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by: Haylee O'Hara


Haylee O'Hara
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This 38 page Class Notes was uploaded by Haylee O'Hara on Sunday September 27, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to POL S 241 at Iowa State University taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 20 views. For similar materials see /class/214556/pol-s-241-iowa-state-university in Political Science at Iowa State University.




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Date Created: 09/27/15
Defining Globalization 1 growing interdependence of domestic markets global markets and firms exist governments must react to global market changes state find it difficult to manage global economic flows firms are developing global rather than national interests commercial liberalism strengthened 2 effective loss of economic control by political authorities Strange global markets and firms are already beyond state control international institutions are unable to provide sufficient governance quotRace to the bottomquot in terms of avoiding barriers to productivity less government regulation fewer environmental controls fewer comprehensive social health unemployment labor provisions Firms TNCs are the only adaptable institutions Serve the interests of a narrower class of people Aggregate economic expansion masks unequal division of wealth transnational capitalist elite emerging with cosmopolitan rather than national allegiance 3 economic cultural social and ideological homogenization of states and societies cultural icons social institutions beliefs are being standardized by spread of Western angloamerican capitalist representative democracy particularistic institutions abandoned in favor of least common denominator in cultural and political life just as overreliance on international organizations can reduce citizen influence over policy globalized markets repress civic activity through corporateeconomic dominance in civil society Ideologies and Globalization Conventional Wisdom globalization challenges the authority and capacity of states polities based social democratic socialist and capitalist developmentneomercantilist ideologies will fail liberal ideology provides the only set of political and economic institutions capable of adapting to globalization o privatization of stateowned firms 0 deregulation of industries 0 increase in market dynamics Alternative Views globalization is exaggerated globalization is misunderstood state is not unnecessary or powerless polities should decide how to respond to economic forces 0 social democracy and capitalist development is still possible Secession v Autonomy Spanish Cases why have Catalonian politicians accepted autonomy while Basque Country leaders push for independence secession Both areas were repressed under Franco regime and both are most industrialized areas of Spain but 0 Ideological differences quasixenophobia in late 19th Basque nationalist ideology 0 Economic Development Basque industrialization concentrated in heavy industry Catalonian industrialization broader and focused on consumer goods DiezMedrano Ties with rest of Spain sought among Catalonia and rejected among Basque Rural and noncapitalist Basques find greater appeal in Basque ideology of separatism from modern Spain Does Federalism Prevent Secession every single longstanding democracy in a multilingual and multinational polity is a federal state A Stepan 0 Federal state provides for autonomy for nationsethnies Federal communist states dissolved Soviet Union Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia Q Does federalism encourage secession Bermeo et al federal systems reduce most measures of violence over unitary systems in most cases 0 Imposed or forced federalism usually fails o No sense of partnership 0 Colonial power dictator or quasidemocracy Pol S 241 12 Jan Purpose of Science All sciences seek to explain phenomena events behavior or conduct Patterns of phenomena can be explained by general theories why do earthquakes occur why does cancer occur why do countries democratize why do welfare policies vary Specific phenomena might be explained by idiosyncratic explanations why did I get cancer Why did Spain democratize in 1976 Scientists prefer general explanations to idiosyncratic explanations Why parsimony explain more with less Occam s razor prediction general theories can predict future events control using a theory one might be able to prevent harmful outcomes and create good ones Social sciences are different from physical sciences Law is a statement of regularity Laws predominate in many physical sciences eg Boyle s law law of gravity Few laws in social sciences Theories Causes and Explanations Theories provide explanations Explanations relate specific events to general class of events today s thunderstorm is related to thunderstorms in general the civil war in Colombia is related to civil wars in general explanations are not descriptions Pol S 241 12 Jan Theory set of interrelated generalizations axioms about a range of phenomena specifies independent explanans and dependent variables explandandum Independent Variables gt Dependent Variables X gt Y axioms are abstractions about empirical world deduce hypotheses from axioms hypotheses