthcoming Iohn Houghton Global Warming The Complete Brie ng 2d ed New York Cam bridge University Press 1997 Ian Rowlands The Politics of Global Abnospheric Change New York Manchester Uni versity Press 1993 Matthew Paterson Global Warming and Climate Politics New Yorlc Routledge 1996 Roger Revelle and Hans E Stress Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During the Past Decade Tellns 9 1957 18 23 President s Science Advisory Committee Restoring the Quality of Ont Environment Report of the Environmental Pollntion Panel Washington DC The White House 1965 126 127 National Academy of Sciences Carbon Dioxide and Climate A Scientific Assessment Washington DC National Academy of Sciences 1979 Enduring cooperation among meteorologists began with the First International Meteorological Conference in 1853 Twenty years later the International Meteoro logical Organization lMO was established After World War 11 the MO turned quotin r n 2 l i c S39K in alkali 539 S Jmu us39mut um 1 3 133 Man 1 lg when it 39 quotlter ml H 308 Addressing Commons Problems 00 1 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 3o 31 32 33 3 36 Equot into the World Meteorological Organization and the latter began operating in 1951 See Paterson Global Warming Quoted in William W Kellogg quotPredictions of a Global Cooling Nature August 16 1979 615 Stephen Seidel and Dale Keyes Can We Delay 3 Greenhouse Warming The Effective ness and Feasibility of Options to Slow 11 Build Up of Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere Washington DC US Environmental Protection Agency September 1983 World Meteorological Organization Report of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Vari ations and Associated Impacts Wilson Austria 9 15 October WMO Publication no 661 Geneva World Meteorological Association 1986 Quoted in Michael Molitor quotThe United Nations Climate Change Agreements in The Global Environment 221 A framework convention is a broad but formal agreement a protocol contains more concrete commitments Both must be signed and rati ed by participating nations Molitor I39he United Nations Clirnate Change Agreements Quoted in Paterson Global Warming 37 Quoted in Michael Weisskopf Bush Says More Data on Warming Needed Wash ington Post April 18 1990 1 Quoted in Molitor quotThe United Nations Climate Change Agreements lPCC Working Group 1 Climate Change The IPCC Scienti c Assessment ed J T Houghton G J Jenkins and J J Ephraums New York Cambridge University Press 1990 Rowlands The Politics of Global ionospheric Change 79 John Hunt quotU 5 Stand on Global Warming Attacked Financial Times August 30 1990 4 Rowlands The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change For the complete text of the FCCC go to wwwunfcccde Steven Greenhouse quotO cials Say us Is Unlikely to Meet CleanAir Goa for 2000 New York Times March 30 1995 6 Bert Bolin quotReport to the Ninth Session of the INCFCCC Geneva H CC Febru ary 7 1994 2 PCC Working Group I Climate Change 1995 The Science of Climate Gangs ed J T Houghton et al New York Cambridge University Press 1996 4 lbid quot Stuart Eizenstadt Under Secretary of State for Economic Business and Agricultural Affairs Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 105th Cong 2d sess February 11 1998 Quoted in Daniel Sarewitz and Roger A Pielke In quotBreaking the Globalng Gridlock Atlantic Monthly July 2000 57 A Ross Gelbspan The Heat Is On The High Stakes Battle over Earth s Threatened Climate New York AddisonWesley 1997 To estimate the in uence of greenhouse gases in changing climate researchers run models for a few simulated decades and compare the statistics of the models out put to measures of the climate Although observations of both past and present cli mate confirm many of the predictions of the prevailing models of climate change at least some of the data used to vadidate the models are themselves model outputs Moreover the assumptions and data used to construct GCMs heavily in uence their predictions and those elements are themselves selected by scientists who already know what they expect to nd See Steve Rayner quotPredictions and Other Approaches to Climate Change Policyquot in Prediction Science Decision Making and the Future of Nature ed Daniel Sarewitz Roger A Pielke In and Radtord Byerly Jr Washington DC Island Press 2000 269 296 37 38 4o 41 42 43 44 45a 46 48 49 Equot 5 52 53 54 55 56 57 59 Climate Change 309 Michael L Parsons The Truth Behind the Myth New York Plenum Press 1995 Patrick I Michaels Sound and Fury The Science and Politics of Global Woming Mash ington DC Cato Institute 1992 S Fred Singer quotBene ts of Global Warming Society 29 MarchApril 1993 33 William K Stevens quotAt Hot Center of the Debate on Global Warming New York Times August 6 1996 C1 Thomas Gale Moore quotWhy Global Warming Would Be Good For You Public Inter est Winter 1995 83 99 Thomas Gale Moore Climate ofPear Why We Shouldn t Worry About Global Warming Washington DC Cato Institute 1 2 Warren T Brookes quotThe Global Warming Panic Forbes December 25 1989 98 Quoted in Gale E Christianson Greenhouse The zoo Year Story of Global Warming New York Penguin Books 1999 258 US Council of Economic Advisers Economic Report of the President Washington DC US Government Printing Of ce February 1990 214 Moore Climate of Fees 2 Rowlands The Politics of Annospizeric Change 139 William R Cline Global Warming The Economic Stokes Washington DC Institute for International Economics 1992 12 Rowlands The Politics of ionospheric Change 13739 John I Fialka quotClinton s Efforts to Curb Global Warming Draws Some Business Support But It May Be Too Late Wall Street omrial October 22 1997 24 Craig Trumbo quotLongitudinal Modeling of Public Issues An Application of the AgendaSetting Process to the Issue of Global Warming journalism 8 Moss Commu nication Monograph 152 August 1995 Frank Loy Undersecretary for Global Affairs Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources US Sen ate 106111 Cong 2d secs September 28 2000 Quoted in William K Stevens quotGreenhouse Gas Issue Haggling Over Fairness New York Times November 30 1997 6 Quoted in Molitor quotThe United Nations C mate Change Agreements 219 220 Quoted in ibid 220 John H Cushrnan I11 quotUS Says Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are at Highest Rate in Years New York Times October 21 1997 22 John H Cushman In quotWhy the US Fell Short of Ambitious Goals for Reducing Greenhouse Gases New York Times October 20 1997 15 Quoted in Christianson Greenhouse 255 Ibid Quoted in James Bennet Warm Globe Hot Politics New York Times December 11 1997 1 The protocol takes effect once it is rati ed by at least fty ve nations the terms become binding on an individual country only after its government rati es the treaty John H Cushman In Industrial Group Plans to Battle Climate Treaty New York limes April 26 1998 1 William K Stevens Science Academy Disputes Attacks on Global Warming New York Times April 22 1998 21 John H Cushman In New Policy Center Seeks to Steer the Debate on Climate Changequot New York Times May 8 1998 13 Andrew C Revlon quotThe Tree Trap New York Times November 26 2000 16 Interlaboratory Working Group Scenarios of US Carbon Reductions Potential Impacts of Energy Technologies by 2010 and Beyond Berkeley and Oak Ridge Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory Sep tember 1997 Rept No LEM40533 and 0RNL 444 310 65 66 67 68 6 70 71 72 73 74 3x 84 9 3330 Addressing Commons Problems Council of Economic Advisors The Kyoto Protocol and the President s Policies to Address Climate Change Administration Economic Analysis Washington DC Execu tive Of ce of the President July 1998 Robert Mendelsohn et al 1ntr0duc 0n in The Impact of Climate Change or the United States Economy ed Robert Mendelsohn and James E Neumann New York Cambridge University Press 1999 15 Bert Bolin quotThe Kyoto Negotiations on Climate Change A Science Perspective Science January 16 1998 330 331 William K Stevens quotMarch May Soon Be Coming in Like a Lamb New York Times March 2 1999 1 7 John Noble Wilford Open Water at the Pole Is Not so Surprising Experts Say New York Times August 29 2000 C1 Loy Statement By employing prudent land use practices the United States argued parties can quotsequesterquot COT that is they can stone it in wood and soils thereby preventing its release into the atmosphere Critics were dubious about heavy reliance on forests to curb C02 however pointing out that while forests currently do offset about one quarter of the world s industrial CO2 emissions research at the Hadley Center in the United Kingdom indicated that many of the recently planted forests would by the middle of the twentyfirst century begin releasing carbon back into the atmo sphere Moreover they noted during the same period warming was likely to increase the amount of carbon released by soils particularly in the peatland forests of the northern latitudes Andrew C Revkin quotl reaty Talks Fail to Find Consensus in Global Warming New York Times November 26 2001 1 Quoted in Andrew C Revlcin quotOdd Culprits in Collapse of Climate Talks New York Times November 28 2000 C1 quotClimate Panel Reaf rms Major Warming Threat New York Times January 23 2001 D8 quotParadise Lost Global Warming Seen as Threat Houston Chronicle February 20 2001 1 Kilimanjaro has lost 82 percent of the icecap it had in 1912 In the Alps scientists estimate 90 percent of the ice volume of a century ago will be gone by 2025 See Eric Pianin quotUN Report Forecasts Crises Brought On By Global Warming Washing ton Post February 20 2001 6 James Glanz quotDroughts Might Speed Climate Change New York Times January 11 2001 16 Quoted in Douglas Jehl and Andrew C Revkin quotBush in Reversal Won t Seek Cuts in Emissions of Carbon Dioxide New York quotlimes March 14 2001 1 Joseph Kahn quotEnergy Ef ciency Programs Are Set for Bush Budget Cut New York Times April 5 2001 16 Douglas Jehl quotU 5 Rebuffs European Plea Not to Abandon Climate Pact New York Times April 4 2001 14 Darren