20TH C ANGLO
20TH C ANGLO PHIL 176
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This 36 page Class Notes was uploaded by Noemie Kiehn on Monday October 5, 2015. The Class Notes belongs to PHIL 176 at California State University - Sacramento taught by Staff in Fall. Since its upload, it has received 65 views. For similar materials see /class/218862/phil-176-california-state-university-sacramento in PHIL-Philosophy at California State University - Sacramento.
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Indexicality and Rigidity The Twin Earth water example did not involve a division in labor but it involves other things which are of fundamental importance to the theory of reference and to the theory of necessary truth Specifically it involves the notions of 1 rigidity and 2 indexicality RIGIDITY Thouqht Experiment Four This Is Water in WlLde Let W1 and W2 be two possible worlds in which I exist and in which this glass exists and in which I am giving a meaning explanation by pointing at the glass and saying This is water Suppose that in W1 the glass is filled with H20 and that in W2 it is filled with XYZ Interpretation One 424 1 One might hold that water was worldrelative but constant in meaning ie the word has a constant relative meaning On this theory water means the same in W1 and W2 it s just that water is H20 in W1 and water is XYZ in W Interpretation Two 424 2 One might hold that water is H20 in all worlds the stuff called water in W2 isn t water but water doesn t have the same meaning in W1 and W2 If what was said in the Twin Earth example is correct then Interpretation 2 is correct We can express this in Kripke s words by saying that water is rigid 424 When I give the ostensive definition this is water the word this is rigid SIMILARITIES TO INDEXICALS 426 Natural kind terms are like indexicals because 1 in both cases it does not appear that intension determines extension 2 in both cases there appears to be an ostensive element REASON 1 For indexicals such as the word I and other pronouns the same word has different extensions in different contexts That is the same word can be used to referto different objects when used in different contexts When Sam uses the word I the extension is Sam when I use the word I the extension is Patti Thus we cannot say that intension determines extension It appears that water is like indexicals in that there can be a mismatch between the intension and the extension of the term REASON 2 Even though water denotes rigidly what it denotes is water only if it is similar to the stuff that is water in the actual world Water is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the water around here 426 Indexicals are also ostensive involves pointing at the referent and that s where the variety of extension comes from Conclusion Words like water have an unnoticed indexical component CONSEQUENCES OF WATER BEING INDEXICAL Proposal We could treat words like water like true indexicals in that there is a mismatch between intension and extension in both cases saying that 0 They have the same meaning in every context just a different extension 0 Meaning does not determine extension ARGUMENT THAT THE EXTENSION OF THE WORD WATER IS ALWAYS THE SAME NOT THAT MEANINGS ARE DIFFERENT Suppose water has the same meaning on Twin Earth and Earth Let water on Twin Earth become phonetically different quaxel Premise In this case water and quaxel have different extensions but the same meaning Premise This is highly counterintuitive Conclusion Water and quaxel have different meanings notjust different extensions PUTNAM S PICTURE We should say that a difference in extension is a difference in meaning and give up the notion that meanings are mental entities of any kind 426 Water is H20 is epistemically contingent but metaphysically necessary If I agree that a liquid with the superficial properties of water but a different microstructure isn t really waterthen my ways of recognizing water cannot be regarded as an analytical specification of what it is to be water 425 We have now seen that the extension of a term is not fixed by a concept that the individual speaker has in his head and this is true both because extension is in general determined socially there is a division of linguistic labor as much as of real labor and because extension is in part determined indexically The extension of our terms depends upon the actual nature ofthe particular things that serve as paradigms and this actual nature is not in general fully known to the speaker Traditional semantic theory leaves out two contributions to the determination of reference the contribution of society and the contribution ofthe real world a better semantic theory must encompass both 427 What is a Speech Act by John Searle SUMMARY 0 Searle practices linguistic analysis in the spirit of Austin careful elucidation of some ofthe concepts of ordinary language Language is of interest not just because of its usefulness for solving philosophical puzzles but in and of itself Like Austin Searle believes that we cannot account for meaning in the absence ofthe context of a speech act In Searle sentences types do not express a proposition Instead tokens or sentences in a context express propositions 0 Using Austin s framework points out that there are many ways of describing or carving up the same speech act physical act act of reference perlocutionary act and illocutionary act In looking at a single act there are many ways of describing it The speakerwill characteristically have moved hisjaw and tongue and made noises He will have performed acts within the class which includes making statements asking questions issuing commands giving reports greeting and warning The members of this last class are what Austin called illocutionary acts and it is with this class that I shall be concerned in this paper 377 For Searle the basic unit of language is the speech act or illocutionary act the production of a token in the context of a speech act not the word the sentence type or the theory For a token to be an instance of communication the audience must take it as being produced by a being with certain intentions relevance of speaker intention in contrast to Russell or Frege or logical positivism lntroduces and defines the