prediction about relations between variables usually stated in if then format If a country grows economically then it will democratize Adhoc hypothesis testing is inferior to theorygenerated hypotheses Causation and Theories Theories identify causes Causation v correlation Correlation regular association between variables Not all correlations reflect causal relationships correlation may be spurious But correlations still be useful as predictors eg per capita income and democratic sunival Three Views of Causation 1 Covering Law View of Causation C Hempel To say that C is the cause of E is to say that C is regularly followed by E C gt E Necessary and sufficient conditions C is necessary for E without C no E C is sufficient for E if C then E Pol S 241 12 Jan 2 Probabilistic Causation C gt E some percentage of the time eg smoking as a cause of cancer 3 Causal Mechanisms processes often unobservable by which C generates E Contingency and Causation In social sciences it very difficult to find necessary and sufficient conditions Contingency chance plays a large role Solar eclipses v trafficjams Tilly Parliamentary v Presidential Systems J Linz et al presidential systems are more prone to breakdown of democracy 0 Consolidation easier under parliamentary system Mainwaring et al presidential system survival depends on other factors 0 parliamentary systems can produce same flaws Empirical record appears to support Linz but how data are examined matters Presidential system chief executive is elected directly executive and legislature have fixed terms of office Parliamentary system chief executive elected by legislative majority exec requires leg confidence to remain in office exec can dissolve leg and call for new elections Linz s Perils of Presidentialism President competes with legislature over democratic legitimacy Fixed term creates rigid positions no way to break deadlocks Zerosum game to presleg interactions Presidents may become intolerant of opposition confuse plurality with mandate Challenges to Presidential Critique in bicameral systems parliamentary legitimacy may be contested by on upper v lower house lines fixed terms allow for stable governments in crises zero sum relations depends on other factors 0 party discipline strong parties more zerosum o electoral system FPTP worse than PR 0 federal v unitary unitary gov ts more dominant no restraint on power of parliamentary exec o checks and balances in presidential systems Rebuilding Failed amp Defeated States Conceptual Issues What is a failed state 0 Rotberg state that no longer provides positive political goods for its citizens nil capacity Sovereign territorial state that is no longer sovereign in areas that it claims to rule 0 Claimants to rule fail to exercise clear priority over other groups in territories 0 State Failure Task Force now called Task Force on Political Instability State failure is a new label that encompasses a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by macrosocietal events such as those that occurred in Somalia Bosnia Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo Zaire in the 1990s How do we measure state failure 0 Know it when we see it standard Widespread violence and lawlessness over large parts of its territory Inability to control borders eg Somalia Sudan Yemen Burma Political goods absent security education healthcare law amp order 0 No clear consensus on the standard 0 Task Force Narrowly defined state failures consist of instances in which central state authority collapses for several years Fewer than 20 such episodes occurred globally between 1955 and 1998 however too few for robust statistical analysis task force used expanded definition failureevent Task Force measures 0 set of nearly 1300 political demographic economic social and environmental variables for all countries of the world from 1955 to 1998 0 list of 114 statefailure events that began between 1955 and 1998 What Causes State Failure based on Task Force findings Task force found key drivers Quality of life that is the material wellbeing of a country s citizens Regime type that is the character of a country s political institutions International influences including openness to trade memberships in regional organizations and violent conflicts in neighboring countries The ethnic or religious composition of country s population or leadership Risk factors that roughly doubled the odds of state failureevent Low levels of material wellbeing measured by infant mortality rates Low trade openness measured by imports plus exports as a percent of GDP presence of major civil conflicts in two or more bordering states Underlying Causes alternative patterns of state formation and state building Europe experienced at least 800 years of war and civil conflict before consolidating state form Much of developing world lacks similar experience Does war make the state Must statebuilding be violent Focus on SubSaharan Africa democracies partial amp full failed more often 5x rate of autocratic regimes low trade openness ethnic discrimination new or entrenched leaders or unbalanced patterns of development caused failure rate 25x as high unbalanced development high urbanization with low GDP per capita makes country 5x more likely to fail Focus on Muslim Countries at least 40 Muslim pop 5x failure