K Carlson quotScientists Deliver Serious Warning About Effects of Global Warming Gallup Poll Releases January 23 2001 Edmund L Andrews quotFrustrated Europeans Set Out to Battle US on Climatequot New York Times July 16 2001 3 Katharine Q Seelye and Andrew C Revkin quotPanel Tells Bush Global Warming Is Getting Worse New York Times June 7 2001 1 Quoted in Andrew C Revlon quotDeal Breaks Impasse on Global Warming Treaty New York Times November 11 2001 See 1 1 Climate Change 311 85 Quoted in quotWhite House Plan Marks Turf Amid AlreadyContentious Debatequot E rE Daily February 15 2002 86 quotDoubts Linger as Kyoto Takes Force This Weekquot Greenwire February 14 2005 87 Andrew C Revkin quotComputers Add Sophistication but Don t Resolve Climate Debate New York Times August 31 2004 88 Peter Foukal Gerald North and Tom Wigley quotA Stellar View on Solar Variations and Climate Science October 1 2004 68 69 89 By contrast core sediment revealed that the Larsen A ice shelf which disintegrated in the mid19905 had been open water 600 years ago See Kenneth Chang quotI39he Melting Freezing of Antarcticaquot New York Times April 2 2002 Dr Andrew C Revkin quotStudy of Antarctic Points to Rising Sea Levels New York Times March 7 2003 8 90 Usha Lee McFarling quotArctic s Biggest Ice Shelf a Sentinel of Climate Change Cracks Apart Los Aageles 39Itmes September 23 2003 Sec 1 3 91 Wallace 8 Broacker quot39I39liennohaline Circulation the Achilles Heel of Our Climate System Will ManMade C02 Upset the Current Balance Science November 28 1997 1582 8 92 Quoted in Andrew C Revkin Warming Is Found to Disrupt Speciesquot New York Times January 2 2003 1 93 quotRising Temps Could Kill 25 Percent of World s Species Scientists Sayquot Greenn re January 8 2004 94 quotC02 May be Changing Structure of Amazon Rainforest Studyquot Greenwire March 11 2004 quotStudy Finds Carbon Sinks May Actually Generate More C02 Greenwire September 24 2004 95 Andrew Freedman quotWarming May Lead to Western Megadroughts Study Says Greenwire October 8 2004 96 Susan Milligan Study Predicts City Flood Threat Due to Warming Boston Globe February 15 2005 1 97 Quoted in Andrew C Revkin quotPolitics Reasserts Itself in the Debate Over Climate Change and Its Hazards New York Times August 5 2003 F2 98 Quoted in Larry Rohter quotUS Waters Down Global Commitment to Curb Green house Gases New York Times December 19 2004 16 99 Barry Rabe Statehouse and Greenhouse The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 2004 100 quotCities Organizing to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions Greenwire February 22 2005 101 Iohn Carey quotGlobal Warming Business Week August 16 2004 102 Carbon sequestration is the longterm storage of carbon in forests soils geological formations and other carbon sinks See Pew Center on Global Climate Change quotClimate Change Activities in the United States 2004 Update Available at wwwpewclunateorg 103 Quoted in Carey quotGlobal Warming 104 Carey quotGlobal Warmingquot quotEnviro Study Highlights Business Efforts to Reduce GHGs Greenwire October 26 2004 105 Mark Clayton New Coal Plants Bury Kyoto Christian Science Monitor December 23 2004 106 Jenny Hogan quotOnly Huge Emissions Cuts Will Curb Climate Change New Sci entist February 3 2005 107 Elizabeth Kolbert quotThe Climate of Man IIIquot New Yorker May 9 2005 55 108 l Cinergy Says It Supports Mandatory GHG Reductions Greenwire December 2 2004 Ben Geman quotClimate Change Is Energy Wild Card Industry Economist Says Greenun39re February 4 2005 ml 113 r 312 Addressing Commons Problms Recommended Reading Gelbspan Ross The Heat Is On The High Stakes Battle over Earth s Threatened Climate New York AddisonWesley 1997 Houghton John Global Warming The Complete Brie ng 2d ed New York Cambridge University Press 1997 Michaels Patrick 1 Sound and Fury The Science and Politics of Global Waming Washing ton DC Cato Institute 1992 Paterson Matthew Global Wamirzg and Climate Politics New York Routledge 1996 Victor David G The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming Princeton Princeton University Press 200x Weart Spencer K The Discovery of Global Warming Cambridge Harvard University Press 2003 Web Sites httpwxfcmint286ophp UNFCCC site wwwipccch IPCC site wwwepagovfglobalwarming EPA site Article 5 The Ends of the World as We Know Them Whereas Maya societies were undone by problems of their own making Polynesian societies on Pitcairn and Henderson Islands in the tropical Pacific Ocean were undone largely by other people39s mistakes Pitcairn the uninhabited island settled in 1790 by the HMS Bounty mutineers had actually been populated by Poly nesians 800 years earlier That society which left behind temple platforms stone and shell tools and huge garbage piles of fish and bird and turtle bones as evidence of its existence survived for several centuries and then vanished Why Unfortunately for the inhabitants of Pitcairn and Henderson their Mangarevan trading partner collapsed for reasons similar to those underlying the Maya decline deforestation erosion and warfare Deprived of essential imports in a Polynesian equivalent of the 1973 oil crisis the Pitcairn and Henderson societies declined until everybody had died or fled Half of the answer involves environmental differences geography deals worse cards to some societies than to others Many of the societies that collapsed had the misfortune to occupy dry cold or otherwise fragile environments while many of the longterm survivors enjoyed more robust and fertile surroundings But it39s not the case that a congenial environment guarantees success some societies like the Maya managed to ruin lush environments while other societieslike the Incas the Inuit Icelanders and desert Australian Aborigines have managed to carry on in some of the earth39s most daunting environments JARED DIAMOND NEW Year s weekend traditionally is a time for us to re ect and to make resolutions based on our re ections In this fresh year with the United States seemingly at the height of its power and at the start of a new presidential term Americans are increas ingly concerned and divided aboth where we are going How long can America remain ascendant Where will we stand 10 years from now or even next year Such questions seem especially appropriate this year History warns us that when oncepowerful societies collapse they tend to do so quickly and unexpectedly That shouldn t come as much of a surprise peak power usually means peak population peak needs and hence peak vulnerability What can be learned from history that could help us avoid joining the ranks of those who declined sWiftly We must expect the answers to be complex because historical reality is complex while some societies did indeed collapse spectacularly others have managed to thrive for thousands of years without major reversal When it comes to historical collapses ve groups of inter acting factors have been especially important the damage that people have in icted on their environment climate change enemies changes in friendly trading partners and the soci ety s political economic and social responses to these shifts That39s not to say that all ve causes play a role in every case Instead think of this as a useful checklist of factors that should be examined but whose relative importance varies from case to case 21 For instance in the collapse of the Polynesian society on Easter Island three centuries ago environmental problems were dominant and climate change enemies and trade were insigni cant however the latter three factors played big roles in the disappearance of the medieval Norse colonies on Greenland Let s consider two examples of declines stemming from different mixes of causes the falls of classic Maya civili zation and of Polynesian settlements on the Pitcairn Islands Maya Native Americans of the Yucatan Peninsula and adja cent parts of Central America developed the New World s most advanced civilization before Columbus They were innovators in writing astronomy architecture and art From local origins around 2500 years ago Maya societies rose especially after the year AD 250 reaching peaks of population and sophistication in the late 8th century Thereafter societies in the most densely populated areas of the southern Yucatan underwent a steep political and cultural collapse between 760 and 910 kings were overthrown large areas were abandoned and at least 90 percent of the population disappeared leaving cities to become overgrown by jungle The last known date recorded on a Maya monument by their so called Long Count calendar corresponds to the year 909 What happened A major factor was environmental degradation by people deforestation soil erosion and water management problems all of which resulted in less food Those problems were exacerbated DOCUMENT ID 36333 ANNUAL EDITIONS by droughts which may have been partly caused by humans themselves through deforestation Chronic warfare made mat ters worse as more and more people fought over less and less land and resources Why weren t these problems obvious to the Maya kings who could surely see their forests vanishing and their hills becom ing eroded Part or the reason was that the kings were able to insulate themselves from problems af icting the rest of society By extracting wealth from commoners they could remain well fed while everyone else was slowly starving What s more the kings were preoccupied with their own power struggles They had to concentrate on ghting one another and keeping up their images through ostentatious displays of wealth By insulating themselves in the short run from the problems of society the elite merely bought themselves the privilege of being among the last to starve Whereas Maya societies were undone by problems of their own making Polynesian societies on Pitcairn and Henderson Islands in the tropical Pacific Ocean were undone largely by other people s mistakes Pitcairn the uninhabited island settled in 1790 by the HMS Bounty mutineers had actually been populated by Polynesians 