notion of a proposition as the common content of various expressions such as 380 1 Will John leave the room 2 John will leave the room 3 John leave the room Distinguishes between the notion of a proposition and that of an assertion An assertion is an illocutionary act but a proposition is not an act at all although the act of expressing a proposition is part of performing certain illocutionary acts 381 Argues for the main thesis that to perform an illocutionary act is to primarily to do rather than to say and to engage in rulegoverned behavior 378 Responds to Austin s call for a general theory of speech acts producing a theory of speech acts in which speech acts are analyzed in terms of schemas For example a speaker S makes a promise acts out a certain illocutionary act if and only if 1he utters an expression E where E is a device for promising and 2the felicity conditions for promising obtain To explain the notion of meaning introduces the notion of semantical rules that govern the use of expressions and distinguishes two types regulative and constitutive The hypothesis that lies behind the present paper is that the semantics of a language an be regarded as a series of systems of constitutive rules and that illocutionary acts are performed in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules 380 Intends to explicate the notion of an illocutionary act by 1 stating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of illocutionary act and 2 extracting from it a set of semantical rules ofthe use of the expression 378 Describes a Gricean theory of meaning that takes into account speaker intention 382 To say that a speaker meant something by X is to say that the speaker intended the utterance ofX to produce some effect in the audience by means ofthe recognition of this intention o Evaluates Grice s definition as beneficial in that it points of the role of speaker intention but as deficient in that it ignores the role of convention It fails to distinguish the different kinds of effects perlocutionary versus illocutionary that one may intend to produce in one s hearers and it further fails to show the way in which these different kinds of effects are related to the notion of meaning 383 An American soldier addresses the Italian captors with Kennst du as Land wo die Zitronen bluhen Gricean effect persuading them I am a German soldier perlocutionary through the recognition of my intention to do so But it doesn t follow that what I mean is that I am a German soldier when I say Do you knowthe land where the lemon trees bloom what we can mean is a function of what we are saying it is also a matter of convention 384 o Amends Grice s definition to take into account the role of convention as well as intention 384 To say that a speaker meant something by X in the performance of a certain illocutionary act is to say that the speaker intended the utterance ofX to produce some effect in the audience by means of the recognition ofthis intention and furthermore if he is using the words literally he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters associate the expressions with the production of that effect 384 o Gives an analysis of promising providing its rules or set of necessary and sufficient conditions 1Normal input and output conditions obtain same language conscious not under duress 2S expresses that p in the utterance of T 3ln expressing that p S predicates a future act A of S 4H would prefer S s doing Ato his not doing A and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A 5lt is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events 6S intends to do A Ammended S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A 7S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A 8S intends that the utterance of T will produce in H a belief that conditions 6 and 7 obtain by means of the recognition of the intention to produce that belief and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means ofthe recognition ofthe sentence as one conventionally used to produce such beliefs 9The semantic rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1 8 obtain Derives rules to govern the use ofthe functionindicating device promise 1Rule 1 P is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence or large stretch of discourse the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S 2Rule 2 P is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S s doing A to his not doing A and S believes H would prefer S s doing Ato his not doing A a preparatory rule 3Rule 3 P is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events a preparatory rule 4Rue 4 P is to be uttered only if S intends to do A the sincerity rule 5Rule 5 The utterance of P counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A the essential rule Two Dogmas of Empiricism by WV Quine Main Points Denies the philosophical explanatory value of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic for all it s a priori reasonableness a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists a metaphysical article of faith 342 Denies the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic not based on any difficulty of applying the distinction but on the grounds that the distinction is based on other notions selfcontradictoriness and meaning that are themselves in need ofjustification Argues that the concept of analyticity is dependent upon the notion of meaning Examines various approaches to meaning and concludes that they really depend on the notion of synonymy or definition the former of which depends upon analyticity and the latter which begs the question 339 Challenges the view of logical positivism that statements can be evaluated for meaningfulness in isolation and in the absence of context Argues instead for a kind of semantic holism such that statements are evaluated as part of a theory I am impressed also apart from prefabricated examples of black and white balls in an urn with how baffling the problem has always been of arriving at any explicit theory ofthe empirical confirmation of a synthetic statement My present suggestion is that it is nonsense and the root of much nonsense to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement Taken collectively science has its double dependence