Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy
Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy PHIL 490
Cal State Fullerton
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This 21 page Class Notes was uploaded by Antonette Anderson on Wednesday September 30, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PHIL 490 at California State University - Fullerton taught by Jeeloo Liu in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 41 views. For similar materials see /class/217082/phil-490-california-state-university-fullerton in PHIL-Philosophy at California State University - Fullerton.
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Date Created: 09/30/15
Phil 490 Consciousness and the Self Handout 14 Fred Dretske The Mind s Awareness of Itself Professor JeeLoo Liu The Goals H To solve the puzzle of phenomenal consciousness the puzzle of how one can be aware of internal affairs aware of what one s experiences are like without being aware of these experiences themselves or of the properties that give them their phenomenal character 2 To argue that the mind s awareness of itself is an awareness of facts about itself it is an awareness of the fact that a mental experience e has the property 15 Different forms of Awareness Objects Properties and Facts 1 awareness of the object x 2 awareness of the property P of the object x awareness of the fact that x is P 9 When an object is moving I can be aware of A the moving object gt o awareness B the fact that it is moving gt f awareness C the movement gt p awareness D all of these E none of these I will call these three forms of awareness oawareness for object awareness f awareness for fact awareness and pawareness for property awareness Everyday perception is generally a mixture of object fact property awareness Usually we become aware of facts by becoming aware of the objects and properties that constitute those facts Awareness of Mental States 0 the mental event experience 5 the phenomenal quality of the experience f the fact that the mental event has this phenomenal property Dretske 3 I can become f aware that something in me has 5 by an awareness of P My experience of the pumpkin s movement pumpkin has P is moving 7 On pain Having a headache is not an awareness certainly not an o awareness of a mental entity a pain in the head In saying that one feels pain what one is saying is that one feels is aware of a part of the body the feeling awareness of which is painful 8 The case of Mary Emerging from the color free room gives her an awareness of properties P that figure in the facts that o is P she was already aware of but it doesn t give her an awareness of any new facts Prerequisites of SelfAwareness factawareness and concepts 1 F unlike p and what one is aware of requires an understanding of 2 Since the mind s awareness of itself is always according to this account f awareness there is no way one can be aware of one s mental states without a mastery of relevant concepts 3 We must first develop suitable concepts those that pick out properties we are p aware of before we can be made conscious of what transpires in my own minds 4 The mind becomes aware of itself of its own conscious experiences by a developmental process in which concepts needed for such awareness are required 5 In the case of such concepts as experience this doesn t happen with children until around the age of four to five years In most animals it never happens 6 The mind is the first and indeed the only thing we are aware of but it is among the last things we are aware of Q Do you agree that children before the age of acquiring concepts and nonlinguistic animals do not have fact awareness and hence cannot be aware of their own minds Phil 490 Consciousness and the Self Handout 19 Eric Schwitzgebel Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or The Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositionol Belief Professor J eeLoo Liu Main Claims 1 We often act contrary to our professed beliefs I argue that it is best to think of such cases as cases in which occurrent judgment diverges from dispositional belief and in which the individual s belief state is in between 2 Belief does not always flow passively from sincere judgment In fact many of our most morally important beliefs change only transiently gradually and with effort There is no such thing as occurrent belief There is only occurrent judgment Moral beliefs require effort and time to change and our professed beliefs do not fully represent our dispositions pm Cases of Inconsistent BeliefsBehavior 1 The implicit racist the case of Juliet professed belief non racism behavior racist 2 The trembling Stoic professed belief death is not bad behavior fear and regret death 3 The cognitive non cognitivist professed belief non cognitivism is right that moral and aesthetic claims cannot literally be true or false behavior embracing moral cognitivism 4 The forgetful driver professed belief a bridge he normally takes to work will be closed for a month behavior keep driving to the bridge to work Claim What I would reject is the view that in cases of this sort there are generally determinate facts about whether the subject believes or fails to believe the proposition in question I would suggest instead that Juliet is somewhere between believing and failing to believe so that it s not quite right either to say that she believes or to say that she fails to believe that all the races are of equal intelligence Occurrent Belief vs Dispositional Belief occurrence An occurrence is an event a particular event