Week 6 Notes PHI 2010
Week 6 Notes PHI 2010 PHI 2010
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This 4 page Class Notes was uploaded by Annette Marin on Sunday October 4, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PHI 2010 at Florida State University taught by Randolph Clarke in Fall 2015. Since its upload, it has received 27 views. For similar materials see Intro to Philosophy in PHIL-Philosophy at Florida State University.
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Date Created: 10/04/15
The MindBody Argument 10415 528 PM Physicalism Initial Definition 0 Everything is wholly physical 0 Every object is a physical object and every property that any object has is a physical property Dualism Substance Dualism There exist two distinct kinds of thing or substance physical things and nonphysical things Only a nonphysical thing or something with a non physical thing as a part can think perceive or feel 0 Descartes was a Substance Dualist o Believed each human body was a combination of body amp soul 0 Believed the mind doesn t think the soul does 0 Substance a thing that has various properties qualities or features 0 Ex an electron a human being a planet 0 State the possession of a property quality or feature by some substance 0 Ex having a charge of 1 believing that today is Thursday being sphe caL 0 State Dualism There are two distinct kinds of properties and so two distinct kinds of states that things can be in 0 physical states and nonphysical mental states Physicalism o All things and properties are either fundamental physical ones or wholly constituted by fundamental physical ones And all fundamental physical things and properties are nonmental The Identity Thesis 0 Every mental state is identical to some physical state The Disembodiment Argument Suppose I pinch myself and I then feel a sensation of pain 1 I can conceive of experiencing this very pain while disembodied 2 IfI can conceive of a particular scenario occurring then that scenario is possible 3 Hence it is possible that this very pain occur in a disembodied being 4 If this very pain were identical with some physical state then it could not possibly occur in a disembodied being 5 Hence this very pain is not identical with any physical state 6 Therefore the identity thesis which says that every mental state is identical with some physical state is false 10415 528 PM 10415 528 PM