rate for partial amp full democratic regimes v autocratic smaller effect for other variables only 5070 increase three new factors 0 countries with sects 3x more likely to fail 0 countries with extremely high or extremely low religious diversity 3x more likely to fail 0 countries with few IO memberships 2x more likely to fail Reconstructing Failed States post1945 US occupied mostly developed states 0 administrative structures of state were intact 0 prior democratic experience post1991 most such states never had well developed administrative structure or state did not have extractive capacity Iraq had high capacity for surveillance amp repression 0 Did not tax extensively rentier state Can federalism produce taxation powers Who should rule until a state is built 0 No stamina in Somalia 0 Extensive international role in Bosnia amp Kosovo Ideology and Analyzing Ideology Ideology as an Analytical Concept identifying political programs on a leftright spectrum comparing political parties 0 eg Labor and Social Democrats v Conservatives and Christian Democrats Distinguish ideological claims from analytical claims claim is open to falsification how would one verify or refute the claim Ideology and Nationalism Nationalism as an Ideology belief that nations should have their own sovereign territorial states is a modern ideology affinity between democracy as a political ideology the people should rule and nationalism these people should rule themselves particular nationalist ideologies define who the people are and are not 0 politics of inclusion and exclusion o nationalist ideologies often rely on getting history wrong Religion and Nationalism anticlericalism v antireligiosity clergy as rival political authority v religion as tenets of faith Secular Nationalist Ideologies Congress Movement in India 0 Ghandi39s Hindu ecumenicalism Ram Raja v secularism of Nehru Bose and others Strong Secular Nationalism anticlericalism of French Revolution and 1910 Mexican Revolution Middle East featured 20th C anticlerical movements Kemalism in Turkey Ba39athism in Syria and Iraq Nasserism in Egypt 39Pahlavi39 Shahs in Iran Islam associated with medievalism and anti Westernism Religious opposition from Islamic traditionalists and new radical Islamic movements eg Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 00000 O NationalistConfessionalist Ideologies religion and nationalist beliefs not readily mapped on LR scale 0 contemporary Hinduism in India eg Bharatiya Janata PanyBJP o Shintoism in Japan priorto WWII religious institutions often mobilized against religious or anti clerical secular ideologies of ruling regime o Catholicism in Ireland against Protestant British rule 1916 Easter Uprising 0 Orthodox Christianity in Russia and Serbia 0 Shi ite Islam in Iran v Pahlavi Shah in 1979 Religion as Ideology and Political Islam is Islam a political ideology o is Catholicism Judaism Protestantism Hinduism etc religions can be classified as moral and social ideologies secular and religious systems of belief about morality and social life creating political doctrines from religions is distinct political act quietism v activism should the clergy take part in politics 0 Khomeini s IIiayat alFaqih Rule of the Jurisprudent in Iran is exceptional 0 Religious doctrinal differences are extensive Shi ite rejection of caliphs as religious leaders v Sunni acceptance Political Islam as catchall term for political mobilization around lslamic identity 0 does not specify precise political aims or agendas Electoral Systems electoral systems affects values one wishes to promote and interests that will be advanced o institution affects interests of parties tensions of values 0 proportionality v decisiveness o accountability v representation 0 local v national interests 0 ethnic v unified identities and interests 3 Types of systems 0 Firstpast thepost FPTP o Proportional Representation PR 0 Mixed Systems alternative and singletransferable vote FPTP Also called winner take all Westminster or majority plurality system Whoever wins the most votes plurality wins the election Advantages of FPTP Simple system Decisive government that wins can rule without coalition in most cases encourages fewer parties UK US but not always India Canada encourages centrist parties to form v extremist parties in order to get past the post accountable singlemember districts allow people to select candidates Problems with FPTP disproportionate If multiple parties run victor may have low percentage of votes reducing legitimacy unrepresentative geographically dispersed but popular parties may never gain office v geographically concentrated but less popular parties 0 1983 British election centrist Labour party members split and form Social Democratic Party which allies with Liberal Party win 26 of votes but gain only 36 of the seats in the House of Commons exclusive minority parties ideology identity or interest have poor chance of winning seats TwoRound System FPTP with requirement that candidate win 50 plus 1 of votes Reduces harm to democratic legitimacy but may exaggerate real level of support France Presidential Elections 0 If no candidate wins 50 plus 1 top two candidates go to second round National Assembly elections 0 majorityplurality TRS 1st round candidates who receive 125 go on to second