that transpires at a particular time and place disposition A disposition is a proneness or tendency to be involved in a particular way under particular conditions in events of a particular type Why there are no occurrent beliefs possible arguments 1 There is no such usage as x is believing that P 2 When one s mind turns to something else one does not cease to believe that P 3 Structurally believe is not a typical case of a term with both a dispositional and occurrent sense Schwitzgebel the Gulf 2 Proposal Cluster of Dispositional Beliefs 1 Dispositional approaches to belief are generally built upon a broad base they re not single track dispositions 2 If to believe is to possess a multi track disposition or a broad track disposition or a cluster of dispositions then there will be in betweenish cases in which the relevant disposition or dispositions are only partly possessed 3 The cases mentioned above fall into this category We should say of such cases that it s not quite right as a general matter either to ascribe or to deny belief simpliciter though certain limited conversational contexts may permit simple ascription or denial 4 A behavioral criterion We believe that P if our actions and reactions generally seem to reflect a P ish take on the world whether those actions and reactions are spontaneous and automatic or deliberate and reflective Summary 1 There are in between cases of dispositional beliefs 2 Ascription of belief should be contextual 3 To ascribe a belief to an agent we should check the agent s actions and reactions to see if they reflect the agent s attitude 4 If one s dispositions are divided then our ascriptions should be nuanced The gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief The central empirical fact is this A person may be absolutely completely persuaded of the truth of a proposition in the sense of reaching a sincere unequivocal unmitigated unqualified unhesistant judgment and yet that judgment may fail to penetrate her entire dispositional structure the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief View 1 marginalize the gulf On this marginalizing model the normal situation is that our actions reflect our beliefs and our beliefs correspond to our judgments View 2 disconnection On the model I propose here the disconnection between judgment and belief is no exception but the norm especially in the case of moral beliefs On Moral Beliefs Our morally most important beliefs the ones that reflect our values our commitments our enduring ways of viewing the world change slowly painfully effortfully It takes work to bring one s overall dispositional structure in line with one s broad life involving judgments And unless we do that work and bring about that change people are quite right to rebuke us for not really or fully or deeply believing what we say we believe From the standpoint of moral psychology the most important of our beliefs are exactly those that do not change in a twinkling with a sincere judgment They re the beliefs that shift only gradually and piecemeal Schwltzgebel the Gulf 3 Conclusion r Lmnslendy or gradually Somelees we have to work to bnng our overall dlsposluonal structure m llne wth our occunentjudgments 2 Genulne bellef does not always flow passlvely from slncere judgmenL Knpke 395 prmclple afduquamtmn fmm 0552mm la behefls ma ampli ed a madeb 3 m M u a clear distinction between judgmentand bellef Divided Sell Phil 490 Consciousness and the Self Handout 18 Eric Schwitzgebel The Unreliability ofNuive I ntrospection Professor JeeLoo Liu Main Theses 1 We are prone to gross error even in favorable circumstances of extended re ection about our own ongoing conscious experience our current phenomenology Even in this apparently privileged domain our selfknowledge is faulty and untrustworthy Most people are poor introspectors of their own ongoing conscious experience Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self fulfillment 5quot Skepticism of Current Conscious Experience Where is the skeptic who says We have no reliable means of learning about our own ongoing conscious experience our current imagery our inward sensations we are as in the dark about that as about anything else perhaps even more in the dark Though infallibilism the view that we cannot err in our judgments about our own current conscious experience is now largely out of favor mainstream philosophical criticism of it is surprisingly meek Problems with Introspective Reports Claim Most people are poor introspectors of their own ongoing conscious experience Examples W W1 1 Emotions Even the grossest features of emotional experience largely elude us Re ection doesn t remove our ignorance or it delivers haphazard results 2 Visual Experience Most naive introspectors are badly mistaken about their visual phenomenology when they first reflect on it when they aren t warned and coached against a certain sort of error even though they may be patiently considering that experience as it occurs If naive introspectors are as wrong as they seem to be as wrong as they later confess they are about the clarity and stability of visual experience they re wrong about an absolutely fundamental and pervasive aspect of their sensory consciousness 3 Pain sensation The case of pain is not always as clear as sometimes supposed There s confusion between mild pains and itches or tingles There s the football player who sincerely denies he s hurt There s the difficulty we sometimes feel in locating pains precisely or in describing their character I see no reason to dismiss out of hand the