upon language and experience but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one Russell s concept of definition in use was as remarked an advance over the impossible termbyterm empiricism of Locke and Hume The statement ratherthan the term came with Russell to be recognized as the unit accountable to an empiricist critique But what I am now urging is that even in taking the statement as a unit we have drawn our grid too finely The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science 345 0 Challenges the reductionism of the empiricism advocated primarily as a result ofthe fact that sentences cannot be evaluated in isolation from the theory in which they are generated 342 o Sees the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic to be intimately tied to its program of reductionism The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement taken in isolation from is fellows can admit of confirmation or information at all My countersuggestion issuing essentially from Carnap s doctrine of the physical world in the Aufbau is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body 344 Challenges the view that the work of science can be clearly distinguished from the work of metaphysics and supported as verifiable in contrast to it Ties in the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic with the rigid distinction logical positivists make between metaphysical questions and hypotheses of science Carnap has recognized that he is able to preserve a double standard for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses only by assuming an absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic and I need not say that this is a distinction which I reject 348 Argues for a kind of continuity between science and metaphysics Says As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool ultimately for predicting future experience in the light of past experience Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms or experience but simply as irreducible posits comparable epistemologically to the gods of Homer But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits Science is a continuation of common sense and it continues the commonsense expedient of swelling ontology to simplify theory OUTLINE Modern empiricism has been conditioned by two dogmas 1the distinction between truths that are analytic and the synthetic and 2reductionism the belief that every meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms that refer to immediate experience Main thesis both of these notions are ill founded Background for analyticity Leibniz distinction between truths of reason true in all possible worlds and truths of fact Hume distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact Kant distinction between the analytic nonself contradictory and the synthetic Problem The notion of self contradictoriness stands in the exact same need of clarification as that of analyticity itself These two notions are the two sides of a single dubious coin 331 Kant analytic if it attributes to its subject no more than is conceptually contained in its predicate Two drawbacks ofthis definition 1 is limited to statements of the subject predicate form and 2 appeals to a notion of containment left at a metaphorical level A statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of its meaning and independently of fact Conclusion The notion of analyticity is based on the notion of meaning Question what is meaning ARGUMENT Meaning is notjust naming or reference Frege Example 1 singular terms Morning star is the Evening star is true because a matter of fact not by virtue oftheir meaning Example 2 abstract terms 9 is the number of planets Example 3 general terms these do not name concrete or abstract objects but they are true of an entity or none or each of many Extension of a term The class of all the entities of which a general term is true We must distinguish between the meaning of a term and its extension Creature with a heart has the same extension as creature with a kidney but they have different meanings In the case of general terms philosophers tend to identify meaning with intension and to contrast this with intension Conclusion we must not confuse meaning with extension Question What sorts of things are meanings The Aristotelian notion of essence is the forerunner ofthe modern notion of intension But meaning belongs to language and essence to the thing in itself Things had essences for Aristotle but only linguistic forms have meanings Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word 333 The two most probable candidates for intensions are 1 mental ideas and 2 Platonic ideas These notions are both problematic Conclusion the notion of meaning is not helpful to understanding the notion of synonymy or analyticity Once a theory of meaning is sharply separated from a theory of reference it is a short step to recognizing as the business of the theory of meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements meanings themselves as obscure intermediary entities may well be abandoned 333 Conclusion the notion of meaning has not proved helpful in trying to understand the notion of analyticity Instead what is important is the notion of synonymy Again we must return to the idea of analyticity There are two types of analytic statements 1 No unmarried man is married True by logical form or logically true 2 No bachelor is unmarried can be turned into form 1 by substituting synonyms 333 The first of these is clear The second of these mention the notion of synonyms which Quine sets out to explain ll Definition Some people think that the second type of analyticity can be reduced to the first by definition by appealing to the lexicon or dictionary The dictionary maker is an empirical scientist who in making the dictionary had to appeal to the notion of synonymy which itself is presumablyjudged in terms of linguistic behavior or usage Conclusion The notion of synonymy is assumed in appealing to a definition Hence we cannot explain analyticity without explaining synonymy lll Interchangeability A natural suggestion deserving close examination is that the synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value 336 what we are looking for is cognitive synonymy The sort of