800 years earlier That society which left behind temple platforms stone and shell tools and huge garbage piles of sh and bird and turtle bones as evidence of its existence survived for several centuries and then vanished Why 3 In many respects Pitcairn and Henderson are tropical para dises rich in some food sources and essential raw materials Pitcairn is home to Southeast Polynesia s largest quarry of stone suited for making adzes while Henderson has the region s larg est breeding seabird colony and its only nesting beach for sea turtles Yet the islanders depended on imports from Mangareva Island hundreds of miles away for canoes crops livestock and oyster shells for making tools Unfortunately for the inhabitants of Pitcairn and Henderson their Mangarevan trading partner collapsed for reasons simi 1ar to those underlying the Maya decline deforestation ero sion and warfare Deprived of essential imports in a Polynesian equivalent of the 1973 oil crisis the Pitcairn and Henderson societies declined until everybody had died or ed The Maya and the Henderson and Pitcairn Islanders are not alone of course Over the centuries many other societies have declined collapsed or died out Famous victims include the Anasazi in the American Southwest who abandoned their cit ies in the 12th century because of environmental problems and climate change and the Greenland Norse who disappeared in the 15th century because of all ve interacting factors on the checklist There were also the ancient Fertile Crescent societ ies the Khmer at Angkor Wat the Moche society of Peru the list goes on But before we let ourselves get depressed we should also remember that there is another long list of cultures that have managed to prosper for lengthy periods of time Societies in Japan Tonga Tikopia the New Guinea Highlands and Central and Northwest Europe for example have all found ways to sus tain themselves What separates the lost cultures from those that survived Why did the Maya fail and the Shogun succeed 22 Half of the answer involves environmental differences geog raphy deals worse cards to some societies than to others Many of the societies that collapsed had the misfortune to occupy dry v cold or otherwise fragile environments while many of the long term survivors enjoyed more robust and fertile surroundings But it s not the case that a congenial environment guarantees success some societies like the Maya managed to ruin lush environments while other societies like the Incas the Inuit Icelanders and desert Australian Aborigines have managed to carry on in some of the earth s most daunting environments The other half of the answer involves differences in a society s responses to problems Ninth century New Guinea Highland villagers 16thcentury German landowners and the Tokugawa shoguns of 17thcentury Japan all recognized the deforestation spreading around them and solved the problem either by devel oping scienti c reforestation Japan and Germany or by trans planting tree seedlings New Guinea Conversely the Maya Mangarevans and Easter Islanders failed to address their for estry problems and so collapsed Consider Japan In the 1600 s the country faced its own cri sis of deforestation paradoxically brought on by the peace and prosperity following the Tokugawa shoguns military triumph that ended 150 years of civil war The subsequent explosion of Japan s population and economy set off rampant logging for construction of palaces and cities and for fuel and fertilizer The shoguns responded with both negative and positive measures They reduced wood consumption by turning to light timbered construction to fuelefficient stoves and heaters and to coal as a source of energy At the same time they increased wood production by developing and carefully managing planta tion forests Both the shoguns and the Japanese peasants took a longterm view the former expected to pass on their power to their children and the latter expected to pass on their land In addition J apan s isolation at the time made it obvious that the country would have to depend on its own resources and couldn t meet its needs by piHaging other countries Today despite hav ing the highest human population density of any large devel oped country Japan is more than 70 percent forested There is a similar story from Iceland When the island was rst settled by the Norse around 870 its light volcanic soils presented colonists with unfamiliar challenges They proceeded to cut down trees and stock sheep as if they were still in Norway with its robust soils Significant erosion ensued carrying half of Iceland s topsoil into the ocean within a century or two Icelanders became the poorest people in Europe But they grad ually learned from their mistakes over time instituting stocking limits on sheep and other strict controls and establishing an entire government department charged with landscape manage ment Today Iceland boasts the sixthhighest per capita income in the world What lessons can we draw from history The most straight forward take environmental problems seriously They destroyed societies in the past and they are even more likely to do so now If 6000 Polynesians with stone tools were able to destroy Mangareva Island consider what six billion people with metal tools and bulldozers are doing today Moreover while the Maya collapse affected just a few neighboring societies in Central DOCUMENT ID 36333 America globalization now means that any society s problems have the potential to affect anyone else Just think how crises in Somalia Afghanistan and Iraq have shaped the United States today Other lessons involve failures of group decision making There are many reasons why past societies made bad decisions and thereby failed to solve or even to perceive the problems that would eventually destroy them One reason involves con icts of interest whereby one group within a society for instance the pig farmers who caused the worst erosion in medieval Green land and Iceland can pro t by engaging in practices that dam age the rest of society Another is the pursuit of shortterm gains at the expense of longterm survival as when shermen over fish the stocks on which their livelihoods ultimately depend History also teaches us two deeper lessons about what sepa rates successful societies from those heading toward failure A society contains a built in blueprint for failure if the elite insu lates itself from the consequences of its actions That s why Maya kings Norse Greenlanders and Easter Island chiefs made choices that eventually undermined their societies They them selves did not begin to feel deprived until they had irreversibly destroyed their landscape Could this happen in the United States It s a thought that often occurs to me here in Los Angeles when I drive by gated communities guarded by private security patrols and lled with people who drink bottled water depend on private pensions and send their children to private schools By doing these things they lose the motivation to support the police force the munici pal water supply Social Security and public schools condi tions deteriorate too much for poorer people gates will not keep the rioters out Rioters eventually burned the palaces of Maya kings and tore down the statues of Easter Island chiefs they have also already threatened wealthy districts in Los Angeles twice in recent decades In contrast the elite in 17th century Japan as in modern Scandinavia and the Netherlands could not ignore or insulate themselves r from broad societal problems For instance the Dutch upper class for hundreds of years has been unable to insulate itself from the Netherlands water management prob lems for a simple reason the rich live in the same drained lands below sea level as the poor If the dikes and pumps keeping out the sea fail the Welloff Dutch know that they will drown along with everybody else which is precisely what happened during the oods of 1953 The other deep lesson involves a willingness to reexamine long held core values when conditions change and those values no longer make sense The medieval Greenland Norse lacked such a willingness they continued to view themselves as trans planted Norwegian pastoralists and to despise the Inuit as pagan hunters even after Norway stopped sending trading ships and the climate had grown too cold for a pastoral existence They died off as a result leaving Greenland to the Inuit On the other Article 5The Ends of the World as We Know Them hand the British in the 1950 s faced up to the need for a painful reappraisal of their former status as rulers of a world empire set apart from Europe They are now finding a different avenue to wealth and power as part of a united Europe In this New Year we Americans have our own painful reap praisals to face Historically we viewed the United States as a land of unlimited plenty and so we practiced unrestrained consumerism but that s no longer viable in a world of finite resources We can t continue to deplete our own resources as well as those of much of the rest of the world Historically oceans protected us from external threats we stepped back from our isolationism only temporarily during the crises of two world wars Now technology and global intercon nectedness have robbed us of our protection In recent years we have responded to foreign threats largely by seeking short term military solutions at the last minute But how long can we keep this up Though we are the richest nation on earth there s simply no way we can afford or muster the troops to intervene in the dozens of countries where emerg ing threats lurk particularly when each intervention these days can cost more than 100 billion and require more than 100000 troops A genuine reappraisal would require us to recognize that it will be far less expensive and far more effective to address the underlying problems of public health population and environ ment that ultimately cause threats to us to emerge in poor coun tries In the past we have regarded foreign aid as either charity or as buying