round 0 plurality vote winner wins 2nd round 2002 presidential elections 0 Chirac s plurality is 199 on first round with 16 candidates 0 2nd round results in overwhelming victory over 2nd ranked Le Pen 169 0 multiple parties can divide FTPT presidential election 0 TRS allows president to have stronger mandate 2002 legislative elections 0 in 1St round Union forthe Presidential Majority UMP has only 33 of vote and Socialist Party SP only 24 o 33 goes to smaller parties and candidates 0 in 2nd round UMP gains almost 50 and SP gains over a 3r other parties gain only 10 Proportional Representation seats are accorded based on percentage of vote received multiple subsystems for allocating seats Advantages of PR more representative political power is proportionate to vote allows minority parties to gain seats views of local and ethnic groups represented Problems with PR some system reduce accountability of candidate to voter List PR extremist parties may gain influence may produce indecisive coalition governments List PR South Africa Voters choose a party which has a list of candidates Number of candidates depends on percentage of the vote Order of the candidates on the list influences which candidate reaches office closed list Party leaders have great deal of control democratic centralism Open list systems most of European List PR allow voters to reorder candidates on the list generating accountability Multimember proportional MMP MMP provides greater accountability of candidates to voters Germany lower house Bundestag elections 0 O O O O 0 First vote Erststimme goes to a candidate in 328 singlemember constituency Second vote Zweitstimme is for state Laender level party list 16 Laender Candidates can run on both tickets Proportion of Lander voter determines Bundestag seats Parties that win 5 of national vote seated proportionately in Bundestag If Erststimme seats to a party exceed Zweitstimme seats then party gets surplus and Bundestag expands Multiple parties represented in Germany Governments must form coalitions Number of parties ranges around 4 SemiPR parallel system of FPTP and PR Japan Hosokawa Morihiro first nonLDP PM in 1993 produces reforms to electoral law in 1994 Parallel PRSingleMember District 0 300 seats in SMDs o 200 seats from PR in 7 blocs ranging in number of districts within each bloc 0 candidate can run for both meaning some SMD losers gain office via PR Junichiro Koizumi elected in April 2001 0 Nov 2003 elections led to LDP one vote shy of majority down from prior vote 0 Koizumi reelected by Diet as PM with 281 votes out of 479 586 o LDP allied with New Komeito party to win PMship Minshuto Democratic Party of Japan gained 186 votes with aid of Social Democratic Party 0 Advantages allows for accountability with representation allows minority parties to take part Disadvantages SemiPR may be confusing for voters and parties Two classes of candidates creates different interestes Extremist parties may still emerge Smaller parties underrepresented v pure PR Alternative Vote only in Australia Nauru Fiji singlemember district rankorder candidates preferential voting if candidate wins 50 plus 1 wins if none then candidate with lowest of first preferences eliminated and the 2nd preferences on ballots for the candidate are reallocated as first preference most plurality candidates win only 53 of seats on average 198096 go to nonplurality firstround candidate 18 January 2005 Factvalue dichotomy can we always distinguish what is from what ought to be 0 is Islamic democracy possible What do we mean by Islamic democracy 0 Religious parties take part a legislation is limited to what is compatible with Islam Afghan constitution a standards of Islam are used to evaluate law by legislators Claim Religiousbased rule is incompatible with liberal representative democracy 0 specific religious mores and rules if legislated will infringe on liberties of others eg ban on pork or alcohol democratic politics ought to be secular in orderto remain liberal a but are Christiansmajority countries free of Christianinfluenced political movements 0 Christian Democratic parties in Europe 0 religious themes in US politics abortion gay marriage drug prohibition Claim Islamic democracy will produce fanatical repressive and violent regime o What evidence do we have a Buruma beware equating fanaticism with religion the secular can be extremist as well see WebCT o How liberal is politics in secular governments in North America and Europe No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty Whenever in short there is a definite damage or a definite risk of damage either to an individual orto the public the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law10 But with regard to the merely contingent or as it may be called constructive injury which a person causes to society by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear for the sake of the greater good of human freedom J 8 Mill On Liberty Chap IV par1011 MultipleCausation Few social events have a single cause 0 Multiple causes mean events are more contingent 0 Sequence matters Civil War as Hobbes v Schmitt S Kalyvas o Hobbessian or greed model Breakdown of central authority and ensuing anarchy privatization of violence private groups clans ethnic factions bandits use force to enrich themselves