synonymy needed merely such that any analytic statement could be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms 337 lfwe assume analyticity we could define cognitively synonymous we could say that bachelors and unmarried men are cognitively synonymous if and only if 3 All and only bachelors are unmarried men is analytic 0 But we need an account of cognitive synonymy that does not depend on analyticity 337 5 Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men 0 But the term necessarily already depends on the concept of analyticity Question Is interchangeability a sufficient condition for cognitive synoymy There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement bachelor and unmarried man rests on meaning rather than on mere accidental matters of fact as does extensional agreement of creature with a heart and creature with a kidney 338 So we must recognize that interchangeaility sava veritate if construed in relation to an extensional language is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense needed for deriving analyticity in the matter of Section If a language contains an intensional adverb necessarily in the sense lately noted or other particles to the same effect then interchangeability sava veritate in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance 339 Answer lfthe theory of meaning is extensional then interchangeability is not sufficient IV Semantical Rules V The Verification Theory and Reductionism Quine sees the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic to be intimately tied to its program of reductionism specifically because the methodology of reductionism is to confirm one sentence at a time The one dogma clearly supports the other in this way as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed ipso facto come what may and such a statement is analytic 345 even in taking the statement as a unit we have drawn our grid too finely The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science 345 VI Empiricism Without the Dogmas The totality of our socalled knowledge or beliefs from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic is a man made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions experience that there is much latitude of choice On What There Is by WV Quine Main Points 0 Quine takes on the metaphysical question of what exists in the spirit of Russell in that 1 the question is metaphysical this is why Klemke classifies Quine as a user of logicometaphysical analysis and 2 Quine takes the question on in the spirit of reducing ontological commitments from the number of commitments our surface grammar appears to commit us to a much smaller number leaving out for example nonexistent entities such as Pegasus and round squares o Presents the problem of Plato s beard and gives McX s and Wyman s explanation of this problem McX s Ardument forthe Existence of Nonbeing 1 If Pegasus were not we should not be talking about anything when we use the word I The denial of Pegasus cannot be maintained JO Therefore Pegasus and nonexistent entities must have some form of existence 318 A Pegasus does not exist as flesh and blood 01 Therefore Pegasus exists in the mind of humans Argues that Pegasus is not an idea in the mind of humans no more than the Parthenon is not an idea in the mind of humans since this is not what people are denying when they deny existence to Pegasus Presents Wyman s argument in terms of nonexistent entities as unactualized possibles Argues against the notion of unactualized possibles mostly using Occam s razor and cases like the fat man in the doo and the fat man at the door Argues that sentences with nonreferring terms such as Pegasus and the round square do not commit us to an ontology inflated by non being For one thing Russell has shown that descriptions do not name entities in the world and thus the phrase the round square does not commit us to the existence of a round square Instead any sentence containing that phrase is an existential statement Thus the statement The round square does not exist is meaningful and true and The round square exists is meaningful and false Nor do statements with names commit us to the existence of what they name For names can be shown to be descriptions and descriptions do not pick out things in the world Quine attempts to answer the question of how we know what ontological commitments any given theory has using the following formula Something exists if and only it can be the value of a bound variable That is the statements of our theory only commit us to the existence of entities over which our bound variables need to range in order to be true As Russell pointed out the surface grammar of our sentences often appears to commit us to the existence ofthings that do not appear to exist However further examination of the implications of our utterances shows that we are not necessarily committed to the existence of such entities Presents McX s argument for the existence of abstract entities attributes McX s Ardument for the Existence of Attributes 1 There are red houses red roses and red sunsets 2 There must be something all these things have in common 3 What these things have in common is what we mean by the attribute of redness A Therefore attributes and abstract entities exist 323 Argues that neither sentences with names nor sentences with general terms or predicates commit us to the existence of abstract entities We may say eg that some dogs are white and not thereby commit ourselves to recognizing either doghood or whiteness as entities Some dogs are white says that some things that are dogs are white and in orderthat this statement be true the things over which the bound variable something ranges must include some white dogs but need not include whiteness or dogness 326 Argues that the need to explain meaningfulness does not require a belief in the existence of abstract objects as we can explain the significance of sentences without postulating the existence of meanings Introduces the notion of a conceptual scheme such that ones ontology is assumed as a part of one s conceptual scheme One s ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences even the most commonplace ones Judged within some particular conceptual scheme and how else is judgment