support now it s an act of selfinterest to preserve our own economy and protect American lives Do we have cause for hope Many of my friends are pes simistic when they contemplate the world s growing popula tion and human demands colliding with shrinking resources But I draw hope from the knowledge that humanity s biggest problems today are ones entirely of our own making Asteroids hurtling at us beyond our control don39t figure high on our list of imminent dangers To save ourselves we don t need new tech nology we just need the political will to face up to our problems of population and the environment I also draw hope from a unique advantage that we enjoy Unlike any previous society in history our global society today is the first with the Opportunity to learn from the mistakes of societies remote from us in space and in time When the Maya and Mangarevans were cutting down their trees there were no historians or archaeologists no newspapers or television to warn them of the consequences of their actions We on the other hand have a detailed chronicle of human successes and failures at our disposal Will we choose to use it JARED DIAMOND who won the 1998 Pulitzer Prize in general non c tion for Guns Germs and Steel The Fates of Human Societies is the author of the forthcoming quotCollapse How Societies Choose or Fail to Succeed From The New York Timer January 1 2005 p A13 Copyright 2005 by The New York Times company Reprinted by permission 23 DOCUMENT ID 36333 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 1 of 8 Just War Theory Justwar theory deals with the justi cation of how and why wars are fought The justi cation can be either theoretical or historical The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and forms of warfare The historical aspect or the just war tradition deals with the historical body of rules or agreements applied or at least existing in various wars across the ages For instance international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague conventions are historical rules aimed at limiting certain kinds of warfare It is the role of ethics to examine these institutional agreements for their philosophical coherence as well as to inquire into whether aspects of the conventions ought to be changed TableofQQntent Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article knitteducnm 2 The Jus Ad Bellem Convention Snifmfrinciplies Of lys11113allo HEADER1 IntroductionHEADER Historically the justwar tradition a set of mutually agreed rules of combat commonly evolves between two similar enemies When enemies differ greatly because of different religious beliefs race or language war conventions have rarely been applied It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people with whom one will do business in the following peace that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve In part the motivation is seen to be mutually bene cial it is preferable to remove any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts Nonetheless it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that such asymmetrical morality should be denounced and that the rules of war should apply to all equally that is just war theory should be universal The just war tradition is as old as warfare itself Early records of collective ghting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors They may have involved consideration of women and children or the treatment of prisoners Commonly they invoked considerations of honour some acts in war have always been deemed dishonourable whilst others have been deemed honourable Whilst the specifics of what is honourable differ with time and place the very fact of one moral virtue has been suf cient to infuse warfare with moral concerns The just war theory also has a long history Whilst parts of the Bible hint at ethical behaviour in httpvwvwieputmedujjustwarhtm 11262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 2 of 8 war and concepts of just cause the most systematic exposition is given by Saint Thomas Aquinas In the Summa T heologicae Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory He discusses not only the justi cation of war but also the kinds of activity that are permissible in war Aquinas39s thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand The most important of these are Francisco de Vitoria 14861546 Francisco Suarez 15481617 Hugo Grotius 15831645 Samuel Pufendorf 16321704 Christian Wolff 1679 1754 and Emerich de Vattel 1714 1767 In the twentieth century it has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war The most important contemporary texts include Michael Walzer39s Just and Unjust Wars 1977 Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill The Ethics of War 1979 Richard Norman Ethics Killing and War 1995 Brian Orend War and International Justice 2001 and Michael Walzer on War and Justice 2001 as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel quotWar and Massacrequot Elizabeth Anscombe quotWar and Murderquot and a host of others commonly found in the journals Ethics or The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs Since the terrorist attacks on the USA on 911 academics have turned their attention to just war once again with international and national conventions developing and consolidating the theoretical aspects of the conventions just war theory has become a popular topic in International Relations Political Science Philosophy Ethics and Military History courses Conference proceedings are regularly published offering readers a breadth of issues that the topic stirs eg Alexander Moseley and Richard Norman eds Human Rights and Military Intervention Paul Robinson ed Just War in a Comparative Perspective Alexsander Jokic ed War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing What has been of great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade the dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only remain intact on the battle eld but their role and hence their explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate Generals have extolled their troops to adhere to the rules soldiers are taught the just war conventions in the military academies yet war crimes continue genocidal campaigns have been waged by mutually hating peoples leaders have waged total war on ethnic groups within or without their borders and individual soldiers or guerilla bands have committed atrocious murderous or humiliating acts Yet increasingly the rule of law the need to hold violators and transgressors responsible for their actions in war is making headway onto the battle eld In chivalrous times the Christian crusader could seek absolution for atrocities committed in war today the law courts are less forgiving Nonetheless the idealism of those who seek the imposition of law and responsibility on the battle eld cf Geoffrey Robinson39s Crimes Against Humanity 1999 often runs ahead of the traditions and customs that demean or weaken the justum bellum that may exist between warring factions And in some cases no just war conventions exist at all In such cases the ethic of war is considered or is implicitly held to be beyond the norms of peaceful ethics and therefore deserving a separate moral realm where quotfair is foul and foul is fairquot Shakespeare Macbeth Ii In such examples eg Rwanda 1994 a people39s justi cation of destructiveness and killing to whatever relative degree they hold to be justi able in this amoral world triumphs over attempts to establish the laws of peaceful interaction into this separate bloody realm and in some wars people ghting for their land or nation prefer to pick up the cudgel rather than the rapier as Leo Tolstoy notes in War and Peace Book 4Ch2 to sidestep the etiquette or war in favour securing their land from occupational or invading forces Against the just war ustum bellum are those of a skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war There are various positions against the need or the possibility of morality in war Generally consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if victory is sought then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and httpwwwieputmedujjustwarhtm 1 1262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 3 of 8 time Arguments from 39military necessity are of this type for example to defeat Germany in World War II it was deemed necessary to bomb civilian centers or in the US Civil War for General Sherman to burn Atlanta However intrinsicists may also decree that no morality can exist in the state of war for they may claim it can only exist in a peaceful situation in which recourse exists to con ict resolving institutions Or intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause the argument from righteousness is a suf cient condition for pursuing whatever means are necessary to gain a victory or to punish an enemy A different skeptical argument one advanced by Michael Walzer is that the invention of nuclear weapons alters war so much that our notions of morality end hence justwar theoriesbecome redundant However against Walzer it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework Whilst sceptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions they need not be Consequentialists can argue that there are longterm bene ts to having a war convention For example by ghting cleanly both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counterrevenges Intrinsicists can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war for example hospitals and densely populated suburbs The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague or restrictive when it comes to war Consequentialism is an openended model highly vulnerable to pressing military needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war if more will be gained from breaking the rules than will be lost the consequentialist cannot but demur to military necessity On the other hand intrinsicism can be so restrictive that it permits no flexibility in war whether it