looting struggle over resources warlords as crime bosses o Schmittian or grievance model Prior group loyalties and beliefs transform abstract enmities into private hatreds ldeology of enmity is centrally created and directed Struggle over identities ancient hatreds and political grievances 0 Both are right and wrong Kalyvas Microstudies journalists anthropologist historians find that motives at local level are often different from master cleavage Serb v Croat Communist v Capitalists lmperialist v Nationalist Locals often exploit nationallevel conflict to advance their own local grievances o Alliances between local and central actors o greed and grievance are intertwined o Sideswitching better explained Mechanisms and Processes v Narratives and Stories Tilly eg democracy without democrats democracy as a result of o modernization o bargaining to achieve mutually satisfactory but not mutually desired outcome Virtually Nopreconditions elite must agree on the boundaries of the state 0 otherwise civil or int l war results democratization is not dependent on economic growth 0 transitions at all income levels 0 consolidation is near certain above 6055 per capita GNP in 1985 US using PPP system Liberalization usualy precedes democratization but the timeframe may be limited o In Czechoslovakia no appreciable liberalization priorto 1989 revolutions Political actors state and regime elites and opposition elites matter 0 Agents rather structures 0 Predictive failure of structural theories oops How states transited to democracy Focus on the process rather than the underlying causes 0 Calculations of actors matters 0 Do reformers expect that civil society will liberalize within regime limits or independently Q Do opposition groups believe that reformers will repress or bargain with them Alliances between regime elite and opposition o Regime elites hardliners and liberalizers 0 Opposition radicals and moderates o Radicals will demand more concessions than even liberalizers will want to concede Need to use more forceful strategy Require mass support against hardliners Pacted Transitions Regime and opposition elites negotiate how to transit to democracy a pact o Assures regime and state elites o Powersharing arrangements may be created 0 Provides path to competitive elections 0 EgSpain Poland 8 Africa Transitions that Failed many of the postSoviet states have not transitioned to democracy or have failed to fully transit o communism as an empirical political system is dead 0 but new regimes are more authoritarian than democratic o personalistic patrimonial rule in Central Asia Belarus Georgia 2003 amp Ukraine 2004 moved back from quasiauthoritarian rule to democratic rule 0 Internal movement strong 0 International support via lOs and NGOs amp other states Russian transition has reversed Q Does int l politics break the Third Wave 0 US was ambivalent about Yeltsin s electoral manipulation Conclusions about transitions to democracy difficult to develop clear causal theory multiple pathways to democracy limited conditions for democratization difficult to predict highly dependent on actors and their strategies Political Economy How do economic factors shape political outcomes 0 How do economic institutions affect politics 0 Unemployment inflation and economic growth affect government policies and survival 0 Do market dynamics undermine or enhance democratic consolidation How do political factors shape economic outcomes 0 How do political institutions affect economic policies 0 Do democratic institutions advance or hinder market functions 0 How do states regulate markets Role of Ideology Social democracy v liberalism o Normative debate over how political institution should regulate economic activities 0 Empirical debate over how well markets function with or without regulation How do ideologies influence political and economic aims o Ideologies define what values are sought equality v freedom 0 Ideologies influence interpretation of outcomes Do states with extensive regulation and taxation grow faster or slower than others Do states have more or less inequality than others What are the effects of inequality Modernization and Development Pathways do stages of development influence political outcomes 0 Early developers US UK France 0 Middle developers Germany Japan 0 Late developers Russia China 0 Late Late experimental developers India Mexico South Africa Iran Modernization O O 0 Generic view state will move toward higher levels of economic development especially industry rather than agriculture Teleological view states are progressing toward industrialized market democracies Process may be uneven How to assist modernization Criticisms of teleological view Rules out alternative political and economic systems Developmental pathways are more varied CPE Early Developersl Advanced Industrialized Democracies Ideological Tension Between Social Democracy v Liberalism SD equality and egalitarian values L equality ofoppon uniz y and limits on state infringement on citizens liberty Struggles over which ideology should prevail Future of the Social Welfare State L welfare state too large SD welfare state should be reformed not eliminated What welfare should be withdrawn 0 National healthcare systems 0 Unemployment insurance 0 Retirement pensions 0 Income subsidies 