possible an ontological statement goes without saying standing in need of no separate justification at all 324 Argues that more than one conceptual scheme is possible with the result that there are different ontologies For example there is McX s conceptual scheme according to which it is obvious that attributes such as red exist Then there is Quine s conceptual scheme according to which objects and red objects exist but redness does not Describes three approaches to the problem of universals being debated by modern mathematicians logicism intuitionism and formalism Claims that each of these approaches corresponds to one of three medieval approaches to the existence of universals specifically realism conceptualism and nominalism Logicism and medieval realism hold a Platonic view according to which universals are not created but discovered According to intuitionism and conceptualism universals exist but are created by humans Finally both formalism and nominalism dodge the existence of universals o Distinguishes between the question of the ontological commitments of a theory and the question of what there is Our acceptance of an ontology is I think similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory say a system of physics we adopt at least insofar as we are reasonable the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the overall conceptual scheme which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense and the considerations which determine a reasonable construction of any part of that conceptual scheme eg the biological or the physical part are not different in kind from the considerations which determine a reasonable construction of the whole To whatever extent the adoption of any system of scientific theory may be said to be a matter of language the same but no moremay be said ofthe adoption of an ontology 328 0 Holds that there are three main conceptual schemes containing three main ontologies phenomenalism physicalism and forthose who believe in mathematics the Platonic 0 Claims that neither simplicity nor the concept of being foundational are unambiguous notions Claims that the phenomenalist conceptual scheme is epistemologically more foundational and the physicalist conceptual scheme is physically more foundational 329 Instead of choosing one conceptual scheme says the following the question of what ontology actually to adopt still stands open and the obvious counsel is tolerance and an experimental spirit Let us by all means see how much ofthe physicalistic conceptual scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalistic one still physics also naturally demands pursuing irreducible in toto though it be Let us see how or to what degree natural science may be rendered independent of Platonistic mathematics but let us also pursue mathematics and delve into its Platonistic foundations 330 RUSSELL AND MOORE Similarities and Differences The role of philosophy analysis View of science View of common sense Expanded role of logic Interest in metaphysics waomesmaomeds Ardumtommpm Empiricism THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY AS ANALYSIS What role did Russell see for philosophy The business of philosophy as l conceive it is essentially that of logical analysis followed by logical synthesis The most important part to my mind consists in criticizing and clarifying notions which are apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically As instances I might mention mind matter consciousness knowledge experience causality will time I believe all these notions to be inexact and proximate essentially infected with vagueness incapable of forming any part of an exact science LogicaAtomism 1924 p 37980 In some ways the analysis of Russell was very similar to the analysis of Moore That is Russell like Moore used analysis to dismiss certain works of metaphysics by scrutinizing the use of words For example Hegel s mistake Hegel s argument depends throughout upon confusing the IS of a predication as in Socrates is moral with the is of identity as in Socrates is the philosopher who drankthe hemlock Owing to this confusion he thinks that Socrates and mortal must be identical Seeing that they are different he does not infer as others would that there is a mistake somewhere but that they exhibit identity in difference Again Socrates is particular mortal is universal Therefore he says since Socrates is mortal it follows that the particular is the universal taking the IS to be throughout expressive of identity But to say the particular is the universal is self contradictory Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake but proceeds to synthesise particular and universal in the universal or concrete universal This is an example of how for want of care at the start vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions which but forthe almost incredible fact that they are unintentional one would be tempted to characterize as puns Our Knowledge of the External World p 39 However Russell saw the use of analysis differently than Moore One example ofthis is their differing views of role of common sense and scrence Science had the place in Russell s thought that common sense had in Moore swhereas Moore used analysis to restore our confidence in common sense a confidence that had been shaken by philosophical confusion Russell used analysis to purify science and purge it ofthe errors to which as the heir of common sense it was the unwitting victim The Twentieth Century to Quine and Derrida p 187 How exactly was this to be done The special sciences have all grown up by the used of notions derived from common sense such as things and their qualities space time and causation Science itself has shown that none of these commonsense notions will quite serve for the explanation of the world but it is hardly the province of any special science to undertake the necessary reconstruction of fundamentals This must be the business of philosophy Mysticism and Logic 1957 p 94 Not only did Russell hold the role of philosophy to aid science rather than common sense but he took a different view than Moore regarding common sense In fact he considered common sense to be the metaphysics of savages EXPANSION OF LOGIC AND ITS ROLE Another difference between Moore