entails a Kantian thesis of respecting others or a classical rights position intrinsicism produces an in exible model that would restrain warrior39s actions to the targeting of permissible targets only In principle such a prescription is commendable yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers Against these two ethical positions just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war From the just war justum bellum tradition theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war jus ad bellum from those that govern just and fair conduct in war Jus In Bella The two are by no means mutually exclusive but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations Backm Table otiContents 2The A dBellemmCenLenjiqn The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be having just cause being declared by a proper authority possessing right intention having a reasonable chance of success and the end being proportional to the means used One can immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor consequentialist they invoke the concerns of both models Whilst this provides just war theory with the advantage of exibility the lack of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems Possessing just cause is the rst and arguably the most important condition of jus ad bellum Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend httpwwwieputmedujjushvarhtm 11262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 4 of 8 itself But unless 39aggression is de ned this proscription is rather openended For example just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical injury eg a violation of territory an insult an aggression against national honor a trade embargo an aggression against economic activity or even to a neighbor s prosperity a violation of social justice The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause Whilst not going into the reasons of why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted Selfdefense against physical aggression therefore is putatively the only suf cient reason for just cause Nonetheless the principle of selfdefense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression as well as in assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external threat interventionism Therefore it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed e g to pursue and punish an aggressor or to preempt an anticipated attack The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here If a government is just ie it is accountable and does not rule arbitrarily then giving the of cers of the state the right to declare war is reasonable However the more removed from a proper and just form a government is the more reasonable it is that its sovereignty disintegrates A historical example can elucidate the problem when Nazi Germany invaded France in 1940 it set up the Vichy puppet regime What allegiance did the people of France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules A Hobbesian rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a poorly accountable inept or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty and the right of declaring war to defend themselves against the government or from a foreign power is wholly justi able The notion of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty what is meant by the state and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government The pOSSession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic The general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of selfinterest or aggrandizement Putatively a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of ghting aggression However possessing right intention masks many philosophical problems According to Kant possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral activity regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused and regardless or even in spite of any self interest in the action the agent may have The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds the most pertinent here being the value of selfinterest itself At what point does right intention separate itself from selfinterest 0n the one hand if the only method to secure peace is to annex a belligerent neighbor39s territory political aggrandizement is intimately connected with the proper intention of maintaining the peace On the other hand a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group and may rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure their freedom yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or too dif cult to wage ie it is not ultimately in their selfinterest to fight the just war On that account some may demand that national interest is paramount only if waging war on behalf of freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or other military interests should a nation commit its troops The issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as consequences both of which should be considered before declaring war httpWwwieputmedujjustwarhtm 1 1262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 5 of 8 The next principle is that of reasonable success This is another necessary condition for waging just war but again is insuf cient by itself Given just cause and right intention the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and bene ts of a campaign must be calculated However the concept of weighing bene ts poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced in the following questions Should one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are too prohibitive Is it not sometimes morally necessary to stand up to a bullying larger force as the Firms did when Russia invaded in 1940 for the sake of national selfesteem Besides posturing for defense may sometimes make aggression itself too costly even for a much stronger side However the thrust of the principle of reasonable success emphasizes that human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match For a nation threatened by invasion other forms of retaliation or defense may be available such as civil disobedience or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds Historically many nations have overcome the probability of defeat the ght may seem hopeless but a charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to stir a people into ghting with all their will Winston Churchill offered the British nation some of the nest of war39s rhetoric when it was threatened with defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940 For example quotLet us therefore brace ourselves to do our duty and so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a thousand years men will still say 39This was their nest hour And What is our aim Victory victory at all costs Victory in spite of all terror victory however long and hard the road may be for without victory there is no survivalquot Speeches to Parliament 1940 The nal guide of jus ad bellum is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used This principle overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought namely the principles of Jus In Bello With regards to just cause a policy of war requires a goal and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing 0f war39s destruction it can also invoke general balance of power considerations For example if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B then B has just cause to take the land back According to the principle of proportionality B s counterattack must not invoke a disproportionate response it should aim to retrieve its land That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion will take place But for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a disproportionate response unless controversially that is the only method for securing guarantees of no future reprisals For B to invade and annex A and then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that their territory would provide a useful defense against other threats is even more unsustainable On the whole the principles offered by jus ad bellum are useful guidelines Philosophically however they invoke a plethora of problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results They are nonetheless a useful starting point for ethics and remain a pressing concern for statesmen and women 93 mileafCltmtents 3 el rinciplesQf lus1nBellQ The rules of just conduct fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality httpwwwieputmedujjustwarhtm 1 1262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 6 of 8 The principle of discrimination concerns who are legitimate targets in war whilst the principle of proportionality concerns how much force is morally appropriate One strong implication of being a separate topic of analysis for just war theorists is that a nation ghting an unjust cause may still ght justly or vice verse A third principle can be added to the traditional two namely the principle of responsibility which demands an examination of where responsibility lies in war In waging war it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately since noncombatants or innocents are deemed to stand outside the eld of war proper Immunity from war can be reasoned from the fact that their existence and activity is not part of the essence of war which is killing combatants Since killing itself is highly problematic the justwar theorist has to proffer a reason why combatants become legitimate targets in the rst place and whether their status alters if they are ghting a just or unjust war Firstly a theorist may hold that being trained andor armed constitutes a suf cient threat to combatants on the other side Voluntarists may invoke the boxing ring analogy punching another individual is not morally supportable in a civilized community but those who voluntarily enter the boxing ring renounce their right not to be hit Similarly those who join an army renounce their rights not to be targeted in war the rights of noncombatants civilians or 