0 Housing construction and subsidies 0 Agricultural subsidies 0 Higher education subsidies and loans Graying of populations How to provide pensions and healthcare to retirees retirees as of pop increasing workers as of pop decreasing tax burden on workers will increase given current benefit levels Policy options 0 cut benefits 0 raise taxes 0 increase of workers encourage immigration Political Effects on Economic Policies and Outcomes Do democratic policies produce higher inflation levels Hypothesis is that public will demand more government spending and highemployment policies 0 Governments will spend excessively and trade higher inflation for lower unemployment recent study Desai et al finds that inflation levels vary based on inequality 19601999 0 low inequality countries have lower inflation rates 0 high inequality countries have higher inflation rates 0 when Gini coefficient is below 40 then democracy restrains inflation In part poor will demand greater government spending when income inequality is high Do democracies tax more than dictatorships concern was that democracies were less capable of taxing than authoritarian regimes advanced democracies do tax more than advanced dictatorships o 315 of GDP in democratic countries with per capita income gt 7000 0 185 of GDP in nondemocratic countries with per capita income gt 7000 0 but most rich nondemocracies are rentier states overall democracies in general do not tax much more than nondemocracies Labor and Welfare Reforms in Germany in Germany Schroder s Agenda 2010 program SDU 0 small firms can fire employees at short notice 0 longterm unemployed will face penalties for refusing lowerpaying jobs 0 income tax cut but tobacco tax raised 0 Liberal oriented Christian Democratic Union CDU wanted greater restrictions on collective bargaining rights 0 Bundestag vote was close 306 v 291 Germany has 12 unemployment Germany is violating EU Eurozone rules that budget deficits do not exceed 3 of GDP 33 for 2002 0 France exceed deficit in 2002 at 32 and in 2003 at 41 Public divided CDU preferred over SDU in recent polls 0 58 said reforms were wrong and 93 said they were insufficient to solve the problems Service Economy and Tradeoffs declining manufacturing employment as of economy weakens labor unions in manufacturing sectors mass service employment often temporary and with lower wages Taxation Systems US has more progressive tax system v Europe but US devotes less to income redistribution 199197 US taxes drew 31 of capital income v 20 24 in Europe 2533 of GDP is devoted to social transfers in Europe v 14 in US Europe trades more regressive taxes for more state directed income redistribution Civil Wars and Weak States degree of ethnic diversity fails to explain onset of civil wars 0 ethnic divisions are common 0 civil wars are infrequent feature associated with weak states low autonomy and capacity better explain onset of civil war 0 poor state GDPcaptia o populous o rough geography transportation amp communication is difficult 0 oil export dependency rentier state 0 new state weak institutionalization o instability of political institutions Howto prevent civil wars 0 Build strongerstates but 0 Promote economic development 0 Assist in political development stable institutions Motivations Behind Civil Wars ideologies to mobilize combatants and supporters exist but they reflect organizational core of members 0 local grievances and social ties matter more 0 ideological commitments often emerge afterjoining fighters not before people may act rationally eg join rebels if food and housing is better supplied by them Ending Civil Wars Victory v negotiated settlement 0 Victory is more common Difficult to achieve stable settlement without thirdparty guarantor Walter 1997 0 Hard to find able and willing guarantor 1958 Lebanon settlement had 14000 US troops present briefly lasts until 1975 1989 Nicaraguan settlement had 260 OAS observers and 800 Venezuelan paratroopers 1979 Zimbabwe agreement had 1200 Commonwealth troops o Guarantor must be willing to use force But El Salvador UN missions 199195 succeeded wout much force available 368 obseners 315 police What peace agreements last Hartzell et al 2001 prior regime was democratic long war at low intensity territorial autonomy for threatened groups thirdparty guarantee Should partition be favored over settlement Sambanis 2000 Propartition view 0 enables postwar democratization o Prevents renewed war v ineffective settlement 0 Reduces residual ethnic violence Antipartition view 0 Partition in one may encourage violent secession elsewhere 0 Successor states are not homogenous 0 Ethnic diffusion will reinforce cooperation Debate over partition as agreement v secession as unilateral action of seceding state Statistical study 0 Partition is more likely after costly identity wars after rebel victory ortruce and in countries with aboveaverage socioeconomic conditions Partitioned states are as democratic or more so than non partitioned ones 0 War recurrence is no more or less likely in partition than not Longer war makes peace more likely but costlier war makes it less likely Treaties produce more stable agreements than truces Negligible effect under most conditions but helpful under some conditions 0 O


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