and Russell lies in the fact that the philosophy that Russell employed was one inclusive of if not based on formal logic By applying the precision of logic to in philosophical criticism and exposition Russell hoped that rigor could be restored Displeased by the fact that mathematics specifically geometry relied on the assumption of premises Russell set out to demonstrate that mathematics was based on logic What was unknown to him at that time is the fact that he was duplicating the efforts of Frege who a generation older than Russell had already done much ofthe work that Russell was to do Together with Whitehead and Peano they grounded mathematics in logic and created predicate and relational logic They also set up to create theories of meaning based on their discoveries in logic Although Russell explored other views for him meaning was purely extensional That is meaning could be defined without appealing to any kind of mental entities Instead meaning could be defined entirely in terms ofthe entities denoted by the expressions For example the meaning ofthe word Socrates was the person the meaning ofthe class of people was the set of people In contrast for Frege meaning was intensional That is although Frege shared Russell s beliefthat the referent of the expression was relevant to the meaning ofthat expression he also believed in the existence of what he called a sense which he defined as the mode of presentation ofthat thing For example the star Venus has a mode of presentation that is part of its meaning in addition to the star itself The notion of intension made it possible for Frege to explain the difference in cognitive content between Venus is Venus and Venus is Hesperus Like Aristotle Russell and Wittgenstein believed that the structure of logic which was itself indubitable revealed something about the structure ofthe world For example the existence of predicate calculus which allowed the attribution of qualities to subjects reflected the structure ofthe world such that we can say that it is made up of substances with properties This view allowed Russell to believe that logic offered a way out ofthe Kantian paradigm and to maintain a form of realism Abandoning metaphysics allows us to realize that it is not the business of philosophy to construct a deductive system That is the philosopher cannot posit first principles and then deduce reality from them 193 We can prove this by showing that there can be no first principles of the kind required Argument one against the possibility of a deductive system Premise 1 The laws of nature cannot constitute such first principles The laws of nature are simple hypothesis that can be refuted by experience Premise 2 Philosophical system builders never build systems on inductive generalizations Conclusion there are no such principles Argument For Premise 2 Descartes Descartes wanted to base all knowledge on propositions it would be self contradictory to deny Intuition was not sufficient as people differ in their intuitions Descartes thought cogito was such a proposition But no significant proposition is selfcontradictory to negate Cogito is a significant proposition It is not self contradictory to negate cogito Even if cogito were logically certain ergo sum doesn t follow from it As Hume showed no one event intrinsically points to any other Conclusion Any attempt to base a deductive system on propositions which describe what is immediately given is bound to be a failure Ar ument three A Priori Truths 194 Another way of deducing all our knowledge from first principles might be to get a set of a priori truths as premises But an a priori truth is a tautology From a set of tautologies only a further set of tautologies can be deduced It would be absurd to put forth a set of tautologies as the whole truth about the universe It is not possible to deduce all our knowledge from a set of first principles Those who say this is the role of philosophy are denying its claim to be a genuine branch of knowledge The claim that it is the role of philosophy to search for first principles is connected to the view of philosophy as studying reality as a whole It is metaphysical to think that the philosopher projects himself out of the world to take a bird s eye view 194 It is also metaphysical to assert that reality as a whole is generically different from what the sciences study piecemeal It is true that philosophy is equally interested in the content of every science Philosophy is not in principle related more closely to any one science than to another Nor is philosophy a special science a special department of speculative knowledge because this view presupposes that there are some things in the world that are the object of speculative knowledge and yet outside the scope of empirical science There is no field of experience that cannot in principle be brought under some form of scientific law 194 There is no type of speculative knowledge about the world that science cannot give 194 Conclusion we have overthrown speculative philosophy 195 REALISM AND THE STATUS OF SENSE DATA The realism that Moore espouses in The Refutation of Idealism is a kind of naive realism since it could not handle the problem of false appearances ie the thing that looks blue but is not the unbroken pencil in the water the gray sense data a color blind person gets when looking at red or green etc To handle false appearances one must introduce a distinction between sense data and physical objects Depending on the relationship viewed between sense data and physical objects Moore sees three main alternatives for fleshing out his view of sense data 1 An indirect realist position Sensedata are nonphysical but somehow produced by interactions between physical objects and our senses 2 The phenomenalist position Physical objects are the collection of sense experiences that we have For example in the perception of a coin we actually experience and anticipate experiencing a series of color patches and elliptical shapes to which for practical purposes it behooves us to assign a uniformity JO A direct realist position Sensedata are parts of physical objects so that for example visual sensedata are visible parts ofthe surfaces of physical objects
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