39innocents39 remain intact and therefore they cannot be justly attacked Others avoiding a rights analysis may argue that those who join the army or who have even been pressed into conscription come to terms with being a target and hence their own deaths This is argued for example by Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill in The Ethics of War 1979 However since civilians can just as readily come to terms with their own deaths their argument is not suf cient to defend the principle of discrimination Rightsbased analyses are more productive especially those that focus on the renouncing of rights by combatants by virtue of their war status leaving a sphere of immunity for civilians Warfare sometimes unavoidably involves civilians Whilst the principle of discrimination argues for their immunity from war the practicalities of war provoke the need for a different model The doctrine of double effect offers a justification for killing civilians in war so long as their deaths are not intended but are accidental Targeting a military establishment in the middle of a city is permissible according to the doctrine of double effect for the target is legitimate Civilian casualties are a foreseeable but accidental effect Whilst the doctrine provides a useful justi cation of 39collateral damage39 to civilians it raises a number of issues concerning the justi cation of foreseeable breaches of immunity as well as the balance to strike between military objectives and civilian casualties Another problem arises in de ning who is a combatant and who is not Usually combatants carry arms openly but guerrillas disguise themselves as civilians Michael Walzer in his Just and Unjust Wars 1977 claims that the lack of identi cation does not give a government the right to kill indiscriminately the onus is on the government to identify the combatants Others have argued that the nature of modern warfare dissolves the possibility of discrimination Civilians are just as necessary causal conditions for the war machine as are combatants therefore they claim there is no moral distinction in targeting an armed combatant and a civilian involved in arming or feeding the combatant The distinction is however not closed by the nature of modern economies since a combatant still remains a very different entity from a non combatant if not for the simple reason that the former is presently armed and hence has renounced rights or is prepared to die or is a threat whilst the civilian is not On the other hand it can be argued that being a civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence not a legitimate target If Mr Smith is the only individual in the nation to possess the correct combination that will detonate a device then he becomes not only causally ef cacious in the ring of a weapon of war but also morally httpwwwieputmedujjustwarhtm 1 1262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 7 of 8 responsible reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target His job effectively militarizes his status The underlying issues that ethical analysis must deal with involve the logical nature of an individual39s complicity or aiding and abetting the war machine with greater weight being imposed on those logically closer than those logically further from the war machine in their work At a deeper level one can consider the role that civilians play in supporting an unjust war to what extent are they morally culpable and if they are culpable to some extent does that mean they may become legitimate targets This invokes the issue of collective versus individuality responsibility that is in itself a complex topic The second principle of just conduct is that any offence should remain strictly proportional to the objective desired This principle overlaps with the proportionality principle of just cause but it is distinct enough to consider it in its own light Proportionality for Jus In Bello requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimise destruction and casualties It is broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives for instance from harboring good will to all Kantian ethics or acting virtuously Aristotelian ethics Whilst the consideration of discrimination focuses on who is a legitimate target of war the principle of proportionality deals with what kind of force is morally permissible In ghting a just war in which only military targets are attacked it is still possible to breach morality by employing disproportionate force against an enemy Whilst the earlier theoreticians such as Thomas Aquinas invoked the Christian concepts of charity and mercy modern theorists may invoke either consequentialist or intrinsicist prescriptions both are which remain problematic as the foregoing discussions have noted However it does not seem morally reasonable to completely gun down a barely armed belligerent tribe At the battle of Omdurman in the Sudan six machine gunners killed thousands of dervishes wthe gunners may have been in the right to defend themselves but the principle of proportionality demands that a battle ends before it becomes a massacre Similarly following the battle of Culloden Cumberland ordered quotNo Quarterquot which was not only a breach of the principle of discrimination for his troops were permitted to kill the wounded as well as supporting civilians but also a breach of the principle of proportionality since the battle had been won and the Jacobite cause effectively defeated on the battle eld The principles of proportionality and discrimination aim to temper war39s violence and range They are complemented by other considerations that are not taken up in the traditional exposition of Jus In Bella especially the issue of responsibility Jus In Bella requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions This ties in their actions to morality generally Some such as Saint Augustine argues against this assertion quotwho is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it is not himself responsible for the death he dealsquot Those who act according to a divine command or even God39s laws as enacted by the state and who put wicked men to death have by no means violated the commandment 39Thou shalt not kill Whilst this issue is connected to the concepts of just cause it does not follow that individuals waging a just or unjust war should be absolved of breaching the principles of just conduct Readin it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare but when soldiers turn their weapons against noncombatants or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder The principle of responsibility reasserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war The issues that arise from this principle include the morality of obeying orders for example when one knows those orders to be immoral as well as the status of ignorance not knowing of the effects of one s actions httpwwwieputmedujjustwarhtm 11262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Just War Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Page 8 of 8 The foregoing has described the main tenets of the just war theory as well as some of the problems that it entails The theory bridges theoretical and applied ethics since it demands an adherence or at least a consideration of metaethical conditions and models as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war A few of those practicalities have been mentioned here Other areas of interest are hostages innocent threats international blockades sieges the use of weapons of mass destruction or of antipersonnel weapons e g land mines and interventionism shtpvfableotmntents Amherlnforrnation Alexander Moseley Email alenltciassigalzt wnd onscnm QZQQQ httpwwwieputmedujjustwarhtm 1 1262007 DOCUMENT ID 36512 Study Guide Exam 1 Duncan POLS 131 Spring 2010 The exam will consist of 50 multiplechoice questions worth 15 points each The questions are drawn about evenly from readings including reserve readings and lecture material BRING A PENCIL a Scantron sheet will be provided with the exam Here are some pointers on what to study 0 All terms and de nitions from the readings and the lectures especially important terms such as legitimacy sovereignty patriotism globalization ethnocentrism etc Information from the lm Guns Germs and Steel as instructed in class Kelleher and Klein s major points about the state system its evolution and characteristics 0 KK s discussion of the world in 1350 know just the general outlines hereinot all that data regarding the different societies and European expansion especially the later stages 0 Information from lectures and reading on how the modern state system evolved colonialism and its legacy and trends since World War II 0 Samuel Huntington s Clash of Civilizations arguments the response after 911 and criticisms by Edward Said 0 KK s points on immigration and gender 0 Responses to diversity identified by KK and criticisms of them 0 General knowledge of the Darfur con ict as presented in class including causes and opposing sides 0 Arguments of the global primacy state primacy and cultural primacy perspectives as outlined in Kelleher and Klein 0 How did the Nunavut experiment come about and what are the responses to it by the different perspectives on ethnicity and global diversity 0 General information on Islam as presented in class including its origin the five pillars and divisions within Islam 0 Points from the Inglehart and Norris reading on democracy in Muslim countries Huntington s view how Muslim countries view democracy and the authors arguments on the real cultural differences between Muslim countries and the West 0 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights background information on its adoption rights included criticisms perspective represented by the Declaration o How human rights are promoted and enforced Basic information on the International Criminal Court as presented in class Where the US stands with respect to human rights and the ICC Feel free to contact me