possibility of genuine introspective error in these cases 4 Inner Speech Does inner speech typically involve not just auditory images but also motor images in the vocal apparatus Is there an experiential distinction between inner speaking and inner hearing Summary 1 In my view then we re prone to gross error even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection about our ongoing emotional visual and cognitive phenomenolo y 2 The introspection of current conscious experience far from being secure nearly infallible is faulty untrustworthy and misleading not just possibly mistaken but massively and pervasively Why then do people tend to be so confident in their introspective judgments especially when queried in a casual and trusting way Here s my suspicion Because no one ever scolds us for getting it wrong about our experience and we never see decisive evidence of error we become cavalier This lack of corrective feedback encourages a hypertrophy of confidence The Unreliability of Introspection 1 There are two kinds of unreliability i Something might be unreliable because it often goes wrong or yields the wrong result or ii it might be unreliable because it fails to do anything or yield any result at a Introspection is unreliable in both ways Reflection on basic features of ongoing experience leads sometimes to error and sometimes to perplexity or indecision The self attribution of current thought contents and emotional states as opposed to the phenomenal form and structure of those thoughts and emotions may be more expressive or reactive like a spontaneous I hate you or simply self fulfilling than introspective if we re going to be strict about what properly falls in the domain of introspection 5 9 4 And of course the accuracy of emotional self attribution is disputable as I think is the accuracy of our self attribution of recently past thought contents Concluding Remarks 1 Descartes had it quite backwards when he said the mind including especially current conscious experience was better known than the outside world 2 My experiences ee and scatter as I re ect I feel unpracticed poorly equipped with the tools categories and skills that might help me dissect them They are gelatinous disjointed swift shy changeable They are at once familiar and alien 3 Descartes thought or is often portrayed as thinking that we know our own experience first and most directly and then infer from that to the external world If that s right if our judgments about the outside world to be trustworthy must be grounded in sound judgments about our experiences then our epistemic situation is dire indeed However I see no reason to accept any such introspective foundationalism Indeed I suspect the opposite is nearer the truth Our judgments about the world to a large extent drive our judgments about our experience Properly so since the former are the more secure I know better what s in the burrito I m eating than I know my gustatory experience as I eat it Phil 490 Consciousness and the Self Handout 7 David Chalmers F ocing Up to the Problem of Consciousness Professor J eeLoo Liu Goals 1 First isolate the hard problem separating it from other easier problems 2 Critique of some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem 3 To give a naturalistic account of 39 that V J ive explanation The Easy Problem and the Hard Problem Experience What unites all of these states is that there is something it s like to be in them All of them are states of experience In this central sense of consciousness an organism is conscious if there is something it s like to be that organism and a mental state is conscious if there is something it s like to be in that state phenomenal consciousness qualia conscious experience The hard problem phenomena of consciousness The problems of experience How is it that these physical systems are subjects of experience Why and how does our experience arise from a physical basis Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all Question Why are the easy problems easy and is the hard on hard To explain experience we need a new approach The usual explanatory methods of cognitive science and neuroscience do not suffice These methods have been developed precisely to explain the performance of cognitive functions and they do a good job But when it comes to the hard problem the standard approach has nothing to say Christof Koch Let s first forget about the really difficult aspects like subjective feelings for they may not have a scientific solution The subjective state of play of pain of pleasure of seeing blue of smelling a rose there seems to be a huge jump between the materialist level of explaining molecules and neurons and the subjective level Koch 1992 p 96 Chalmers argument for explanatory gap 1 When a phenomenon is functionally definable we explain the phenomenon by explaining its function 2 We explain a function by specifying a mechanism that performs the function 3 This kind of explanation is reductive in the sense that the explanation of the mechanism gives the complete story of the phenomenon 4 But even after we have given a complete explanation of the physical mechanism for conscious experience we still don39t give the complete explanation of conscious experience itself 5 Therefore conscious experience is not functionally definable 6 Therefore there is an explanatory gap between a functional analysis of conscious experience and the explanation of the experience itself Some research strategies 1 to explain something else 2 to deny that there is anything more to be explained Dennett 3 to claim to be explaining experience Humphrey 4 to explain the structure of experience Clark Hardin 5 to isolate the substrate of experience to identify the sort of neural process from which consciousness arises Crick amp Koch Edelman J ackendoff For a satisfactory theory we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience we need an account of why and how Chalmers Proposal Nonreductive Explanation 1 We will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world alongside mass charge and spacetime 2 There are basic psychophysical principles that will not interfere with physical laws but will be a supplement to a physical theory 3 The new basic principles postulated by a nonreductive theory give us the extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge 4 Naturalistic dualism Toward A Theory of Consciousness Naturalistic Dualism 1 The principle of structural coherence Awareness is a purely functional notion it contains cognitively accessible information There is a direct cor between 39 and It is this isomorphism between the structures of consciousness and awareness that constitutes the principle of structural coherence Given the coherence between consciousness and awareness it follows that a mechanism of awareness will itself be a correlate of conscious experience I 2 The principle of organizational invariance This principle states that any two systems with the same fine grained mctional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences 3 The doubleaspect theory of information There is a direct isomorphism between certain physically embodied information spaces and certain phenomenal or experiential information spaces Thus information or at least some information has two basic aspects a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect Phil 490 Consciousness and the Self Handout 11 Alex Byrne Some Like It HOT Consciousness And H igherOrder Thoughts Professor J eeLoo Liu Goals H To examine Rosenthal s version of the HOT hypothesis and the arguments he supplies to support it To argue that even if the hypothesis were true it would not satisfactorily explain phenomenal consciousness N HOP vs HOT HOP The Perceptual Mode Theory the Spotlight theory the Inner Sense theory Locke Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man s own mind Armstrong Consciousness is no more than awareness perception of inner mental states Difficulties A subject need not believe the testimony of his senses In this respect perception is unlike belief If we take the inner eye story seriously I should be able to doubt the testimony of inner sense But this does not seem to be possible Secondorder I may believe that there is no tree before me Firstorder It may appear to me that there is a tree before me For this reason the perceptual model of consciousness does not seem to me to be promising HOT higherorder thought hypothesis 1 Awareness 2 occurrent belief Byme 2 2 Consciousness is no more than awareness belief of inner mental states by the person Whose states they are PConsciousness vs Aconsciousness Pconsciousness A mental state that is phenomenally conscious is a state that there is something it is like to be in Aconsciousness An access conscious state is one Whose content is available for various cognitive operations action reasoning and verbal report On focus here Will be on Whether the hi gher order thought hypothesis can explain phenomenal consciousness in terms of certain kinds of nonconscious mental states The Higherorder Thought Hypothesis A higherorder thought or HOT is a thought about some mental state Rosenthal s Theses l A mental state is conscious just in case one has a roughly contemporaneous thought to the effect that one is in that very mental state 2 Rosenthal is committed as he of course recognizes to the existence of nonconscious states that have sensory qualities nonconscious headaches visual experiences and so forth 3 A higher order thought itself may well not be the object of a further hi gher order thought and if it is not then it is not conscious Typically one s hi gher order thoughts are not themselves conscious thoughts Byrne 3 Rosenthal s Argument First Rosenthal notes the distinction between reporting and expressing21 If I assert that p I am not only reporting that p but also expressing my thought that p So if I assert that it s raining I am reporting an external state of affairs that it s raining and also expressing my thought that it s raining Now suppose a mental state S of mine is a conscious state and suppose I have the capacity to report my mental states Then in virtue of the fact that S is conscious I can report that I am in S That is I can express my higher order thought that I am in S So whenever I am in a conscious state S I have the ability to report that I m in S and hence the ability to express my higher order thought that I am in S It does not immediately follow from this that I am actually having whenever I am in S the higher order thought that I am in S But says Rosenthal it is unclear how one could have the ability to express some particular thought without actually having that thought The best explanation of our ability to express the higher order thought in question is plainly that one actually has that thought p 109 A mental state S of mine is a conscious state 9 I have the ability to express some particular thought that I am in S 9 I am actually having the thought that I am in S A mental state S of mine is an unconscious state 9 My inability to express some particular thought about S 9 My not having the thought about S Dretske s Objection