for specific questions on this study guide Study Guide Exam 3 POLS 131 Spring 2010 Duncan Like the others this exam will consist of 50 multiplechoice questions worth 15 points each drawn roughly equally from the lectures and the readings BRING A PENCIL Here is what you should study Important terms and concepts from lectures Points from lectures and Smith about ecosystems and the laws of ecology Inclass points about world population including the current population growth rate projections for this century grth rate patterns around the world and limits on carrying capacity The four adaptations for human survival and their environmental impacts as discussed in your text Textbook discussion about the major threats to critical resources Points made in your text about deserti cation the oceans and the Amazon rainforest Kelleher and Klein s discussion about human health especially access to Western medicine and malnutrition Points from the lecture about pollution toxic waste disposal our current energy situation and problems associated with various energy sources Conceptual considerations on international environmental politics including the precautionary principle the free rider problem and the North South dilemma The three perspectives presented in chapter 7 of your text their primary arguments criticisms of each and how they address the problem of new infectious diseases Information from your text on the green revolution and the AIDS epidemic Lecture material on the Law of the Sea and arguments surrounding the free trade environment connection The main arguments in the Diamond reading The information presented in class about ozone depletion how the world and the US responded and how this issue differs from climate change The IPCC and its findings From the reserve reading on climate change introductory discussion of international climate change politics general history of scientific findings on climate change opponents arguments The international and US response to global warming and recent developments Information from class on international environmental politics and the players involved Good luck Ecosystem Interdependence No examination of environmental policy can be complete without an understanding of the laws and forces that drive the natural world In this chapter we explore ecol ogy the sub eld of biology that strives to explain the interrelationships among peo ple other living things and their environments Only through an understanding of how a natural enyjronment works can we understand the impact of policies de signed to regulate that environment We also will examine some of the most press ing issues involved in managing ecosystems 39 An ecosystem is any group of plants animals or nonliving things interacting within their external environment Typically ecologists study individual organisms the life cycle of the organism its requirements of its environment its functioning in the environment populations of organisms including questions such as stabil ity decline or growth in populations communities of organisms or the ecosystem as a whole including the biogeochemical cycles of carbon oxygen hydrogen soil minerals and energy1 Ecosystems may seem to be independent units that interact very little with their external environments Some ecologists describe them as a watershed in New Hampshire a Syrian desert the Arctic icecap or Lake Michigan 2 Yet ecosystems are fopen in the sense that they interact with everything else in the environment In fact the earth itself is an ecosystem commonly referred to as the ecosphere or biosphere3 39 39 Earth like all ecosystems receives energy from the sun Otherwise there is very little interaction between the earth and the external environment Conse quently with the exception of energy from the sun the resources that the planet started with are the same as those that exist today although constantly changing 1 DOCUMENT ID 36910 2 Chapter 1 fog This is why some use the term spaceship earth to describe the earth s rela tionship with the external environment Like a spaceship the planet must work with what it has When cedainmsourcesare exhausted or conxertedjntga form in which they are no longer useful to humans new suppliescannotsimply Mpgned om somewhereelse The utility that they provided humans is essentially lost forever To better understand how an ecosystem functions let 3 use the oversimpli ed example of a freshwater ecological cycle Fish in a river or a lake produce organic waste that settles to the bottom nourishing bacteria and creating inorganic products from which algae feed The fish in turn feed off the algae This example suggests that the interrelationships within an ecosystem are relatively simple But as Edward Kormondy a leading ecologist wrote The ecologist in studying natty ag systems is confronted by theicomplexities Hofjlmost unlimited variables 4 Barry Com monerTin his book The Closing Circle identi es four laws ecglggy that are based opwgdelyaccepted norms in the science of These laws are useful in39ii derstanding how ecosystems function and the limits to humankind s abiiity to manipulate them5 The first law ofgcology is that everydiingi connected to everythingejse An ecosystem consists of mulnpleinter50nnective parts which act on one an other 6 The interconnectednessnof ecosystems suggests it is dif culgjf not impos sible to manipulate one aspect of an ecosystem without impacting often unmep g aiy other aspects of the ecosystem The rstla w of ecology reflects the existence of the39elaborate netw rk Of interconnections in the ecosphere among different living organisms and between populations species and individual organ isms in their physicochemical surroundings That is anmego smystem is a house of cards where each card may directly or indirectly support other card39s or e39ven the whole house 39 Whega cosysmm is the introductiobngf a foreignelement for example changes occur in the relationship between organisms within the system as well39as between organisms and their physical envnonihe tTthat is the biochemical balances within the ecosystem may also be upset39HowESver they can often adjust and legaintheirbalance For example in the case of drought in grassland lack of food will result in malnutrition of mice which will eventually lead to their hiberna tion During hibernation they are of course eating less allowing the grasses to re juvenate and protecting their own numbers by being less exposed to predators8 If an imbalance occurs within an ecosystem that system may not go back into equilibrium in quite the same way For example in the case of a freshwater lake the organic waste that appears in the lake naturally plays an important role in the food chain affecting the growth of algae If however a foreign source of nutrient is in troduced to the lake it can lead to the rapid growth of algae resulting in eutgophica tign in this example the nutrient might be septic tank sewage The bacteriapfrom a 39 septti tank stimulate the growth of algae which consumes available oxygen The laEko39Xygen eventually kills other life forms in the lakequot l 99ndlaw0f ecology isthateverything must go somewhere Commoner uses the example of the mercury in a typical AA dry celibattery to illustrate this pomt First it is placed in a container of rubbish this is collected and taken to an incinerator Here the mercury is heated this produces mercury vapor which is emitted by the in DOCUMENTID 36910 Ecosystem Interdependence 3 cinerator stack and mercury vapor is toxic Mercury vapor is carried by the wind eventually brought to earth in rain or snow Entering a mountain lake let us say the mercury condenses and sinks to the bottom Here it is acted on by bacteria which con vert it to methyl mercury This is soluble and taken up by sh since it is not metabo lized the mercury accumulates in the organs and esh of the sh The fish is caught and eaten by a man and the mercury becomes deposited in his organs where it might be harmful And so on9 I39Hhi snsecond law Ofecologyr is applicable when thinking of the earth It is an enclgseglgpnitLlike a spaceship Nothing is justthrown away When fossil fuels39 burn they release the energy needed to push our cars but they also release sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides that must go somewhere As we have learned this somewhere often may be into our rivers and lakes as acid rain or into the upper atmosphere contributing to the greenhouse effect and in turn global warming As we will see later some environmental policies such as those governing solid waste disposal seem to ignore the second law of ecology Thethirdlawofecology is that nature1anW lzgst Thrgughout most of humanghistoryimat least in Western culture there has Vbeenan assumption that hu mans canorperhaps should conquer nature This third law of ecclogysuggests thafWhen it comes to manipulating relationships in nature humankind is at best a poor judge of how their manipulations of the environment will impact nature Com moner uses the analogy of the watch to explain the third law of ecology Suppose you were to open the back of your watch close your eyes and poke a pencil into the exposed works The almost certain result would be to damage the wa t c39lif T Ove i zquotears n m rbhs watchmakers each taught by a predecessor have tried out a huge variety of detailed arrangements of how a watch works have discarded those that are not compatible with the overall operation of the system and retain the better fea tures Any random change made in the watch is likely to fall into a very large class of inconsistent or harmful arrangements which have been tried out in past watch making experience and discarded10 Thethird law 70f ecology suggests that humans tinkering withrnatural sys tems likethe random poke of your watch witha pencil will ultimately prove detri ment to those systems 39 Tb understand the importance of the third law of ecology we must remember that ecosystems have developed through natural selection over billions of Lears The uiteragtions