t1 Fr ed with moustache t2 Fr ed Without moustache Suppose I see Fred on Monday and see him later on Friday spending some time talking to him in broad daylight on both days Suppose that Fred has a moustache on Monday that he has shaved off by Friday And suppose that I do not notice that Fred has done some shaving Nonetheless surely I saw the moustache on Monday and failed to see it on Friday My conscious visual experience of Fred on Monday was different from my conscious visual experience of Fred on Friday the Monday experience was of a moustache among other things the Friday experience was not of a moustache The point is just thatI am not aware that these experiences differ p 113 Byrne 4 Q The conscious content of a mental state is the content specified by the higher order thought about that state Now there is no problem here for conscious thoughts But can the content of a visual experience for instance my visual experience as I gaze on a sunny day towards the San Gabriel mountains be captured in a single thought Rosenthal s reply We re seldom if ever conscious of all the detail that s represented in our sensory states even sensory states at the center of our visual field And the amount of detail we re conscious of often changes When that happens moreover it needn t be the sensory state that changes but only the way we re conscious of that state The higher order thought hypothesis explains these things Higher order thoughts represent sensory states in greater or lesser detail So a higher order thought might represent one s sensory state as being just of a bookcase with lots of things on it But the higher order thought might instead represent the sensory state in greater detail as including a thimble In the first case one is conscious of seeing the bookcase but not the thimble in the second case one s conscious of seeing both MD 91533 Byrne s Objections 1 The inexpressibility problem The concepts that I can deploy in thought may be inadequate to characterize fully the content presented by the visual sensuous manifold just as one may lack the resources to describe exhaustively the content of a painting The problem of the unthinkable thought There seems no reason to suppose that the proposition describing the content of my visual experience is one that I could think for it would surely be an immensely complex thought imagine the length of a sentence of English that expresses it 3 The problem of introspection If I do actually have such an unwieldy thought by introspection I ought to be able to make it conscious Yet when I try to become aware of my awareness of my visual experience I do not stumble on such a monstrous thought The problem of mistaken HOT What about cases where the higher order thought gets matters wrong N 4 Evidently given the distinctness of the higher order thought and the mental state it is about such cases are possible For instance I may be seeing that there s a cat on the mat and my hi gher order thought may be that I am seeing that there s a dog on the mat What would happen then What would I consciously experience p 119 Suppose I have the hi gher order thought that I am in a certain sensory state and suppose I m not in this state Having got this far there is only one answer to the question of what I will consciously experience it will seem to me phenomenologically thatI am in this sensory state p 121 Byrne 5 Conclusion 1 There are cases Where the higherorder thought only partially captures the content of the mental state it is about esp with sensory states 2 There may be cases Where the higherorder thought is mistaken about the content of the conscious mental state 3 So I judge the higherorder thought hypothesis to be a heroic failure when it comes to phenomenal consciousness Phil 490 Consciousness and the Self Handout 13 Fred Dretske Conscious Experience JeeLoo Liu The Goals 1 To refute the Higher Order Thought HOT and the Hi gher Order Perception HOP theories 2 To argue for the J39 quot quot between thinquot and fa t 3 To show that if we have conscious experiences beliefs desires and fears it cannot be our introspective awareness of them that makes them conscious A key question for Dretske What makes an experience conscious Awareness of Facts and Awareness of Things consciousness awareness Example i There is a difference between hearing Clyde play the piano and seeing him play the piano ii A perceptual belief that he is playing the piano must also be distinguished from a perceptual experience of this same event An initial distinction i awareness of objectsawareness of events eg Clyde39s playing the piano thingawareness ii awareness of facts eg that he is playing the piano factawareness experience lt conceptfree belief lt conceptcharged Question What is the point about the distinction between awareness of events and awareness of facts Features of Awareness of Facts 1 Consciousness of facts implies a deployment of concepts If S is aware that x is F then S has the concept F and uses applies it in his awareness of x eg One cannot be conscious that the toast is burning unless one understands what toast is and what it means to burn unless that is one has the concepts needed to classify objects and events in this way 2 Our awareness of facts takes the form of a belief e g To smell that the toast is burning is to be aware that the toast is burning which is to believe that the toast is burning 3 The perceptual awareness of facts is a mental state or attitude that involves the possession and use of concepts the sort of cognitive or intellectual capacity involved in thought and belief 4 Perceptual awareness of facts has a close tie with behavior with in particular an ability to say what one is aware of Question Under this description can any nonlingual animal be said to have quot factawareness e g A cat can smell and thus be aware of burning toast as well as the cook but only the cook will be aware that the toast is burning The Connection between ThingAwareness and FactAwareness Dretske39s Claims H J To have an experience of a thing is to be conscious of the thing to have an experience of a fact is to be conscious of the fact There is no property F which is such that an awareness of a thing which is F requires an awareness of the fact that it is F Example 1 Suppose S sees a speckled hen on which there are 27 speckles Each speckle is clearly visible Not bothering to count S does not realize that is not aware that there are 27 speckles In such a case although S is aware of all 27 speckles things he is not aware of the number of speckles a fact Example 2 Suppose that Tom at time t1 differs perceptibly from Tom at t2 only in having a moustache at t2 S sees Tom at both times but does not notice the moustache is not therefore aware that he has grown a moustache To be thingaware of a difference is to be aware of the thing some object event or condition X that makes the difference To be factaware of the difference is to be aware of the fact that there is a difference not necessarily the fact that X is the difference Tom at t1 Tom at t2 S was thingaware but not factaware of the difference between Tom at t1 and t2 He was at t2 aware of the thing that made the difference but not factaware of this difference First Conclusion Awareness of things X requires no factawareness that X is F for any F of those things Conscious Beings and Conscious States 1 Agents are said to be conscious in an intransitive sense of this word he regained consciousness and in a transitive sense he was conscious of her creature consciousness H The always intransitive sense in which certain internal states processes events and attitudes typically in or of conscious beings are said to be conscious state consciousness Dr etske s Claims 3 only endorses the innocent idea that beings who are conscious of something are conscious it does not say that conscious beings must be conscious of something On Armstrong s case of the truck driver i There is transitive creature consciousness of both things the roads the stop signs and facts that the road curves left that the stop sign is red etc ii What the driver lacks is a hi gher level introspective awareness a perception like awareness of the current states and activities of his own mind iii The driver is neither thing aware nor fact aware of his own mental states iv But the driver s experience of the road itself was not an unconscious state V Dretske The truckdriver has thingawareness but not factawareness of the road Three Examples in Support of Dretske s Claim 1 The example of seeing the difference between Alpha and Beta Readers who were only thing aware of the difference between Alpha and Beta were not fact conscious of the difference These are conscious differences of which no one is conscious We commit ourselves to the possibility of differences in conscious experience that are not re ected in conscious belief 2 The example of seeing two different wiggled shapes and then identify the one seen Subjects were thing aware of the wiggles but never became fact aware that they were there We do see and hence consciously experience these points of detail despite not noticing them 3 The example of monkey s perception of the LARGER THAN relation The monkeys are trained to respond to the larger of the two shapes A B whatever their absolute size happens to be The monkeys were not fact aware of the difference in size before the training but their experience of A and B was different before they were capable of exhibiting this difference in behavior Learning of this sort is simply the J l p of fa t from thinquot Spot the difference my examples Spot a dlffelences Spot 5 Differences on the Pirate Flags 125 mg quot 5 l U leel itsnriQee s Ell M U Conclusion There can be conscious difference in a person s experience of the world of which that person is not conscious Therefore it is not a person s awareness of a mental state HOT that makes the state conscious Dretske39s Tentative Answer to the Key Question What Makes Experiences Conscious 1 Creature consciousness HOT is not necessary for state consciousness 2 Spotlight consciousness HOP is also not necessary for state consciousness 3 What makes an internal state or process conscious is the role it plays in making one intransitively conscious normally the role it plays in making one transitively conscious of some thing or fact An experience is conscious not because one is aware of the experience but because it makes one aware of the properties of X and objects X itself of which it is a sensory representation a functional analysis of conscious states 4 Experiences and beliefs are conscious not because you are conscious of them but because so to speak you are conscious with them 5 Introspection is best understood not as a thing awareness but as fact awareness an awareness that one has certain beliefs thoughts desires and experiences without a corresponding awareness of the things the beliefs thoughts desires and experiences themselves 6 What makes conscious experiences conscious is the way they make us conscious of something else the world we live in and the condition of our own bodies
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