within natural systems sometimes present a very delicate balance and interfering can disrupt that system Nature is usuauy39a better judge of what is good ft the longterm viability of any given system Commoner goes on to note The arti cial introduction of an organic compound that does not occur in nature but is martmade and is nevertheless active in a living system is very likely to be harmful 11 There are many new chemical compounds oating around the biosphere sincehumanity learned chemical engineering One can only imagine the effects these new ecosystem players have on their natural peers or what cumulative longterm impacts they may have on humans Thquurth law of ecology isthat there is no such thing as afreelupgh Simply stated law provides that any interaction with nature any extraction use or dis ruption carries with it some costu39l hat cost may be in the form of the conversion of t DOCUMENT ID 36910 2 4 Chapter 1 resources to a form in which they are noglonger of use to humans or the disruption of a je das ys39tei jhfa renae itunstable Commoner notes Because the global ecosystem is a connected whole in which nothing can be gained or lost and which is not subject to overall improvement anything extracted from it by human effort must be replaced Payment of this price cannot be avoided it can only be delayed 12 While Commoner s four laws of ecology provide a useful orientation for our study of humankind s interaction with its environment there are two additional components of our relationship with nature that need to be expounded on the no tionsof sustainability and a steady state and the common pool natureof natural re sources THE STEADY STATE A giggdy gate refers torrrthat level of activity within an ecosystem that can be main tained oyer ar long period of time For e ample given the limitations quoton arable land andgivater39resourcesktherejs some upper limit of human population thatvthe world can siistain Givemthe nite nature of the earth sgresopgge s hthe exhaustion of39re sources has an impact on earth s ultimate Asteadylstate form All ecasystetns havea point at which mergewmstate This is no to suggest that resource utilization cannot be greater than that necessary for sustaining the steady state but only that those gigsgumrcesusedtoday impactthe natureandcir cumstances ofgthe balance necessary to create a steady state within anecosystemiin thecfiiture The steady state idea as applied to environmental policy is problem atic in that diggivs disagreement regarding an ecosystem s upper limiting carrying 739 capacity Closely related to the notion of the steady state is the concept of sustainabil ityglgesogrcgusgfithenby nonrenewable extraction or lfy d gradationfpolfutio must hedimitedv to a point where it does hb t thfeat rf the regenerative capacity of natural systems Otherwise those systems are not being used in a sustainable man neffdr39nianaged to maintainer steady Astate39 As we will see throughout the39book the institutions that manage the planet Often are not geared toward sustainability For example in many Sunbelt cities in the southern and southwest United States political economic and even the health of social and cultural institutions are predicated upon continued growth and expansion of building and construction This is nonsustainable in the long run and will ultimately lead to the demise or redefinif tiori 39of these institutions and the assumptions upon which they are founded In nat ural resource management we cannot cutmore trees than we grow and in pollution and envirpnmental management we gannot introduce more pollutants into a natural syst rii jhan it can absorb and Still provide life sustaining ecosystem services These are both e xamplesgot nonsustainability COMMON POOL RESOURCES Garrett Hardin in his in uential essay The Tragedy of the Commons 13 drew at quot tention to the problems associated with common pool resources He uses the anal 39 ogy of a common green or the sharing of a common pasture where the rational DOCUMENT ID 36910 mumwwAM w quotn3 r individual will seek to maximize his or her returns from that pasture by putting as many additional cattle as he or she can afford onto the commons This rational indi vidual behaviorquot hBWeverLyvili result in destruction through overgrazing of the com mon pasture Nomindividual in this situation has an incentive to protect the pasture In fact the incentives operating on individuals are to increase their return from the pasture the result being the hastened destruction of the pasture for everyone Common pool resource problems are very much a part of environmentalpol icy The groundwater in an aquifer underlying several farms for example may be a common pool resource Farmers located above the aquifer have no incentive to save the groundwater for future use In fact if the groundwater supply lies beneath adja cent farms landowners may have an incentive to pull as much out of the ground as possible as soon as possible there being no individual incentive to manage the re source for the longterm beneficial use of all K Air is alsopa common pool resource Individual polluters have no incentive to protect the common pool resource of clean air In fact the individual has every in centive to continue polluting The cost of air pollution is not home only by the pol luter but rather by the community as a whole Polluters on a body of water are in a similar situation as are usersoiany re sourgewwho areynot responsible and have no incentive to ensure the use and manage ment of that Lesoggce over the long term The oceans are a classic example of a common pool resource problem Nations have little or no incentive to restrict their harvesting of sh when they are competing with other nations that are not willing to similarly restrict their shing activities The result is the depletion and possibly the eventual destruction of common pool sheries Fisheries off the coasts of Japan and the northeastern United States are facing severe reductions in sh populations It is presumed that this depletion is the result of years of commercial overfishing without paying much regard to the needs of the aquatic ecosystems Because there is not a strong international body governing pollution dis charges into the ocean individual nations have little or no incentive to regulate their polluting activities in a way that will provide for a clean ocean environment for all the inhabitants ofihe earth Again what is rational for the individual in this case the nations thatare polluting could lead to the destruction of the overall resource As you will see later common pool resources have proven problematic to environ mental policy development and implementation SUMMAB We live a world of nite resources Everyrlirnepwe drive our cars there is less ir replaceable oil in the world a resource management problem There is also more carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere a pollution or environmental prob lem 39lhis thickens the layer of greenhouse gas that in turn arti cially heats our planet everyone s problem Each time we write on another piece of paper there may be fewer trees to help cleanse the air These same trees could provide habitat for a dozen species in addition to providing ood and erosion protection Egg every action there are inputs and outputs everything must go somewhere The conse quences of our actions may lead to unanticipated undesirable and unsustainable outcomes Nature can be strong and resilient but only on one side of a ne line DOCUMENT ID 36910 6 Chapter 1 When this line is crossed nature s fragility and humans ecosystem interdepen dence become known and crucial life support systems fail We must know our limits as well as those of our environment For example we rely everyday on freshwater to replenish our bodies irrigate ourqcrops and pro vide electricity Yet we use this natural resource faster than nature can replenish it We overwork our farmland and pollute it and our freshwater with chemicals that reduce the land s agricultural lifespan The remaining fertile land we turn into roads and new subdivisions to fit our growing population These activities are not ulti mately sustainable That is they are not conducive to the allimportant steady state to which nature must return Nature will reach homeostasismey en iht this meansuin definitely shutting down crucial life sustaining ecosystem serVgCes 7 Though environmental policy is so important it is also a paradox We must force ourselves not to deplete needed39natufalr soui aes or pollilte iri a way that sud denly thrusts a pencil into nature s delicate watch But hgm gwmmenvi ronrnental policy and they have limited knowledgeand time We Ing stusewand pay for resources every day and we must be responsive to a diverse publicthat is there is politics involved It is paradoxical begay We must protegr ghc Vemenvnwment that gives us life while at the same time protect the interests of thosewhoexploitjt all pgusrto someextent Understanding ecological relationships the notion of sustainability and the steady state and common pool problems provides the background necessary for ap preciating the complexities involved in environmental policy formation and imple mentation It is just as important however to possess an understanding of the values culture and politics that drive the policy making process That is the subject of the next chapter NOTES Thomas C Emmel Ecology amp Population Biology New York W W Norton 1973 pp 313 Jonathan Turk Introduction to Environmental Studies 2nd ed Philadelphia Saunders 1985 NH p Edward J Kormondy Concept of Ecology 3rd ed Upper Saddle River NJ PrenticeHall 1984 p 8 Ibid p 9 Barry Commoner The Closing Circie New York Knopf 1971 Ibid p 33 Ibid This example was taken from Turk Introduction to Environmental Studies p 39 Commoner The Closing Circle p 40 Ibid p 42 11 Ibid p43 12 Ibid p 46 13 Garrett Hardin The Tragedy of the Commons Science 162 1968 pp 1243 1248 5quot pwweewp DOCUMENT ID 36910
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